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General introduction
The work of the research group ‘Religious individualisation in historical perspec-
tive’, which began in 2008 at the Max Weber Centre for Advanced Cultural and 
Social Study at the University of Erfurt (Germany), has finally come to an end. The 
research group (or ‘Kollegforschergruppe’ in German) was generously funded by 
the German Science Foundation (‘Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft’, DFG) and 
was intellectually embedded in the vibrant and rigorous multi-disciplinary atmos-
phere and deliberative culture of the Max Weber Centre for Advanced Cultural and 
Social Studies at the University of Erfurt. The research group consisted of more than 
120 members, including the core team at Erfurt, the long-term fellows from all over 
the world who joined us for one or more years, the many short-term fellows who 
spent weeks or months with us in Erfurt, and the countless conference participants 
who were kind enough to loan us their expertise for a few days at a time. 
This publication draws together important lines of investigation pursued by 
the research group during the last ten years. Transcending selves, dividual self, 
conventions and contentions and, finally, authorities are the four perspectives 
that inform and explore processes of ‘religious individualisation’ in this publi-
cation and constitute its four Parts. Starting from the mechanisms of religious 
individualisation, we explore the agents, characteristics, patterns, and dynamics 
of such processes. We focus on human actors, both as they cast themselves and 
as they were constructed or conceived in different periods and across different 
regions, and examine how they were embedded in social webs and how agency 
was asserted, ascribed, or denied. We discuss how agency was appropriated and 
modified and, at the same time, shaped and produced by its various contexts. We 
look into economic, political, and legal conditions and constraints, but also into 
cultural practices and everyday discourses, as well as the expert discourses of 
philosophers and theologians, as well as locally embedded intellectuals and their 
trans-local counterparts. The 53 contributions to this publication address the 
spaces and patterns of individualisation and de-individualisation in each case, 
Note: The authors are grateful to those members of the research group, who have been  co- authors 
to texts on which we are drawing here, in particular Riccarda Suitner and Wolfgang Spickerman. 
William Sullivan translated a working text, of which passages are being used here.
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as well as the tensions produced in the course of these developments; power rela-
tionships as well as processes of protest and marginalisation; and, finally, the 
processes of de-, re-, and neo-traditionalisation.
Each Part of the publication is preceded by an introduction that situates the 
discussion and familiarises the reader with the concepts employed in all the Part’s 
subdivisions (‘Sections’). It is, however, the afterwords, reflections shared by the 
authors of each Section, that set the publication apart. All the authors of the 
publication met for nearly a week to discuss, criticise, strengthen, and reshape 
their contributions, as well as to identify common themes, threads, and missing 
 perspectives. Thus, we invite readers to start either from the beginning or from 
the many ends of this publication. As will become clear on reading them, many 
of the chapters contribute to several of the systematic aspects of the  publication 
and are also relevant to other Sections and Parts.
Accordingly, this general introduction does not offer summaries of the summa-
ries or meta-reflections on the meta-reflections. Rather, it introduces the work of 
the research group ‘Religious individualisation in historical perspective’ on a larger 
scale. The quantity of individual historical ‘outputs’ produced by the research group 
in the ongoing process of applying and reshaping the concept of ‘individualisation’ 
cannot be summarised even in a massive publication like this. If forced to sum up 
the findings of the group with regard to this concept, we might say that the gist of 
the many contributions is both critical and revisionist. It is ‘critical’ in that many 
contributions have been directed against the monopolisation of the term ‘indi-
vidualisation’ by advocates of the modernisation theory that dominates everyday 
discourses. It is ‘revisionist’ in that our group members have often argued against 
a historiographical perspective that assumes all ‘premodern’ cultures to be essen-
tially collective or collectivist (with the exception of a few ‘big individuals’). Thus, 
following the example of the first report of the research group, published in 2013 
(Joas and Rüpke 2013, now online and open access: https://www.db-thueringen.
de/receive/dbt_mods_00034459), we will briefly sketch our starting point and then 
introduce the wider field of research questions tackled, as well as significant results. 
1  Master narratives of individuality  
and individualisation in the history of religion
Contrary to received preconceptions and common assumptions, ‘individualisation’ 
offers a window not only into present societies but also into those of the past, as 
well as into the history of religions more generally (see Rüpke 2016a, used in the 
following). It might be helpful to once again look back at the origins of an estab-
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lished master narrative, the questioning of which was the analytical starting point 
of the research group. Examining empirical data back in the early 1960s, Thomas 
Luckmann pointed, in the context of his analysis of contemporary religion, to the 
growth of American churched religion and conceived of this as indicative of indi-
vidualisation (Luckmann 1967, an enlarged version in German: Luckmann 1991). 
However, ‘individualisation’ is generally regarded in sociological discourse as a dis-
tinguishing feature of the modern age far beyond the realm of religion and as one 
of the dominant characteristics of ‘modernity’. Such views usually – although not 
in Luckmann’s case – lose sight of the paradoxical rise of mass culture as a con-
comitant mode of integration. Even when one takes into account that sociological 
theories of modernity differ in the degree of importance they assign to individual-
isation, individualisation nevertheless has a firm place within all classical socio-
logical accounts of modernisation (as demonstrated by Flavia Kippele [1998], Kron 
and Horáček [2009], and others). Viewed from this perspective, religion appears as 
negatively related to the process of individualisation. With the exception of a few 
thinkers, such as Georg Simmel (1968) and later Luckmann himself, religion has 
been seen as having fallen prey to the processes characterised by individualisation.
From the perspective of ‘History of Religion’, it is worth taking a closer look 
at the narratives of historical processes that were thought to form the basis of the 
equation of individualisation with modernity. These narratives take quite differ-
ent forms. In his famous study of the Italian Renaissance, Jacob Burckhardt (1860, 
141) claimed that interest in subjectivity had risen considerably in the European 
context from the end of the thirteenth century. Later studies showed how in this 
period new and ground-breaking philosophical, aesthetic, philological, and reli-
gious alternatives, as well as new institutions, helped create spaces of critique 
and distance towards what became regarded as ‘traditional’ society and practices 
(e.g. Martin 2004). With the coming of the Renaissance, for instance, ‘paganism’ 
became not only an aesthetic form but also a religious alternative (see Hanegraaff 
2012; for another position see Stausberg 2009). 
The processes of religious individualisation that can be identified in these 
contexts drew inspiration from late medieval practices of religious piety. Later, in 
the early sixteenth century, the Reformation made religion the object of individ-
ual choice. While the dominant Aristotelian and Scholastic paradigms had come 
under scrutiny in the early years of the Renaissance, reformers now questioned 
again another dominant religious tradition, that is Catholicism. In this case, 
however, the orthodox interpretations were not only supplanted by intellectual 
and artistic enterprises but were, instead, openly fought against. Max Weber’s 
(1864–1920) thesis on the post-Reformation Protestant ethic is an especially 
trenchant example of this trend, with its emphasis on the turn to inner-worldly 
asceticism, the responsibility of each individual for his/her life, and the ‘rational-
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ization of the conduct of life [Lebensführung] – now in the world yet still oriented 
to the supernatural [Jenseits] –’ as the ‘effect of ascetic Protestantism’s concept of 
calling’ (Weber [1920] 2011, 157).
The first cracks in the Western self-image of a primarily, if not exclusively, 
modern Western origin of (religious) individualisation become visible in the context 
of Weber’s comparative analysis of Eurasian ‘world-religions’ and civilisations. With 
respect to India in particular, Weber made what he called its ‘intellectual’ religions, 
or soteriologies, a repository of the most pronounced and systematically developed 
attitudes of world-indifference and world- rejection available to the cultivated indi-
vidual. Weber denied that this individualising attitude impacted life in the world 
and that these modes of religiosity reached the majority of lay people or the lower 
sections of society (what he called the ‘masses’). Weber saw developments in India, 
and in all other non-Western civilisations, as dead-ends. For him, only Protestant 
individualisation allowed a breakthrough to the practical individualisation of life 
in the world, the ‘ability and disposition of men to adopt certain types of practical 
rational conduct  [praktisch-rationale Lebensführung]’ (Weber 2004a, 109; see also 
1996, 250, 359 / 1958, 3251; Fuchs 1988, 138ff., 277ff.; 2017, 227, 254). 
Louis Dumont (1911–1998) developed Weber’s agenda in another direction 
and proposed the figure of the Indian world-renouncer (saṃnyāsin, śramaṇa) 
as probably the earliest form of religious individualisation, albeit one that was 
already highly diversified. The ideal-typical renouncer, who broke loose from 
social bonds, became conceived of as the ‘individual-outside-the-world’ (Dumont 
1980, 185, 267–86; for this and the following see Fuchs 1988, 417ff., 453–525). 
Dumont argued that, in societies of the ‘traditional, holistic type’, individual-
ism could generally only occur in clear opposition to (and thus for him ‘outside’) 
society (Dumont 1986, 26); societies composed of self-oriented individualists 
are a modern phenomenon. However, Dumont also regarded the ‘otherworldly 
individual’ as the ‘motor’ and ‘main agent’ of historical developments in India, 
not only in the religious field but also in the political and even economic realms 
(Dumont 1965, 91; 1975a, 64; 1975b, 163). In addition, Dumont advanced a strong 
thesis that Indian brands of religious individualisation might have functioned as 
an important direct or indirect trigger of religious individualisation in the eastern 
 Mediterranean during antiquity. They would, thus, have influenced Greek philos-
ophers and early Christians, and through this the West more broadly (the refer-
ence here is to the gymnosophists or ‘naked sages’, as yogins were called in the 
Mediterranean). The category of the (otherworldly) individual, Dumont specu-
lates, ‘might have been invented only once’ in history, thus making India appear 
1 N.B: The English translation of Weber [1921] 1996 – Weber 1958 – is not reliable.
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as the world-historical origin of (religious) individualisation (Dumont 1975b, 168; 
1986, 29). In his view, it was only during the history of Western Christianity that the 
move from ‘otherworldly’ to ‘innerworldly’ individualism was made. The decisive 
steps in this direction were, he thought, taken first by Calvin and then, secondly, 
by Luther. In a first phase, the religious authorities of the church and the pope 
were made superior to the more worldly powers of the emperor and nobles; in a 
second phase, the will of the individual became identified with God’s will, allow-
ing the individual will to reign without restriction (1986, ch. 1). Dumont’s views 
remain partial and one-sided due to his strict separation between individualizing 
religion and ‘traditional’ society. The society conceived by him as strictly ‘holis-
tic’ denies especially the lower sections any agency or individual subjecthood. 
This is due to his depreciation of other sources of religious individualisation in 
India as well as elsewhere. Regarding the Indian case, Dumont, like Weber before 
him, especially downplayed the relevance of bhakti. Despite this, he acknowl-
edged that bhakti makes it possible, in the context of ‘traditional’ Indian society, 
that ‘one can leave the world from within’ and that all people ‘can become free 
individuals’ (Dumont 1980, 282f., emphasis added; cf. Fuchs 2018).
Even elaborate analyses such as these, which detected forms of individualis-
ation in the pre-modern and non-Christian world, were still imbued with strong 
traces of Orientalist stereotyping and of the Western tradition of ‘othering’ the 
non-Western world (Fuchs 1988). While they might have given an important 
historical role to the Asian ‘other’, they continued to consider both the modern 
religious and secular forms of individualisation to be more authentic and more 
historically advanced. While scholars such as Weber and Dumont reflect the 
beginnings of an awareness of the wide array of modes of religious individual-
isation, the understanding that individualisation is a distinguishing mark of the 
unique Western modernity nevertheless remained largely prevalent. This led 
other scholars to insinuate that individuals belonging to certain non-European 
or pre-modern cultures lack even the possibility of formulating any opposition 
of interests between ‘themselves’ and ‘society’. Such views have been strongly 
and successfully criticised by anthropologists (e.g. Spiro 1993; see also Part 2 
and the concept of dividuality). Recent work on the religion of pre-modern and 
 pre-Christian antiquity, usually characterised as ‘collective’, has produced similar 
results. The extensive ancient discussions about religious deviance and attempts 
to legally standardise religious behaviour attest to the perception and acceptance 
of an extensive religious individuality practiced in many different forms (Rüpke 
2011, 2016c). 
Meanwhile, the Western world’s exceptional self-description as ‘modern’ has 
been critically challenged in the global non-West. This critique takes either the 
form of pointing to the historical inappropriateness of such claims to singularity, 
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or the form of a counter-stereotype, elevating Eastern collectivity over supposed 
Western individuality (cf. Asad 1973, 1983). Conceptually linking the modern age 
and religious individuality has obstructed the study of comparable phenomena 
in earlier periods, so that individuality and individualisation have played only a 
limited role in the examination of the dynamics of religion in history. The case of 
bhakti in India has already been mentioned. Bhakti – a blanket term for a wide 
range of phenomena and strands – allows individual devotion; various forms of 
bhakti connect with a critique of both social and religious restrictions. For Mediter-
ranean antiquity, some conceptions of polis religion or civic religion have claimed 
that the religious practices of the political elite and their definitions of legitimate 
religious actions were the only significant sector of religion in their polities. The 
variety and changeability of individual religious actions and their profound influ-
ence on those rituals called ‘public’ by the elite, have been disregarded, leading 
to an emphasis on the collective and the fundamentally different character of 
pre-modern societies (see Rüpke 2007, 5–38; Kindt 2012, 12–35 for criticism). In a 
similar vein, the assumption of the religious unity of medieval Europe (see Bor-
golte 2001 for criticism) is just a counterpart of the assumptive  self-description 
of modern societies, implied in the secularisation thesis, as pluralistic. In con-
trast to such conventional wisdom, recent research focussing on the history of 
Western esotericism and learned magic has unveiled a variety of individualising 
impulses and strands that have informed Western cultural and religious history 
from late antiquity onwards (see von Stuckrad 2010; Otto 2011; Hanegraaff 2012; 
Otto 2016, 2017; Bellingradt and Otto 2017; Otto 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). The diag-
nosis of modern individualisation and the ascription of a public and collective 
character to pre-modern religion are mutually reinforcing  frameworks. 
However, such observations and criticisms cannot overlook the fact that reli-
gious individuality is distributed unevenly even in situations characterised by 
processes of individualisation which affect or transform religion. In identifying 
the Renaissance as a turning point, Burckhardt did not deny the existence of dis-
senters in the preceding centuries. What made a difference in the 14th century, 
and what constituted individualisation as a process, was not, as the traditional 
historical narrative has it, the presence of individual intellectuals such as Petrarch 
(1304–1374). Rather, the defining feature was the increasingly large number of 
people interested in technical and economic matters, as well as in the subjective 
dimension of human existence. Mere numbers cannot provide a metric for assess-
ing the scale of this phenomenon. One needs to identify, rather, the contexts, the 
intellectual, discursive, and practical (e.g. ritual) forms of manifestation, as well 
as the consequences within a given local society. Even in ‘modern’ and ‘Western’ 
societies, the acclaimed form of ‘individuality’ might turn out to be very partial, 
or even only illusionary (see Kron and Horáček 2009, 151f.). 
General introduction   7
Consideration of contemporary religion in the USA shows that ‘individual-
ity’ is not a straightforward characteristic of ‘modern’ religion, as is claimed by 
those who argue for the privatisation of religion. ‘Individuality’, as a framework 
of interpretation as well as a form of behaviour, is primarily found among mobile 
members of the white middle class. For them, ‘individuality’ as a concept is con-
firmed by their own commitment and its social consequences (Madsen 2009, 
1279–82). This emic concept of ‘individuality’ is not an arbitrary option within a 
range of possible privatised sacred cosmoi. On the contrary, it is a concept devel-
oped by a specific group, albeit one that carries a hegemonic character. It is a way 
of life that is dominant in the eyes of the entire society, even if the whole society 
does not participate (ibid.). There is an important consequence to this, histori-
cally as well as sociologically: certain religious traditions might have or develop 
practices of self-reflection that are able to foster individuality. The institutionali-
sation of such tendencies, however, and its conceptualisation as ‘individuality’ is 
a matter of historical contexts and social location.
2  Looking into religious individualisation –  
in a nutshell
Before going into further detail, a brief overview is necessary. As indicated above, 
the ‘Kollegforschergruppe’ – or in short KFG, as we used to call it – began by 
formulating a critique of modernisation theory. The intention was to then bolster 
this by demonstrating that phenomena that might well be called ‘individual-
isation’ were existent and important in pre-modern and non-Western cultures. 
However, in the years since we have pushed forward and beyond this analytical 
starting point in at least three directions. 
a) With regard to modernisation theory, the independence of ‘individualisation’ 
from other crucial factors all too easily bundled together as ‘modernisation’ has 
been sufficiently demonstrated (e.g. Bellah and Joas 2012; Deuser and Wendel 
2012; Joas 2012, 2013a, 2013b). ‘Individualisation’ has, thus, been set free as 
an analytical term that is useful beyond Western ‘modernity’, or even multiple 
‘modernities’ (Fuchs, Linkenbach and Reinhard 2015; Fuchs and Rüpke 2015a; 
Mieth and Müller-Schauenburg 2012; Mieth 2014; Mieth 2016; Mulder-Bakker 
et al. 2017; Otto 2016, 2017, 2018a; Reinhardt 2014a, 2014b, 2016; Rosenberger 
2013; Rüpke 2011, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016c; Rüpke 
and Spickermann 2012; Suitner 2016; Vinzent 2011; Vinzent 2014).
b) With regard to the history of religion, many phenomena and processes came 
to the fore when we set aside the lenses of collectivism and looked instead 
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for anything comparable to ‘individualisation’ (see Otto 2017 and further 
below). In particular, narratives of ancient and post-ancient (‘medieval’ or 
‘early modern’, in terms of West-European epochs) circum-Mediterranean, 
European, and West and South Asian religions have changed and gained 
new facets far beyond the work of the group itself. Concepts such as ‘self’ 
and ‘agency’, ‘subject’ and ‘personhood’, ‘individuation’ and ‘personal iden-
tity’ have been taken on board, and at the same time critically examined, in 
our attempt to develop more fine-grained concepts and descriptions (Fuchs 
2015; Fuchs and Rüpke 2015b; Hartung and Schlette 2012; Hollstein, Jung and 
Knöbl 2011; Lichterman 2013; Messlin 2012; Ram 2013; Rebillard and Rüpke 
2015b; Rüpke 2012a, 2015c, 2016b; Rüpke and Woolf 2013; Schlette 2013; see 
also Parson in this publication). 
c) Finally, reflection has turned towards the very concepts with which we 
started. How are concepts of ‘religion’ shaped by the aforementioned master 
narrative of ‘modern Western individualisation’ (Otto, Rau and Rüpke 2015; 
Rüpke 2018b)? How is the normative character of the concept of the ‘indi-
vidual’, whenever it is implied that one should be an individual, informed 
by such a narrative? How has the master narrative affected concepts of 
‘history’ and ‘change’? The paradoxical consequences of securing individ-
uality by processes of institutionalisation (e.g., through ritualisation, group 
formation, the establishment of textual canons and traditions, etc.) as well 
as backlashes into de- or non-individualisation have come into view. Looking 
more closely at the individual has also brought to light features of person-
hood that do not easily comply with linear and uni-directional individual-
isation narratives. Even in (early) modernity, individualisation processes do 
not lead to a fully ‘bounded’ self-contained individual. The individual person 
always exhibits permeability, vulnerability, and openness towards the outer 
and the social world in various degrees, as s/he is also capable of parting and 
pluralising him/herself in order to navigate multiple belongings, personali-
ties, and allegiances (see Taylor 2007 and Part 2 of this publication). Unrav-
elling relational and partible aspects of the self has forced us to postulate 
a  co-constitutive relation between what we call ‘dividuality’ and individual-
ity. All this has affected our view onto historical and contemporary societies 
and schools of thought, from a sociological and anthropological perspective 
(Fuchs 2015; Rüpke 2015c) as well as in terms of intellectual and ritual history 
(e.g. Mulsow 2012, 2015; Ben-Tov, Deutsch and Herzig 2013; Otto 2016; Bell-
ingradt and Otto 2017; Otto 2018a, 2018b).
Regarding the very concept of ‘religious individualisation’, and in stark con-
trast to the master narrative referred to above – which usually conceives religious 
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 individualisation as a more or less unambiguous or self-explanatory social process –, 
we arrived at the conclusion that religious individualisation should rather be under-
stood as a polythetic umbrella term, i.e. as a heuristic tool rather than a clear-cut 
semantic signifier of specific social dynamics (Fuchs 2015; Fuchs and Rüpke 2015a; 
Otto 2017). Our work revealed that religious individualisation, similar to other poly-
thetic categories, entails a large number of semantic notions, which are evoked by dif-
ferent scholars on different occasions and with regard to different obser vations, 
thus hampering interdisciplinary or even basic inter-subjective understand-
ings of the matter. Inspired but also frustrated by such misunderstandings, and 
through comparing a large number of case studies and sub-projects, a semantic 
matrix emerged that maps different notions of religious individualisation, grouped 
in four basic domains. This matrix is provided here in an abbreviated version (based 
on the original version published in Otto 2017, 33–6). This narrative rendering of the 
matrix also includes more recent contributions. 
Religious individualisation is said to encompass (or to underlie):
(A) Notions focusing on an enhanced range of individual options or choices: de- 
traditionalisation; de-institutionalisation; pluralisation (see also Section 4.2 in 
this publication); privatisation (see Rüpke 2016a); individuality may become 
a normative ideal, a ‘cult’ (Kron and Horáček 2009, 120–4), it may become 
mainstream and compulsory; striving for authenticity or alleged uniqueness; 
enhanced religious self-determination (Mieth 2017); ongoing recalibrations 
and reinterpretations of tradition (leading to manifold variations and thus 
pluralisation: Parson in this publication; Renzi forthcoming); novel religious 
syncretisms and eclecticisms initiated through cultural contacts and exchange 
(see Fuchs, Linkenbach, and Reinhard 2015, and below on ‘interconnections’); 
conventionalisations (in the sense of stable, formalised and  recognised con-
ventions and practices, which regulate and stabilise individual initiatives in 
societal forms: see Mulder-Bakker in this publication); the religious market 
model (thus granting religious tolerance and competition: see Hermann- 
Pillath in this publication); strategic use of dividuality or of multiple personae 
to enhance one’s options (see articles in Section 2.2 in this volume). 
(B) Notions focusing on self and creativity: creative, independent, original think-
ing on religion; developing or creating religious ideas, concepts, choices, 
norms, practices; reforming or inventing religions; enhanced focus on the 
‘self’ or individual salvation; development of religious self-reflection, and of 
the idea of an individual religious identity or ‘selfhood’, eventually accom-
panied by moments of liberation; struggle for distinctiveness from the reli-
gious ‘other’ (see also Murphy in this publication); awareness of individual 
responsibility for one’s actions, of moral responsibility, or the formation of 
a  sophisticated concept of conscience; development of the notion of human 
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dignity and/or individual human rights, or of the ‘conception of the unique 
value of one’s own personhood’ (Gordon 2015, 368); creative  re-interpretations 
of religious self-concepts in the light of crisis, such as repressions, diaspora, 
or war (see Michael Nijhawan’s piece on ‘precarious diasporas’ in this publi-
cation); development of the notion of a permeable or  multi-dimensional self 
(see Part 2 in this publication); narratives of extraordinary, charismatic, or 
outstanding religious figures or ‘authors’ (see Section 3.2 in this publication); 
biographic transformations with regard to religious selves and identities, e.g. 
through conversion (see Suitner in this publication). 
(C) Notions focusing on deviance and critique (see also Part 4 in this publica-
tion): individual appropriations that lead to deviations from established 
religious or ritual norms (consider material often subsumed under the 
heading of so-called ‘folk’ or ‘popular’ religion; see also Raja and Rüpke in 
this publication); social, cultural, and/or religious ‘dis-embeddedness, tem-
porary rupture of social bonds’ (Rüpke 2013, 13); intellectual ‘autonomy’ (as 
opposed to ‘heteronomy’) while thinking about religious matters (see, for 
example, Malinar or Müller-Schauenburg in this publication); questioning 
established religious norms, concepts, persons, and/or institutions; openly 
criticising established religious norms, concepts, persons, and/or institu-
tions (this notion is stronger than the former, which may be private; see 
also Fuchs in this publication); consciously choosing to engage in religious 
heterodoxy or heteropraxy; consciously writing or practicing the forbidden 
while risking persecution or even death; open rebellion or revolt against 
established religious norms or institutions.
(D) Notions focusing on experience: forms of inwardness (‘Innerlichkeit’: Fuchs 
2015, 335); focus on individual, experience-based ‘spirituality’; special atten-
tion given to ‘intuition’ and other forms of inspired knowledge; intense reli-
gious experiences, e.g. direct encounters with the divine (also through posses-
sions: see Malik in this publication), or in the form of individually determined 
exploration of the inner self (see Parson in this publication), which may lead 
to individualised off-book perspectives on religious matters (partly inspired 
by prophecy or divination: see also Eidinow and Facchini in this publication); 
traditional experience-based religious paths towards individual liberation, 
enlightenment, or divine union (for example, in Christian mysticism, monas-
tic Buddhism, or Indian bhakti traditions); ideas and practices that foster 
self-transcendence (see Part 1, particularly Mieth in this publication). 
It is crucial to understand that this matrix does not represent a ‘typology’ or even 
a full-fledged theory of religious individualisation. We see it, rather, as a discur-
sive collage of meanings that have been ascribed to religious individualisation 
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within and beyond our research group. Heterogenous as this matrix may appear 
at first sight, it has proven to be a useful tool in scanning for indications of indi-
vidualisation, as well as in comparing different cases and individuals. If one 
interprets the matrix as a heuristic ‘net of notions’, it may be applied to religious 
data – either partially or in its entirety – in order to elucidate whether a certain 
case is relevant for the study of religious individualisation, which domains and/
or notions are triggered by the material, and which are dominant or marginal. 
This procedure, which has also been called ‘polysemantic analysis’ (Otto 2017, 
51), may be carried out either individually or as a collaborative endeavour, with 
the latter approach allowing for a more fine-grained intercultural comparison – 
for instance, by comparing specific notions across case studies from different reli-
gious, geographical, or historical contexts. 
Whether these different notions and domains actually refer to a coherent 
field (ultimately in the sense of a ‘homeostatic property cluster’: see Otto 2017, 
39f., and further Stausberg and Gardiner 2016) or, rather, to various types of phe-
nomena subsumed under the same umbrella for pragmatic or other reasons, is 
open to debate. In a way, the matrix reflects a new attempt to deal with the per-
sistent problem of so-called ‘critical categories’ in the Study of Religion, i.e., with 
the problem of defining an analytical category in the (post-)modern humanities 
without falling into the traps of either deconstructionism or conceptual vague-
ness and arbitrariness. The advantage of our polysemantic approach is (1) that all 
semantic facets of the category are preserved and thus enter the analysis (in con-
trast to monothetic working definitions which usually suppress undesired seman-
tic notions), and (2) that the concept under scrutiny is never fixed nor stable, but 
remains flexible and open to revisions, recalibrations, and extensions in the light 
of new findings. Despite its ambiguities and fluidities, the matrix has turned out 
to be a useful heuristic tool for identifying and comparing different patterns and 
facets of religious individualisation both diachronically and cross-culturally. 
We differentiate the concept of religion in a similar fashion for heuristic pur-
poses. In order to obtain a grasp of the subject that can comprehend and compare 
religious individualisations from antiquity to the present, from Western Europe 
to the west Asian and Indian regions (with brief forays into East Asian contexts), 
from large-scale Christian organisations to contexts of religious pluralism and 
diffuse religiosity, from individual practices to temple ritual to academic theol-
ogy, it is necessary to have a sufficiently broad concept of religion available as 
a working tool. ‘Sufficiently broad’ does not, however, mean gathering together 
as many or as few as possible of the conventional topoi provided by definitions 
of religion. For the purposes of this project, the object ‘religion’, with its ongoing 
processes of individual appropriation on the local and trans-local levels, is under-
stood as a permanently changing system of orientation (‘religion in the making’) 
12   Martin Fuchs et al.
that has a peculiar but always precarious status within the cultural context to 
which it relates. It is also understood that ‘religion’:
–  in its content refers to some principle transcending the everyday that 
often appears in the form of personal gods but can also appear in different 
grades of the ‘supernatural’;
–  communicates this orientation through a wide spectrum of media, in which 
rituals and specific (‘holy’) objects and stories play a prominent role and in 
which various forms of systematisation (‘doctrine’) can appear;
–  provides directions for action in the form of both worldviews and 
norms about how to conduct one’s life; nevertheless, the impact and 
consequences of these norms and worldviews always depends on their 
appropriation (and hence also modification) by individuals; 
–  can assume a solidified institutional character in a variety of forms, which 
may range from individual charismatic ‘providers’ and their ‘clients’ or 
‘students’ to ‘lay associations’ and other membership concepts as well 
as religious elites who can set limits or open up manoeuvring room for 
individual appropriations; and finally,
–  in its concrete implementation constitutes a place of intensive 
interconnection across cultural, spatial, and temporal boundaries. 
The term ‘system of orientation’ brings together under one heading 
attempts to answer the problem of defining the relationship between 
individual action and social groupings (for the above cf. Fuchs and 
Rüpke 2015b).
3  Looking into religious individualisation – 
widening the perspective 
Discovering and documenting these different facets and processes of religious 
individualisation from other times and places opens up a broad but neglected 
field for empirical research in which special weight is placed on comparing and 
tracing the interactions between different religious and cultural traditions. Yet 
this approach also requires that we consider the implications this research has 
for social theory and the history of religion. Our central focus has been defined 
by the following five hypotheses:
1) Religious individualisation is not just a phenomenon specific to modern 
Europe but also a useful heuristic category for the study of historical processes 
across very different religious and cultural contexts, whether approached as 
religions (Islam, Buddhism), regions (Western, Southern and Eastern Asia, 
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also areas in Europe such as the Iberian Peninsula), and time periods. This 
requires a critical approach to translation and terminology, a broadening and 
rethinking of concepts by including other experiences and narratives and 
other forms and trajectories of individualisation (Fuchs 2015). The applica-
tion of religious individualisation as a heuristic to interpret diverse cultural 
and historical contexts (whether inspired by the above matrix or not) starts 
from a polemical intention to search in a way that goes against the grain. As 
we uncovered other types or facets of religious individualisation originating 
in other places, we were increasingly able to contextualise the kinds of indi-
vidualising processes that are more or less familiar to us and establish rela-
tionships among them with greater sensitivity.
2) These processes of religious individualisation should be understood less as 
isolated phenomena and more as reworkings of, or reactions to, religious 
experiences, traditions, and discourses. Thus, the contexts in which processes 
of individualisation take shape remain highly significant, as do the practices 
and ideas from which specific actors distance themselves or which they try 
to revise. At the same time, looking for the contexts of processes of religious 
individualisation opens the way for additional (religious) options and tradi-
tions to become visible. Meanwhile, constellations of cultural entanglements 
can also come to the fore as important triggers of individualising strands. The 
chapters in this publication demonstrate that the investigation of the history 
of individualisation is, in many cases, an investigation of the history of inter-
connections which examines the different ways in which cultural boundaries 
have been crossed. By ‘history of interconnections’ we mean an inquiry in the 
sense of ‘entangled history’ or ‘histoire croisée’, which analyses the recipro-
cal interactions and transfers between different cultural contexts, regions, 
religions, and reference systems. Such an inquiry involves an increased focus 
on ‘boundary-crossing’ interactions and exchanges, in which diverse cul-
tural and religious traditions encounter one another and ideas and practices 
that strengthen or trigger individualisation processes are transferred. In addi-
tion to the question of how particular institutions (such as rights of religious 
groups) are implemented and how forgotten practices (individual confes-
sion) and discourses (‘prophecy’) are rediscovered, the question of possible 
interactions is particularly exciting. Migrations of ideas as well as practices 
and their effects created complex interactions with consequences for religion 
long before the great breakdowns of tradition within and outside Europe in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Seen from this angle, the insights 
gathered by our research group can be used to trace the vertical, or ‘deep 
time’, dimension of these processes of transformation. In the present and 
for the future, the ever-increasing interaction and  interconnection among 
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 cultural strands and trends of diverse origin taking place amid intensified 
and divergent processes of globalisation is striking.
3) Given that many processes of religious individualisation are closely con-
nected to the formation of institutions, traditionalisation, and convention-
alisation, the interactions among these processes must be systematically 
examined (see foremost Part 3 in this publication). Such kinds of institu-
tionalisation processes can (but need not necessarily) have the paradoxical 
effect of again limiting the scope of individualisation. Individualisation and 
 de-individualisation are in many cases intertwined. Institutional protection 
of individual practices creates at one and the same time an awareness of the 
possibilities for heteropraxy or heterodoxy and the tools to counteract these 
through standardisation. Such mutual reactions may then again increase the 
power of dissent, but also the emphatic rejection of alternatives. Hence, even 
processes such as the creation of canons, traditions, or forms of fundamen-
talism can be revisited rewardingly in the light and in the context of indi-
vidualisation processes, if one keeps an eye on the ambiguities involved in 
such processes. Religious individualisation – provided it is not taken to mean 
a one-way path to modernisation – thus designates contingent processes of 
personal religious exploration and of the cultural or social groundings of 
such explorations and their respective articulations. The boundary crossings 
and feedback loops are processes inherent to individual actions as well as to 
the creation of communities or standardisation at an institutional level. Fur-
thermore, relapses into de-individualisation not only constrain individuals 
but may also create free spaces for new forms of individualisation. This is 
precisely the reason why concepts such as ‘self’, ‘individualism’, or ‘religious 
geniuses’ do not structure our publication. Formulations like ‘Transcending 
Selves’, ‘The Dividual Self’, ‘Conventions and Contentions’, and ‘Authorities’ 
have, instead, been chosen as the organising principles of the four Parts.
4) The perspectives just outlined allow for the development of an alternative 
or even complementary narrative to the aforementioned master narrative of 
‘modern Western individualisation’. Here, the concept of ‘dividuality’ comes 
into play, not only with regard to ‘non-Western’ perspectives but also by com-
paring the multiple Western and non-Western modernities. Various authors 
with an anthropological background, such as Edward LiPuma (1998; 2001) 
and Alfred Gell (1999; 2013), but also Charles Taylor, the philosopher of the 
modern self (Taylor 1989, 2007), have started to point out (two) different co- 
existing dimensions of personhood found across time and space, including in 
the modern West. Of these, one is more individual and the other more divid-
ual. The altered awareness offered by the concept of dividuality is reflected 
in the contributions contained in Part 2 of this publication.  Dividuality is, 
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on the one hand, traced as the dynamic foundation of human sociality and 
individuality (see the articles in Section 2.1) and, on the other hand, as a lived 
social reality and concrete social praxis in particular societies and social con-
texts (see the articles in Section 2.2 and 2.3). The socio- historical perspective 
in particular helps to reveal concealed histories of dividualisation that run 
alongside individualisation as its complement, and which have, paradoxi-
cally, often facilitated individual and distinct standpoints by means of divid-
ualising strategies (for example, in the form of literary practices, such as the 
play with different pseudonyms sed by a single author, or the opposition 
between author and private individual; see Section 2.2).
5) In the history of theory, the concept of individualisation has mostly served 
as a Eurocentric strategy of exclusion. Likewise, the concept of religion has 
often turned the collective into an absolute value that has been attributed 
especially to pre-modern or non-Western areas. Based on the KFG’s results, 
and through confrontation with the history of scholarly research in this area, 
a concept of religion has been developed that makes it possible to reconstruct 
the study of religion in the context of historical processes of individualis-
ation and interconnectedness while avoiding the pitfalls of Eurocentrism. 
With these theoretical reflections (Fuchs 2015; Rüpke 2015c; Otto 2017; Albre-
cht et al. 2018), new large-scale narratives (such as Joas 2012; Rüpke 2018a), 
and the work collected in the present publication, we are aiming at nothing 
less than a redefinition of the concept of religion by challenging the prevail-
ing view, which locates religion in the collective, the institutional, and the 
standardised.
This prevailing supposition about religion has informed scholarly choices, deter-
mining what issues receive analytical attention and what groupings, behaviours, 
or beliefs merit being described as ‘religion’. It has also had a decided influence 
on the portrayal of religion in other disciplines. Our hypothesis, based on our 
previous findings and those provided set out in this publication, is that a new 
conception of religion is needed, a conception that envisages an intrinsic and 
reciprocal relationship between the individual and the social (brokered by inter-
connections and processes of individualisation and de-individualisation). Taking 
the concept of religious individualisation as an analytical starting point of an 
inquiry that is sensitive to both contingency and context, it is possible to reorient 
the study of religion towards a perspective that systematically acknowledges pro-
cesses of individualisation and entanglement. Individuals act religiously when-
ever they communicate with at least situationally available non-human address-
ees (whether those are situated within or beyond that context) to whom they 
ascribe agency and render such action plausible by routinely and strategically 
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 appropriating traditional semantics. As a consequence, religious action entails 
 adscription of agency to patrons and/or audiences, processes of groupings, as 
well as competition and distinction. Religion, hence, should be analysed and 
described as lived religion and religion in the making.
4 Implications and perspectives
The present publication, despite its size, does not intend to offer the final word 
for research on processes of religious individualisation and their manifold his-
tories. Rather, by consolidating our present knowledge, it offers a starting point 
for further research. Within this larger horizon, we propose the continuation and 
expansion of research in five particular fields:
4.1  Individualisation and religious (and cultural) 
entanglements
While starting from local contexts and specific forms of religious individualis-
ation, further attention must be given to interactions and interconnecting pro-
cesses among concurrent religious strands, as well as to the transmission of 
practices and beliefs across the boundaries of different social groups and ways 
of life. Whether within or across continental or subcontinental spaces, detailed 
historical and ethnographical studies must be combined with the investigation of 
geographically wide-ranging and longue-durée processes of transferral (Mulsow 
2018). What we can expect to emerge from this field of research is a deeper under-
standing of the reciprocal effects between micro- and macro-phenomena, ranging 
from religious idiosyncrasies of intellectual intermediaries, nonconformists, and 
long-distance travellers to processes of group formation that make use of new 
conceptualisations and forms of individualised practices. Two aspects deserve 
particular attention here:
a) Cultural brokers: For Norbert Elias, it was migrating scholars of the Renais-
sance period who were the first people to whom processes of individualis-
ation can be ascribed (Elias 2001). By contrast, our combined work has 
shown that such impulses are by no means to be found only in Europe or 
from the early modern period onwards, but also in ancient and medieval as 
well as non-European societies, not least in South Asia. In the context of reli-
gion, such processes emerge above all when they coincide with phases of 
‘religionification’ (thus Rüpke 2010) or religious pluralisation, as for example 
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in the Roman imperial period and over broad stretches of the religious history 
of India. India was, for most of its history, characterised by a high degree of 
religious diversity. Religious ideas and religious groups could not but have 
other religious modes and concepts in view when elaborating their own prac-
tices and perspectives. This has led to lively exchanges, to demarcations, to 
all kinds of combinations, as well as to disputations and struggles, and there 
were many constellations in which social actors did not make any particular 
distinction between the various religious strands or pedigrees (Fuchs 2018, 
141–3; Linkenbach 2016; Parson in this publication and forthcoming). Such 
constellations allowed an unending stream of new individualising forms and 
stances that have not, so far, been exhaustively explored. In the European 
context, demands for religious individualisation have always been present 
in deviant intellectual or ritual (and partly underground) traditions, such as 
certain strands of Western esotericism or learned magic (see on the latter Otto 
2016); yet, at certain moments and in particular places, they also increased on 
a broader societal scale, as, for instance, during certain phases of the Middle 
Ages or during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Central Europe. In 
such phases one can investigate such things as, taking pre-modern Europe 
as an example, ‘pluralised exiles’ (thus Mulsow 2010) and correspondingly 
pluralised migrants, who could use their plural identities to increase their 
own options for religious action. These learned migrants were both products 
of interconnections and entanglements and actors who pushed such inter-
connections further by developing religious ‘syncretisms’ and even by means 
of cultural ‘misunderstandings’, bringing together currents from different 
cultural backgrounds (App 2014, 11–23; Mulsow 2018, 22–6). The encounter 
between the Portuguese Jesuit Monserrate and the Mughal ruler Akbar pro-
vides an example of this multi-faceted plurality in the context of the cross- 
civilisational circulation of millenarian ideas in the sixteenth century (Sub-
rahmanyam 2005; see also Kouroshi 2015; Fuchs, Linkenbach and Reinhard 
2015). Like other ‘marginal men’, they carried knowledge of their cultures of 
origin into other regions and manifest simultaneously a special receptivity to 
foreign ideas.
The investigation of these special groups of ‘cultural brokers’, often members 
of elite but sometimes also of subaltern classes (Nath Yogis, Sufis, Roman mili-
tary personnel), permits – where the sources are available – the examination of 
questions that can otherwise scarcely be answered. One starting point here is the 
question of how experiences of religious contacts or entanglements translate into 
individual activity, since subjective awareness of large-scale structures can take 
very diverse forms. 
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By differentiating the various facets and phenomena of religious individual-
isation, and by accepting that de- or non-traditionalised behaviour can oscillate 
between perfection and deviance, it is possible to widen the range of descrip-
tive terms available to us. Taking such an approach allows us to more reliably 
ascertain the nature and degree to which concepts and ideas (Mulsow 2017) that 
originated outside a particular group or cultural context had an impact on indi-
viduality in that context and on the specific manifestation of that individuality. 
We see this clearly in several of the chapters dealing with South Asian figures 
such as Kabir, Akbar, Dara Shikoh, Banarsidas, Ramakrishna, Keshab Sen, and 
Gandhi (Dey, Fuchs, Höke, Murphy, Parson, Sangari), and also in chapters on 
European Judaism (Facchini) and Pope Benedict XIII resp. Pedro Martinez de 
Luna (Müller-Schauenburg), or on Albert the Great (Casteigt’s first contribution) 
and the Chinese Buddhist Monk Xuanzang (Deeg). Other issues that may also 
come to the fore consider cases of factual interconnections (‘hybridity’) that are, 
however, no longer perceived as phenomena of difference (for example, radical 
pietism that runs across religious confessions, or the fusions between Sufi, Nath 
Yogi, and bhakti ideas and practices in early modern Punjab; Murphy in this 
publication); finally, stereotypical defensive behaviour, such as that of religious 
apologetics, could actually reinforce religious interconnectedness and hybridi-
ties despite intending to prevent precisely this. Methodologically, such research 
should start from well-documented cases of individuals and their special forms 
of individualised religious practices and then move on to consider consequences, 
social diffusion, and the discursive evaluation of ‘precarious’ (Mulsow 2012) 
forms of religious practice and knowledge.
The sources thus reveal a broad spectrum of agents, from religiously deviant 
individuals in central Europe (‘Beguines’, ‘visionaries’, ‘hermeticists’, ‘spirit-
ualists’, practitioners of ‘learned magic’, etc.) who were not always aware of the 
diverse transnational paths that their sources had taken, all the way through 
to religious entrepreneurs, including missionaries (such as the Jesuit missions 
in China, Japan, and India; since the nineteenth century also female mission-
aries), merchants, military personnel, and researchers across highly variegated 
cultures. Such people are found across periods and continents, beginning with 
‘Chaldeans’, ‘sorceresses’, ‘magi’, ancient astrologers, entrepreneurial ascetics 
in India and elsewhere, prominent bhaktas, gurus, or ācāryas, and saint-poets, 
including some from disrespected groups and women but in the Indian case also 
many ordinary people, all the way up to Zen specialists such as E. Herrigel and 
D. T. Suzuki. 
b) Structural relationships of exchange and interconnection across cultural and 
religious boundaries: The very term ‘Jesuits’ points to the necessity of con-
sidering not only contacts through individual actors but also networks and 
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interconnectional regimes, as well as their evolutions. By ‘interconnectional 
regimes’, we understand network structures in which particular structural 
and habitual conditions – principles, rules, norms, and expectations on both 
sides – make long-term interconnections possible. Examples of intercon-
nectional regimes include orders, missionary societies, and imperial forma-
tions (the Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Mughal Empire) in which 
various religious strands, ethnic groups, and also particular officeholders 
interact. Local and cross-regional networks are linked together and solidi-
fied by such regimes; the classification of groups in legal terms provides both 
limits and a free space for their particular activities. Outsiders’ stereotypes of 
groups can be polemically rejected or, on the contrary, adopted and canon-
ised as the groups’ own self-descriptions.
Attention should also be given to the types of interaction and their individualising 
effects. Processes of interconnection as well, as isolated developments, should 
be investigated across a geographical area ranging from Europe to South Asia, 
with western Asia and Islamic empires serving as a bridge in both directions. In 
addition to strategies of group and network formation and reciprocal differentia-
tion, individual encounters also matter. For instance, the reactions of contempo-
rary ‘observers’ who conceptualise these facts in their respective textual genres 
in their capacities as philosophers, theologians, jurists, ethnographers, hagiog-
raphers, and historians. Such processes are of particular interest for the history 
of individualisation, on the one hand, through their relation to traditions of 
 self-reflection that have been present in philosophy and ethnography ever since 
antiquity – European as well as West, South, Southeast, and East Asian – and, 
on the other hand, through the individualisation, shaped by mobility, of religious 
experience and through the adoption of foreign traditions by individuals. 
4.2  The long-term effects of processes of religious 
individualisation and ‘de-individualisation’: 
opposing forces and countertrends
As Georg Simmel emphasised many years ago, individualisation is always accom-
panied by processes of institutionalisation and standardisation. Individualis-
ation was thus always complemented by the potential for de-individualisation. 
The most important types of ‘de-individualising’ counterforces might be said to 
be standardisation, normalisation, canonisation, ritualisation, the development 
of dogmas, and the disciplining of deviants – processes that we address as ‘con-
ventions’, in the third Part of the publication, and ‘authorities’, in the fourth Part. 
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Complementary dynamics of individualisation and de-individualisation need to 
be further explored in order to bring to light forms and configurations of stabilis-
ing mechanisms:
a) The role of law: In the late-antique Mediterranean, for example, the develop-
ment of diverse forms of religious individualism (from  elective-membership 
groups to hermits) is associated in a reciprocal process with  self-reinforcing 
tendencies towards normalisation, whether in the criminal law of the Codex 
Theodosianus or in Talmudic texts. In more recent times such tendencies 
translate, for example, into regulations on individual or corporate reli-
gious freedom in constitutional law. In many cases, religious communities 
demanded, through their conduct and their stated commitments, appropri-
ate behaviour from group members. In light of the significance that has been 
attributed, especially since the European Enlightenment, to the universal-
ity of legal rules and equality before the law as a means of individualisation 
(instead of de-individualising standardisation), law, and religious law in par-
ticular, as well as their corresponding law-forming institutions, appear to be 
particularly interesting objects of research.
b) Confessionalisation: Paradoxically, the increase in the number of religious 
options and in the institutional protection of plural models leads both to the 
availability of alternatives and choices and to uniformity-imposing processes 
of ‘confessionalisation’. In the wake of such processes, religions may enhance 
the criticism of individualisation to the point of fundamentalism. In addition, 
it must be kept in mind that an individual’s decision not to exercise certain 
options, or an individual’s making of decisions that have the effect of reduc-
ing further options, constitutes a necessary part of one’s lifestyle and hence – 
paradoxically – also of individualisation. This form of  de-individualisation is 
closely related to processes of religious individualisation.
c) Interconnections between spatially distant regions: Here, too, the intercon-
nectional approach broadens the spectrum of questions we can ask. Due to 
a strong tendency to legitimise and standardise ideas and institutions, the 
product of interconnections may in certain cases turn into an institutional 
homogeneity that intentionally conceals the underlying interconnectedness. 
This form of transmission of religious currents and ideas involves longue 
durée processes to such an extent that they include transcending the limits 
of a local community or even becoming transcultural. Given that many reli-
gious actors take care to corroborate that their actions accord with tradi-
tion, one must look into the significance of interconnection or disconnec-
tion, or, as the case may be, the significance of the supposed refusal. Such 
processes may be causal for the transmission of specific kinds of content, 
as, for example, certain Jewish elements in ‘Christian’ traditional concepts 
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(the Sabbath, ‘Israel’) or ‘Western’ elements in Orthodox churches. These 
 macro-sociological questions seek to explore the extent to which ‘noncon-
formity’ is possible in a particular setting (including the settings of social 
classes) and to understand the circumstances in which religious individual-
isation turns into a kind of standardisation.
d) Religious pluralism and the rise of ‘religions’: As many of the chapters stress, 
individualisation always raises the question of how boundaries are demar-
cated. ‘Religions’ themselves are a central ingredient in these developments. 
Religions appear in this context as solidifying nexuses of religious practices 
and convictions – ‘syncretisms’ in the original sense of the term – that create 
community and draw outward boundaries. Religious pluralism in societies 
can also safeguard religious practices and convictions of minorities as stable 
religious options.
4.3  Conceptual development and conceptual  
comparisons – questioning the self 
As some of the chapters in this publication demonstrate, ideas about personhood 
and self – explicit as well as implicit – that were developed in religious con-
texts are an important field of investigation and need to be more systematically 
explored (consider for instance Jain, Buddhist, and Hindu conceptions of ‘moral’ 
action, including karma theories). Non-Western ideas of self or selfhood should 
be subjected to a more elaborate comparison with the modern Western concepts 
that underlie most of our theories. What is required is a sense for the processual-
ity and mutability of ‘self’-constitution.
Efforts to bring different philosophical conceptualisations into dialogue with 
one another have recently been pursued with new vigour (cf. Fuchs 2015). Bud-
dhist, Jain, Vedantist, and Western phenomenological and analytical traditions 
have so far been profitably brought together (see among others e.g. Siderits et al. 
2011; Ganeri 2012; earlier already Hacker 1978 a and b). The primary current dis-
tinction is between positions that defend notions of a minimal self and those that 
plead for a narrative notion of self. In connection with the first group of positions, 
ongoing debates are interested in the question of whether the self is to be under-
stood as a stream or as a structure. Among those who support narrative notions 
of self, a major dispute is between those who claim that the self is narratively 
enhanced and those who argue that the self is narratively constituted (Krueger 
2011). So far, however, comparative discussions of different strands of philo-
sophical thought have left untouched an important question: to what extent do 
the conceptualisations of self that emerge in a particular cultural and  historical 
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context reflect and/or inform social ideas of the times in which they are devel-
oped and stand for societal processes of individualisation. In line with Charles 
Taylor’s authoritative reconstruction of paths towards the modern notion(s) of 
self in ‘the West’ (Taylor 1989), we suggest further studies in order to reconstruct 
other histories of ‘self’. 
4.4 The concealed histories of dividuality
Anthropological debates about the global variability of notions of the self, the 
person, individual identity, and agency have inspired Part 2 of our publication, 
in which we focus on the debate concerning ‘dividualist’ modes of personhood. 
The inquiries in this Part into the multiple articulations of the self or the 
person clearly show that an understanding of self and personhood in pre-modern 
as well as in modern times cannot be based solely on individuality but has to be 
complemented by a perspective which can also detect the dividualist dimension. 
We consider three lines of further research to be necessary and promising. Firstly, 
we propose investigating how the dividualist and the individualist aspects of the 
person are co-constituted and co-existing at different times and in different geo-
graphical places, and whether relationalities differ according to the spheres of 
life (religious, economic, social) in which they occur. In addition, it is important 
to ask if the relationship between the two aspects in a particular social setting is 
just a lived reality and tacit knowledge, or if it is also emically conceptualised and 
theorised. If the latter is the case, does this relationship enter these epistemolo-
gies or does it even function as a guiding social imaginary? Secondly, how far can 
an analysis of the individual-dividual relationship contribute to an anthropology 
or philosophy of life and provide new inputs for reflections on the conditional-
ities of life? Anthropologists and philosophers have emphasised the corporeal 
and social vulnerability of the human being, as well as its material dependency. 
Despite their singularity, an individual person is never fully in control of her/his 
life, never acts fully according to his/her free will, but works, rather, within the 
existing limits produced by the necessary entanglement of body and environment 
(Butler 2006, Jackson 2008, 2013), including the non-immediate or transcenden-
tal. These entanglements play out more forcefully under conditions of precarity 
and social suffering, and where life is considered of unequal worth (Fassin 2009, 
2010, Butler 2006). Thirdly, how does the individual–dividual relationship play 
out in the larger narrative of the state, the nation, and the citizen? Can we dive 
deeper into the problem of navigating multiple personae and multiple belongings 
(Pfaff-Czarnecka 2013), especially under political conditions of flight, migration, 
and displacement, often provoked by religious fundamentalisms and conflict?
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4.5 Conceptual terminology in the history of religion
We close this introduction by returning one last time to terminology. As the 
research summarised and developed in this publication shows, the terms ‘indi-
vidualisation’ and ‘religion’ contain an implicit agenda that often associates 
Europe with secularised modernity, and religion in Europe and elsewhere with 
collectivity. This agenda is often activated in the form of historical narratives, 
which constitute an important means for individuals and religious groups to 
create both inclusion and exclusion and, thus, to construct their identities (Rüpke 
2018b; see, for example, Malinar and Frenkel in this publication). ‘Confessional-
ising processes’ – already in the period from the third to the sixth century across 
the entire Mediterranean region – gave rise to narratives about ‘Jews’, ‘pagans’, 
‘Christians’, and ‘Manicheans’, and later about ‘Catholics’ and ‘Protestants’. 
Similarly, ‘communalising processes’ in India since the 19th century have estab-
lished and juxtaposed categories of ‘Hindus’, ‘Muslims’, ‘Sikhs’ and others as 
typical actors and driving forces of religious change (for confessionalising pro-
cesses in antiquity: Rebillard 2012; Rebillard and Rüpke 2015a; Rebillard 2016; 
in later Europe: von Greyerz et al. 2003; van Lieburg 2006; for communalising 
processes: Pandey 1990; van der Veer 1994; Fuchs and Dalmia 2019). Admittedly, 
such narratives opened up a perspective on multifaceted interactions and today 
form a basis from which we can speak about religious plurality. At the same time, 
however, they also cemented (and continue to cement) group boundaries that are 
the objects of fierce controversy and a wide variety of forceful efforts on the part 
of religious organisations to impose closed group identities. Complaints about 
deficits in religious identity are historically widespread, in later periods even 
among religious groups with a closed membership. Individuality is equated with 
deviance. But historiography and narrative in general has also provided, since 
antiquity, an important opportunity for emphasising the religious individuality 
of the actors described or for opening up religious space for the author himself or 
herself (Becker and Rüpke 2018). In many chapters of this publication, narratives 
figure as an important tool of individualisation. 
And our own narratives? During the late Enlightenment (described as ‘the 
saddle period’ by Reinhart Koselleck), certain key concepts in the history of ideas 
(‘piety’, ‘culture’, ‘future’, and even ‘religion’) underwent a change in meaning 
amid the social upheavals of the period. Together with changes in the historical 
understanding of time came a renewed historicisation of religion and a develop-
ment of diverse, individualised religious cults and movements (Feil 2007). Histor-
icisation also affected the ways of representing the intensive developments of a 
wide range of religious traditions during the early modern and colonial periods. 
Our own work is a part of this trend within the history of the related disciplines. 
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The use of ‘historical perspectives’, characteristic of our research, to understand 
the relationship between religion and the individual, is itself part of a process 
of historicisation of religions. The study of Christianity as a key catalyst of reli-
gious individualisation, as proposed by early scholarship, had to be transcended 
in order to grasp the role of other religious traditions as contexts for processes of 
religious individualisation. At the same time, this inquiry made the importance 
of religion in social processes clearly recognisable: across different historical 
periods and cultural regions, religion has been a privileged locus for individual-
ising processes. 
These historiographical findings confirm the paradox of religion that is 
at the centre of this publication: religion shows both individualising and de- 
individualising tendencies. At the same time, we neither see religion as the one and 
only seedbed of individualisation nor do we see religion as consistently discourag-
ing or thwarting processes of individualisation. The publication demonstrates the 
fruitfulness of zooming in on individualisation. As proposed here, however, both 
the concept of religion and the concept of individualisation, particularly the latter, 
must be used with much more care than has previously been the case, in the form 
of ongoing (conceptual) reflection. The trajectory of the work initiated here sug-
gests further avenues for research that maintains an engagement with additional 
terms and paradigms, in other regions and epochs. The ground gained in this pub-
lication, along with the critical reflection on religion and individualisation, needs 
to be expanded by the further elaboration of concepts that attend to the manifold 
phenomena and historical processes beyond the early modern period and Europe.
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Religion is inherently relational. Talking of religion or religiosity means talking 
of a relationship people think to have to something else, something beyond, or 
something felt inside, but in every case something that is not immediately availa-
ble. At the same time, no religious individual can neglect his or her relationship to 
other people, and there are various religious positions that equally give this rela-
tionship prominence. Finally, the concern of an individual for him- or herself is 
often conceived in relational terms, as ‘self-relation’. In cases considered spiritual 
or religious, this may overlap with the inner experience of a larger force. Preoc-
cupation with oneself, or with one’s self, occurs in various shades and to varying 
degrees. There also is the suggestion to regard the object of self-relation as itself a 
relation (Schlette, this publication; cf. below in this Introduction).
These three types of relationality are not independent of each other, but con-
dition, if not actually co-constitute each other. How the relations among these 
relationships are being conceived nonetheless varies immensely. Not all three are 
in focus to an equal degree in each case. What differs in particular is the degree to 
which human individuals or human selves are being assigned an active, shaping 
(gestaltende) role in this relational web, or are seen as merely recipients of the 
acts of others or the Other, or even as being engulfed by, and thus disappear-
ing into the position or role that is being assigned to him or her. Relations in all 
three respects allow the individual – and actually constitute the conduits that 
enable this – to express him- or herself, to expand, to explore things, to widen 
his or her scope, to connect, but also to experience ‘an other’ and the import and 
significations of an other. The question is, in which way the individual develops 
and builds, and actually can develop and contribute to building, these relation-
ships. Individuals contributing to a process of individualisation each represent 
an exemplar of a particular modality of individualisation. In reverse, and this 
points to instances of de-individualisation, one’s others (or the Other), and the 
relationships to or with them, may constrain and even overwhelm the individual.
What then matters is how ‘the’ Other, how the social others, how the ‘self’ 
and ‘selves’, and how the form and dynamics of their interrelations and inter-
actions are being conceived. The view on these relationships moreover differs 
depending on the angle one claims to take: that of an Ego who puts him/herself 
at the centre; that of the Divine (God) and the expectations humans ascribe to 
the Divine; or that of one’s social others, if not of the ‘generalized other’ in G. H. 
Mead’s sense of the term (Mead 1934).
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1 Relationality and ‘transcendence’
Part 1 of our publication puts aspects of religious relationality in the centre, cir-
culating around selfhood and interactional dynamics. Reflections gathered in 
this Part focus on how individual selves are seen to ‘transcend’ the confines of 
their (assumed or inferred) ‘identities’ and in this way either confirm the individ-
uality of religious seekers or are an expression of individualised search. Keeping 
the framework of the three relational axes in view, the way the different aspects 
and dimensions are being explored however differs across the contributions to 
this Part (as well as to the other Parts) of the publication. Some foreground the 
relationship of an individual with the Divine or the Absolute and thus position 
the individual and the divine as two poles, differing with regard to the dynamics 
between the poles. Others approach this relationship from how it is embedded 
or even grounded in social relationships and in this way makes the rapport with 
the divine appear as a social relationship of a particular kind. Schematically 
speaking, this second perspective conceives of the religious-spiritual terrain 
as a triadic instead of a dyadic relationship. The dyadic image fits to ideas of 
a bounded being, discriminated from fellow beings, and tends to concentrate 
on elaborating the conception of self-hood. The relations to other humans as 
well as the non-human world – being pushed into the background in favour of 
concentrating on the self-divine relationship – tend to be seen as accidents or 
ancillary to what seems central, or are considered derivative of the core relation. 
This perspective one can find in an ideal-typical, but at the same time extreme 
form represented by Louis Dumont’s individual-outside-the-world, in the case of 
India (Dumont 1980, 185, 267–86), as well as by modern ideas that take individu-
als as singles. The triadic or triangular model leaves the notion of self-hood more 
open and allows for a broader exploration of relationalities and a stronger con-
sideration of the social dimension of this array of relationships.1 The distinction 
between these two kinds of approaches or emphases, which represent different 
(disciplinary) lines of thought, is reflected in the way Part 1 of our publication 
has been partitioned.
‘Transcending selves’ then has a threefold meaning. The phrase refers first of 
all, and rather conventionally, to the experience of something beyond direct human 
grasp, something often substantialised as ‘the’ transcendent, but something with 
which individual actors want to connect or feel connected. The beyond (which 
1 Versions of the triadic or triangular model are further explicated in the article of Fuchs in this 
publication and in the Afterword of Section 1.2.
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may be a ‘within’2) can be experienced as deepening or widening the (everyday) 
self, or even as contributing to its actual and authentic formation. The metaphor 
of self-transcendence secondly, and in a wider and at the same time more profane 
sense, refers to a self, or the image of a self, that reaches out to the world beyond 
him- or herself and experiences some powerful connectivity to something larger or 
broader in which it feels included, but which, on the face of it, can equally denote 
non-religious contexts – as in cases of ‘collective effervescence’, to employ Émile 
Durkheim’s much quoted term (Durkheim 1964; cf. Joas 2000, 58–61). (Some, 
of course, turn this around and regard the profane transcendent as sequel to or 
extension of the religious tra nscendent.) And finally (and still broader), the phrase 
as used here refers to those social relations of a self that impact and connect him 
or her directly and inwardly with others, and become in this way adjuncts of a 
self. Under the last auspices, ‘transcending selves’ then relates in an emphatic 
sense of the term to what a person or self shares with significant others.3 In reli-
gious contexts, as discussed in Part 1, the last and the first forms of transcending 
are sometimes closely entwined, and may involve the second form too. The last 
form is being mulled over particularly in Section 2 of this Part of our publication, 
but it also points towards cases of internalised interdependence conceptualised 
in Part 2 in discussions around the term ‘dividuality’. As the introduction to Part 
2 indicates (p. 323 of this publication), the concept of dividuality ‘emphasises 
the existential moment of relationality and porousness between human beings, 
things, and the transcendent, and acknowledges the capacity of relevant actors 
to co-create the human being and her/his perception of the Self’. The relation to 
the transcendent in the common, narrower and more spiritual sense of the term 
stands in the foreground of Section 1. Concerning all three forms, ‘transcending’ 
relates to the self as subject as well as object of the process. But while from a theo-
logical point of view, as in the case of Meister Eckhart (Dietmar Mieth, Section 1.1), 
it is God who is seen as active and as initiating the process (in the case of Eckhart 
to be understood as a process of continuous movement and becoming), others, 
like Magnus Schlette (in an earlier work), consider the human self as the instance 
2 The image applied here is that of ‘beyond direct human grasp’. This is not necessarily meant in 
the sense of the spatial metaphor of ‘beyond’, as when one says ‘beyond this world’ or ‘beyond 
this life’, or ‘life beyond’.
3 It is with respect to the second meaning in particular that Hans Joas and after him Mag-
nus Schlette have recently brought self-transcendence into closer focus. Joas makes 
 self-transcendence a core term of his sociology of sacralisation and of the formation of ideals 
and values (2000; 2017, esp. 431–5). In his eyes, experiences of self-transcendence ‘have to be 
experiences of decentering’ (Joas 2008, 14). Building on Joas, Schlette (2013, ch. 13) emphasises 
the aspect of receptiveness, openness or even disposition for the experience of the unexpected, 
incommensurable or incongruous.
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that is active in a process of self-transcendence. For Schlette the process and activ-
ity of self-transcendence, however, occurs on the border between transitivity and 
intransivity and has to be seen as a process or activity that demands ‘neither effort 
nor willfulness’ (‘weder Anstrengung noch Vorsätzlichkeit’) (Schlette 2013, 351f.).
2 Struggling with selves and selfhood
Discussions and reflections on the notion of the ‘self’ abound. The ‘self’, or 
notions translated by the word ‘self’, have been central to philosophical and 
 theological-doctrinal debates in the West in Christian and secular contexts, in 
India in various philosophical schools as well as in Brahmanical, Buddhist, Jain, 
Sikh and other religious contexts, and in the Islamic milieus, which includes 
South Asia, especially within Sufi traditions (and there will most probably be 
further instances of such reflections in other cultural contexts). What complicates 
things even more is not only that we have no consensus on what the term ‘self’ is 
to mean and include, or how to translate terms from other languages with com-
parable, but not identical meanings, themselves again often polyvalent, accruing 
additional meanings over time (like ātman, ahaṃkāra, jīva, chitta, buddhi, manas, 
etc. in Indian languages; also the Buddhist anattā – ‘not-self’; or nafs, qalb and rūḥ 
among Sufis),4 but also that in European language use the term ‘self’ is being inter-
mixed with other terms like ‘person’, ‘identity’, ‘soul’, ‘Ego’ and even ‘subject’.5 
Speakers and scholars may employ one of these terms referring to connotations 
for which others would employ another of the mentioned terms. For a long while 
the epistemic dimension stood in the foreground in discussions about the self. In 
recent times attempts are increasing to overcome limiting terminological conven-
tions, especially now including bodily dimensions, self-other relationships, and 
more generally, inter-subjectivity. In this publication, ‘self’ stands as a placeholder 
for the practices, experiences and representations of humans circumscribed in dif-
ferent ways as person, even persona, identity, individual, in part also subject and 
actor or agent, respectively as ‘patient’ of someone else’s actions.6 In some con-
texts, notions of soul as well as of mind, but also of the body and of embodiment 
4 Regarding processes of differentiation and accretion of meanings of the term ātman cf. Malinar 
2015, 391–3.
5 Terminologically, discussions in this publication are dominated by Western philosophical lan-
guage. Non-Western terminologies and conceptualisations are taken up in particular chapters.
6 The aspect of ‘patiency’ or the receptive or ‘passive’ dimension of agency is increasingly being 
included in theories of ‘action’; see Dewey 1987 [1934]; cf. Fuchs 1999, 359f., 374–7; Pettenkofer 
2010, 134f.; and others.
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fill in for aspects of selfhood. ‘Self’ here is not meant to demarcate a specific idea of 
selfhood that all contributors would share. Self or person in the articles that follow 
can be geared to spirituality, but can also comprise embodiment and the whole 
gamut of sensoria, can refer to concrete human beings or to imagined- constructed-
conceptualised beings, can see them as contained or as connected.
Of particular importance is that in no case the self can be understood as some-
thing that we can fully grasp. The self cannot be addressed as an ‘object’ of obser-
vation and scholarly discourse: ‘We are not selves in the way that we are organ-
isms, or we don’t have selves in the way we have hearts or livers’ (Taylor 1989, 
34).7 The self, in significant respects, is constituted through self- interpretation 
and, one should add, the interpretation of someone’s self or person by others. 
What is more, the self’s interpretations ‘can never be fully explicit’, nor can a 
self’s articulations ever be completed (ibid.). Self is not a substance: self – like 
religion – is inherently relational. There are concepts that try to take self as an 
entity or substance, but these usually lean towards notions of ‘soul’, or substan-
tialised notions of ātman or jīva, or, going in the opposite direction, towards an 
objectifying depiction of a ‘person’.8
Significantly, the notion of self tends to show up in composites (Komposita). 
This includes composites denoting the attempt of understanding selves, or one’s 
self: self-interpretation (in German both Selbstdeutung and Selbstauslegung), self- 
articulation, self-recognition (Selbsterkenntnis), self-awareness or self- perception 
(Selbstwahrnehmung), and self-definition (and in this sense then trying to determine 
one’s self); composites denoting the activity of developing or enhancing one’s self: 
self-becoming (Selbstwerdung), self-discovery (Selbstfindung), self-formation (Selb-
stbildung), and self-realization (Selbstverwirklichung); composites denoting the 
effort of establishing/corroborating/proving one’s self or oneself: self- ascertainment 
(Selbstvergewisserung), self-assertion (Selbstbehauptung) or self-determination; 
and composites denoting occupation with one’s self which more explicitly than the 
other denotations emphasise the reflexive character of thematising and imagining 
one’s self, like with the terms self-image (Selbstbild) and – the most discussed term 
– self-consciousness (Selbstbewußtsein). ‘Self’, it seems, stands for something that 
has to be accessed. Therefore, the access-points matter.
At the same time, and against this background, a self has to be conceived as 
itself accessing the world and other selves or persons. One way to further proceed 
7 Jonardon Ganeri confirms this from a different philosophical background. From a liberal nat-
uralist standpoint, a first-person stance, which the self occupies, ‘is compatible with the claim 
that no entity exists that might be visible from the perspective of a scientific naturalism’; Ganeri 
confirms that ‘Buddhists are right to deny the existence of any such thing’ (Ganeri 2012, 327).
8 Regarding jīva see the article by Rahul Parson in Part 3 of this publication.
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in this direction is the renewal of a focus on attention, as recently exemplarily 
articulated by Jonardon Ganeri (2017). He takes attention as ‘key’ to an ‘account of 
the nature of persons and their identity’ that ‘precedes self’. Ganeri discriminates 
between two distinct roles that conscious attention performs in experience, that 
of placing and focusing – ‘placing’ signifying ‘opening a window for conscious-
ness’; ‘focusing’ ‘accessing the properties of whatever the window opens onto’ – 
and distinguishes varieties of conscious attention that include intending, intro-
spection, empathy9 and past-directed or autonoetic attention (Ganeri 2017, 1–4).10
What the explorations and imaginaries encapsulated by the composites 
mentioned show is that the self becomes available, accessible, through delibera-
tions. But is there a self before these deliberations and what would this be? Some 
assume a pre-discursive familiarity with one-self or a pre-reflexive state or sense 
of self-ness, which as such is underdetermined, implicit. Manfred Frank (2002) 
employs the conception of a pre-reflexive Selbstgefühl, which one might trans-
late as sense of self. Dan Zahavi identifies the pre-reflexive sense of ‘mineness’ 
or ‘ipseity’ with a ‘minimal’ or ‘core’ sense of self (Zahavi 2005, 125).11 Magnus 
Schlette proposes the phenomenological notion of pre-intentional awareness, 
which to a certain extent seems in line with Ganeri’s term ‘attention’. Schlette 
conceives the object of this relation, the pre-reflexive self, as itself relational, ‘but 
neither in terms of a reflexive nor in terms of an egological relation’: ‘We have to 
conceptualize it as a pre-intentional co-consciousness in any state of mind that 
this particular state of mind belongs to me’ (Schlette, Part 1 of this publication; 
cf. Schlette 2013, 197–207).12 Even if attention, pre-intentional awareness or the 
minimal self would have to be presupposed systematically, these can be accessed 
indirectly only, once the self is being discursively (re-)constructed from within its 
both conceptual and pragmatic contexts.
9 On empathy see Antje Linkenbach’s article in Part 2.
10 ‘Attention is the selective placing and focal accessing that brings a world to view and pro-
vides orientation within it’ (Ganeri 2017, 28). In his new book, Ganeri engages in particular with 
what he calls the ‘meticulous Buddhist introspective observation of the human mind’s structure 
and functioning’ (ibid., 5), especially the Theravāda philosopher Buddhaghosa, with contempo-
rary cognitive psychology, and with contemporary philosophy of mind.
11 ‘[…] the idea is to link an experiential sense of self to the particular first-personal givenness 
that characterizes our experiential life; it is this first-personal givenness that constitutes the 
mineness or ipseity of experience. Thus, the self is not something that stands opposed to the 
stream of consciousness, but is, rather, immersed in conscious life’ (Zahavi 2005, 125; author’s 
emphasis). Regarding ipseity, see also Paul Ricœur (e.g. 1999).
12 ‘Inner-directed self-relation […] therefore means the relation to inner-directed mental states 
(states evoked by inner stimulation) that I am pre-intentionally and co-consciously aware of as 
my mental states’ (Schlette, Part I of this publication; author’s emphasis).
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The environs of ‘self’, both understood as a concept and as something that is 
implicated in the world, are being articulated from different angles. Here Charles 
Taylor (1989) might be used as a guide. In the first instance, a self is placed in 
social as well as cultural spaces, with a cultural repertoire, shared social imag-
inaries and publicly available conceptual and moral languages, which a person 
might share, but also may dissociate him/herself from (Taylor 1989, 35): some-
thing not only, but particularly relevant with respect to people driven by religious 
intents.13 Starting from the other end of naturalist first-personal accounts of sub-
jective consciousness, there too the focus is now on how the self is open to and 
connects with the world.14 More particularly, a self inescapably relates to other 
selves in conceptualising and constructing its identity, and one would have to 
add, taking others as both fellow beings and as opponents: ‘[o]ne is a self only 
among other selves’ (ibid., 35). And, finally, what for Charles Taylor is of particular 
importance, humans cannot do without ‘some orientation to the good’ and define 
themselves by where they ‘stand on this’ (ibid., 33). For Taylor it is ‘the space of 
moral and spiritual orientation’ within which one’s ‘most important defining rela-
tions are lived out’ (ibid., 35). A human being feels the ‘need to be connected to, 
or in contact with, what they see as good […] or of fundamental value’ (ibid., 42).15
The situatedness of selves in this triple way makes the selves appear dynamic. 
Selves are nothing fixed, but constantly change, shift, move, develop. Selves are 
evolving. The self, one’s identity, the idea of personhood shifts from context to 
context of interaction and inter-subjectively established meaning; it never is com-
plete, concluded, rounded off. It never is entire. This further complicates deliber-
ations on the self. Ways to handle this condition differ. One way of dealing with 
13 The concept ‘social imaginaries’ refers to implicit meanings and underlying or background 
assumptions about social existence, the ends of individual and social life, and also regarding 
fundamental values and norms (cf. Fuchs 2015, 333, with reference to Cornelius Castoriadis and 
Charles Taylor). This does not mean that anyone would be socially predetermined. – The use of 
the term of cultural repertoires here is mine.
14 Jonardon Ganeri’s attempt of reconstructing human subjectivity from the angle of a liber-
al naturalist conception of the self sees the self as ‘a unity of coordination, immersion, and 
participation’: ‘Fully first-personal subjective consciousness is at once grounded (in “friction” 
with the world and subject to its constraint), lived (in experiential openness and presence to 
the world), and engaged (with the pulls and demands of emotion and intention on the world)’ 
(Ganeri 2012, 329; author’s emphasis). Ganeri develops his conception in dialogue with Indian 
naturalistic philosophies of mind, especially those of Cārvāka, the Buddhist Yogācāra school, 
and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, incorporating recent discussions in phenomenology, analytical philoso-
phy and Western philosophy of mind as well as Greek and Islamic philosophy.
15 Hans Joas (2000, 142f.) criticizes that Taylor leaves the relationship between the concepts of ‘self’ 
and ‘identity’ somewhat unclear and that he sometimes speaks of ‘the good’ in ‘essentialist terms’.
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this is a narrative approach – the reconstruction of the genealogy, the sequence 
of instantiations, of a self from the viewpoint of the present. Different versions of 
a narrative account of self have been proposed (Schapp 1953 [2004]; Ricœur 1999; 
Krueger 2011; and others). More radically, Buddhists reject the idea, encapsulated 
in the famous concept of anattā, not-self, ‘that a detached witness watches from the 
centre of a space of experience’ or ‘that a detached agent acts in the centre of a space 
of action’ (Ganeri 2017, 9f.). In a different direction go those conceptualisations that 
assume the possibility of identifying or establishing a core sense of continuity of 
the inner self even under conditions of constantly changing circumstances and in 
the vicissitudes of life. This may, as in several cases discussed in our publication 
(like those of Eckhart, Arndt, Kierkegaard), be backed by trust in the co-presence 
of the Divine, and thus by a foundational relationality, and may sometimes be even 
conceived as a processual, moving, interactional relationship. Other conceptual-
isations, in contrast (like many found in bhakti and among certain Sufis), think in 
terms of impermanence interrupted by transient experiential moments in which 
unity and the fulfilment of the relationship with someone else, or with the Divine, 
is being fleetingly, but never continuously, attained – just a hunch of permanence. 
It is the two last positions that are represented in Part 1 of this publication: the third 
one primarily in Section 1.1, the last one primarily in Section 1.2.
3 Religious language of self-transcendence
Religious discourses give the situatedness of selves a specific perspective. On 
a metaphysical-doctrinal level, religious authors tend to articulate the situ-
atedness of humans in generalising, existentialist terms, be it suffering, be it 
 meaninglessness, be it moral damnation of this world (the Diesseits), or be it 
longing for the beyond, for ‘liberation’. On the level of lived religion, discourses 
tend to target moments, situations, experiences (in the sense of Erlebnis) and explo-
rations in which a person, a ‘self’, senses or discovers something non- transient 
and liberating. Magnus Schlette makes the point that William James regarded reli-
gious experiences as eo ipso experiences of self-transcendence, that is a surrender 
to ‘transcendent powers’; in this he sees a line going back to Friedrich Schleier-
macher (Schlette 2013, 366; James 2008 [1902]).16 This again, however, reduces 
the view on self-transcendence to a substantialised expression of ‘transcendence’.
16 Hans Joas in a recent book (2017, 70, 73) comes to the conclusion that James did not receive 
his inspiration from Schleiermacher, but he sees an indirect connection to Schleiermacher via 
American Transcendentalism.
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Religious thinkers conceive of ‘the transcendent’ and what we here call pro-
cesses and moments of self-transcendence in very different ways. Much of what 
goes on in religious contexts is about ways of understanding and conceiving, as 
well as preparing for experiences of self-transcendence. Across the different reli-
gious contexts, Abrahamic as well as Indic ones, one encounters images of enlight-
enment through, or togetherness (communion) and even of union with the Divine, 
of love for the Divine and love of humans by the Divine, sometimes of fusion with 
the Divine, of sensory and bodily experience of the Divine, or even extinction in 
the Divine, aside from the more intellectualist conceptualisations of becoming a 
witness or voice of the Divine and a mediator between the Divine and other humans, 
of directedness towards the Divine, of devotion to and participation in the Divine 
(bhaj in the word bhakti). As mentioned before, some see the self- transcending 
relation to the Divine in the wider context of reaching out to and sharing with other 
humans, and thus as part and parcel of a form of social self-transcendence.
A particular experiential notion, also taken up by William James, and already 
referred to by Schleiermacher before him,17 and again by Kierkegaard, is that 
of self-surrender (Selbstaufgabe, Hingabe), or, in the Indian Śrīvaiṣṇava bhakti 
context starting with Ramanuja (traditionally, 1017–1137 CE), the comparable 
Sanskrit term prapatti, which Srilata Raman and others take as synonymous with 
‘self-surrender’.18 It is with regard to notions of self-surrender also that the paradox 
of self-transcendence becomes most tangible: the idea of confirmation of a self in 
the very act or attempt of relinquishing it, of its extinction. This may mark the 
extreme of constitutive relationality. But this is significant in other ways too. One 
often encounters statements that exhibit a lack of sociological sense and under-
standing of relationality and insinuate that Indic religions, particularly the Upani-
shadic and Buddhist variants, would represent positions of denial of individuality 
and individualisation, and thus the very opposite of Christianity as the exemplary 
field for religious individualisation. It rather seems that  self-surrender – and this 
is only one option in the Indian, as in the Christian contexts –, be it viewed as an 
experience or as a desire, marks the extreme of religious individualisation.
17 In his Über Religion Schleiermacher asks to give up one’s life out of love for the universe (aus 
Liebe zum Universum Euer Leben aufzugeben), to aim to become more than one is oneself (strebt 
danach mehr zu sein als Ihr selbst), to lose oneself, and in this context to eradicate (vernichten) 
one’s individuality (Schleiermacher 1799, 132).
18 Prapatti from pra+pad, which can be translated as ‘to take refuge with/in’ (van Buiten, ac-
cording to Raman 2007, 11). Discussions within Śrīvaiṣṇavism concerned the various dimensions 
of prapatti, the idea of God’s grace and compassion, and in this context, the balance between 
God’s doing and what the individual human should do or not do for his/her own salvation – pra-
patti either signifying just one of several paths in search of God, or requiring ‘to do nothing, for 
any effort was an impediment to the working of God’s grace’ (Raman 2007, 11).
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4 Transcending and embedding selfhood
The focus on relationality underlying the idea of ‘transcending selves’ guides 
the arrangement of the papers. The papers assembled under this title have been 
divided into two sections. A gross differentiation is the one already mentioned 
between a dyadic and a triadic focus. One may further distinguish between two 
analytical modalities of accessing the question of self, one focusing on the exege-
sis of systematic statements contending with questions of self, the other on recon-
structing the practical and semantical articulations of self-hood. This is also being 
reflected, although not to the full extent, in the way the papers were divided up. 
The first approach predominates in the first section of Part 1 of this publication, the 
second in the second section, with the (partial) exception of the paper of Andrés 
Quero-Sánchez. Magnus Schlette’s article may be considered an in-between case. 
He focuses on the practical attitudes and dispositions underlying the texts (in this 
case poems) he analyses.19 In any case, especially the systematic reconstructions 
of notions of self, identity and person would require additionally to be histori-
cized, with respect to the intellectual and social contexts in which the systematic 
positions were developed. This, however, is not part of the discussions here. 
4.1  Section 1.1: Relationships between transcendence 
and selfhood
The inner dynamics of relationships of (self-)transcendence have usually not 
been analysed sociologically and comparatively in Western scholarship. They 
rather still are the preserve of theologians and philosophers. Many of the current 
conventions of talking of the transcendent and of transcendence with respect to 
the self originate here. The discussions of recent years in Erfurt, with their focus 
on religious individualisation, at least allowed starting a process of reconsid-
eration that prepares cases taken from Christian contexts for comparisons and 
perhaps even sociological analyses in the future. De-centring one’s lens and the 
assumptions of the debate will take a long time.
The pieces in Section 1.1 provide snapshots of processes of religious individ-
ualisation in the European context. They offer exemplars, important instances or 
moments, of processes that show the unfolding of particular ideas and formats 
of selfhood in relation specifically to ideas and experiences of the divine. While 
19 In this context see also his reflections on the reconstruction of the ‘grammar’ of the uses of 
notions of self(-realisation); Schlette, 2013, 45–9.
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Section 1.1 presents cases from different epochs, starting with the 13th century, 
and while all these cases are taken only from West European traditions this selec-
tion is not meant to confirm the belief in the idea of a singular and linear process 
that developed in the Western and Christian context independently of processes 
elsewhere. One paper, that of Julie Casteigt, gives an inkling at least of exchanges 
with the Arabic scholarly world. What this selection then illustrates is the fact 
that European developments have been studied much more intensively than the 
philosophical and conceptual developments elsewhere.
The article by Julie Casteigt on the work of Albert the Great (c. 1200–1280) 
that opens our publication presents an exemplary and at the same time unique 
case of religious individualisation. The article shows how Albert not only takes 
the figure of John the Baptist as the model witness of God, mediating between 
the Divine and the human world. But further, using the metaphor of ‘vases of 
light’ and universalising the model of John, Albert argues for the possibility that 
everyone, in an absolutely singular manner, can become a manifestation of the 
divine principle and act as metaphysical mediator between God and other human 
addressees, constituting thereby a community of individuals.
In Albert’s case the individual appears as the recipient, or ‘vase’, of the light 
that transcends the self. In the case of Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–1328), presented 
by Dietmar Mieth, the individual is meant to prepare him/herself to receive and 
recognise the presence of God in his/her heart. The transcendence of the empir-
ical self, experienced as a sudden breakthrough, is being understood by Eckhart 
not only as a constant process of flow and movement, but also as a mode that 
does not allow distinction between God and human on the categorial level: dis-
tinctio per indistinctionem, or ‘distinction by non-distinction’.
With the article of Magnus Schlette we jump to a much later stage, the early 
17th up to the turn to the 19th century, but stay in central Europe. Discussing the 
philosophical transformation by Immanuel Kant of the inward-oriented Protes-
tant worldview exemplified by intellectual figures of the Protestant tradition as 
diverse as Johann Arndt (1555–1621), Paul Gerhardt, Gerhard Tersteegen and Bart-
hold Hinrich Brocke, with respect to the idea of natural beauty and the sublime, 
Schlette elaborates on the two-level concept of self-relation that is entailed in 
these Protestant positions, based on an inner sense of relationality with God, 
experienced (comparable to Eckhart) as togetherness, and the progress from an 
inner-directed to an other- or outer-directed self-relation.
In a move beyond Kant, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1786–1834) raised the ques-
tion of the relationship of human rationality to the transcendent. Elisabeth Gräb-
Schmidt, in her article, thus shifts the focus from the process of  self-transcendence 
to the position of the individual vis-à-vis ‘the’ transcendent, or transcendence 
as ‘religion’ and thus as a sphere of its own, a notion that  prevails in modern 
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 contexts. While the transcendent appears here as the unalienable precondition of 
rationality, Schleiermacher insists on the limits of rationality for the individual. 
He sees the individual as grounded in an overarching transcendent, which con-
firms his/her individuality.
Matthias Engmann in his discussion of Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) returns 
to practices of self-transcendence. Kierkegaard regards God as ground of, and 
presence in, every human being that each human is being asked to actively actu-
alise, the goal being self-surrender. The article points to an understanding of 
religious individualisation as ‘becoming oneself before God’ and thus a process 
of re-positioning and increased self-awareness in acknowledging one’s uncondi-
tional dependency. Here, the immanent aspects of authenticity and (self-)tran-
scendence are systematically correlated to the individual’s inward relation to God.
These elaborations on self and self-transcendence in the European context are 
backed by Anders Klostergaard Petersen with a general evolutionist narrative of the 
making of the self, or what he calls ‘suifaction’. Klostergaard Petersen considers 
the transition from what he calls complex urban to early cosmos types of religion, 
what others call axial age religions, as the point at which genuine forms of self-
hood, i.e. the distinction of the individual self from not only other selves but also 
from the group, emerged, accompanied by ideologies of selfhood as well as modes 
of self-cultivation that made the self ‘independent’ of culture. Discussing the 
examples of the Book of Deuteronomy and of late Stoicism, Klostergaard Petersen 
understands the self at this developmental stage as being involved in a relation-
ship to ‘superhuman powers’. This he sees then superseded – with the coming of 
modernity, in the form of Western Enlightenment and Romanticism – by the idea 
of a detached autonomous self that now is conceived as existing ‘all on its own’.
4.2  Section 1.2: The social life of religious individualisation
The relationships of religiously inclined individuals with other spiritual seekers cor-
relate with and, in various and different ways, corroborate the relationship of selves 
with what is variously considered as the divine, the absolute or the ground. Speak-
ing more generally, relationships with the Divine are embedded, or are even seen as 
co-grounded, in relationships with other people one is or feels attached to. Religious 
positions differ in how far they acknowledge and above all respect and include the 
relationships to others, or, conversely, are in denial of such social relationships, on 
which, however, they inescapably build, even while they try to break these.
The article of Andrés Quero-Sánchez presents such a case of denial. His 
paper, at the same time, represents a link to the papers in Section 1.1. Focussing 
on Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854), and on Schelling’s engagement with ideas of 
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Plato, Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler, Jakob Böhme, and Friedrich Jacobi, he 
discusses how this idealist thinker struggles with what he regards as the threat 
of one’s particular engagements to an unmediated relationship to the Absolute.
The other three contributions to this Section take social relations as their 
starting point. Rubina Raja, who takes us to Palmyra in the three first centuries 
CE, discusses the relationship between priests and the (lay) people to whom they 
attended, but also the relationship between these priests and their deities. Raja 
focuses in particular on the banqueting tesserae (tiles or tokens) that served as 
entrance cards to religious banquets and that were found in large numbers in 
Palmyra. The religious banqueting events can be regarded as clear signs of a 
process of religious individualisation when seen against the background of the 
otherwise seemingly standardised Palmyran ritual practices. Individualising 
aspects show up in several ways, with respect to the choice of people invited, 
the individual personages of invitees, and the individualised iconography of the 
entrance cards. On top of this, and this seems a specific feature, judging by the 
way the tesserae were designed Raja can show that the priests were put on a level 
with the deities.
Dimensions of relationality and intersubjectivity are at the centre of discus-
sion in the contribution of Martin Fuchs. Fuchs takes bhakti, a core strand of 
Indian – especially, but not only, Hinduistic – religiosity, as an exemplary case 
of relationally grounded religious individualisation. Covering a history of at least 
2000 years till today, the term bhakti denotes forms of participatory devotion and 
self-transcendence and stands for direct access to and experience of the divine. 
Of core relevance are the dimension of universal recognition and the potential 
for, but also the limitations of, the critique of religious as well as social hierar-
chy and exclusion. Examining what he regards as the phenomenological core of 
bhakti, while keeping track of the diversity, malleability and innovative capacity 
of bhakti, Fuchs develops the concept of a triangular interactional structure of 
reciprocity and authority between saint-poets (exemplary bhaktas), ‘lay’ devotees 
and the divine, in which each side, transcending itself, reaches out to the others.
Discussing a context that combines bhakti elements with Sufi and Nath Yogi 
traditions – 18th century Punjab, today divided between the states of India and 
Pakistan – Anne Murphy takes the concept of religious individualisation as a key 
to develop a new understanding of the ways in which what later generations 
conceived of as separate religious traditions are being connected, blended and 
transcended contextually. Taking the case of the qissa (a poetic narrative) Hir, 
composed by Wazir Shah – centred around a love story, social (gender, family) 
relations and religious affiliations, and popular even beyond the region to this 
day – , Murphy puts particular focus on the ways deep normative conflicts are 
being fought, in which strict conventions and hierarchies of gender and caste 
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clash with an individualising ethos and the critique of authority. Bringing 
into play differing religious perspectives and alignments, she shows how the 
 cross-religious, both as devotional experience and as a form of religio-social cri-
tique, was in vital respects tied to religious individualisation.
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Section 1.1:  Relationships between selfhood 
and transcendence
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Julie Casteigt
‘Vase of light’: from the exceptional 
individuality to the individualisation process 
as influenced by Greek-Arabic cosmology in 
Albert the Great’s Super Iohannem
1 Introduction
As we know, standard theories regard religious individualisation as a specifically 
modern or early modern phenomenon. The question today is whether we can 
find glimpses of religious individualisation also in pre-modern Europe, perhaps 
even connected with the dynamics of stabilisation or ‘institutionalisation’. I shall 
focus in what follows on Albert the Great (1200–1280) and his treatment of the 
individual. This first appears in his commentary on the Gospel of John (Jn 1:6). The 
verse reads: ‘A man came, sent from God, whose name was John (New English 
Translation).’ Albert the Great highlights John, as witness of God, to be an excep-
tional individual. Paradoxically, Albert will raise this witness-figure to the rank 
of a universal model of individualisation. At the end of his commentary, he even 
invites every reader to become a witness of God in their own way (Casteigt forth-
coming). This transformation of an exceptional individual to a model of individu-
alisation happens through a series of textual processes. I would like to show here 
how Albert develops them by interlacing different philosophical and scientific 
traditions that enable this Christian character to reach a universal signification 
for every individual.
As a preliminary, I ought to clarify how I shall use here two main concepts.
The first one is imported from sociological studies. ‘Institutionalisation’, 
as processes through which individualisation forms are established, will in the 
frame of this philosophical inquiry be understood and described as modes of 
elaboration of textual series, and not as being embedded in social and politi-
cal institutions. In this case, the dynamics of textual institutionalisation and 
its entanglement between Christian exegesis and Greek-Arabic cosmology and 
metaphysics results in an ambivalent, or even paradoxical, characteristic of 
religious individualisation. To become universal, the model of individualisation 
taken from John the Baptist goes through a de-personalisation of the individual, 
that is, an assimilation to non-human beings. This particular feature leads us to 
develop several meanings of the second main concept of our inquiry, i.e. individ-
ualisation.
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‘Individualisation’ will be regarded as religious inasmuch as the individual is 
always defined in this corpus of texts in relation to his or her divine principle. In 
the Super Iohannem, Albert the Great places his analysis on a metaphysical level. 
He does not consider here the political, social, or economic conditions of the 
institutionalisation of individualisation. In this context, ‘individualisation’ will 
be considered here as indicating a process which leads from the first meaning 
of the word in these passages of the Albertian works, through a second, and to a 
third meaning, which I synthetically present as three distinct steps.
First of all, ‘individualisation’ designates the circumscription, or description, 
of an individuality. Albert’s description of the exceptionality of the first witness 
of the incarnate divine Word, John the Baptist, is based on John’s singular prop-
erties as a person. According to this first meaning, Albert’s understanding of indi-
vidualisation – as the description of the unicity of an individuality – complies 
with the patristic tradition.
Secondly, the dynamics through which this mode of individualisation 
will be universalised potentially to all human beings entail a process of de- 
personalisation and assimilation to non-human agents. Thereby, an exceptional 
individual will become a model of religious individualisation through the media-
tion of the individuality of cosmic entities. These entities are non-human beings 
that can transmit light without producing it. In Greek-Arabic cosmology, such 
entities that do not produce the light that flows through them are stars, planets 
and their satellites. Albert figuratively calls ‘vases of light’, because their trans-
parency allows them to spread the light of the sun that they receive. This second 
step of the ‘institutionalisation’ of individualisation opens a broader question: 
the one of the attribution of a common mode of agency to human and non-human 
beings. ‘Agency’ is used here as a common term for beings considered as intellec-
tual entities, like the cosmological ones, without being specifically restricted to 
human agents. Therefore, ‘religious individualisation’ may serve as a productive 
heuristic tool for highlighting the interaction between the identity of an individ-
ual and his or her mode of operating as an agent. It helps heuristically to link the 
levels of being and of operation. In this perspective, individuals have to be con-
sidered at a larger scale than the personal one. They belong to a cosmos in which 
they interact and share their mode of operation with non-human agents.
Thirdly, ‘individualisation’ will be understood, through the cosmological 
image of the ‘vase of light’, as a possible universal pattern that concerns any indi-
vidual as far as he or she is embodied. In this sense, ‘individualisation’ does not 
mean anymore an exceptional gift but rather a relational place between the divine 
principle and the other agents of the human and non-human community which 
enables the whole universe to continuously receive the light of the principle, even 
in its extreme parts. The embodied individual, who is then ‘institutionalised’ by 
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this textual series of steps, has a relational function: he or she links up the divine 
principle to all creatures and enriches the manifestation of the principle with 
particular features based on his or her bodily constitution. Thus, the function 
of John as a pattern of individualisation is not directly to be understood as an 
ethical practical norm but rather as a metaphysical model in which the particular 
properties of individuality (in the first meaning) are reduced or theoretically sus-
pended, so as to concentrate the attention on the being and on the agency of the 
individual as an embodied mediation of the causality of the first principle.
This modification process of the meanings of ‘individualisation’ occurs 
through the reception of the Greek-Arabic cosmology into the medieval biblical 
exegesis, so that the interlacing of different religious traditions changes Albert’s 
comprehension of the Gospel of John as a fundamental text for the Christian tradi-
tion. With these references to the Greek-Arabic cosmology, the Doctor universalis 
gives, indeed, a new interpretation of the Johannine witness: a witness is not con-
fined to exceptional personalities but, more generally, he or she is to be under-
stood as a mediation which, similarly to a ‘vase of light’, manifests the principle 
indirectly, transmitting the light of the principle itself to others who cannot have 
direct access to it. But he or she does not carry on a mere transparent diffusion of 
the light. The witness colours the ray that he or she receives with the particular 
quality of his or her own individuality. And this qualification by his or her individ-
uality relies on the specific physical composition of his or her body. Thereby, the 
Dominican master opens a new possibility to understanding individualisation in 
the Christian tradition. In this third step of the dynamics of individualisation, 
even though Albert the Great offers a universal model of individualisation, such 
an individual is still characterised by his or her particular body. And this body has 
a religious function: it manifests the divine principle in an absolutely singular 
manner.
From the viewpoint of the textual corpus and of the method we will follow, I 
shall focus on the exegesis of John 1:7  (‘He came as a witness to testify about the 
light, so that everyone might believe through him’, New English Translation) and 
on the textual network around the figure of the ‘vase of light’. It will appear that 
the ‘vase of light’ constitutes a figural unity in Albertian thought which crosses 
his entire works, connecting different textual corpora of commented texts (Aristo-
telian, Dionysian, biblical) and various disciplines. As a first step, I shall develop 
the first meaning of ‘individualisation’ and its institutionalisation strategy by elu-
cidating how Albert the Great interprets the traditional explanation of the charac-
teristics of any witness according to the Fathers of the Church. As a second step, I 
shall show how Albert builds a new model of ‘individualisation’ using the image 
of the ‘vase of light’. Both the second and the third phases of the process of indi-
vidualisation that we will distinguish belong to the Albertian interpretation of the 
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Greek-Arabic cosmological texts about the ‘vase of light’ and allow Albert to give 
a new interpretation of the Johannine witness and of the individual represented 
by the witness.
2  Individualisation as the description 
of an exceptional personality
As a preliminary, I owe the reader an explanation about why I have chosen this 
textual corpus and this particular case. The Gospel of John belongs to the set of 
revealed holy texts of the Christian tradition. As the fourth Gospel was the last 
work that, in the Middle Ages, a master of theology should comment on according 
to the order of studies in the Latin Universities, it offered, therefore, the occa-
sion to make a synthesis between the different philosophical traditions that a 
master had commented on in his career and the various texts of the Bible that 
he had examined as an exegete. That is why Albert the Great’s Super Iohannem 
represents a major speculative work, so as to observe how he binds together the 
reception of Greek-Arabic philosophy and the Christian tradition, at the end of the 
thirteenth century in the Latin world.
Therefore, from a methodological point of view, we will be particularly 
careful in looking at the way Albert interlaces the patristic sources with the Greek- 
Arabic ones for the first meaning of ‘individualisation’. The manner in which the 
Doctor magnus comments on his sources builds a textual series in a particular 
literary genre: the exegetical one. These textual series reflect the speculative 
work he pursues throughout his biblical commentary about the different types of 
individualisation. It is, therefore, possible to distinguish two different typologies. 
The first meaning of ‘individualisation’, that is the description of an exceptional 
personality, is elaborated by an ‘architectonical’ network of mustered individual 
aspects and implicit patristic sources, whereas the second and third meanings of 
‘individualisation’ lean on a dynamic typology. The reader must cross the whole 
of the Albertian works and its textual treatment of the ‘vase of light’ to understand 
what the new model of ‘individualisation’ means. The first typology proceeds by 
juxtaposition of criteria, the second by dynamic development of a unique model 
that is expressed through an image.
As for the first meaning of ‘individualisation’, at the beginning of his expo-
sition of the verse Jn 1:7, Albert the Great explains clearly the aim of the verse as 
he understands it: in that verse, ‘the witness is praised, and he is shown omni 
exceptione maior (Lewis, Short 1956)’ (Albertus 2019, 106, 6). Albert uses here a 
specific juridical terminology that means that this witness, John the Baptist, is 
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greater than anything which could limit his testimony. There are four reasons for 
him being a witness beyond reproach and suspicion: his nature, his function as 
a witness, the authority of the one who sends him, that is God himself, and the 
meaning of his name (ibid., 106, 14–7).
The first reason is his human nature that makes him appropriate not only 
to his human addressees but also to the divine Word made flesh (ibid., 106, 
22–108, 4) whom he testifies. So his exceptional reliability rests on the fact that 
he, as a human being and not as an angel (ibid., 108, 5–6), is an adequate medi-
ation for both terms of the relationship. No divine mediator would suitably com-
municate with human beings except the one who is the Word made flesh. But 
the witness needs to share the very nature of his addressees, just as the pontiff 
is chosen among men as a mediator between them and God, according to the 
example that the Doctor magnus gives. About this first reason, the Master of 
Cologne does not claim any novelty of his thesis: he explicitly quotes the Glossa 
ordinaria (Glossa 1603, 1024), a miscellany of biblical glosses of the Fathers of the 
Church, and comments on it.
The second reason is John’s function as being sent (Albertus 2019, 108, 9–14). 
‘Being sent’ etymologically means that he is not an angel by nature but by func-
tion: he announces the Word made flesh. He comes neither from his own author-
ity nor from the authority of other human beings or by their mediation. But he 
receives his mission from God himself (not the incarnate God): that is the third 
reason for his absolute reliability (ibid., 108, 15–8) as a witness. Both the second 
and the third reasons are founded upon several biblical quotations.
The fourth reason is the witness’ name (ibid., 108, 19–23) and its meaning. 
The name ‘John’ was not chosen by his parents. Otherwise, their newborn son 
should have taken the name of his father: Zechariah. His name was given by God 
and, as a reflection of this divine origin, it means in itself grace or divine gift. The 
Gloss which Albert of Cologne explicitly refers to adds: ‘substantially given’. In 
other words, John’s identity consists substantially in the grace of God. The Doctor 
magnus insists on placing John’s whole life from the beginning under the sign 
of God’s gift: from the announcement to his father, his conception in the womb 
of the old Elizabeth…. Albert writes also that John’s father was God. Thereby, he 
means: the one who gave John his name. But the scriptors of the manuscripts of 
Düsseldorf (Albertus 1455), Emmerich (Albertus 1476), Köln (Albertus 1450–1455) 
and the printed editions (Albertus 1477; 1504–1505; 1651; 1899), who perfectly well 
knew that John’s father was Zechariah, corrected pater to patet, so that the text 
does not mean anymore: ‘the father, the way he [John] was made, the nature of 
John and his mission are referred to God’ (Albertus 2019, 112, 3–4) but ‘it is evident 
that the way he was made, the nature of John and his mission are referred to 
God’. These later corrections made by the scriptors of the manuscripts show how 
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Albert’s interpretation – that the whole being of John comes from God, under-
stood as his father – still was new and difficult to accept even in the fifteenth 
century.
Moreover, the Doctor magnus emphasises that the identity of John consists 
substantially in the divine gift, with the verse 1 Cor. 15:10 (‘By God’s grace, I am 
what I am etc.’). Thereby, he suggests an identification between Paul of Tarsus 
and John the Baptist on the very point of their whole identity being given by God, 
in as much as they are sent by him and have accepted their mission.
Thus, what makes John the Baptist an exceptional witness is, firstly, that 
he is a human being whose nature ensures him to be an appropriate mediation 
between the incarnate Word and his human addressees; secondly, that he does 
not come from any human authority; thirdly, that he has been sent by God and 
that does not add any human intention to the divine mission he receives; and 
fourthly, that, as being sent, his whole identity substantially consists in his divine 
mission.
Through the networks of biblical verses he quotes, Master Albert makes clear 
that John shares certain aspects of his exceptionality, as a witness, with other bib-
lical characters1 (Albertus 2019, 112, 1–4). The Albertian method of interpretation 
of the Christian Holy Scriptures consists in elaborating echoes and resonances 
between some aspects of certain biblical figures. These figures correspond to each 
other and contribute to a constant rewriting and modifying of the story of the 
People of God. But also the Prologue which the Doctor magnus writes to his own 
Super Iohannem creates an overlay between two different persons named John: 
the Evangelist and the Baptist. Under the following aspects both John the Baptist 
1 With any Pontiff, according to He.  5:1; with the Patriarch Abraham as a man according to 
Gen 18:27; as a sent man, with Obadiah 1:3; with Is. 48:16 and with Moses in Ex. 3:13 as sent from 
God; with Paul in 1 Co. 15:10 as receiving substantially his identity from God. And when Albert 
the Great refers to another translation which links every aspect of John’s life to God, he adds 
some more identifications to other biblical figures. This alternative translation of the verse is so: 
‘This exposition is confirmed by another translation that says so: “He has been made man, he 
has been sent by God, his name was John”.’ The Doctor universalis distinguishes between three 
aspects with regard to the first criterium: his father, the way he was made and his nature: ‘For 
this reason, John’s father, the way he was made, his nature and [his] mission are referred to God.’ 
And the name ‘John’ indicates this original relationship to God in the womb of John’s mother, 
which assimilates him to Jesaiah in Is. 49:1: ‘The Lord has called me from my mother’s bosom 
etc.’ and to Jeremiah in Jr 1:5: ‘Before I made you in the motherly bosom, I have known you, and 
before you came out of the motherly bosom, I have sanctified you.’ In relation to John’s mission 
in this second translation, Albertus Magnus likens John the Baptist to Paul in Gal. 1:11–12: ‘I have 
let you know the gospel that has been announced to me, because it is not according to man. And 
I have neither indeed received it nor learnt from a man, but from Jesus Christ’s revelation’ and to 
Jr 1:7: ‘You will go to all that I will sent you to, and you will tell them that I shall command to you.’
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and John the Evangelist overlap implicitly. As for the authority who sends the 
witness, the Doctor universalis writes that the divine Wisdom itself manifests in 
the increated Word and in the Word made flesh and is the first efficient cause that 
teaches John the Evangelist and moves him to write (Albertus 1899, 7–8). So John 
the Evangelist, like John the Baptist, neither speaks from his own authority nor 
because he is sent by human beings. He is sent by God (ibid., 12b) and the spirit 
of the Wisdom speaks in and through him, so that the authority of what he writes 
is indubitable, says Albert, commenting on Mt 10:20 (ibid., 8) about the fourth 
Evangelist. Regarding the name ‘John’, the Doctor magnus follows the commen-
tary of Jerome of Stridon and understands this name as meaning the grace of God, 
which indicates a person in whom grace is or to whom a divine gift is made (ibid., 
11b ). Thanks to the similarity of these features, both John the Evangelist and the 
Baptist are described, on the one hand, as exceptional individuals and, on the 
other, as overlapping figures. Their singularity can, under certain aspects, build 
a general type of individuality.
Therefore, on a more general level, we could conclude from this first defini-
tion of the individuality of the witness that he or she corresponds to a singular 
case whose outstanding properties could be yet granted to other exceptional bib-
lical figures. The exceptionality of this individual is paradoxically conceived as 
general or, at least, as sharable by others. As far as his or her nature is concerned, 
the witness is a human being, so that he or she can communicate what the Word 
made man (humanatum) is to his or her human addressees. Relating to his or her 
mission as a witness sent from God as well as to the name ‘John’, the conception of 
the individual consists in shifting the substance of the human individuality from 
its contingent singularity towards its divine origin. The human individual in his or 
her own being substantially consists in the gift of God, that is, in the relationship 
with God. It is, therefore, a relational conception of the substance, or of the being, 
that is applied here to the understanding of the individual. Hence, the exceptional 
individual is the one whose characteristic is to receive his or her being (pointed 
out by the name ‘John’ in the case of John the Baptist) and the reason for his or 
her action only from the divine principle. The singularity of these exceptional wit-
nesses of God rests on a detachment from their own particular qualities as this or 
that concrete person. They are in a sense unexceptional, because their identity as 
individuals substantially consists in what all individuals share, that is the univer-
sal metaphysical origin of a first cause of being and acting. But their identity is 
not circumscribed by the particular features that usually describe the contingent 
conditions of a personal existence. So the textual ‘institutionalisation’ of the figure 
of the individual consists, in this first step, in elaborating a category of individu-
als who are exceptional because they have left behind all the particular features 
of their particular identity determined in space and time. This process of textual 
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‘institutionalisation’ is inherited from the patristic tradition which is here referred 
to very generally as the Gloss. This textual process uses an overlapping technique 
that consists in putting into relief some similar features that enable linking together 
different biblical figures. Yet, Albertus Magnus sharpens this patristic technique, 
concentrating it in a metaphysical formula about the identity of the witness.
In contrast with those exceptional individuals, the interlacing of the exegesis 
of the Gospel of John with the Greek-Arabic cosmology could make one think, at first 
sight, of a universalisation of the role of the witness who receives a specific function 
in the cosmos. Yet I shall argue here that an accurate reading of how the Albertian 
text really operates has led us to discover that the universalisation, as a detachment 
from the properties of an individual who exists in a particular space and time, is 
already involved in the original interpretation that Albert develops leaning on the 
inheritance of the patristic tradition: the identity of such an individual consists in 
defining itself substantially as coming only from his or her divine principle. What 
the Greek-Arabic cosmology brings to the Master of Cologne is, therefore, more spe-
cifically the identification of such individuals with non-human agents.
3  The identification of the individual with 
non-human agents through the influence 
of Greek-Arabic cosmology
In his commentary on Jn 1:8a (‘This one was not the light’), Albert the Great com-
pares John the Baptist to a ‘vase of light’. According to the words of the Gospel of 
John, John the Baptist is not the true light that, as a source of illumination, illumi-
nates from itself. Such a true light corresponds only to Christ. But John is  identified 
to an illuminated light (Albertus 2019, 120, 19–20), that is a light that illuminates 
because it receives its own light from the source of light itself. Albert’s aim is to 
strongly underline the Evangelist’s insistence upon ‘the distinction between the 
one who gives testimony and the one whom he bears witness to’ (ibid., 120, 11–12), 
that is, between John and Christ. It follows that human individuals are not prime 
agents. They receive their capacity to act from a divine principle that is the uni-
versal cause of action. In what follows I shall demonstrate that the witness repre-
sents a type of agency that is at the same time secondary with regard to the first 
cause and immediate, as long as it transmits the whole virtue of the first cause 
itself. This type of agency corresponds, in the Albertian system, to the  specific 
function of a mediation that does not communicate only a reduced part of what it 
receives, contrarily to a conception of causality in terms of participation.
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The argument of the lux illuminata is already in the Gloss on Jn 1:8 and in 
Augustine’s commentary on the Gospel of John (Augustinus 1954, 10, 9–11). But 
the Doctor magnus does not refer to either of those sources here, although he has 
quoted the Gloss explicitly about John the Baptist, as we have seen. Rather, later 
on in the exegesis of Jn 1:8a, he refers to Avicenna. And he uses the expression 
‘vase of light’, in order to answer to a wrong understanding of the verse Jn 1:8a 
which would, according to him, derive from Avicenna’s interpretation of lux in 
his Liber de anima (Avicenna 1972, 170, 7–171, 22). The Albertian choice to explic-
itly rely upon an Arabic source rather than the Fathers of the Church underlines 
the core of his philosophical gesture: he draws from non-Christian traditions, 
in order to universalise the function of the Christian witness as a metaphysical 
mediation and to found it on rational arguments.
According to Avicenna, lux means only the ‘light in [its] own nature and that 
is not illuminated’ (Albertus 2019, 122, 1–2), that is to say only an active principle. 
Therefore, Avicenna would contradict the Albertian exegesis of this verse, namely: 
‘The good are the illuminated light, but the illuminating light, which is Christ, is 
different’ (ibid., 120, 19–20). Avicenna would deny the distinction between two 
types of light and would interpret the verse Jn 1:8a as follows: ‘The good are the light 
that illuminates and that is not only illuminated’ (ibid., 122, 2–4). Moreover, Albert 
refers to the evidence of biblical authorities such as Mt  5:16 to strengthen what 
would be Avicenna’s interpretation of the verse. So, according to Avicenna and to 
this passage of the Holy Scriptures, John the Baptist should be an active principle of 
illumination, rather than passive, and would be, then, identified with Christ.
Avicenna’s interpretation of lux as only active constitutes an objection to the 
exegesis of Jn 1:8a that the Doctor universalis first gave. To rebut this argument, 
Albert makes explicit his identification between the witness as an illuminated 
light and the specific function of mediation as a ‘vase of light’. He develops the 
distinction between the two types of light that he has already introduced at the 
beginning of the exegesis of Jn 1:8a: the divine source of light which is only active 
and another one which illuminates, because it is illuminated. This second type of 
light, which is receptive, corresponds to John and to the category of perfect human 
beings (ibid., 122, 5–10) to which John belongs. We shall come back to this cate-
gory of perfect individuals in the third step of our inquiry. Let us concentrate now 
on their comparison with an illuminated light. These active and passive functions 
of illuminating and being illuminated are assimilated to what the Doctor expertus 
calls a ‘vase of light’. To illustrate this expression, he gives the example of a ‘lumi-
nary that emanates the light that is infused to him’ (ibid., 122, 9).
The comparison with luminaries – that is with cosmological entities – is not 
new. Albert the Great quotes two occurrences in the Holy Scriptures that mention 
the luminary (ibid., 98, 21; 122, 9–10). But Albert’s interpretation comes from 
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the understanding of the luminary as a ‘receptacle of light’ by John Damascene 
(Damascene 1955, 86, 1–2). The Doctor magnus characterises this receptive func-
tion noted by Damascene as a ‘vase of light’. As the ‘vase of light’ is a receptacle, 
it corresponds to the physical and metaphysical function of the matter, that is, 
the passive term in a relation, within the meaning of being receptive. Therefore, 
a ‘vase of light’ is, in Albert’s eyes, a body that is composed of a formal principle, 
the light that it receives, and a material one, the capacity to receive the light and 
to be informed by it. ‘A luminary is, namely, as the Damascene says, a “vase of 
light” and so there must be in it a composition of light (luminis) and of a body that 
holds the light (lumen)’ (Albertus 1993b, 235, 27–30).
Because this capacity to receive characterises precisely a body, a personal 
individual can be easily compared to a ‘vase of light’ and, therefore, to an 
impersonal being, like a cosmic entity. The mode of operation of such a non- 
human agent consists in both receiving the light from the source of illumination 
which is, in this cosmological (Duhem 1954, 327–45; Hoßfeld 1969, 318–29; Price 
396–436; Stein 1944, 182–91; Gregory 1996, 1–23) monarchical2 system unique, 
and in transmitting it to others. According to Isidore of Seville (Isidorus 1850, 
178b; 1911, without pagination) whom the Doctor universalis follows (Albertus 
1980, 90, 28; 1972, 65, 1), the etymology of solis is solus lucens: the sun is the 
only entity that shines from itself and possesses light in itself. The moon and 
the stars don’t have light in themselves. They acquire it from the sun (ibid., 90, 
28–30).
Therefore, perfect human beings are not anymore merely described as excep-
tional individuals. Rather, they are identified with the general function of a body 
that is able to receive the light of the source of illumination, so as to transmit it 
to others (Albertus 1993b, 235, 42–4). This identification with non-human agents, 
the cosmic entities, leads us to examine, firstly, their specific mode of agency 
and, secondly, their status as embodied individuals.
3.1 The mode of agency of non-personal entities
In assimilating the personal individual to a non-human agent, Albertus Magnus 
focuses attention on their common mode of agency. The first characteristic of 
the operating mode of a ‘vase of light’ consists, namely, in receiving the light of 
2 ‘Monarchical’ is here understood in its etymological meaning, denoting what has a unique 
principle. Albert makes clear that the comparison between the sun and God, as first cause, is only 
an analogy between a creature and the creator, which includes an immeasurable disproportion.
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the sun from which all the bodies in the universe receive their light univocally 
(Albertus 1972, 64, 49–54), that is according to precisely the same nature and 
definition, be they superior or inferior bodies. On this argument of the univocal 
presence of the light in every cosmic body, the Doctor magnus follows the author-
ity of Aristotle and of other philosophers (Aristoteles, Metaph., lib. 2, cap. 1 (993b 
24–7) in Ps.-Aristoteles 1562–1574, 283b; Avicenna 1980, 311, 9–15) he anony-
mously mentions. If all cosmic bodies receive the same nature of light, therefore 
this light must come from a first source. That means that all other bodies that 
emit light receive from the sun the light they give out. So the first characteristic 
of the mode of agency of non-human entities is to be receptive with regard to 
the first universal agent, which is the first cause. This feature precisely meets 
the definition of John as an exceptional personal individual: as cosmic bodies 
receive the whole light they transmit from a unique luminous source, the sun, so 
John is sent by God only and receives from God only his own being and capacity 
to act as a witness.
The second characteristic of the mode of agency of a ‘vase of light’ corre-
sponds to John’s identity substantially consisting in being received from God. 
We shall observe how the comparison with cosmic entities enables Albert the 
Great to universalise this ontological definition and to specify it on the level of 
the mode of operation. The second feature of the mode of agency of the ‘vases 
of light’ is that they operate on the basis of their own being, and not only as an 
accident (a non-essential element) regarding what they are. The comparison with 
non-personal entities leads the Doctor magnus to define the being of an individ-
ual through his or her action and, reciprocally, to link his or her action to his 
or her ontological constitution as an individual. The transition from the recep-
tion of the sunlight to its transmission happens, namely, through the ontological 
transformation of the cosmic body. Albert writes that the cosmic body receives 
‘in its depth’ (Albertus 1971, 154, 26–33; 107, 39–46; Albertus 1980, 90, 57–91, 4; 
Albertus 1975, 57, 1–2) the light that passes through it, so that this body entirely 
enters into fusion with the light (Albertus 1975, 56, 71–57, 7; Avicenna 1972, 260, 
95–263, 54, spec. 263, 44–54). The Master of Cologne points out that to receive 
light ‘in one’s depth’ means to welcome it according to one’s own being (Albertus 
1972, 64, 55–6). This melting of all its parts radically transforms its own being as 
material body into a luminous being. This happens to this body through its being 
‘trampled’ (calcatio) until it reaches fusion. In other words, it was only a physical 
body with specific transparent properties that particularly enable it to receive and 
transmit the light of the sun. And now it becomes in actu a bright light transmit-
ter. Comparing the personal individual with a non-human agent, Albert the Great 
highlights that the mode of agency of an individual in general fundamentally 
arises from the transformation of his or her own being that is performed by the 
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first universal agent. The definition of his or her being as individual depends on 
the permanent flowing of the active power of the first cause through him or her 
that makes him or her able to illuminate.
The third characteristic of the operating mode of the ‘vase of light’ concerns 
the final cause of this operation. The aim of the emission of light from the sun is 
to illuminate the whole universe as deeply and completely as it can, according to 
the measure in which the various bodies can receive it. So light is this instrument 
through which the sun, or first motor, attracts every inferior body and leads it 
towards its own form, or being in actu, that is the very nature of light itself (ibid., 
65, 7–9). Some bodies remain dark and opaque. Others refract light outwardly or 
superficially, as we will see below. Yet, the ‘vases of light’ are totally transformed 
in light. That is why they acquire a specific function as mediations that convey 
the light of the sun without reduction. Hence, through this fusion, the first motor 
assimilates to itself some specific cosmic bodies, transforming them into ‘vases 
of light’ which are able to transmit at their turn the light of the principle. But 
they are not merely channels that remain independent from the light that passes 
through them, assuming this transmission only as a role that would not affect 
their identity. As ‘vases’, they retain in some way the light they welcome, so that 
the sunlight becomes their own form, or definition, as individuals. The Doctor 
universalis even speaks of them ‘soaking’ (Albertus 1980, 78, 7–11) up the light of 
the sun until the light reaches their own centre. Yet, their being-light – that is, 
being of the same nature of the light of the sun – indicates their essential and 
continuous dependence upon the sun, as the source of light. They can transmit 
light further on, because this act can constantly be led back to the first motor 
(Albertus 1993a, 107, 68–71) as the principle that constitutes them. Their being in 
actu, that is in the operation of transmitting light, consists in drawing continu-
ously light from its source (ibid., 107, 73–6). And this act of drawing light, melting 
and emitting it, forms their own being as ‘vases of light’: the being of luminaries 
is constituted by the light of the sun itself (ibid., 43, 1–3 and 14–23).
This conception of the identity of non-human entities rejoins here the iden-
tity of exceptional human individuals, like John the Baptist and John the Evange-
list. Both are paradoxical types of individualisation. The identity of the personal 
and non-personal entities is not defined by their particular features but only by 
the universal ones, namely that they receive their being and their operation from 
the first principle. Yet, with the comparison of the exceptional witnesses of God 
with non-human agents, Albert the Great now focuses this conception of individ-
ual identity on the mode of agency that is intimately related to the being of the 
agent. He bases this conception on the arguments of the Philosophers and can 
thus generalise it.
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3.2 Embodied individuals
Now, the Master of Cologne does not make explicit why he uses exceptional indi-
viduals and specific cosmic bodies as a model of individualisation which could 
have a normative value for everyone – in the conclusion, we shall make explicit 
the nature of ‘normativity’ here. The function of the ‘vase of light’ is both cosmic 
and metaphysical. It corresponds to the function of a mediation which prevents 
a metaphysical system from being, on the one hand, pantheistic (Albertus 1993a, 
45, 52–6) and, on the other, monistic. According to the first modality, the principle 
would be confused with the universality of the beings it produces. According to 
the second, all the individuals would melt their differences in the unique nature 
of the principle. Albertus Magnus wants to avoid such metaphysical modalities 
that eliminate the possibility for the divine principle and the individuals to be 
differentiated.
Therefore, he insists on establishing specific mediations which are able to 
transmit the nature of the first principle itself, on the one hand, and on the 
other, leave a free space for the constitution of individual differences, because 
they signify a distance – or a difference – between the principle and the indi-
vidual beings. In other words, such mediations allow, on the one hand, the 
unity of a differentiated universe. The Philosophers (De epistula de principio 
universi esse, cf. Libera 1990a, 55–78; Libera 1990b, 356–64; Libera 2005, 74–87; 
Aristoteles 1986, 74, 16–7; Alfarabius 1836, 47; Avicenna 1980, 481, 50–1; Aver-
roes 1562–1574, 344b; Algazel 1933, 117, 33–4; 119, 10–1; 24–6; Maimonides 1520, 
53; Avicebron 1892–1895, 113, 23–114, 6) express this conception of the universe 
as a totality ‘turned towards the One’ (uni-versum), which Albert describes as 
follows: ‘from the simple One immediately arises only the One according to the 
order of nature’ (Albertus 1993a, 55, 72–6). This conception of the unity that 
spreads immediately from the first principle towards the extremities of the uni-
verse rejoins the univocal transmission of the light of the sun, which we have 
mentioned above.
On the other hand, such mediations open the possibility for a differentiated 
order with different degrees (ibid., 55, 65–7). Depending on their greater or lesser 
distance from the first principle, each body receives the unique nature of the sun 
light differently, namely, according to its own capacity to receive. Therefore, the 
exceptional individuals or the ‘vases of light’ as specific cosmic bodies can be 
used as universal models of individualisation, because they indicate the funda-
mental nature of every agent, human or non-human: that is to receive one’s being 
and one’s operation entirely from the first principle. And, thus, they can serve as 
mediations that prevent confusion between the first principle and all individual 
beings. Yet, the comparison with the ‘vases of light’ points out that these specific 
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agents are not universal beings that would only be defined by the light of the sun, 
but are embodied individuals.
As a fourth characteristic, the mode of operation of these impersonal agents 
is linked to them having a specific ‘substance of body’ (Albertus 1980, 90, 60–1) 
which differs from that of the sun and of the other bodies. The reason why a 
body receives and, to some extent, retains the light of the sun is its own consist-
ence, its ‘thickness’ (Albertus 1971, 107, 38–9), as the Doctor magnus writes. He 
goes further: light is no property of the fire in itself. The fire receives light, when 
it is mixed up with a transparent body that has some thickness (Albertus 1971, 
107, 29–32). In other words, light wouldn’t shine and appear to us, if it weren’t 
reflected upon a body and received by it. It would just dazzle and blind. That the 
individual agent is embodied is, namely, the condition for the light of the sun 
to be seen.
Yet, bodies receive the light of the sun singularly according to their relation 
to the source of light. The Doctor universalis, following ‘men who excel in phi-
losophy’ – Aristotle (Ps.-Aristoteles 1562–1574, 283b), Ptolemy (Ptolemaeus 1515, 
35v), Avicenna (Avicenna 1980, 311, 9–15), Messelach (Thorndike 1949, 354) and 
many others (e.g. Al-Bitrûjî 1952, 90, 4–5; 128, 30–129, 14) – distinguishes several 
degrees of reception (Albertus 1980, 90, 44–57). Jupiter (Albertus 1971, 154, 986, 
esp. 32) is from all sides crossed by the light of the sun and is, thus, resplendent. 
Because the body of Mars is of a less noble nature, the light it transmits declines 
towards red. The light that Venus emits is pale. And the light that passes through 
Saturn is even more pallid. The light of the moon seems to be veiled, because the 
moon is earthly (Aristoteles 1966, 152, 12–5) and opaque and because, depending 
on its phases, it gets away from a perpendicular position with regard to the sun 
(Albertus 1993a, 107, 77–88). Being embodied agents allows the different ‘vases 
of light’ to grant various shades to the light of the sun. Without each of these 
singular bodies, the light of the sun wouldn’t have been manifested under those 
frequencies of the light spectrum.
The comparison with the ‘vase of light’ enables the Doctor universalis to link 
together the being and the agency of the individual as entirely received from the 
divine principle, on the one hand. And, on the other, it points out the absolute 
singularity of the way in which an embodied individual transmits what he or she 
receives from the first principle. This absolute singularity is based on his or her 
being embodied, which acquires here the status of a metaphysical function. In 
his commentary on the Gospel of John, Albert of Cologne derives, namely from 
a comparison of the ways in which the different cosmic bodies receive the light 
of the sun, a typology of the different ways a heart relates to the spiritual light 
(Albertus 2019, 98, 3–23). The embodied agency of the witness does not appear in 
the description of the exceptional individual influenced by the patristic tradition. 
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By contrast, it constitutes a main characteristic of the mode of agency of the ‘vase 
of light’. Therefore, Albert the Great clearly interprets the Gospel of John relying 
on this Greek-Arabic cosmological theory. He explicitly compares perfect human 
beings (ibid., 122, 7–8) like John to the ‘vases of light’, which are transparent and 
yet receive the light of the sun ‘in their depth’, that is being modified in their own 
being. They differ from the bodies that only receive light superficially and have, 
therefore, a shine that has only an outer beauty. They are also different from the 
black or opaque bodies that do not receive light, except as the manifestation of 
their own darkness.
4 As a conclusion
A closer reading of Albert’s texts has revealed that, in the first type of individual-
isation, that is, in the patristic description of an exceptional individual, Albert’s 
original interpretation consists in introducing already a universalisation dynamic. 
The Master of Cologne transforms the patristic conception of the exceptional wit-
nesses of God, interpreting these witnesses as individuals who receive their whole 
being from God. What makes them exceptional is precisely what takes them away 
from their unicity as particular persons existing in a certain time and space.
Therefore, the function of the comparison with the ‘vases of light’ is not only 
to reinforce the universalised reach of the patristic type of individuality. But also, 
the assimilation of personal individuals to non-personal cosmic entities enables 
Albert to highlight their common mode of agency as embodied beings. Their 
mode of operation gives them the status of mediations of the first principle with 
regard to all other entities in the universe, because they receive inwardly the flow 
of the first principle which grants them being and agency, so that they are trans-
formed in this active principle which constitutes their being as mediations, or 
‘vases of light’. Their embodiment enables them to transmit, at their turn, the 
light they receive, without reducing it and in a singular manner that depends on 
their physical constitution.
Thus, the second and third meanings of ‘individualisation’ – which are 
also two steps in an individualisation process, that is ‘individualisation’ as de- 
personalisation and as embodiment – which Albert the Great derives from his 
interpretation of the Greek-Arabic cosmology, enable him: to base his interpre-
tation on philosophical arguments in speaking about exceptional individuals 
whose being and acting are only defined by the divine gift; to focus on the close 
relationship between those individuals’ being and their operating; and to assign 
a specific metaphysical function of mediation to those individuals.
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That is why the Doctor universalis attaches a normative value to this cos-
mological pattern, or more precisely a protreptic function: every reader of his 
commentary on the Gospel of John is invited to go through this individualisation 
process, so as to match his or her mode of agency and the conception of his or her 
own identity to the mediating function he or she occupies in the universe between 
the divine principle and his or her own human community. Albert concludes his 
own commentary, following John the Evangelist himself, by calling on his reader 
to become, at his or her turn, a witness in his or her own way: that is an embodied 
individual who transmits in his or her own singular mode what he or she receives 
from the divine principle to his or her human addressees, constituting thereby 
(through his or her individualisation in actu) a community of individuals. Of 
course, human beings, as created, participate the light of the first causes. They 
do not convey it to others without reducing it. Yet, Albert’s interpretation of the 
‘vase of light’ has a protreptic function, in that it invites the reader to turn himself 
or herself towards this specific definition of his or her own being and agency. 
It does not mean that the definition of the individual as a participation of the 
first cause, which only receives being and capacity to act according to its limited 
capacity, is denied. Rather, Albert the Great suggests a plurality of perspectives on 
the comprehension of individuality. The protreptic function of the ‘vase of light’ 
underlines one of those perspectives that the reader can take into consideration.
The way in which the Master of Cologne himself goes through the individ-
ualisation process that leads to the ‘vase of light’ is reflected in the function he 
gives to this individualisation process in his own philosophical system, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, in the way he deals with the different rationalities 
involved in his act of commenting. Far from subordinating his hermeneutics to a 
corpus of theological dogmas, so as to constitute a ‘Christian philosophy’ accord-
ing to Étienne Gilson’s formula (Gilson 1998, 1–38), Albert extends Johannism 
beyond the limits in which the traditional exegesis of the Fathers of the Church 
had circumscribed it. Johannism is instead conceived under the influence of 
concepts forged inside exogenous sciences and under non-Christian authorities, 
such as Alfarabi, Avicenna, Averroes, Messelach and Ptolemy.
This interlacing of various religious traditions, scientific disciplines and 
realms of realities that allows this original interpretation of the Johannine 
witness is not a minor phenomenon in Albert’s way of thinking. On the contrary, 
it leads to a central notion in Albert’s philosophical system. The function of the 
mediation that entirely communicates the flow of the principle protects Albert’s 
‘ metaphysics of fluxus’ from both monism and pantheism. Therefore, the indi-
vidualisation process that Albert understands under the name ‘vase of light’ is 
raised as a philosophical tool that prevents all individuals from being assimi-
lated to the divine substance or confused with it, on the one hand, and, on the 
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other, that prevents the divine principle from being identified with individuals 
and reduced to them. With such mediations as ‘vases of light’, the first principle 
is present to every entity in the universe, even the farthest.
Albert was one of the first Dominican exegetes in the thirteenth century to 
receive the inheritance of the Greek-Arabic philosophy and sciences and to cross 
it with his own understanding of the Holy Scriptures and with their Greek-Latin 
patristic interpretations. At the studium of Cologne, he founds a new stream of 
interpretation in which one of the main principles is that the same truth lies at 
the origin of every religious tradition (Pagan, Jewish, Christian, Muslim…), which 
we can also find in Eckhart’s works (Echardus 1936–1989, 154, 14–155, 2; 155, 5–7).
Moreover, the enhanced diffusion of the Albertian comprehension of this 
process of individualisation is documented in Eckhart’s reading of the same 
passage of the Gospel of John (Casteigt 2014, 159–76). Meister Eckhart likens the 
fulfilment of the witness to the birth of a son. In other words, the mediation, or 
the witness, achieves its being in actu in an immediacy to the principle. The son 
has the same being as the father. He is only distinct from the father, as far as their 
relation is concerned, as the one who is begotten is different from the one who 
begets. But the subtlety of Eckhart’s interpretation is that the son has the same 
mode of agency as a ‘vase of light’. Identical to the nature of the principle, he 
transmits the very light of the principle without reducing it. Eckhart insists on the 
transparency of the agent, whereas Albert highlights the embodiment that makes 
the operation of the agent unique.
Albert the Great does not only look for homologous structures in the dif-
ferent religious traditions and ways of thinking; he does not merely modify the 
literary exegetical genre which will, for example in Eckhart’s works, naturally 
include the ‘external’ influences of other disciplines of knowledge and other reli-
gious traditions; but rather he, as an author, goes through a specific process of 
de- personalisation and embodiment. In other words, his individualisation, as an 
author, is not limited to the criteria of the particular religious tradition to which 
he belongs. But his receiving of other religious traditions and assimilating them 
moves him off-centre from the place of exceptional individuality he occupies as 
a master in his religious order, the Order of Preachers, and in the intellectual 
institutions of his time. Through this de-personalisation, he experiences theoret-
ically (through the commentaries of Greek-Arabic cosmological and metaphysical 
texts in this case) and practically, through the process of writing, an individualis-
ation as a procedure which is opened to everyone as a possibility and as part of a 
development which is not only reserved for human agents but includes also non- 
human ones. Indeed, the model of individualisation is the one in which a star or a 
planet actualises transmission, through the singularity of its own physical body, 
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Dietmar Mieth
Self-transcendence in Meister Eckhart
1  Meister Eckhart’s vernacular project 
in the service of religious self-awareness
The importance Meister Eckhart the Lehrmeister and Lebemeister, thus the Paris-
ian magister and vernacular preacher, ascribes to ‘equality’ is striking. He means 
both human and religious equality. (cf. Sermon 65, MW) Eckhart addresses all 
individuals – without distinction of sex – on the basis of equal possibilities. In 
scholastic philosophy as for Eckhart, of course, ‘equality’ is a metaphysical, not 
a sociological category. Inequality of social rank has no influence on this funda-
mental category, as, ‘before God’, all are equal, in terms of God’s Creation and of 
their humanity and their salvation. To clarify, we may say that, while plants and 
animals are unequal, all are ‘equal’ as God’s creatures. When this perspective 
dominates, a social component arises, as becomes clear in Eckhart’s use of the 
word Eigenschaft, meaning for him subjection to external purposes and ascend-
ancies. In humorous vein against Thomas Aquinas, Eckhart makes the point that 
Thomas was interested in the inequalities of blades of grass, thus in grasses indi-
vidually, but that he himself is interested in their equality, thus grass in genere 
(cf. Sermon 53, MW 281, Pr. 22, DW I, 384–6).
Eckhart addresses individual people as ‘souls’, and so mostly without regard for 
differences. He does not, of course, overlook or pass over the differences between 
individuals, but sees such differences as being leibgebunden, ‘tied to the body’. He is 
also able explicitly to expand on the idea, not least when he indicates that ‘my body 
is more in my soul than my soul is in my body’ (Semon 66 and Sermon 21, MW); 
he goes further when he attests to the perfection of embodied humans as being the 
‘best’, while that of angels is only the highest (cf. Sermon 70, MW 359; Pr. 67, DW III, 
cf. Mieth, LE IV, 95–122).We read in Eckhart’s explicit preaching program:
When I preach it is my wont to speak about detachment (Abegescheidenheit), and of how 
man should rid himself of self and all things. Secondly, that man should be in-formed back 
into the simple good which is God. Thirdly, that we should remember the great nobility 
(Adel) God has put into the soul, so that man may come miraculously to God. Fourthly, of 
the purity of the divine nature, for the splendour of God’s nature is unspeakable.
(Beginning of Sermon 22, MW 152, Pr. 53, EW I, 564, 6–14)
The program is about God’s and the soul’s Lauterkeit (transparency, clarity). In his 
concern to formulate scholastic thinking as sermons in the vernacular, Eckhart 
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imparts thoughts that, while highly speculative, are expressed by him in terms of 
a linguistic pool that, created in the context of a spiritual relationship with God, 
has already itself become vernacular. Speculation in a language that has yet to 
be employed in speculation often has an innovative result. For this reason, even 
19th-century Old-Germanists were first struck by Eckhart’s supreme linguistic 
astuteness as a vernacular preacher. Eckhart is not actively concerned with reli-
gious ‘experience’, in the sense of Bonaventure’s cognitio Dei quasi experimen-
talis, or the same scholar’s Three ways to God (De triplici via), thus experience 
already established and current in the vernacular, in the sense of what in today’s 
parlance is referred to on the basis of historical testimony as mystagogy. But the 
rich imagery he employs is often interpreted as ‘mystic’.
Eckhart is not interested in immersive mysticism, initiation into secret 
ciphers, or promotion of an ecstatic condition. But he is conscious of telling 
the absolute truth, come ‘direct from the heart of God’. And he insists that, in 
a sermon, a communicative resonance is possible between preacher and audi-
ence and vice-versa. Above all, though, Eckhart’s desire is to teach how one 
may live. Life is not to be shorn of its ‘now-ness’ on the strength of the future, 
or of a plan. For God is present in every ‘now’ more than he is in the flow of 
time: ‘He works, and I come into being’ (Sermon 65, MW). Unity in works, exer-
cise of the heart, individual identity in religious and moral terms: these are 
his educational project, from which even ‘coarse and unschooled’ people are 
expressly not excluded (cf. Divine Comfort, MW 553f., BgT, EW II, 213). It is with 
such optimism that, here like Socrates, according to the official accusation he 
‘confused’ people.
2  The early project: self-transcendence 
in Eckhart’s teaching in Erfurt
Eckhart begins, as a prior in Erfurt (from 1294), by apparently following 
normal tradition with his Collationes, a title inspired by John Cassian; Eckhart, 
though, has a new spiritual program in mind, at whose center stands, not ‘expe-
rience’, but, in the tradition of the philosophical maxim ‘know thyself’, the 
investigation of one’s own sensibility: nim dîn selbes wâr (Talks, MW 489, EW II, 
340, 25f.).
There is seldom explicit mention of ‘experience’ in Eckhart’s sermons. And 
yet he is nolens volens confronted by the question of experience when he speaks 
spiritually to the ‘people’. In Erfurt itself we have accounts of the desire of pious 
women to achieve an ecstatic state (jubilus) arising from a particular path of 
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piety.1 From the beginning, however, Eckhart dismisses all guarantees of a par-
ticular path to God, emphasizing instead the Weiselosigkeit des Gottfindens, the 
pathless way to find God; that is to say, it is not the already ritualized path itself 
that matters, but the way that path satisfies the criteria that Eckhart deploys.2
Eckhart orchestrates transcendence of self as a process by which God and 
humans relate together. Selbst/self is a central concept in medieval spiritual 
writing. Eckhart’s early Erfurt teachings (1294–1298) are commonly cited: nim dîn 
selbes war und wo dû dich vindest, dâ lâz dich. Observe yourself, and wherever you 
find yourself, leave yourself: that is the very best way. (cf. lc) He provides a kind of 
guide to diagnosing one’s own sensibility: where you discover yourself, there you 
must leave yourself. This most widely known and followed of Eckhart’s works can 
be summarized as follows:
Instead of changing themselves internally, pious people want to change 
themselves externally. For example, they want to imitate others, go on journeys, 
or enter a monastery. They are not at peace with themselves. They think they have 
to change the circumstances of their lives, and, in the process, neglect to change 
themselves internally. For they relate to (external) circumstances in a perverse 
way. Instead, they ought to learn to change themselves; otherwise they are not at 
peace, wherever they go, whether into another circle of acquaintance, to another 
place, or far away. They run far away from themselves, and become lost. Stay with 
yourself, but leave yourself. However, you forsake external goods, that of itself 
will not have an effect on you. But, if you step away from your covetous desires, 
then you can have goods and reputation, but they will no longer matter to you. 
You must not care for yourself as if you were an all-important possession. You 
must not even cultivate the longing for your own covetous desires.  What Jesus 
praises in spiritual poverty (Matthew 5:3) is inner freedom from one’s own striv-
ing to possess and one’s own longing. So: ‘Pay heed to yourself, and where you 
then find yourself to be (dich vindest), there leave yourself. That is the best you 
can do’. So: study your Befindlichkeit. (Be)vinden translates the Latin experiri, the 
religious experience that is summarized in the technical expression experientia 
Dei quasi experimentalis (Bonaventure).3 Eckharts’ ‘Talks of Instruction’, which I 
will resume in the following, insists:
What impedes you is that you are always yourself and nothing else. It is your self-will, even 
if you do not know it and refuse to believe it. For the disquiet that plagues you always comes 
from your own will, whether you are aware of it or not. (cf. Talks, MW  487ff.) When we think 
1 Mundschenk 1997, n. 1610 ff., 243.
2 Cf. on Eckhart’s pathless way to God in Mieth 1969.
3 Cf. Geybels 2007.
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a human being should avoid something or seek something in particular, we are usually 
thinking of places, or people, or a way of life, or stress, or an activity: but this is not to blame 
for the fact that he is prevented by his way of life or whatever else: you, everywhere, your-
self, are what impedes you, for in all these matters you behave wrongly […].
The ‘leaving’ meant here is a process of letting go – in the sense of freeing from 
ties – without end. Whoever lets himself go immediately readmits himself. This 
leads to a conception of Gelassenheit (‘detachment’), today best understood as 
unreserved surrender. So the bond with God always does as well by the ‘leaving’ 
as the ‘leaving’ itself goes well. God fills a person to the extent that the person is 
empty. Eckhart constantly poses his listeners the question: where are you, how is 
it with you? If all is well with you, that is your doing too. The way you are is the 
way you act.
[…] So begin with yourself, and let yourself be […]. The more people venture forth, the less 
they find peace. They act like someone who cannot find the way; the further he goes, the 
more he becomes lost. So what is he to do? He should first relinquish his own self: then 
he has relinquished everything. It is true: if a person relinquishes a kingdom or the entire 
world, but retains his own self, he has given up nothing. Yes! If he has relinquished his 
own self, whatever he then retains wealth, respect, or whatever: (yet) he has relinquished 
everything […].
For, whatever you do not wish to covet, for God’s sake you have given that all up and sur-
rendered it. This is why our Lord said: Blessed be the poor in spirit (cf. Matthew 5:3), which 
is to say those who are poor by their own will. And no-one should doubt this. If there were 
a better way, our Lord would have said it when he spoke of this: Whoever wishes to follow 
me, he must first deny himself (Matthew 16:24) – this is the nub of it. Get to know yourself, 
and, wherever you find yourself, leave yourself there. This is the best way.’
These criteria of ‘leaving’ deconstruct certain ideals of particularity in the fields 
of humility,4 prayer, penance, poverty, and contemplative immersion, among 
many others. But it is possible further to construe Eckhart’s practical spiritual 
intention in terms of the fundamental concept Gelassenheit.5 In common with the 
German words Wirklichkeit and Bildung, Gelassenheit cannot be translated into 
English without shift or loss of meaning. Neither ‘calmness’ nor ‘coolness’ fits, 
and neither does ‘composure’; just as ‘reality’ does not fit for Wirklichkeit, or ‘edu-
cation’ for Bildung. This relates to the fact that our fundamental concept Gelas-
senheit stems from so-called Late-Medieval Dominican mysticism, as represented 
by Meister Eckhart (ca. 1260–1328), Henry Suso (1294–1361), and Johannes Tauler 
(1300–1361). Conversely, historical linguistic developments and the globalization 
4 Cf. Schöller 2009; Witte 2013, 302–30.
5 Cf. Mieth 2014b.
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of English have had such an inverse effect on German usage that Wirklichkeit is 
now associated with reality, Bildung with instruction or training, and Gelassen-
heit with calmness or coolness. This represents a loss in central meaning and 
human meaningfulness. For, if we consider the religious origin of these words 
in German, Wirklichkeit has something to do with Gottes Wirken, for God is lau-
teres Wirken (Latin actus purus): it is not a matter of presence, but of dynamic. 
Similarly, Bildung has something to do with Herzensbildung, and Gelassenheit is 
not quiescence, but the fundamental stance of self-distancing and surrender. If 
we look for an element of Eckhart’s central message in English, then we find it 
rendered by ‘detachment’.6 The sense cannot be expressed in such an integrative 
form in German. However, rendering it by Eckhart’s Abgeschiedenheit or Ledigkeit, 
‘detachment’ brings us closer to our Dominican than, for example,  ‘calmness’.
3  ‘Inwardness’ – God is internal to humans, 
not outside or above us. Self-transcendence  
from the inside out 
When you are inwardly in the right place, then it does not matter where you 
choose to be. If you are in the wrong place inwardly, then nowhere will be right 
for you. If you are in the right place, then God is with you, on the street, among 
human beings. Nothing stands in your way anymore. God shines in everything 
you come across. God works through you when you are in that place. Then, 
although circumstances might be changing around you, you are, as it were, con-
stantly ‘God-feeling’. This fundamental feeling penetrates you, even when you 
are at the same time moved by many things. God is active and seeks you out. 
Nothing stands in his way. You may be helped in this by being in a church, but 
what matters is a presence of God in every situation. Instead of frantically seeking, 
you must let yourself be found. The feeling may be compared to a constant thirst: 
as long as it is unquenched it remains present, whatever else may happen. The 
thirst dominates your self-awareness (cf. Talk, MW, 491ff., DW V, 206). The thirst 
is slaked by a Durchbruch or ‘breakthrough’ into an inner source, and the conse-
quence is a life-change, not an external alteration.
One can practise this. Learning to write also begins clumsily until such time 
as it flows easily from the hand. Learning an instrument, one arrives at facility 
6 Cf. Vinzent 2011. 
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through practice. So it is with the sense of God: first you have to make an effort, 
for example in prayer; then it comes of itself.
When we are in this fundamental state of feeling, we can use the possibilities 
we meet with in the world. Whoever has inner understanding also works well. For 
God is ‘in all things’, and to be found in all circumstances. For he is ‘pure reality’ 
(Wirklichkeit); he consists entirely in works. Whoever possesses him inwardly, he 
helps from the inside out. Whoever comes so far, in the midst of works has the 
sense of being unconstrained and with God.
Anyone might fall into difficulties in this process, or be misled into error. But 
we can so attune ourselves as to nevertheless remain inwardly in that fundamen-
tal state, or be capable of returning to it. Everyone can be weak, but, in finding 
our way back to our self and to our fundamental state, we draw new strength 
from our weaknesses. The problem is not the weakness; the problem is wanting 
what makes us weak and error-prone: that is, renouncing our fundamental state 
in favour of another state. The problem is not the tendency to sin – we should not 
wish it away – but the way we react to the tendency.
Remember: it is not that familiar splendour that constitutes love in its full-
ness, but the intensity of our will. Will is more than splendid feelings (cf. Sermon 
65, MW). Will must be strong for its own sake, even without the support of pleas-
ant feelings. We can test the strength of the state we are in by opening ourselves 
up to everyday necessity, and being ready to help the poor and tend the sick, 
instead of wallowing in pious feelings.
Whoever lets something go, receives back a hundred times as much (cf. Mark 
10:29f.). Whoever gives something up receives it as a gift. For whatever such a 
person then lacks creates space for the unfolding of God’s love. Paul even goes 
so far as to risk being separated from the comfort of Christ’s love when what is at 
stake is his active love for his brothers and sisters (cf. Romans 9:3). Here too, the 
message is, if you lose comfort you gain greater comfort.
This being so, Eckhart also gives answers to the need for experience, although 
in a metaphoric of life rather than an instruction to seek experience in a narrow 
sense. In, for example, the Dionysian Sermon 71 (EW II, 64ff., Sermon 19, MW) 
and in the cycle on God’s birth in the soul,7 he gives such answers to the repeated 
question: How can we feel something (‘bevinden’) of this?
7 Cf. DW IV, 1, Sermons 101–4 (102=83 MW, 103=90 MW); on the authenticity of this God’s-birth 
cycle, cf. Steer (ed.), ibid. 320 f.
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4  Working from the inside to the outside, in order 
to mitwirken with God’s Wirklichkeit (activitas)
This brings me to a brief consideration of Eckhart’s association with ‘mysticism’. 
Nowhere does Meister Eckhart associate the term with himself. ‘Mysticism’, 
understood as the religious experience of profound realities, is a recent concept.8 
While Eckhart speaks of contemplation and ecstasy, in the sense of particular 
gifts of grace, he always mentions the act of experience in a distanced sense. 
Experience assumes that one contemplates one’s contemplation, thus observing 
oneself as it were in unity with God, watching oneself ‘in the act’.9 It is more 
important to Eckhart that one should ‘know’ of that unity, even without any 
accompanying experiential act. ‘Knowing’, Wissen, is here meant in the sense of 
wisdom and accomplishment. What is central is Isticheit, the ineluctable knowl-
edge that something ‘is’, not that it can be typified in distinct categories.10 The 
allocation is ontological, not epistemological or psychological. Implied here is 
an end to the practice of admiring people on account of their explicit, ecstatic 
Jubilus, or their particular attributes11: a habit that can lead to error. Only practi-
cal change that a person has brought about in his or her own life, in the sense of 
works of love, is reliable:
You often ask how you ought to live. Now pay close attention. Just as I have told you about 
the image – that is the way you should live! You should be His and for Him, you should not 
be your own or for yourself, or belong to anyone…. I declare truly that, as long as anything is 
reflected in your mind, which is not the eternal Word, or which looks away from the eternal 
Word, then, good as it may be, it is not the right thing. For he alone is a good man who, 
having set at naught all created things, stands facing straight, with no side-glances, towards 
the eternal Word, and is imaged and reflected there in righteousness. That man draws from 
the same source as the Son, and is himself the Son. 
(Sermon 14, MW 116ff., Pr.16b, EW I, 192) 
‘God has not bound man’s salvation to any special mode’. You following 
Eckhart, must rather draw all good ways into your own way (Talks, MW 505; 
DMBR, DW V, 251, 10–4).  It is thus a question of self and experience, but also of 
a successful path to a good life.
But: if God withdraws and conceals himself, what can I do? 
8 Cf. de Certeau, 2010, 31.
9 Cf. Vinzent 2014, 220.
10 Cf. my interpretation of Sermon DW 67 (MW 70), LE IV, 102 ff. Cf. besides Beccarisi 2005. 
11 For ‘jubilus’: cf. the description of the Béguines in Nicolaus von Bibra in Mundschenk 1997, n.1.
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Distinguish what you feel and what comforts you from everything else. For, 
even towards suffering, you can behave as if you were being comforted. God 
suffers with you. His readiness to experience pain and his ability to do so are 
greater than ours. Whatever pain hits us hits him harder, because he is even more 
sensitive to it. Does not his suffering make our bitterness sweet? The light shines 
in the darkness: we do not see it in the daylight.
You can behave towards God in such a way that you let him be, and do 
not keep him for yourself. Then you can abandon yourself, as Paul abandoned 
himself to the will of God (cf. Acts 9:6), as Mary committed her will to the will of 
God. As we have seen, Eckhart repeats often: You become truly human by ceasing 
to want for yourself. It is a question of not blocking the way with self-will when 
God’s will wishes to pass through you. There are many people in heaven who did 
not quite manage that (you can cross the sea even on a light breeze). But that is 
the direction to take to the main prize: to be enveloped in God, wearing him ‘like a 
cap on your head’ (Talks, DW V, 228,4; tr. DMBR).  God allows himself to be borne 
on our tongue, so that we may remark what is really sweet and delicious.
How can we become certain of eternal life?  
(cf. Talks, MW 502, DW V, 240–4) 
There is a certainty through inner epiphany, which is given to few people and 
can be subject to self-deception. But there is also the certainty of love, and this 
is greater, more ‘authentic’, more credible, and more certain. It relies on daily 
contact with love. All creatures and human friendships are involved in this 
contact. Whoever loves is not afraid (cf. 1 John 4:18). Whoever loves is wrapped in 
the cloak of forgiveness (cf. 1 Peter 4:8). Love erases everything and begins anew. 
The more it erases, the more it is increased (cf. Luke 7:47).
God comes near to you, however far away you may feel. (cf. lc. 249–51, 5) God 
stands before your door: leave it open for him! And do not be severe with yourself 
if you cannot take the path that everyone reveres. For there are many paths (cf. 1 
Corinthians 7:24). One path to the good is not to be pitted against another. You 
should not despise the ways taken by others. You yourself must not be fickle in 
the ways and paths that you take. You may learn from role models, but do not 
copy them! This even applies to Jesus Christ: we do not have to fast for 40 days as 
we are told he did. Let everyone choose their own way, following Christ and not 
trying to copy him. Fasting in Jesus’ sense is also not to utter a word when silence 
is preferable: or not to respond to an insult.
If you are inwardly secure in your direction, then fine clothes are not a con-
sideration: they do not elevate you, but neither do they damage you (cf. Talks, MW 
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506ff.; EW II, 388ff.). It is the same with good food with your family or in other 
company. Be happy and give thanks for it. There is a time for fasting, and a time 
for eating. Joy and sorrow have their time. We can even learn from Jesus Christ 
himself that blessings can lie in sorrow. You must, therefore, not shine in these 
things, in eating and dressing, by the regard you wish to create. It is not forbidden 
to cook or put on something special: such a stricture too could be burdensome. 
But you must not be overweening on your own account; much rather be ‘over-
weening’ on Christ’s account. If your works come out of him, he will take them up.
To be careless in the midst of your works  
(cf. Talks, MW 492ff.; DW V, 209–11) 
How do we practice finding and embracing God in all things? We must remove 
from our works the impediment of our inner direction. If we succeed in that, we 
can work and delight in our works, without mirroring ourselves in the outcome. 
For then we embrace our works as a gift from God, that is to say as a continuation 
of his works and his authorship. It is a question of disengaging inwardly, and 
of the state of being disengaged (Abgeschiedenheit). This is our preparation for 
correctly receiving the gifts of God: to learn that it is not a question of magnifying 
something to hang on the wall for our own glory. God wishes to find himself again 
in our will. The correct ethic does not seek success in the sense of a goal; it allows 
in what God wants for the world. This can be a strong and good feeling, but that 
feeling can also deceive if it does not identify itself as inner surrender.
Inner and outer works  
(cf. Talks, MW 512; EW II, 404,14 – 406,3) 
We may not remain inactive in our inwardness. Works are important, as long as 
they are works performed with God. For inwardness must break out in works, and 
works lead back into inwardness: works outward and inward together. But it is a 
question of ‘working from the inside outwards’. We can also work on inwardness, 
for example through humility (see above). The highest point of exaltation lies in 
the lowest point of self-abasement. The smallest is the greatest (cf. Mark 9:35). They 
who can give receive most. We owe to God the honour of giving. All that we have in 
the form of gifts is only ‘lent’ to us. We must therefore dispossess ourselves inwardly. 
For God himself alone wishes to be our entire possession. That is true poverty: to be 
empty and at the same time newly replenished. Eckhart asserts with Paul: ‘We must 
have as if we had not’, and yet possess all things (2 Corinthians 6:10).
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 God does not give me the best that I can in any way imagine for myself; 
and even this is as I must want it. He gives when we take back our own expecta-
tions. Whether God works with nature in humans, as the creator, or with grace 
as the savior, is hard to distinguish here. Eckhart has it that the particular course 
the water takes to flow into a garden is not as important as that the garden gets 
watered (cf. Talks, MW 521, EW II, 430,29 – 432,4).
Eckhart as a Dominican belongs to the poverty faction. But he does not teach 
emulation of Jesus’ poverty, as Francis does, but emulation of God’s wealth. God 
is rich because he lacks nothing; but he keeps hold of none of his wealth for 
himself. Eckhart – without disavowing outward poverty – thus espouses an inner 
concept of poverty: not to have, not to know, not to want; but to relinquish all this 
to God’s works.  
5 Transcending self in God’s birth 
God’s incarnation is for Eckhart the central perspective in Christian theology, and, 
for him, the historical event of Christ’s birth represents only an occasion for more 
precise reflection on that central theme.12 The significance of this for Eckhart is: 
as well as a creatio continua (‘perpetual Creation’) there is an incarnatio continua 
(‘perpetual Incarnation’); which is to say, an event that has both always been 
consummate, and at the same time is in the process of being consummated at 
every moment as a work of God. From this perspective, Eckhart not only sees 
the world and humanity differently, but also the Trinity, so to speak retroactively, 
at its origin or in principle. Insofar as (according to Boethius) a human being – 
not, say, an angel – is a ‘person’ in the sense of individual substance, Christ is a 
‘person’ through his humanity. But it is not only on Earth that he has this quality, 
but also in the Trinity. In this way, through the perpetual act of God’s incarna-
tion, relationships (relationes) in the Trinity become relationships between per-
sons.13 The process not only changes our understanding of the Trinity, but also 
‘ennobles’ the nature of humanity. There is thus a kind of return-birth, in which 
humanity, in actively collaborating in God’s Wirklichkeit, reinforces the dynamic 
of the relationship between body, soul, and the divine (the Trinity).14
What happens during the process of being borne and being born? Many think 
only of the ‘product’, the child. But the father becomes a father only when he has 
12 Cf. Mieth 2012 on the following.
13 Cf.  Pr. 67, DW III, Sermon 70 MW. Cf. Mieth, LE IV.
14 Cf. Mieth 2014a, 63–72.
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a son or a daughter, the mother a mother only when she has a son or a daughter. 
Eckhart expands this rationale to the extent of saying, ‘God becomes when all 
creatures pronounce God’ (Sermon 109, DW IV, 771, 5ff.). The word ‘God’ comes 
into being by there being people who can utter it, even though they do not reach 
the obscure depths of the deity by doing so. God is also present within belief after 
coming into being, but then he is above all names.
Birth as a divine self-revelation is to be understood as an event in time that 
reveals to us a constant, intense gesture of devotion by God. At the same time, 
again according to Eckhart, it is to be understood as a becoming without time, 
that is to say a constant, perennial motion (cf. In John n. 8, LW III, 8 f.). This 
motion is part of God’s plan of creation, which we are not to understand as if he 
lives before and above us: by this extreme level of devotion, he lives in us. John’s 
gospel begins: ‘In the beginning was the word’, and Eckhart equates this with 
the beginning of creation. ‘In the beginning’, he says, ‘is not the same as “at” 
the beginning’. Eckhart knows that creation must happen constantly: God is not 
a clock-maker, who winds the mechanism at the beginning and then constantly 
intervenes to put it right.
Eckhart understands the Word (in the sense of John 1:1) as a speech event: 
something issues from and at the same time remains in the speaker. That is very 
easy for us to comprehend and validate. The same applies to the eyes’ outward 
gaze: it simultaneously depicts in us the image of what is seen. Or he speaks of 
an echo, in which the sound is and at the same time rebounds; or of warmth left 
behind in the night by a sunny day: a vestige of the light.
God becoming human is for Eckhart at the same time a revelation of the 
general process of becoming human: God meant much more by his irreversible 
association with humanity than merely to live with humans on Earth. Humanity 
and divinity are inextricably interwoven, not merely since the time of Jesus, but 
in the sense of revelation working and affecting the past and the future, fulfilling 
itself in time, and at the same time located transversely to time.
Language mediates between this emblematic birth, across time and yet in 
time, and humanity’s creative, self-knowing profession of self, finding expres-
sion in a reciprocal birthing process not to be confused with rebirth. For human-
ity, in its own works that themselves emerge from God’s Wirklichkeit, also gives 
birth to God. The only way we have the ‘Word’ is in words, but these refer to a 
perspective on Wirklichkeit where this Wirklichkeit is not ‘given’, but is in the 
process of arising. However, this potential to emerge is God’s Creation, whether 
as the becoming of the world or as God’s becoming human. Or, as Eckhart says: 
‘God works, and I come into being’ (Sermon 65, MW 331ff.). For the meaning of 
God’s becoming human is humanity’s becoming out of God and becoming God. 
By ‘becoming’ is here expressly not meant spatial progression or the temporal 
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cycle of becoming and expiring, but something happening in the now, working 
across time’s chronological course, so to speak in another dimension, but always 
happening, without cease and at every moment of time. Otherwise, if this activ-
ity did not constantly happen, as a product of Creation, but also as a process 
of becoming human, everything would collapse into the vortex of nothingness. 
Becoming human and becoming an ‘I’ are entangled in this process. The offer is 
all-inclusive, but leaves the personal way open. In Eckhart’s own words:
[…] the process, or the engendering and outflowing we are speaking of here, really happens 
first and above all in the arising instant. This does not happen in movement or in time: it 
is the goal and end of movement. […] Therefore it does not logically pass into non-being, 
or sink into past time. But, if this is so, the process is always in the beginning. But then it 
is always with us: take away time, and evening becomes morning; and, if it is always as if 
“in the beginning”, then birth is always, arising always: either never or always, because the 
beginning, or “in the beginning”, is always. So it is that the son in the deity, the Word “in 
the beginning”, is always being born, has always been born.15
By God’s intent, revealed to us in the gradual unfolding of his Creation as revealed 
by scripture, and by his gracious adoption of humankind, true humanity becomes 
coordinate with being Christ. Eckhart expresses God’s intent in terms of ‘witness’ 
and ‘giving birth’: that is to say, true being strives to break through into this reality of 
givens, which itself exists only by virtue of the same perennial process. For, in them-
selves, created beings would be nothing. But the process of God’s Creation brings 
them together in a unity in which they are differentiated only by pure activity (God 
as sheer works, thus actively giving birth) and pure passivity (being born). Without 
this process of becoming in a creatural sense, nothing, again, would be revealed. 
It is only by virtue of this differentiated state, discerned by us in our earthly being, 
that we as individuals are able to see the way that existence is constituted and to 
live from that revelation. By this means, and by its sense of self, humanity moves 
into a higher realm of security in which it is consecrated, not conserved.
This as an art of living is fulfilled in terms of a liberation from impediments, 
Gelassenheit in Eckhart. There is also the joy of being liberated, enhancing 
comfort, a joy in partaking in the divine process: ‘God works, and I come into 
being’: even that (cf. Sermon 65, MW, DW I, 114,5). My works can become part of 
God’s Wirklichkeit.
What was originally merely on loan now becomes our own. The image of 
God in humans is disclosed, and united with the primal image. God’s becom-
ing human reveals the true possibilities of human nature: being the image as 
15 In John n.8, LW III, 8 f. Tr. into English from Dietmar Mieth’s modern German DMBR, see on 
this cf. Mieth 2014a, 159f.
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a process of birth, as truly being the son. Humanity joins the company of the 
Trinity, becoming, in Eckhart’s German, geborngot (EW II, 288,9).
What I have described here, keeping close to the texts but using modern par-
lance, has another important point. Human corporeality is always a factor, and 
even co-penetrates God. For Eckhart does not distinguish the son of God become 
human and therefore become flesh from any non-corporeal person within the 
Trinity. Humanity thus stands above the angels, who are diaphanous spirits 
without individuality, because corporeality enjoys the dignity of Christ’s being. 
As the body individualizes humans, in self-transcendence a remarkable ambiva-
lence arises: while the path of self-transcendence leads away from individuality, 
and one loses one’s individual name (John or Mary), it is only in individuality 
that the ‘best perfection’ can be achieved, where the body in the soul is taken into 
unity with God. This can be understood only if conceived in terms of dynamic 
relationships, and not combinations of substances. Eckhart thus revolutionizes 
ontology,16 and he is seen today as pioneering a processual structure of relation-
ships, an interpenetration: the one is in the other after the manner of this other; 
the other is in the one after the manner of this one. In his mature work Buch der 
Tröstung, Eckhart celebrates this ‘two in one’ by the erotic image of fevered love 
(cf. Divine Comfort, MW, 535; DW V, 30, 15ff.).
6  An example of Meister Eckhart’s teaching: 
self-transcendence on hearing the word of 
God, as inner resonance without particular 
preconditions 
I cite Meister Eckhart’s sermon on Jesus’ encounter with the Samaritan woman 
at the well (cf. John 4) as an example of the way he treats the need for experience 
(Erfahrung cf. Sermon 66, MW 58, 300–4; DW II, 108–25)17.  Here, Eckhart is not 
confronted with a requirement for a particularly deep level of knowledge on the 
part of his audience: in the words of the sermon’s title – actually the initiating 
bible passage – they wish to be “good and faithful servants” (cf. Matthew 25:21) 
of their Lord.
16 Cf. Matsuzawa 2018.
17 Cf. Mieth, Experience 2017 a., 195–197.
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Eckhart wishes, however, to show that, merely because his hearers have 
no access to a deeper experience of God, they must not think of themselves as 
Knechte, in the sense of performing only lowly services. Their feeling that they 
lack the necessary gifts creates the didactic situation: the audience regard them-
selves as being too ‘uncouth and ignorant’, and yet, in the sense of the sermon’s 
theme, want to be ‘good and faithful servants’ of God, and, as such, also accepted 
or appointed by God. They have no confidence in being especially accepted and 
esteemed by God. They may therefore be lay brothers of the Dominican Order. 
Eckhart’s didactic intention in telling the story of the Samaritan woman is to 
demonstrate that nobody is too ignorant to encounter God, in the sense of experi-
encing a turning point in his or her life. In his own words:
Ich spriche aber mê – erschricket niht, wan disiu vroude diu ist iu nâhe, und si ist in iu18 – 
ez enist iuwer keinez sô grop noch sô kleine von verstantnisse noch sô verre, er enmüge 
diese vröude in im vinden in der wârheit, als si ist, mit vröude und mit verstânne, ê daz 
ir talanc ûz dirre kirchen komet, jâ, ê daz ich tâlenc gepredige: er mac es waerlîche in im 
voinden und leben un haben, als daz got got ist und ich mensche bin! Des sît gewis, wan ez 
ist wâr, und diu wârheit sprichet ez selber. Daz will ich iu bewîsen mit einem glîchnisse, daz 
stât geschriben in einem êwangeliô.
But I say yet more (do not be afraid, for this joy is close to you and is in you): there is not one 
of you who is so coarse-grained, so feeble of understanding or so remote but he may find 
this joy within himself, in truth, as it is, with joy and understanding, before you leave this 
church today, indeed before I have finished preaching: he can find this as truly within him, 
live it and possess it, as that God is God and I am a man. Be sure of this for it is true, and 
Truth herself declares it. I will show you this with a parable which is in the Gospel.
(Sermon 58, MW  301, Pr. 66, DW II)
The peculiarities of this sermon:
It is the sole passage in the German and Latin works of Meister Eckhart where 
a biblical pericope is translated word for word as a complete text. The text is also a 
narrative, likewise a rare device in Meister Eckhart. Here, the audience of a sermon 
is to be immersed in the experience of the Samaritan woman. This too is unique. 
The aim is the equalization of access to God and a lowering of the threshold in the 
sense of access without reserve, for all. If Eckhart is here defending the preaching of 
‘learned’ sermons to the unlearned, the point is important for him on the threshold 
of his trial in Cologne (cf. Divine Comfort, MW 553ff., EW II, 310–13).
Above and beyond this didactic purpose, Eckhart’s intention is to dramatize 
his ‘dethroning’ of God, which might be summarized by his motto was oben war, 
18 Cf. DW 1, 95.4 ff.: […] warumbe gât ir uz? War umbe blîbet ir niht in iu selben und grîfet in iuwer 
eigen guot? Ir traget doch alle wârheit wesenlich in iu.
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ward innen (or: what was remote became near), by raising the level of the water 
in the well: when the Samaritan woman drops the implements she needs to draw 
water, her pitcher and rope (mediations), this signifies her realization that the 
‘true’ water is not bubbling in the depths, but as it were in her face at the well’s 
rim. She is, so to speak, eye to eye with Christ. Eckhart frequently says that he 
does not favor ‘seekers after God’, but those who allow themselves to be ‘found’.
I will here interpolate Jesus’ encounter with the Samaritan woman at the 
well (John 4:6–42), first in Meister Eckhart’s ringing translation into Middle High 
German:
unser herre saz ze einem mâle ûf einem brunnen, wan er was muede. Do kam ein wîp diu 
was ein Samaritânâ von den heiden, und si brâhte ein kruoc und ein seil und wollte wazzer 
gewinnen. Und unser herre sprasch ze ir: ‘wîp, gib mir ze trinkenne!’ Und si antwurte im 
und sprach: ‘war umbe eichest dû von mir trinken? Nû bist dû doch von den juden und 
ich bin ein Samaritânâ, und unser ê und iuwer ê hânt keine gemeinschaft miteinander.’ Dô 
antwurte unser herre und sprach: ‘westest dû, wer von dir trinken eischet, und bekantest 
die gnâde gotes, vil lîhte iechest dû mir trinken, und gaebe dir von dem lebendigen wazzer. 
Swer trinket von disem wazzer (hier im Brunnen), den dürstet aber; der aber trinket von 
dem wazzer, daz ich gibe, den endürstet niemermê, und von im sol entspringen ein brunne 
des êwigen lebens.’ Daz wîp merkte diu wort unsers herren, wan si engienc niht gerne dicke 
ze dem brunnen. Dô sprach daz wîp: ‘herre, gip mir trinken des wazzers, daz mich niht mê 
endürste.’ Dô sprach unser herre: ‘ganc und bring her dînen man’. Und si sprach: ‘herre, 
ich enhân keinen man.’ Dô sprach unser herre: ‘wîp, dû hâst wâr: dû hast aber vünf man 
gehabet, und den dû nû hâst, der enist niht dîn man.’ Dô liez si vallen seil und kruoc und 
sprach ze unserm herren: ‘herre, wer bist dû? Dâ stât geschriben : als messias kumet, den 
man heizet Kristun, der so uns lêren alliu dinc und so uns diu wârheit kunt tuon.’ Dô sprach 
unser herre: ‘wîp, ich bin ez, der mit dir sprichet’, und daz wort ervulte allez ir herze. Dô 
sprach si: ‘herre, unser eltern die betten under den böumen ûf dem berge, und iuwer eltern 
von der jüdischeit die betten in dem tempel: herre, welche von disen betent allerwaerlichst 
got ane, und welches ist diu stat? Berihte mich des.’ Dô sprach unser herre: ‘wîp, diu zît sol 
komen und ist iezuo hie, daz die wâren anbetaere niht aleine suln beten ûf dem berge noch in 
dem temple, sunder in dem geiste und in der wârheit beten alsô den vater ane; wan got der 
ist ein geist, und wer in anebeten sol, der sol in anebeten in dem geiste und in der wârheit, 
und alsolîche anbetaere suochet der vater.’ Daz wîp war alsô vol gotes und übervliezende vol 
und ûzquellende von vülle gotes und wart predigende und rüefende mit lûter stimme und 
wollte allez daz ze gote bringen und vol gotes machen, daz si mit ougen anesach, als si selber 
ervüllet was.[…]
Jesus antwürtet, daz ist, daz er sich offenbâret waerlîche und genzlîche und al, als er ist, 
und ervüllet den mensche alsô übervlüssiglîche, daz er ûzquellende ist und ûzvliezende 
von übervoller vüllede gotes, als diz wîp tet in einer kurzen zît ob dem brunnen, diu vor gar 
ungeschicket was dar zuo.
Once our Lord was sitting on a well, for he was weary. Then came a woman who was a 
Samaritan (one of the heathen), bringing a pitcher and a line, meaning to draw water. And 
our Lord said to her: ‘Woman, give me to drink’. And she answered him, saying: ‘Why do you 
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ask me for a drink? You are one of the Jews and I am a Samaritan, and those of our faith and 
your faith have no dealings with each other’. Then our Lord replied, saying: ‘If you but knew 
who it is who asks you for a drink, and if you knew the grace of God, you might perhaps have 
asked me for a drink, and I would have given you from the living water. Whoever drinks of 
this water [here in the well] will again become thirsty, but whoever drinks of the water that I 
give will never thirst again, and from it shall spring up a fountain of eternal life’. The woman 
was struck by our Lord’s words, because she did not like going often to the well. So the 
woman said: ‘Sir, give me some of this water to drink, so that I may never be thirsty again’. 
Then our Lord said: ‘Go and fetch your husband’, and she said: ‘Sir, I have no husband’. 
Then our Lord said: ‘Woman, you are right: you have had five husbands, but the one you 
have now is not your husband’.19 At this she dropped her jug and line and said to our Lord: 
‘Sir, who are you? It is written that when the Messiah comes whom men call Christ, he will 
teach us all things and make the truth known to us’. Our Lord said: ‘Woman, I am he who 
is talking to you’, and at these words her heart was full. ‘Lord’, she said, our fathers used 
to worship under the trees on the mountain, and your fathers the Jews worshipped in the 
Temple. Sir, which of these worship God most properly, and in which place? Tell me that’. 
Then our Lord said: ‘Woman, the time shall come, and is now, when true worshippers shall 
worship not only on the mountain and in the Temple, but shall worship God in the spirit and 
in truth: for God is a spirit, and whoever worships him must worship in the spirit and in 
truth, for such are the worshippers the Father seeks’. At this the woman was filled with God, 
filled to overflowing, welling over with divine fullness, and she went preaching and crying 
out with a loud voice, wanting to bring to God everyone she saw, and make them full of God 
as she was full. […]
And Jesus will answer, that is, reveal himself truly and wholly and totally, as he is, filling 
that man to overflowing, so that it comes welling up and running over with the overfull full-
ness of God, as happened in a short space to this woman at the well, who before was quite 
unready for it. ( MW 58, 301ff.)
The story in the English Bible, John 4:6–42 (NIV): 
6 Jacob’s well was there, and Jesus, tired as he was from the journey, sat down by the well. 
It was about noon. 7 When a Samaritan woman came to draw water, Jesus said to her, ‘Will 
you give me a drink?’ 8 (His disciples had gone into the town to buy food.) 9 The Samaritan 
woman said to him, ‘You are a Jew and I am a Samaritan woman. How can you ask me for 
a drink?’ 10 Jesus answered her, ‘If you knew the gift of God and who it is that asks you for 
a drink, you would have asked him and he would have given you living water.’ 11 ‘Sir,’ the 
woman said, ‘you have nothing to draw with and the well is deep. Where can you get this 
living water? 12 Are you greater than our father Jacob, who gave us the well and drank from 
it himself, as did also his sons and his livestock?’ 13 Jesus answered, ‘Everyone who drinks 
19 Eckhart – concurring with allegorical tradition – likens the five men to the five senses by 
which it is possible to sin, and he likens ‘the husband she does not have’ to reason, which can 
lead to understanding, and shape the will.
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this water will be thirsty again, 14 but whoever drinks the water I give them will never thirst. 
Indeed, the water I give them will become in them a spring of water welling up to eternal 
life.’ 15 The woman said to him, ‘Sir, give me this water so that I won’t get thirsty and have 
to keep coming here to draw water.’ 16 He told her, ‘Go, call your husband and come back.’ 
17 ‘I have no husband,’ she replied. Jesus said to her, ‘You are right when you say you have 
no husband. 18 The fact is, you have had five husbands, and the man you now have is not 
your husband. What you have just said is quite true.’ 19 ‘Sir,’ the woman said, ‘I can see that 
you are a prophet. 20 Our ancestors worshiped on this mountain, but you Jews claim that 
the place where we must worship is in Jerusalem.’ 21 ‘Woman,’ Jesus replied, ‘believe me, a 
time is coming when you will worship the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem. 
22 You Samaritans worship what you do not know; we worship what we do know, for salva-
tion is from the Jews. 23 Yet a time is coming and has now come when the true worshipers 
will worship the Father in the Spirit and in truth, for they are the kind of worshipers the 
Father seeks. 24 God is spirit, and his worshipers must worship in the Spirit and in truth.’ 25 
The woman said, ‘I know that Messiah’ (called Christ) ‘is coming. When he comes, he will 
explain everything to us.’ 26 Then Jesus declared, ‘I, the one speaking to you – I am he.’ 27 
Just then his disciples returned and were surprised to find him talking with a woman. But 
no one asked, ‘What do you want?’ or ‘Why are you talking with her?’ 28 Then, leaving her 
water jar, the woman went back to the town and said to the people, 29 ‘Come, see a man who 
told me everything I ever did. Could this be the Messiah?’ 30 They came out of the town and 
made their way toward him. 31 Meanwhile his disciples urged him, ‘Rabbi, eat something.’ 
32 But he said to them, ‘I have food to eat that you know nothing about.’ 33 Then his disci-
ples said to each other, ‘Could someone have brought him food?’ 34 ‘My food,’ said Jesus, ‘is 
to do the will of him who sent me and to finish his work. 35 Don’t you have a saying, ‘It’s still 
four months until harvest’? I tell you, open your eyes and look at the fields! They are ripe for 
harvest. 36 Even now the one who reaps draws a wage and harvests a crop for eternal life, 
so that the sower and the reaper may be glad together. 37 Thus the saying ‘One sows and 
another reaps’ is true. 38 I sent you to reap what you have not worked for. Others have done 
the hard work, and you have reaped the benefits of their labor.’ 39 Many of the Samaritans 
from that town believed in him because of the woman’s testimony, ‘He told me everything 
I ever did.’ 40 So when the Samaritans came to him, they urged him to stay with them, and 
he stayed two days. 41 And because of his words many more became believers. 42 They said 
to the woman, ‘We no longer believe just because of what you said; now we have heard for 
ourselves, and we know that this man really is the Savior of the world.’
My line of thought on this text is as follows: What changes does Eckhart make to 
the text in his translation? (references in italics in the text):
1. He provides the sameritânâ not only with a pitcher, but also with a rope. His 
purpose at first seems to be to make the text more vivid to his audience: the 
sense, however, as we shall see, lies deeper. In the course of the narrative, he 
provides a dramatic heightening, for, when Jesus reveals his special knowl-
edge, Eckhart has the woman drop rope and pitcher with alarm.
2. Second change: the Samaritan woman, not Jesus himself, gives an account of the 
different religious laws of the Samaritans (Eckhart here calls them ‘heathens’: 
a reference to the normal term for Muslims!) and the Jews: praying on Mount 
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Gerizim and praying in the Temple at Jerusalem. The problem is thus raised by 
her for the Messiah to solve, with Eckhart here heightening the tension of the nar-
rative by means of question and answer. We have to keep in mind here that the 
audience (perhaps in Erfurt) experience in their own lives the tension between 
Synagogue and Church (the buildings are a stone’s throw apart!). It is for this 
reason that Eckhart does not repeat at this point in his translation the words of Jesus 
reported here by John, ‘Salvation is from the Jews’! That would have compelled him 
to provide a specific commentary, but he has something else in mind here.
3. A third alteration to the text: instead of ‘no longer on the mountain or in the 
Temple’ he says: ‘not only on the mountain and in the Temple’. The audience 
probably understand this in real-life terms as: not only in the synagogue and 
in the church here, in this place. In this way, Eckhart emphasizes ‘worship in 
the spirit’ – which the Father desires, according to Jesus’ explicit testimony – 
not as the dissolution of previous places of worship, but as their extension to 
the individual: everyone can also worship God in his or her heart, as well as 
in the synagogue and the church; can have God find him or her, just as the 
Samaritan woman in all her imperfection had herself found by Jesus.
4. Eckhart speaks to his audience in a fourth alteration to the biblical text, seeking, 
with the immediacy and suddenness of the change in the Samaritan woman, to 
entice them into an immediate experience: in his version, the Samaritan woman 
reacts by breaking out in ecstatic jubilation. But Jubil is immediately translated 
into commitment: the woman becomes proactive, sets off and begins to preach 
in her village. What she has experienced so changes her that she becomes a 
messenger of the Messiah. The disciples’ amazement at the situation – Jesus 
is speaking with a heretic, and a woman to boot! – is not shared by Eckhart. 
He is already clear in his mind: for him, Jews and Christians, men and women, 
even ‘heathens’ (Muslims), are actually included ‘in the spirit’. Synagogue 
and Church are there, but what is important is what is going on in the hearts of 
people: the essential experience, and the consequent changing of lives.20
Meister Eckhart 
The hour is coming, and is already here, when true worshippers will worship the Father in 
the spirit and in the truth; for so does the father wish to be worshiped. God is spirit, and all 
who worship him must worship in the spirit and in the truth.
20 For Eckhart, the heart is still intellectively informed; it is the centre of corporeal existence, 
out of which human beings think and understand.
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‘Not only on the mountain or in the Temple’: so says Eckhart, instead of, as in John’s text, 
‘neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem’; which would signify today, in the ‘spirit’ of 
Eckhart:
True worshippers will pray to God the Father or the Mother not only in Jerusalem, not only 
in Rome, not only in Mecca, but at all places in the gift of the spirit and in the truth that 
liberates.
The scene at the well, like the story of the Good Samaritan, is frequently portrayed 
in art. Many cities have their ‘Samaritan’s Well’ (a particularly fine example is to 
be found in Freiburg in Switzerland). Scenic details are important to the setting in 
Eckhart’s translation: the rope is used because the well is very deep (‘Jacob’s Well’ 
can still be seen; it is 32 meters deep, a fact that was presumably not unknown in 
Eckhart’s time).
The encounter with the woman is fraught with misunderstandings, as is often 
the case in John’s Gospel. The woman speaks of water at the empirical, physical 
level; Jesus of ‘living water’ at a metaphorical level. Similarly, the word ‘schöp-
fen’, ‘to draw’ (water, breath, confidence, hope, courage, etc.) can signify the 
sensual level. In order to relay water, a vessel is needed. The woman remarks 
quite soberly that Jesus does not even have a vessel for his water. The human 
being is the vessel. The human being is the ‘place’ of God. The life-giving power 
of God streams through human beings: through every human being. When the 
human being is the place, ‘places’ become secondary.
This raises the question: must we fight so over Jerusalem and Mecca, Church 
and Synagogue, like the Jews and the Samaritans over the mountain of true 
worship; like, later, the religions of the Christians and the Muslims, who, each in 
turn, took away the others’ places of worship to align them in another direction, 
the Christians towards Jerusalem, the Muslims towards Mecca; when it was always 
a matter of only one or two meters’ difference in the same easterly direction? 
Eckhart would have us ask what moves people to pray, what circumstance, and 
not to what point of the compass and what prominence they direct their prayer.
‘Life’, as in ‘living water’, links the two levels of body and soul. The water of 
the senses is necessary to life; the water of the spirit quickens life.
So the water of life is not the water that drives the mills of intellect (‘Paris’) 
and power (‘Avignon’). It is the water that comes to human beings themselves 
in their purified state, streaming into them. It is the moments in which human 
beings are more intensely alive. That is something different from merely living.
What (according to John and Eckhart) does Jesus mean by ‘in the Spirit and 
in truth’? Human beings themselves, as manifest creatures of God, are the new 
locations of worship. ‘For whom it fits’, Eckhart says on this point, for him or her 
‘it fits everywhere’. A change of location does not bring a change of heart. We 
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recognize that change of heart by virtue of actions appropriate to it: ‘Why do you 
venture out? You carry the truth essentially within you’ (Sermon 13 MW; Pr.  5b, 
DW 95,6).21
We are used to separating places and people, especially by religions. Jesus 
removes this separation: in reminding us of humans as the central image of God 
in Creation, and by his own existence as a human, which guarantees the full pres-
ence of God.
With the Jesus of John’s gospel, Eckhart’s text says: ‘[…] the time shall come, 
and is now […]’. It is by no means as if humans have to wait for something in order 
for the text to be realized. Christ comes anyway, through human beings, meaning 
that he comes not only among people of our own tradition and spiritual home, 
but also, to our embarrassment, among strangers. ‘They were amazed that he was 
talking with a Turkish woman at the bus stop’ would bring the disciples’ reac-
tion up to date in today’s terms. The image is apt insofar as Eckhart’s ‘heathen’ 
woman may well represent a Muslim (see above).
A final point of the sermon should not be overlooked: that a Samaritan 
woman, thus a ‘heathen’ up to now, is sent as a witness without being required 
to amend her life. This is conceived similarly to the tale of the sinful woman in 
Luke 7, who has shown ‘great love’, for which Jesus (as, later, explicitly Eckhart) 
is satisfied with the new direction in her life.
7  Analytical logic and metaphorical speech: 
understanding Eckhart’s thinking
Eckhart can be understood today only when we consider that, as magister of the-
ology in Paris, he is a metaphysician. His propositions and inquiries (quaestiones) 
operate at the logical-analytical level of metaphysical conjecture. His expositions 
of biblical texts, though, envision a doubling of language in terms of an outer 
‘shell’ and an inner ‘core’. Eckhart’s sermons in Latin and German, which attest 
to his calling as a member of the Order of Preachers, belong, as he himself asserts, 
to the same active context as his biblical expositions; that is to say, they use this 
doubling of language to which metaphor is fitted. To depict by the use of meta-
phor is at the same time to imply an awareness of the linguistic frontier that it is 
precisely the task of metaphor to cross. In this context, a word refers to something 
21 Cf. Sermon 2, DW I (8 MW): Möhtet  ir gemerken mit mînem herzen, ir verstündet wol, waz ich 
spriche, wan ez ist wâr und diu wârheit sprichet ez selbe.
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and at the same time refers away from itself. Jesus’ phrase in John’s gospel where 
he talks about praying ‘in the spirit and in truth’, whose exposition by Eckhart I 
have reproduced here, is given cogency by the fact that it leads beyond the classic 
‘places’ of worship (Jerusalem, Mount Gerizim), without replacing them with any 
alternative location. The spatial dimension (and the temporal dimension too) is 
thereby transcended. By ‘transcend’ is here meant ‘to refer beyond itself’, or ‘to 
describe something for which there is no specific word for rendering one to one 
the thing described’.
We cannot, therefore, understand the transcending self in the sense of a 
spatial change. Transcending in Eckhart’s sense leaves space, time, and matter 
behind. It steps across the normal conventions of the anchoring of the self in 
place, time, and corporeality, but those conventions remain in place, although 
sous rature (as Derrida correctly perceived: ‘under erasure’, Derrida apud Margre-
iter 1997, 398). Now it is possible to understand this removal from space, time, and 
corporeality, in which location in space, time, and body nevertheless persists, as 
transcending into ‘another state’ (as remarked by Robert Musil in reception of 
Eckhart), insofar as this other state belongs to the human condition, for example 
in states of ecstasy, in sexual love, or in hate. This element is familiar to Eckhart. 
To him, the senses are ecstatic, and are the realm of longing and rage. But his 
understanding of the flux of transcendence is not primarily anthropological, but 
theological. That is to say, transcendence is not a product of humanity’s search 
for God; God is the active party: ‘pure Wirklichkeit’, active always and now. Tran-
scendence, then, is not setting up a ladder ‘from below’ to God, like the biblical 
Jacob’s ladder often received in religious literature and art to represent the path 
‘from below upwards’. Eckhart speaks not of a ladder, but of a sudden Durch-
bruch (‘breakthrough’), with humans not acting through their own power, but 
being drawn by a power whose thrust comes, as it were, into them from above. 
The human being, aware of this inner flux, and at the same time changing his 
or her life to fit it, transcends. Self-transcendence is therefore always conceived 
of from the aspect of its being enabled by God: thus theologically. Nicholas of 
Cusa discovered Eckhart for himself, received him, and took up these thoughts, 
while another recipient was Schelling in the 19th century. Ever since, there has 
been widespread interest in Eckhart’s philosophy and theology, and in interfaith 
spirituality. What is specific to Eckhart is that he makes flux and movement the 
basis for his metaphorically-grounded verbalization of a process that binds the 
divine and the human realms. I suggest the image of a vertical ellipse with two 
foci, but in motion. This may be compared with an old-fashioned paternoster lift 
that never stands still, and takes you with it when you jump into it from the floor 
where you are at. Similarly, the human ‘breaks through’ by taking a leap into 
movement.
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Eckhart is also able to liken constant flux to the water cycle: water comes 
from the spring via stream and river to the sea, where it condenses, forms clouds, 
which soak the ground with rain, so that springs burst forth.22 In this conception, 
there is no substance (perhaps in the sense of Panentheism as deus sive natura), 
but only relations. Relations define being, the verb defines subject and object. 
In a flowing movement, different signs exist only in passing. Immediacy reigns 
overall. There is no third interposed element. Markus Vinzent has recently shown 
how Eckhart himself eliminates mediators in other spiritual writers (Mech-
tild von Magdeburg) in favor of immediacy.23 Here too belongs the doctrine of 
‘non- distinctness’ between God and humanity, especially in the figure of Christ, 
but hence also in all who participate in the general process of God’s becoming 
human. In order that this should not be equated with the destruction of differ-
ence, Eckhart uses the figure of argumentation distinctio per indistinctionem, or 
‘distinction by non-distinction’.24 Behind this lies the thought that all distinctions 
need a category external to the thing to be contrasted, a ‘third’, to come to the aid 
of the distinction. According to Eckhart, this functions only if God and humans 
are distinguished as differently being, perhaps locating God as an ens a se beside 
other beings. This is not possible if, as Eckhart’s programmatic assumption has it, 
being is God (esse est deus). His position is that being cannot be doubled: God is 
not a stone among other stones. It is therefore not possible to distinguish catego-
ries of being. This is presumably what Derrida understood when he distinguished 
différance from difference. Eckhart attempts to represent immediacy as the ‘two in 
one’, thus as difference and unity at the same time, taking fervent loving union as 
an image, designating it as a metaphor but at the same time referring beyond it.
8  Self-transcendence on the way  
into the Modern Period
Eckhart’s spiritual influence during the transition from Late Medieval to Modern 
Period is marked by something of a hiatus. While the Dominicans Johannes Tauler 
(1301–1361) – received by Luther – and Heinrich Seuse (1300–1364) linked to him 
each in his own way, so that it is possible to speak of a ‘Dominican Mysticism’, 
22 The motif of the water cycle may be found, for example, after Book of Wisdom 11:23, in Sermon 
94 MW. It is also in Marguerite Porete’s The Mirror of Simple Souls (1927) in chapter 82, see cf. Mieth 
2017c,  31.
23 Mieth 2019.
24 Cf. Mieth 2014a, 22.
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Eckhart’s problems regarding his reception by the Church were not without effect, 
above all in the Netherlands. Devotio Moderna, which was founded there by 
Gerrit Groote (1340–1384) as a spiritual counter-movement against Parisian scho-
lasticism, promoting a life of penitence and retreat from the ‘world’, exerted an 
influence on Innerlichkeit, not only that of Erasmus of Rotterdam, but in spiritual 
Protestantism, which evolved into Pietism.25 In many places, communities follow-
ing Devotio Moderna were absorbed into Lutheran communities. Pietistic Inner-
lichkeit, in the sense of pious withdrawal, and linking with Devotio, leads from 
Eckhart and Tauler and their reception by Luther. Eckhart, Tauler, and Luther saw 
the rise of worldly commerce as an encouragement to self-transcendence rather 
than an impediment.26 To Pietists, Innerlichkeit meant withdrawal from worldly 
superficiality. Like Devotio, it is thoroughly associated with handicrafts in the 
sense of the ideal link between prayer and labour. Eckhart’s Wirklichkeit, as the 
re-enactment of God’s works, and his Innerlichkeit in the midst of commerce, is 
associated with Pietism insofar as the latter sees Creation in the contemplation of 
the dynamic, and God at work in human lives. But Pietism lacks Eckhart’s imme-
diacy, independent of time and place, which may be termed Durchbruch (‘break-
through’). All of these movements are concerned with finding the correct, pious 
means for us to realize ourselves as human beings. It was accordingly a long time 
before Eckhart’s vertical immediacy found intellectual consummation again in 
German Idealism (Hegel, Schelling).
References
Primary sources 
DW = Meister Eckhart, Die Deutschen Werke, 5 vols., ed. under the auspices of the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1958-. 
 [vols. I-III and V ed. Josef Quint, vol. IV.1–2 ed. Georg Steer; Das Buch der göttlichen 
Tröstung (Book of divine comfort) and Reden der Unterweisung (RdU – The Talks of 
Instruction) in vol. V, 8–105, and Traktat von Abgeschiedenheit (Treatise on Detachment) in 
vol. V, 400–68]
EW = Meister Eckhart, Werke. Bibliothek des Mittelalters 20 and 21, 2 vols., ed. Niklaus Largier, 
Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, 1993. 
 [vol. I: texts and translations into Modern German by Josef Quint, ed. and commented by 




der göttlichen Tröstung and the beginning of the Commentary on John, 488–536, with an 
excellent commentary in German: 835–67]
LE  =Lectura Eckhardi, 2 vols., eds. Georg Steer and Loris Sturlese, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2001–2017. 
 LW =  Meister Eckhart, Die Lateinischen Werke, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1936-
 [Currently curated by Loris Sturlese. The Commentary on John can be found in LW III: Magistri 
Echardi expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem, eds. Karl Christ et al., 1994]
Meister Eckhart, Einheit mit Gott: Die bedeutendsten Schriften zur Mystik. A selection (since 
1979), partly translated into Modern German and commented by Dietmar Mieth, pending 
new edition, Ostfildern: Patmos, 2014.
English Translation
MW = The Complete Mystcal Works of Meister Eckhart, revised with a foreword by Bernard 
McGinn, translated by Maurice O’C Walshe, New York: Crossroad, 2009.  
 [Abbreviation MW in this text with the English number of the Sermon and with the treatises 
Talks of Instruction and Divine Comfort.] 
Secondary sources
Beccarisi, Alessandra. 2005. ‘Isticheit nach Meister Eckhart. Wege und Irrwege eines 
philosophischen Terminus’, Meister Eckhart in Erfurt, Miscellania Mediaevalia 32. 214–334.
de Certeau, Michel. 2010. Die Mystische Fabel, 16. bis 17. Jahrhundert. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
Flasch, Kurt. 2010. Meister Eckhart. Philosoph des Christentums. Munich: Beck. 
Geybels, Hans. 2007. Cognitio dei experimentalis, a theological genealogy of Christian 
religious experience. Leuven: Peeters. 
Hackett, Jeremiah (ed.). 2013.  A Companion to Meister Eckhart. Leiden/Boston: Brill.
Margreiter, Reinhard.  1997. Erfahrung und Mystik: Grenzen der Symbolisierung. Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag.
Matsuzawa, Hiroki. 2018. Die Relationsontologie bei Meister Eckhart. Paderborn: Schöningh. 
Mieth, Dietmar. 1969. Die Einheit von vita activa und vita contemplativa in den deutschen 
Predigten und Traktaten Meister Eckharts und bei Johannes Tauler: Untersuchungen zur 
Struktur des christlichen Lebens. Studien zur Geschichte der katholischen Moraltheologie 
15. Regensburg: Pustet. 
Mieth, Dietmar. 2012. ‘Meister Eckhart, Das Buch der göttlichen Tröstung’. In Kanon 
der Theologie, 3rd edition, ed. Christian Danz, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft.103–13. 
Mieth, Dietmar. 2014a. Meister Eckhart. Munich: Beck.
Mieth, Dietmar. 2014b. ‘Gelassenheit’, Erbe und Auftrag, Monastische Welt 90. 246–55.
Mieth, Dietmar. 2015. ‘Mystik und Metapher. Metaphorische Gottesrede bei Meister Eckhart’, 
Una Sancta 70. 4. 306–16. 
Mieth, Dietmar. 2017a. ‘Experiential ethics and religious experience with reference to Meister 
Eckhart’. In Commitments to medieval mysticism within contemporary contexts, eds. 
Patrick Cooper and Satoshi Kikuchi, Leuven: Peeters. 195–222. 
Mieth, Dietmar et al. (eds.). 2017b. Meister Eckhart in Paris and Strasbourg. Eckhart Texts and 
Studies 4. Leuven: Peeters. 
Self-transcendence in Meister Eckhart   97
Mieth, Dietmar. 2017c. ‘Geflügelte Motive und Leitbilder: Meister Eckhart und Marguerite 
Porete’. In Dietmar Mieth et al. (eds.), 23–50.
Mieth, Dietmar (ed.). 2017d. Anfänge der religiösen Selbstbestimmung im Mittelalter= 
Theologische Quartalschrift Tübingen 197 (2017) 1. Quartalheft, 1–100: Ostfildern: 
Schwabenverlag.
Mieth, Dietmar. 2017e. ‘Innerlichkeit statt Weltgestaltung, Die “Imitatio Christi” des Thomas 
von Kempen auf dem Weg zu den “Stillen im Lande” (Pietismus)’. In Mystique Rhénane et 
Devotio Moderna , ed. Marie-Anne Vannier, Paris: Beauchesne. 267–83.
Mieth, Dietmar. 2019. ‘Der Aufstieg des Gewerbes: Eckhart, Luther und Max Weber’. In: 
Jahrbuch der Meister Eckhart Gesellschaft, Bd. 13: Meister Eckhart und Martin Luther, ed. 
Volker Leppin and Freimut Loeser, Stuttgart 2019. 
Mieth, Dietmar (ed.). 2019. Religiöse Selbstbestimmung: Anfänge im Spätmittelalter. Meister-
Eckhart-Jahrbuch 5. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
Mundschenk, Christine (ed.). 1997. Nicolaus von Bibra, der Occultus Erfordensis. Critical edition 
with introduction, commentary, and German translation. Weimar: Böhlau.
Schöller, Donata. 2009. Enthöhter Gott – vertiefter Mensch. Zur Bedeutung der Demut 
ausgehend von Meister Eckhart und Jacob Böhme. Munich: Alber. 
Vinzent, Markus. 2011. Meister Eckhart, The Art of Detachment. Eckhart Texts and Studies 1. 
Leuven: Peeters.
Vinzent, Markus. 2014. ‘Bildsequenzen der Individualisierungsstufen des Menschen bei 
Augustinus, Meister Eckhart und Marguerite Porete’. In Religiöse Individualisierung in der 
Mystik, Eckhart- Tauler-Seuse, Meister Eckhart Jahrbuch 8, eds. Freimur Löser and Dietmar 
Mieth, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 195–220.
Voigt, Jörg.  2012. Beginen im Spätmittelalter, Frauenfrömmigkeit in Thüringen und im Reich. 
Weimar: Böhlau. 
 [Especially on sources and their assessment, with copious literature on the Beguine 
movement in the Middle Ages.]
Witte, Karl-Heinz. 2013. Meister Eckhart. Munich: Alber. 302–30.

 Open Access. © 2019 Magnus Schlette, published by De Gruyter.  This work is licensed 
under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110580853-005
Magnus Schlette
The inward sublime: Kant’s aesthetics  
and the Protestant tradition
Imagine great natural objects, scenes or events: waterfalls, the ocean churned up 
by stormy winds, or still and motionless, formations of clouds in the sky, thunder, 
deserts, a panther, preferably not behind bars but in its natural habitat. We may 
call all of this sublime, and if we do so, everybody will understand what we mean 
even if they do not agree. This general and colloquial use of our language refers 
to experience which for the first time was made a central subject of philosophical 
investigation in British 18th century aesthetic theory (cf. the classical overview of 
this tradition in Monk 1960). Joseph Addison and his successor, Edmund Burke, 
claim that we predicate natural objects or events as sublime if they have aroused 
the sensation of an ‘agreable Horrour’ in us (Addison 1965 [1711/12]). Whatever 
evokes the idea of pain and danger in an undirected lustful manner we call 
sublime (cf. Burke 1990 [1757], 36). The sublime experience (i.e. the experience 
of the ‘sublime’) is one of potential, but never of actual domination; personal 
safety is the prerequisite of our experiencing the sublime. Possible candidates 
have properties such as extensive size, overwhelming power, unpredictability, 
lack of contour or structure, infinity.
English philosophers give us a good description of what happens to us when 
we experience the ‘sublime’. ‘Horror’ – and even more so ‘terror’1 – may be a 
strong word for our feelings, but it certainly points in the right direction. There 
is something repelling about the sublime – being brought about, as Kant says, 
‘by the feeling of a momentary check to the vital forces’ (Kant 1953 [1790], 91) – 
and this effect has to do with the threat that we sense in the sublime. This threat 
appears to be latent, since no effective and identifiable power is actually used 
against us, and therefore our repellence contains, however faint and vague, eerie 
feelings. This is exactly what makes the sublime a source of ‘horror’. Burke as 
well as Kant emphasize, though, that this repellence is only an integral part of 
an experience that contains attraction as well: the horror – in Addison’s origi-
nal words – is ‘agreeable’. Burke even gives etymological references to support 
his argument that the differentiation between horror and delight, repellence and 
attraction is a merely analytical one. The Greek term ‘thambos’ means ‘fear’ or 
‘wonder’, ‘deinos’ is ‘terrible’ or ‘respectable’ (Burke 1990 [1757], 54). Colloquial 
1 ‘Indeed terror is always, either more openly or latently, the ruling principle of the sublime’ 
(Burke 1990 [1757], 54).
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language proves, says Burke, that there are seemingly diametrically opposed feel-
ings which are intrinsically connected, and the ‘sublime’ stands for (the source 
of) such ambivalent feelings. But neither Addison nor Burke has a satisfying 
answer to the question, though, as to why something that is identified as the 
source of a potential threat creates some sort of delight in us.2 The relief we feel 
when we realize that we are not affected by a potential threat caused by exten-
sive size, overwhelming power, unpredictability, lack of structure or infinity is 
not synonymous with the feelings the ‘sublime’ arouses in us. Kant clearly saw 
this predicament inherent in English theory (cf. Kant 1953 [1790], 110). I am not 
going out on a limb when I say that Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Sublime’ in his Kritik 
der Urteilskraft is the most influential philosophical approach to the phenomena 
in question. But although Kant’s phenomenal analysis bears much similarity to 
Burke’s, the core of the interpretation is diametrically opposed to that of Burke.
The sublime, according to Kant, is based on two different classes of phenom-
ena. On the one hand, great natural objects, scenes or events, if they are of extraor-
dinary dimension, transcend ‘every standard of sense’ (Kant 1953 [1790], § 25, 98). 
Therefore the imagination is incapable of comprehending what it has apprehended 
and representing it as a coherent form or a qualitative whole (cf. ibid., § 26, 99). The 
feeling of the sublime marks precisely the transition from the limits of understand-
ing to the incomprehensible. It is aroused when our imagination evokes the idea 
of theoretical (i.e. mathematical) infinity in us but cannot sufficiently represent 
it – to sum up Kant’s approach to the ‘mathematically sublime’. On the other hand, 
great natural objects, scenes or events may obviously transcend our power to resist 
them and therefore be a potential threat to us (cf.  ibid., 110). ‘But, provided our 
own position is secure, their aspect is all the more attractive for its fearfulness; 
and we readily call these objects sublime, because they raise the forces of the soul 
above the height of vulgar commonplace […]’ (ibid., 110–1) – to sum up Kant’s 
approach to the ‘dynamically sublime’. Since these two concepts of the sublime are 
not mutually exclusive, something can be both mathematically and dynamically 
sublime, and often enough we would say that something is experienced as dynam-
ically sublime because of properties which are the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions of the mathematically sublime. In any case, the mathematically sublime and 
the dynamically sublime coincide in their contra-finality for their comprehension 
by us as rational beings. In Schiller’s words, the mathematically sublime rejects 
our Fassungskraft (‘power of comprehension’) and the dynamically sublime our 
Lebenskraft (‘power of life’) (Schiller 1992 [1801], 610).
2 Burke offers some speculative explanations in reference to contemporary corpuscle theory, 
which to us do not sound convincing anymore. Cf. Burke 1990 [1757], 122–3.
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Kant concedes that nature causes the experience of the sublime in us. Here 
he is still in agreement with Burke. But in contrast to the Englishman, he rejects 
the idea that nature is also the object of the sublime. Once for all he states that 
‘the broad ocean agitated by storms cannot be called sublime’ (Kant 1953 [1790], 
92) – but Burke would have claimed precisely this. For Kant the ocean is ‘horri-
ble’. Burke would have agreed. But while he would have taken exactly this prop-
erty as substantial to the ocean’s sublimity, for Kant the churned up waters are 
just horrible – and nothing else. Obviously Kant plays on Addison’s words: The 
agreeability of the horrible (which creates horror in us) has a source that does 
not lie in nature (ibid.). According to Kant, in our supposed confrontation with 
the sublime in nature, we experience the contra-finality of nature as illustrating 
our ideas such as infinity, eternity, freedom and might which we nevertheless can 
think very well (cf. ibid., 103) and – as far as they have (or should have) an impact 
on our practical life – feel committed to (ibid., 116). Nature evokes these ideas 
in us, but in such a way that at the same time we are conscious of its inability to 
demonstrate the intelligible. Hence the experience of the sublime is the experi-
ence of the individual as belonging to the community of rational beings. It is an 
experience that makes us aware of the idea of humanity in us and of our infinite 
superiority to the non-intelligible, i.e. to physical nature. It is only by a ‘certain 
subreption (substitution of a respect for the Object in place of one for the idea of 
humanity in our own self – the Subject)’ (ibid., 106) that we attribute to nature 
what actually is respect for our own vocation as rational beings. While our theo-
retical faculty of reason is mathematically sublime, our practical faculty of reason 
is dynamically sublime: Threatening natural objects or events might destroy our 
individual physical nature, but they could never even touch the rational vocation 
that defines our self-identity. In short: Organisms can be killed, not persons.
There are conceptual reasons for denying that Kant’s theory of the sublime 
turned out the way it did because of his primary intention either to give a coher-
ent interpretation of a phenomenon within his project of criticism and therefore to 
fulfill the standards of systemic coherence or to solve the immanent problems and 
imperfections of his predecessor’s theories. First: Even if the author of the Kritik 
der Urteilskraft was forced to interpret the sublime according to the epistemologi-
cal standards set by the author of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, the final criterion 
for the validity of his theory is not systemic coherence but the appropriateness of 
the phenomenon’s representation. Appropriateness again is defined by the prob-
ability of intersubjective rational consent. Therefore, explaining Kant’s new way 
of thinking about the sublime by referring to the pressure of systemic coherence 
would provoke the question as to the origin of an increasing probability of intersub-
jective rational consent to Kant’s theory of the sublime. Second: The claim that Kant 
represents the creative continuation of a particular tradition of aesthetic thinking 
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(Burke) by means of its immanent criticism does not explain why Kant adopted 
this particular tradition and not a different one. Basic philosophical intuitions may 
be articulated in certain vocabularies handed down by tradition, and they may 
be specified by the inferential pressure inherent in any philosophical vocabulary 
chosen or developed, but they arise somewhere else. I propose that they are rooted 
in fundamental empractical patterns of understanding, which have been incorpo-
rated by individual thinkers during their socialization.3 The very idea of empractical 
patterns of understanding serves a heuristic function in my argumentation. It facil-
itates the hypothesis that Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Sublime’ is founded in a collective 
attitude of mind as well as the correlating disposition to inner-directed experience 
and action which originates from the dominant version of Protestant piety in 18th 
century Germany. These originally religiously-generated attitudes and dispositions 
are weak determinant factors, in so far as they increase the chance that within a 
distinct frame of cultural space and time, which is dominated by Protestant inward-
ness, a way of thinking as it is displayed in Kant’s idea of the sublime may emerge. 
From now on, I will call this way of thinking – in Kant’s words, this ‘Denkungsart’ – 
simply and briefly, the worldview of 18th century German Protestant piety.
In the following I will present the integral function of aesthetic experience 
within Protestant piety according to its religious ethics (I) and thereby focus on 
Johann Arndt’s Wahres Christentum, the best known and most acknowledged 
edification book among Protestant believers in the early 18th century. It presents 
a ‘programme’ for leading the Protestant believer to ‘true’ Christian life. Then I 
will illustrate the aforesaid function of aesthetic experience within the world-
view of Protestant piety by a close reading of three prominent German poems, 
which reflect and poetically codify the Protestant-Pietist experience of nature.4 
After a close reading of Paul Gerhardt’s Geh aus, mein Herz (II), Gerhard Ter-
steegen’s Gott ist gegenwärtig (III) and Barthold Hinrich Brockes’ Kirschblüte 
bei der Nacht (IV) the results of the interpretations are discussed with reference 
to the concept of the sublime (V), which will lead me back to Kant. I read his 
concept of the sublime as a philosophical transformation of what I will call the 
 Protestant-Pietist worldview (VI).
3 I call empractical patterns of understanding convictions about what the case is and what 
should be the case within the meaning-laden world. These convictions take the form of practical 
attitudes and dispositions, be they attitudes of mind and experience or dispositions of action, 
and are displayed in thought, experience and action. They are so fundamental that the individu-
al may not even be conscious that she expresses them in her particular way of thinking, experi-
encing and acting. And they develop in processes of longue durée, which are capable of adopting 
the most heterogeneous contents.
4 For the complete original text of these poems see the appendix.
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1  At the spring of Protestant piety: Johann Arndt 
and the ‘silent Sabbath’ of inwardness
Johann Arndt’s Vier Bücher vom Wahren Christentum (1605–1609) was not just 
any publication among the diversity of edification books that flooded the book 
market of early 17th century Germany. It was more widely spread than any of 
Luther’s books at the time. Arndt’s Wahres Christentum and his Paradiesgärtlein 
voller Christlichen Tugenden (1612) ‘may be looked at as the most influential 
devotional books in German Protestantism’ (Schmidt 1979, 127; my translation – 
M.S.). Johann Arndt counts as the direct predecessor or even founder of Pietism 
(cf. Stoeffler 21971, 202; Wallmann 21986a, 14 (incl. fn 51); 1990, 15; Brecht 1979, 
148ff., 153–4; 1993, 131; cf. Sommer 1988, 135–42 on the history of research about 
Arndt), whose protagonists not only read his books intensively but also trans-
lated and published them, prayed and taught out of them.5 ‘In the late 1600s and 
early 1700s Arndt’s Wahres Christentum was a common feature in almost every 
Lutheran family’s private library in Northern Germany’ (Wallmann 1986b, 176; my 
translation – M.S.), which is not even astonishing if one considers that between 
1605 and 1740 this book was published in 123 editions (cf. Lehmann 1980, 114–5). 
‘Those who deal with Arndt’, writes Johannes Wallmann to illustrate the impor-
tance of this author for German cultural history, ‘do not ascend a lonely peak in 
the history of piety, but find themselves at the spring of a river that for centuries 
has traversed, irrigated and fertilized the land of Protestant piety’ (Wallmann 
1995, 5; my translation – M.S.).
In his Vier Bücher vom wahren Christentum, Arndt came to terms with his 
experience with the average piety of the Protestant population during the times 
when the denominations developed and differentiated.6 His book intends to 
5 Philipp Jakob Spener and August Hermann Francke published Wahres Christentum; Nikolaus 
Ludwig Graf Zinzendorf translated it into French; Spener published his Pia Desideria at first 
as a preface to Arndt’s Evangelienpostille, before it was published separately and advanced to 
being one of the most influential theological texts of Protestantism itself. Spener also held the 
so called Predigten über des seligen Johann Arndts Geistreiche Bücher vom wahren Christentum 
(prayers on Arndt’s Wahres Christentum) and published them in 1711 in Frankfurt, Germany. Au-
gust Hermann Francke strongly recommends, in his Idea Studiosi theologiae, that Arndt’s Wahres 
Christentum become the most personal reference to every student of theology and be maintained 
through his whole life (Francke 1969 [1721], 174).
6 Cf. Schilling 1988. On the pastoral motivation of Arndt’s literary production cf. Mager 1992. 
Wallmann interprets Arndt as a frustrated parish priest whose long years of tiring and resig-
nating pastoral work brought about his desire to search for the spiritual springs of belief in the 
Protestant (as well as Catholic) literary tradition (Wallmann 1995, 9).
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overcome the denominational bounds in the name of a vital praxis pietatis that 
would unify all Christian believers.7 He wants to reach his goal with the idea of 
an imitatio Christi, which he interprets as the personal imitation of Jesus’ life 
through ascetic self-discipline, the consequent rejection of worldly interests and 
a rigid exercise of Christian virtues. According to Arndt, we are obliged to lifelong 
repentance and this attitude should take the form of active contrition. Arndt is 
confident that true Christians may free themselves from the burden of sin caused 
by the transgression of Adam and Eve by resolute determination to virtuosic acts 
of repentance, while trusting the help of Christ as a ‘doctor and spring’.8 The acts 
of repentance count on the help of Christ in a way that is analogous to the sick, 
whose care for their precarious health contains the regular use of their medicine. 
Consequent abstinence from all worldly affairs is the key orientation for the sin-
ner’s intended radical change. The turn to God progresses as a renunciation of 
the world by means of contemplation and reflexion.9 For Arndt, the love of God is 
primarily neither a practical attitude, nor the attention to the canonical religious 
texts (i.e. the bible). Instead, it is the realm of feeling where the believer ‘meets’ 
her God in loving togetherness.
Since there is nothing more beloved for the loving soul than Jesus, and no good higher and 
sweeter than God’, our life would be ‘the finest and most perfect if it returned to its origin, 
which is in God. But this can only happen if man goes within himself with all his might and 
renounces his knowledge, desire and memory of the world and all carnal affairs and turns 
his soul with all his desires to God through the Holy Spirit, rests and celebrates in distance 
from the world in a silent Sabbath; then God will begin to act on him 
(Arndt 1845 [1605/09], 219, 325; my translation – M.S.)
Arndt presupposes that our soul is virtually different from the sinful world and 
that God, to whom man shall turn through contemplation, is ‘inside’ us and can 
be ‘found’ there.
7 Cf. Weber 1969. The purity of dogma has to be preserved, Arndt says, but the observance of a 
sacred life needs a much greater dedication: ‘Die Reinigkeit der Lehre ist mit wachenden Augen 
zu bewahren; aber die Heiligkeit des Lebens ist mit größerem Ernst fortzupflanzen’ (Arndt 1845 
[1605/09], 310). Even Hans Schneider, who stresses Arndt’s antipathy for the Calvinists, concedes 
that his edification book rejects the common theologica polemica of his times and adapts pre- 
and non-Lutheran traditions (Schneider 1992, 297).
8 ‘Arzt und Heilbrunnen’ (Arndt 1845 [1605/09], 136).
9 Arndt formulates this by combining the term ‘Kehre’ (a sharp turn or bend) with different pref-
aces (‘hin’, ‘ab’, ‘ein’, corresponding to the English prepositions ‘to’, ‘off’ and ‘into’), which shall 
express that the practical orientations of turning to God, renouncing the world and contemplat-
ing the Christian truth ‘in my heart’ have the same root: Hinkehr through Abkehr by Einkehr 
myself.
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With reference to a prominent passage in the Gospel of Luke, Arndt explains 
precisely what we should understand by man’s affectionate contemplation of 
his loving togetherness with Christ. The intention of his edification book was to 
show, ‘how you may search and find the Kingdom of God in yourself’ (ibid., 319). 
Arndt understands the Kingdom of God in a rather spiritualistic sense. He locates 
it in particular mental states of the contemplating believer with a variety of sen-
suous and emotional qualities that are identified by the use of an appropriate 
vocabulary. The verbalization of the believer’s ‘togetherness’ with his God serves 
as reflexive insurance, because – as Kant put it with his deistic skepticism – how 
does one know ‘that it was God speaking to him’ in his emotional tete-à-tete 
(cf. Kant 1998 [1798], 333). Arndt uses an imagery of sensuous affection to conjure 
up the inner experience of salvation that is supposedly spontaneous and culmi-
nates in mystical states. Again and again he suggests the sensuous qualities of 
salvation by analogy to aesthetic experience: The Holy Spirit pours itself into the 
believer’s soul and puts it into a state similar to our experience of the sun shining 
from within, the day shining from within, the fountain flowing from within and 
the rain flowing from itself and dampening everything (cf. Arndt 1845 [1605/09], 
320). This repeated analogy intends to express the ‘quasi-sensible’ state of reli-
gious experience that William James pointed to10 and founded in ‘mystical states 
of consciousness’.11 The intended ‘peak’ of mystical experience is reached by cre-
ating a ‘peaceful silence’ (Stille) brought about by the radical abstinence from all 
worldly affairs. It is conveyed by a ‘darkness’ (Finsternis) of the mind, which we 
have to understand as surrendering its work of processing outer data and deliver-
ing representations of the empirical world to us. The meditative contraction of our 
consciousness to a point of utter concentration culminates in a moment which 
Arndt predicates as the rise of the ‘godly light’. His imagery of light illustrates the 
‘togetherness’ with God as a form of permeation and illumination characterized 
by a synthesis of recognition and union (unio mystica). It may hardly be verbal-
ized, though, because whatever happens in this ominous moment, ‘neither mind 
nor will nor memory may grasp or keep’ (Arndt 1845 [1605/09], 333; my transla-
tion – M.S.). Because of the immediateness of its experience it is not sufficiently 
accessible in retrospect and therefore cannot be appropriately  represented. It is 
10 In his Varieties of Religious Experience, James argues (and also plausibly shows by interpret-
ing conversion reports) ‘that in the distinctively religious sphere of experience, many persons 
[…] possess the objects of their belief, not in the form of mere conceptions which their intellect 
accepts as true, but rather in the form of quasi-sensible realities directly apprehended’ (James 
1987 [1902], 64).
11 ‘I think that personal religious experience has its root and centre in mystical states of con-
sciousness […]’ (ibid., 342).
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‘hidden in the most inward depths and substance of the soul’ (ibid.; my transla-
tion – M.S.). On the other hand, this incommensurability of the mystical expe-
rience may preserve its impact on everyday life, because what cannot be said 
appropriately maintains a never- dwindling source of interpretation and may be 
remembered as such: a mystical possession of the soul that has ‘the Kingdom of 
God and its happiness in itself’ (ibid., 331; my translation – M.S.).
Repentance, succession and regeneration are the central thoughts that are 
developed in the first three books of Arndt’s Wahres Christentum. Now these three 
books are followed by a fourth one, which combines the edificatory intentions 
with metaphysical contemplation. For Arndt, the manifold forms in nature are 
formulations of the liber naturae, in which the true believer, who has under-
gone the process of repentance, succession of Christ and final regeneration, may 
read the creator’s profession of loving us. Arndt intends to create the attitude 
of ‘tasting’ God’s love and feeling ourselves within it by evoking a sentimental 
emotion at the sight of natural beauty – thereby returning God’s love by means of 
an intentional stance toward nature. Our joy in nature and its usefulness for us 
have the status of a service. It makes us conscious of nature as a creation whose 
epitome we ourselves prove to be: the crown of creation as creation’s internal self- 
consciousness – being created by God to feel the joy at all the things we have at 
our (aesthetic and practical) disposal.12 The consciousness of nature’s beauty as 
creation is a speculum of our soul’s own beauty and proves our resurrection as the 
image of God,13 which is why actually God celebrates himself as the creator of all 
things by means of our – in Kant’s words – aesthetic reflection. The true believer’s 
aesthetic reflection on natural beauty is a form of godly self-celebration.14
I said that Arndt intends to return God’s love by means of an intentional stance 
toward emotionally, sentimentally perceived nature. Of course, this is not the only 
way to return God’s love, and it is not the primary one. As the design of his edi-
fication book clearly shows, the metaphysical contemplation of nature’s beauty 
shall follow the believer’s repentance, his succession of Christ and his regenera-
tion, which again is founded in generally inner-directed and  particularly mystical 
12 Arndt 1845 [1605/09], 417 (der Mensch, ‘von Gott geschaffen, daß er sich dessen freue, was 
er hat’).
13 Sommer 1999, 216: ‘Our amazement at the greatness of creation in all of its parts and of the 
care of God in it reaches a climax in the creation of man […] The praise of God in his creatures and 
the beauty of the human soul, when God reflects himself in it – with this essential feature Arndt 
has returned to the beginning of the whole book’ (my translation – M.S.).
14 The fact that Arndt’s cosmology is based on the belief that God’s love had been objectified in 
nature may also have been motivated by giving a consoling answer to the apocalyptical cosmol-
ogies of the baroque, which read natural objects and events as signs of the end of all times. Cf. 
Kemper 1987, 34–65.
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states of consciousness. The soul is the original ‘location’ where God is found, not 
nature. And the perception of nature’s beauty derives from the experience of a 
beauty that is of a different kind: internal, non-sensuous, but ‘quasi-sensible’ (W. 
James), discovered in the most private mental states of the supposed ‘together-
ness’ with God. Therefore it is Arndt’s inner-directed piety that ‘charges’ the con-
templation of nature sentimentally and turns the natural sphere into a reservoir of 
sentimental allegories, which not only appear in the 4th book, but generally and 
often in Wahres Christentum. The sentimental disposition of the believer toward 
nature is not the result of an immediate experience of nature, but its prerequisite. 
The subject becomes sentimental in his mystical experiences of permeation by 
and union with the godly might, and these experiences mediate the experience of 
nature, which is posterior to the latter.
Arndt’s edification book intends to establish an aesthetically sensible, sen-
timental attitude toward nature as part of an overall concept of true piety. The 
goal of this piety is to guarantee salvation by means of quasi-sensible experiences 
through contemplation. For the believer, the object of this experience is God ‘in 
myself’. I would thus like to call the basis of the true believer’s certainty that she 
is on the right path a relation to God expressed as an emotional inner-directed 
 self-relation.15 The object in itself of this relation is also relational (the self), but 
neither in terms of a reflexive nor in terms of an egological relation. We have to 
conceptualize it as a pre-intentional co-consciousness in any state of mind that 
this particular state of mind belongs to me.16 The self-relation (in terms of a relation 
to the non-egological and non-reflexive self) is inner-directed, when the mental 
states have been evoked by inner stimulation (by bodily sensations or thoughts). 
Inner-directed self-relation therefore means the relation to inner-directed mental 
states (states evoked by inner stimulation) that I am  pre-intentionally and 
 co-consciously aware of as my mental states. The self-relation is emotional in as 
far as it is an emotional relation to the inner-directed mental states in question. Of 
course it is cognitive, too, because I must be capable of identifying discrete states 
of mind, but more importantly these states of mind are subject to an emotional 
15 In the following I will operate with the distinction of ‘inner-directed’ and ‘other-directed’ 
self-relations. These terms will be exclusively used in the way I define them. They do not bear any 
similarity of meaning to David Riesman’s differentiation of ‘inner-directed’ and ‘other-directed’ 
characters in Riesman 1989.
16 The philosophical discovery of this non-intentional co-consciousness is one of the great 
achievements of late 18th century philosophy. Rousseau calls it sentiment de l’existence; Nova-
lis, Selbstgefühl. Cf. Manfred Frank’s brilliant reconstruction of the historical genesis of Novalis’ 
Selbstgefühl in German 18th century epistemology (Frank 2002). Also cf. Schlette 2005b (par-
ticularly in reference to contemporary conceptualizations of this self-relation in the Philosophy 
of Mind).
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relation; the self-relation’s weight in the logic of belief derives from its emotional 
character. The second-order relation (i.e. the believer’s relation to the relation he 
is as a self) is basically an emotion-bound interpretation of the first-order relation; 
it establishes what the object itself of the religious experience in question is for the 
believer. For him the first-order relation is a relation in which he not only relates to 
himself, but also to God (‘in himself’). The believer interprets his first-order rela-
tion as a pre-intentional awareness of God. This interpretation is what takes place 
in a second-order relation to the (in itself relational) self, and it is emotion-bound, 
because for Arndt no cognitive relation may prove the authenticity of the suppos-
edly identified mental state, but only the spontaneous emotional reaction to it.17
The attitude toward nature derives from the emotional inner-directed self- 
relation. I would like to call it an emotional other-directed self-relation. The 
first-order relation of the self in this case comprises the pre-intentionality and co- 
consciousness of myself in those mental states that have been evoked by outer stim-
ulation (namely natural objects, scenes or events). Again, the second-order relation 
is basically an emotion-bound interpretation of the first-order relation. Also in this 
case the first-order relation is a relation for the believer in which he relates to God 
‘in himself’. Again he interprets his first-order relation as a pre-intentional and 
co-conscious awareness of God. But whereas in the inner-directed self-relation, the 
mental states that prove God’s presence to the believer are founded in the ‘depths 
of his soul’, i.e. in situations of inner stimulation, in the case of other-directed self- 
relation the mental states that prove God’s presence to the believer are founded in 
situations of outer stimulation (by nature). In short: Whenever I see (or have just 
recently seen) the beautiful natural, I feel God ‘in myself’. Aside from the mere cos-
mological argument that nature is God’s creation and God therefore – in the widest 
panentheistic sense – appears in nature, there is an experiential argument that God 
is present in nature. Because if I feel God in me whenever I approach the beauties 
of nature aesthetically, this presence of God ‘in myself’ must have been caused by 
something godly outside of me. But still I would not even sense it if I had not been 
previously assured of the existence of God in the mystical states of consciousness.
17 Actually the logic of pietist belief according to Arndt is far more complicated, because the 
spontaneous emotional reaction has to be made subject to an even higher-order observance. 
‘Examine the depths of your heart, how it is there’, Arndt requires of the true believer (Arndt 
1845 [1605/09], 148; my translation – M.S.); cf. other characteristic examples of the demanded 
observance in the records of Philipp Jakob Spener’s pietist collegia: Spener 1979 [1687], 479 [and 
repeatedly]). This may initiate a regressus ad infinitum that leads into the struggle of penance 
(Bußkampf) which characterizes the most dominant form of pietism in the18th century, the Hal-
lensian pietism, established by August Hermann Francke. Cf. my reconstruction of the pietist 
logic of belief in Schlette 2005a.
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It will be interesting to see how this ‘logic’ of piety – particularly the pro-
portion between the inner-directed and the other-directed self-relations which 
Arndt introduces to us theologically – is expressed in a worldview, i.e. in emprac-
tical patterns of understanding. When I assign the texts I interpret to the Arnd-
tian tradition of Protestant piety, then I mean this in terms of a praxis pietatis 
that has been most effectively explicated as well as initiated – although certainly 
not exclusively initiated – by Arndt’s edification literature. I do not mean this in 
terms of direct causation. Although all of the authors I deal with were shaped by 
a religious milieu that was inspired by Arndt, it would not make sense to say that 
reading Arndt caused these authors to write and think the way they did. Growing 
up in this milieu greatly increased the chance that the way these authors thought, 
experienced and acted took the form it did. Let us now – using Pierre Bourdieu’s 
distinction (cf. Bourdieu 1974, Chap. IV ) – focus on an opus operatum that para-
digmatically expresses the modus operandi of the piety in question.
2  ‘Go forth my heart and pleasure seek’: Paul 
Gerhardt and the Protestant piety of nature
The opus operatum of inner-directed Protestant piety that I will discuss first is the 
church song Geh’ aus, mein Herz, und suche Freud18 by Paul Gerhardt.19 Again this 
is not just one text among many, but the most well-known example of Protestant 
piety of nature.20 Understanding this poem brings us to the heart of 18th century 
Protestant Germany. And it is no coincidence, as I will show, that  Gerhardt’s 
18 ‘Go forth/out my heart and pleasure seek’, as the title is usually translated in English editions.
19 Paul Gerhardt was born in 1607 in Gräfenhainichen (Palatine Saxony) and went to the royal 
school (Fürstenschule) in Grimma, before he began to study theology in Wittenberg in 1628. Be-
tween 1643 and 1651 he worked as a tutor in Berlin where he later worked as a deacon at St. Nico-
lai. Not willing to renounce his orthodox-Lutheran polemics against other confessions during 
church services, as he was required to do by the ruling prince, he was relieved of office in 1666. 
In 1669 he became deacon in Lübben (Niederlausitz), where he died in 1676. The most productive 
phase of his poetry was during his time as a tutor in Berlin. Between 1647 and 1736 his church 
songs were published in more than 40 editions of the Protestant hymnbook Praxis pietatis meli-
ca. Johann Georg Ebeling published the first complete edition of his songs in 1667 under the title 
Pauli Gerhardi Geistliche Andachten. Generally on Gerhardt cf. Bunners 1993; on the poetological 
assessment of Gerhardt cf. Hillenbrand 1992; particularly on Gerhardt’s song Geh aus, mein Herz, 
und suche Freud cf. ibid., 101–106; Schmidt 1982, 285–302.
20 On the relation between church songs and Protestant piety in 17th century Germany cf. Brecht 
1993, 188–203; on the religious poetry of nature in Germany cf. Krummacher 1976; Kemper 1981.
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poem was added to 19th century editions of Arndt’s Wahres Christentum. A close 
reading of it shall prepare the appropriate attitude toward the subject of the 
fourth (cosmological) book because Gerhardt’s language evokes the very senti-
mentalism that correlates with Arndt’s theology of piety psychologically.21 
1) Geh’ aus, mein Herz, und suche Freud’ / In dieser lieben Sommerzeit / An 
deines Gottes Gaben; / Schau an der schönen Garten Zier, / Und siehe, wie sie 
mir und dir / sich ausgeschmücket haben.
2) Die Bäume stehen voller Laub, / Das Erdreich decket seinen Staub / Mit einem 
gruenen Kleide; / Narzissus und die Tulipan, / Die ziehen sich viel schöner an 
/ Als Salomonis Seide.
3) Die Lerche schwingt sich in die Luft, / Das Täublein fleucht aus seiner Kluft 
/ und macht sich in die Wälder; / Die hochbegabte Nachtigall / Ergötzt und 
füllt mit ihrem Schall / Berg, Hügel, Tal und Felder.
4) Die Glucke führt ihr Völklein aus, / Der Storch baut und bewohnt sein Haus, 
/ Das Schwälblein speist ihr Jungen; / Der schnelle Hirsch, das leichte Reh / 
Ist froh und kommt von seiner Höh / Ins tiefe Gras gesprungen.
5) Die Bächlein rauschen in dem Sand / Und malen sich und ihren Rand / Mit 
schattenreichen Myrten; / Die Wiesen liegen hart dabei / Und klingen ganz 
von Lustgeschrei / Der Schaf und ihrer Hirten.
6) Die unverdroßne Bienenschar / Zeucht hin und her, / sucht hier und dar / Ihr 
edle Honigspeise; / Des süßen Weinstocks starker Saft / Kriegt täglich neue 
Stärk und Kraft / In seinem schwachen Reise.
7) Der Weizen wächset mit Gewalt, / Darüber jauchzet Jung und Alt / Und rühmt 
die große Güte / Des, der so überflüssig labt / Und mit so manchem Gut 
begabt / Das menschliche Gemüte.
8) Ich selbsten kann und mag nicht ruhn, / Des großen Gottes großes Tun / 
Erweckt mir alle Sinnen: / Ich singe mit, wenn Alles singt, / Und lasse, was 
dem Höchsten klingt, / Aus meinem Herzen rinnen.
9) Ach, denk ich, bist du hier so schön / Und läßt du’s uns so lieblich gehn / 
Auf dieser armen Erden: / Was will doch wohl nach dieser Welt / Dort in dem 
reichen Himmelszelt / Und güldnem Schlosse werden!
10) Welch hohe Lust, welch heller Schein / Wird wohl in Christi Garten sein! / 
Wie muß es da wohl klingen, / Da so viel tausend Seraphim / Mit eingestim-
mtem Mund und Stimm / Ihr Alleluja singen!
21 On the mystical strains of Gerhardt’s piety in his songs cf. Petrich 1914, 197ff.; van Andel 
1976, 173–9. Gerhardt’s piety of nature ‘derives from Arndt’s “LIBER NATURAE” and participates 
in the very old dogma about nature as the second book of God’s revelation (next to the Liber Dei, 
the bible) that reaches back to Augustine and Origines’ (Haufe 1978, 73; my translation – M.S.).
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11) O wär ich da, o stünd ich schon, / Ach, süßer Gott, für deinem Thron / Und 
trüge meine Palmen! / So wollt ich nach der Engel Weis / Erhöhen deines 
Namens Preis / Mit tausend schönen Psalmen.
12) Doch will ich gleichwohl, / Weil ich noch / Hier trage dieses Leibes Joch, / 
Auch nicht gar stille schweigen; Mein Herze soll sich fort und fort / An diesem 
und an allem Ort / Zu deinem Lobe neigen.
13) Hilf nur und segne meinen Geist / Mit Segen, der vom Himmel fleußt, / Daß 
ich dir stetig blühe; / Gib, daß der Sommer deiner Gnad / In meiner Seelen 
früh und spat / Viel Glaubensfrücht erziehe.
14) Mach in mir deinem Geiste Raum, / Daß ich dir werd ein guter Baum, / Und 
laß mich wohl bekleiben; / Verleihe, daß zu deinem Ruhm / Ich deines 
Gartens schöne Blum / Und Pflanze möge bleiben.
15) Erwähle mich zum Paradeis / Und laß mich bis zur letzten Reis / An Leib und 
Seele grünen: So will ich dir und deiner Ehr / Allein, und sonsten keinem 
mehr, / Hier und dort ewig dienen“ (Gerhardt 1992 [1667], 71).
Let us focus on the first stanza of Gerhardt’s song.22 In our context, ‘Geh aus!’ has 
the performative meaning of an encouraging invitation to leisurely leave a closed 
space and enter an open one. The addressee of this invitation is metonymically 
referred to as the alter ego of the lyric self (‘mein Herz’),23 and thereby the dichot-
omy of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is specified as the opposite between the inwardness 
of emotional life and the openness for sensuous impressions.24 As a form of the 
lyric self’s invitation to itself, the beginning of the stanza expresses a relation, 
which contains the lyric self in two intentionally different ways: directly as the 
invitee and indirectly as the inviting instance. The poem takes off from an innerly 
self-relation, a way of addressing oneself to turn to the outside. Now, if one wants 
to seek pleasure in the outer world, it should be such that one may also find what 
one is looking for. The temporal reference ‘in dieser lieben Sommerzeit’ charac-
22 For a translation I suggest the following: Go forth, my heart, and seek pleasure in this beautiful 
summertime, enjoying the gifts of your God. Look, see the beauty of the delightful garden’s decora-
tions and see how they have decked themselves out for you and for me.
23 Another logically possible way of reading the formulation would be the assumption of an-
other person that is referred to using a nickname. This version can be excluded considering the 
further context of the poem.
24 Bunners’ suggestion that the invitation to go out expresses the ‘turn to God’ is semantically 
unfounded and caused by the projection of the end of the poem into its beginning (cf. Bunners 
1993, 198). Lothar Schmidt also refers to the form of address, without having much to say. It was 
a common topos that could be shown in German lyricism from Friedrich von Hausen to Christine 
Busta, as he remarks (L. Schmidt 1982, 285). His claim this is a mere formula ignores the neces-
sary interpretation and thereby fails to identify the logic of contentual development in this poem.
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terizes the outer world as the most pleasurable natural season (certainly for most 
people in the 17th century). The suggested emotional dedication of the heart to a 
sphere external to the heart is corresponded to by reference to a natural season 
that is compatible with the sentiments of the heart.25
So far the stanza lacks an explicit reference to God: It merely encourages the 
sentimental admiration of nature. But this is followed by a subtle indication (the 
last one until the 7th stanza) that Gerhardt wrote the church song with the inten-
tion of praising God: the pleasure may be sought for ‘[A]n deines Gottes Gaben’. 
The flourishing nature that has been evoked by reference to the natural season 
of summer is predicated as a gift of God, and this God is being called the God of 
the heart (‘among the gifts of your [the heart’s – M.S.] God’), which characterizes 
the joy felt at the sight of nature as a sentimental form of worship. Above all, if 
God is the God of the heart, then the relation to God is characterized by their 
‘togetherness’, whose utmost possible privacy is reached through mystical states 
of consciousness.26 The relation to nature and to God through his ‘perception’ 
in nature are subordinated to the latter. The gifts of God ‘speak’ to the heart that 
originally senses him inwardly and only secondarily becomes aware of him by 
outer stimulation.
The fourth line of the first stanza is the paratactical continuation of the 
preceding three lines, and it specifies the encouragement to ‘go forth’ as an invi-
tation to look at the ornamental decorations of the natural beauties. The senti-
mental self (i.e. ‘the heart’) shall seek the pleasure of aesthetically contemplating 
nature. It is not encouraged to practically engage in its shaping, arrangement and 
practical exploitation. The scenery that is being evoked alludes to the peaceful 
idyll of the Garden of Eden, in which we see God walking among his creation with 
the pride of a successful craftsman (cf. Gen 3, 14). The aesthetic contemplation 
determines what the lyric self is specifically focusing on in nature. It is its decora-
tiveness – in Kant’s words: its aesthetic finality – that appeals to the contempla-
tor. The fifth line says that the natural beauties have decorated themselves ‘for me 
25 This becomes obvious if you substitute the attribute ‘kalt’ (cold) for ‘lieb’ (lovely), which 
would ridicule the invitation, whereas a ‘stormy’ or ‘hot’ summertime would allude to the emo-
tional opening as an erotically compulsive one.
26 This becomes more obvious, indeed, if you consider Gerhardt’s poetic production as a whole. 
Lines like ‘Was ist’s, o Schönster, das ich nicht / In deiner Liebe habe’ are formulated in the spirit 
of mystical contemplation that seeks visualization of the passion of Christ and unification with 
Jesus. Gerhardt was greatly inspired by St. Bernhard, whom he explicitly refers to as a primary 
source of his poetic imagination (cf. his Passionssalve des heiligen Bernhardi an die Gliedmaßen 
des HErrn JEsu, containing Gerhardt’s maybe most famous church song ‘O Haupt voll Blut und 
Wunden’, a masterpiece of poetry that belongs to the pantheon of German literature for its au-
thentic articulation of German Protestant inwardness).
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and you’, suggesting that nature’s aesthetic finality may unify reason and heart. 
This arrangement does not reveal an order, though, which has been established 
in nature by a gardener (whether it be man or God), because the gardens have 
decorated themselves (‘Und siehe, wie sie […] / Sich ausgeschmücket haben’): 
It reveals an order nature has established itself. God may be present in all the 
astonishing natural objects, but above all he is present in the ‘heartbeat’ of an 
organism that may unfold itself to the diversities of natural forms according to the 
immanent logic of its (the organism’s) development.27
Gerhardt evokes a harmonic correlation between aesthetic and teleological 
finality. And within Gerhardt’s religious worldview, as it is being expressed in his 
church song, the explicit consciousness of nature’s teleological finality follows 
the aesthetic awareness of its beauty. Accordingly, stanzas two to five refer to the 
beauty of nature,28 before stanzas six and seven accentuate nature as a teleo-
logical ensemble.29 It is not until the seventh stanza that God as the originator 
27 The second half of the second stanza confirms this interpretation: ‘Narzissus und die Tuli-
pan, / Die ziehen sich viel schöner an / Als Salomonis Seide’ (the daffodils and tulips are dressed 
finer than in Salomo’s silk). These lines metonymically allude to Salomo’s enormous wealth. But 
silk is also a symbol of the orient’s aesthetic sophistication. Gerhardt indirectly approves of this 
because the comparison says that the delicate fabric that we associate with the name of Salomo 
is surpassed by the flowers, whose splendour adorns the gardens. Gerhardt may also have been 
inspired by Mt 6, 29, where Jesus tells his successors to learn from the lilies, which grow on the 
fields: they were not working, nor spinning, but even Salomo, in all of his splendour, had not 
been dressed as beautifully as any one of them. The passage in the bible is intended as an alle-
gory of God’s care, though. The same way in which God knows how to dress the useless flowers, 
he also knows to give man all he needs. This meaning is not preserved in Gerhardt’s implicit al-
lusion to the biblical text because for Gerhardt the beauty of nature derives from its own impulse 
to beautification. It is this impulse that is primarily of godly origin.
28 Nature’s beauty is referred to as the movements and melodious sounds of the birds (‘Die 
Lerche schwingt sich […]’ [the lark is swinging itself into the air]; ‘die […] Nachtigall ergoetzt und 
füllt mit ihrem Schall’[the nightingale enthralls and fills with its song]); the characteristic prop-
erties of the wild animals common to the habitat of Central Europe (‘der schnelle Hirsch, das 
leichte Reh’[the fast stag, the light deer]); the sound and the quasi-artificial course of the creeks 
(‘Die Bächlein rauschen […] und kränzen sich […]’ [the creek is rustling …]); the pleasant order 
of the natural scenery as a whole (‘die Wiesen tränken sich dabei’[the meadows lie next to it]). 
Being aware of the acoustic and visual stimuli merging to a qualitative unit, the heart may seek 
its pleasure. – L. Schmidt has mentioned the affinity of Gerhardt’s song to the literary tradition 
of the locus amoenus (Schmidt 1982, 288). Gerhardt brings anacreontic and biblical motives to a 
harmonic fusion.
29 The teleological finality is merely seen out of a physicoteleological perspective, of course, 
that interprets the natural design as an order serving the needs of man (whereas it is logically 
possible to conceptualize the teleological finality merely in functional terms). Gerhardt refers to 
the honey production of the bees, the flourishing of the vine, the growth of wheat. Hillenbrand 
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of nature’s finality is explicitly mentioned again. And here Gerhardt primarily 
points out the aesthetic qualities of nature again: Everybody, young and old, 
praises the great loving kindness of Him who ‘so abundantly refreshes the human 
soul with a good many faculties’ (‘… so überflüssig labt / Und mit so manchem 
Gut begabt / Das menschliche Gemüte’). The essentially contemplative and aes-
thetic features of this song are confirmed even in those passages, which stress the 
utility of nature for man. These features are even more accentuated by the fact 
that the loving kindness of God is not only praised for the sake of nature, but also 
for the sake of the joy we may feel while contemplating nature’s aesthetic and 
teleological finality. With no doubt ‘a good many faculties’ refers to our capability 
of feeling joy at the beauties of nature. The piety of nature expressed in the song 
culminates in the reflection that this pietist capacity of joy in nature itself came 
to be through God. From now on the lyric self expresses nothing but enthusiasm 
due to its insight into God’s hidden effects on man. Therefore, the seventh stanza 
is the turning point of the poem: In what follows, the lyric self exclusively focuses 
on God, of whom it became aware through aesthetic contemplation.
It is not difficult to detect the relation to God by means of inner-directed 
and other-directed self-relations in the opus operatum (Bourdieu) of Gerhardt’s 
song. The opening up to the world of summer can be decoded as an emotional 
 other-directed self-relation, in which nature serves mainly as a confirmation 
of the qualitative content that is ‘found’ in the self’s more fundamental inner- 
directed self-relation. This inner-directed self-relation is the experiential back-
ground of the poem and it is only indirectly evoked by the imperative phrase.30 
More specifically, the poem articulates a religious experience whose development 
may be reconstructed as the elevation of the self: from an intuitive feeling of God – 
which belongs to the inwardness of the (ideally) mystically aroused religious self 
(indirectly expressed by the implicit meaning of the imperative’s address at the 
beginning of the first stanza); over the sensuously mediated experience of God – 
through the aesthetic (stanzas 1–5) as well as teleological (stanzas 6–7) contem-
plation of nature; and the explicit recognition of God – through self-reflection as 
deciphers these passages as hidden biblical references that intend to evoke the ‘eschatologi-
cal dimension of salvation’ (Hillenbrand 1992, 101; cf. ibid., 103). Hillenbrand’s interpretation is 
plausible, but it cannot disprove that the text primarily articulates a particular religious attitude 
toward nature. Thus it has maintained its attraction to Protestant believers and still is a promi-
nent keystone of liturgy.
30 That is why the way from the inward to the outward relation to God by means of natural ex-
perience and back is not a hermeneutic circle, as Schmidt claims (1982, 290). The hermeneutic 
circle consists of preliminary judgments, their revision, transformation and reestablishment on 
a higher level, which for Gerhardt would be a blasphemously relativistic perspective on the rev-
elation of truth in the inward states of mystical consciousness.
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a  contemplator of nature (stanza 7) as well as the reflection of nature as corre-
sponding to the attitude of contemplation (stanza 7 and 8); to the direct expe-
rience of God – through the contemplation of his transcendence (stanzas 9–11), 
which ‘takes off’ from empirical experience by ascribing an allegorical meaning 
to some of the objects and facts experienced. The eleventh stanza is the peak of 
this elevation. The four last stanzas serve the function of an epilogue: The lyric 
self declares his humble acceptance of human faith (stanza 12) and prays for 
support in the struggle for religious authenticity and salvation (stanzas 13–15).
Gerhardt’s song paradigmatically expresses the Arndtian worldview. It will 
be interesting to see how this worldview, which is commonly associated with the 
notorious forms of sentimentalism in 18th century Germany, proves to be funda-
mental to sentimentalist as well as rationalist attitudes of mind and experience. 
In what follows, I will contrast Gerhard Tersteegen’s church song Gott ist gegen-
wärtig, a paradigmatic poetic example of religious sentimentalism, with Barthold 
Hinrich Brocke’s poem Kirschblüte bei der Nacht, which is no less paradigmatic 
for the rationalist worldview. Both authors have been shaped by the Arndtian 
tradition of Protestant piety.
3  ‘let me […] let you affect me’: Gerhard 
Tersteegen and the sentimentalist 
transformation of the piety of nature
Let us first take a look at Gerhard Tersteegen’s complete poem, before we particu-
larly focus on the sixth stanza31:
31 Gerhard Tersteegen, born in Moers in 1697, grew up in a Reformed family and went to the 
local Latin school for over nine years. Financial considerations caused his family to push him 
to move to Mühlheim an der Ruhr and start an apprenticeship as a merchant there. Tersteegen 
made contact with quietist circles and, after having had a conversion experience, he resigned 
the job his family had chosen for him and worked as a weaver until 1728, when he gave up this 
work to dedicate himself exclusively to religiously edifying activities in the context of quietism. 
He translated Jean de Labadie and Thomas a Kempis, wrote a collection of songs under the title 
Geistliches Blumengärtlein inniger Seelen and between 1733 and 1753 a major biographical work 
called Auserlesene Lebensbeschreibungen heiliger Seelen. The sermons he held between 1769 and 
1773 have been published under the title Geistliche Brosamen. Tersteegen died in 1769 in Mühl-
heim an der Ruhr. On the literary significance of Tersteegen cf. Kemper 1997, 58–95; on the impact 
of mysticism on Tersteegen’s opus cf. van Andel 1973 and – for the opposite reading – Wolff 
1989. Whereas van Andel characterizes Tersteegen as a quietist mystic, whose piety contradicts 
the principles of reformation, Wolff accentuates its compatibility with Lutheranism. Also cf. the 
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1) ”Gott ist gegenwärtig! Lasset uns anbeten, / Und in Ehrfurcht vor ihn treten. / 
Gott ist in der Mitte! Alles in uns schweige, / Und sich innigst vor ihm beuge. 
/ Wer ihn kennt, Wer ihn nennt, / Schlag die Augen nieder, / Kommt, ergebt 
euch wieder.
2) Gott ist gegenwärtig, dem die Cherubinen / Tag und Nacht gebücket dienen; 
/ Heilig! heilig! singen alle Engel-Chören, / Wenn sie dieses Wesen ehren; / 
Herr, vernimm Unsre Stimm, / Da auch wir Geringen / Unsre Opfer bringen.
3) Wir entsagen willig allein Eitelkeiten, / Aller Erdenlust und Freuden; / Da 
liegt unser Wille, Seele, Leib und Leben, / Dir zum Eigenthum ergeben: / Du 
allein Sollst es sein, / Unser Gott und Herre, / Dir gebührt die Ehre.
4) Majestätisch Wesen, möcht ich recht dich preisen, / Und im Geist dir Dienst 
erweisen ! / Möcht ich, wie die Engel, immer vor dir stehen, / Und dich gegen-
wärtig sehen! / Laß mich dir Für und für / Trachten zu gefallen, / Liebster 
Gott, in allen.
5) Luft, die alles füllet, drin wir immer schweben, / Aller Dinge Grund und 
Leben, / Meer, ohn Grund und Ende, Wunder aller Wunder, / Ich senk mich 
in dich hinunter: / Ich in dir, Du in mir, / Laß mich ganz verschwinden, / Dich 
nur sehn und finden.
6) Du durchdringest alles: laß dein schönstes Lichte, / Herr, berühren mein 
Gesichte: / Wie die zarten Blumen willig sich entfalten, / Und der Sonne stille 
halten, / Laß mich so, Still und froh, / Deine Strahlen fassen, / Und dich 
wirken lassen.
7) Mache mich einfältig, innig, abgeschieden, / Sanfte, und im stillen Frieden, 
/ Mach mich reines Herzens, daß ich deine Klarheit / Schauen mag im Geist 
und Wahrheit. / Laß mein Herz Ueberwärts, / Wie ein Adler schweben, / Und 
in dir nur leben.
8) Herr, komm in mir wohnen, laß mein’n Geist auf Erden / Dir ein Heiligthum 
noch werden: / Komm, du nahes Wesen, dich in mir verkläre, / Daß ich dich 
stets lieb und ehre; / Wo ich geh, Siz und steh, / Laß mich dich erblicken, / 
Und vor dir mich bücken. (Tersteegen 1927 [1729], 235)
psychological analysis of Tersteegen’s biographical development in Hoffmann 1982 and the pub-
lications on Tersteegen in Kock/ Thiesbonenkamp 1997. On the significance of Tersteegen’s song 
Gott ist gegenwärtig for his overall piety cf. Ludewig 1986 (with a theological perspective on Ter-
steegen) and Kemper 1997, 58–95 (from the standpoint of literary studies). Tersteegen’s songs are 
examined particularly in context of pietist song production in Althaus 1997.
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Now, rather than starting at the beginning of Tersteegen’s song, I would like to 
begin with the sixth of eight stanzas.32 Gerhard Kaiser (1996, 33) has pointed out 
that it ideally exemplifies how, within the mindset of 18th century pietism – almost 
a hundred years after Gerhardt’s song was written – the sentimental experience of 
nature becomes independent from its original religious origins. My main intention 
in the following is to question this popular thesis, which has become common 
textbook knowledge about pietist literature in German Studies. Kaiser writes that 
this stanza articulates the sensitivity to (‘Einfühlung in […]’) a precisely observed 
natural event. The flowers are not only a metaphor for the human soul, but accord-
ing to Kaiser (1996, 34) they are described as entities that have a soul themselves. 
And he explicitly contrasts Tersteegen’s individualized way of writing about 
nature with the supposedly merely allegorical approach of Gerhardt in Geh aus, 
mein Herz, und suche Freud. And indeed, Kaiser is right about the higher degree 
of poetic individualization in Tersteegen’s poem. Whereas Gerhardt’s poem seems 
to be about experienced nature, Tersteegen’s deals with actually experiencing it. 
Whereas Gerhardt gives us a panorama, Tersteegen gives us a situation (of experi-
encing). But let us focus on the stanza more closely. What does the lyrical self say 
about the flowers? It describes the flowers’ sensitivity to sunshine as a conscious 
act; the flowers unfold willingly and remain still in the sun. This formulation log-
ically implies that flowers take an intentional stance toward their own sensuous 
states (which are caused by sunshine). But what the lyrical self says is not identi-
cal with what the text means. It does not mean that the flowers intend a qualitative 
mental state, and it does not mean that they intend to unfold and to remain still in 
the sun. It does not even mean that they have any qualitative mental states at all. 
The text does not give us a biological hypothesis about natural life. Instead, these 
lines can only be understood metaphorically. Let me try to reconstruct the logic of 
aesthetic perception that is expressed in the stanza.
It begins with the proposition that God (to whom the personal pronoun 
refers) permeates everything. This proposition formulates a conviction that can 
be interpreted either as a claim or an expressive statement. Our stanza does not 
make this conviction plausible; it presupposes its plausibility. Either the lyric self 
has proven it in the foregoing stanzas or it does not do so at all. In any case, 
the sixth stanza only continues with what follows from this conviction. Now it 
is unlikely, of course, that God’s actual permeation of everything is meant in a 
physical sense. Therefore, the very use of the verb ‘permeate’ is metaphorical. It 
32 As a paraphrasing translation I suggest as follows: You permeate everything. Let your most 
beautiful light, my Lord, touch my face: How the gentle blossoms unfold willingly, and hold still in 
the sun: let me this way, quietly and gladly, grasp your rays and let you affect me.
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indicates the effect of God in the world (including his effect on man, of course) as 
a form of unification or fusion; it indicates a panentheistic worldview. This con-
viction makes the lyric self appeal to God with his request: ‘Let your most beau-
tiful light, oh Lord, touch my face’ (‘laß dein schönstes Lichte, / Herr, berühren 
mein Gesichte […]’). And we are right to believe that the Godly acts of permeation 
are metaphorically illustrated by the word ‘light’, since that refers to the appar-
ently least material matter we may most clearly perceive and therefore ideally 
serves the illustration of a spiritual permeation. God’s might is visualized by its 
illustration as a light that he shall instruct to touch the face of the lyric self. But at 
this point Tersteegen manages a subtle fading of the noumenal into the phenom-
enal sphere. Strictly speaking, he would have to say that the light of God was told 
to permeate the soul or heart or even the mind of the lyric self (as the common 
mystical formulations go), but certainly not touch its face. The focus of the lyric 
self changes from the contemplation of God’s might to empirical sensuous experi-
ence. We witness a metamorphosis of the metaphorical use of the term to its literal 
use, from the metaphysical entity that permeates everything to the physical light 
that touches everything, from God to sunshine. We almost feel enticed to appeal 
to the lyric self with Gerhardt’s words: ‘Go forth, my heart, and pleasure seek 
[…]!’ But in contrast to Gerhardt’s heart, the lyric self in Tersteegen’s song does 
not need any invitation, although the context of our stanza gives us all rights to 
identify it with the same semantic sphere to which Gerhardt alludes by using the 
term ‘heart’ as a metonymical reference to the lyric self’s emotional  inwardness. 
Why is that so? Why does ‘the heart’ in Tersteegen’s text not need any invitation 
to go forth and seek pleasure in the natural world? To answer this question we are 
forced now to consider the foregoing stanzas of Tersteegen’s song.
The song begins, in the first (and again in the second) stanza, with the excla-
mation ‘Gott ist gegenwärtig!’ (God is present!), and thereby introduces itself as a 
form of expressive communication. The lyric self never explicitly tells us exactly in 
what God is present; instead it evokes the idea in us of what it is to feel this pres-
ence. At first this feeling still seems to be integrated into a liturgical context.33 But 
then the lyric self begins to worship in a way that fully abstracts from all possible 
aspects of communal experience. It reaches its destination in the fifth stanza, where 
the liturgical context has fully disappeared behind the emphatic expression of the 
self’s atmospheric stimulation: ‘Air that fills everything, in which we hover/ ground 
and life of all things that be, sea without bottom and end, wonder of all wonders …’ 
33 Cf. the first stanza: ‘Lasset uns anbeten […] Gott ist in der Mitte’ (‘Let us pray to God […] God 
is among us’ [or: ‘God is in the centre’ – depending on the interpretation]). Cf. the songbook of 
the German Protestant church (EKG), where Tersteegen’s song is printed in the chapter ‘Service’ 
under the category ‘For the entry’ (‘Zum Eingang’) (EKG, no. 128).
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(Luft, die alles füllet, drin wir immer schweben, / Aller Dinge Grund und Leben, / 
Meer, ohn Grund und Ende, Wunder aller Wunder,’). Hans-Georg Kemper does not 
fully grasp its character. He writes that ‘in looking at nature the biblical-personal 
God […] literally vanishes into the “air” and “ocean” – that is the elements’ (Kemper 
1993, 138; my translation – M.S.). In fact, the language does not – as Kemper claims – 
evoke a view or look at nature, but a ‘quasi-sensible’ awareness of God that is more 
appropriately described as an overall bodily sensation of inner (not outer) stimuli. 
This sensation temporarily revokes the subject- object-dichotomy, which is always 
implied when we visually focus on something (like the air or the ocean). Therefore 
we cannot speak of a natural experience in the strict sense of the word here, since 
it is not an experience of something that may serve as a distinct intentional object 
of the experiencing subject. ‘Air’ and ‘ocean’ are metaphors that illustrate the nunc 
stans of a mystical experience. They seem appropriate because it is their properties 
– a seeming infinity (air and ocean), immateriality (air) and, last but not least, a 
tactile bodily stimulation (ocean) – which create the impression of a dissolution in 
the surrounding waters that corresponds to the particular mystical state articulated 
by the lyric self. Its inner stimuli result in a sensitivity to the suddenness (symbol-
ized by the infinity of air and ocean), the spirituality (symbolized by the immateri-
ality of the air) and the ‘quasi-sensible’ lustfulness (symbolized by the dissolution 
associated with the ocean) of the experience. Consequently the stanza ends with 
the lines: ‘I sink into you: I in you, you in me, have me fully disappear, only you to 
see and find’ (‘Ich senk mich in dich hinunter: / Ich in dir, Du in mir, / Laß mich 
ganz verschwinden, / Dich nur sehn und finden’).
These lines directly precede the sixth stanza which begins with the proposition 
‘You [i.e. God – M.S.] permeate everything’. We can see now that it is the articula-
tion of subjective, ‘quasi-sensible’ evidence gained by mystical experience. And 
we can also see why this experience seems to intrinsically move the emotionally 
aroused self toward the perception of nature, whereas in Gerhardt the emotionally 
determined self (i.e. the heart) needed an explicit invitation. The inwardness indi-
rectly alluded to in Gerhardt simply must be different from Tersteegen’s inward-
ness. The latter is much more sensuously determined than Gerhardt’s. It is therefore 
determined to a greater openness to nature. The overall sensitivity to atmospheric 
stimulation is apt to turn the self to the outer world. Let us see now how precisely 
this attitude is formulated in Tersteegen’s text. As we said, the request for spiritual 
permeation in the first two lines of the sixth stanza fades the noumenal into the 
phenomenal. What goes on in the lyric self is actually similar to the state of day 
dreaming, where we may suddenly become aware of already long-perceived, but 
not yet consciously represented data from the outer world, just because the con-
tents of our day dreams dispose us to consciously focus on the perceived data. 
Analogously, the lyric self’s sensuous contemplation of a God that may permeate 
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everything is disrupted by the sudden and immediate evidence of the sunshine 
which seems to touch everything in a gentle manner. The metaphysical contem-
plation has suddenly drawn the attention to a ‘physical’ fact and the perception of 
this fact superimposes the metaphysical contemplation. Therefore, the second line 
oscillates between the articulation of an inner and an outer sensation. More impor-
tantly, the perspective from which the outer sensations are consciously represented 
is determined by the previous inner sensation of God. Therefore, the proposition, 
which articulates the awareness of the ‘physical’ fact (namely ‘The gentle flowers 
willingly unfold and remain still in the sun’), is adjusted to the grammatical frame 
of a comparison, whose function is the formulation of an allegory.
Let us return now to the two crucial lines about the flowers. What the lyric self 
says is not what is meant, as I claimed in contradiction to Gerhard Kaiser’s inter-
pretation. The lyric self suggests the sensitivity and intentionality of the perceived 
flowers. But considering the context, this means that a ‘physical’ fact is seen in the 
light of the self’s own mystical inspiration. It projects features into the flowers that 
are actually features of the self’s mystically generated disposition to a given expe-
rience at a given moment. After God has revealed himself to the self with inward, 
yet ‘quasi-sensible’ evidence, the self is prepared to see the world as it is articu-
lated in the third and fourth line of the sixth stanza.34 Consequently, the following 
two lines (‘let me this way, quietly and gladly, trasp your rays and let you affect 
me’) express another change of attention: They return to metaphysical contem-
plation that has merely been enriched by outer perception. In the seventh stanza, 
the lyric self appeals to God again: ‘Mache mich einfältig, innig, abgeschieden […]’ 
(‘make me simple, heartfelt, isolated’). After our soul has been purified, Terstee-
gen once wrote, ‘God may well once grant us such holy delight (Divertissement) 
and promenade; yes, he may well lead us outside once to look at his depictions 
and illustrations, only to lead us back, then, inward to him, to contemplate the 
idea and essence of truth; and by going in and out like this with our Good Shep-
herd, we find pasture and food everywhere’ (Op. cit. ibid.; my translation – M.S.).
Unquestionably, Tersteegen’s depiction of nature shows a higher degree of 
individualization than Gerhardt’s. But the actual object of individualization is not 
the natural, but its experience, whose qualitative content does not derive from the 
perception of nature as something incomprehensibly unique, but from inward 
mystical experience and its projection into the natural sphere. Like Gerhardt, Ter-
steegen expresses a spirituality that establishes a relation to God by means of the 
34 According to Ludewig, the development of the song corresponds to the biographical devel-
opment of Tersteegen’s piety. ‘In his later years’, says Ludewig, he found ‘a noticeably positive 
attitude toward nature’ (Ludewig 1986, 205; my translation – M.S.).
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dialectic between emotional inner-directed and other-directed self-relation. I would 
like to compare Tersteegen’s text with another poem now, which prima facie seems 
to show no affinities to Tersteegen’s inwardness. Again my discussion of the fol-
lowing text serves to paradigmatically exemplify religiously determined attitudes 
toward natural experience in the context of the Arndtian tradition of Protestantism.
4  “In a reflective mood I saw”: Barthold Hinrich 
Brockes and the rational explanation of nature
The poem I would like to focus on is Barthold Hinrich Brockes’ Kirschblüte bei der 
Nacht.35 This is the complete text36:
35 Brockes was born in Hamburg in 1680 as the son of a wealthy merchant. From 1691 to 1697 
he went to the “Gelehrtenschule des Johanneums,” therafter to a college prepatory school. He 
studied law in Halle (a.d. Saale), then traveled extensively through Italy (1703) and continued 
his journey going to Geneva, Lyon, Paris, Brussels, Antwerp and Leiden, where he received a 
law degree. In December 1704 he returned to Hamburg. He married Anna Ilsabe Lehmann, the 
daughter of a merchant in Hamburg, and had twelve children (of whom four died before reaching 
their 18th birthday). In 1720 he was elected senator of Hamburg. For diplomatic affairs he met the 
kings of Denmark and Prussia and the Palatinate Prince of Hanover. Brockes wrote several libret-
tos and founded the Teutsch-übende Gesellschaft in Hamburg. He was elected poeta laureatus by 
the German emperor for poetry published between 1721 and 1748 in nine volumes (the last one 
post mortem) under the title Irdisches Vergnügen in Gott. Brockes died as a well-acknowledged 
patrician of Hamburg in 1747 and was buried in St. Nicolai. On Brockes’ position between early 
Enlightenment and Protestant theology Chraplak 2015. On the relation between the sacred and 
the secular in Brockes’ poetry cf. Fry 1990, on Brockes’ position within the history of natural lyr-
ics cf. Peters 1993 (with specific reference to Brockes’ flower-poetry). On the sublime in Brockes’ 
poetry cf. Zelle 1990.
36 A paraphrase of the contents of what follows (translation according to https://sites.google.
com/site/germanliterature/18th-century/brockes [hit 30th of July, 2018]): In a reflective mood I 
saw / recently a cherry tree in blossom / on a cool night by moonlight; / I thought nothing could 
be more white. It was as if snow had fallen; / every branch, even the smallest, / carried a full 
and equal load / of delicate white round balls. / No swan is this white, for on each petal / -since 
the moon’s soft light / permeates the delicate leaves - / even the shadows are white and without 
blackness. / Impossible, I thought, that on earth / anything whiter could be found.
Then as I wandered here and there / in the shadow of this tree / by chance I looked up / 
through all these blossoms into the air / and I witnessed a still whiter light / a thousand times so 
light, so clear, / so astonishing it almost bowled me over. / The snowy blossoms seemed almost 
black / set against this white gleam. A white light fell / into my face from a bright star / that shone 
right into my soul.
I thought as much as God delights me / in earthly things he has still greater treasures. / The 
greatest beauty of this earth / cannot be compared with that of heaven.
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Ich sahe mit betrachtendem Gemüte
Jüngst einen Kirschbaum, welcher blühte,
In kühler Nacht beim Mondenschein;
Ich glaubt, es könne nichts von größrer Weiße sein.
Es schien, ob wär ein Schnee gefallen.
Ein jeder, auch der kleinste Ast
Trug gleichsam eine schwere Last
Von zierlich weißen, runden Ballen.
Es ist kein Schwan so weiß, da nämlich jedes Blatt,
Indem daselbst des Mondes sanftes Licht
Selbst durch die zarten Blätter bricht,
Sogar den Schatten weiß und sonder Schwärze hat.Unmöglich, dacht ich, 
kann auf Erden
Was Weißers angetroffen werden.
Indem ich nun bald hin, bald her
Im Schatten dieses Baumes gehe,
Sah ich von ungefähr
Durch alle Blumen in die Höhe
Und ward noch einen weißern Schein,
Der tausenmal so weiß, der tausendmal so klar,
Fast halb darob erstaunt, gewahr.
Der Blüte Schnee schien schwarz zu sein
Bei diesem weißen Glanz. Es fiel mir ins Gesicht
Von einem hellen Stern ein weißes Licht,
Das mir recht in die Seele strahlte.
Wie sehr ich mich am Irdischen ergetze,
Dacht ich,hat Gott dennoch weit größre Schätze.
Die größte Schönheit dieser Erden
Kann mit der himmlischen doch nicht verglichen warden (Brockes 1992 
[1721/48], 38).
The first stanza of the poem evokes a situation of spontaneous contemplation 
whose objects are the blossoms of a cherry tree under a full moon.37 The past 
tense of the text indicates that the lyric self is retrospectively evoking a past expe-
rience. In the first four lines it communicates its utmost astonishment about the 
37 The poem does not mention a full moon, but we have to presuppose it, otherwise the effect of 
the blossoms would not be physically believable.
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perceptual impressions caused by the cherry blossoms. Their whiteness is said 
to have transcended everything the lyric self has experienced so far (cf. line 4). 
The following four lines specify the phenomenon in question; the next four lines 
deliver an explanation for its cause, before the stanza ends in the last two lines 
with a confirmation of the phenomenon’s outstanding character. The specifica-
tion of the phenomenon as well as its explanation are framed by the lyric self’s 
asseveration that the characteristic properties of the cherry blossoms overwhelm 
the power of comprehension. Their whiteness on that very night was not just 
whiter than the usual appearance of this colour ‘on earth’, it was outstanding. 
And although the lyric self undertakes a close rational investigation of the phe-
nomenon – which proceeds by careful and detailed observation and results in a 
‘causal theory’, according to which it was the particular mode of light radiated by 
the moon that created the stunning effect38 – the rational act of comprehension 
surrenders to the impression. Impossible, the lyric self concludes, to find any-
thing on earth that could be even whiter!
Indeed, the analytical description and causal explanation of natural phe-
nomena hardly serve the sufficient representation of these phenomena in 
Brockes’ poems. The poet writes about nature in the tradition of the liber naturae 
cosmology; and the objects observed always reveal a higher order than the merely 
functional one, which we may define in physical terms.39 But usually an admis-
sion of nature’s incomprehensibility refers either to its teleological complexity, 
presupposing a principally understandable finality,40 or to the aesthetic ‘drama’ 
38 Cf. line 10 and 11: ‘Indem daselbst des Mondes sanftes Licht / Selbst durch die zarten Blätter 
bricht […] (since the moon’s soft light permeates the delicate leaves).’ Kirschblüte bei Nacht gives a 
rather modest example of Brockes’ rational way of looking at nature. The poet often displays a ‘ra-
tional matter-of-fact style’, which often enough proceeds according to an order that is demonstrat-
ed by ‘the succession of theorem, proposition, line of reasoning and inference’, as Wolfgang Mar-
tens has shown in reference to his poem Die Heide (Martens 1989, 269, 266; my translation – M.S.).
39 On the tradition of the Book of Nature and Brockes’ adaptation of Arndt’s Wahres Christentum 
and Christian Scriver’s book Seelenschatz cf. Fry 1990, 252–69.
40 In Das Blümlein Vergissmeinnicht, Brockes clearly articulates his confidence that man – a 
proper, namely pietist, mind presupposed (cf. Brockes’ first stanza of his poem Die Welt (Brockes 
1992 [1721/48], 18)) – may successfully read (in) the Book of Nature: ‘In so viel tausend schönen 
Blättern / Aus dieses Weltbuchs A B C / So viel, so schön gemalt, so rein gezogne Lettern, / Daß 
ich, dadurch gerührt, den Inhalt dieser Schrift / Begierig wünschte zu verstehn. / Ich konnt es 
überhaupt auch alsbald sehn / Und, daß er von des großen Schöpfers Wesen / Ganz deutlich 
handelte, ganz deutlich lessen’ (Brockes 1992 [1721/48], 77). The following stanza from Die Welt 
does not contradict this confidence: ‘O unbegreiflichs Buch! O Wunder-A B C! / Worin als Leser 
ich und auch als Letter steh’!’ (ibid., 21). The wonders of nature may factually never be fully 
comprehended by us, but only because we are always restricted by a partial perspective on the 
whole, of which we are part. Brockes would never question the fact that nature is principally 
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of natural events, which mysteriously show the harmony of its elements and 
thereby indicate their baffling finality,41 or it even refers to the teleological faculty 
of perceiving the natural order through its delightful appearance. But incom-
prehensibility is seldom described as a single ‘secondary quality’ as such that is 
said to be outstanding as it is in Kirschblüte bei der Nacht. You may hardly find 
a more significant example for the principal surrender of rational explanation to 
the ‘wonders’ of nature than in this poem, since the incommensurability of the 
perceived object is not at all explicable in teleological terms. Neither is the fasci-
nating object fascinating as something mysteriously teleological, nor as some-
thing that mysteriously illustrates the finality of the natural order. It is simply 
fascinating as something that is mysteriously white, whiter than anything that 
has ever been white before.
The fact that we are not likely to find anything ‘on earth’ whiter than these 
cherry blossoms even prepares an outbidding of the superlative. While casu-
ally strolling in the tree’s shadow – caused by the ‘gentle’ moonlight, we may 
suppose – the lyric self, as it reveals to us in the second stanza, becomes aware 
of an even whiter white, something so indescribable that Hermann Glaser called 
it rather enthusiastically a ‘super-white infinity’ (Glaser 1980, 25–7). Indeed, this 
white – the lyric self is talking about a ‘bright star’ (st. 2, line 10) – is not from this 
world, it is literally extraterrestrial and therefore evokes the idea of the infinite 
in us that we usually associate with the common features of the universe. What 
Walter Benjamin said about the aura of natural objects – that they were ‘the unique 
appearance of something distant, no matter how close it might be’42 – surely char-
acterizes the lyric self’s impression of the cherry blossoms. But even more so it 
fits to the perception of the starlight. In both cases, a metaphorical meaning of 
‘distance’, illustrating the incomprehensibility of the aesthetically experienced 
object, may stand for the colour; but in the second case even the literal meaning 
of distance is appropriate: The star’s colour is from another actual world, a world 
comprehensible, and he even thinks, again, that we are also principally capable of comprehend-
ing, as long as we as true believers transcend our partial perspective: ‘Laß grosser Schreiber!’, 
the stanza continues, ‘mich im Buche dieser Erden / Zu Deines Namens Ruhm / ein lauter Buch-
stab werden!’.
41 Let me exemplify this by a stanza out of Die Sonne, which deals with sunrise: ‘Drauf erzeugt 
dein Glanz und bildet / Farben, Morgenröt und Tau, / Malt, bepurpurt und vergüldet / Das gemi-
schte Silbergrau, / Und der Himmel scheint ein Schleier, / Der aus Rosen, Gold und Feuer / (Von 
der Luft Saphir bezirkt) / Wunderbarlich schön gewirkt’ (Brockes 1992 [1721/48], 117).
42 According to Benjamin, we define the aura of natural objects ‘als einmalige Erscheinung 
einer Ferne, so nah sie sein mag’. His example: ‘An einem Sommernachmittag ruhend einem 
Gebirgszug am Horizont oder einem Zweig folgen, der seinen Schatten auf den Ruhenden wirft – 
das heißt die Aura dieser Berge, dieses Zweiges atmen’ (Benjamin 1980 [1935], 479).
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that is infinitely far away. And although the lyric self rather dryly remarks that it 
was ‘almost half astonished’ by that sight (st. 2, line 7), we are not puzzled by the 
fact that this light emotionally arouses the self, as it openly admits in the last line 
of the second stanza. Maybe after the surprise of the cherry blossoms nothing can 
really increase its astonishment anymore. The fact is that the light shines into the 
self’s soul in the same way it was sought to ‘touch the face’ of Tersteegen’s lyric 
self and would have warmed the ‘heart’ that is addressed in Gerhardt’s poem.
In Brockes’ text, we actually seem to find what we missed in Tersteegen’s and 
Gerhardt’s church songs: the conceptualization of the natural as something that 
may surprise us by its qualities. The cherry tree clearly does not serve the lyric self 
as a mirror of religious projections; it therefore does not seem to be the external, 
yet integral part of a pietist self-relation. In Kirschblüte bei der Nacht the lyric self 
is not oriented inwardly – just the opposite: it is overwhelmed by something unex-
pected, which awakes its curiosity. The rational investigation, anticipating the 
great spirit of the naturalist societies which rise in the later half of Brockes’ and 
the beginning of the following century, proves this curiosity. We would expect, 
now, to find the lyric self in the third stanza praising the Lord for the wonders of 
nature, which so astonishingly outrule its power of comprehension and surprise 
it with ever new qualities. But irritatingly the opposite is the case: The contem-
plation of the starlight makes the lyric self conscious of God’s even ‘greater treas-
ures’ that it cannot become aware of sensuously. How is this sudden change of 
mind possible? Why does the self, after the cherry blossoms and the starlight have 
evoked the idea of the infinite, of the superior, turn away from nature and deny its 
impression by minimizing it in relation to the wonders of God?
The prima facie interpretation is as follows: Brockes ‘stages’ the increase in 
beauty from the terrestrial blossoms to the extraterrestrial starlight because he 
wants to introduce us to an allegorical meaning. The starlight is a sign for the 
heavenly beauties, which are incomparably greater than the earthly ones. The 
lyric self reads this sign correctly, and with him so do we. But I do not think that 
this interpretation is appropriate to the text. Let us therefore take a look again 
at what was happening in the summer night we read about. Let us suppose 
that the poem reconstructs an experience. Let us suppose that it is really about 
someone walking around in a mild early summer night and suddenly becom-
ing aware of the incommensurable materiality of whiteness that characterizes 
cherry blossoms in full moonlight. In my opinion it would not make any sense to 
suggest that this person, by accidentally focusing on the stars,43 would abruptly 
43 Brockes makes it quite clear that the change of focus is accidental: ‘Indem ich nun bald hin, 
bald her […] gehe/ Sah ich von ungefähr […]’ (Then as I wandered here and there …).
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shift from  immediate sensuous perception to allegorical reflexion. It would not 
make any sense to presuppose that the self originally intended the starlight as an 
allegorically meaningful object referring to the treasures of Heaven. That would 
not be plausible for the simple fact that within the logic of the very experience 
articulated there is a ‘primacy of perception’ over understanding. The starlight, 
if intended accidentally, would first have to be perceived in the same way the 
cherry blossoms had become subject to the lyric self’s attention. More precisely, 
the experience must have proceeded in the following way: The self, attention-
ally occupied with the whiteness of the blossoms (1), continued its walk and 
caught the stimulus of some other ‘whiteness’ (2), on which it then intentionally 
focused (3), identified as a star (4) and succeeded to compare with the whiteness 
of the previously perceived blossoms (5), before it finally ascribed an allegorical 
meaning to it (6), which it retrospectively articulated according to the dichotomy 
of ‘earth’ vs. ‘Kingdom of Heaven’ (7). The allegorical understanding is the final 
result of an experience that is based on the primacy of non-allegorical perception.
What follows from this? Simply that the cherry blossoms and the starlight 
originally belong to the same, namely the physical, sphere. The allegorical inter-
pretation displayed in the third stanza does not represent a previous ‘allegorical 
perception’.44 And therefore it does not represent an astonishment that derives 
from the allegorical meaning of the perceived object. The lyric self’s excitement is 
directly linked to the primordial (non-allegorical) perception of the starlight. The 
third stanza represents a thought (st. 3, line 2: ‘Dacht ich’) that has been moti-
vated by the perception of the ‘super-white infinity’ (Glaser). We already encoun-
tered this thought in the 9th stanza of Gerhardt’s song, in which the lyric self 
also ‘thinks’ that the Kingdom of Heaven must be indescribably (more) beauti-
ful, since God had already created so much beauty in our world.45 But we have 
to consider that Gerhardt’s ‘point of departure’ differs from Brockes’. Whereas 
Gerhardt’s poem indicates the primacy of inner-directed self-relation, Brockes’ 
‘enlightened’ self seeks to still the curiosity which has been evoked by the unpre-
dicted quality of superior whiteness. Brockes’ lyric self is not encouraged to seek 
44 Principally ‘allegorical perception’ is possible. This would mean that with the prerequisite 
of the according dispositions something is spontaneously perceived as representing an absent 
entity. Exactly this is not the case with Brockes’ lyric self in Kirschblüte bei Nacht. It perceives an 
astonishing whiteness, ‘an even whiter glance’, before it can identify this as the appearance of a 
star whose exceptional brightness may serve allegorical purposes.
45 ‘Ach, denk ich, bist du hier so schön / Und lässt du’s uns so lieblich gehen / Auf dieser armen 
Erden: / Was will doch wohl nach dieser Welt / Dort in dem reichen Himmelszelt / Und güldnem 
Schlosse werden!’ (Ah, I think, if you are so beautiful here and show and show us such lovely sights 
on this poor earth, how wonderful it would be, after this world, there in the rich heavens and life in 
the golden palace).
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the relation to its God in an other-directed self-relation which is defined by clearly 
determined dispositions. Brockes’ lyric self is simply outdoors. It happens to find 
itself wandering around. It does not project, it curiously perceives.
Therefore, the thought of the lyric self, which we get to know in the third 
stanza, is not motivated immanently by the development of the poem. After the 
lyric self has enthusiastically surrendered to the incommensurable impressions 
of blossoms and starlight, it suddenly and mysteriously denies the sensuous 
evidence of natural greatness in the name of intelligible, clearly non-sensuous 
evidence. Denied is not only the primordial impression of the cherry blossoms, 
but also the primordial and non-allegorical impression of the starlight, in so far 
as both belong to the empirical sphere of sensuous perception. They could not 
be compared, as the lyric self claims, to heavenly beauty. The starlight may only 
serve to illustrate the ‘much greater treasures’ as an allegorical sign, as a stimu-
lus for metaphysical contemplation. But as the natural source of sensuous and 
incommensurable impression, its quality is denied. The surrender of the rational 
observer to the incommensurable beauty of the natural sphere, whether terres-
trial or extraterrestrial, which the self attentionally became aware of, is finally 
turned into the opposite: the surrender of natural beauty to the greater one of 
intelligible entities, which – as we must add – are not sensuously perceivable, but 
reveal themselves inwardly.
We see now that Brockes’ poem finally re-establishes the relation to nature 
as an other-directed self-relation – which was also expressed in Gerhardt’s and 
Tersteegen’s poems and which we find in many of Brockes’ poems. But whereas 
in the case of Gerhardt and Tersteegen it was made plausible as an internal aspect 
of a primarily inner-directed self-relation, Brockes’ text starts out rather differ-
ently. It does not allude to any sort of inward contemplation or even unio with 
God. Instead the self is originally set into the openness of unpredictable sensuous 
perception. Only the apodictic judgment in the third stanza hints at the fact that 
every aesthetic relation to nature is an other-directed relation to God in me and 
that it is subordinate to the relation I can directly establish with the Creator.46 – 
How do our results make sense in relation to the concept of the sublime?
46 J. A. H. Reimarus has handed down to us that Brockes – similar to the logic of the piety of 
nature displayed in Tersteegen’s text – used to begin his service in nature with the service in 
church (Strauß 1876, 8).
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5 The inward sublime
First of all, none of the three poems discussed deal with the kind of natural phe-
nomena which Burke or Kant would call candidates for the sublime. Gardens, 
particularly flowers, and more so ‘secondary qualities’ such as colours are 
neither mathematically nor dynamically sublime. They are of no incommensura-
ble extension, they do not come with any vagueness or obscurity that may create 
unease in us, and they certainly do not appear to us as a potentially dangerous 
power. Instead, they are simply beautiful. Still, we may find traces of the sublime 
in Tersteegen’s text. Whereas Gerhardt’s Geh aus, mein Herz is restricted – in 
Kant’s words – to the sphere of aesthetic and teleological finalities, Tersteegen’s 
Gott ist gegenwärtig clearly goes beyond it. But he does not do so in the sixth 
stanza, where he refers to the natural world (namely the ‘gentle flowers’), but 
in the fifth, in which the lyric self circumscribes the unio with God within the 
inner-directed self-relation. ‘Air’ and ‘sea’ are characterized in their incommen-
surable extension (‘air that fills everything’, ‘sea without bottom and end’). But 
here they serve as metaphors for the ‘sublimity’ of God in us. And obviously the 
powerful might that we associate with the sea (and with the air, where we do 
not try to visualize oxygen, but the open sky and wind) does not create unease 
in the lyric self, because it actually intends to ‘disappear’ into this might. The 
attribution of unease (or horror) to the experience of the sublime presupposes 
the will to resist and to maintain autonomy, but exactly this is not the case in 
mystical contemplation. In Tersteegen’s song, the mystical relation to God via 
inner- directed self-relation is characterized in terms of the sublime. But it is the 
inward sublime, which in the following stanza prepares the lyrical self to contem-
plate natural beauty.
Brockes’ text, like Gerhardt’s, does not reveal any traces of the sublime. The 
cherry blossoms as well as the starlight are referred to as beautiful (indirectly in 
st. 3, line 3), and indeed both would not fulfil the criteria of sublime objects. In 
fact, according to Kant their outstanding whiteness would not even be called 
beautiful in the strict sense of the word, as it is defined by the validity claim of 
an aesthetic judgment. Mere ‘secondary qualities’ such as colours may evoke a 
‘positive emotional reaction of the subject in his relation to the world’ (Kulen-
kampff 1978, 75; my translation – M.S.). But this emotional reaction, according 
to Kant, defines the agreeable, not the beautiful. Agreeability is neither a suf-
ficient nor even a necessary condition of an aesthetic judgment that evaluates 
the beautiful, because beauty, in Kant’s terms, is a function of the interplay of 
our cognitive powers, engaging our imagination and the epistemic categories of 
quantity, quality, modality and relation. Thus, an object is beautiful if it is final to 
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this interplay, not just emotionally agreeable.47 But certainly the praised white-
ness in Kirschblüte bei der Nacht fulfils Burke’s criteria of the beautiful, which 
differ substantially from Kant’s concept. By beauty, Burke means ‘that quality or 
those qualities in bodies by which they cause love, or some passion similar to it’ 
(Burke 1990 [1757], 83), and he clearly stresses that beauty is no matter of propor-
tion – as Kant’s finality of the beautiful object to our cognitive powers surely is – 
and therefore ‘demands no assistance from our reasoning; […] the appearance of 
beauty as effectually causes some degree of love in us, as the application of ice or 
fire produces the ideas of heat or cold’ (ibid., 84).
Burke’s definition of the beautiful yields to those characteristics that Kant 
exclusively ascribes to the sublime, namely the incommensurability and/or 
incomprehensibility of the aesthetic object. And he puts emphasis on the possi-
ble suddenness which may accompany the perception of beauty. This definition 
fits perfectly to the experience of the lyric self in Brockes’ poem. The whiteness of 
blossoms and starlight surprises the attentionally perceiving self, who repeatedly 
stresses the incommensurability of the perceived. The whiteness resists the self’s 
‘causal theory’ about the physical origin of the stunning impression and therefore 
proves to be incomprehensible. By minimizing the physical beauty in relation to 
the metaphysical, yet non-sensuous, beauty, Brockes denies the exceptionality 
of an appearance that is particularly characterized by effects on the perceiver – 
namely incommensurability and incomprehensibility – which Kant ascribes to 
objects commonly called ‘sublime’.48 Therefore it will be interesting to see how 
Brockes deals with the sublime in the strict sense of the word. Let us take a look 
at a stanza in his poem Die Sonne:
Siehet man des Meeres Breite,
Muß man nicht erstaunt gestehn,
Daß die ungeheure Weite
Fast entsetzlich anzusehn?
Dennoch schwimmt, samt dem Gefäße,
47 On the difference between the agreeable and the beautiful, cf. Kulenkampff 1978, 75–8; 
Früchtl 1996, 69–71. Früchtl points out that aesthetic judgment is to be located somewhere be-
tween determinant experience judgment and mere perception judgment, and suggests calling it 
a third order-perception judgment – which is a judgment about the agreeable object that can be 
generalized, since it abstracts from the mere agreeability of the object in favour of its finality to 
our cognitive powers.
48 According to contemporary aesthetic theories, we may even have some reason to ascribe sub-
limity to the phenomena in question. At least prima facie there seems to be an affinity between 
the ‘super-white infinity’ in Brockes’ poem and monochrome paintings, which Lyotard refers to 
as examples of the sublime in modern art.
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Dieses Weltmeers Tief und Größe
In der Sonnen Meer von Glut
Wie ein Tropf im Weltmeer ruht  
 (Brockes 1992 [1721/48], 116, stanza no. 45).49
The stanza clearly refers to the natural sublime. But – unlike the first two stanzas 
in Kirschblüte bei der Nacht – it does not take the personal perspective. It wants 
to prove a general point about the sublime in nature, as the impersonal form 
in the first line (‘If one sees the width of the ocean’) shows. First it refers to the 
ocean’s ‘enormous expanse’ that is ‘almost terrible to look at’. This is reminiscent 
of Burke (1757, 53) ascribing the effect of terror to the sublime. The reservation 
of its being almost terrible creates the impression of a defensive attitude toward 
the object by trying to play down what actually would be overwhelming. ‘Nev-
ertheless’, the stanza continues, the ocean and the planet that contains it swim 
in the glow of the sun. The overwhelming features of nature, which are exempli-
fied by the attributes of the ocean rather than precisely observed, are neutral-
ized by something even larger that is brought into play. The ocean is described 
as small compared to the sun, no matter how large and terrible it may appear 
at first. Now, it may seem that one case of the natural sublime has simply been 
just outdone by another case that arouses our sentiments even more intensively. 
But from the beginning of the poem it is clear that the sun serves an allegorical 
function: it pictorially illustrates a metaphysical truth. No immediate and unpre-
dicted perception is articulated, as it is in Kirschblüte bei der Nacht. Instead, Die 
Sonne is a hymn on a star, and the depiction of its sublime properties as well as 
their sublime effects on the world – which, by the way, are not said to create the 
least feeling of terror in us, although its dominating might is clearly admitted in 
several stanzas – serve as symbols in the worship of God. The approach therefore 
is neither motivated by a sudden phenomenal surprise nor by the curiosity of the 
natural scientist who wants to understand the astonishing. In short: it is not phe-
nomenological like in many of Brockes’ other poems, including Kirschblüte bei 
der Nacht. It is allegorical from the start. The hymn-like appeal to the sun serves 
as a ‘bridging principle’ to turn the reader’s attention to the godly properties and 
the praise of the Creator. The poem is a praise of God mediated by the praise of the 
sublime sun. It stimulates our respect for the infinite, the eternal and the mighty 
in us, which brings us to the actual inhabitant of these attributes. It expresses 
49 If one sees the width of the ocean, doesn’t one have to astonishingly admit that the tremendous 
vastness is almost appalling to look at? Nevertheless, this ocean’s depth and size floats with its 
vessel in the sun’s sea of blaze like a driblet rests in the ocean. (My translation – M.S.)
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a relation to God by means of an other-directed self-relation.50 Clearly the sun’s 
incommensurable and incomprehensible greatness, since it illustrates the met-
aphysical greatness of God, is thought to be a faint image of the latter, which is 
non-imaginable. Therefore it is denied (by minimizing it) after it has successfully 
done the job of ‘leading’ us to God:
Edle Quelle güldner Klarheit,
Deine Größe, Kraft und Pracht
Zeigen uns die große Wahrheit,




Höher und gewaltiger  (Brockes 1992 [1721/48], 116, stanza no. 64).51
Let me summarize: Tersteegen, as well as Brockes, ascribe predicates of the sublime 
primarily to God whom we, again, primarily sense inwardly. The contemplation of 
nature may evoke our idea of God and our feelings for him in us, because it refers 
to him, but it does so in a rather platonic mode: like a faint image of the original 
idea. Just as we must know the original idea to be capable of identifying something 
as its (faint) image, the relation to God by means of an other-directed self-relation 
is founded in a relation to God that is established by an inner-directed self- relation. 
In Gerhardt’s texts, as well as in Tersteegen’s and Brockes’, we can detect the con-
ceptualization of nature as an integral element of the pietist self-relation. Here, 
nature is subject to the disposition of seeing ‘outside’, what is felt ‘inside’. The way 
nature is perceived reflects states of consciousness which are caused by inner stim-
ulation. But Brockes’ Kirschblüte bei der Nacht exemplifies a disposition that goes 
clearly beyond this. The objects (blossoms and starlight) attentionally perceived 
surprise, dazzle the perceiver, whose disposition toward nature is based on curios-
ity for the new, for the unknown and non-predicated – let it be cherry blossoms or 
50 Cf. the 56th stanza: ‘Wenn man, was wir hievon lesen, / Und, was glaublich ist, erwägt, / 
Welch ein majestätisch Wesen / Gott der Sonne beigelegt, / Was für Macht er drin gesenket, / 
Ruft mein Herz, das dies bedenket: / Welch ein König! Welcher Thron! / Welch ein Reich und 
welche Kron!’ (‘If we consider … what a majestic nature God has given to the sun, the might He 
has bestowed her with, then my heart, while contemplating all of this, exclaims: What a King, 
what kind of throne, empire and crown’; my translation - M.S.).
51 Noble source of golden clarity, your size, power and splendour show us the great truth, that 
this God who made you, is indescribably more beautiful, greater, ineffably more cheerful, better, 
incomprehensibly more glorious, much higher and tremendous.
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flies or whatever natural object the wanderer may run into in Brockes’ poems. But 
it is also guided by an eagerness to explain it. In the end, however, this disposition 
is not carried through the whole process of the articulated experience. The factual 
incommensurability and incomprehensibility of the perceived as such – whether 
it repels the perceiver or not52 – makes her turn to a metaphysical contemplation 
of these characteristics and evaluate the actual stimulus of this contemplation as 
minor to the intelligible content of what is perceived. The factual incommensura-
bility and incomprehensibility of the natural object is minor to the ideas of incom-
mensurability and incomprehensibility, which are part of our contemplation of 
God and the ‘Kingdom of Heaven’. Incommensurability and incomprehensibility 
are central features of the sublime. Brockes’ poem Die Sonne confirms the logic 
of reinterpreting natural phenomena, as was displayed in the final stanza of his 
Kirschblüte bei der Nacht: The factual sublime is minor to the idea of sublimity, 
which is originally stimulated by the former and which is part of our contempla-
tion of God. The natural sublime is surpassed by the inward sublime.
6 Kant’s aesthetics and the Protestant tradition
Let us finally return to Kant. I previously argued that the particular form which his 
theory of the sublime takes cannot be explained merely in terms of systemic coher-
ence and historical reference – whether critical or affirmative – to predecessors. I 
argued that it had to be understood as an Ausdrucksgestalt, an expressive articula-
tion of empractical patterns of understanding, which originate from the Arndtian 
tradition of Protestant piety. But I also restricted the ‘empractical’ to a heuristic 
concept, whose plausibility depends on empirical evidence, i.e. on the results of 
the foregoing interpretations. According to these results, Gerhardt, Tersteegen and 
Brockes are different, though structurally related, examples of the inward world-
view, whose concept of nature is determined by an other-directed self-relation, 
which derives from an inner-directed self-relation. The poems analysed display this 
other-directed self-relation without explicitly dealing with it. The other- directed 
self-relation is expressed in the way the poems semantically make sense of their 
52 Hans Blumenberg characterizes Brockes – not very charmingly, but trenchant – as an ‘hon-
est’ poet, who displays a ‘homely’ attitude toward the world and was ‘pedantically busy’ to teach 
us the wonders of creation. He calls Brockes’ Irdisches Vergnügen in Gott an edificatory book for 
the ‘placid senses’ of the bourgeois (cf. Blumenberg 1986, 180, 181, 182). The incomprehensi-
ble, particularly the sublime, despite its fascination may very well have repelled a character like 
Brockes.
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topics; it determines – again borrowing Bourdieu’s words – the modus operandi of 
the opera operata, which have been discussed. Another opus operatum, expressing 
a worldview that has been shaped by the inward tradition of Protestant pietism, 
is Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Sublime’. It is the philosophical transformation of the 
inward sublime we found in the previously interpreted texts, particularly of an 
attitude toward aesthetic incommensurability and incomprehensibility, which 
Brockes displays in Kirschblüte bei der Nacht. Let me once again refer to one of 
Kant’s central passages that clearly locates the sublime inwardly and interprets 
the outward sublime as a comparatively insufficient presentation of the inward: 
‘All that we can say is that the object lends itself to the presentation of a sublimity 
discoverable in the mind. For the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot 
be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason, which, 
although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited and called 
into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous pres-
entation’ (Kant 1953 [1790], 92). But the fact that a specific sensuously perceived 
object may present the inward is not simply arbitrary. The ‘substitution of a respect 
for the Object in place of one for the idea of humanity in our own self’ (ibid., 106) 
has a fundamentum in re. The object is incommensurable, it is incomprehensible: 
it does not just seem to be so. But this substitution is only possible under the con-
dition that we are already acquainted with the ideas of the incommensurable and 
incomprehensible, which as such – as ideas – may clearly be comprehended by 
thinking them (cf. ibid., 115). Our awareness of the gap between what may be per-
ceived and what may be thought, i.e. ‘the feeling of the unattainability of the idea 
by means of the imagination, is itself a presentation of the subjective finality of our 
mind in the employment of the imagination in the interests of the mind’s super-
sensible province, and compels us subjectively to think nature itself in its totality 
as a presentation of something supersensible, without being able to effectuate 
this presentation objectively’ (ibid., 119). ‘Thinking nature’, which arouses our 
restricted faculty of imagination, is nothing else but an invitation to its allegorical 
interpretation; Kant, too, stands in the tradition of the Book of Nature.
But, of course, the meaning that is allegorically understood by thinking nature 
as presenting something supersensible to us differs substantially from the poets’ 
understanding of the matter. Kant gets rid of all ontological claims regarding the 
supersensible, whose awareness is being aroused by nature, and he is sceptical 
about its personalization as God. From a subjective standpoint, he writes in Die 
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, religion is the recognition of all 
our duties in terms of godly commandments (Kant 1998 [1793], 822). The validity of 
these duties does not derive from their supposed godly origin because this origin 
is a mere hypothesis. It derives from our consent to them, because as rational 
beings belonging to the ‘space of reason’ (Sellars), we are intrinsically forced to 
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agree upon them. For various practical reasons, we may (and even should) repre-
sent these duties as godly commandments. But this practical acknowledgement 
does not have any ontological consequences, nor is it based on such. Kant argues 
similarly about the sublime. Whereas the discussed poets seek the contemplation 
of God by means of the perception of nature, Kant seeks the stimulation of ideas, 
the dignity of which derives from the mere fact that we are capable of thinking 
them. We may represent those ideas, of which we become aware through the sup-
posedly sublime in nature, as attributes of God, but this personalization does not 
represent any ontological knowledge. What we actually become aware of with the 
utmost certainty is our faculty of thinking the infinite, the eternal, the almighty. 
And whereas Brockes, Tersteegen and Gerhardt were also and even primarily 
aware of God by means other than the contemplation of nature, according to Kant 
we have an internal faculty which enables us to think the supersensible without 
any reference to the ‘outer’ world. All three of those poets presuppose a relation to 
something supersensible by means of an inner-directed self-relation, which inte-
grates an other-directed self-relation. But within the Protestant tradition of piety, 
the correlated ‘other’ within this inner-directed self-relation is understood as God 
(‘in us’); whereas Kant conceptualizes it as ideas, which on the one hand are gen-
erated by our individual activity of thinking (thereby being ‘in us’, so to speak), 
but on the other hand transcend this activity by their objective, i.e. logical validity.
In as far as the natural sublime makes us aware of our intelligible faculty, it is 
functionalized for the inner-directed self-relation of rational beings. We may think 
the noumena without being aware of thinking them. But then the natural sublime 
puts us in a state of ‘monitoring’ our faculty of thinking, thus making us aware of 
our superiority over the phenomenal sphere. Particularly the dynamically sublime 
has a practical impact on our everyday life, since it is predestined to arouse the 
awareness of a moral vocation in us that is superior to all sensible motivations of 
our actions. At one point, Kant claims that we generally say of a man ‘who remains 
unaffected in the presence of what we consider sublime, that he has no feeling’ 
(ibid., 116). But according to his argumentation, we may also say that being affected 
by the so called natural sublime causes a feeling in us. It is a feeling for our moral 
commitments as rational beings and their superiority over the phenomenal sphere, 
and it is conveyed by the confidence that we – as rational, as moral beings – may 
prevail over (our) nature. Consequently, it is psychologically important in every-
day life because it helps the individual who has become entangled in his ordinary 
affairs to (ever again) sensuously discover his supersensible vocation as a subject 
(cf. Früchtl 1996, 481–90). According to Kant’s theory, the awareness of our faculty 
of thinking seems to make our normative commitments valuable to us. We are 
supposed to intrinsically follow our vocation, but the fact that we confidently do 
so, although we are factually more likely disposed to fail, seems to be based on 
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the fundamental satisfaction we gather from consciously thinking the noumena. 
Otherwise it would not make any sense to associate any sort of attraction with the 
sublime because the attraction merely derives from the attention it draws to our 
own faculty of thinking the (specifically practical) ideas. Thinking them seems to 
result in evidence that not only forces practical consequences on us, but also makes 
them valuable to us.53 The ideas are valuable as the outcome of inferential thought.
But how can our mere thought be the source of practical values that direct 
our actions? Following Kant’s argumentation, the reader gets the impression that 
thinking the ideas seems to elevate us over ordinary life in a way similar to that 
of religious believers crossing the threshold from the profane to the sacred. For 
Kant, the ‘sacred realm’ is an inward sphere, too: we may be stimulated by nature 
to cross the threshold, but when we do so, we shut ourselves off from the phe-
nomenal sphere. Kant does not explicitly point to the quasi-religious implications 
of his theory, but Schiller has clearly seen them. In Über das Erhabene, which 
he wrote as a sort of supplement to his Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des 
Menschen, the individual experience of the natural sublime, which he interprets 
within the framework of Kant’s theory, is characterized in a way that resembles 
classical reports of conversion experiences.54 Indeed, the natural sublime is the 
source of ‘conversion’. It is not a conversion to God, but to our vocation,55 which 
becomes sensible to us in moments of enthusiasm caused by nature. Nature may 
stimulate us to discover our vocation, but ultimately we discover it ‘inside’.
53 The recognition of the moral law means both: the understanding of its inferential necessity 
and the respect we feel for it. Cf. Kant 1998 [1785], 28.
54 ‘Das Erhabene verschafft uns also einen Ausgang aus der sinnlichen Welt […]. Nicht allmäh-
lich […], sondern plötzlich und durch eine Erschütterung reißt es den selbständigen Geist aus dem 
Netze los, womit die verfeinerte Sinnlichkeit ihn umstrickte […]. […] so ist oft eine einzige erhabene 
Rührung genug, dieses Gewebe des Betrugs zu zerreißen, dem gefesselten Geist seine ganze Sch-
nellkraft auf einmal zurückzugeben, ihm eine Revelation über seine wahre Bestimmung zu erteilen 
und ein Gefühl seiner Würde, wenigstens für den Moment, aufzunötigen’ (Schiller 1992 [1801], 612). 
Bjørn K. Myskja emphasizes the moral significance of the sublime and he clearly sees its impor-
tance in initiating a conversion as a necessary condition for cultivating the character. Cf. Myskja 
2002, 194–203, 216–23. Myskja’s book offered a great deal of inspiration when writing this essay.
55 According to the phenomenological description of Kurt Goldammer, a conversion ‘takes place 
when a new truth has been recognized, a new and deep dimension of the Sacred, of the will of God, 
has been disclosed and has led to an inner change, when a new path to salvation is found, when a 
new life begins […]’ (Goldammer 1960, 454–5; my translation – M.S.). In terms of Kant’s philosophy 
of religion, we may say that indeed a truth is discovered, and indeed this discovery leads to an inner 
change and a new beginning in life. But the truth derives from the reasonable validity claim of our 
practical ideas, and it is contingent that we represent this truth as the will of God. By thinking the 
ideas and consequently acknowledging them as our guiding principles in life, we also take some-
thing like a path of salvation: it leads us to our ‘Glückswürdigkeit’ and our unanimity with ourselves.
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Elisabeth Gräb-Schmidt
Transcendence and freedom:  
on the anthropological and cultural 
centrality of religion
The fact that rigorous philosophical thinking is not possible without reference 
to transcendence, as it is also expressed in the notion of God, was already 
instilled in platonic and neo-platonic antiquity, which emphasised the depend-
ence of human thought on transcendence. Defenders of religion in modernity 
have called to mind these references to transcendence with respect to the sys-
tematic of human thinking in a move counter to the modern critique of religion, 
and have concentrated on the definition and clarification of a concept of religion. 
In the German Enlightenment, the critique of religion was therefore not com-
mitted to its dismissal but rather the self-illumination of the status of religion, 
much differently than in France, where a radical critique of religion was brought 
forward by the circle around the Encyclopédistes and Voltaire, or in England by 
David Hume.1 These differences make it clear that religion need not fall victim 
to Enlightenment critiques,2 as the so-called ‘New Atheists’ maintain today by 
means of old arguments.3
On the contrary, the conceptual clarification of religion can itself also prove 
to be a critical undertaking, namely, by permeating religio-theoretical aspects of 
1 Karl Gabriel has recently shown that the formation of the relationship of the theology of 
the Reformation to the Enlightenment is due to the special relationship between the state and 
religion, or religious communities in Germany, which – differently than in French Catholicism 
and in southern Europe as we have said – did not behave in a reactionary and hostile manner 
towards reason, but rather fostered a constructive relationship between faith and reason. 
A connection of this kind can enable an entirely different relationship between religion and the 
public realm, or between religion, the law and the state than in the anti-religious atmosphere of 
secular France (cf. Gabriel, Gärtner, Pollack 2012).
2 As such, describing the Enlightenment as a constitutive process of secularisation does not 
correspond in any way to the image of the epoch, but rather proves to be a projection backwards 
from the crises of the 20th century. Ulrich Barth expresses succinctly the misunderstanding with 
respect to the relationships of Enlightenment and the critique of religion (cf. Barth 2009).
3 It is the religious-critical voices of Karl Marx, Ludwig Feuerbach, Sigmund Freud and 
Friedrich Nietzsche, which are found again today, nearly unchanged in, ‘New Atheism’ in its 
various forms. Although according to their genetic reduction, religion had already reduced to an 
epiphenomenon, the return of such theorems are being celebrated today in the neuro-biological 
and motivation-theoretical levelling of religion (cf. Boyer 2004; Schmidt-Salomon 2006; Dawkins 
2006; see also the critical response to Dawkins by McGrath 2004; Harris 2007; Dennett 2008).
142   Elisabeth Gräb-Schmidt
life with reflection. Further, belonging to the conceptual clarification of religion 
is the task of making clear its relation to the other remaining aspects of existence. 
It is in this connection between religion and existence in its subjective and inter-
subjective associations that one of the culturally central roles of religion becomes 
manifest.
Approached categorially, two spheres which, previously unseparated,  yet 
have been in the process of separation from one another since the onset of 
modernity, must therefore be differentiated for the clarification of the concept 
of religion. These are the anthropological sphere, which encompasses the soci-
ological and biological dimensions, and the sphere of metaphysics or transcen-
dental philosophy. Consequently, it is not appropriate to consider one of these 
spheres without also taking the other into account respectively. This is because 
the question of religion raises the question of the whole, the question of unity. 
However, after the metaphysical turn in modernity this question no longer relates 
directly to being (Sein). On the contrary, it is focused on its mental visualisation. 
It is precisely at this point that religion asserts its ontological and metaphysi-
cal critical capacities. This, however, does not make the object of metaphysics 
superfluous. Rather – on the mental level  – the ontologically and metaphysically 
determinative questions are repeated. They remain present on the level of theo-
retical consciousness, which is oriented directly towards a ground which grounds 
the whole, and which first makes it possible to assume a systematic nexus of 
thought. This connection presupposes an interrelationship between being and 
reason, and safeguards reality as a result. The treatment of religion by sociology 
and evolutionary biology – that is, on the anthropological level – does not have 
these relationships in view, but it likewise does not remain untouched by them. 
Sociology and evolutionary biology are right to fight back against a pre-critical 
re-ontologisation. But their rejection of these ontological and metaphysical con-
nections does not necessarily lead to a rejection of reality and normativity. They 
can be present in the guise of the relational aspects of consciousness as entailed 
in the theory of freedom, that is, in the guise of the practical processes of imple-
mentation and interpretation.
Following Kant, and interacting with Kant’s criticism, the representatives 
of German idealism such as Fichte, Hegel and Schelling in particular, have felt 
obligated to this task, but so have especially Schleiermacher, Hölderlin and Kier-
kegaard. In connection to the theologian Schleiermacher, I would like to turn to 
the question of what meaning and function is befitting a notion of transcend-
ence for thinking and acting, how this relation to transcendence is put together 
and how it comes to be in this relation to reflexive subjectivity on the one hand 
and, on the other hand, to the self-established irretrievability (Nichteinholbarkeit) 
of this relation. We shall see that it is precisely the individual in its singularity, 
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which in its indefensibility and opacity stands for the irretrievability correspond-
ing to transcendence.
The proposition that transcendence serves as an epistemological and 
action-theoretical function of the concept of religion will be unfolded in three 
steps. Firstly, I will determine the challenge of religion in its contemporary 
situation. Its presence, not only sociologically, in the so-called ‘return of 
religion’, but rather more precisely in the philosophical striving for a ‘New 
Realism’ (cf. Gabriel 2013; 2014; Ferraris 2014) just as with a ‘New Atheism’,4 
gives occasion for assuming there is sustained interest in a point of access 
to reality, which means, in fact, that the question of reality, i.e. of validity 
and normativity, has not been suspended. This being the case, however, struc-
turally presupposes the previously mentioned reference to transcendence for 
holding onto reality, respectively identity and normativity. Therefore, I want, 
secondly, to turn to the protagonist who was concerned with the topic of reli-
gion in precisely this way, namely, to Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher. 
I will do so through his recourse to Kant, for in this Schleiermacher, in crit-
ical interaction with Kant, attended to the work of providing a conceptual 
clarification of religion or transcendence in a similarly metaphysical-critical 
manner. To the extent that he continued the modern program along Kant’s 
line – though with critical distance – he can provide inspiration for the con-
temporary debates on the recovery of reality and validity. The contemporary 
relevance of this question does not, in the last instance, arise from the fact it 
can be shown that transcendence, which for Schleiermacher is what religion 
stands for, need not be tied absolutely to explicit forms of religion, but rather 
that it can also be tied to implicit aspects of transcendence in other phenom-
ena in life. In a third section, it will consequently be shown that a critical 
concept of religion that is open to a variety of phenomena can have eman-
cipative potential coming to bear precisely on those relations accompanying 
subjectivity and rationality which can be characterised as representing that 
which is unfulfilled and unattainable. This presupposes that the human being 
remains thematically oriented, and therefore as such, to the understanding 
(Verstehen) of reality, that is, oriented to the relationships between the world 
and itself in an  unobstructed way.
4 This is because there are even traces of a ‘return of religion’ in this field, for example in 
Dworkin 2014.
144   Elisabeth Gräb-Schmidt
This shifts the hermeneutical connection of experience and understand-
ing into a kind of view wherein its focus on interpretation (Deutung) cannot 
determine reality universally, but only to the extent that it holds onto it and 
the validities that spring out of it symbolically. The effective power of the 
 interrogation of the emancipatory power of religiously determined individ-
uality will be measured by the extent to which it is successful in asserting 
its symbolically determined connection to transcendence in accordance with 
theoretical approaches to rationality and freedom, without, however, thereby 
wiping out its existing ties to transcendence. The meaning of religion for indi-
viduality and vice versa might culminate in the fact that in the consolidation of 
the religious as such, it shows itself to be the symbol of the specific character 
of irretrievable singularity according to its form, which thus turns out to be 
compatible with modernity. Consolidated in the symbol, religion then encoun-
ters individual self-assurance with universal purpose as a space for resonance. 
This possibility of the place and significance of the individual in its religious 
character is to be portrayed in reference to the development running from Kant 
to Schleiermacher.
1  The new inquiry about being and its lost 
ground: religion and the problem of its 
conceptual clarification in modernity
It was not with Luhmann, but rather with Kant, that it first belonged to the 
concept of religion to become its own object in its special clarification beyond 
the traditional trappings. That is, both the critique and the affirmation of reli-
gion go hand in hand. It was indeed the case that the critique of religion, being 
expressed concurrently with the assertion of the natural scientific worldview of 
classical mechanics and the positive understanding of the sciences upon which 
it was built, that concealed this shared bond between the critique and affirma-
tion of religion. The transcendental aspect of consciousness, which belonged to 
Enlightenment criticism, was pushed to the background, prepared not least by 
the anthropological turn, which was then perceived solely in sociological and 
evolutionary biological ways and not received in a philosophical manner with 
regard to its consequences for the theory of religion. This positivistic paradigm 
shift in the self-understanding of all the sciences, oriented towards the natural 
sciences as it was, then radiated onto society, not only distorting insights about 
religious matters in the process but also things taken for granted in philoso-
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phy. Whatever was to be accepted as clare et distincte would need to prove itself 
before the tribunal of a natural-scientific (or, alternatively, a logical) positivism. 
Religion therefore came under pressure for legitimacy in two respects. It had to 
maintain its claim, not only before the tribunal of reason, but also in contrast to 
 empirical-positivistic thinking. The danger of mixing world view and science goes 
hand in hand with this double and yet asymmetrical demand,5 which can poten-
tially yield fundamentalist consequences on both sides. A conceptual clarifica-
tion of religion which remains obliged to the critical enterprise of modernity will 
endeavour to uncover such mixtures and dissemblances (along with attempting 
to clarify religion in its tension between affirmation and critique), as well as being 
able to clarify both its critique and its affirmation in an appropriate manner. This 
critical- affirmative clarification of religion also has consequences for the under-
standing of reality and validity.
Religion signals its claim to reality in its being-out-for (Aussein) the whole. 
With respect to the question of the place of religion in the light of reason, the 
questions raised at the beginning about the ‘New Atheism’ and the ‘New Realism’ 
therefore carry some importance, albeit they are explicitly concerned with ques-
tions revolving around the understanding of reality. In this regard, it is necessary 
to pay attention to two things in a conceptual clarification of religion: on the one 
hand, that it takes the empirical-critical challenge to religion into account, but 
on the other hand, that this process of clarification preserves a reference to the 
continuing importance of the transcendental for retaining reality and validity. 
Neither descriptions from cultural anthropology and the sociology of religion are 
sufficient for this, nor is a return to speculation. The practical claim of religion is 
only satisfied when the leading determinative criteria are neither exclusively of 
an empirical nature nor of a solely speculative one, but rather when theoretically 
grounded procedures on the conceptual level are applied, as would be formu-
lated in the modern-critical understanding of religion. It is for this reason that the 
practical claim retains its fundamental significance in modernity, now conveying 
what was previously allocated to the metaphysical dimension. The practical task 
upholds the claim to reality as well as the claim of normative rules, thus avoiding 
becoming lost in subjective or merely individualistic questions of taste or expres-
sions of certainty. A post-traditional and postmodern society could manage quite 
well with something like this, albeit a social arrangement of this kind would 
5 There is no question about whether empiricism is methodologically justified in science, 
however, the fact that this only represents a subdomain of our understanding of reality should 
not be concealed. If this distinction is not retained by the counterpart, but on the grounds of 
empirical thinking instead, then this task vanishes all too quickly in a dismissal of the notion of 
transcendence from the area of science.
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not do do justice to the theoretical standards of the modern study of religion, 
nor would the actual importance of religion for the individual and social way of 
life (Lebensführung) on the one hand and the profiling of categorical  thinking 
on the other hand come into view. The importance of religion actually hangs on 
its reaching out to the individual towards the transcendental nexus which guar-
antees reality and normative validity. This far-reaching effect is noticeable in 
various spheres which have emancipated themselves from explicit religion in the 
sense of a specific sphere – such as in art, but not only there; its effect is also felt 
in the economic and political sphere, in science or sport. The variety of expres-
sions of religion which arise from this, even in its concealed form, should also be 
considered.6
Additional difficulties with the definition of religion emerge from this, 
since religion, or respectively, everything that is permeated by religion, is itself 
diffuse in these phenomena and developments. It is necessary to reckon with 
fuzzy, transitional and interim religious phenomena. At this point, with respect 
to the study of religion, it is necessary to consider ‘invisible’ religiosity (cf. 
Luckmann 1991), as it has been defined by Thomas Luckmann, or even wan-
dering religiosity, or the so-called phenomena of an ‘affinity for religion’ (cf. 
Osthövener 2015, 358–77). Only in considering this multifacetedness, does it 
become apparent, in its full sharpness, that the efficacy of a conceptual clar-
ification of religion matters for questions of normative character. This comes 
to the fore especially when the varying potentialities for marking distance and 
difference, which have constructed themselves in the field of religion during 
modernity, are perceived as potentialities from which claims to reality and nor-
mativity are fed.
In this distance to religion, which, in being distant, is equally indebted to 
the religious sphere or to transcendence respectively, the increasing complexity 
of religion consequently becomes apparent, which for its part must be embraced 
conceptually. This occurs in that, this insight into the indispensability of tran-
scendence in both forms, i.e. of the critique as well as the affirmation of religion, 
is evidenced in various ways. Consequently, it is the aspect of transcendence 
that is found in the individual which suggests itself to be an instrument avail-
able for the clarification of the function of the religious beyond its explicit reli-
gious forms.
6 Nevertheless, philosophers like Herbert Schnädelbach, however, rightly resist rash usur-
pations, which are undertaken during the course of the clarification of religion as an anthropo-
logical constant. Not all vital questions are religious ones and not all interpretations of meaning 
are drawn from or rooted in transcendence. This must be clearly labelled, precisely in order not 
to jeopardise the prerogative of religious questioning (cf. Schnädelbach 2009, 3). 
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2  The function of religion as a clarification  
of the transcendently grounded individuality  
of humanity, with particular consideration of 
Schleiermacher in connection to Kant
Schleiermacher’s theory of religion can be conceived as a continuation of Kant’s 
critical enterprise. He wants to continue systematically the limits on thinking 
about the ground with respect to the conditions for thought posed by Kant. It is 
in the network of tension between criticism on the one hand and the emphasis on 
transcendence on the other that religion has its systematic place. The inheritance 
of Kant’s liberating critique and the liberal achievements of enlightenment and 
secularism demonstrate themselves at this point – as we shall see – in connection 
with religion and freedom.
2.1 Kant
Kant did not fight his battle with dogmatism only to oppose it with vain subtleties 
(Kant 1799, 876 [AA XII, 360]). He stood in service of the Enlightenment, in service 
of reason and of understanding, and especially in service of freedom, the freedom 
of thought, the freedom of action and the freedom of the word. In accordance 
with human dignity, emancipation and maturity are for the attainment of sover-
eignty, opposing both immaturity and authoritarianism as well as opportunism 
and cowardice. A pre-requisite for this was, however, that freedom and maturity 
could be arrived at by means of thought, because this alone serves for assessing 
the reason being used. Its arrival at the limits of pure reason ought not therefore 
result in an explaining away of religion – as is sometimes alleged – but rather in 
designating its location within the framework of his critique of reason. A concep-
tual clarification of religion, on the contrary, is also for Kant, one of the leading 
requirements of reason. But it is not directly graspable and communicable on the 
level of reason, and is therefore to be seen as falling within the limits of reason. 
The limits themselves are, however, likewise a mark of the theoretical standards 
of a conceptual approach to religion and as such ought not be disregarded. They 
have a precisely determined place which for reason itself is not an arbitrary one, 
but rather one which remains significant for the question of the foundational and 
orientating function of thinking and acting.
Kant posited the issue of the meaning of transcendence without running 
through it argumentatively, but rather by programmatically dismissing such 
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argumentation altogether. This is where the notion of ‘reverence for the moral 
law’, which he developed in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, finds 
its conceptual home. Kant presupposes the religious dignity of humanity, which, 
being veiled within human morality, appears in every act of respect for the moral 
law. This feeling of respect refers humanity to the transcendent foundations of 
freedom, or more aptly, to its being grounded in a ground. Being transcendent, 
this ground is therefore not something that one can directly experience or com-
municate, but rather access only indirectly along the way of experience of this 
respect. In this moment of reverence for the moral law, freedom runs up against 
its own limits, which show themselves to be bound to something transcendent. In 
this experience of reverence, the humanity of the human being becomes appar-
ent, which in Kant’s understanding is attributed and promised to it through the 
humanity in human beings. Kant therefore saw human dignity for its part as 
something inherently bestowed to humanity and not something which human-
ity itself can produce, not even via processes of recognition. Demonstrating this 
dignity in a gracious manner, being able to provide its expression in being as well 
as in thought, encapsulates the meaning of the question of enlightenment and 
maturity, of human rationality and freedom.
Kant therefore knew something about the meaning of humanity’s conscious-
ness of transcendence. When Kant takes reverence into account for the moral 
law, as well as the need to develop ideas that give thinking its guidelines, this 
points precisely to the transcendent fundament of human being, which is only 
accorded in experience and encounter.7 This is the point where the proponents of 
German idealism, by critical engagement with Kant, sought to move beyond him. 
Recourse to the subjectivity of reflection plays a role in this endeavour in various 
ways. In the following, this will be unpacked with reference to Schleiermacher 
whose aggravation with Kant’s criticism consists of focusing on the individual 
with respect to its experience of transcendence. This secures for him an indica-
tion of reality and validity as a religious experience and thus can take over the 
function of providing orientation for thinking and action. In Fichte’s ‘Philosophy 
of the Ego’ the subjectivity of reflection is exalted as the hermeneutical anchor 
point in the status of ultimate justification; while in Schleiermacher it carries 
similar importance, it is differentiated by a relativising critical function opposite 
thought and its competence for argumentation. The sum of his intention to carry 
on with Kant’s criticism does not consist in closing the hole in the foundation 
7 He ultimately took account of this dimension in his critique of pure reason, which is to include 
not only the theoretical, but also the practical reason and the power of judgment, and not least 
of all in his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (cf. Heidegger 1963, 14).
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of the modern critique of metaphysics, but rather to strengthen its justification, 
albeit with the consequence – and this is what distinguishes him from Kant, just 
as much as from other representatives like Fichte and Hegel – of making this jus-
tification plausible. At this point the individual person plays an indispensable 
role, since this establishment of plausibility cannot conceptually bypass every 
individual’s experience, or more precisely, every experience of transcendence.
2.2 Schleiermacher
Schleiermacher stands at the beginning of reflection on the theoretical clarifica-
tion of religion, which he developed in critical interaction with Kant’s critiques. 
These appeared to him, however, not only to be rudimentary, but also somewhat 
misguided. It was this deficit that he sought to address in his early writing on 
religion. Even though Kant was aware of the epistemological significance of reli-
gion, Schleiermacher nonetheless goes beyond him on this point (cf. Barth 2004, 
272–5). His difference with Kant becomes apparent in that Schleiermacher under-
stands religion to be foundational for morality. This is because, for Schleier-
macher, there is no pure reason, no knowledge without presuppositions. Rather, 
knowledge and reason are always bound up with social and historical condi-
tions. Without taking into account the ‘need for reason’ and without heeding the 
‘respect for the moral law’, he became aware, by considering the individual’s 
experience of religion, of the residuum of a ground and the need for grasping 
the whole. These subsequently become guiding aspects for thinking and action.
By means of religion, Schleiermacher points towards that which is always 
already given to and not retrievable from consciousness, but which also cannot 
be excluded from it. Whereas Kant only diagnosed and postulated the achieve-
ments of the theoretical and practical reason in view of the limits of its impact on 
thinking and action, Schleiermacher, with his deliberations on the theory of reli-
gion as such, fully and thoroughly explores the limits of this conceptual sphere in 
its function for thinking and action. The possibility for doing this arises from his 
knowledge of the religious consciousness as that which concurrently positions all 
action and thought processes alike.
These connections between religion and other aspects in an individual’s daily 
conduct of thought and action mark the anthropological turn of religion. But this 
should not be misunderstood with respect to Schleiermacher in the sense of a 
biologizing attempt to explain away religion. The turn to anthropology rather, 
marks Schleiermacher’s turning to focus on the attempt to theorise about con-
sciousness and the individual. In this vein, he holds in his ‘Second Speech: On 
the Essence of Religion’ (Schleiermacher 2001, 74–115; ET: Schleiermacher 2014, 
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18–54) that religion represents its own province in the mental and spiritual facul-
ties of humanity (Gemüt). As such, religion is identified indeed as a distinct area 
not dependent on knowledge and morality which, albeit appears in the individ-
ual, it never does so in and for itself, but rather always in connection with knowl-
edge and morality, and as that which actually grounds both (cf. Schleiermacher 
2001, 79–87).8
The salient point of Schleiermacher’s theory of religion will therefore be mis-
understood when its affinity to and its critique of Kant’s critical enterprise are 
not taken into equal account (cf. Barth 2004). It is not a subsequent conclusion 
about reverence for the moral law as it is with Kant, for this would be secondary 
for Schleiermacher. A provisional intention prevented Schleiermacher from dis-
missing the absolute and the unfulfilled which are thematised in concert with 
religion. The absolute is postulated by Kant by means of the theory of reason 
with ideas and postulates – even if in a hiatus opposite theoretical apprehension. 
This kind of absolute is not postulated by Schleiermacher, rather it emerges as 
a dimension guiding knowledge and action in its effect in precisely this feeling 
or in immediate self-consciousness. This notion, or both notions respectively re- 
present religion for Schleiermacher. It is the ineluctable and irretrievable entity 
of the individual, located in the immediate self-consciousness. In this it demon-
strates a degree of sovereignty which affords a constructive-critical engagement 
with thought and action.
The position of religion will therefore be misunderstood if it is identified 
either with knowledge or morality, or if knowledge and morality as independent 
of religious consciousness are understood as the pre-determined conditions of 
all perception. In this way, the possibility of subsuming religion into knowledge 
and morality in the sense of traditional metaphysics is ruled out. According to 
Schleiermacher, such a metaphysics is obsolete and can be seen as superstitious, 
and such an ethics, corresponding to this, rightly falls victim to being judged as 
mere unsophisticated and uncritical conformism. If, however, these connections 
were simply to be dismissed, then bare relativity and arbitrariness would find 
their way into thinking. On the other hand, if with Schleiermacher, the religious 
consciousness is envisaged as leading action and thought, this has normative 
consequences. In this case, it is not possible to prohibit the operations of con-
sciousness in their reaching out towards the goal and intended purpose in service 
8 At this point it was clear to him that the thesis about the foundational function of religion for 
knowledge and morality would be met with resistance to the extent that he challenged the self-
understanding of every theoretical and practical science, of the natural sciences just as much as 
that of economics and philosophy – and even that of conceptual metaphysics (cf. Schleiermacher 
2001, 57–73; ET: Schleiermacher 2014, 3–17).
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of the rejection of metaphysics and the recognition of scientific capacities. On the 
contrary, its analysis on the level of action and its reflective apprehension on the 
level of thinking belong to the self-transparency of the sciences. Schleiermacher 
is committed to precisely this kind of analysis of the implications of the religious 
conscious presented in this way.
This consolidation and validation of religion does not lead Schleiermacher 
in any way – as many allege – to a dismissal of Kant’s concerns, but rather to a 
specification, say, with regard to the concept of the transcendental. To the extent 
that he takes on these fundamental epistemological concepts from Kant, Schlei-
ermacher entirely shares in Kant’s basic epistemological orientation. This means 
he maintains that presuppositions of knowing are not only to be found in empiri-
cal, social and historical conditions, but also that these are subject to categorical 
presuppositions. However, Schleiermacher takes this approach further. He makes 
recourse in an even more basic manner to the conditions of the presuppositions 
of what Kant designates as the a priori transcendental determination of thinking. 
He sees these presuppositions – contradictory as this may seem – as being bound 
to experiences, that is to ungraspable experiences, namely, to the ‘Whence’ of 
absolute dependence (cf. Schleiermacher 2003, 32–40 [§4]; ET: Schleiermacher 
2011, 12–9 [§4]). Thus, in his thought, God is situated in the ground (of experi-
ence) instead of being postulated. An a priori attached to experience actually rep-
resents a square circle, but one which rests on a different concept of empiricism. 
What is decisive at this point is the distinction in the concept of experience. Expe-
riences clarified in this way are not to be confused with observable empiricism; 
on the contrary, they ought rather to correspond – even in their irretrievability – 
to the Kantian a priori, which for Kant precedes empirical and rational clarifi-
cations. This is precisely what is made possible by the special formation of the 
individual in whom the immediate impressions of such experience, themselves 
not accessible to empirical experience, are being called forth. This is how the 
individual in Schleiermacher’s thought advances into the categorical horizon of 
the determination of validity.
The clarification of the concept of individual thereby changes the weight of 
Kant’s transcendental theory. The character of the transcendental changes as the 
feeling of religious experience generated in the individual becomes the focal point; 
it transcends the dichotomy between a priori and a posteriori via pre-empirical, 
as it were, categorical ‘atmospheres’, which for Schleiermacher are consolidated 
in religious feeling, that is, in immediate self-consciousness. These ‘atmospheres’ 
or moods are not congruent with empiricism and observable experience. Further-
more, they only correspond with the a priori to some extent, namely insofar as 
they concern the pre-empirical conditions of the presuppositions of knowledge 
and action. Resembling moods, they surpass Kant’s pre-empirical a priori in 
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two respects: firstly, in that they – certainly not in a finite manner – do not aim 
at a whole qua idea or postulate, but rather can be followed back to a ground, 
which is presupposed as such; and secondly, through the effects emanating from 
those moods, which ultimately arise from feeling. According to Schleiermacher’s 
insight into the anthropological function of religion one can or must assume that 
these effects indicate precisely this obligatory character of religion. This sense 
of obligation does not disappear, rather it secures, for being as such, epistemic 
reality and moral normativity. It is in this way that these effects join in the cate-
gorical function of transcendence.9
The moments of expanding reflection which are the marks of Schleiermach-
er’s concept of religion are expressed in these aspects of autonomy, interpenetra-
tion and reflexive apprehension of knowledge and action; the latter two resting 
in a ground which is irretrievable but which accompanies all experiences atmos-
pherically. For Schleiermacher, Kant’s understanding of the a priori itself must 
be understood as an abstraction. It misunderstands the specific way humans are 
always already placed in the world through a foundational dispatching (Disponi-
erung), just as all other categorical forms are. It is consequently the status of the 
a priori which, being retained in terms of the theory of validity, are conceived 
formally as being bound up in dispositions which substantively colour all knowl-
edge and action. These dispositions evince a remaining, radical transcendence 
which is bundled in the individual, who represents the place at which the effects 
of being and essence (Da- und Sosein) consolidate into the experience of tran-
scendence. Reality and validity thus posited are vouchsafed in experience as if 
from a ground. Schleiermacher illustrates the interconnection of transcendence 
and reflection on the grounds of the immediate self-consciousness in the indi-
vidual with the bare asymptotic convergence of the real to the ideal: – as in the 
Dialectic (Schleiermacher 1986) (which focuses on the whole); in The Christian 
Faith (cf. Schleiermacher 2003, 39) (focusing on the ground); or with the infinite, 
the ‘universe’ in its effects – as in the Speeches on Religion (Schleiermacher 2014) 
(in which both the whole and the ground are considered).
What we can say is this: with regard to the history of ideas, Schleiermacher 
is looking to adopt concerns previously held by metaphysics about the appre-
hension of reality and the warrant for orientation, but he does so in alignment 
with critical shifts which accept neither a being-in-itself nor the notion of ahis-
torical truth. Schleiermacher changes track in line with this critical perspec-
tive and even takes it further – not in order to close the gap which had widened 
9 One could reproach him for mixing origin and validity; however, he rather conceived them as 
interlocking in a way in which they could not be detached from one another.
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between questions of being and validity, but in order to concretise thought and 
action. He  accomplishes this feat by ascribing to the transcendental both a 
meaning emphasising a fundamental reaching out to the transcendent, as well 
as a meaning emphasising its being bound back onto experience. He can do this 
because he implements a distinction between the ground and the whole. This 
stands in service of rational comprehensibility, if not even retrievability. Such a 
distinction is possible in the case of religion because in the individual the ground 
can be identified in contradistinction from an apprehension of the whole. To the 
extent that religion coalesces in distinct and independent ways with morals and 
metaphysics or knowing, it adds that which is withdrawn from us but on which 
we nevertheless depend on as so far as reason asks for orientation. Therefore reli-
gion accompanies conceptual systematisation and practical action. This allows 
Schleiermacher to include specificity for being and validity without having to 
make a claim to rational apprehension.
The constellation of thought stands and falls with the said position of the 
individual, which Schleiermacher retains opposite modern subjectivity and 
which reveals the aporetic complex of criticism with respect to the understanding 
of reason. This culminates not in rationality, but rather in a specific capacity for 
perceiving respect for the whence of one’s being addressed and the wither of the 
answer for which the individual stands. As a result, there is a kind of passivity 
embedded in the individual which the theories of self-determination of subjectiv-
ity can contour and critically reflect. This does not thereby lead to solipsism – as 
is always suspected when discussing modern reflective subjectivity – but rather 
to positing a mode of responsivity geared towards hearing and communication 
which dwells within the individual. This responsivity is inaugurated by a with-
drawal which is always already intrinsic to the individual, manifesting itself as a 
singularity, but which is not the same as solipsism, but which rather – precisely 
because it is withdrawn – is able to overcome it by means of communication.10
On the theological level, what is withdrawn is to be integrated as an extra 
nos and indeed as nothing less than what makes being human into a humanum. 
This is not something, however, that the human being itself brings about on its 
own. The humane demands transcendence as a mode of being called into the 
formation of its human being as a person in its individuality (cf. Herms 2003). It 
is an invocation to the formation of its individuality and freedom which does not 
10 What distinguishes Schleiermacher from Kant is the distinction between the ground and the 
whole. This makes it possible to make this distance plausible via transcendence, which in the 
self-consciousness demands for freedom as self-limitation and that means for freedom as social 
freedom, in order to make inter-subjectivity possible, that recognizes others as the others. As a 
result, this approach is essentially suited for pluralism.
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consume the human being solipsistically, but rather places it in community with 
others. This kind of community understands itself to be ineluctable with such 
individuated ‘selfs’ who are united together in personal freedom – and that is 
what distinguishes this self from the ‘selfish’ self, for which, say, Kierkegaard is 
misguidedly stigmatised, and also from the reflective subjectivity of Kant, which 
is marked by an essential self-referentiality. Freedom is in need of such selves in 
order to be able to approximate their goal of a community of those who are free.
In this turn into the inter-individual, religion demonstrates its spiritual- 
theoretical (geisttheoretisch) take-off power, which is also where the externally 
won and freedom oriented quality of Schleiermacher’s approach is asserted. This 
person-, freedom and community-forming ascending power can only be demon-
strated by religion, as and in consciousness of the distance and the difference of 
reason to its ground in the individual. The distinction with respect to Kant and the 
representatives of German idealism is that Schleiermacher does not identify the 
individual with liberal reflective subjectivity, but rather that precisely the oppo-
site is advanced: the individual is understood as pre-given, constituted in its ine-
luctability allowing it to be and to act. In the individual, as a singular and original 
category, the determinations of validity and reality which the subject draws on for 
accomplishing freedom and reality are interconnected. This means it is precisely 
this ground which appears in the religious consciousness as something external, 
so to speak, which cannot be made into an object, neither directly in speaking 
about God, nor indirectly as idea or postulate.11 This is precisely the reason why 
the externality is not to be apprehended as ‘pure’, – and not to be located as pure 
reason – but instead as being bound up in historical circumstances. Reference to 
it ought to therefore only be made in terms of a perspective and in re-enactment of 
its effects in moments of convergence – or in expressions of distance.12
11 If this insight had remained in view, then the long sustained and constantly reappearing 
critique of Schleiermacher’s Christian Faith would have long been pronounced guilty of 
untenability and deceitfulness (cf. Barth 1980; see also Bayer 1985, 1005–16) This is because 
apart from piety as a feeling or as a consciousness-dependent subjectivist ‘play version’ of piety, 
which the so-called extra nos put up for negotiation, precisely this evaluation will be exposed as 
incorrect through the demonstration of the affinity of the religious with morals and metaphysics 
or philosophy.
12 Schleiermacher’s reconstruction of dogmatics corresponds meticulously to this insight in this 
context. Schleiermacher indeed introduces the anthropological turn in that he emphasizes the 
anthropological and cultural relevance of religion. However, he likewise demands the dogmatic 
reformulation of faith in all its connections. Thus, the anthropological turn for Schleiermacher 
does not mean an empirical dismissal of theoretical questions about validity. This means that in 
and through this interweaving of thinking and acting with religion, religion itself must be seen as 
contextual and therefore also conditioned by time and processes of development, irrespective, 
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It is precisely on such ground that Schleiermacher states in the ‘Second 
Speech’, ‘that one religion without God can be better than another with God’ 
(Schleiermacher 2001, 112; ET: Schleiermacher 2014, 54). This is true precisely 
on the grounds that a religion with recourse to God squanders its efficacy when 
God functions in it as a placeholder who merely refers to a special area of life 
which has neither anything to do with the other areas of life, nor is integrated into 
them.13 The task of Schleiermacher’s investigation and reformulation of Christian 
doctrine is not God in God’s self, but rather what appears under the perspective 
of faith defined as consciousness of difference.
3  The symbolic function of the concept of religion 
in service of emancipation and freedom
In order to achieve progress in the conceptual clarification of religion, I have 
weighted the phenomenon of religion in this paper with respect to its transcen-
dental function by means of Schleiermacher’s work. It is significant to bear in 
mind that the concept of religion emerges in a time in which it must likewise also 
serve as a placeholder, namely, a placeholder for lost metaphysical and ontolog-
ical self-understanding. As a result, it does not only accommodate various forms 
of explicit religion and a broad array of their symbols, but also forms that are 
hidden and not immediately identifiable. This interrelationship has been argued 
for in terms consonant with the sociology of religion about vague and diffuse 
religiosity all the way to an ‘affinity for religion’, which comes to bear as a decided 
mode of delimiting religion (cf. Luckmann 1991; Osthövener 2015).
As will become clear, this diagnosis is relevant for the present investiga-
tion insofar as it is not at all arbitrary whether one knows about the context of 
even such hidden forms or the multifacetedness of what it is that religion stands 
for or not. Such forms of religion, as placeholders, precisely mark the place at 
which transcendence can be thematised and actively retained in its function for 
however, of its transcendental connections. It is obligated in this regard to take into account the 
definitions of value and validity of a specific time. These are to be thoroughly examined for their 
potential to illuminate within the context of the authority of this time’s dogmatic framework. Cf. 
on this also the introduction by the editor Rolf Schäfer (Schleiermacher 2003, XV).
13 To the extent that Schleiermacher undertakes the methodological implementation of such 
an account in his dogmatics, Christian dogmatics as such expounds the explication of its 
determination at the beginning of the religious self-consciousness within and for its own time 
(cf. Herms 1984).
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 thinking and acting. This is because without a reflective self-reference which actu-
ally presupposes this reference to transcendence, there can be no discussion of a 
self- apprehension of subjectivity and consequently of autonomy and freedom – 
and along with them, of inter-subjectivity. To the extent that this reflective self- 
reference induces human beings to face themselves it leads them to maturity and 
responsibility with respect to self and the world. However, reference to reality 
cannot be waived if this process of self-reflection which sets forth claims to nor-
mativity and validity as such is to occur. This reference to reality, however, – as 
ought to have been demonstrated here – can be vouchsafed by the transcenden-
tal aspects characterising irreducible individuality.
Schleiermacher’s theory of religion is open to an interpretation which makes 
apparent that the religious sphere is not finally put to rest in modernity but 
instead flows into the larger cultural sphere. It is precisely in such an interplay 
that the multifacetedness of a clarification of religion points to its ineluctable 
moments. Those are the two complementary ways in which distance, or differ-
ence, and transcendence can be determined, both of which subsequently consoli-
date in the concept of the symbol. The concept of distance stands for the essential 
self-understanding under normative conditions, which arise from the reaching 
out to the whole and aim to achieve unity in order to make possible the reflex-
ive relationship of the self to itself (Sich-zu-sich-selbst-Verhalten). The concept of 
transcendence, on the other hand, stands for the necessity of the presupposition 
it shows of a ground which vouchsafes orientation. As a result, both concepts – 
distance and transcendence – stand for the polar diametrically opposite ends of 
the condition of being human, meaning they signify the attainment of autonomy 
and freedom as those emancipatory determinations of humanity which were 
striven for in the Enlightenment and which possess the potential to critically 
accompany its dialectic. They therefore appear to me to need to be declared as 
the support structure or bedrock of every conceptual clarification of the concept 
of religion. This is because in all striving towards autonomy, religion makes refer-
ence to transcendence as a category of presuppositions to rational thought which 
holds it open for the Other – for the stranger – and therefore makes distance to 
its own self possible.
This openness for others and this interpretability consequently revolve 
around the symbolic function of the concept of religion itself as placeholder 
for the lost metaphysical ground which must be considered with regard to the 
self-understanding of humans and to their orientation in thinking and acting. 
If the emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment is not to be squandered, 
then the relation to reality represented by means of the symbol must be guar-
anteed. However, this can only be the case by the reaching out of the individual 
towards something transcendent which has always already imposed itself on the 
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 individual and which can symbolically uphold this connection to reality. From the 
position of reflective self-assurance, religion in its symbolic function can stand for 
the regaining of the individual so that the emancipatory, modern subject does not 
have to be abandoned, but can rather be critically-constructively accompanied 
through the aforementioned connections. A fundamental connection between 
religion or transcendence and reason such as this will be concealed by the propo-
nents of the theory of secularisation and also – by no means to a lesser extent – 
by unreflective references to a return of religion which argumentatively serves to 
ban any kind of critique of religion. It will not, furthermore, be thwarted any less 
by a revelational positivism or metaphysical adherence to ahistorical truths and 
pre-existing orders of being. All of these perspectives misplace the symbolically 
consolidated moments of openness in religion which evoke responsivity in par-
ticular and through which the grounding in reality is produced.
In its symbolic function, the concept of religion, considered as a placeholder 
for the transcendental elements, ensures humankind of its humanity and con-
sequently warrants that the Enlightenment need not fall victim to its own dia-
lectic and that freedom and emancipation need not regress into alienation and 
heteronomy. Rather, it is not to be adduced at all without being anchored in the 
individual as the place where the interconnection of transcendence and experi-
ence takes place. The task of a conceptual clarification of religion in its service 
towards self-assurance and self-determination is to remain aware of the symbolic 
meaning of religion as an anchor for the emancipation of thought and freedom in 
action, as was presaged by Kant, developed more extensively by Schleiermacher 
and as was then to be concretised by Kierkegaard with respect to the determina-
tion of the individual. Though for now, this final proponent of transcendence, 
must be reserved for another examination.
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Matthias Engmann 
Taking Job as an example.  
Kierkegaard: traces of religious 
individualization
Individualisierung […] bedeutet auch, und vielleicht vor allem, die Verantwortung des Men-
schen für sich selbst, die er auf nichts abschieben kann und die ihm niemand abnehmen 
kann […]  (Simmel 1999, 331)
1 Introduction
Kierkegaard does not use the term ‘individualization’ (dan. Individualisering) in 
any of his writings. Nevertheless, there are enough anchor points and evidence 
to extrapolate an implicit concept of individualization, foremost as a concept 
of becoming oneself. However, rather than giving a broad overview on possible 
interpretive approaches to individualization, this article wants to explore Kier-
kegaard’s idea of existential appropriation as the condition of religious individu-
alization actualized in edification.
Two points have to be mentioned here. Firstly, most of Kierkegaard’s writings 
do not explicitly theorize the ‘self’, even though that may be an implicit result. The 
aim of the texts lies in their reactive effect on the reader, intending a hermeneu-
tical process of discovering one’s own self-relation (and its actualization). That 
aspect is covered by Kierkegaard’s idea of existential appropriation. Secondly, to 
realize that existential aim, Kierkegaard uses a specific strategy to mediate the 
contents of existence and the self. For that purpose, he never called himself a the-
ologian or philosopher but a religious writer who establishes a situation of exis-
tential communication that avoids objectivity and imposes subjectivity. Instead 
of mediating specific knowledge, Kierkegaard’s way of communication guides 
one to an awareness of one’s own capability to realize existential actuality.
A systematic perspective on existential communication and appropriation 
leads then to a productive examination of individualization in Kierkegaard when 
his work is not only understood as source of theoretical investigation, but above 
all as an example of how individualization can be actualized by any individual 
through or based on a literary work. Therefore, this article looks on Kierkegaard 
as a thinker who uses language and (philosophical) concepts to go beyond them 
with the aim to initiate and induce lived individualization concretely. For that 
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matter, this article will look more closely at one of Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Dis-
courses in order to understand how individualization is mediated by Kierkegaard.
The chosen Discourse, The Lord Gave, and the Lord Took Away; Blessed Be 
the Name of the Lord, re-traditionalizes one of the most known figures in the Old 
Testament, Job, and presents him not only as a role model for how the individual 
reader may enter into an existential lived relation to God, but also as an example 
or ‘prototype’ [Forbillede] of a ‘teacher and guide of humankind’ (e.g. SKS 5, 
115 / KW 5, 109).1 From the very start of the Discourse, Job is presented in a sys-
tematic tension. Just as Camus portrayed Sisyphus almost 100 years later, Job is 
presented as an individual with concrete life-world experiences and is a proto- or 
ur-representation of the condition humaine. Being at the same time both concrete 
and general, Job represents figuratively the (concrete and general) possibility of 
discovering one’s own personal relation to God. The Discourse on Job becomes 
thereby one example of Kierkegaard’s strategy for giving the reader the possibil-
ity at hand to enter into the ‘individual’s relation to himself before God’ (SKS 7, 
397 / KW 12.1, 436f.).2
However, before we dive deeper into Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Job, it is 
necessary to examine some of the above-mentioned concepts and to give a picture 
of what kind of texts the Upbuilding Discourses are (section two). How are the 
concept of edification and Kierkegaard’s idea of existential appropriation related 
to the Discourses? The developed framework will help to interpret the Discourse 
on Job (section three). That includes two questions here. Firstly, how is the liter-
ary figure of Job characterized by Kierkegaard as an authentic believer and what 
does it mean to be such a believer in a concrete existential way by experienc-
ing contingency, suffering, and thankfulness? Secondly, how does the Discourse 
offer the possibility of existential appropriation in regard to Kierkegaard’s focus 
on language? The concluding section will the resulting particular understanding 
of ‘religious individualization’.
2 Upbuilding discourses
Especially from 1843 till 1846, the years between Either-Or and the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard presents his work 
1 For the citation of Kierkegaard’s writings, see the references.
2 That is the core definition of the most religiously individualized life-form in Kierkegaard, the 
concept of inwardness. On (religious) inwardness regarding the aspects of life-form and individ-
uation, see Engmann 2017, 310–82.
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in two parallel published text corpora. On the one side, we have the famous pseu-
donymous writings. On the other side, there are 21 small Discourses published 
under Kierkegaard’s own name in compounds of two, three, and four ‘talks’. 
In 1843 and 1844 Kierkegaard published the so called Eighteen Upbuilding Dis-
courses, in 1845 the Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions. However, there are 
two possibilities for dealing with the Discourses, specifically with the Eighteen 
Upbuilding Discourses. On the one hand, you can read them as a separate collec-
tion of texts parallel to but quite separate from the pseudonymous works (see e.g. 
Greve 1990, 280 (fn. 57)). On the other hand, you can read each of the given com-
pounds as strongly related to the pseudonymous works. In the latter regard, the 
connection between the different text corpora appears mostly in the inner con-
ceptual correlations between one or more of the Discourse compounds and one 
(or sometimes two) of the pseudonymous works. But sometimes there are also 
obvious external correlations, e.g. when Kierkegaard published his famous writ-
ings Repetition and Fear and Trembling together with Three Upbuilding  Discourses 
1843 on the same date, the 16th October.3
2.1 Content and aim
It is helpful to consider some differences and similarities between the Upbuilding 
Discourses and the pseudonymous works. The very first and obvious point is the 
fact that Kierkegaard published the Upbuilding Discourses autonymously. In this 
regard, one might claim that Kierkegaard writes not with a literary strategy of 
hiding himself as an author but of showing his thoughts directly to the reader. 
Quite the reverse! The Discourses are multilayered texts communicating their 
content indirectly, which brings them close to the pseudonymous writings. The 
name ‘Kierkegaard’ on the cover pages of each compound is, in effect, a pseudo-
nym.4 Like the ‘real’ pseudonyms, e.g. ‘Constantin Constantius’ (Repetition) or 
‘Johannes de Silentio’ (Fear and Trembling), the name ‘Kierkegaard’5 represents 
a specific perspective on the task of existence. The focus of ‘Kierkegaard’ is gen-
erally different than the focus of the ‘real’ pseudonyms. The difference lies not 
3 The Discourse on Job was published on 6th December 1843. It is the first Discourse of Four 
Upbuilding Discourses 1843, a compound that remains not only in conceptual relation to the 
named pseudonymous works but paves also the path for the basic religious-existential concept 
of ‘patience’ in the Two Upbuilding Discourses 1844.
4 I follow hereby Jan Sløk. See Hagemann 2001, 69.
5 The further mentioning of ‘Kierkegaard’ (in quotation marks) refers to the pseudonymous na-
ture of the Upbuilding Discourses.
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in the intention of how the reader has to deal with the texts but in the intended 
anthropological presupposition. While the ‘real’ pseudonyms demand a decision 
of the reader about how to position him/herself to the text and its offer of living 
a religious existence, the pseudonymous ‘Kierkegaard’ presupposes a religious 
stance on the part of the reader and wants him/her to recognize the constant 
repetitive practice of such specific mode of existence. ‘Kierkegaard’ focuses on 
the renovation of practice that indicates his basic claim: the individual is already 
religious but does not realize his/her own religiousness in existential continuity.6
Hopefully two aspects become clear. Firstly, Kierkegaard uses, not only in 
his pseudonymous writings but also in the Discourses, his ‘postmodern talent’ 
to decentre himself as a writing self (see Mooney 2003, 122). Thereby, the his-
torical person Søren Kierkegaard is not the responsible (or direct) author of the 
Upbuilding Discourses, which is furthermore underlined in the prefaces of each 
compound where you can read that the person who wrote the Discourses ‘does 
not have authority’. Therewith, the implicit spirit and intention of communica-
tion becomes obvious. Kierkegaard wants to avoid a reading of the Discourses 
as ‘sermons’. They are not intended to educate the reader in religiousness but 
to prepare the reader for his/her own conditions of realizing a lived religious-
ness. If Kierkegaard put himself forward as an author who literally has something 
important to say on religiousness, the reader of the Discourses would take Kier-
kegaard’s words as one opinion on religiousness but not as an invitation for his/
her own self-practice. The important existential aspect of the Discourses is not 
the presentation of objective content but the subjective involvement of the reader 
in what is said.
That leads to the second point. The Upbuilding Discourses mediate religious-
ness in its practical dimension. If we look at the communicative situation, then 
we can see that the main content of all the Discourses, the individual’s relation to 
God,7 is contextualized and embedded in a variety of observations and descrip-
tions of lived experiences (see Deuser 1985, 155–60), e.g. happiness, sadness, 
suffering, thankfulness, patience, anxiety, expectancy, sorrow, earnestness, 
courage, fear of death etc. The Discourses thematize existence in its different 
modes and moods, its possibilities of emergence, and what kind of thinking 
and experiences are thereby involved. By exploring and focusing on the plural-
ity of factual experience, the Discourses offer possibilities of thinking and living 
6 The aspect of constant practice appears in the Discourse on Job very clearly. Regarding the 
relation between the reader of the Discourse and Job’s proverb, ‘Kierkegaard’ underlines perma-
nently the aspect of ‘memory’ and to practice ‘not to forget’.
7 On the aspect that the relation to God is the central point of the Discourses, see e.g. Bjergsø 
2009, 5f.; Harrits 2000, 128; Pattison 2002, 121.
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without value judgement. That is important because the reader has to position 
himself (see Lotti 2003, 141). Therefore, the Discourses are treatises on the issue of 
how the individual can relate him/herself to the possibilities of existence. ‘Kier-
kegaard’ supports that by creating a very specific atmosphere of fictionality that 
simulates concrete life-forms. He establishes a rhetorical situation in which the 
reader starts to search for his/her own life-experience in the given descriptions; 
and the beauty of the poetic language helps to engage the reader. The aim of 
such a literary endeavour is to initiate a subjective dialogue8: not only between 
the reader and the text. The Discourses invite the reader ‘to think’: to have what 
has, since Socrates, been defined as a dialogue with oneself. Therefore, they are 
guides to finding new self-relations.
To understand this correctly we have to acknowledge the implicit and explicit 
existential subject of the Discourses: the practice of one’s own religiousness, i.e. 
the lived relation to God. Insofar as the Discourses give a poetic and  existential 
‘catalogue’ of descriptions of human experience, you can call them meditations 
on existence. If we consider here the intended impact on the reader we can call 
them mediations on the practice of asceticism, not only in the etymological sense 
of ‘exercise’, but also in the sense of getting into a state of mind in which oneself is 
withdrawn from the world by understanding one’s own self- actuality as an expres-
sion of one’s relation to God. For that, an existential change of perspective is nec-
essary. God is not supposed to be seen as an other-worldly and abstract possibility 
but as a concrete part of one’s own life-world and by that as the ground of one’s 
own being. The transformation of the individual’s standpoint lies in a qualitative 
leap to find a new perspective on and position to the same life-world. Such an exis-
tential approach appears in the Philosophical Fragments as (religious) ‘rebirth, by 
which he enters the world the second time’ (SKS 4, 227 / KW 7, 19). Accordingly, 
the Upbuilding Discourses describe the practice of religiousness in forms of self- 
transcendence, i.e. as an experience of re-positioning oneself in a ‘relationship of 
opposition to God’ (SKS 4, 77 / KW 6, 210). Especially one existential concept in the 
Discourses expresses such self-transcendence in its core: the concept of ‘nothing-
ness’ or self-annihilation. If one has to withdraw from the world to find a new rela-
tion to the same world grounded and fulfilled by God, one has to withdraw from 
oneself as part of this world too, to find a new relation to one’s own self ‘before 
God’. For that matter we can say with George Pattison, that the Upbuilding Dis-
courses are ‘giving us a larger and deeper picture of what it might actually mean to 
live as if “before God”, counting ourselves “as nothing”’ (Pattison 2002, 166).
8 On the dialogical aspects of the Upbuilding Discourses, see Deuser 1985, 155f.; Harrits 2000, 
133; Lotti 2003, 139f.; Pattison 2002, 122 and 141; Shakespeare 2003, 93f.
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Now we can underline an important aspect regarding the presentation of 
thought in the Discourses. Although the Discourses ‘talk’ about the practice of 
religiousness in a not-at-all-hidden literary mode of religious-affirmative lan-
guage, they never avoid the philosophical aspect of what it means to have a 
true self-relation (before God).9 However, this philosophical component does 
not mean that the Discourses are theoretical treatises arguing in a philosoph-
ical (and/or speculative) manner and creating on the textual surface objective 
knowledge about religious self-relation. ‘Kierkegaard’ resists the temptation 
to speak on religiousness in an academic way,10 which differentiates the Dis-
courses fundamentally from the works of some of the pseudonyms, especially 
Vigilius Haufniensis (The Concept of Anxiety) and Johannes Climacus (Conclud-
ing Unscientific Postscript), who are famous for their systematic investigations 
of existential religiousness (although they have ‘upbuilding’ passages and use 
indirect communication). The difference between the literary enterprise of the 
Discourses and an academic style of writing lies in the following: in the former, 
rather than guiding the reader to more talkativeness of mind, he/she is supposed 
to reach a state of ‘stillness’, a concept of inward devotion mediated by ‘Kier-
kegaard’ (see Mooney 2003, 121). The reader is not supposed to stop thinking in 
such stillness, but the way he/she starts to think while reading the Discourses 
is different from an academic-systematic style. The priority lies not in objective 
categorization. Important is the subjective understanding of oneself in what is 
said, recognizing one’s own existential possibility.11 The effect is an actualized 
existential transformation, from self-discovery (by reading the Discourses) into 
an engagement of existence. For the aim of such overcoming of self-distance, 
Kierkegaard sees in any intellectual (objective) exploration and mediation 
of religiousness the avoidance of enforced self-practice. In other words, Kier-
kegaard focuses on the difference between an authentic, lived religiousness and 
an imagined one.
9 Especially the Four Upbuilding Discourses 1844 explore the religious self in its true relation 
before God by describing the existential process of religious self-annihilation.
10 On Kierkegaard’s avoidance of academic writing in the Discourses, see Mooney 2003, 114–6; 
and Pattison 2002, 161f.
11 In The Concept of Anxiety the pseudonymous voice gives the right expression for that: ‘To 
understand a speech is one thing, and to understand what it refers to, the personal, is something 
else; for a man to understand what he himself says is one thing, and to understand himself in 
what is said is something else’ (SKS 4, 442 / KW 8, 142). To understand what is said means to 
understand factuality (objective knowledge); to understand oneself in what is said means to un-
derstand one’s own (existential) possibility (guided by what is said) (See Lotti 2003,136).
Taking Job as an example. Kierkegaard: traces of religious individualization   165
2.2 Edification and appropriation
Those short remarks allow us to explain the entangled ideas of edification and 
existential appropriation in the Upbuilding Discourses. Therewith, we are deep-
ening the discussion of the content and considering the existential aim of the 
Discourses.
The intention of the Discourses is to build up the reader from his/her ground 
of being, God, understood as the unconditional ground of all things. More pre-
cisely, the Discourses want to guide the reader to a self-practiced process of 
building up an existential actuality in which God is recognized as ground (see 
also Theunissen 1958, 91). Coming into such an existential state of being upbuilt 
means to be in a state of uplifting edification, a lived devotional relation to one’s 
own life by accepting God as ground (see also Ringleben 1983, 13). From the sys-
tematical side it is important to see that the existential process of upbuilding con-
stantly refers to a lived relation to God as ground, but this ground is conceptually 
not set by any human being. Therefore, the process of upbuilding refers not to 
a relation to God a posteriori, it refers a priori to the presupposition of God in 
every human being. Precisely this conceptual condition of edification has to be 
accepted in any investigation of the Discourses, because it shows the only con-
dition under which you can talk about the existential possibility of edification: 
namely the existential acceptance of the dependence of any individual on God. 
However, if one has no sensibility for the literary and descriptive presentation of 
religiousness in the Discourses, one might probably look at the given conceptual 
construction as an authoritative presentation of edification by Kierkegaard, but 
even then the existential task and intention of the Discourses cannot be denied, 
namely that the reader has to discover the conceptual condition of edification by 
him/herself and embed it into their own experience. This aspect of self-practice 
thwarts any ‘authoritative’ situation of communication in the Discourses in the 
direction of a non-authoritative intention of existential appropriation.
The basic and crucial point of any existential appropriation is to recognize 
that personal existing is not solely a matter of knowledge.12 Knowledge entails 
objectivity and, insofar, a distanced relation of the individual to the object of 
knowledge. In contrast, existence is action, lived experience, and the continu-
ity of self-relation. The pseudonymous Johannes Climacus unites these aspects 
under the umbrella term ‘subjectivity’, i.e. being involved in self-engagement 
12 We can find that e.g. in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript when the pseudonym 
 Johannes Climacus notes, ‘But existing is something quite different from knowing’ (SKS 7, 271 / 
KW 12.1, 297).
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while living life in its full concreteness. The reader of Kierkegaard’s texts has to 
understand this difference between (objective) knowledge and (subjective) exist-
ence. At the same time, the mediator of existing, Kierkegaard, has to make the 
reader understand what existence means; thus he stays in an inter-position of 
mediation. He has to bring the reader to a specific knowledge, but at the same 
time, it is necessary to distance the reader from keeping this knowledge as some-
thing objective.
To induce a process by which the reader sees the content of the presented 
text not as something merely objective but as something that points to his/her 
own self-relation, Kierkegaard uses different strategies. For example, the ‘Kier-
kegaard’ of the Discourses presents himself not only as ‘without authority’ but 
sometimes also as a reader of the Discourses who only wants to find out what it 
means to be religious.13 By that means, hierarchy is abolished, reader and ‘author’ 
are on an equal footing, ready to transform their own lives into a religious mode 
of living. The presentation of ‘Kierkegaard’ as a non-authoritative ‘author’ helps 
furthermore to fulfil another condition of appropriation. The reader has to reject 
an immediate and direct relation to the ‘author’ as well as the textual knowledge, 
because appropriation is not a mimicking imitation of what is said. This is clearly 
underlined in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The ‘author’ should write 
‘without wanting to induce him [the reader] to go the same way [of presented 
knowledge], but just urging him to go his own way’ (SKS 7, 251 / KW 12.1, 277). 
Accordingly, the reader’s appropriation is always a process of freedom. At the 
same time, appropriation is mediated, guided by the one who writes.
Such systematic/existential tension is expressed by the Socratic ‘midwifery’ 
(maieutics), the guidance to one’s own freedom. In other words, appropriation 
is based on an encouragement of the individual to discover one’s own potenti-
ality by taking a personal journey (of experience) to find, form, and recognize 
one’s own individuality. Such a process is conditional upon how the reader posi-
tions himself to himself through the text. If the positioning is affirmative, the 
mechanism of Socratic maieutics brings the reader to the decisive point where 
he/she discovers the presented existential content as something that lies within 
him/herself as hidden knowledge. Therefore, appropriation can be seen as a re- 
discovering process of presupposed conditions which are meant to be actualized 
and transformed into a lived life-form. Regarding the Upbuilding Discourses, 
becoming religious means to become what one has been (religiousness is pre-
supposed) and to be what one becomes (religiousness has to be actualized into 
13 See for example the last page of At a Graveside, the third Discourse of the Three Discourses on 
Imagined Occasions, SKS 5, 469 / KW 10, 102.
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the future and remains only by such constant reactivation). Existential appropri-
ation implies, by this intertwined relation of becoming and being, that the reader 
re-discovers his/her (potentiality of) religiousness through the presented text 
and transforms such re-cognition into a constant existential actuality.
The necessary condition for that is the reader’s ‘interest’ in his/her self as 
grounded in religiousness.14 No appropriation can be successful if there is no 
‘passion’ (to use the terminology of the pseudonymous Johannes Climacus) for 
religious existing. Only with the will and the openness to religiousness, can the 
reader be invited by and involved in the Discourse (to search him/herself).
Finally, when we talk about the Upbuilding Discourses we have to keep in mind 
that we deal with texts – or better, with situations of specific communication – 
which present literarily a sense of existential concreteness and transformation. 
Existential appropriation is a concrete process of self-relation while  edification is 
the concrete realization of a self-related religiousness. Both are two sides of the 
same upbuilding process of existential transformation: to see one’s own life in 
a different light that illuminates existence as the concreteness of becoming new 
in finding the ground in God, and to experience the immersion into that relation 
which brings the individual into a practice of self-surrender. (The discussion of 
‘Kierkegaard’s’ interpretation of Job, below, will demonstrate this thoroughly.) 
Beside this existential perspective, there is furthermore a structural similarity 
between appropriation and edification. In both processes the self depends on 
something exterior. While appropriation is based on a maieutic process of discov-
ering one’s own self (and religiousness) by depending on someone who offers the 
ideas and the help to do that, edification is characterized as a process of getting 
into a self-relation that is grounded in God. Such (overall) dependency of the self 
is important for the discussion on individualization.
3 Discourse on Job
In this section we will first examine how Job exemplifies edification and what it 
means to live religiousness authentically. In the next step we will slightly change 
the perspective in the direction of the existential aim and the performative pres-
entation of the text.
Before we start the analysis we should mention that Job is not the only poetic 
figure who is symbolically taken by Kierkegaard to exemplify religiousness. The 
14 Johannes Climacus calls ‘interest’ the conditio sine qua non for one’s own religiousness (see 
SKS 7, 25 / KW 12.1, 16).
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biblical characters of John or Anna are other examples.15 Furthermore, as we men-
tioned above (fn. 3), the Discourse on Job was published around two months after 
the small pseudonymous writings Repetition and Fear and Trembling. Specifically 
the latter one is famous for using the story of Abraham and Isaac to show what it 
means to live faith as ‘double-movement’ (SKS 4, 131 / KW 6, 36), i.e. as an exis-
tential process of transforming one’s own perceptual and habitual involvement 
in the world by an unconditional relation to God. This is the content of Repetition 
too, as novel and as concept. Therein, Job becomes relevant.
The second half of Repetition contains letters between the pseudonymous 
‘author’ Constantin Constantius and his ‘Young Friend’. Like the book of Job 
in the Old Testament, the second half of Repetition has a dialogical struc-
ture.16 The ‘Young Man’ talks to Constantin as a ‘Silent Confidante’ regarding 
the problem of having fallen in love with a young woman he does not want 
to marry anymore. Out of melancholy, guilt, contrition, and a religious self- 
understanding the ‘Young Man’ refers to Job not only as a poetic figure who 
insists on his right of justice against God (see esp. SKS 4, 75–8 / KW 6, 207–11) 
but also as a symbol of a plagued man who overcomes suffering by being a 
passionate believer.17
However, the secondary literature examines two presentations of Job in 
Repetition. The first one is the extrapolation of Job in the understanding of the 
‘Young Man’ (see esp. Dietz 1993, 243–5218). In this regard, the main focus lies on 
Job as a concrete individual and ‘rebel’ who claims his own freedom against God. 
The second understanding of Job, as Dorothea Glöckner examines (1998, 83), 
sees him through the eyes of Constantin Constantius. Job there appears particu-
larly as a devotional believer who represents an understanding of life in which 
the will for a just life does not guarantee a happy life without suffering. He 
becomes a symbol for human reality, that any control of life is humanly impos-
sible. The difference between both presentations lies in the existential quality of 
Job’s relation to God. While the ‘Young Man’s’ Job insists on his own person since 
his religious passion is dedicated to himself as a concrete living person against 
15 For John see He must increase; I must decrease (Three Upbuilding Discourses 1844); for Anna 
see Patience in Expectancy (Two Upbuilding Discourses 1844). On the aim of using these biblical 
figures, see Burgess 2000, 212–4; Grøn 2000, 200f.
16 For constructive remarks on the relation between the dialogical structure of a text and the 
existential meaning of it (referring the book on Job), see Deuser 2010, 75; also Colton 2003, 231 
and 236f.
17 ‘Nowhere in the world has the passion of anguish found such expression’ (SKS 4, 72 / KW 6, 
204). See also SKS 4, 77 / KW 6, 210.
18 For a critical discussion on Dietz, see Glöckner 1998, 80 (fn. 69).
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and before God, Constantin’s Job surrenders and hands over his person to God 
because his religious passion is dedicated to the eternal ground and condition 
of all being.
3.1 Edification: thankfulness and truthfulness
The interpretation of Job by ‘Kierkegaard’ in The Lord Gave, and the Lord Took 
Away; Blessed Be the Name of the Lord is very close to the understanding of Con-
stantin Constantius. Job appears as a devotional believer with an unwavering 
relation to God, which simultaneously presupposes that as a fundamental part of 
Job’s life and which becomes deeper by experiencing what it means to be oneself 
before God, i.e. to live life grounded in God. Job appears as both concrete individ-
ual and as ‘prototype’ (of edification).
By that, ‘Kierkegaard’ clarifies thoroughly that edification is no stable exis-
tential actuality, given and self-evident. Job repeats his faith by an experience 
of resolute awareness. Actualized faith means thereby to get into a state of ‘still’ 
(pure) mind based on personal experiences that shape and open up the horizon 
for accepting God as the eternal ground of being. The Discourse points out such 
kind of experience by the example of Job’s thankfulness.
The aspect of thankfulness as an existential and religious experience and 
concept can be found in several writings of Kierkegaard (see Schulz 2014a, 176 
(fn. 80)19). Specifically the first (under discussion) and the third Discourses of 
the Four Upbuilding Discourses 1843 need to be seen as ground-texts on thank-
fulness in Kierkegaard. However, after the introduction (SKS 5, 115–9 / KW 5, 
109–14), ‘Kierkegaard’ starts the main section of the present Discourse with a 
short description of how Job came to say ‘The Lord gave, and the Lord took away; 
blessed be the name of the Lord!’ (SKS 5, 119f. / KW 5, 114f.). In that short para-
graph, Job is already presented as someone who did not rebel against his fate 
(God) but who ‘surrendered to sorrow’ and confessed his faith by ‘worship’ (SKS 5, 
120 / KW 5, 115). Insofar as Job does not question his faith while suffering, it might 
not surprise how ‘Kierkegaard’ continues on the textual level. He starts his inter-
pretation of Job’s word not with the second part, ‘and the Lord took away’, which 
might be useful if the experience of suffering wants to be underlined; instead, he 
takes Job’s word as it was said, chronologically, and starts with the interpretation 
19 Schulz does not mention the Discourse on Job. On thankfulness in Johannes Climacus, taking 
on Schulz’ systematic examinations, see Engmann 2017, 371f. (fn. 1190).
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of ‘The Lord gave’: an expression that underlines the fact of thankful receiving 
(‘from above’20).
[F]irst of all he said, “The Lord gave.” The statement is brief, but in its brevity it effectually 
points out what it is supposed to point out, that Job’s soul was not squeezed into silent sub-
jection to the sorrow, but that his heart first expanded in thankfulness, that the first thing 
the loss of everything did was to make him thankful to the Lord that he had given him all the 
blessing that he now took away from him  (SKS 5, 121 / KW 5, 115f.)
Although Job goes through unimaginable suffering, losing his own children, he 
is presented as one who does not stop believing in God’s goodness. Thereafter, 
‘Kierkegaard’ moves into Job’s mind and lists what Job remembers in his thank-
fulness: his wealth, the happiness about his children, his recognition by other 
people, his life lived in justice, etc. (SKS 5, 121f. / KW 5, 116). Therefore, ‘Kier-
kegaard’ mentions, ‘his thankfulness was not forgetful’ (SKS 5, 122 / KW 5, 116), 
and adds afterwards a fundamental condition for a right understanding of Job’s 
stance to God: ‘indeed, it was as if it were not the Lord who took it away but Job 
who gave it back to him’ (SKS 5, 122 / KW 5, 116f.).
Hereby, three points are supposed to become clear. Firstly, life is seen under 
the condition of givenness. This points not only to the old question of onto-
logical contingency, of how man comes into this world,21 but also to the ques-
tion of how the being of each person is dependent on something that cannot 
be controlled. Secondly, any valuation of actual life is earnest and true only 
if life is seen under the condition and in the light of the past, an issue that is, 
in historical perspective, famously presented in St. Augustine’s Confessions. 
It points to an understanding of existence as a process of constant becoming 
and self-narration. Life is not only seen as a process of unpredictable chang-
ing but of searching for one’s own place in such conditioned life. Thirdly, 
everything in life, even life itself, is borrowed, so to say. If someone gets some-
thing good, it does not mean that he/she can claim such good as something 
that was necessarily earned. In the light of the questions of origin and change 
20 In the Four Upbuilding Discourses 1843, the first Discourse on Job is followed by two Dis-
courses, titled Every Good Gift and Every Perfect Gift Is from Above. Especially the third Discourse 
connects thankfulness with the aspect of receiving (from God): SKS 5, 152–8 / KW 5, 151–8. On the 
systematic relation between these Discourses, see Colton 2003; Glöckner 1998, 88f.
21 Most impressive and very influential on the philosophy of existence in the 20th century is 
the ‘Letter from October 11th’ in Repetition where the ‘Young Man’ adopts Job’s perspective on 
the contingency of life and translates it into a personal expression: ‘Where am I? […] What is the 
meaning of the world? Who tricked me into this whole thing and leaves me standing here? […]” 
(SKS 4, 68 / KW 6, 200).
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(ontological contingency), it points to an understanding of life as a process 
shaped by non-self-evidence. Especially that is pointed out by Job’s attitude to 
see his loss not as a taking-away but as a giving-back, a self-surrendered relation 
to life by living it freely as it happens and finding meaning by that. Therefore, 
thankfulness is not a sign of personal induration but of dealing with life with 
flexibility and adaptability. ‘Kierkegaard’ shows therewith, not just the pure fact 
of contingency as being important for any understanding and evaluation of life 
but also for the personal relation to life based on the intertwined parameters 
of the world, the particular person in this world, how the person understands 
himself in this world, and what grounds the world.
Now it is possible to understand Job’s thankfulness systematically. a) Thank-
fulness is an expression of a conscious and confirmed dependency on a gifting 
power. Simultaneously, to be thankful means to react freely.22 In thankfulness a 
person proves his/her freedom of self-determined action. b) Thankfulness is a 
way of looking at life as an undivided unity, seeing it as a fragile process in the 
way it emerges and appears, but always permeated by a gravity that holds life 
together. In Job’s case such gravity power is God. c) Thankfulness is a way of 
finding home in coming back to life itself. Although Job’s suffering makes him 
aware of his exposure to life, it guides him to thankfulness, an embracement of 
life, and to a world-, self-, and ground-relation. Job is then not simply accepting 
his fate, he confirms it with his attitude: becoming aware of what he had and has, 
and what he was and is.
Job finds himself before God (in a life which always has been grounded in 
God23). What characterizes Job’s self-relation and relation to God? ‘Kierkegaard’ 
notes:
On the day of sorrow, when everything was lost, he first of all thanked God, who gave it, 
deceived neither God nor himself, and even though everything had been shaken and over-
thrown, he remained what he was from the beginning, “honest and upright [redelig og 
oprigtig] before God”.  (SKS 5, 123 / KW 5, 118)
He did not conceal from himself that everything had been taken from him; therefore, the 
Lord, who had taken it away, remained in his upright soul. He did not evade the thought 
that it was lost; therefore his soul remained quiet until the Lord’s explanation again came 
to him and found his mind, like good earth, well cultivated in patience.  
 (SKS 5, 123 / KW 5, 118f.)
22 On thankfulness and freedom, see Henrich 1999, e.g. 164; and Schulz 2014a, 173–5.
23 ‘Or had the Lord actually changed? Or did the Lord not remain truly the same, just as Job did?’ 
(SKS 5, 126 / KW 5, 121f.).
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The very moment everything was taken away from him, he knew it was the Lord who had 
taken it away, and therefore in his loss he remained on good terms with the Lord, in his loss 
maintained intimacy with the Lord; he saw the Lord, and therefore he did not see despair. 
 (SKS 5, 125 / KW 5, 121)
So the Lord did not take everything away, for he did not take praise away from him, and he 
did not take away peace in the heart, the bold confidence in faith from which it proceeded, 
but intimacy with the Lord was still his as before, perhaps more inward [inderligere] than 
before, for now there was nothing at all in any way capable of drawing his thoughts away 
from it.  (SKS 5, 126 / KW 5, 122)
According to these quotations, Job’s relation to God is characterized by several exis-
tential conditions. Out of endurance, strong focus, and willingness (‘patience’),24 
the lived relation to God leads beside thankfulness to trust (‘intimacy’)25 and 
security (‘peace in heart’) experienced in intensity (‘inward’ [inderlig]). Given this 
existential perspective, God is fully recognized only if the mind is in ‘stillness’, 
pure, without doubt. On the one hand, ‘Kierkegaard’ hints at Job’s devotion as 
a state of mind in which God appears as ground without attribution, as uncate-
gorized wholeness and unity (just as life is seen in thankfulness). On the other 
hand, the pureness of mind shows an inner movement of emptying. A relation to 
God implies then actualized forms of transcendence, namely self-surrender and 
looking on the world as nothingness.26
However, Job is a real person, suffering, thanking, trusting, being part of this 
world. He surrenders to God by staying in this world as a concrete individual who 
lives a devotional relation to God. In such concreteness are limits involved, e.g. 
the limit of holding fast and keeping God in mind, especially when there is suffer-
ing which can be explained out of natural reasons.27 Therefore, the religious task 
is characterized as a constant confirmation and repetition of the relation to God: 
and Job ‘remained’ – as cited above – ‘what he was from the beginning, “honest 
and upright before God’”.
The terms ‘honest and upright’ [dan. redelig og oprigtig] are two existential attrib-
utes we can find throughout the whole oeuvre of Kierkegaard (see Schulz 2014b, 
434–9). Both characterize truthfulness, the existential condition for a successful 
24 On ‘patience’ and its conceptualization, see e.g. Engmann 2017, 523–51; Possen 2003.
25 The aspect of trust is also underlined in Glöckner 1998, 86.
26 ‘Kierkegaard’ underlines: ‘But the one who sees God has overcome the world, and therefore 
Job in his devout words has overcome the world […]’ (SKS 5, 125 / KW 5, 121).
27 See SKS 5, 123–5 / KW 5, 119f. ‘Kierkegaard’ mentions there coincidence, human violence, and 
natural forces as causal possibilities for Job’s suffering. But he also shows that no explanation 
gives a full satisfying answer for Job’s suffering. Every reason leads to new questions. Countering 
doubt by the unconditional, God, therein lies Job’s rationality. See also Deuser 2010, 82.
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Dasein. To be upright refers mainly to a lived practice of sincere self-transparency, 
while honesty refers mainly to lived integrity and probity (dan. redelighed). What 
kind of existential relations are systematically expressed by honesty and upright-
ness? While self-transparency and integrity imply a constant self-relation, probity 
involves a relation to someone else. Insofar as Job is acting ‘honest and upright’, 
‘Kierkegaard’ makes clear that Job’s relation to God is an intertwined relation of his 
self- and God-relation. Only when he knows who he is can he live a true relation 
to God, and vice versa: only in a lived relation to God does Job know himself truly.
That points to the mentioned existential-religious dependency. The own self 
needs be understood as a gift of God, thus Job is relating himself to finiteness 
and eternity, looking in faith and devotion to God and himself. However, if God 
revokes human control, then the person also has no full power and control over 
what he/she is. Therefore, full self-transparency is impossible and Job’s religious 
self-surrender can be seen as a reaction to such understanding (of givenness and 
contingency). He hands himself over to God and in that light he recognizes that he 
cannot fully understand himself: thus he understands himself. Such wilful sur-
render characterizes Job’s thankful and truthful devotion as a form of authentic-
ity, because his existential actuality appears as a wholehearted self-consistency 
in which he becomes a lived expression and articulation of his religious stance.
The inward (truthful) relation to himself and God has an impact on the 
form of Job’s life, which by itself has an impact on Job’s perception of his expe-
riences. Therefore, it is important to mention that suffering (out of contingency) 
does not have to be compensated,28 because it is seen as a condition of life that 
brings someone closer to him/herself and God. Of course, this does not imply 
that someone has to be thankful for his/her suffering. It is simply qualified as an 
implicit part of life that everybody has to deal with (adaptability). Furthermore, 
suffering is connoted as a (needed) measure of thankfulness. Only one who stays 
thankful in suffering is earnestly thankful. Here we can see a typical pattern in 
Kierkegaard’s thought: the coherence of personal attitude and stance is validated 
only in crisis. Crisis shows truthfulness. In Job’s case such uprightness opens up 
new perspectives on and positions to (i.e. also subjective attitudes and stances 
to) life and himself. That consists of: a) life is in every regard ambivalent and 
fundamentally non-self-evident; b) what God does is meaningful, even when it 
does not seem like this from a human perspective (the old question of theod-
icy emerges here, see Welz 2017); c) one cannot understand oneself thoroughly; 
28 Job is not overcoming suffering by thankfulness. That would imply to forgive God. But Job is 
presented without hubris. Some of the secondary literature claims such kind of compensation, 
see Colton 2003, 207 and 211; Glöckner 1998, 87; more generally: Schulz 2014a, 176.
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d) one’s actions show who one is. By implementing these insights into his life-
view, therein lies Job’s authenticity. Thankfulness as well as truthfulness are the 
most significant expressions for that.
By that, Job becomes an example for the human incapability of having access 
to a holistic, absolute, and eternal knowledge. At the same time, he also stands as 
an example for transforming this incapability into an existential striving and reli-
gious actuality in the form of self-surrender and an acceptance of one’s own pow-
erlessness. Therefore, he is one of the examples for edification in Kierkegaard’s 
oeuvre, as long as edification means ‘the annihilation in which the individual 
sets himself aside in order to find God […]’ (SKS 7, 510 / KW 12.1, 560). Facing 
the unconditional implies here, foremost, self-emptying and an acknowledged 
dependency and relationality of one’s self. Hence, edification is not character-
ized by personal achievement and self-assertion but by confirmed passivity as 
the ground-mode of religiousness. Job fulfils and actualizes then the function of 
a role model of confession: not to achieve anything by one’s own strength and to 
confirm therewith truly to be human (see also Glöckner 1998, 236).
Now we can finally draw a historical line to one pietistically influenced thinker 
who interprets Job in a manner close to Kierkegaard, Immanuel Kant.29 Although 
Kant contextualizes Job in the strict sense of theodicy, his focus lies on Job’s inward 
stance to God.30 That includes not only affection but above all an upright positioning 
to his incapability of understanding God. Kant uses in this context precisely the same 
terms as ‘Kierkegaard’ does, ‘Aufrichtigkeit’ and ‘Redlichkeit’ (Kant 1923, 133 and 
136f.; dan. oprigtighed og redelighed), which leads for Kant also to the subjective atti-
tude of being ‘wahrhaft’ (ibid., 135; ‘truthful’) with oneself. Furthermore, for Kant’s 
and ‘Kierkegaard’s’ Job devotion lies in the human incapability of understanding 
the proof of God’s wisdom. Both philosophers underline that devotion is based on 
an active mind and not on pure emphatic naivety. God has to be seen clearly as the 
non-understandable ground of all being. While ‘Kierkegaard’s’ Job finally mirrors 
such understanding of God existentially with a ‘still mind’ and  self-surrender 
(pureness), Kant’s Job holds on to a straight forwardly active mind in his relation 
to God. Job appears thereby as a figure who follows religiousness as ‘guten Lebens-
wandel’ (ibid., 134; ‘a good way of life’) concerning morality as the practical con-
dition of social action. (Such social dimension is only implied in ‘Kierkegaard’.31) 
29 See Kant 1923, 131–8. On Kant’s interpretation of Job, see Brachtendorf 2002, 80–3; Deuser 
2010, 78; Dieringer 2009, 120; Ricken 2003, 213–5; Schilling 2009, 78–81.
30 I use the expression ‘inward’ because Kant underlines the connection between faith and 
 introspection; see Kant 1923, 135f.
31 ‘[I]f you are honest [redelig] with yourself and love people, then you cannot wish to avoid Job 
[…]’ (SKS 5, 128 / KW 5, 123).
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 Simultaneously, Kant’s Job becomes by his mind-restriction also an example for 
authenticity. Kant mentions, ‘HIOB spricht, wie er denkt, und wie ihm zumute ist […]’ 
(ibid., 132; ‘Job speaks what he thinks and how he feels’). Job serves, in his upright-
ness, as an example for one’s own religious stance. Hence we can say Job is, not only 
for ‘Kierkegaard’ (at least in terms of thankfulness), but also for Kant, an example for 
proving human freedom (of action). Nevertheless, the particular focus on freedom is 
different. For ‘Kierkegaard’ the existential freedom lies in saying ‘yes’ to the depend-
ency on God, while Kant sees the freedom in saying ‘yes’ to the epistemic incapabil-
ity of understanding God.32
3.2 Appropriation and language
We can see clearly that the Discourse presents religiousness as a concrete practice 
and exercise of a subjective relation to God. That points to the existential aim of 
‘Kierkegaard’s’ Job-interpretation, the matter of existential appropriation.
One’s personal process of appropriation is on two levels, accompanied by 
actualized translation and transformation. On the one hand, the reader is sup-
posed to transport the poetic reality constructed by ‘Kierkegaard’ into his/her 
own actual life; on the other hand, he/she is supposed to change from a non-
God-related life into a devotional existence (and if the reader already actualizes 
devotion, then the Discourse offers a measure for proving one’s inward inten-
sity of devotion). By that, existential appropriation corresponds not only with an 
awareness of contingency but takes Job’s word as the necessary ground for one’s 
own religious actuality because, even when there is a peacefully lived life without 
extraordinary situations (SKS 5, 128 / KW 5, 124), it expresses an understanding of 
faith as inherent happiness in all possible (and inevitable) suffering (SKS 5, 127 / 
KW 5, 122). Job’s word prepares one for life.
However, to appropriate Job’s word includes ‘above all [to] learn from Job to 
be upright [oprigtig]33 with yourself […]’ (SKS 5, 127 / KW 5, 123). Thereby, ‘Kier-
kegaard’ intends appropriation as the existential process of reaching a new (reli-
gious) life-stance characterized by authenticity. Accordingly, we will now discuss 
the question how does ‘Kierkegaard’ guide the reader into a process of  existential 
32 Here we can see how the idea of enlightenment shines through Kant’s presentation of Job. 
Job knows that he is determined by something exterior (God), which thwarts of course the 
idea of enlightened autonomy. However, within this framework he holds on to the courage of 
using his mind, the duty of an enlightened person. Therefore, Kant’s Job presents more a proto- 
enlightened human being, on the way to and in the direction of modernity.
33 Hong translates ‘oprigtig’ as ‘honest’.
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appropriation? Here we have to consider that language is, for Kierkegaard, a 
central subject of thought; and the Discourse on Job is one important example of 
his investigations.34
The Discourse is, on the content level as well as on the performative level, an 
examination of Job’s word. ‘Kierkegaard’ underlines several times that it is ‘brief’ 
and it became through the centuries a ‘proverb’, because of its particular signif-
icance. Although Job’s word represents all the unimaginable situations when 
language cannot express suffering (see Shakespeare 2003, 102), ‘Kierkegaard’ 
does not present it simply as the first and last word of comfort (even though he 
mentions that: SKS 5, 127 / KW 5, 122). ‘Kierkegaard’ characterizes Job’s word 
as a formula which has to be interpreted, decoded, and translated into present 
time – with the aim to act upon it. Therefore, ‘Kierkegaard’ underlines, on the 
first page, Job’s ‘significance by no means consists in what he said but in what 
he did’ (SKS 5, 115 / KW 5, 109). Hence, the task is for ‘Kierkegaard’ to guide the 
reader to action (faith) by guiding him/her through Job’s word. The failure of the 
reader would be to hold on to the textual level since it is more important to see 
Job’s example shining through his word. ‘Kierkegaard’ notes therefore, ‘the state-
ment itself is not the guide, and Job’s significance consists not in his having said 
it but in his having acted upon it’ (SKS 5, 115 / KW 5, 109). Thereafter, appropri-
ation does not simply imply knowing Job’s word objectively; the reader should 
rather understand him/herself in Job’s word. By that, ‘Kierkegaard’ intends a 
de-intellectualization of Job’s word to lure out the religious ground in the reader’s 
soul. How does ‘Kierkegaard’ deal with language here and why is it helpful for the 
reader’s appropriation?
The first step ‘Kierkegaard’ takes is to demonstrate how language depends 
on the context. Job’s word would change its meaning if it was said by someone 
else, or in a different situation, or if Job did not exemplify the word by his 
own action (SKS 5, 116 / KW 5, 110). In the second step he demonstrates how 
understanding depends on perception. A child understands Job’s word differ-
ently than a young man or an old man, simply because the age of a person is 
connected to his/her life-experience which gives the used and interpreted lan-
guage different layers of meaning (SKS 5, 117f. / KW 5, 111f.). In the third step 
he demonstrates how meaning depends on usage.35 ‘Kierkegaard’ does this by 
interpreting Job’s word. He starts with the first part, ‘The Lord gave’, brings up 
the content of thankfulness, and then contrasts the meaning of it with oppo-
sites of thankfulness, namely unthankfulness, restlessness, craving, defiance, 
34 For subtle observations on Kierkegaard’s use of language, regarding the Upbuilding Discours-
es in general, see Shakespeare 2003.
35 On language and usage, see e.g. Pattison 2002, 141.
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self-deceit etc. (SKS 5, 122f. / KW 5, 117f.). Such contrasting shapes the meaning 
of thankfulness by describing it negatively. Taking up the second part, ‘and 
the Lord took away’, ‘Kierkegaard’ demonstrates the translation of the word 
into present language and knowledge by giving the reader of modern times 
(meaningful) explanations of Job’s suffering, namely coincidence, human vio-
lence, natural forces etc. (SKS 5, 124f. / KW 5, 119f.). In such deconstruction 
of Job’s word he sees an intellectualization that holds back from faith (SKS 5, 
125f. / KW 5, 120f.). Finally by taking up the third part, ‘Blessed be the name of 
the Lord!’, ‘Kierkegaard’ connects the meaning of Job’s word with the reader’s 
life-context, as a word that is valuable for religious appropriation (SKS 5, 127f. / 
KW 5, 123f.).
We can see, ‘Kierkegaard’ starts with general observations on language 
and shades gradually into the task of existential appropriation. By that means, 
language itself becomes part of existential actuality. Language is then nothing 
abstract anymore, it is usage in concrete communication. ‘Kierkegaard’ then 
obscures the communication with overlapping meanings36 (especially while 
interpreting Job’s proverb) by using a strategy of deconstruction. He empties 
the language of its common meaning that the reader would expect (see Colton 
2003, 212). While the Discourse progresses, Job’s word becomes more and more 
blurred and re-connoted (without dis-embedding it from its meaning as biblical 
proverb37). Equally, the language used opens up horizons. ‘Thankfulness’, for 
example, is taken out of its common usage and gets shaped by a religious context. 
The reader is thereby not only confronted with new meaning but with new per-
spectives on reality (see e.g. Pattison 2003, 88).
The strategy of distancing and re-building helps to shape the language as 
porous and to open it up to what lies beyond.38 That means in the present case to 
36 We can see that also in another aspect. Language is the connecting medium between speaker 
and addressee. Here, Job as well as ‘Kierkegaard’, and the reader too, can be interpreted as either 
speaker or addressee. Who speaks to whom then? Precisely this indistinctiveness opens up a 
space for overlapping perspectives and possibilities of meaning.
37 Of course, ‘Kierkegaard’ intends to keep the meaning of the proverb for the reader’s (reli-
gious) appropriation. That is also shown by ‘Kierkegaard’s’ re-traditionalization of biblical quo-
tations at the beginning of almost every Discourse. ‘Kierkegaard’ takes over the tradition but 
modifies the culturally established meaning by re-interpretation in order to open up new per-
spectives of thinking.
38 Although David Kangas comes from a different perspective, he emphasizes a similar point 
regarding the second and third Discourse of the Four Upbuilding Discourses 1843. While Kangas 
looks only briefly at the immanent relation between language and edification, he emphasizes 
that Kierkegaard’s use of ‘absolute figures’, which are neither metaphors nor concepts, ‘rup-
tures the immanent tendencies of language’ and opens up a space of ‘improper signification’. 
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see Job as a concrete human being. If the reader reaches a level of understanding 
that concrete experience is involved in Job’s word – understanding ‘Job’s wretch-
edness, […] how Job could say it’ (SKS 5, 118 / KW 5, 112) – then the path is paved for 
existential appropriation. Such a process of transcending oneself in the concrete 
existential position of Job can be successful, if the reader gets strongly involved in 
the Discourse. ‘Kierkegaard’s’ transformation of language is one important strat-
egy for that. By re-connoting language, he has to deal with the fragile balance 
between talking meaningfully and being misunderstood; hence opening up the 
common meaning of the language irritates the reader, which helps simultane-
ously to engage the reader’s attention.39
However, ‘Kierkegaard’ can only pave the path for the reader’s own engage-
ment. Therewith, what ‘Kierkegaard’ notes at the end is important: ‘the dis-
course, however, has not wanted to impose itself on anyone’ (SKS 5, 127 / KW 5, 
123). The reader needs to have interest and willingness to transform Job’s 
poetic reality into self-actuality. The existential process of becoming oneself 
(appropriation) implies then to be open to what one is confronted with (Job’s 
example) and to react upon it affirmatively. As long as that means starting 
a dialogue and vivid conversation with oneself, the reader of the Discourse 
shapes not only his/her self-understanding and life-view but reaches a new 
self-articulation.
Now we can see clearly how method and content are intertwined in the 
Discourse. The specific use of language mirrors and mediates appropriation as 
a process of re-connoting one’s own life. ‘Kierkegaard’s’ demonstration of how 
language becomes new anticipates appropriation and the immanent aim of new 
 Therewith, one’s personal stance of edification represents a process that ‘works […] against lan-
guage’, i.e. the individual recognizes in his/her religiousness the existentiality of meaning that is 
intended by the Discourses, a meaning that has to be discovered since it lies beyond the signifi-
cations of language. See Kangas 2000, 108–13, esp. 112f.
39 ‘Kierkegaard’ uses further strategies to involve the reader, e.g. asking questions of the reader 
(SKS 5, 126 / KW 5, 121f.); talking directly to the reader as ‘my listener’ (e.g. SKS 5, 127 / KW 5, 122); 
giving descriptive examples of concrete life-situations (SKS 5, 122f. and 127f. / KW 5, 117f. and 
123f.; see e.g. Lotti 2003, 142–6); talking in suggestive phrases like ‘But you agree with us that 
you can learn from Job […]” (SKS 5, 127 / KW 5, 123); using Job’s story and Job himself as a parable 
and (fictional) possibility of devotion (on the use and aim of parable in Kierkegaard, see Pur-
karthofer 2000, 153); using written language like spoken language and never the ‘I’ as instance 
of talk (see Pattison 2002, 147f.); using pictorial language, e.g. biblical metaphors (‘Kierkegaard’ 
uses for example the metaphor ‘worm of craving’, SKS 5, 122 / KW 5, 117. On pictorial language 
and metaphors in the Discourses, see e.g. Pattison 2002, 122–32; Purkarthofer 2000.), etc. All 
these techniques and strategies help to start a dialogue with the reader. The aim is to unmask 
existence in the light of Job’s example and to mirror it back into the reader’s ‘life of action’ (SKS 5, 
119 / KW 5, 114).
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self-articulation. Consequently, learning the new language (of the Discourse) 
 initiates existential appropriation and thereby the existential possibility of learn-
ing faith.40
4 Conclusion: religious individualization
Before we come up with a understanding of ‘religious individualization’ given 
by ‘Kierkegaard’s’ Discourse on Job, we will briefly summarize three important 
points.
Firstly, the human self is seen as fundamentally relational, embedded into 
communication, dependent on the external world and language. Especially the 
existential aim of (religious) self-appropriation shows the immanent tension of 
any self-actuality: being autonomous while depending on external mediation.
Secondly, one’s self-awareness is intertwined with the aspects of freedom 
and transformation. Reaching new subjective perspectives on and positions to 
oneself and life is the aim and the condition for truthful existing.
Thirdly, one’s self-relation and self-understanding is shaped by the experi-
ence of life’s impinging givenness: the contingency of life, and the dependency 
on unconditional conditions of life. Existential religiousness emphasizes such a 
life-view (in which the self is affected by life) since the religious individual looks 
at and beyond life’s emerging surface while it emphatically accepts one’s ines-
capable embeddedness into life as a meaningful enterprise that grounds in God.
What picture of individualization emerges now, if we consider Job as ‘Kier-
kegaard’s’ model for religiousness?
a) Looking at the content of the Discourse on Job, the personal process of indi-
vidualization lies in one’s confirmation/stabilization of one’s own religious-
ness by an enhanced focus on oneself correlating with an intense inward 
 relation to God. Job’s ‘thankfulness’ demonstrates that thoroughly as a 
process of becoming oneself before God.
b) Considering the existential aim of the text, individualization lies in the 
subjective process of re-thinking oneself, pointing furthermore to one’s 
40 Katrin Dickow underlines that too with her thesis that learning faith resembles the learning 
of a new language (Dickow 2009, 140–56). However, in opposition to language, faith cannot be 
learned with the helping hands of vocabulary books and grammatical rules. Faith does not de-
pend on a specific grammar which can be used to move faster into a devotional religiousness. It 
is an experiential discovery of God as unconditional ground. Consequently, an individual who 
knows what faith is and how it is systematically constructed does not necessarily have faith. Any 
intellectual effort opens up only the possibility of having faith concretely.
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 re-positioning in the world. As long as that also aims towards a religious way 
of existing, the Discourse on Job mediates a spiritual beginning (see also Lotti 
2003, 142).
Both aspects show that individualization is systematically embedded in an exis-
tential subjectivity, that identifies the awareness, acknowledgement, and con-
creteness of one’s lived self-relation, and by that also the existential conditions 
for one’s lived religiousness (see Concluding Unscientific Postscript, part two, 
section two, esp. chapter two).
For the purpose of this article it is important to mention now that existential 
appropriation is not only the condition but also a concrete articulation of reli-
gious individualization, because it expresses the actuality of one’s freedom to 
initiate an earnest self-discovery considering the possible religious foundation of 
one’s own being. For that, Job is literarily functionalized as a role model giving 
an existential image as guiding orientation for the reader’s mind (see also Harrits 
2000, 130); thus the process of self-appropriation lies on the shoulders of each 
individual,41 ‘my reader’, as ‘Kierkegaard’ pronounces in every preface of the 
Upbuilding Discourses.42
Individualization and appropriation both express a subjective process of 
emergence and translation. Considering that correlation we can mention further 
characteristics.
c) In Repetition, the ‘Young Man’ says, ‘If Job is a poetic character, if there never 
was any man who spoke this way, then I make his words my own and take 
upon myself the responsibility’ (SKS 4, 73 / KW 6, 205). That expresses precisely 
the existential aim for every (wilful) reader (of the Discourse): to take over the 
non-delegable responsibility for oneself (including one’s religiousness).
d) In self-appropriation/individualization the individual reaches concrete 
self-awareness. Taking Job as an example, the important point is to achieve 
41 In Unscientific Postscript, Johannes Climacus underlines how a religious (and ethical) role 
model opens up the possibility of existential engagement for the reader (SKS 7, 328f. / KW 12.1, 
359f.). Climacus exemplifies that by using Job in his function as role model for existential ap-
propriation of religiousness that gives the reader the possibility of concrete action which can 
be translated into self-actuality, i.e. Job offers actual self-possibilities. Hereby, Climacus is close 
to Kant’s understanding of the relation between a religious role model and one who follows the 
(lived) example of the role model in the Critique of Judgment. For a more specific discussion on 
Climacus’ explanation and its correlation to Kant, see Engmann 2017, 540f. (fn. 525).
42 Precisely this perspective on the first person singular is a necessary condition for any exis-
tential appropriation, namely the capability of grasping a given issue and accepting it as true or 
valid for one’s own existence (see Schulz 2012, 71).
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an awareness of being consciously present – in this time, at this place – and 
to handle with adaptability the given circumstances of life.
e) Job also stands for devotional self-surrender. ‘Kierkegaard’ hints at under-
standing that as a process of self-emptying, of one’s renunciation of time 
and temporality (see esp. SKS 5, 122f. / KW 5, 117f.). However, self-surrender 
appears in the end as a confirmation of one’s own being without illusion,43 
i.e. as truthful self-awareness.
f) Truthfulness includes the awareness of one’s exposure to life; religiously 
turned – one is nothing before God. Human existence means to live in the 
awareness of honest failure (Job’s ‘thankfulness’ confirms that). Accepting 
human insufficiency and passivity defines religious authenticity.
g) Such authenticity implicates a specific form of self-transgression which 
stands not for devotional self-annihilation but for a critical movement of 
mind, recognizing one’s weakness and limits.44 The particular religious point 
here is that the individual can reach a sublime state of being uplifted, under-
stood as being-entrust-with-God. For such edifying acknowledgement of 
God, Job’s ‘thankfulness’ shows that he overcomes the distance between the 
one who gives/takes (God) and the one who thanks (himself); he transcends 
his separation from God inwardly.
h) Most important is the acceptance of being dependent on the uncondi-
tional ground. That colours the idea of individualization fundamentally as 
non-self-assertion. Translating that dependency into self-actuality: therein 
lies the primary step to enter into a process of religious individualization. 
However, only religiousness confirms dependency emphatically. Out of that 
reciprocity, religious individualization appears as one’s freedom to become 
new by embracing one’s relativity (non-absoluteness).
43 ‘[A]nd above all learn from Job to become upright [oprigtig] with yourself so that you do not 
deceive yourself with imagined power [indbildt Kraft] […]’ (SKS 5, 127 / KW 5, 123).
44 In this regard, it is interesting that ‘Kierkegaard’s’ Discourse on Job re-traditionalizes nar-
rowly the biblical book on Job. In their subtext, both point out the problem of dealing with life 
and its conditions and that any question on life leads to contradictory answers and non-final 
justifications. On the biblical book, see Deuser 2010, 76.
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Anders Klostergaard Petersen
Suifaction: typological reflections  
on the evolution of the self
The human person, whose definition serves as the touchstone according to which good 
must be distinguished from evil, is considered as sacred, in what one might call the ritual 
sense of the word (sc. in the thinking of Kant and Rousseau – AKP). It has something of 
that transcendental majesty which the churches of all times have given to their Gods. It is 
conceived as being invested with that mysterious property which creates an empty space 
around holy objects, which keeps them away from profane contacts and which draws them 
away from ordinary life. And it is exactly this feature which induces the respect of which it is 
the object. Whoever makes an attempt on a man’s life, on a man’s liberty, on a man’s honour 
inspires us with a feeling of horror, in every way analogous to that which the believer expe-
riences when he sees his idol profaned. Such a morality is therefore not simply a hygienic 
discipline or a wise principle of economy. It is a religion of which man is, at the same time, 
both believer and God. But this religion is individualistic, since it has man as its object, and 
since man is, by definition, an individual. Indeed there is no system whose individualism 
is more uncompromising. Nowhere are the rights of man affirmed more energetically, since 
the individual is here placed on the level of sacrosanct objects; nowhere is he more jealously 
protected from external encroachments, whatever their source. 
(Lukes 1969, 21f; Durkheim 1898, 6)1
How can one approach a notoriously tantalising and yet intellectually challeng-
ing topic revolving around historical processes of religious individualisation? The 
question is not only inextricably related to the issue of modernity but it has also in 
conjunction with this topic been the subject of intense discussion among contem-
porary thinkers like Foucault, Habermas, Sorabji and Taylor. I shall not enter this 
philosophical conversation although my examination does have more than a tan-
gential relationship to it. My main concern lies in establishing a typology that will 
allow us to make some finer gradations in our talk about processes of individualis-
ation in the history of culture, religion included.2 In this way, I cast my nets wider 
1 For the historical background of the reflections in relation to the Dreyfuss Affair, see Lukes 
1969, 14–9, and 1972, 338–44. Following the editors’ wish, all non-English texts are provided 
in translation. References to the texts in their original language are given as additional page 
numbers.
2 I do not think it makes sense to speak about religion as a separate sphere independent from 
culture until modernity. Surely one can speak about religion – from a third order perspective – in 
relation to pre-modern cultures but it is on the premise that the conflation between culture and 
religion is acknowledged (cf. Petersen 2017c; 2017d). Although it has taken considerable time to 
make this insight general in scholarship, it is a basic tenet of Weber and Durkheim, see Weber 
1963, 546–54, and Durkheim 2007, 47.542.
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than the Erfurt project by examining historical processes of individualisation in 
general rather than confining the study to processes of religious individualisation 
only. I do this for two reasons. First, such an expansion is needed to answer the 
question of historical processes of religious individualisation specifically. Second, 
since throughout most of human evolution religion and culture have been overlap-
ping entities there is the more reason to expand the analytical horizon. To some 
my taxonomical ruminations may sound like a dull and old-fashioned enterprise 
founded on the idea of reifying particular epochs and geographical areas as con-
stituting important steppingstones on a long journey eventually culminating in 
Western modernity. Although I think of certain historical processes as archetypal 
and decisive for the subsequent developments, I do not assert typologies to mirror 
reality in any 1:1 relationship. Typologies are models that can be good to think 
with inasmuch as they provide us with a grid creating a plausible framework for 
understanding the world (here understood in Popper’s wider trichotomous sense 
of worlds). If we refrain from operating with some basic taxonomical distinctions 
in relation to selfhood, we shall continuously be haunted by elusive categories and 
misunderstandings such as those found in the discussions pertaining to the emer-
gence of the individual. The more so, since there is an obvious risk, as can also be 
seen from the scholarly literature on the subject, that all forms of selfhood come 
to be measured in relation to modern Western forms of individualisation which 
render them deficient in one way or the other.
Admittedly, my study has an ambitious longitudinal character, but to be able 
to speak about historical processes of individualisation we need to know what we 
are talking about. How is it possible to think about individualisation if there is no 
individual in the first place, or if we have not clarified the meaning of the adopted 
terms?3 And even more so, how can there be individualisation if there is no self? 
Some may arguably object that obviously there is a self (Searle 2001, 75). If that is 
the case, however, we should be able also to point to the emergence of this self, 
just as we should be able to delimit ourselves from periods and species for which 
we are not prepared to talk about it, let alone the individual.4 In other words, 
3 Despite several excellent essays, Arweiler and Möller 2008 is symptomatic of the problems 
arising from a lack of typological and definitional considerations, when taking up the subject of 
self-understanding. Apart from Gill’s essay (2008, 359–61), there is hardly anywhere in the book 
where the central concepts relating to self-understanding and individualisation are defined in 
relation to each other.
4 I want to develop the Durkheimian-Maussian argument of selfhood by taking into account 
not only what we today know about animals other than humans but also about possible differ-
ences with respect to self-awareness in the hominin lineage. In the Maussian understanding, 
self-awareness served as a default assumption for the examination (1938, 265).
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typological reflections on the evolution of the self and different manifestations of 
selfhood are inevitable if we want to pursue the question of historical processes 
of individualisation, let alone religious individualisation.5
Second, I risk my neck by arguing that a decisive change in self-awareness 
and, thereby, self-understanding took place in some elite segments at the transi-
tion from urban forms to kosmos types of religion: that which Bellah designated 
the change from archaic to Axial age forms of religion.6 I assert that this ideolog-
ical transformation driven by changed socio-material conditions in some distinct 
Eurasian cultures had a lasting effect on subsequent forms of individualisation, 
and that parallel changes can be documented in cultures outside this geographi-
cal area and time period, when comparable socio-material developments were at 
hand. Here I shall focus on one particularly prominent feature of kosmos religion, 
the element of suifaction as self-cultivation. I shall conclude by discussing two 
examples testifying to the change in suifaction, with respect to self-cultivation or 
training, that the kosmos religions gave rise to.
1 Some crucial problems
As implied by the term individual there never was and never will be a self who 
exemplifies an entire epoch or geographical area. Someone is always different 
from anyone, just as the particular one is different from everyone (Burridge 1979); 
but these differences aside there are patterns of meaning that the different selves 
belonging to different socio-cultural segments of society embody at different his-
torical epochs and geographical areas. It is to these patterns that I turn my atten-
tion by focusing on processes of selfhood rather than understanding it as denot-
ing a state or an acquisition (cf. Gordon 2015, 367). Suifaction is always a matter of 
flux rather than a possession one may obtain once and for all.
5 I agree with Mauss who asserted on the issue of individualisation that it is a subject belonging 
to social history. Thus Mauss in teasing apart the notion strove to examine it on the basis of 
laws, religions, habits, and social and intellectual structures (1938, 265). I agree with him that we 
should continue the work on notions of suifaction to obtain a better and more thorough under-
standing of the subject (1938, 281).
6 I now prefer to designate Axial age religions as kosmos forms of religion in order to detach the 
argument from its terminologically heavy reliance upon a Eurasian perspective and an idealist 
accentuation at the cost of socio-material preconditions for the distinctly cultural evolution. Due 
to constraints of space I shall have to exclude the important judicial and economic dimension 
of selfhood from the reflections. Obviously that will have to be taken into consideration in the 
future to achieve a more thorough and complete understanding.
188   Anders Klostergaard Petersen
Initially, however, I shall express a word of caution. As Martin has noted, 
there is an imminent risk that when searching for ideologically loaded phenom-
ena such as questions relating to the emergence of the individual and individual-
ism, one is likely to find them in those geographical areas and periods for which 
one has a preference (1994, 118f.). I do not argue that all we find is a matter of 
self-reflection only, but any attempt to search for historical processes of individu-
alisation inevitably involves the question of the origin of an ideologically particu-
larly moot phenomenon and hence should take the risk of presentism seriously 
(cf. de Certeau 1975, 40, 58).
In other words, searching for processes of individualisation, and the related 
issues of the emergence of the individual and individualism as a concomitant 
ideology requires methodological and theoretical rigour in order to avoid blunt 
self-reflection. Yet, it is analytically not only viable but also advantageous to 
operate with a continuum on which one may insert different caesurae enabling 
us to differentiate between diverse manifestations of selfhood, processes of indi-
vidualisation and related ideologies pertaining to the understanding of the self 
with respect to the wider society, one’s community and family. Other scholars 
have also emphasised the presentist ring related to the search for the emergence 
of the individual and, therefore also by necessity, processes of individualisation 
(cf. Pelling 1990, v). Personally, I do not think that presentism constitutes a 
problem per se, since it pertains to any historical study. As long as one succeeds 
in handling the problem in a cognisant and methodologically rigorous way, there 
is no reason to stumble at the presentist dimension. The more so, since it would 
be scholarly detrimental were we to dispose of raising some of the grander prob-
lems pertaining to cultural history. In fact, it is an important exercise insofar as it 
diminishes the risk of falling victim to prejudicial thinking by forcing us to tackle 
a patently thorny question. The enterprise becomes problematic only if the pre-
sentism is not counterweighted by a parallel acknowledgement of alterity. I do 
not have any hobby horses in calling things by different names as long as we can 
retain lucidity in the nomenclature adopted, and agree on what exactly we are 
in pursuit of in the worlds examined (cf. Petersen 2017c; 2017d). In saying this I 
do not expect that other members of the project will necessarily agree, let alone 
embrace, my taxonomical terminology,7 nor do I assert that it correlates with his-
torical realities in any direct way. I present it as a model only, the virtue of which 
should be judged on its ability to instigate a more thorough and thick thinking 
7 I agree with Gordon (2015), but contrary to him I think we need a typology to know what we 
are talking about.
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on the issue.8 In other words, the merit of the typology lies in its ability to offer a 
model that is good to think with and prevents us from making blunt generalisa-
tions thwarting out the nuances between different epochs, geographical areas, 
and diverse socio-cultural segments, while simultaneously acknowledging the 
existence of certain patterns in cultural history. I do not think it is possible to 
come to any agreement on a fixed point in history which may be said to constitute 
the dawn of the individual and the emergence of individualism. There may be 
different ways to approach the subject and to conceptualise it, as different con-
tributions written over the years as part of the Erfurt project vividly demonstrate. 
The merits of the diverse attempts should be assessed on their capacity to create a 
plausible overarching view projected onto history and relating to suifaction.
The key focus of the project is extremely valuable in this regard. By down-
grading the quest for the origin of (religious) individualism and the emergence 
of the individual in favour of casting light on historical processes of religious 
individualisation, the endeavour allows for greater versatility and pluriformity. It 
opens up for a more comprehensive view that enables us to operate with different 
processes of suifaction and, therefore, to apply the perspective to a variety of his-
torical eras and geographical areas. When, for instance, Burckhardt dated indi-
vidualism to the Italian Renaissance, this dating made excellent sense in light 
of his overall argument (1985, 93).9 At the same time, however, it makes sense 
from another perspective to argue that Burckhardt was wrong if by individualism 
one understands the situation epitomised by Kant and Rousseau and elegantly 
described by Durkheim in my preamble text (cf. Makari 2015, 267–97, 397–424). 
Admittedly, Kant does not directly touch upon individualism in his famous defi-
nition of enlightenment. In the subsequent tradition, however, his understand-
ing became closely connected with the birth of the individual and individual-
ism, since the latter came to designate the being of the autonomous enlightened 
citizen. Based on this view, it hardly makes sense to speak about the individual 
and individualism prior to Enlightenment.10 In the Beantwortung der Frage: Was 
Ist Aufklärung, Kant asserts that enlightenment consists in:
[…] human’s exodus from his self-imposed nonage (aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmün-
digkeit). Nonage is the incapacity to use one’s own understanding without another per-
son’s guidance. The nonage is self-imposed when its cause springs not from a lack of 
8 For the distinct function of models in relation to method and theory, see Jensen 2009.
9 Seidentrop 2014, 334–48, argues against Burckhardt by dating individualism and, hence, mo-
dernity to early liberalism of the 16th and 17th century, while also emphasising this tradition’s 
background in Christianity (cf. 51–110, 349–63).
10 The Enlightenment understanding also constitutes the point of departure for Dumont’s re-
flections 1983, 20.
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understanding but in indecisiveness and absence of courage to be guided by one’s own 
understanding not led by another. “Sapere aude!” “Have courage to use your own under-
standing!” therefore, is the adage of Enlightenment. 
(Berlinische Monatschrift 30. September 1784 – my translation)
If, conversely, one understands individualism as being intrinsically related to 
political autonomy it is difficult even to use the notion with respect to Enlighten-
ment, since neither Kant’s Prussia nor Rousseau’s France, or for that matter any 
other European state of the age, subscribed to a form of political independence 
of the individual citizens that we would acknowledge as identical with political 
autonomy. At the same time, one has to add that if one were to define individu-
alism along the lines of Kant’s understanding of the enlightened self, even today 
only few people would qualify as, in fact, being individuals – which points to 
another general problem in reflections on the issue. Each time we insert a caesura 
on the continuum eventually leading to stronger forms of individualism, we have 
to acknowledge that the changes did obviously not happen from one day to the 
next, nor were they extended to all members of society. It took a long time before 
what originally emerged as an elite phenomenon disseminated to wider segments 
of the population. And even when we grant the special role of social and cultural 
entrepreneurs in paving the way for new forms of selfhood,11 these entrepreneurs 
presumably also balkanised or oscillated between different representations of 
personhood embedded in different ideologies and ontologies.12
In my view, much of the critique voiced against an allegedly Western hegem-
onic self-eulogy of Western modernity as the breeding ground for the emergence 
of the individual with a concomitant ideology falters on the ground, when the 
modifications and nuances inherent in this view are taken into consideration. 
Based on such an understanding I also think it is presumptuous to deny that in 
the various Enlightenment movements there was a particularly strong emphasis 
placed on the concept of the individual. In fact, it makes sense to argue, along 
with Durkheim, Dumont, Taylor and a whole series of other notable thinkers, that 
in terms of intellectual and philosophical history, Enlightenment and, I would 
add, Romanticism in effect constituted the period during which the emergence 
of the individual understood as an autonomous being independent of all author-
ities other than one’s own reasoning and choices came into being supported by 
a concomitant ideology. This view does not imply that there could be no sense of 
11 For the role of social and cultural entrepreneurs in paving the way for transitions in intellec-
tual history in particular in relation to the Axial age, see Abrutyn 2014.
12 For the idea of balkanisation as crucial for examinations of ancient cultures, see Veyne 1983, 
although he uses the term exclusively in relation to religious representations.
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selfhood in preceding eras or that other non-Western cultures were void of rep-
resentations of selfhood. What the argument amounts to is the fact that Enlight-
enment in conjunction with Romanticism, in terms of intellectual history and 
philosophy, set a new frame of reference for how the self could be envisaged and 
understood in relation to an unconditional instance. But surely nothing in evo-
lution emerges ex nihilo. Any novelty is built on existing vestiges, since natural 
selection needs something to work with and ratchet onto. The same pertains to 
other selection mechanisms that we need to acknowledge if we want to give a 
plausible description of evolution relating to intentional agents such as Homo 
sapiens.13 This connects to both specifically biological and cultural evolution, 
as Bellah, with respect to the latter, emphasises in an epitome of his thinking: 
‘Nothing is ever lost,’ that is, nothing decisive (2005, 72, 83; 2011).
So let us return to the evolutionary issue and clarify how the question may 
be posed: What does it take for selfhood to come into existence? There is ongoing 
and vibrant research in the behavioural sciences and primatology that argues for 
extending the notion of selfhood also to include animals other than humans. On 
the background of such insights the taxonomical considerations pertaining to 
selfhood do not become less crucial. What exactly do we mean when using the 
concept of self, and how do we make the epistemological transition from self to 
individualisation? I agree with Dumont that although the emergence of the indi-
vidual surely represents a late Western phenomenon such a view does not take 
away the burden of examining the historical presuppositions which eventually 
led to the modern phenomena (see also Mauss 1938):
Thus when we speak of man as an individual, we designate two concepts at once: an 
object out there, and a value. Comparison obliges us to distinguish analytically these two 
aspects: one, the empirical subject of speech, thought, and will, the individual sample 
of mankind, as found in all societies; and, two, the independent, autonomous, and thus 
essentially nonsocial moral being, who carries out paramount values and is found primar-
ily in our modern ideology of man and society. From that point of view, there emerge two 
kinds of societies. Where the individual is a paramount value, I speak of individualism. In 
the opposite case, where the paramount value lies in society as a whole, I speak of holism 
(1986, 24; 1983, 34f.)14
Unlike Dumont and Taylor I am not particularly focused on what led to the modern 
Western notion of individuality and its undergirding ideology of individualism. 
I am more interested in different notions of selfhood and in how they evolved 
13 For an elaboration of the various selection mechanisms at play in the hominin lineage, see 
Turner et al. 2018.
14 Cf. also idem, 1983, 21 and Taylor 1989, 111–42.
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under particular circumstances. I do not think there was any unidirectional or 
irreversible movement from say antiquity to modernity stretching from Paul over 
Augustine and Luther to Kant and Kierkegaard. There were periods of increased 
individualisation in certain social segments, just as there have been eras of de- 
individualisation as well as continuous reciprocal processes of individualisation 
and de-individualisation. That said, however, I also assert that in hindsight one 
can point to important configurations in the thinking about and the instantia-
tion of the self that eventually manifested themselves in modern Western ide-
ologies about individualism, as exemplified in the lonely figure of Friedrich’s 
famous ‘Wanderer above the Mist’ painting or the anguished self of Kierkegaard’s 
 philosophical-theological oeuvre painstakingly making its own existential choice 
by being suspended above 70,000 fathoms of water (cf. Petersen 2004).
In line with these considerations, my concluding examples are meant to 
demonstrate how one particularly strong notion of selfhood emerged at a crucial 
time in history on the Eurasian continent at the transition from complex urban 
forms of religion to early kosmos types of religion.15 Yet, it would be wrong to date 
the emergence of the individual to this epoch, just as it would be fallacious to use 
this terminology with respect to the pre-modern period,16 but certainly one can, in 
some segments of these past Eurasian societies, see a much stronger concept of 
the self that begins to take form in difference to urban forms of religion (Petersen 
2013a): a transition that paved the way for a distinctly new type of religion that 
eventually became disseminated to much wider segments of the population. In 
this way, the examples demonstrate what may be gained by operating with a 
typology that, on the one hand, allows for terminological differences between dif-
ferent notions of selfhood diverging from each other by the degree of suifaction 
15 In Bellah’s terminology this transition is dubbed the movement from archaic to Axial age 
types of religion. I adhere to his general framework of evolutionary thinking about religion, but 
as noted in fn. 6, I have abandoned his terminology for two reasons. First, for comparative pur-
poses it is important to make it less dependent upon the Eurasian development and to make 
the nomenclature more stringent in terms of consistent terminology. Second, it is crucial to lay 
emphasis on the socio-material presuppositions for any cultural development to take place. 
Hence, I divide the history of religion into the following stages: 1) gatherer-hunters’ religion; 
semi-nomadic religion 2) early agricultural religion; complex agricultural religion; 3) early urban 
religion; complex urban religion; 4) early kosmos religion; complex kosmos religion; 5) early 
global religion; complex global religion. Often the forms of religion are overlapping, just as some 
of them have persisted unto the present although influenced by subsequent forms of religions.
16 See, for instance, Bonnet 2013, Graf 2013, and Woolf 2013. Whereas Bonnet rejects the term 
individualisation (49), Graf emphasises its limitations (132f.) for an appraisal of ancient religion, 
and Woolf underlines ‘how there were, properly speaking, neither individuals nor religions in 
Roman Antiquity’ (155). 
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involved, and, on the other hand, enables us to see other periods and geographical 
areas during which individualisation processes also came to the fore of attention.
2 A Durkheimian take on selfhood
As a point of departure, I find it hard to imagine a world inhabited by humans 
not capable of making a simple distinction between individual members and 
the group, but the same pertains to other apes. Evidently they are also capable 
of making differentiations between themselves, kin and other members of the 
group. And by the same reasoning, we should grant the same to our hominin 
predecessors. Self-recognition is found with many animals, but if that is so what 
exactly does it mean to speak about and conceptualise a self, and what are the 
differences between hominin self-recognition and that of other animals?
The difference between member and group is a key to understanding human 
culture and society in general. The self only attains reality by recognising how at 
one and the same time it constitutes a self by being different from the group and 
how its existence is contingent upon its group membership: a double movement 
that takes place between individual awareness and collective consciousness 
(Durkheim 2007, 344). Human beings are homines duplices suspended between 
culture and biology, group and self. We may push this Durkheimian understand-
ing further by taking recent evolutionary insights into consideration.
When our hominin predecessors left the arboreal areas for the open grass-
land sometime around 2, 5 million years ago, they had to undergo drastic changes 
to survive in their new habitat. As we can see from our ape cousins in the pan 
lineage, from which we split apart some 6.5 million years ago and with which we 
share almost 99 percent of our genes, they are, as other apes, basically nepotis-
tic, despotic and self-centred. Their form of social life consists in  fission-fusion 
groups and involves at the most a number of peers around 100. The same per-
tains to the other apes such as orangutans and gorillas, from the lineages of 
which we are further apart. In calling apes despotic and egoistic I do not mean 
to castigate them. Had our predecessors stayed in the woodlands, we would have 
been the same. It is the niche that we came to inhabit which, in interchange with 
our genome, changed our nature. To survive on the savannah it was crucial to 
engage in different forms of co-operation at a far more stable scale compared to 
the momentary types of collaboration that we find among other apes. It was deci-
sive to engage in alliances to protect oneself not only against predators but also 
to be able to sustain one’s life by getting access to prey (Bickerton 2009, 123f.). 
During these millions of years, natural selection worked in such a way as to result 
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in a number of remarkable changes in hominin anatomy crucial for its survival 
in a new biotope. Bipedalism was decisive in order to be able to view over the 
grass and detect predators in due time. Important changes on the upper arm 
and shoulder paved the way for hominins’ possibility of defending themselves 
against predators by standing at a safe distance and throwing stones at attacking 
animals, since the human shoulder came to work as a catapult (Turchin 2016, 
95–110). Bipedalism also led to enlargement of the larynx and elongation of the 
vocal cords that in turn led to greater versatility in sounds produced and, thereby, 
provided physical presuppositions for the later development of language.
In several books, Turner argues that with the move to the savannah the hominin 
palette of emotions was also considerably developed with respect to the four primary 
emotions of fear, anger, sadness and happiness, found also among the other apes 
(see, for example, Turner and Maryanski 2008, Turner et al. 2018). The development 
of secondary emotions like shame and guilt was important for an ape that, given the 
drastic change in environment, had to survive by means of stable alliances for which 
it was not genetically disposed (Turner et al. 2018; Henrich 2016; Turchin 2016). In 
fact, guilt and shame are necessary prerequisites for an animal to set up a strong 
sense of morality whereby the self is able to reflect on its ability or failure to comply 
with the norms of the group. In Turner’s view the emergence of religion should 
also be seen in this context. Ultimately it should be thought of as an evolutionary 
by-product resulting from the expansion of the hominin palette of emotions.17 Obvi-
ously religion constitutes an impure concept inasmuch as it is comprised of elements 
originating in different evolutionary contexts. We certainly find ritualised behaviour 
in a number of animals, but what we do not find among animals other than later 
hominins is symbolisation relating to religion.
Although religion originally constituted an evolutionary by-product relating 
to the previously mentioned expansion of the hominin palette of emotions, it came 
to have adaptive functions for group-bonding. Emotions are evanescent. The pos-
itive values pertaining to emotions for social cohesion are, given their ephemeral 
nature, difficult to maintain over time. At this point religion became crucial in pro-
viding the means for stabilising the group by bestowing upon it a more constant 
foundation for upholding positive emotions. By directing their emotions towards 
an emblem – symbolically and indexically signifying the fundamental values of 
the community – members of the group could maintain the positive emotions over 
time and hence strengthen the bonds uniting them into a coalition.
17 When talking about religion I use the term from a third order perspective. I can easily sub-
scribe to Jensen’s definition of religion as ‘cognitive and semantic networks comprising ideas, 
behaviours and institutions in relation to counter-intuitive superhuman agents, objects and pos-
its’ (2014, 8).
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In continuity of Durkheim, I think of religion as a storage battery in which the 
group − consisting of individual selves − invest positive emotions in the emblem 
on behalf of the collective and at the cost of the individuals (2007, 91, 337f., 342). 
But subsequent to the group gathering around the emblem and celebrating its 
fundamental values, the adherence and ongoing commitment to these ideals, 
indexically symbolised by the emblem, will inevitably fade away. Therefore, a 
new gathering or re-presentation of the cult is needed to reaffirm the significance 
of the emblem and the concomitant values:
Without symbols, moreover, social feelings could have only an unstable existence. Those 
feelings are very strong so long as men are assembled, mutually influencing one another, 
but when the gathering is over, they survive only in the form of memories that gradually 
dim and fade away if left to themselves. Since the group is no longer present and active, 
the individual temperaments quickly take over again. Wild passions that could unleash 
themselves in the midst of a crowd cool and die down once the crowd has dispersed, and 
individuals wonder with amazement how they could let themselves be carried so far out of 
character. But if the movements by which these feelings have been expressed eventually 
become inscribed on things that are durable, then they too become durable. These things 
keep bringing the feelings to individual minds and keep them perpetually aroused, just as 
would happen if the cause first called them forth was still acting. Thus, while emblematiz-
ing (l’emblématisme) is necessary if society is to become conscious of itself, so is it no less 
indispensable in perpetuating that consciousness. 
(Durkheim 1995, 232; 2007, 344f.)
The fundamental understanding of human beings as homines duplices whose 
existence is suspended between biology and culture puts religion into focus if 
humans are to establish and preserve culture and community (Durkheim 2007, 
119f., cf. 353). Durkheim’s perspicacious acknowledgement of the frailty of com-
munity and culture is an important counterweight to a long tradition of  thinking 
in the humanities and social sciences about culture as an instrument of sup-
pression. Far from understanding culture as a means to exert power, although 
certainly acknowledging this dimension as well, Durkheim emphasised the 
vulnerability of culture and society and pointed to religion as the means to 
establish and uphold community. By virtue of being as a storage battery into 
which the group invests its positive emotions, religion can, within a split 
second, also evolve into a nasty phenomenon if the community −  dependent 
on its socio-material situation  − instead invests negative emotions into the 
battery. Thus, the positive effects of religion may by the same token be turned 
180 degrees around and develop into something repugnant, as history patently 
demonstrates. I underline this point in order not to be understood to argue for 
the positive effects of religion only. Similarly, I do not as indicated argue that 
religion appeared ab ovo.
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Religion could ratchet onto ritualised behaviour found among numerous 
animals (for the ratchet effect, see Tomasello 1999; 2009; 2016). With the emer-
gence of religion, however, the way was paved for the introduction of a reward and 
punishment system implemented within the group and imposed on its individual 
members to diminish the risks of free-riding, cheating and betrayal in the group 
(Haidt 2012, 285–318). Inasmuch as humans – similar to their ape cousins − do 
not have any strong or innate social proclivity to engage in group and community, 
their groupishness must be culturally inculcated upon them. Yet, it is astound-
ing to see what has happened in terms of groupishness within less than 10,000 
years from the transition from gatherer-hunter forms of living to early agricultural 
forms of life. We have exponentially enhanced our social living to the extent of 
modern megalopoleis like Seoul, with 25 million people, or the North-East Amer-
ican coast with almost 65 million people. How could such an increasingly drastic 
development occur, and what are the implications of this for the understanding 
of selfhood? An important driver in this evolution has been religion, since evolu-
tionarily it has allowed self-centred despotic apes to become social (Turner et al. 
2018). Contrary to bees and ants that are bio-programmed for their sociality and 
hence eusocial, the hominin lineage is ultrasocial (Turchin 2016, 14f.). It is by 
means of culture and religion that the ape can be tamed and turned into an ultra-
social being, deliberately willing to give up some of its natural self-insistence.
3 Hominin vs. other animal forms of selfhood
The difference between humans and other animals does not lie in humans’ pos-
session of culture understood as socially transmitted learning. There is nothing 
innate about Japanese macaque monkeys washing sand from their potatoes before 
eating them. It is not something for which they have a special bio-programmer. 
They do it because they have learned it by imitating others in the group.18 Sim-
ilarly, when chimpanzees succeed in obtaining food by using different tools for 
gaining access to termite mounds, they are capable of this by cultural capacity. 
There is, however, one crucial difference between hominin and hominid culture. 
The utensils used for getting access to termite mounds remain the same over 
time. They are never refined. But if one takes a look at the history of, for instance, 
the fork and knife during the past two centuries, it is obvious how they have 
18 Imitation is one of the most important elements in dissemination of social learning, and it 
cannot be confined to human beings only, but it takes on special forms in the context of hominin 
evolution, see Laland 2017, 150–74.
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 continuously undergone refinement in terms of increasing complexity. This dis-
tinction is significant. Many animals possess culture, from corvids to apes, from 
capuchin monkeys to porpoises; but they do not have cumulative culture which is 
the hallmark of hominin evolution (Henrich 2016, 56f., 286–95; Laland 2017, 8–11, 
183–6). As I have already said there is now abundant evidence that a number of 
animals, apart from having culture, also have a sense of selfhood – wherefore 
self- recognition cannot be confined to the hominin lineage only. Goodall argues 
with respect to chimpanzees that:
They are capable of intellectual performances that we once thought unique to ourselves, 
such as recognition of self, abstraction and generalization, cross modal transfer of infor-
mation, and theory of mind. They have a sense of humor […] Perhaps, after all, it is not 
so ridiculous to speculate as to whether chimpanzees might show precursors of religious 
behaviors. In fact, it seems quite possible that they do.  (2005, 275)19
Others have argued along the same lines that something similar may be found 
with elephants, parrots, corvids and whales (de Waal 2016; Lents 2016). The 
premise for the argument has often been Darwin’s famous claim that: ‘Neverthe-
less the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, 
certainly is one of degree and not of kind’ (1936, 494). Whatever this amounts to, 
it makes it even more important to have a clear terminology when we speak about 
selfhood, self-awareness and individualisation. It is at this point that I embark on 
my typological considerations.
Unlike Waal, Goodall, Lents and a great many other primatologists and 
natural scientists, I am sceptical towards thinking about natural selection in 
terms of a unidirectional movement. I endorse the gene-culture  coevolution 
 perspective as the most plausible way for thinking about evolution. Any species 
needs to be understood on the background of its distinct niche.20 The hominin 
lineage is special by virtue of the role that culture has come to play in the gene- 
culture evolution relationship. Laland and Henrich among others in  different 
ways argue that hominin evolution is characterised by cultural evolution gaining 
the upper hand in the gene-culture relationship in such a way that it eventually 
became the primary driver in the hominin evolution (Henrich 2016, 57; Laland 
2017, 234, 318).21
19 For strongly ritualised behaviour among chimpanzees, see Kühl et al. 2016.
20 For niche construction theory and its impact for how we should understand evolution, see in 
particular Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman 2003, Bickerton 2009 and Laland 2017.
21 Whereas Henrich dates this constellation to around two million years ago, Laland asserts 
that it is a relatively new situation occurring at the transition from the gatherer-hunters’ form 
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An important part of Laland’s argument is the appearance of protolanguage 
and thus a provisional form of symbolic thinking already 1.7 million years ago 
(2017, 175–207, and in particular 205; cf. Bickerton 2003, 213–21). Most scholars 
date the emergence of symbolic competence to around 450,000 years ago, so it 
makes a huge difference that Laland and Bickerton locate it another 1.2 million 
years back in time at the transitional stage from Oldowan culture, which remained 
the same over almost a million years, to the emergence of Acheulian hand axes 
signifying an important refinement in tool making. Whether Bickerton is right 
that it was the need for power scavenging that triggered the emergence of pro-
tolanguage or, as in Laland’s argument, it was the need for high fidelity teaching 
that prompted it needs not concern us here. The crucial point is the appearance 
of symbolic communication. This evolutionary leap had decisive influence on the 
level of self-awareness that we can plausibly impute to our distant predecessors 
(cf. Peirce 1932, 186).
There is a great variety of different forms of self-recognition among animals 
other than humans,22 but the hominin capacity for symbolic language and, 
thus, capacity for self-awareness cannot be underestimated in terms of making 
a decisive evolutionary difference. Apes that have self-recognition are by means 
of indexical communication confined to the here and now of sign transmission. 
Only species that have symbolic competence can transcend the hic et nunc of 
present communication, wherefore we also attribute to them alone the ability 
of conceptual thinking. The possession of concepts allows the hominin species 
to communicate about things that are not immediately present in their environ-
ment, whether spatial or temporal. As demonstrated by Rappaport, symbolic 
competence also involves a number of problems such as the risk of being exposed 
to lying – other animals can be very sly in deception, but they cannot lie since 
it presupposes symbolic communication (Rappaport 1999, 11–7, 415f.). My basic 
argument is that we may well attribute to a number of animals the ability to rec-
ognise themselves as different from other animals, kin and the remaining group, 
but it does not make sense to accord self-awareness to any other animal but the 
hominin lineage of the last 1.7 million years. It takes a concept of the self in dis-
tinction from not only other selves, but also the group, before we can speak about 
a genuine form of selfhood.
of culture to early agriculture around 10.000 BCE. Laland argues that the situation from around 
four to two million years ago to the appearance of early agriculture was characterised by equal 
determinacy in the gene-culture relationship.
22 If, for instance, one amputates an arm from an octopus the octopus will not eat the arm. Had 
the arm been one from another octopus it would have eaten it. The example may appear exces-
sive, but it presupposes that a sense of self-recognition needs to be attributed to the octopus.
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4  Typological reflections on the evolution of the 
self: from self-mirroring to individualism
Having argued for a first crucial distinction between self-recognition, found in 
a variety of animals, and self-awareness as distinct to the hominin lineage from 
around 1.7 million years ago, it makes sense to search for further leaps. We know 
that some animals are capable of recognising themselves in a mirror, hence 
self-mirroring, but that involves neither self-awareness nor suifaction. It takes 
a mindful species, self-conscious of its choices, to engage in stronger forms of 
self-recognition. Obviously this change did not happen all at once. On the con-
trary, it was a long evolutionary transition from protolanguage to a more devel-
oped form of language that occurred sometime during 200,000 to 100,000 BCE. 
The existence of cave paintings from the latter part of 100,000 BCE and the use 
of ochre and pearls already around 100,000 BCE demonstrates the spread of con-
ceptual thinking with ramifications of suifaction and, thus, a stronger sense of 
self-awareness. When humans can be portrayed in hunting scenes and human 
ornamentation can be documented, this surely testifies to incipient processes of 
selfhood.
Similarly important changes in self-understanding occurred at the transition 
from gatherer-hunters’ forms of culture to early forms of agriculture with the ear-
liest types of semi/-permanent habitations. The sharing of land and a sense of 
belonging to one particular place will inevitably have had consequences for one’s 
notion of selfhood in relation to other members of the group, just as inheritance 
of land through kinship strengthened one’s sense of belonging to a smaller group 
within the community. Unfortunately we do not know much about this transition 
given the lack of written sources. 
The next important change took place around 6000 years ago with the ear-
liest forms of urban culture emerging in the Near Orient. The figure of the divine 
king and, from the invention of writing, textual instantiations of him points to a 
shift in understanding with respect to at least one prominent self. Although this 
figure was seen as different from the remaining group by his distinct relation to 
the divine, he was not understood as constituting an independent self. On the 
contrary, it was his double nature as divine and human that gave him a specific 
role or function. The urban forms of religion gave rise to new forms of individ-
uation that called for an enhanced awareness of differences between society at 
large, one’s local community, kin-group and self. The basic premise, however, of 
such religions is the maintenance of a proper balance between the divine and the 
human, a culturally imposed fundamental ontological differentiation that serves 
to keep the two spheres at a proper distance from each other. Crises occur in the 
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form of blessings withheld from humans (e.g. wine, fat oil, abundant harvest, 
numerous descendants), when the proper distance is not observed and the two 
realms approach each other too closely. At the vertical axis heaven and earth 
should be kept apart, just as the temple institution at the horizontal spatial axis 
functioned to retain proper distance between the realms.
In Israelite religion, for instance, the high priest once a year would enter the 
holy of holies to cleanse it from all the ontological impurity brought upon it by 
humans during the previous year with the aim in mind to have the deity return to 
his sacred abode. 
I shall not dwell on this transition to complex urban culture, since in my view 
it did not lead to any major change in the understanding of selfhood: a fact that 
may be inferred from the ideology at stake. What Smith aptly dubbed as the loc-
ative type of religion characteristic of one particularly prominent strand of reli-
gion in the ancient Mediterranean religions is exactly this complex urban form of 
religion (cf. Smith 1990, 121f.). Smith failed, though, to see how it was the divine 
king only who was assigned a distinct role, in some of these forms of religion, to 
be incorporated into and, eventually, translocated to the divine world, and how 
all other humans were enjoined to remain at their proper place within the cosmic 
order. These religions were all concerned with putting man, and only secondarily 
woman, in their proper place and even more importantly safeguarding that they 
remained there. Such an ideology is not likely to have promoted a strengthening 
in suifaction. Therefore, I shall proceed to the grand changes that took place in 
elite segments in some Eurasian societies during the period from the sixth to the 
third century BCE. These transitions were contemporaneous with the complex 
urban type of religion, but they also pointed forward to a new form of religion that 
would increasingly become disseminated to wider segments of populations and 
show itself more adaptive to far larger communities, hence my term early kosmos 
forms of religion.23 It is the emergence of this form of religion that has often been 
dubbed the Axial age transformation of religion (Bellah 2011a). I consider this 
transition – comparable to Smith’s category of utopian forms of religion − crucial 
also in terms of paving the way for an intensified understanding of the self and 
a concomitant ideology of selfhood. I have previously characterised this transi-
tion by 12 points that, to a greater or lesser extent dependent upon the particular 
culture in question, highlight some of the main changes with respect to the con-
temporaneous urban religion (Petersen 2017a; 2017b; Turner et al. 2018). Here I 
23 Norenzayan (2015) is also concerned with this change, but contrary to my argument he re-
verses the order of events. He asserts that ‘big gods’ were conducive to larger societies, whereas 
I argue that ‘big gods’ were a result of changed infrastructure, enhanced density in population, 
and a growth in urbanisation with concomitant increased labour division.
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shall only highlight five points of special importance for a different concept of 
the self:
(1) An increased form of self-reflexivity as a ‘thinking about thinking’ in these 
forms of religion is closely related to a foundational epistemology expressed 
in spatial categories, whereby differences between opposing views are pro-
jected onto a vertical axis and expressed as a contrast between the heavenly 
over and against the mundane perspective. This dualistic staging is similarly 
projected onto an axis of depth that implies a disparity between interiority 
and exteriority, soul and body (cf. Petersen 2015, 71–6, 89);
(2) These forms of religion are distinguished from comprehensive urban reli-
gions by loosening the ontological differences between gods and humans. 
Therefore, they encourage adherents to imitate the godhead to such an extent 
that eventually the followers are thought to transcend the ontological differ-
ence between divine and human (cf. Petersen 2013b);
(3) They place emphasis on the element of askēsis, understood in the basic 
Greek sense of training. By engaging in forms of self-exercises, the practi-
tioners undergo different forms of privations relating to what they consider 
false values while striving to inculcate the principles of their new worldview 
by embodying them in a continuous form of self-cultivation (cf. Hadot 1995; 
2001; Sloterdijk 2009; Petersen 2013b);
(4) Early kosmos types of religion exemplify a shift in emphasis from the ritual 
observances of traditional religious sacrifices to various forms of inner atti-
tudes as a prerequisite for proper cultic observance. This is sometimes called 
the displacement of ritual by moral stance. It is not traditional cult per se 
that is criticised. What is called for is a moral attitude reflecting the new 
worldview as a presupposition for observing rituals in the proper manner (cf. 
Petersen 2017a);
(5) The emergence of this form of religion characteristically occurs in a situation 
of considerable social competition involving religious entrepreneurs’ disso-
ciation from the ruling elite − whether political or religious or both − and 
defiance against traditional kinship structures and political power as well as 
a plea for greater equality and social justice (cf. Abrutyn 2014; 2015);
I do not argue that these five characteristics were all present in the same way in, 
for example, the Upanishad literature, early Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, 
Platonic philosophy, and Deuteronomian theology; but they were permeating all 
these different kosmos forms of religion to greater or lesser extents. In pointing to 
the early kosmos religions as a crucial stepping stone for the later developments I 
do not argue for a unidirectional, irreversible progressive movement. Subsequent 
processes within the individual religions and cultures were characterised by both 
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greater embracement of urban types of religion and correspondingly in other 
strands detachment from them by enhanced emphasis on selfhood, but I assert 
that they could not avoid relating to what had preceded them in a determina-
tive ideological way (Petersen 2018). We see this in a variety of religions in which 
there were periods with increased individualisation and de- individualisation, 
just as the two processes often went hand in hand in rivalries and contestations 
between different groups that within the individual cultures accentuated individ-
ualisation at the cost of de-individualisation or vice-versa. Such processes even-
tually gave rise to the modern Western individual (as well as all other cultures 
influenced by this tradition) and an undergirding ideology of individualism sub-
sequent to Enlightenment and Romanticism.
5  Two examples of suifaction illustrating the shift 
from urban to kosmos forms of religion
To avoid being accused of mere theoretical speculation, I now turn to two histor-
ical cases to illuminate my point of the kosmos forms of religion as particularly 
relevant for the discussion of selfhood and processes of individualisation in cul-
tural history. The first example comes from Deuteronomy and is representative 
of Deuteronomian theology.24 It is particularly interesting because it represents 
an intermediary stage between an urban and a kosmos type of religion. We do 
not know its precise date of origin, but a presumable date sometime around the 
middle of the first millennium BCE is likely. The second example comes from a 
late stage in Stoicism, from Epictetus and Seneca, and serves to illustrate a more 
complex form of kosmos religion, but certainly one the contours of which may 
be seen in Deuteronomy, hence my choice of empirical material comes from two 
different religio-cultural contexts in terms of time and space.
Deuteronomian theology is not confined to the Book of Deuteronomy, and 
was determinative for the shaping of the mythic narrative depicting Israel’s 
history until the Babylonian exile as found in Joshua, Judges, 1 and 2 Samuel and 
1 and 2 Kings. Similarly, it has exerted important influence on the shaping of what 
eventually became the Pentateuch, just as it had impact on other writings such 
as parts of the prophetic literature. I shall not delve into these issues, but will 
24 For the general historical discussion of Deuteronomy and Deuteronomian theology, see Otto 
2007, 137–46, and Kratz 2013 and 2015, 53f., 115–20. I am indebted to Prof. Jensen for conversa-
tions on the Axial nature of Deuteronomy and deuteronomian religion as well as Jensen 2017.
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focus on suifaction as it appears in the Book of Deuteronomy– regardless of its 
close connection to the Book of Joshua − and concentrate on the Book in its final 
redactional form dating sometime during the fourth to the early third century BCE 
(cf. Otto 2013, 211; Collins 2017, 39–41).
At the same time as Deuteronomy exemplifies the kosmos type of religion, it 
also testifies to a great many features characteristic of the urban form of religion. 
A good life consists in the blessings sent by YHWH to his people in the form of 
fat oil, good wine, crops, abundant offspring etc. Israel will continue to receive 
YHWH’s blessings as long as it remembers its contractual lord and does not 
replace him with other gods/idols. Contrary to the priestly theology of notably 
Leviticus, the cult with the temple and the different regulations relating to it 
are not the prime focus of Deuteronomy. YHWH’s name is present in the temple 
(14:23), but, contrary to the core idea of the priestly theology, YHWH is not under-
stood himself to inhabit the temple. YHWH is in heaven (26:15). In fact, Otto has 
argued that the priestly theology may be seen as a counter-programme to the Deu-
teronomian religion (234). Israelites should visit the temple and partake in the 
cult by bringing sacrifices at the yearly pilgrim feasts;25 but Deuteronomy is not 
particularly concerned with the temple and its cult. The focus lies on the land 
that Israel inherited from YHWH as its special property. In this way, Deuteronomy 
together with Deuteronomian theology bears witness to a classic urban form of 
religion founded on the principle of ethnicity. Israel constitutes an ethnic enclave 
in a world surrounded by foreign people and other gods – whether they be extra- 
or simply disloyal intra-kin people (cf. Collins 2017, 42) − and Israel will remain 
a divine reserve only by worshipping YHWH who has granted Israel its distinct 
piece of land.
Contrary to all these elements that inevitably connect Deuteronomian the-
ology with an urban form of religion, there are features in Deuteronomy that 
point in another direction. Moses enjoins Israel to follow the statutes (ʾl-hḥqym) 
and judgements (wʾl-hmšpṭym) which he teaches them (4:1a). They shall observe 
them that they may live, enter and possess the land which YHWH has given them 
(4:1b). Therefore, they are also inculcated not to add to or take away from the 
commands (mṣût) given by YHWH (4:2). The statutes and judgements imposed 
on Israel by YHWH and Moses constitute their wisdom (ḥkmtcm) and under-
standing (byntcm) before all other people who will thereby come to acknowledge 
Israel as being in possession of these qualities (4:6). In fact, Israel is distinct and 
25 Presumably the cult of worship is located at Sichem and not Jerusalem, which is not even 
mentioned in the book. It is only due to the larger and later framework of Pentateuchal theology 
that Jerusalem comes to be identified with the place of cultic worship in Deut.
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privileged when compared with all other nations by virtue of the fact that it has 
YHWH so near to it (4:7), and that it has been granted ‘such statutes (ḥkm) and 
righteous ordinances (wmšpṭym ṣdyqm) as all this law (htôrh hzʾt) which I set 
before you this day’ (4:8).
Demonstrably Torah is a polyvalent term, since by tradition it refers to the 
Pentateuch, sometimes the entire Tanak, as well as the full complex of rules 
and ordinances which YHWH according to the Pentateuch gave the Israelites at 
Mount Sinai/Horeb (cf. Cohen 1987, 182–5, and more generally Hayes 2015). Here, 
however, Torah is a common denotation for the authority attributed to various 
norms, regulations, ordinances, injunctions and prohibitions understood to orig-
inate in YHWH’s bestowal of the Law on Israel.
The text, however, does not only speak in the second person plural but occa-
sionally makes leaps in its discourse to second person singular as, for example, 
in 4:9: ‘Only take heed to yourself (hšmr), and diligently keep yourself (wšmr), lest 
you forget (tškḥ) the things your eyes have seen, and lest they depart from your 
heart all the days of your life. And teach (whôdʿtm) them to your children and your 
grandchildren.’ Here Israel is not only addressed as a collective entity but every 
Israelite man is personally obliged to preserve the continuous remembrance of 
YHWH’s deeds in order to prevent them from falling into oblivion. We find the 
same transition in discourse in the important chapter 6, containing the Shema, 
in which every Israelite man is enjoined to have the words of YHWH in his heart 
(6:6). He shall teach them diligently to his children, and shall talk of them, when 
he sits in his house, when he walks on his way, when he lies down and when he 
rises up (6:7). He shall bind them as a sign (lʾôt) on his hand and they shall be as 
frontlets between his eyes (6:8), just as he shall write them upon his door-posts of 
his house and his gates (6:9). This unremitting emphasis placed on the Torah as 
a set of regulations to be continuously remembered involves an incessant train-
ing program for every Israelite man who is called to unceasingly think of YHWH 
and his deeds and to inculcate this remembrance in his household. Deuteronomy 
presents itself in this way as ‘the Book of the Law’ (bsphr htôrh hzh) containing 
YHWH’s commandments and statutes (mṣôtyw wḥqtyw) (30:10a). Every Israelite 
man should turn to YHWH as his god with all his heart and soul (30:10b), and 
make sure that the word of God is in his mouth and in his heart so that he may 
perform it (30:14).
I do not argue that Deuteronomy and Deuteronomian theology represent a 
full-blown kosmos form of religion. It remains deeply enmeshed in the urban type 
of religion. What I do claim, though, is that this theology testifies to a process of 
increasing suifaction that would eventually let go of its dependence upon those 
features of religion belonging to the urban type. The more the emphasis is placed 
on the self and its need for self-cultivation in order to pay heed to the Torah of 
Suifaction: typological reflections on the evolution of the self   205
YHWH, the less one needs the ethnic group (Israel) and the land (the territory) 
for the overall worldview. By Deuteronomy’s strong emphasis on Israel’s exclu-
sive allegiance to YHWH and the role of the self unremittingly to instill within 
itself its specific obligation and faithfulness to YHWH, the self comes to the fore 
of religious attention. By virtue of such an understanding the religious commu-
nity is increasingly transformed from an ethnic entity into a community of shared 
commitment to YHWH (cf. Gerstenberger 2002, 207–72; Crouch 2014, 109). Deu-
teronomy reflects a high degree of equality among YHWH-abiding Israelite males 
who form a ‘theocratic’ community on the basis of their commitment to YHWH. 
They are accountable to YHWH only and do not have any Davidic king interfer-
ing between them and YHWH (cf. Markl 2012, 301; Otto 2013, 226). In this way, 
the book represents a form of thinking that vacillates between processes of ind-
vidualisation and de-indivdualisation. The former points forward towards more 
complex forms of kosmos religion which by exclusive focus on  self-cultivation 
may eventually abandon its determinative dependence upon principles of eth-
nicity, the ontological difference between deity and man, and concomitant 
‘mundane’ blessings sent by YHWH to Israel. The latter points backwards in time 
to the urban type of religion in contrast to the cosmos form. It accentuates those 
features which religions focused on self-cultivation, self-mastery and continuous 
self-training in the end cast off.
All differences aside, I think we may see Stoicism as one distinct manifes-
tation of kosmos religion which – with all the necessary reservations in terms 
of dissimilarities between archaic Greek and Israelite religion − had abandoned 
such elements that gave Deuteronomian theology an ambivalent character, ulti-
mately leaving the latter to oscillate between the urban and the kosmos types of 
religion.26 In Stoicism the kosmos form of religion appears at full throttle, but 
here I confine myself to the element of suifaction and look upon it in terms of 
 self-cultivation specifically as it appears in Epictetus and in Seneca’s Letters. 
There are obvious differences between these two corpora of texts which I shall 
not dwell upon. It suffices to say that they are, ceteris paribus, training programs 
urged upon their respective intended addressees with the aim in mind to have 
them inculcate and follow a Stoic way of life.
Contrary to the urban type of religion, these texts have abandoned the idea 
of ethnicity as foundational for religious belonging, the notion of an ontological 
difference as fundamental for upholding the proper balance between the divine 
and the human world, and the understanding of ‘worldly’ blessings as the divine 
26 For ancient philosophy as representative of religion, from the third order perspective, see 
Petersen 2017a; 2017b.
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boons par excellence. The philosopher does not belong to any particular ethnicity 
in this world, but is a kosmopolitēs, a man belonging to the entire universe (cf. 
Epictetus 1.9.2, 1.9.5, 2.10.3). As both Epictetus and Seneca make copiously clear, 
the philosopher in particular has kinship with God (cf. Seneca 18.12f., 91, 123.16; 
Epictetus 1.9.4–6, 1.9.25, 1.14), just as by his training he has learned to be uncon-
cerned about worldly blessings such as, for instance, wealth and well- being. 
In  fact, he should set himself free from all worries and unnecessary concerns 
by devoting himself to philosophy as constituting, in the words of Hadot, a way 
of life.
From their beginning, Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius and Arrian’s Discourses of 
Epictetus are meant to mould the intended addressees in such a way that they 
concern themselves with what lies within their abilities to do something about 
and leave all other things behind for the sake of this. By the use of reason they 
have been granted a faculty that if properly trained will allow them to exert 
mastery over their lives. The self-mastery brought about by continuous self- 
cultivation is the ultimate aim of these texts through which Arrian (rendering the 
speeches of Epictetus) and Seneca goad their addressees into pursuing a good 
mind (cf. Seneca 23.1, 37.1 ad bonam mentem). Surely one cannot avoid the con-
tingencies and necessities of life, but through the philosophical way of life one 
can learn to conquer them (cf. Seneca 37.3). In an epistle concerned with  Lucilius’ 
promise and oath to become a good man (vir bonus, 37.1), Seneca spells out how 
philosophy provides him with a way (et hanc tibi viam dabit philosophia) that 
will make him sound (salvus), unconcerned (securus), happy (beatus), and, 
most importantly, free (liber) (37.3). Only by way of philosophy can this goal be 
reached, since it enables one to put all things under the control of reason (ratio) 
and, thereby, have folly (stultitia) and the most cruel passions (affectus multi 
 savissimi) subdued (37.4).
The endurance and dispassionate mind that can be obtained through phi-
losophy is also a major concern of Epictetus. To avoid falling victim to external 
impressions (phantasiai) the philosopher has, through the faculty of reason, 
been enabled to handle them in the right way (chrēsis orthē, 1.1.7, cf. 1.1.12). By 
the proper use of judgement on these external impressions such as, for instance, 
death, the philosopher through reason is capable of applying the powers of 
choice and refusal, desire and aversion, whereby he can come to master them 
(cf. 2.18.24f., 3.8.1–5).
The idea of training or askēsis permeates all of Seneca’s and Epictetus’ texts. 
The philosopher needs to engage in continuous training which will enable him to 
remain within the philosophical world as a way of life. In chapter 12 of the third 
book of Arrian’s Discourses of Epictetus, he takes up the issue of training specifi-
cally. Philosophers should not engage in training in things that are against nature 
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(dia tōn para phusin) or paradoxical (paradoxōn), since they cannot do anything 
about this. Rather they should train in order to obtain the faculty of acting unhin-
dered with respect to choice and aversion (orexei kai ekklisei akōlutōs anastrephest-
hai, 3.12.4). Thereby they will neither fail to get what they desire (mēte oregomenon 
apotungkhanein), nor fall into what they would avoid (mēt ekklinonta peripiptein):
For since it is impossible without great and constant training (aneu megalēs kai sunechous 
askēseōs) to secure that our desire fail not to attain, and our aversion fall not into what it 
would avoid, be assured that, if you allow training to turn outwards, towards the things that 
are not in the realm of the moral purpose, you will have neither your desire successful in 
attaining what it would, nor your aversion successful in avoiding what it would. 
(3.12.5 – LCL translation by Oldfather)
Similar to other representatives of kosmos forms of religion like Siddhartha 
Gautama, Confucius and Socrates, the Stoic philosopher in Epictetus’ under-
standing should make his self entirely independent of culture by spending his 
time on self-cultivation. This will enable him to make progress in desire and aver-
sion and thereby obtain autonomy of mind.
In several studies, Gill has made the point that the Stoic tranquility and 
autonomy of mind is conspicuously different from the modern post-Cartesian and 
Kantian one. I agree. Gill insists on the difference between what he terms subjec-
tive(-individualist) and objective(-participant) selves, where the latter designates 
the ancient view and the former the modern Western one (2006, 328–44; 2008, 
359–61). There is nothing in the Stoic view, or any other ancient perspective on self-
hood for that matter, that suggests anything close to the modern detached auton-
omous subject. The Stoic philosopher and other ancient person can only obtain 
what he aspires to by having been granted that faculty by the gods or God. The self 
is always involved in a relationship to superhuman powers. That said, however, we 
see in the examples provided a transition towards a far greater emphasis placed 
on the self and the need for this self to engage in a deliberate process of training 
self-cultivation. Once again, however, I stress that this did not imply the emergence 
of the individual, but it constituted the beginning of a long journey lasting at least 
1700 years by which suifaction increasingly came to be understood in terms of 
self-cultivation, and by which these processes of self-cultivating individualisation 
became increasingly prolific in emphasis on the self at stake (cf. Sloterdijk 2009).
6 Conclusion
Admittedly, the argument put forward is convoluted, so I allow myself to sum-
marise the main points of the typology developed. I assert that: 1) a sense of 
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selfhood, that is self-recognition, is found in several animals in addition to the 
hominin species, but this sense, ceteris paribus, is confined to the hic et nunc 
of animal communication; 2) genuine self-awareness, therefore, is neither found 
among other animals nor in the hominin lineage prior to the emergence of pro-
tolanguage, at the earliest around 1.7 million years ago with the appearance of 
Acheulian culture, and this change constituted a precondition for engaging in 
conceptual thinking about being a ‘self’ that was not confined to the here and 
now of discourse; 3) a stronger form of suifaction emerged with Homo sapiens 
with a fully developed language and capacity for ornamentation, painting and, 
thereby, external memory storage around 100,000 BCE; 4) there were leaps 
towards stronger self-understanding and, thereby, processes of individualisation 
at the transitions from hunter-gatherer culture to early agriculture and, similarly, 
from complex agricultural culture to early urban culture; 5) the emergence of 
early forms of kosmos religion and the transition from complex urban religion to 
this type of culture was decisive for the subsequent development in terms of intel-
lectual history; 6) the further intensification in dominant forms of thinking about 
suifaction all had the change from urban to kosmos or the transition from archaic 
to Axial age religion as an ideological presupposition; 7) and, finally, that the very 
strong forms of individualisation and individualism that we see in connection 
with Enlightenment and Romanticism be thought of as a further escalation in 
suifaction rather than something categorically novel.
An important point of these typological ruminations has been to argue how 
historical changes in selfhood, self-awareness, and suifaction are best understood 
as degrees of intensification resulting from transitions in the distinct niche of the 
species in focus. Chimpanzees, for example, are not in need of any extensive 
self-recognition or any self-awareness for that matter, since they inhabit an envi-
ronment in which there are no evolutionary gains related to complex language 
and, thus, suifaction. This is different from the hominin lineage that ever since 
its appearance in the open grasslands has been in decisive need of engaging in 
alliances and co-operations in order to survive. To succeed with that, language, 
self-awareness, suifaction and individualisation became incrementally crucial. 
What was once needed in Uruk in terms of suifaction in the third millennium 
BCE, did not suffice in fifth century Athens. But the degree of suifaction needed 
for coping with living in fifth century Athens would not help much in present day 
New York. These are the differences in terms of gradations of selfhood between 
different socio-cultural environments that the typology suggested is meant to 
highlight.
Finally, two historical examples illustrate my point that something decisive 
took place in terms of suifaction at the shift from urban forms to kosmos types of 
religion. At first, it was a transition found in some elite Eurasian cultures only, 
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but eventually the idea of self-cultivation became disseminated to greater seg-
ments of populations. The example from Deuteronomy testifies to a form of think-
ing that oscillates between an urban form of religion and a kosmos one. There 
are features that strongly unite it with the former, whereas there are others that 
point forward in what was to evolve at a more full scale in the history of religions. 
My final example from Stoicism represents self-cultivation at full measure. Life 
is understood as a continuous ideological training-program for the sage, which 
enables him to detach himself from the influence of harmful external impres-
sions and, thereby, cures him from the malaise pertaining to this world. The stoic 
sage, though, was no individual in the modern sense. His whole world is directed 
towards God as his helmsman. Nevertheless, the emphasis placed on self- 
cultivation marks a transition as regards the extent to which humans are called to 
engage in processes of suifaction. The understanding of suifaction in subsequent 
forms of religion all had to respond to this very prominent change in thinking, 
whether negatively or positively. The modern individual and the concomitant ide-
ology of individualism may be understood as a particularly strong version of sui-
faction, by which the self is now all on its own – or as Wilhelm Müller would have 
it: ‘Lustig in die Welt hinein. Gegen Wind und Wetter! Will kein Gott auf Erden 
sein. Sind wir selber Götter!’ (‘Happy through the world along. Facing wind and 
weather! If there’s no God upon earth, then we ourselves must be gods!’ ̶  transla-
tion Celia Sgroi) (Schubert Winterreise).
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Afterword: relationships between selfhood 
and transcendence
The contributions to this section present manifold and diverse examples  indicative 
of a form of religion which we may characterise by its inextricable connec-
tion between selfhood and transcendence. However, religion is not necessarily 
dependent upon establishing a relationship between religious agents and tran-
scendence, whether in scripture or praxis, nor does it inevitably imply that these 
agents need to be qualified as selves in a distinct manner. In short, neither self-
hood nor transcendence is a necessary component of religion. Therefore, cultural 
objectifications of religion, which give evidence to the interrelation of selfhood 
and transcendence, embody a structurally specific type of religion which evolved 
at a particular time presupposing a certain complexity with respect to social for-
mation. Anders Klostergaard Petersen refers to this fact by naming this particular 
type of religion as cosmos religion. It is a common conviction all authors of this 
section share that bringing selfhood and transcendence into a relationship has 
the structural potential of unfolding a dynamic of religious transformation that 
changes our understanding of selfhood as well as transcendence.
It is standard opinion in philosophy that selves are entities under a descrip-
tion. Unlike apples and pears, selves may not be spatially located and denoted, 
but very much consist in individuals’ various linguistic and practical ways of 
relating to their own states of mind and affairs, whether present, past or antic-
ipated. Whereas the capability of self-relation is an anthropological constant, 
the cultural significance of concepts of selfhood depends on the historically var-
iable importance that is socially acknowledged and attributed to these kinds of 
self-relation. The most basic common denominator of the studies in this section 
consists in the fact that the mediation of the individual’s self-relation through 
its relation to transcendence is indicative of a decisive authorisation of selfhood. 
Selves that relate to their own states of mind and affairs via their relationship to 
a transcendent and unconditioned power are endowed with a gravity of utmost 
importance. The contribution of the articles to the overall topic of religious indi-
vidualisation consists in the exploration of the importance and seriousness that 
individuals – whether single, selected or all individuals – acquire for themselves 
as well as in studying the acceptance of this importance by their fellows and the 
social collective in which they are embedded and take part.
216   Julie Casteigt et al. 
The sense of ‘a hidden and more fundamental level of existence’ calls for 
‘beyonding’ the immanent – as Kenneth Burke (1966) has coined it – in the direc-
tion of a concept of transcendence ‘with a capital T’ (Dalferth 2012). It involves 
the concept of a power as reflected in its quality of transcending all symbolic 
means of appropriately addressing it. Whereas Anders Petersen’s contribution 
elaborates on the cultural and social presuppositions under which this sort of 
transcendence could historically emerge, the subsequent contributions reflect 
on various symbolic instantiations of it. Although there is good reason to claim 
a genealogical lineage, which leads from Eckhart’s mystical thought via Tauler 
into the mystical strands of pietism and their philosophical sublimation in Kant, 
Schleiermacher, and Kierkegaard, the essays of this section have not focused 
on this very lineage, but rather pinpointed how different texts which belong to 
diverse historical contexts nevertheless vary within the same overall structural 
pattern: their relevance for the plausibility of an overarching concept of reli-
gious individualisation has not been located in their contribution to the afore-
said lineage but in unfolding a variety of symbolic representations of the intrinsic 
relationship between selfhood and transcendence. Whereas a lineage is always 
historically singular, the typological focus on common structures allows for the 
integration of a much larger range of religious sources. The texts therefore invite 
research on homologous instantiations of a dynamic between selfhood and tran-
scendence in other cultural settings than the ones we have investigated.
Anders Klostergaard Petersen points out that it was ‘the Axial age transforma-
tion of religion’, as it was originally coined by Karl Jaspers in his monograph The 
Origin and Goal of History and only recently picked up by Robert Bellah (2011; Bellah/
Joas 2012), which fostered a dynamic relationship between self and transcendence 
that eventually brought about such emphatic conceptualisations of selfhood as were 
much later on unfolded in European enlightenment and romanticism. He articu-
lates the insight into the dependence of selfhood on the individual’s socially medi-
ated interpretation and authorisation of his or her own states of mind and affairs in 
orientation toward an almighty instance of transcendence by suggesting we under-
stand the result of such interpretation and authorisation as suification. Thereby, he 
alludes to a dynamic of increasing importance that individuals are socially allowed 
and expected to bring to their distinctness from the other, and particularly from the 
social context in which they are nevertheless embedded. According to Petersen, the 
Stoic tradition of philosophy as a particular life-form demonstrates how a dynamic 
between self and transcendence, as it had been established in axial age transforma-
tions of urban into cosmos religions – that is religions characterised by the intrinsic 
interrelation between selfhood and transcendence – ‘provided a transition towards a 
far greater emphasis placed on the self and the need for this self to engage in a delib-
erate process of training self-cultivation’.
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Suification as self-cultivation, prompted by establishing a transcendence- 
mediated self-relation, may also be taken as a common characteristic defining 
concepts of selfhood as they have been promoted through the philosophical think-
ing of Meister Eckhart, Immanuel Kant and Søren Kierkegaard. In these thinkers 
we find different models of representing the intricate way in which individuals 
relate to their own states of mind and affairs, in particular in the context in which 
self-relation is understood as mediated by its relationship to a transcendent and 
unconditioned power. Moreover, self-cultivation is a proper term characterising 
this double relationship of the self with respect to itself and the transcendent 
because it stresses the transformative power expected to qualify the individu-
al’s encounter with the almighty. If individuals understand themselves in the 
context of meanings imbued with the authority of a transcendent power, they are 
expected to be fundamentally changed through this and to embody the effects of 
this encounter into their whole way of being.
This explains the importance of an attitude of passivity in the double rela-
tionship of the self to itself and to the transcendent instance, an attitude which 
nonetheless does not contradict the aspiration for self-cultivation: self- cultivation 
needs to be realised in a mode of being that expresses receptivity and respon-
siveness to the activity of the transcendent power. This is the reason for a basic 
conceptual familiarity between Eckhart’s concept of Gelassenheit, as it is pre-
sented in Dietmar Mieth’s contribution, and the idea of becoming oneself through 
self-surrender that is at the centre of Matthias Engmann’s reconstruction of Kier-
kegaard’s thought. Both are embedded in respective strategies of suification as 
self-cultivation, to use Petersen’s phrase.
Mieth paraphrases Eckhart’s concept of Gelassenheit as referring to ‘the fun-
damental stance of self-distancing and surrender’. The believer shall let himself 
be found by God instead of searching for him. God’s turning to us, according to 
Eckhart, takes place within us, and therefore has to be understood in terms of 
particular psychological states of passivity and receptiveness that suggest reli-
gious qualification. These states have to be learned, although they are subject to 
practice. It is this dialectic of self-cultivation through passivity that is also central 
to Kierkegaard’s thought. Matthias Engmann emphasises the fact that for Kier-
kegaard the reader of his prose has to be introduced into a ‘process of becoming 
oneself before God’. This takes the form of a particular praxis of self-surrender to 
the unconditional ground of one’s own being: ‘Most important is the acceptance 
of being dependent on the unconditional ground. That colours the idea of indi-
vidualisation fundamentally as non-self-assertion’. The distinctiveness of Kier-
kegaard’s thought consists in the fact that for the Danish philosopher this insight 
into the dialectic of self-cultivation cannot be propositionally communicated. 
His thought proves to be an elaborated reflection on the symbolic restraints of 
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thematising the interrelation of selfhood and transcendence within the frame-
work of modern existential philosophy.
One might think that the dialectic of passivity and self-cultivation does not 
apply to Kant’s Denkungsart. But it is Matthias Engmann again, who points to 
structural affinities in Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s thought by comparing their 
respective interpretations of Job. The Job of both philosophers accepts God as 
‘the non-understandable ground of all being’, a ground that in the philosophy 
of Kant is being subjected to a rationalist transformation which takes God to be 
the symbolic representation of the unconditioned validity of reason. Magnus 
Schlette’s contribution shows how this rationalist representation of the uncondi-
tional derives from a protestant tradition of inward-oriented religiosity rooted in 
pietist thought. And he points out that Kant elaborates a specifically rationalist 
version of the aforesaid passivity towards the transcendent power: it is particu-
larly and with utmost intensity in experiences of the sublime that we as indi-
viduals are seized by the internal force of our self-awareness as moral beings, a 
self-awareness that transcends the confines of the individual and lifts him/her 
into the realm of mankind. Kant’s aesthetic of the sublime displays a transcen-
dentalised version of the dynamic of selfhood and transcendence.
In her contribution, Elisabeth Gräb-Schmidt also focuses on the Kantian 
emphasis placed on the self in relationship to an unconditional entity. Gräb-
Schmidt takes the discussion of Kant further by concentrating on Schleiermach-
er’s attempt to anchor religion in a transcendent instance with a counterpart 
in human consciousness. By linking the transcendent unconditional entity to 
human consciousness, she sees Schleiermacher as paying remedy for a problem in 
Kant’s philosophy that the transcendent can be accessed only indirectly in terms 
of experience and communication. Gräb-Schmidt argues that Schleiermacher’s 
thinking needs to be seen in close connection to Kant’s philosophy. In its focus on 
individual consciousness in relation to the transcendent, we see a new instantia-
tion of the selfhood-transcendence relationship, in which the absolute ‘emerges 
as a dimension guiding knowledge and action in its effect in precisely this feeling 
or in immediate self-consciousness’. In this way, the unconditional returns as 
something that cannot be reduced to a postulate as in Kant’s philosophy, but, in 
fact, has an experiential grounding in human consciousness. Thereby, the accent 
in Kant’s thinking of the transcendental is relocated to the feeling of religious 
experience – something that would prove vital for subsequent romanticism.
With Julie Casteigt’s article we move in a slightly different direction, or rather 
we return to some of the typological questions pertaining to suifaction and posed 
in Petersen’s contribution. Subsequent to the studies on incipient modernity, 
we here return to the distant past. If individualisation, understood in the sense 
of an independent and autonomous ‘self’ detached from any transcendent and 
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unconditional power, is a modern phenomenon only, how should we under-
stand and describe earlier forms of behaviour and thinking in which the ‘self’ 
also comes to figure prominently? We already looked at forms of religion, such 
as the cosmos or Axial age type, in which the self takes a more prominent place 
in comparison to archaic or urban forms of religion. Casteigt also touches upon 
this question by suggesting that we may find glimpses of religious individualis-
ation also in pre-modern Europe. In a detailed study, she discusses Albert the 
Great’s Super Iohannem and shows how Albert is inspired by Greek-Arabic cos-
mology and how this cosmology enables him to highlight certain selves as being 
and acting in accordance with divine grace. In his view of selfhood, Albert differs 
from the preceding patristic tradition in understanding the exceptional witness 
of God as, indeed, constituting a very prolific self. In Casteigt’s understanding, 
this ‘self’ constitutes an individual who receives his or her whole being from God. 
They are distinct in their selfhood inasmuch as they have been disconnected from 
their singularity as distinct persons existing at a certain time and space.
Thus, we come full circle as regards the argument of this section’s chapters: 
how to designate and understand incipient and increasing degrees of selfhood 
suspended between a transcendent power and distinct sense of selfhood. We do 
not provide one definite answer, but we all call for greater awareness in terms of 
language, conceptualisation, models, and theory when posing the question of 
individualisation in general and religious individualisation in particular through-
out human history.
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‘Go from your country and your kindred 
and your father’s house!’ (Gen. 12:1):  
Schelling’s Boehmian redefinition of idealism 
1 Introduction: Schelling’s ‘analyticity-principle’
‘A is A’. – This is surely the fundamental thesis underlying Schelling’s Philoso-
phy of Identity,1 which is not merely – at least not only – a theoretical statement 
but rather one with an eminently practical meaning, primarily concerning prac-
tical life. This is the thesis that I would like to explore in what follows (see also 
 Quero-Sánchez 2019c, Chap. 2). It is surely not easy to determine what Schelling 
is telling us by such a statement (‘A is A’). I will try to explain it by analysing a 
crucial passage in the so-called Würzburg Lectures, from 1804, in which Schelling 
himself explains this sentence in terms of the ‘Analyticity-thesis’, according to 
which only analytical or identical statements – that is to say: statements of the 
form ‘A is A’ – tell us how the world really is. Let me quote the crucial passage in 
this context:
In the case of common [or vulgar] knowledge (Im gemeinen Wissen) we find – for instance 
with Kant – the following opposition: either my knowledge pertains to the objective, real 
world – it is then not true in an absolute manner, but it is only a synthetic knowledge – or 
my knowledge is true in an absolute manner, but it then does not pertain to the objective 
world, having only a [merely] subjective meaning, because in this case I am not experienc-
ing anything about the world itself but only about my own thought. If knowledge pertains to 
reality, it is then not an absolute knowledge; and if knowledge is absolute, it then does not 
pertain to reality. This is the way the common [or vulgar] logic (die gemeine Logik) – which 
is the point of view of Kant and his entire philosophy – argues, looking for reality only 
through a [merely] conditional, synthetic knowledge. But this sort of knowledge really is 
rather – considered from the higher point of view of true philosophy – a knowledge without 
any reality at all.  (Schelling 1860, 150,3–14)
1 See, for example, Schelling 1860, 145, 25–7: ‘The fundamental law of reason as well as of 
any knowledge (provided that it is rational knowledge) is the Law of Identity, i.e. the sentence 
“A = A”’. All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated (see the Bibliography below, 239–41).
Note: This work was supported by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft) under Grant QU 258/3-1: ‘The Eternal Concept of the Individual’: A Historical, Philological 
and Systematic Study on ‘Mystical Reason’ and its Reception in Schelling’s Works.
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Schelling is here describing – and criticising – Kant’s position, according to 
which analytic statements do not tell us what the world is like. The statement, for 
example: ‘A whole is bigger than each of its halves’, tells us nothing about how the 
world really is, since it is true no matter what is actually or factually the case. By 
contrast, a synthetic statement of the form ‘A is B’, for example: ‘That swan there 
is white’, or its generalisation: ‘All swans are white’, describes what is actually or 
factually the case. According to Kant’s ‘common logic’, if we want to know what 
the world is actually like, we have to look at it: we must sustain our knowledge 
upon experience, that is to say: we always need to look for some kind of ‘empirical 
mediation’ supporting our ‘knowledge’. This is the position – the ‘vulgar’ posi-
tion, as he calls it – which Schelling is inverting in the passage that I have just 
quoted. Of course, as the reader has already probably noticed, by stating that only 
analytical or identical statements of the form ‘A is A’ tell us how the world really 
is, Schelling cannot be using the terms ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ in the same way 
as Kant did. Now, what is an analytic statement, what is a synthetic one according 
to Schelling? Moreover: to what extent can one say that an analytical statement 
describes what really is?
My favourite example in this context is of a judge (J) who has to decide 
about the innocence or guilt of some accused person; let’s call him ‘Peter 
Smith’: Is Peter Smith innocent or guilty of killing his neighbour? Assuming 
now that both Mr. Smith did actually kill his neighbour and J knows it, J can 
act  – at least – in two different ways: Either he declares Mr. Smith guilty of 
killing his neighbour – just because he has killed his neighbour – or he declares 
him innocent, maybe because there is a certain political power pressing him to 
do so, or because Mr. Smith belongs to his own political party, to his own circle 
of friends or perhaps to his own family, or maybe because he has been bribed. 
In the latter case, there is, as Schelling himself would express it, some ‘medi-
ation’ acting as a fundament or a ground for a statement of the form ‘A is B’; 
a fundament namely for the following statement (uttered under the assump-
tion that both Peter Smith did actually kill his neighbour and J knows it): ‘Mr. 
Smith is innocent (of killing his neighbour)’, actually meaning: ‘This guilty 
man here (A) is an innocent man (B)’ (‘A is [not A but] B’). By contrast, in the 
former case, there is no such a ‘mediation’ but J, by stating that ‘Mr. Smith is 
guilty (of killing his neighbour)’, is expressing an ‘unmediated’ knowledge (see 
 Quero-Sánchez 2014, 212–9), i.e. a knowledge letting things be as they them-
selves – or by themselves – are: ‘This guilty man here (A) is a guilty man (A)’ 
(‘A is A’). An ‘identical or unmediated knowledge’ is thus practical on its own, 
whereas a ‘non- identical knowledge’ always includes some kind of ‘mediation’ 
functioning as a particular motivation for a certain kind of practical behaviour 
in some particular context.
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Now, let me raise the question that I posed before again: to what extent can 
one say that an analytical statement describes what really is? I think it is not diffi-
cult to answer this question by using the example I have just given you: By (under 
the assumption that both Peter Smith did actually kill his neighbour and J knows 
it) saying: ‘Mr. Smith is guilty (of killing his neighbour)’, meaning thereby: ‘This 
guilty man here (A) is a guilty man (A)’ (‘A is A’), J is undoubtedly describing the 
world as it really is; and by contrast, in saying: ‘Mr. Smith is innocent’ (‘A is B’), 
meaning thereby: ‘This guilty man here (A) is an innocent man (B)’ (‘A is [not A 
but] B’), he is not doing so. Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity is thus establishing 
some kind of (particularly but surely not only moral) ‘integrity’ as the fundamen-
tal criterion of both ‘being (really)’ and ‘knowing what is (really) the case’.
Schelling is telling us at the same time that we have to avoid experience in 
order to know how things – maybe not factually or actually but nevertheless – 
really are. By showing us how things factually are, experience is preventing us 
from knowing what they really are. Of course, we also have to understand the word 
‘experience’ here in the sense which is characteristic of (particularly German) Ide-
alism. The underlying tacit premise here is that the world, as it normally appears – 
that is, as it factually is, or as it merely ‘exists’ – is not real (at least not really). But 
what does this mean? What is the normal case that experience is – maybe ‘daily’ – 
confirming? Well, one would say that experience ‘daily’ shows a world dominated 
by any kind of ‘mediation’ establishing any form of inequality.2 Experience shows 
us the dominion of the ‘Inequality-Principle’. Everything needs some ‘mediation’ 
for it to ‘be’, that is, for it to ‘keep existing’ or, if we are talking of living beings, to 
‘survive’. Generally speaking – and, as is well known, experience loves speaking 
generally – things keep existing or just ‘are (there)’ because (or in virtue) of some 
kind of ‘mediation’. Experience shows us, again and again, lots of things disap-
pearing because they are lacking any kind of ‘mediation’. This is the way things 
‘are’. C’est la vie. Or, in German: Das Leben ist ungerecht. Acting in virtue of some 
kind of ‘mediation’ – for example, having been bribed – J‘s statement declaring 
Mr. Smith innocent would (under the assumption that both Peter Smith did actu-
ally kill his neighbour, and J knows it) be a ‘particular’ or just ‘empirical’ judge-
ment, that is: a judgment empirically mediated by some kind of particularity: a 
concrete or particular instantiation of the ‘Inequality-Principle’ as the principle 
dominating the world as it factually – but not really – is. By contrast, by declaring 
Mr. Smith guilty, J is not grounding his judgement upon any empirically medi-
ated experience but upon an empirically non-mediated or ‘intellectual intuition’ 
2 For the use of the expression ‘daily’ in this context see below, p. 228.
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(intellektuelle Anschauung).3 Concisely: Neither ‘existence’ nor ‘particularity’ play 
a role in Schelling’s definition of those things which really are,4 although both – 
namely ‘existence’ and ‘particularity’ – are crucial, of course, for factual existing, 
empirically knowable things. In Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity, the Absolute 
or God – who is nothing else but the Absolute itself (Schelling 1860, 148,19f.) – 
lacks as such particular existence. What really is, is as such – that is, considered 
as something that really is – not an empirically knowable thing existing in a par-
ticular way.
2  Schelling’s ‘analyticity-principle’ as mystical 
Entbildung
We surely have to see this concept of ‘Analyticity’ constituting Schelling’s Philoso-
phy of Identity as a (at least to a certain extent) ‘mystical’ one. No mystic has ever, 
as far as I can see, used this term, though some use similar terms for expressing 
the ‘Analyticity-thesis’. In this context, the concept of entbildung is particularly rel-
evant, meaning a process in which any bilde, that is, any ‘representation’ telling 
us what things factually – generally, i.e. in the common or vulgar way – are like, 
ceases to be in force. Bilder, that is to say: ‘images’ or mere ‘representations’, are 
(merely) telling us how reality usually or in the normal case – factually or actually 
– ‘works’, namely by showing us a whole of particular things needing some kind 
of ‘mediation’ to ensure their survival or viability. Meister Eckhart (d. 1328) actu-
ally identifies both concepts, ‘mediation’ and ‘image’, in his German Sermon 70: 
‘I can only see God if I do so without image and without any mediation (âne bilde 
3 See Schelling 1860, 151,16–21: ‘God or the Absolute is the only unmediated object of knowl-
edge, all other objects can only be known in a mediated way. The opposition between Dogmatism 
and true philosophy can adequately be expressed as follows: the former anywhere merely ad-
mits a mediated knowledge of the Absolute, whereas the latter admits a thoroughly unmediated 
knowledge [of it].’ See ibid., 153,23–8: ‘The characteristical form of knowing the Absolute is thus 
[…] a contemplative one. Any unmediated knowledge is = intuition (Anschauung), and also any 
form of contemplation is as such intuition. Since we are now speaking of the knowing of reason, 
we have to call such an intuition an “intuition of reason” or, as it is usually called, an “intellec-
tual intuition”’.
4 See ibid., 502,20f.: ‘Everything which exists is necessarily something individual’; ibid., 156,28–
33: ‘[…] the aspect establishing a difference […] does not constitute the essence or true esse but 
rather the non-esse or the non-being of things. Such an aspect [i.e. the one establishing a differ-
ence] does not characterise things considered as being things (since considered as being things, 
things are just one) but just things considered as non-being things.’
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und âne allez mittel)’ (Meister Eckhart 1973–1976 [repr. 1999], 194,11f.). This is the 
reason why you can only see God or the Absolute by being – paradoxically enough 
– blind, as Eckhart himself points out in his German Sermon 72 by interpreting 
John 1:5 (‘The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it’): 
‘What does this “darkness” mean? It means first that man should not be dependent 
nor hanging upon anything; he should be blind, without knowing anything of any 
creature. As I have sometimes already said: You should be blind if you want to per-
ceive God’ (ibid., 250,5–8). And in his German Sermon 70 Meister Eckhart states in 
a similar way: ‘I have sometimes quoted Saint Augustine saying: “As Saint Paul did 
not see (dô sant Paulus niht ensach), he then saw God”. I would now like to invert 
these words in a pointed way, and so I say: “As he saw nothing (dô er sach niht), he 
then saw God (dô sach er got)”’ (ibid., 189,3–190,1). This is nothing but the crucial 
thesis constituting Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity as I have explained it above: 
we must avoid experience in order to know in an unmediated way or by means of 
‘intellectual intuition’ how things – maybe not factually or actually but neverthe-
less – really are (Quero-Sánchez 2016, 149–54). Actually, Schelling has read some 
German sermons of Meister Eckhart, which some passages in his Erlangen Lectures 
Initia philosophiae universae and in the different extant versions of the Weltalter, are 
clearly presupposing (Quero-Sánchez 2018, 132–61). These are works composed by 
Schelling after having arrived in Munich in 1806, particularly after September 1810. 
In a recent paper, I have argued that Schelling, precisely at this time, also by the 
end of 1810 or the beginning of 1811, became acquainted with the Basle Tauler-print 
of 1521 (particularly the reproduction of a year later), which, as is well known, con-
tains more than 60 Sermons by Eckhart, who is there mentioned by name, among 
them some sermons which are important for Schelling: Sermon 52 (the so-called 
Speech on Poverty) as well as the Sermons 2, 3, 69, 71 and 114 (Quero-Sánchez 
2018, 173–7; for a more comprehensive discussion see also Quero-Sánchez 2019e). 
Surely crucial to the development of Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity, was Spen-
er’s translation of Tauler‘s sermons, which Schelling had demonstrably known, 
probably at a very early stage of his career, in the Tübinger Stift, or perhaps even 
earlier. This translation contains not only an edition of the Pseudo-Taulerian Book 
of Spiritual Poverty, which Schelling highly valued (Quero-Sánchez 2015), but also 
some important German sermons by Eckhart, here erroneously presented as Tau-
lerian works: Sermons 1, 68, 69, 70, 101, 102, 103, 114, etc. (Quero-Sánchez 2018, 
131, 176; for a more comprehensive discussion see also Quero-Sánchez 2019e). It is 
important to emphasise, however, that I am not thereby claiming that Schelling’s 
philosophy is based upon some sort of irrationalistic ground, but rather that mys-
ticism – at least if one understands it in the way Schelling did (and I think this is 
actually the right way to understand it) – itself presents a rational structure, espe-
cially a particular conception of reason, which, strictly speaking, cannot be called 
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‘a particular’ one, since ‘absolute reason’ as a revitalisation of what I would like to 
call ‘mystical reason’ is presupposing the neutralisation of ‘particularity’ as such.
3  Schelling’s ‘analyticity-principle’ as Platonic 
‘logification’ of existence
The ‘mystical’ position which characterises Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity was 
already present in his early papers on Plato, which he composed at the Tübinger 
Stift, particularly – but not only – in his Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus from 
1794 (see Quero-Sánchez 2019c, including further bibliographical references). As 
scholars have long since noticed, Schelling is very often using Kantian terminol-
ogy for his explanation of Plato here (Krings 1994). Now, the metaphysical posi-
tion that he is expressing with Kantian terminology is not a Kantian one, but he is 
rather defending the ‘mystical’ theses which will years later emerge with his Phi-
losophy of Identity, particularly the ‘Analyticity-Principle’. Especially important 
in this context is a note which Schelling wrote at the beginning of the commen-
tary. He describes here, as he explicitly says, ‘what you can daily see’, that is, the 
world as it – normally, factually or generally – appears. We daily see, Schelling 
says, that what is accepted to be true is ‘often’ not the result of ‘conviction arising 
from true arguments but it is dependent upon [a certain] political supremacy, 
which, after having privileged a certain opinion, forces the dissenting voice to 
keep silent or at least to speak so low that it cannot really be heard’ (Schelling 
2016a, 152,14–7). What you daily see is, as Schelling further writes, ‘the triumph-
ing scoffing of privileged teachers at dissidents, who have no other power on their 
side but the power of truth (or at least the power of the conviction [arising from 
argument])’ (ibid., 152,18–21). The ‘power of truth’: that is the power of reason or 
the power of ‘Analyticity’ stating ‘A is A’ – just because A is A (and precisely not 
B). This is, of course, not the common (or vulgar) way that you can – daily – see, 
since daily experience merely shows us different instances of ‘Syntheticity’ (‘A is 
[not A but] B’), depending upon some political supremacy as a certain empirical 
‘mediation’ which functions here as the empirical ‘reason’ establishing a relation 
between A and B that does not exist by or in itself. Not an empirically mediated 
experience but only an unmediated intellectual intuition shows us how things 
are ‘in themselves’.
Also, Schelling’s differentiation between ‘physical’ and ‘logical’ existence, 
which he develops as one of the central theses of the commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus, is to be understood in the light of the ‘Analyticity-Principle’. We have 
to distinguish, Schelling says, physical existence, as the characteristical way 
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in which ‘particulars’ – factually – are, that is to say: the world that ‘you can 
daily see’, from logical or pure existence, as the characteristical way in which 
things – maybe not factually but nevertheless – really are (ibid., 168,12–30). 
A thing existing in a merely physical sense is something which is not dependent 
upon its own concept but which has been brought into a ‘particular’ form of exist-
ence by some ‘mediating’ merely empirical cause – say: by means of some sort of 
‘political supremacy’ destroying Analyticity as it is defined by the pure concept 
or (Platonic) Idea alone. Because of its dependence upon such a ‘mediation’, the 
thing needs a temporal beginning for ‘being (-merely-there)’; and it will be gone 
when its  mediation ceases to support it: for it is not by itself. Such a merely ‘medi-
ated’ being is nothing by itself but just something ‘being-merely-there’ in virtue 
(= because of the virtue) of something else. Because of its being- dependent-upon-
some-mediation, a thing is a (merely) temporal thing. By contrast, a thing exist-
ing in a logical sense has never begun to be and will never be gone: it is eternal, 
having nothing to do with temporality at all. Because of its ‘unmediated’ being, 
its being by itself, such a thing happens or exists ‘immediately’, that is to say: in a 
timeless way. ‘Eternity’ (‘being immediately’) therefore means nothing but ‘abso-
luteness’ (‘being unmediated’). Of course, such an eternal being can also appear 
in a certain time, but it is nevertheless ‘timeless’, i.e. something fully independent 
of time as from any kind of ‘mediation’: it exists – it is-there – in virtue of its own 
being which is as such – as being by itself – fully ‘indifferent’ with regard to par-
ticular, empirically determined existence as such.
According to Schelling – and I think that here he is interpreting Plato’s 
Timaeus in the right way – Plato establishes a relationship between time and 
the (physical) existence of a concrete or particular reality, that is, of a ‘ground’ 
or ‘substratum’ (hupokeimenon, subiectum or suppositum) as the ‘requirement’ 
or ‘condition’ characterising the world as it ‘is (merely) there’. Let me quote the 
crucial passage in this context: According to Plato, Schelling writes, ‘Temporal 
succession begins together with the beginning of a ground [or “substratum”]; […] 
[therefore] we can say that [according to Plato’s Timaeus] there was no time at all 
before there was a world or a ground [or ‘substratum’] whatsoever’ (ibid., 170,3–7; 
see Plato, Timaeus, 37d5–e3).
‘Temporality’ means for Schelling therefore nothing but ‘conditionality’: it is 
the sort of (physical) existence characterising those things which are in a merely 
hypothetical way, that is, not in virtue of their own concept as of their own power, 
but just because of the ‘mediation’ of some sort of external power. By contrast, 
those things which really ‘are’ have nothing to do with time – nothing at all: they 
are lacking any ‘ground’, any ‘substratum’, any ‘requirement’ or any ‘condition’ 
(any hupokeimenon, subiectum or suppositum). What really ‘is’, that is, what 
exists not in a merely physical but in a logical sense, is ‘ground-less’ and it has 
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thereby nothing to do with any kind of temporal succession. Logical existence is 
thus nothing but ‘groundless’ existence, that is, existence lacking both particu-
larity and (physical, empirically knowable) existence as such.
4 Jacobi’s attack
As is well known, the later development of Schelling’s philosophy, particularly 
from 1809 onwards, can, and maybe should, be seen as an attempt to philosoph-
ically recover the value of particular or physical existence, which in the context 
of the Philosophy of Identity was, as I have said, a very problematic one. He is 
now trying to present a conception of God or the Absolute – or generally speak-
ing: of anything which really is – as including particular, not merely logical 
existence (see Schelling 2017, 106,11–4). Clearly, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi played 
a role, maybe the crucial one, in such a development by Schelling (see Ciancio 
1975, and Weischedel 1969, on the relationship between Jacobi and Schelling). 
In his treatise Description of the System of My Philosophy, that is to say, in 1801, 
we already find some passages in which Schelling is reacting to some passages 
by Jacobi, particularly to his Letters on Spinoza, from 1785 (with a second edition 
in 1789). Schelling paraphrases here some passages by Jacobi concerning the 
concept of ‘immediacy’,5 but presenting a characteristic understanding of this 
concept, which is clearly influenced by mysticism, particularly by the aforemen-
tioned Book of Spiritual Poverty (Quero-Sánchez 2014, 212–9; 2015, 257–62). When 
Schelling came to Munich, in 1806, he came to know Jacobi in person, who was at 
that time the President of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, of which Schelling 
had even become a member himself. Jacobi wrote, as is well known, a treatise 
entitled On Divine Things and Their Revelation, primarily directed against Schell-
ing’s Philosophy of Identity, but, of course, forgetting to mention him by name. 
Schelling reacted against this writing in a very belligerent manner, with a work 
of 1812, entitled Schelling’s Monument to Mr. Jacobi’s Writing on Divine Things (see 
Jaeschke 1999). We find in the work by Jacobi, mentioned above, a passage that 
best expresses the kind of critique to which Schelling was reacting in his philo-
sophical development from 1809 onwards. Of course, he is not just reacting to 
this passage, but his later philosophy can be best understood as a reaction to a 
critique, such as the one Jacobi is expressing here. We have to keep in mind that 
Jacobi’s attack appears in 1811 (Jacobi signed his Prologue [Nothwendiger Vorberi-
5 Schelling had also quoted Jacobi in his treatise Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie, of 1795 
(Ciancio 1975, 3).
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cht] on the 5th of October 1811), although he had been working on it since the end 
of 1807. We also need to keep in mind that Schelling’s first wife, Caroline, has died 
in September 1809. Jacobi first asks:
Is it possible that any knowledge, virtue or beauty appear to us without presenting any 
particular form at all? […]. Would such a concept in us be something capable of making us a 
living being which were, in addition, capable of living in relationship with some other living 
beings?  (Jacobi 2000, 51, 8–14)
And Jacobi adds to this:
Maybe these considerations are still not near enough for an understanding. Let me raise, to 
get closer to you and more sternly [to bring these considerations near to you], the following 
question (Ich frage, um näher zu treten und eindringlicher zu werden): is it possible to con-
ceive a person having a friend and maintaining that he loves his concept [i.e. the concept 
of the friend] but not the particular person with a singular name; because the particular 
person with the singular name is not the person really, but precisely the aspect which, 
because it contains some imperfections in itself, is damaging this person? If it were possi-
ble to find someone thinking this way, he would have to see with indifference – the more 
indifferent the more truly – how his friend is brought unto his grave. Because he would still 
retain the concept and would yet be able to think of another possible friend presenting even 
better qualities than the defunct one, yet without any defect at all, which would be as such 
immortal!
But this is not the way we, common people, think. We love in a friendship the particu-
lar person with a singular name: this person himself, in the particular way he is.
(ibid., 51,15–28)
Now, what kind of problem could anyone have with such an – as Jacobi calls it – 
‘individual, positive friendship’? Jacobi himself explains this in the continuation 
of the passage just quoted:
Surely, it is possible to criticise this form of […] friendship from a rigorous point of view, in a 
similar way as you can criticise […] a particular political constitution from the point of view 
of [pure] virtue and [pure] freedom. You will hear the following objection: Do we not have to 
say that by you defining friendship as a relation between individualities you are adulterat-
ing the real thing by mixing it with particularity; you are adulterating what is unconditional 
by mixing it with conditionality? Are you not essentially corrupting these things? Is not by 
such a friendship the [mere] opinion defiantly prevailing over the understanding, not the 
biased judgement over the healthy and unbiased one, not reputation over reason, not love 
over justice [or righteousness]?  (ibid., 52,6–21)
I think, this is actually the position characterising Schelling’s Philosophy of Iden-
tity. Now, Mr. President was unwilling to give up his system grounding upon an 
‘incomprehensible’ friendship-structure. Let me quote his response to the ques-
tions he himself had just raised:
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All this could be true, and yet it would not make false the fact that only such a positive 
friendship, which is related to individuals and is therefore an exclusive one, that is, one 
which is biased – if you will: blind and superstitious –, in a nutshell: such an incomprehen-
sible friendship […], has ever been seen – all along and wherever men have been talking 
about friendship – as authentic and true friendship. (ibid., 52,28–34)
Schelling’s attempt to philosophically recover the value of particular existence – 
‘Schelling’s “Delogification” of Idealism’ – will now be quite different from Jaco-
bi’s defence of such an ‘incomprehensible’ friendship-structure. He undoubtedly 
took the fundamental basis for his new position from Boehme,6 as I will try to 
show in what follows.
5  Schelling’s Boehmian ‘delogification’  
of idealism
Probably, Schelling came to know Boehme’s positions in the summer, or the 
autumn, of 1799, in house of August Wilhelm Schlegel. It was Ludwig Tieck who 
brought to Jena the interest for Boehme’s writings, which he had previously 
‘rediscovered’ in Berlin. Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis and Fichte were also present 
at these ‘philosophical-theological’ conversations in Schlegel’s house (Plitt 1869 
[repr. 2003], 245–7). Hegel also came into contact with Boehme’s writings in Jena, 
after having arrived there in 1801 (Magee 2013, 224–7). However, there are some 
passages in a previous work by Schelling, namely in his Survey of the Most Recent 
Philosophical Literature (November 1796–July 1798) which seem to suggest a pre-
vious lecture on Boehme by Schelling (Schelling 1988, 121,25–34, 122,11–4). I am 
not going to discuss this question of when exactly Schelling first encountered 
Boehme’s positions in my paper, but just demonstrate the extent to which Boe-
hme’s thought was crucial for Schelling’s attempt to philosophically recover the 
value of particular existence.
Scholars have often noticed and discussed how important Boehme was for the 
development of Schelling’s thought from 1809 onwards. He is actually present in the 
works composed by Schelling at this time, particularly in the Philosophical Inves-
tigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and the Stuttgart Private Lectures, the 
Erlangen Lectures, as well as in the different extant versions of the Weltalter. In fact, 
most of the aspects in Schelling’s Philosophy at this time which one could relate to 
6 Not only Boehme, but also Philipp Matthäus Hahn, Friedrich Christoph Oetinger and Franz 
von Baader were crucial in this context (see Quero-Sánchez 2019a; 2019b; 2019d).
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Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler and the Pseudo-Taulerian Book of Spiritual Poverty 
(see Quero-Sánchez 2018, 132–61), can also be found in Boehme, particularly – but 
not only – the concept of ‘equanimity’ (Gelassenheit) (see Quero-Sánchez 2020).7 
Surely, Boehme himself had read the mentioned authors. This is demonstrably the 
case with regard to ‘several of Boehme’s closest followers’ (Penman 2013, 66–71), 
for example Benedikt Hinckelmann (d. 1642), at whose Dresden home Boehme 
stayed for a while in 1624. An inventory of Hinckelmann’s collected manuscripts is 
extant, containing some entries on Johannes Tauler (see Anonymous 1692, 259, 260, 
264, and 274). The same is the case with Abraham von Franckenberg (1593–1652).8 
In addition, both Boehme and his circle of friends were very familiar with the works 
of Valentin Weigel who, for his part, often quotes from Meister Eckhart.9
I do not think that Schelling took his Analyticity-Principle from Boehme; 
nevertheless, we also find it in Boehme’s works, here expressed by means of the 
concept of ‘meekness’ (Sanftmut; or, as the adjective, ‘meek’, in German: sanft). 
It is surely not by chance that Schelling himself uses this Boehmian concept in 
his Stuttgart Private Lectures from 1810, by speaking of a ‘meek unity’ (eine sanfte 
Einheit) (Schelling 2017, 144,4–6). The eternal, original and uncorrupted nature is 
‘meek’ insofar as it does not know any kind of violence or externally determining 
compulsion. This is the case, to return to my example in section 1 of this paper, 
with J disregarding any attempt of some political power pressing him to act in a 
7 As is well known, Boehme wrote a short treatise with this title (De æquanimitate oder Von der 
wahrer Gelassenheit [Of True Resignation or Dying to Self]), which he included in his printed book 
Christosophia oder Der Weg zu Christus (The Way to Christ, Görlitz: Johann Rambau, 1624) (see 
Böhme 1957a). Some Eckhartian motifs that we find in Schelling – I particularly have in mind 
Schelling’s distinction between ‘God’ and ‘that what God is’ – are surely to be traced back to a 
direct reading of Eckhart’s Speech on Poverty.
8 See Bruckner 1988, A 2 (p. 4), A 40 (p. 33), D 36 (p. 100) and D 25 (b) (= Johannes Tauler, 
Predigten [Leipzig: Conradus Kachelofen, 1498] [this print contains, as is well known, some 
German Sermons by Eckhart: Steer 101–104]) (p. 98). Von Franckenberg also possessed the 
 Pseudo-Taulerian Book of Spiritual Poverty (in the edition by Daniel Sudermann [Frankfurt a.M.: 
Lucas Jennis, 1621) (ibid., D 37 [p. 101]).
9 See Pektaş 2006, 195–206, particularly 195: ‘il s’agit du seul auteur auquel Böhme renvoie 
sinon expressément: Valentin Weigel’; ibid., 196: ‘Il s’agit du petit traité, très symboliquement 
intitulé: Von Armut des Geistes oder wahrer Gelassenheit, composé en 1570, dont le troisième et le 
cinquième chapitre ne sont qu’un patchwork composé des Sermons allemands 12 et 52 [of Meister 
Eckhart], choix qui n’est pas seulement dû à une préférence marquée de Weigel, mais renvoie 
aussi à la source dont celui-ci dépend, ainsi identifiée: […] l’édition bâloise de 1522 les contient.’ 
Interestingly, the inventory of Hinckelmann’s collected manuscripts contains the mentioned 
work by Weigel (see Anonymous 1692, 264: ‘Anonym. aus Tauleri Schriften gefertigte zwey Trac-
tat. [1] Von der Bekehrung des Menschen. [2] Von Armuth des Geistes anno 1570’; ibid., 265: ‘Val. 
Weigel. von der Bekehrung der Menschen. [2] Von Armuth des Geistes anno 1570 geschrieben’). 
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certain or precisely particular way. The meek unity of nature concerns therefore 
things being by themselves, or in virtue of their own power or inner force. There 
was in those original times, Boehme says, nothing but an eternal ‘Being without 
a Why’ or a ‘why-less Being’: a dominion (!) of ‘true righteousness’ as the char-
acteristical (but not particular!) way of God (see Boehme 1958, 874,2–4 [English 
by J. Sparrow, in Boehme 1772, 497,12]). Eckhart of Hochheim had masterfully 
expressed such a fundamental philosophical position in his Latin Commentary 
on John’s Gospel (a work which Schelling admittedly did not know): suave est 
quod sua vi nos trahit, that is, ‘meek’ (or ‘gentle’) (suave) is what attracts us just ‘in 
virtue of its own power’ (sua-vi) (Meister Eckhart 1936–1994, 287,11f.).
Such an original, uncorrupted nature is, as Boehme again and again points 
out, the one related to the concept of God as a ‘merciful God’, according to Deu-
teronomy, 4:31 (‘For the Lord your God is a merciful God’). Now, we also read 
in Exodus 20:5 that God is ‘a jealous God’, which Boehme normally refers to by 
using the adjectives ‘angry’ (zornig), ‘wrathful’ (grimmig) and ‘zealous’ (eifrig): 
your God is thus, so it seems, also an angry, a wrathful and a zealous God. To 
Boehme’s concept of divinity belongs therefore not only ‘meekness’ but also 
‘anger’, or ‘wrath’, that is, der Zorn or die Grimmigkeit. God’s ‘wrath’ character-
ises or ‘forms’ the world as it merely seems to be, that is, the world merely existing 
under the dominion of the Principle of Particularity or Inequality, which is really 
nothing but a creation of man existing in a merely particular, corrupted or corrupt 
way. Being originated by man’s corruption, God’s ‘wrath’ ‘forms’ the world as you 
can ‘daily’ see it; the world, for instance in which, what is accepted to be true is 
‘not the result of conviction arising from true arguments but dependent upon a 
certain political supremacy’ (see above, p. 228f.). Schelling is surely presuppos-
ing such a Boehmian conception of God’s wrathfulness when he, in his Stuttgart 
Private Lectures, speaks both of a ‘dreadful’ and an ‘awful reality’: eine schreck-
liche Realität; eine furchtbare Realität (Schelling 2017, 100,24–102,2). A degener-
ated or corrupt world is actually, I would say, a ‘dreadful’, an ‘awful reality’. The 
following passage in Schelling’s Erlangen Lectures Initia philosophiae universae is 
also to be taken into consideration in this context:
Even all the oldest doctrines agree in this point: that everything that now appears as being 
captured (or “biased” [befangen]) by particular existence has before sunken down (or 
“degenerated” [herabgesunken]) from an original freedom in this dreadful world of particu-
lar existence. It is natural to see this in connection with an immemorial culpability, through 
which the eternal freedom sunk into such a state of particular being. 
(Schelling 1969, 69,5–9)
There are some similar passages in the different extant versions of Schelling’s 
Weltalter (Schelling 1946 [repr. 1979], 14,15–15,8). Of course, God’s wrath is not what 
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God is in himself – for He is essentially meekness or love – but what man himself 
brings into existence through his corruption, that is, because of his own decision 
for particularity or inequality. Now, to what extent has such a Boehmian position 
anything to do with Schelling’s attempt to philosophically ‘recover’ the value of 
particular existence? The crucial point here is that Boehme considers the fight-
ing or struggle of men – and, generally speaking, of nature as a whole – against 
the dominion of particular or ‘mediated’ existence, against degenerated being, 
or against such a dreadful, corrupt reality as the necessary condition for absolute 
Being to become a particular living or really existent being. That is to say: Absolute 
being, which is as such or by definition unconditional (‘unmediated’), needs – par-
adoxically enough – a condition (a ‘mediation’) for it to become a particular living 
or really existent being. This is a position we find almost everywhere in Boehme’s 
works, who points out – again and again – that wrathful reality is as fundamental 
for life as for particular existence. Let me quote just a passage: if everything were ‘in 
a sweet Meekness […] where would be the Mobility, Kingdom, Power, and Glory? 
Therefore, we have often said, Anger is the Root of Life’ (Boehme 1960, 451,28–31 
[English by J. Sparrow, in Boehme 1764, 274,37–9]; see also ibid., 9,24f. [English in 
Boehme 1764, 19f.]; ibid., 364,1–3 [English in Boehme 1764, 224,24–6]; Boehme 1957, 
80,22–5 [English in Boehme 1781, 50,37–40]). Of course, Boehme is here thinking of 
his own experience with the world of strict orthodoxy as he found it represented 
by Gregor Richter, the Lutheran Pastor in Görlitz, his chief antagonist. We find in 
Schelling’s Stuttgart Private Lectures a similar statement: ‘Life’, he says, ‘necessarily 
presupposes opposition [“contrast”, “contradiction”, “antithesis”, “antagonism”, 
“conflict” (Gegensatz)]’ (Ohne Gegensatz kein Leben) (Schelling 2017, 98,32). A year 
before, Schelling had written something similar in his Philosophical Investigations 
into the Essence of Human Freedom: ‘for, where there is no struggle [or “no fight-
ing”], there is no life’ (denn wo nicht Kampf ist, da ist nicht Leben) (Schelling 1860, 
400,3–6 [English by J. Love and J. Schmidt, in Schelling 2006, 63]). Precisely in this 
context, Boehme defines a concept of ‘Revelation’ or ‘Manifestation’ (Offenbarung) 
that Schelling will incorporate as one of the central aspects of his late philosophy:
For the Eternal Nature has produced nothing in its Desire, except a Likeness out of itself; 
and if there were not an everlasting Mixing, there would be an eternal Peace in Nature, but 
so Nature would not be revealed and made manifest, in the Combat it becomes manifest; so 
that each Thing elevates itself, and would get out of the Combat into the still Rest, and so it 
runs to and fro, and thereby only awakens and stirs up the Combat. 
(Boehme 1957, 9,14–21 [English by J. Ellistone, in Boehme 1781, 12,27–32])10
10 See Schelling 1860, 373,15–374,2 (English by J. Love and J. Schmidt, in Schelling 2006, 41): 
‘Since it is undeniably real, at least as general opposite, there can indeed be no doubt from the 
outset that it was necessary for the revelation of God; exactly this results from what has been 
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The Absolute is not something being really in a merely abstract way, but by 
its particular fighting against a particular instantiation of particularity, as against 
a particular form of corruption, a thing becomes a particular really existent or 
living thing. This is how God, or the Absolute, is revealed and made manifest: ‘in 
the combat’. A condition, that is to say, a ground or fundament (hupokeimenon), 
is therefore required for something to be a particular, really existent or living – 
revealed or manifested – thing. This is Schelling’s ‘Boehmian’ correction of his 
original idealistic position in order to avoid a typically realistic critique as the one 
we have found in Jacobi. The condition ‘is merely the ground of existence’ (das 
Wesen, sofern es bloß Grund von Existenz ist), which we have to distinguish from 
the really existent or living thing itself (das Wesen, sofern es existiert) (Schelling 
1860, 357,17–20 [English in Schelling 2006, 27]). However, Schelling is thereby not 
giving up his original idealistic position: not at all. Why? Because the ‘ground’ 
as the condition is here needed just as something to be negated or denied. The 
particular really existent or living Absolute as the negated or denied ‘ground’: 
this is the Absolute as ‘non-ground’ or as ‘abyss’ (Ungrund), which is actually 
the characteristic Bohemian expression which Schelling uses at the end of his 
Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (ibid., 406,15–22 [English in 
Schelling 2006, 68]). One could best express this position by quoting Hegel: its 
negation – namely the negation or denying of particular existence as such – is 
its being, that is, the (not merely real but really) particular existence or life of the 
Absolute: ‘the Non-Being of the finite is the Being of the Absolute’ (Hegel 1978, 
290,7f.). You could therefore with Hegel state: ‘Being’ and ‘Non-Being’, that is 
‘Nothing’, ‘are the same’ (see ibid., 44,20–56,2). By denying its merely given par-
ticular existence a thing – particularly, though not only, a man – is performing 
what is really its (his/her) particular existence: it (he/she) is really existing and 
not merely being-there as such and such particular, merely physically existent as 
well as empirically knowable ‘thing’. To return again to my example from section 
1, any particular judge, for example J, is both denying his merely given particular 
existence and precisely thereby performing his true particular existence by (under 
the assumption that both Peter Smith did actually kill his neighbour and J knows 
it) uttering the following (analytical or identical) sentence: ‘Mr. Smith is guilty (of 
killing his neighbour).’ This becomes especially clear in the certainly extreme case 
previously said as well. For, if God as spirit in the inseverable unity of both principles, and this 
same unity is only real in the spirit of man, then, if the principles were just as indissoluble in him 
as in God, man would not be distinguishable from God at all; he would disappear in God, and 
there would be no revelation and mobility of love. For every essence can only reveal itself in its 
opposite, love only in hate, unity in conflict. Were there no severing of principles, unity could not 
prove its omnipotence; were there no discord, love could not become real.’
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that Plato masterfully discusses in his Euthyphro, namely if (in a similar situation) 
Mr. Smith were the father of J, with the neighbour being a hired workman of Mr. 
Smith, who – I mean: this workman – had probably murdered a slave of Mr. Smith 
(Quero-Sánchez 2015a, 43–5; see Plato, Euthyphro, 4A–E).
Both Meister Eckhart and Boehme had constantly insisted on this require-
ment of denying any merely given particular existence as such in order to 
perform – precisely thereby and paradoxically – that which really constitutes 
the particular existence of any particular man (and, generally speaking, of any 
particular being): the true particular existence of any particular man. And both 
had done this by quoting some biblical passages which are actually crucial in 
this context: Matthew 23:9 (‘And call no man your father on earth, for you have 
one Father, who is in heaven’); ibid. 10:35 (‘For I have come to set a man against 
his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against 
her mother-in-law’); Ephesians 5:31 (‘Therefore a man shall leave his father and 
mother and hold fast to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh’). After 
having quoted these three verses in his Latin Sermon no. 29, Meister Eckhart 
states: ‘Hence, the Holy Scripture always calls on you to leave this world, to leave 
yourself, to forget your own house as well as the house of your own family, to 
leave your own country and your own relatedness’ (Meister Eckhart 1936–1994, 
270,11–5; see also id., Latin Sermon 25, ibid., 242,1–9; 1936–1994, 284,5–285,2; 
see on this Quero-Sánchez 2004, 118–23). For his part, Boehme continually 
points out that ‘Man is not at Home, in the elementary Kingdom of this World. 
For Christ said: “My Kingdom is not of this World.” And to his Apostles he said: 
“I have called you out from this World”; also: “Flesh and Blood cannot inherit 
the Kingdom of God”’ (Boehme 1960, 237,44–238,4 [English by J. Sparrow, in 
Boehme 1764, 146,35–8]). Boehme particularly quotes in this context Paul’s 
Epistle to the Philippians 3:20 (‘Our citizenship’ – or, as the King James Version 
says, ‘our conversation’ – ‘is in heaven’) and John 18:36 (‘My kingdom is not of 
this world’) (see, for instance, Boehme 21996, 376,12–23 [English by J. Sparrow, 
in Boehme 1772, 219,23–30]; Boehme 1966, 98,33–41 [English by J. Rolleston 
Earle, in Boehme 1930, 155,19–32]). His favourite passage is, however, Genesis 
12:1, when God says to Abraham: ‘Go from your country and your kindred 
and your father’s house’ (see, for instance, Boehme 21996, 364,1–18 [English 
by J. Sparrow, in Boehme 1772, 212,35–44]). For ‘kindred’, the Vulgate version 
of the Bible says cognatio; the Septuagint, suggeneia. Both expressions trace 
back to the word we find in the Hebrew Bible: molædæt, which actually means 
‘kindred’ or ‘kindredship’; but also ‘affiliation’, ‘relationship’, ‘relatedness’. 
The German ecumenical Bible translation, the so-called Einheitsübersetzung, 
uses here rightly the word Verwandschaft. Boehme quotes the passage, of 
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course, according to Luther’s translation, which is here very interesting: ‘Gehe 
von deiner Freundschaft’, that is, ‘Go from your friendship’.11
No; Schelling had not seen with indifference how Caroline was brought unto 
her grave in September 1809 – surely not. Idealistic philosophy is not to be seen 
as an inhuman one, as Jacobi seemed to be presupposing by his critique of Schell-
ing in 1811. But any decent idealist would surely want people to forget their own 
given particular existence, that is to say: any kind of friendship molædæt, in the 
public sphere, refusing or perhaps precisely opposing any form of ‘friendship’ 
which were presented by anyone as if it were a sort of indispensable ‘ground’ 
for rightly functioning politics. ‘Yes, Mr. President’, Schelling could have said to 
Jacobi – and I think this is precisely what he actually said with the later develop-
ment of his philosophical Idealism – ‘with your appeal to positive, exclusive and 
incomprehensible friendship you are actually adulterating the political constitu-
tion’, in as much as ‘by such a friendship [mere] opinion were actually defiantly 
prevailing over the understanding, the biased judgement over the healthy and 
unbiased one as well as reputation over reason, and – precisely – friendship over 
justice or righteousness’. We all probably know that such an idealistic ‘indiffer-
ence’ with regard to any kind of ‘friendship’ is a really dangerous thing. Jacob 
Boehme surely knew it. The idealist philosopher – if you like: the Boehmian, as 
the one whose ‘conversation is in heaven’ – ‘can only live’, as he explicitly says 
in his Aurora, ‘in the greatest peril in this world’ (lebed in grosser geferligkeit in 
diser weld) (Boehme 1963, 112, 4–7 [English by A. Weeks, in Boehme 2013, 335, 
2–6).12 So what? As he himself points out in his Mysterium magnum (and there are 
two similar passages in Eckhart’s German Sermons): ‘if thou [namely God who is 
nothing but righteousness or justice itself] bringest me into Hell, I will go along’ 
(Führest du mich in die Hölle, so will ich auch mit).13
11 The word Freundschaft (‘friendship’) also means in the Middle Ages and even today in some 
German dialects Verwandschaft (‘kindred’), also Blutsverwandtschaft (‘blood-relationship’). See 
the German Dictionary (Deutsches Wörterbuch) by Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, the 3rd acception 
of the vox Freundschaft: verwandtschaft, blutsfreundschaft, geschlecht (I thank Freimut Löser for 
this reference).
12 See also ibid., 279,39–280,2 [English in Boehme 2013, 741,28–31]; Boehme 1958, 735,2–14 [Eng-
lish by J. Sparrow, in Boehme 1772, 420,12–9]
13 See Boehme 1958, 735,15–23 (English by J. Sparrow, in Boehme 1772, 420,20–5): ‘For he says 
very inwardly to God, Lord, wilt thou have me in Prison and in Misery, that I shall sit in Dark-
ness, then I will willingly dwell there; if thou bringest me into Hell, I will go along, for thou art 
my Heaven; if I have by thee, I enquire not after Heaven and Earth, and if Body and Soul should 
fail, yet thou art my Comfort; let me be where I will, yet I am in thee, and thou in me; I have fully 
enough when I have thee, use me for what thou wilt.’ See Meister Eckhart, German Sermon 47, in 
id. 1971 (repr. 1988), 401,3–5; id., German Sermon 112, in Sturlese, Löser 2008, 120,23–5.
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Dining with the gods and the others:  
the banqueting tickets from Palmyra  
as expressions of religious individualisation
1  Small objects and expressions of religious 
individualisation: the conundrum of 
archaeological evidence
Much research on religion in the Roman world has focused on the collective and 
ritualised collectivity as defining traits; in the last decade, however, a new focus 
on experiences and the individual’s role in religion has also emerged (Raja, Rüpke 
2015, for a collection of articles taking such an approach; see also Rüpke 2016). 
These new ways of approaching ancient religion are part of a broader trend which 
insists that, in order to fully understand religious individualisation and propose 
a helpful framework for its contextualisation, we need to abandon our academic 
comfort zone and include aspects that lie beyond the often Western-centric (Euro-
centric) way of understanding religion and religious individuality (e.g. Fuchs 
2015).
While many disciplines working with material from the ancient Mediter-
ranean world have tackled religion and individuals (or the lack of visible indi-
viduals!) through historical (written) and epigraphic sources and have used 
archaeological evidence as an illustration of this, grasping the individual and 
the process of individualisation is something that remains a challenge in archae-
ological research. Archaeological evidence often testifies to the ‘end products’ of 
processes, and evidence from the religious realm often only gives insight into pro-
cesses that underline the collectivity of religion and its associated aspects, such 
as the architecture of sanctuaries, for example (Raja 2015d). However, over the 
Note: I thank Jörg Rüpke and the ERC group ‘Lived Ancient Religion’ for the past years of close col-
laboration within the framework of which thoughts about the Palmyrene tesserae have also been 
shared. I gratefully acknowledge the generous funding received from the Carlsberg Foundation 
for the Palmyra Portrait Project, without which this research could not have been undertaken. 
I also acknowledge with gratitude the support of the Danish National Research Foundation (grant 
number 119) for the Centre of Excellence for Urban Network Evolutions, which has granted new re-
search opportunities feeding into research on Palmyra in general. Information about the Palmyra 
Portrait Project is available on the following webpage: http://projects.au.dk/palmyraportrait.
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past years, members of the ‘Lived Ancient Religion’ project, among others, have 
tackled such material, including also archaeological perspectives (Albrecht et al. 
2018, also for further references), in order to bring to the forefront fruitful ways of 
engaging with material culture and the individual.
The present article attempts to determine the dynamics, and seemingly 
inherent tensions, between religious individualisation and standardised reli-
gious practices (Sartre, Sartre-Fauriat 2016, for general literature on Palmyra). 
The article tries to capture and lay open moments of individualisation in which 
seemingly strictly standardised religious practices are being loosened through an 
emerging or more clearly visible behavioural pattern. It does so by addressing the 
so-called banqueting tesserae of Palmyra – one of the most important groups – 
which give us insight into the structure of religious life in Palmyra in the first 
three centuries CE (Raja 2015c; Raja 2016a, for recent research undertaken on the 
banqueting tesserae as well as further references).
The discussion will focus on how these tesserae might have been introduced at 
a certain point in the development of religious life in Palmyra as well as which type 
of individuality they express. The article will examine whether specific religious 
experiences and communicative efforts were related to the tesserae and how these 
objects framed (or reframed) the religious banquet – a common ritual in ancient 
Mediterranean religions. Furthermore, the constellations and situations that 
might have given rise or put a stop to individualisation will be identified in order to 
approach a typology of individualisation, based on the Palmyrene material.
Since the tesserae are mainly important because of their detailed iconogra-
phy, in particular the visual language will be addressed as a means of under-
standing the above-mentioned aspects. Such an examination has the potential of 
yielding information about the dynamics between individualisation and institu-
tionalisation; in other words, these tiny objects give insight into the processes of 
individual and group formations and dynamics and shed light on the trajectory 
of religious life from individual processes to institutionalisation and, thus, stan-
dardisation. However, these processes should be distinguished from pre-existing 
non-individualistic standardised and conformist practices. Thus they form their 
own processes of standardisation of the individualising practices themselves.
2 The banqueting tesserae of Palmyra
Ancient Tadmor, also known as Palmyra, flourished in the first three centuries CE 
(Sartre, Sartre-Fauriat 2016), in particular due to the trade relations of the city in 
which the city’s elite played an active role (Seland 2014a; 2014b; 2015). Palmyra 
Dining with the gods and the others   245
experienced continued growth until the Roman emperor Aurelian sacked Palmyra 
in 273 CE, after the uprising against the Romans, headed by the Palmyrene queen 
Zenobia (Hartmann 2001; Kropp, Raja 2016, for a collection of recent articles on the 
city). The city is today most known for the numerous well-preserved ruins dating 
to the first three centuries CE (Kaizer 2002, for the religious life of Palmyra; Raja 
2015a, for the portraits and further literature; Gawlikowski 1973, for the architec-
ture; Henning 2013, on the tower tombs; Smith 2013, for further literature on Palmy-
ra’s art, architecture and, in particular, history). However, apart from monumental 
remains, Palmyra is also home to a large corpus of so-called banqueting tesserae 
stemming from the city. The banqueting tesserae, of which there are several thou-
sands and more than 1,100 distinct series, were catalogued in the 1950s (Ingholt, 
Seyrig, Starcky 1955, for the most extensive compilation of the tesserae; Dunant 
1959, for further examples; Seyrig 1940, for an earlier publication on the tesserae 
and their relation to the ritual banquets in Palmyra). However, much has been 
learned about them since and, without a doubt, they represent the richest availa-
ble source for understanding aspects of the religious life of Palmyra through their 
varied iconography and the inscriptions that many of them also carry.
While Palmyra is considered the only truly bilingual city of the Near East, 
with bilingualism being highly prevalent in the public sphere (Smith 2013, 16–21, 
for sources about the bilingualism of Palmyrene society; see also Yon 2012), the 
funerary and religious spheres in Palmyra were, nevertheless, highly mono-
lingual. In these realms, the language remained the local Palmyrene Aramaic 
dialect. Another trait that made Palmyra unique is the fact that Palmyrene society 
merged local traditions with new ideas and imperial trends, as evidenced by 
archaeological and epigraphic sources (Raja 2015a, for a discussion of the ways 
in which Palmyrene funerary portraiture reflects local and imperial traditions). In 
this paper, examples of Palmyrene banqueting tesserae are considered in order to 
outline their role as central expressions and markers of situations and processes 
of individualisation within the religious sphere in Palmyrene society (Raja 2015a; 
2015b, for recent discussions of other aspects of the banqueting tesserae). These 
tiny objects carried great importance in certain situations. They were media with 
a specific function. They served as entrance tickets to religious banquets, and 
after they had served this function, they seem to have lost their importance and 
were often left in the banqueting halls.
The interplay between highly individualised objects and the organisation of 
religious life in Palmyra stands at the centre of this contribution (for the most 
comprehensive treatment of religious life in Palmyra to date, see Kaizer 2002). 
Priests in Palmyra were the ones who commissioned the banqueting tesserae. 
This can be concluded from the iconography on the tesserae in which Palmy-
rene priests are depicted, usually reclining on a banqueting couch, most often 
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alone but sometimes together with another priest, in what can be interpreted as 
banqueting scenarios. Sometimes, these priests are accompanied by inscriptions 
giving us their names and priestly titles. The Palmyrene priests can be recognised 
by their priestly clothes and, not least, their significant Palmyrene priestly hat, a 
cylindrical hat with a flat top – a shape that was unique for priestly dress in the 
Near East in the Roman period (Raja 2017a; 2018).
While reclining Palmyrene priests are the most common motif on one side of 
the tesserae, the other side of the banqueting tickets display a wide-ranging icono-
graphic repertoire, within which some overarching groups can be distinguished; 
common motifs include busts of Palmyrene priests as well as representations of 
various deities and symbols for these. Votive and offering scenes – showing liba-
tions or incense offerings at altars – and banqueting settings are also depicted. A 
wide range of symbols, more or less well understood, including numerous inter-
preted as astral, are equally prominent within the tesserae iconographic reper-
toire. Furthermore, architectural elements are displayed, including, for example, 
temple fronts, parts of buildings and architectural frameworks, which may indi-
cate that the banquets were set inside of buildings. Inscriptions are found on a 
large number of the tesserae; these may give the name of the person or group 
offering the banquet, names of deities, the date of the event or the measures of 
the food and drink given to each person. A large number of the depictions stem 
from signet seals, which would have belonged to certain individuals. It seems that 
the one who commissioned a series of tesserae often would have had his signet 
seal imprinted on one side, thereby making them even more recognisable as 
belonging to a particular individual. The signet seals often carry Roman motifs 
such as Greco-Roman deities, portraits of Roman-style men, as well as astrolog-
ical symbols. These stand in contrast to the moulded motifs, which more often 
than not are made in a distinctively Palmyrene style. The highly diverse and varied 
iconographic language of the tesserae underlines that a high level of choice must 
have been involved every time a series of tesserae was produced. The tesserae 
motifs display a large range of iconographic elements, which were combined in 
numerous ways. Furthermore, they show how carefully the motifs were imprinted 
upon the tesserae. All these factors underline a process of individualisation, being 
signs of individual choice and expression clearly marked in the visual language: a 
process, however, which took place within a defined category of material, namely 
the tessera shape. No other kind of entrance tickets have been found in Palmyra.
The original name of the so-called banqueting tesserae is not known. They are 
not mentioned in any sources from Palmyra which speak about the religious life. 
However, since more than 1,100 different types exist, the tesserae must have played a 
central role in the religious life of Palmyra during the Roman period (Ingholt, Seyrig, 
Starcky 1955, for the corpus). The quite small tesserae, which were produced in 
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series, measured between a few centimetres by another few up to approximately 5 by 
5 centimetres (Al-As’ad, Briquel-Chatonnet, Yon 2005; Ingholt, Seyrig, Starcky 1955). 
For the largest part, they were produced in very finely levigated clay from which 
almost all impurities had been removed. This would have allowed for the visual ele-
ments to be imprinted more clearly in the wet clay. Some series were also produced 
in materials such as bronze, iron, lead and glass; however, these are rare and seem 
to have been exceptions ( Hvidberg-Hansen, Ploug 1993, 23, for an introduction to the 
tesserae in general. They incorrectly state that these banquets were held in honour of 
dead priests; there are no indications, however, that this was the case (see also Gnoli 
2016, for a recapitulation of the evidence speaking against such an interpretation)).
For each series of tesserae made in clay, two moulds with different reliefs were 
produced. These moulds seem to have been used only once, namely for the produc-
tion of one single series of tesserae. By way of the moulds, a high relief could be 
produced on each side of the clay. A clay lump was placed between the two moulds, 
and the exact thickness of the tesserae would depend on how hard the moulds 
were pressed together. It is not known in what quantities the individual series were 
produced, but one find indicates that it could have been more than 100 (the only 
assumed complete series is published by Al-As’ad,  Briquel-Chatonnet, Yon 2005, 
comprising 125 identical tesserae). However, each tessera was made carefully, and 
this shows that considerable attention was paid to making the tesserae within 
each series look as uniform as possible, perhaps in order to avoid falsifications.
A few tesserae are datable by their inscriptions, which give the date of 
the banquet (Ingholt, Seyrig, Starcky 1955, 22, no. 158, for a dated example; 
 Hvidberg-Hansen, Ploug 1993, 189, I.N. 3206, for a tessera dated to 460 of the Pal-
myrene era, which equals 118/119 CE). The tesserae all seem to stem from the period 
between the late first century CE and the late third century CE, which is the period 
from which most of the archaeological evidence from Palmyra stems. However, 
purely stylistic datings of the tesserae are difficult to achieve, since the small 
objects make it hard to trace the typological development on more than a very 
broad scale. Apart from displaying a varied iconographic language, the tesserae 
also come in a wide variety of shapes. As such, the shape must likewise have been 
a parameter which was up for choice when commissioning a tesserae series.
The iconography of the tesserae was highly varied and detailed. In particular, 
when considering the size of the tesserae, it is striking how much attention was 
paid to iconographic details such as inscriptions, which were found on many of the 
tesserae. This fact in itself indicates that these objects carried a meaning that was con-
veyed explicitly and deliberately through the visual language. However, the impor-
tance of the object seems to have been lost after the event (the banquet), since the 
tesserae were largely left behind in the banqueting hall, from where they made their 
way into the drainage systems. This is one clear indication that the  individualisation 
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 expression was confined to before the event, namely during the process of motif 
selection for the tesserae, and to the event itself, namely the entrance at the banquet 
(and potentially the moment when one received such a banqueting ticket).
The find spots of many of the tesserae, in and around the banqueting hall 
in the Sanctuary of Bel in Palmyra (Ingholt, Seyrig, Starcky 1955, III–V; see also 
Gawlikowski 2015, for a new contribution on Bel of Palmyra and for further bib-
liography), are indicators of their use and also of what seems to be a temporary 
use. Large numbers of tesserae were found in the drainage of the banqueting 
hall, which shows that the tesserae were not taken away after the event, and 
that guests left them there after having gained entrance. Thus, the tesserae had 
a very punctual function, so to say. They simply functioned as entrance tickets to 
religious banquets, which were hosted by Palmyrene priests – both as individ-
uals and as groups; this is clear from the inscriptions, which often state names 
of priests or groups of priests and the deity to whom they dedicated the banquet 
(Ingholt, Seyrig, Starcky 1955, 91, for a number of these).
Furthermore, these tesserae could include a number of symbols, other inscrip-
tions and iconographical elements (Kaizer, Raja 2019, for a symbol of the divine). 
On the one hand, they were highly individualised, and on the other hand, they 
were non-individualised and fitted into a category based on set parameters: mate-
rial, iconographic language and inscriptions. In other words, these tesserae were, 
on the one hand, expressions of the choices of the individual Palmyrene priests, 
of whom there were many (Raja 2018, for a recent contribution on the visual rep-
resentations of priests in Palmyra), and on the other hand, they were expressions 
of the organisation of religious life in Palmyra overall. Therefore, they represent a 
unique group of material through which the interplay between individualisation 
processes and institutional standards can be examined.
3  The religious contexts of the banqueting 
tesserae: processes of individualisation  
within a structured religious universe
In earlier contributions, I have discussed the ways in which the tesserae and the 
priestly iconography from Palmyra offer insight into the structure of Palmyrene 
religious life, which seems to have been heavily based on the involvement of elite 
male Palmyrene citizens who acted as priests (Raja 2017a; 2017b; for the tesserae, 
Raja 2016b). Through new studies of a comprehensive corpus of Palmyrene funerary 
sculpture, including the numerous depictions of Palmyrene priests, it is now  possible 
Dining with the gods and the others   249
to revisit the tesserae in the light of new knowledge about the structure of Palmyrene 
priesthoods and compare this with evidence from the tesserae (Raja 2017c).
Priestly representations make up approximately twenty-five per cent of all male 
funerary representations, which is a high and significant number. Furthermore, in 
the sarcophagi banqueting scenes, priests are often depicted together  – fathers, 
uncles and sons – indicating that Palmyrene priesthoods were held within families 
and bestowed upon sons and nephews by more senior male family members (Raja 
2016a, 130f., for the various categories of priestly representations; Raja 2016a, 142, 
for the argument that priesthoods were held within families). It has been argued 
elsewhere that there is reason to believe that Palmyrene priesthoods were passed on 
within families from fathers to sons, and that a father, most likely with the consent 
of the priesthood group, could also bestow priesthoods on several sons while still 
alive (Raja 2016a; 2017c). So, while being a status symbol which clearly indicated 
and underlined a certain position in society, Palmyrene priesthoods were also kept 
within families or extended families, likely for centuries. In this way, priesthoods 
were an important part of structuring Palmyrene society, both within and across the 
tribes or extended families that made up the basis of Palmyra’s social and religious 
structure. Priesthood also became a way of maintaining order and continuity within 
Palmyrene religious life. In some ways, this would have allowed for little variation 
and choice in Palmyrene religious life, which seems to have been structured through 
continuity and traditions. However, the banqueting tesserae offered one way of indi-
vidualising religious life and leaving an individual mark on religious ritual, since 
the individual priest could choose what he wanted to depict on these items when 
and if he hosted a religious banquet at some point during his time as a priest.
While the tesserae on the one hand tell us about the structure of religious life 
at Palmyra, and that religious banquets were part of ritual life, they also tell us 
that these banquets were reserved for certain people. The tesserae functioned as 
entrance cards to religious banquets, and this must have meant that there were 
people who were not invited to these events. We do not have any knowledge of 
how the tesserae were distributed or to whom. We also do not know whether 
further invitees, apart from those who held tickets and, therefore, most likely sat 
in the banqueting halls, could have sat in the porticoes of the sanctuaries, for 
example (Raja 2016b, 347–51, for the evidence for banqueting halls in Palmyra). 
Although such distribution practices remain unknown to us, the tesserae clearly 
indicate that a selection process was in place, and that a certain structure must 
have overarched the distribution patterns. The tesserae are therefore evidence for 
a certain practice, which was performed at Palmyra for centuries within the frame-
work of Palmyrene religious life, and the only insight into the individualisation of 
such practice is what we gain from the iconography of the tesserae. Their visual 
language is the only indicator of the individual choices of the  commissioners 
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 (Palmyrene priests). This leads to questions about the range of choices that were 
available and the limits that applied to such practices of individualisation.
While a set number of parameters come into play in tesserae imagery, including 
priestly iconography, symbols, deities and inscriptions, these could be mixed in a 
variety of ways, which allowed for the creation of unique series. It seems, indeed, to 
have been a wish or perhaps even a requirement that tesserae series differed from 
each other, which again opens the question of the degree to which the tesserae 
allowed for processes of individualisation to take place. However, since such a high 
degree of variety was involved, choice and, therefore, preference must have been in 
play. While the priestly iconography was static and did not differ across centuries, 
the other visual elements were highly diverse and could be mixed in numerous 
ways. One important aspect is the mix of iconographic styles encountered in the 
tesserae’s visual language. While the moulded elements were depicted in a sig-
nificantly Palmyrene, local iconographic tradition, the signet seal impressions 
often show Greco-Roman motifs, indicating that these signet seals might have 
been imported to Palmyra from other places (Raja 2016b, 353–61, for some exam-
ples). These signet seals also connect the tesserae with one specific individual, the 
commissioner of the tesserae series: one of the Palmyrene priests. It is interesting 
to note that, in the Palmyrene funerary sculpture, the Palmyrene priests and men 
often wear signet rings, showing that these items were indeed used in Palmyra.
Since the tesserae are most commonly found in the Palmyrene sanctuaries, 
and first and foremost the Sanctuary of Bel, it seems that they were only intro-
duced with or after the monumentalisation of the Palmyrene sanctuaries. Through 
this monumentalisation, the structure of Palmyrene religious life would have been 
crystallised quite clearly to society, since religious architecture would have created 
a physical presence and setting for ritual practice. Thus, the individuality that was 
expressed through the tesserae’s iconographic language was dependent on the 
overall structure of religious life and its cycles, and therefore, there were limits 
to the scope of its development. However, the tesserae did relate to the specific 
religious communal experience of the ritual banquet, but did so with an emphasis 
on the commissioning individual as the benefactor and central individual and the 
reason for the existence of that specific religious banquet (not of religious ban-
quets per se). In other words, the tesserae reframed the  religious banquet to be 
an event that, apart from the religious celebration, was also clearly a celebration 
(even if not officially) of the sponsor of the banquet. This certainly ties well into 
the euergetistic framework of Roman civic and religious communities. However, it 
also takes this framework one step further, since the tesserae so firmly place the 
individual, at least visually, on the same level as the deity/ies who were celebrated 
at the banquets. The god (receiver) and the donor (giver), so to say, became two 
sides of the same coin – in this case, the same tesserae. The Palmyrene priests 
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become individualised through the visual repertoire on the tesserae, or at least 
claim a highly individualised position, by situating themselves on the same level 
as the local and non-local deities depicted on the tesserae. Other visual material, 
such as procession reliefs and votive scenes, stemming from the religious sphere in 
Palmyra, does not represent communication with deities and priests on the same 
lines. Therefore, in fact, the tesserae give us the strongest evidence for the impor-
tance and status of priests in Palmyra and constitute a unique group of material to 
gain further insights into the dynamics of individualisation processes.
4 Conclusion
The banqueting tesserae from Palmyra constitute the largest group of archaeological 
evidence from the city and give insight into the structure of religious life in Palmyra 
and the processes of individualisation within the religious sphere of the city. The 
Palmyrene banqueting tesserae seem to have been introduced after or along with the 
monumentalisation of the Palmyrene sanctuaries. They were connected to a certain 
practice, namely the ritual banquet, which took place in a controlled setting and 
to which only certain individuals were invited. The tesserae offered the sponsor of 
the banquet, one of several Palmyrene priests, a physical space to represent aspects 
which may be interpreted as parts of an individualisation process. This process was, 
however, limited by the material and by the fact that the religious banquets seem to 
have been exclusive events to which only a certain number of people were invited. 
Nonetheless, the Palmyrene banqueting tesserae remain an under-explored resource 
for understanding processes of individualisation within that which seems like a 
highly structured religious life with an emphasis on non-individualised values and 
on conformist practices. Palmyrene religious life seems to have operated within both 
extended local family structures, as indicated by the funerary evidence, and within 
the structures of adapted versions of association inspired by the Greco-Roman world, 
as the tesserae indicate, and at the same time, it was adapted to the overall  structure 
of the Roman Empire. The tesserae give unique insight into attempts at individu-
alisation within the scope of a highly structured religious framework based on an 
organisation run by Palmyrene priests, who all were members of the Palmyrene elite.
This contribution has examined and discussed how the Palmyrene banquet-
ing tesserae were most likely introduced at a certain point in the development of 
the religious life of Palmyra, and how they express a certain type of individuality 
that emerged out of the physical structuring of Palmyrene religious life, which 
also limited individuality. It has also been shown how Palmyrene priests were sit-
uating themselves, visually at least, on the same level as the deities depicted on 
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the tesserae. The importance of holding a Palmyrene priesthood was underlined 
through the use of the visual language repertoire and each priest was singled 
out of the group of Palmyrene priests through the individual depiction on the 
tesserae. Furthermore, this paper has addressed the specific religious experi-
ences and communicative efforts that were related to the tesserae; it has been 
shown how these objects contributed to reframing the religious banquet – which 
was a common ritual in ancient Mediterranean religions, but which took on a spe-
cific character in Palmyra – by placing the donor of the banquet on the same item 
as the deity who was celebrated at the event. Finally, the structure of Palmyrene 
religious life has been outlined, and it has been shown that the religious banquet 
limited the degrees of individualisation. In other words, the type of individualis-
ation visible within the framework of the Palmyrene material was both facilitated 
and constrained by the material, namely the tesserae themselves.
Appendix
List of Illustrations
Fig. 1: Tessera (I.N. 3198) obverse in two registers. The upper register represents the god 
Sams/Malakbel between two busts of priests. The lower register shows a central signet seal 
with bust flanked by two Medusa busts. The tessera measures 3 cm in length, 2.7 cm in height 
and is 0.7 cm thick. (photo: Rubina Raja, courtesy of the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen)
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Fig. 2: Tessera (I.N. 3198) reverse depicting reclining Palmyrene priest. The inscription in 
Palmyrene Aramaic reads: ‘[Moqi]mu Zebid[a] Hai[ran]’, which was the name of the priest. 
Measurements: same as above. (photo: Rubina Raja, courtesy of the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, 
Copenhagen)
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Self-affirmation, self-transcendence and 
the relationality of selves: the social 
embedment of individualisation in bhakti
Bhakti stands out by providing possibilities of religious individualisation not only 
for a select few, but, in principle, for everyone. The phenomenon of bhakti pro-
vides avenues and openings, of which women and marginalised people could 
also avail themselves. At the same time, bhakti individualisation is an inherently 
relational affair.
Bhakti can be characterised as an experience of self-affirmation, ‘(self-)tran-
scendence’ and connectedness, connectedness at one and the same time with the 
Ultimate Divine and with other humans. In a nutshell, and running the danger 
of over-generalisation, bhakti can be understood as representing a devotional as 
well as participatory approach to the Divine (Pechilis 20121). Its individualising 
potential lies in both the recognition of one’s individual particularity and dignity 
and the possibility of finding one’s own way of self-expression. Particularly char-
acteristic for bhakti is the emphasis laid on the relational aspects of human expe-
rience, manifested in (imageries of) continual interactions with the Divine, or the 
Divine’s representative, and with other bhaktas (i.e. ‘devotees’). To the extent that 
these inner social dynamics open up alternative experiential spaces, the articu-
lations of bhaktas from among the socially excluded or disadvantaged provide a 
special window on these dynamics and will help better understand the dialectics 
of social (non-)recognition.
Bhakti marks an extremely broad field, with regard to its social, historical 
and geographical as well as experiential and spiritual scope. Talking of bhakti 
relates to a multifarious ensemble of attitudes, practices, experiences and articu-
lations, the emphases differing from case to case. ‘Bhakti’ does not represent ‘a’ 
religion, or ‘a’ denomination, but stands for traditions and structures of modal-
ities of practice and articulation as found within various, not always clearly 
demarcated (and demarcable) religious contexts known under the labels of ‘Hin-
duism’ and ‘Sikhism’, but also ‘Buddhism’ and ‘Jainism’, and arguably  similarly 
1 See also below.
Note: For critical comments on earlier versions of this article I thank Vasudha Dalmia, Antje Link-
enbach, Anne Murphy, Rahul Parson and Kumkum Sangari.
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within various Sufi contexts.2 One can characterise bhakti as one strand, or 
path – mārga – beside, and interacting with, other spiritual and ritual strands 
and paths, to which bhakti relates and with which bhakti practitioners interact 
(Fuchs 2018). Bhakti has a reported existence of around two thousand years.3 
The other strands include those that put ritual into the centre (karma), as also 
the path of knowledge (jñāna), the path of world-renunciation (saṃnyāsa-hood, 
vairāgya), and the tantric path of normative reversal, especially in the nāth form – 
aside from the large field of folk and tribal religiosities in India. Various schools of 
bhakti fostered (sometimes close) linkages with specific philosophical schools.4 
At the same time, strings of bhakti also stand, or stood, in close exchange with 
phenomenologically comparable experiential modes of different heritage, espe-
cially Nath and, as indicated, Sufi (Ṣūfī) practices.
The article, taking overall a comparative perspective, will try to do justice to 
the major forms of bhakti. It addresses the (sociological) question of institution-
alisation of bhakti modes of individualisation in reference to bhakti’s inner social 
dynamics. It reads these as expressions of alternative Weltbeziehungen, i.e. rela-
tionships with, in and to the world. We can understand these relationships and 
the inner dynamics of bhakti only when we look closely into individual cases.5 On 
the other hand, it is of equal relevance to get a clear understanding of bhakti as 
a phenomenon, or better, a family of phenomena, at large and as one key to the 
historical dynamics of the evolving Indian civilisation.
What I discuss is what I consider the phenomenological core of bhakti. 
Obviously, as indicated, bhakti phenomena cannot in every case be strictly 
 demarcated from other religious forms and strands. But they can be pinned down 
or earmarked. This then also allows identifying individual or private bhakti prac-
tices even while these presuppose inter-subjective communal practices.
2 Regarding Jainism, see John Cort 2002. A particularly interesting case of, at the same time 
affirmative and critical, Jain engagement with bhakti is that of Banarsidas (1586–1643) discussed 
in this publication, Part 3, by Rahul Parson. Hans Harder (2011) points to the bhakti elements in 
texts recited by Maijbhandari Sufis in the Chittagong region of Bangla Desh. Anne Murphy (this 
publication, Section 1.2) describes religious spaces in the case of Punjab shared by Sufi and Nath 
Yogi as well as bhakti ideas, practices and traditions.
3 Some scholars push the first appearances of bhakti ideas and practices even further back in 
time, pointing out traces in the Upaniṣads (Kaṭha and Śvetāśvatara) or, still earlier, in the Ya-
jurveda (Prentiss 1999, 18; Pechilis 2011).
4 These involve Viśiṣṭādvaita, Bhedābheda and Dvaitādvaita in the case of Vaiṣṇavite forms of 
bhakti, and arguments with, and adaptations of, Advaita Vedānta in the case of Śaivite forms 
(including Shaiva Siddhanta).
5 Cf. especially Fuchs (ed.) forthcoming (a).
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And a last preliminary remark: Bhakti is not just a phenomenon of the past. 
The sources of bhakti have not dried up. New bhakti sects kept emerging well into 
the 19th and 20th centuries.6 In our days, bhakti also provides a core ingredient 
to many of the contemporary global or cosmopolitan ‘Guru’ movements, provid-
ing a source of egalitarian and even ecumenical impulses (Lucia 2014; cf. Fuchs 
forthcoming (b)).
1  Prefix: recognising bhakti:  
a history of scholarly interpretations
The difficulties in categorising bhakti are reflected in the history of its study 
and reception. Outside India, but also in certain circles within India, bhakti was 
long regarded as non-classical. Most of bhakti literature – predominantly poems 
and songs – was composed in the so-called ‘vernaculars’, i.e. the (historically) 
actually spoken languages, and only partially in the language of prestige, higher 
knowledge and ritual – in short the language of refinement or ‘high culture’, i.e. 
Sanskrit. Moreover, a comparatively large number of bhakti poets hailed from 
non-elite backgrounds, and thus were not deemed ‘knowledgeable’, and they 
addressed the wider ‘non-educated’ public. The poem-songs were and are fre-
quently performed in the company of people from various walks of life, including 
lower castes as well as women.
During the 19th into the 20th century prominent western scholars showed a 
disregard, if not strong disdain, of bhakti and expressed this with strong words. 
Max Weber’s (1978 [1921]) statements about bhakti had a highly pejorative over-
tone. He specifically excluded from this judgement only the Bhagavadgītā, which 
for him represented the position of intellectuals. This disdain was so strong in 
his case that it superseded Weber’s own contrary insights into the emancipatory 
moments and universalistic potential of bhakti. Louis Dumont (1980 [1960]) too saw 
bhakti as an incongruous element in the context of his so well-structured concept 
of the Indian value system and normative order – an ideal type of  hierarchy –, 
and this exactly because bhakti allows for salvation for everybody and from within 
6 Including, as a more orthodox sect, ISKCON, popularly known as ‘Hare Krishna movement’, 
founded in 1966 in New York. Other more recent and prominent collective forms of bhakti com-
prise Mahimā (Alekh) Dharma, founded in the 1860s, and the teachings of its best-known pre-
ceptor Bhima Bhoi (c. 1850–1895), and the Rādhāsoāmī Satsaṅg, also founded in the 1860s, with 
its two major branches.
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social life.7 On the other hand, in the later part of the 19th century many Christian, 
especially Protestant missionaries started making a volte-face (Oddie 2006), and 
began to see bhakti in a new light, as a step towards monotheism. They highlighted 
the notion of divine grace, which they considered to be comparable to grace in 
Christian reformation contexts. The missionaries of course did so in an attempt 
of tapping Hinduism for a Christian conversion project. This was accompanied by 
the speculations of some Indologists who too saw parallels between certain, par-
ticularly Vaiṣṇava and Sikh, forms of bhakti and Christianity. Starting with George 
Grierson (1851–1941), who spoke of the ‘Bhagavata reformation of the Middle Ages’, 
and the establishment of the ‘Sikhism as reformation’ trope in the 19th century, 
this extended to the point of identifying Krishna with Christ in the case of Albrecht 
Weber and others, including claims of a Christian origin of Krishna and even of the 
notion of divine grace (Max Weber 1978, 22f; Dalmia 1997, 391f.).8
In India at the same time, bhakti poetry received a new kind of attention in 
the context of projects of self-ascertainment – in German: Selbstvergewisserung – 
and self-assertion vis-à-vis colonialism. Still vivid traditions, many regional 
variants of bhakti received fresh validation in the context of 19th/20th century 
proto-national regional (linguistic) and trans-regional movements of cultural 
affirmation. Mahadeo Govind Ranade (1842–1901) drew parallels between bhakti 
‘reforms’ and the Protestant Reformation in Europe (Hawley 2015, 29). Bhara-
tendu Harishchandra of Benares (1850–1885) aimed beyond the regional context 
and posited Vaiṣṇava bhakti as ‘the original and all pervasive religious mode of 
the country’, India’s true and eternal, or sanātana dharma (Dalmia 1997, 374, 390). 
The modern Indian revaluation of bhakti in the 1930s went so far as to make 
bhakti a cornerstone of a full-fledged nationalist agenda, in the shape of the ven-
eration of the home country – deś bhakti. Devotion to the nation was regarded as 
the endpoint of bhakti’s evolution and fulfilment of its mission. According to this 
narrative, bhakti was seen as the completion of a movement that, starting with 
the Āļvārs (or Āzhvārs; Vaiṣṇavites) and Nāyanārs (Śaivites) in the Southeast of 
India, in Tamil Nadu, in the 5th century CE, progressed northwards via Karna-
taka and Maharashtra in the West of the subcontinent, and, while branching 
off into Andhra and Gujarat, finally (in the 15th to 17th centuries) reached the 
7 For a critique of Weber’s and Dumont’s treatments of bhakti see Fuchs 1988, 2016, 2017b and 
2018. The English translation of Weber’s study on Indian society and religions (Weber 1958) is 
unfortunately highly unreliable.
8 Grierson termed Vaiṣṇava bhakti ‘the greatest religious revolution that India has ever seen’ 
(Grierson 1910, quoted in Hawley 2015, 34; also Dalmia 1997, 401ff.; specifically critical Krishna 
Sharma 1987). Regarding the establishment of the ‘Sikhism as reformation’ trope see Ballantyne 
2006, ch. 2 and p. 165.
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North, the Hindi- (and earlier Hindavi/Braj-)speaking area regarded as the hub 
of modern India (Hazariprasad Dvivedi), together with the Punjab, Kashmir, the 
Northeast, Bengal and Assam (Hawley 2015, ch. 1 and 2).9 In its wake scholars 
started re-discovering the emancipatory, egalitarian and even rebellious dimen-
sions of certain strands of bhakti, especially, but not only, from the side of women 
and low-caste poets. Talk was of bhakti as movement(s) of protest, representing 
subaltern voices and expressing sometimes radical social critique (Ramanujan 
1973; Omvedt 2003; 2008; 2012; Zelliot, Mokashi-Punekar (eds.) 2005; Bhagavan, 
Feldhaus (eds.) 2008; and others). In opposition to this, some leading Marxist 
historians, like D. D. Kosambi (1962, 31f.), R. S. Sharma (1974) and Ranajit Guha 
(1983, 18; 1989, 257ff.), considered bhakti a social ideology of feudalism, signify-
ing passivity and subordination.10
What thus seemed dominant for a long time was the attempt to avail oneself 
of bhakti for various external, including ideological and political, purposes, 
driven by agendas that themselves did not necessarily do full justice to the 
specific milieus and the ambience of bhakti. Or, alternatively, as was the case 
with Weber and Dumont, to discredit bhakti since it did not fit into agendas of 
comparison of civilisations and world-religions, and thus keep Indian religions, 
and India more generally, in a pre-configured niche of stalled development and 
failed rationalisation. Interestingly however, there is one earlier narrative, a kind 
of second-order self-objectification of bhakti, which seems to support some of 
these constructions. A 17th century Sanskrit text, the Bhāgavata Māhātmya, pro-
vides an allegorical narrative of bhakti and its voyage across the Indian subcon-
tinent. Depicted as a goddess, born in the South, traveling through the length 
and breadth of India, Bhakti finally reached the Yamuna and Vrindavan as an old 
woman and in a state of exhaustion, but there, at the centre of Krishna bhakti, 
she felt revived and turned into a young woman again.11 This parable of bhakti 
furthermore includes a reference to Jñāna and Vairāgya, the two other religious 
paths of knowledge and renunciation, which are depicted as Bhakti’s sons, who 
travelled with her and became even weaker than Bhakti herself, and it was she 
who had to nurse them back to life. Knowledge and renunciation are being made 
into dependents of bhakti! We thus find a clear sense of the significance of bhakti 
9 The first vigorous critique of the idea of a monolithic bhakti movement came from Krishna 
Sharma (1987).
10 For a critique of the Marxist historians see K. Sharma 1987, 29ff. However, Kosambi (1962, 
33f.), immediately after calling bhakti ‘the basic need in feudal ideology’, underlines the critique 
of casteism, starting in the 12th and 13th centuries respectively, by both the Mahānubhāva and 
the Vārkarī bhakti movements.
11 See the summary of this narrative in Hawley 2015, 62ff.
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and a clear awareness of the sub-continental linkages and movements back in 
the 17th century, however without attending to any nationalist or socialist or 
other externally driven agenda. At the time of its composition the Māhātmya was 
rather meant to sing the greatness of the Bhagavata Purāṇa, the most revered 
Vaiṣṇava text, and thus of Krishna and his bhakti. John Hawley speculates that 
this might have been connected with an attempt at reasserting Brahmin control 
over Bhagavata Purāṇa performances that had proliferated in northern India 
since the 16th century.12
What then ‘is’ bhakti? One aspect that the socio-analytical attempts at framing 
bhakti from the outside share is that they tend to point to the normative and atti-
tudinal dimensions of bhakti, and in this sense they contain kernels of truth. For 
me though this confirms that bhakti requires a different approach, an approach 
that explores the bhakti phenomena from within their own frames of reference, 
that focuses on the articulations of bhakti, on the life-worlds of bhaktas, and on 
the forces driving its practitioners.
In recent years, starting slowly in the 1980s and 1990s, scholars in the fields 
of Religious Study, History and Anthropology have begun exploring bhakti afresh, 
trying out new approaches. Many of these new approaches have been informed 
by a focus on social praxis and cultural practices, have pursued interpretive 
strategies that shed the limitations of old-style philology, and focus on the posi-
tionalities of social actors and on modes of performance. Moreover, many place 
themselves in the context of a kind of critical theory, taken in a wide sense of the 
term. Taken together, I think one could see this as a kind of anthropological and 
phenomenological turn of bhakti studies.
Perhaps it was no coincidence that this process of re-focusing occurred at a 
point in time at which the approach to the study of religion was put under scru-
tiny more generally. In my view this includes as major aspects: challenging the 
dichotomy of religion and secularisation; turning away from a textualist under-
standing of religion and from the search for a dogmatic core; and replacing this 
with a focus on lived religion and actual religious practices. It further involves 
extreme care regarding the applicability of the very concept of religion, as a com-
parative and thus overarching term, especially with respect to its applicability to 
non-Abrahamic forms; a preference for terms more open, but also more vague, 
like religiosity, even spirituality; critique also of the notion of religions as collec-
tive containers; and the exploration of widely neglected historical processes of 
religious individualisation.
12 Cf. John Hawley (2015, 68–74). In addition, he deliberates about the cross-subcontinental 
linkages among Brahmin Vaiṣṇava bhaktas.
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Bhakti, I would add from my side, actually strongly resonates with certain 
modes of sociological thinking that are afloat today: namely the primacy of rela-
tionality, intersubjectivity and social interaction; mirroring oneself in the other; 
the ability to anticipate the actions of the other, which happens reciprocally and 
thus constitutes sociality; situationally grounded reflexivity; the inclusion of 
patiency and emotion in the concept of social action; and one could even include 
a normative dimension, as in the case of John Dewey and Bhimrao Ambedkar, 
specifically the centrality of free and open communication connected with mobil-
ity and based on respect (G. H. Mead 1934; Dewey 1987; 2002; Ambedkar 1989; cf. 
Joas 1996, esp. ch. 3.3; Pettenkofer 2010, ch. 7; 2017; Fuchs 2019). Talking of bhakti 
resonating with sociological thought is not meant to put bhakti into a box and 
classify it again from an outside position. On the contrary, what I have in mind 
is a concept of the social that explores the dynamics of situations and constella-
tions from within these settings, with the perspectives and practices of the actors 
involved in view. What makes bhakti so interesting is that it is  self- generating, 
self-propelling and self-organised. At the same time, it is bhakti that helps develop 
new sociological concepts.
2  Introduction: a reconstructive phenomenology 
of individualisation in bhakti and its 
institutionalisation (an overview)
Bhakti, as found across Indian regions and languages, denotes before all else 
an attitude of participatory devotion. This is included in the very root of the 
word ‘bhakti’ – the Sanskrit bhaj, ‘to share, partake, participate, belong to’ – 
and it is being continuously repeated in all writings on bhakti (where some, 
largely the older ones, emphasise devotion, and others, often more recent 
ones, participation (in God)).13 Immediately foregrounded by this meaning is 
the relational attitude and the aspect of praxis. The emphasis is on the direct, 
and actively sought relationship to, and desired potential or actual experience 
of, the Divine or the Ultimate Reality, on the practices involved, and on the 
interactions with fellow bhaktas and what one could call participatory con-
gregations.
13 Recently it was Karen Pechilis especially (Prentiss 1999; Pechilis 2011; 2012) who put strong 
emphasis on the participatory dimension.
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Bhakti, obviously, concerns liberation or salvation: liberation or salvation 
from the world as given or from the circumstances in which one finds oneself. 
More particularly, and this is specifically important in the Indian context, bhakti 
stands for the universal ‘right’ to, and potentiality for, salvation. Alongside this 
in certain cases, however, bhakti also stands for the wish to radically reconfig-
ure the world. Bhakti is practiced while being based within the social world, 
in clear difference to those who seek to renounce society.14 Those pursuing a 
bhakti line of action, the bhaktas, attempt to build a relationship to God or to 
the Divine, or try to experience (the presence of) the Divine. How they do this 
can oscillate between two forms, by aiming for union with God or by trying to 
experience the Divine within oneself. This involves activity from both sides, 
activity of the bhaktas as well as the imagined activity of the Divine, or else the 
preparedness of bhaktas for the experience of the Divine, and it is embedded in 
a social context shared with others who all share the desire for a participatory 
relationship with the Divine.
The difficulty and challenge is to provide an overview of bhakti without 
becoming schematic and generalising. It is important that we retain a clear sense 
of the diversity and malleability and the constantly evolving character of the phe-
nomena assembled under the label ‘bhakti’, while at the same time keeping the 
ability to draw conclusions of general meaning and with broad relevance.
2.1 Personages of exemplary bhaktas
Of central significance are the many figures of exemplary bhaktas – be they poet-
saints, group leaders, or gurus. These give inspiration, create imaginary worlds, 
suggest a way, represent the Divine to the followers, offer specific interpretations 
or teachings, and have often been inventors of new practices and new conceptu-
alisations. Devotees want others to learn from them and follow their examples, 
and in this sense bhakti stands for a ‘proselytising’ trend in Hinduism’s history. 
Still, the emphasis throughout is on each individual’s own efforts. The spiritual 
leaders, like the other bhaktas, can only assist or give (soteriological and moral) 
advice. This may include testing the sincerity of worshippers, as God him- or 
herself might also do. A few more outspoken poet-saints include addressing and 
demurring the oppressive living conditions of the poorer sections of people. In 
some more rigidly organised sampradāyas (roughly, but somewhat misleadingly 
translatable as ‘sects’) lead figures may act as gatekeepers (to that particular 
14 Cf. Monika Thiel-Horstmann (1989) for a slightly different emphasis.
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brand of bhakti). The leaders of such sampradāyas simultaneously introduce 
stricter rules and try to control the (moral) conduct of their followers, from 
whom they may at the same time expect certain contributions and duties. It is 
the connection with these lead figures, poet-saints and gurus, incidentally, that 
Weber reviled in particular: He denigrated their veneration as ‘anthropolatry’, as 
worship of humans (Weber 1978, 351, 359, 369, comp. 159, 187; 1958, 319, 325, 335, 
comp. 156, 179).
We must however distinguish between different forms and aspects of guru-
ship: To start with, there is the guru as individual spiritual guide or person of 
knowledge, with whom one interacts directly, face-to-face. Then there is the guru 
as part of a paramparā, i.e. as one in a row or series of gurus succeeding each other 
as teachers and disciples, following on and representing the original guru or the 
satguru. A satguru represents the highest authority in this world. In some cases 
this may verge on considering the satguru as the manifestation of the Supreme 
Being in human form.15 But, phenomenologically speaking, there is another, and 
most intriguing, dimension of guru-ship, the guru as a name.
It is this last manifestation of guru-ship that warrants special attention.16 This 
concerns especially those lead figures whom we call poet-saints, and refers to the 
time after their death. On the one hand, it is a process of memorialisation that 
keeps them alive. In a way, it is the community in this case that participates in 
conceiving the individual personality of the lead figure. The community, which 
actually exists only when people congregate, takes the name and the writings of 
a poet-saint, i.e. the poems and songs connected to his or her name, as reference 
and shared identity. What this usually means is that the singers of such a ‘commu-
nity’ keep on composing poems not just in the style and genre used by the guru, 
but also under the name of the originating figure – a special form of pseudony-
mous writing. The guru lives on in and as memory, communally redacted (Sangari 
forthcoming). This form of institutionalised continuity is found in particular in 
the sant17 traditions in the North and, partly, Maharashtra, but also in the cases 
15 Cases would include Vallabhacharya (1479–1531), Swaminarayan (1781–1830), but in the eyes 
of many also for example Kabir (c. 1440–1518), and many others.
16 See especially Sangari forthcoming.
17 As a classic on the sants see Schomer and McLeod (eds., 1987), including Charlotte Vaude-
ville’s articles. ‘Derived from Sanskrit sat (“truth”, “reality”)’ the root meaning of the term sant 
is ‘“one who knows the truth” or “one who has experienced Ultimate Reality”’ (Schomer 1987, 2). 
By extension the term can refer to those who seriously seek enlightenment. The designation sant 
has been given to the poet-saints of two distinct bhakti traditions, the non-sectarian Vaiṣṇava 
 poet-saints of Maharashtra of the 13th to 18th century, devotees of the god Vitthala or Vithoba, and 
the North Indian poet-saints from the 15th century onwards representing a largely nirguṇa con-
ception of the Supreme Being, i.e. the Divine without qualities. Regarding nirguṇa see also below.
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of Mirabai, the most famous Northern Indian female poet-saint (c. 1498–1546), 
and Surdas (c. 1478/1483–1561/1584), both bhaktas of Krishna, as well as others.18
2.2 Articulations of bhakti
At its core, bhakti is communication: symbolic, but before all else practical, 
communication. The prime mode of articulation of bhakti is oral – addressing 
other bhaktas, or all contemporaries around, and addressing God, and even 
‘one’s own heart’ (Cutler 1987, 25). Vocal expression, however, cannot be sepa-
rated from bodily and performative expressions, especially music and dance, 
communally shared (Novetzke 2008, ch. 2; Pechilis 2012, ch. 5). The signifi-
cance of performative modes, however, differs widely. Recitation, narration, 
explanation, singing, dance, dramatisation, procession, worship, ritual and 
the role of visual elements, at people’s residential places or at important reli-
gious centres (like temples and gurudwārās), are combined in different ways 
in different bhakti traditions. To this should be added the role of figurative 
and other physical representations, as well as objectifications of memories of 
the past, in form of mūrtis (images or statues in saguṇa bhakti; see below) 
and sacred sites (sometimes extended sacred landscapes), or material symbols 
of gurus, as well as other material objects and practices (Murphy 2012, 30 et 
passim, especially with respect to the Sikh tradition). In their regular transac-
tions, especially the northern sant traditions tend to focus on textual expres-
sion and chanting.
The common modes of verbal expression, across all forms of bhakti, are 
poems and songs, especially poems sung and performed. While states of suffer-
ing (from God’s absence) and longing (for the experience of the Divine/Ultimate) 
can be very individualised, it is the sharing of feelings, expectations and experi-
ences with others – ‘publicly’, as Christian Novetzke calls it (Novetzke 2008) – in 
the form of satsaṅgs (‘gathering together for the truth’), and kīrtans (a kind of call-
and-response style performance, but with wide regional variations), that stands 
out. Many of these modes of expression are still practised today.
One finds a wide range of regional poetic genres, some invented just for 
bhakti purposes.19 The languages employed are the local or regional languages 
18 For Mirabai and Kabir, see especially Sangari 1990 and Hawley 2005. Hawley also includes 
Surdas.
19 These include abhaṅg and ovī (both in Marathi), vacana (in Kannada), pada/śabda, sākhi/
dohā (in Hindi), kīrtan (from Sanskrit; a call-and-response style song, ubiquitously used, but 
regionally varying), bhārūd (in Marathi; allegorical drama-poems) etc.
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spoken at the time of composition by ‘ordinary’ people. And these are still more 
or less understood today. Sanskrit is used in specific cases and in second- order 
reflections and elaborations. Bhakti poems and songs call on God, as they address 
people, both other bhaktas as well as those not (yet) committed; but the poems 
are not didactic. They employ a wide diversity of modalities – they often express 
emotions, especially emotions of longing and love for God, or they can display 
arguments (even bitter complaint) with God, or with other bhaktas.20 The poems 
and songs play with numerous images and metaphors, and saguṇa texts (see 
below) especially allude to Puranic Hindu mythologies. They express the avail-
ability of these feelings and experiences for everyone. Especially the texts of the 
sant poets often assert humanitarian values and ideas regarding human dignity, 
sometimes attacking core social as well as religious norms. They pronounce cri-
tique of the established ‘external’ religion, particularly of empty ritualism, reli-
ance on scripture, the conceit of religious functionaries, and, directly or indi-
rectly, of exclusionary and hierarchical attitudes and socio-ritualistic ostracism 
(exemplary: Kabir, c. 1440–1518, whose criticism is directed both at Brahmanical 
religion and institutionalised Islam).
Others, especially women bhaktas, express their love of God by rejecting 
and infringing the social norms that bind them, reversing common rules of 
modesty (e.g. Mahadeviyakka, 12th century; Lalla Ded, 14th century). Through-
out there are references to other religious practices and other religious strands, 
practices and traditions expressing other religious attitudes which bhaktas 
oppose. But poems might also seize on concepts and metaphors extracted from 
other strands, including ritual practices, tantra (Naths), or traditions of renun-
ciation. And they pick up aesthetic principles and philosophical concepts gen-
erally available. Many poems are highly inventive, and some deliberately turn 
the ordinary world upside-down, employing particularly enigmatic language 
and taking imaginary licence, as in the case of Kabir’s ulaṭbāṃsī language 
(Hess, Singh 1983), or in the case of Karaikkal Ammaiyar, a devotee of Shiva 
(c. 550 CE), who at her own behest transformed from a beautiful woman into 
a demoness, identified with the ghouls inhabiting the cremation grounds, and 
whose poems consciously make use of tantric imageries (Chakravarty 1989; for 
both cf. Fuchs 2017a).
20 Concerning the love for God, bhakti traditions envisioned love variously and in analogy to 
sentiments in relationships between humans, in the form of servant-master, parental, friendship 
or erotic relationships, shifting between more peaceful or more ecstatic understandings of the 
relationship. Cf. e.g. Malinar 2015, 404f.
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Examples of bhakti, and stories of exemplary bhaktas, have been collated in 
various (regional) collections of biographies or hagiographies21 (like the Periya 
Purāṇam, the 12th century account of the lives of the 63 Nāyanārs; Anantadas’ 
late 16th century hagiographies of (sant) bhaktas; and Nabhadas’ early 17th 
century Bhaktamāla with Priyadas’ 1712 commentary, the Bhaktirasabodhinī), 
or in the form of narrations of major episodes in a (sat-)guru’s life as well as 
those of his followers (like the 13th century Līḷācaritra of the Mahanubhavas, or 
the 17th century Chaurāsi Vaiṣṇavan kī Vārtā of the Vallabhacharyas). In addi-
tion there are literary-metaphysical and mythological-legendary texts extolling 
bhakti, some of which have generated a chain of commentary literature, as well 
as  philosophical-metaphysical treatises. The most famous text of the first cate-
gory is the Bhagavata Purāṇa (8th–10th century), especially its tenth book on 
Krishna and his līlā, his (erotic) play with his followers; the most famous of the 
second category is the Bhagavadgītā (c. 2nd century BCE). Both were composed 
in Sanskrit, but especially the Bhāgavata Purāṇa has many versions in other lan-
guages. The Gītā was first made accessible for non-elite and non-Sanskrit speak-
ers through Jnandev’s late 13th century pioneering and highly praised Marathi 
commentary known as Jñāneśvarī (Novetzke forthcoming). The Gītā provides 
the first systematic exposition of bhakti; however the Gītā is not exhausted by its 
bhakti elements. It seems noteworthy though that the Gītā itself is constructed as 
conversation: conversation between God and bhakta, Krishna and Arjuna.
2.3  Conceptualisations of the divine and of human-divine 
relationships
How bhaktas conceive of, and address, the Divine (or the Ultimate Reality) 
differs, but the different modalities fall within a certain spectrum of direct acces-
sibility and experience. Important throughout is to take into account the differ-
ence between experience, and more generally ‘religious sensibility’ (Vaudeville 
1987a, 38), and the doctrinal or metaphysical level. It is standard practice to dis-
tinguish between saguṇa and nirguṇa conceptions of the Divine: the conception 
of the Supreme Being with or without qualities. Seemingly excluding each other, 
they can be taken as standing for two levels of enlightenment when seen from a 
doctrinal angle. Looked at from the angle of experiential sensibilities, and taking 
the ways dimensions of saguṇa and nirguṇa find expression in poems and songs, 
they can appear as co-present in the renderings given by even authorial figures, 
21 See Pechilis’ critique of this term in Pechilis forthcoming.
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each modal change exhibiting a shift in expressing the experience of the Divine. 
Or they can be seen as a way to express the tension as well as shift between pres-
ence (actuality) and absence (beyond-ness) of the Divine (Murphy 2012, 29).22 
In a saguṇa perspective one conceives of God analogously to how one conceives 
of another person, and this means, however close one gets to him or her, there 
always remains a final difference (viraha), which affirms God’s beyond-ness. The 
Divine as presented in songs and poems with a penchant for saguṇa is predom-
inantly referenced as a form of Shiva or as a Vaiṣṇavite deity, i.e. as a form of 
Krishna or Ram. In addition, there is bhakti of Devi or Kali or other manifestations 
of the female principle (McDaniel 2004).
In nirguṇa bhakti the Divine is conceived as formless, non-personal, ineffa-
ble, all-pervading reality, as something ‘which can only be spoken of in negative 
terms’ (Vaudeville 1987a, 26). Still, and this aligns nirguṇa with saguṇa bhakti, the 
goal is union with, rather than merging into the formless God (ibid., 27). Viraha 
taken from this angle refers to the unfulfilled desire to experience the Divine, or 
to the utter momentariness of such experience. Whereas saguṇa practices rep-
resent God by both ‘individual’ name and form (nāma-rūpa), from the angle of 
nirguṇa the Divine is addressed in abstract terms, by the non-specific word nāma 
(‘name’), by the generic Rāma, or some other appellations. Uttering the generic 
name, or concentrating on the name, however, is seen as of utmost importance in 
nirguṇa contexts. Both strands ‘hold the conviction that God is infinitely merciful 
and that he will, whenever he chooses, remove the veil of darkness […] and grant 
the bliss of eternal union with himself’ (ibid., 38).23
It is thus that many poems and songs relate to experiences – anubhava and anu-
bhāva (‘the’ experience24) –, trying to put into words what cannot be caught in words. 
22 Sikh gurus ultimately undermine the distinction between the two positions or strands (Anne 
Murphy, personal communication). Other cases in which the distinction is not consistently work-
ing concern the North-Indian poet-saints Kabir (fragments of saguṇa devotion in Kabir’s nirguṇa 
conceptualisation of God), Mirabai (fragments of a nirguṇa idea of God in Mirabai’s basically 
saguṇa devotion; for both see Sangari 1990, 1472, 1543f.) and even Surdas (Hawley 2005, 14f., 
73, 305–17), as well as the historically earlier Western Indian poet-saint Namdev (ibid., 75). Few 
scholars would today hold to the quite rigid distinction between the two modalities for which a 
scholar like K. Sharma (1987) stands.
23 In Vaudeville’s view the opposition between saguṇa and nirguṇa is one largely on the ‘doctri-
nal or metaphysical plane, but on that plane only’. She claims that ‘[i]n their religious sensibility 
as well as in their ethical views Sants [who stand for a nirguṇa approach] and Vaiṣṇavas [who 
stand for saguṇa] remain very close to each other’ (Vaudeville 1987a, 39).
24 Ramanujan 1973, 13. – Regarding anubhava among Jains, compare Rahul Parson in this 
publication, in particular regarding the views of Banarasidas (1586–1643) and his ‘occasionally 
 competitive’ relationship with bhakti.
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But practising participatory devotion is also intended to trigger new experiences. Its 
performance is itself experiential. Moreover, the participatory dimension extends to 
the other bhaktas with whom one shares ‘spiritual’ interests or a community built 
around these shared interests. At the same time, and against this very background, 
with this communality as resource, bhakti can also be practised individually.
2.4 Institutionalisations of bhakti
Bhaktas create their own congregational forms, forms of ‘voluntary affiliation’ 
(Sangari forthcoming). This needs special mention with respect to doubts, voiced 
by scholars of comparative religion, that Indic religions ever managed to develop 
something like community life and forms of brotherliness among lay followers.25 
While congregational assemblies can become formally institutionalised, it seems 
especially pertinent that many congregational gatherings remain informal and 
self-organised. These congregations may supersede and destabilise, but impor-
tantly, do not cancel out the ‘primal’ communities people socially belong or are 
assigned to; these in particular include caste. Again, one should not generalise. 
Congregational forms range from simply addressing others and addressing God 
through communal singing of bhajans in non-formal assemblages, to various 
forms of satsaṅgs, to participation at performances, and to pilgrimages – the most 
famous being the annual group pilgrimages of the Vārkarīs in Maharashatra, which 
involve joint travel, ideally by walking, over an extended stretch of time, inclusive 
of regular collective singing, and often joint evening meals. Some sant bhaktas, like 
Kabir, on the other hand actively opposed pilgrimage. There also are temple festi-
vals, especially prominent in the South, combining bhakti with Brahmanical ritu-
alism (Pechilis 2012). More standardly, group fellowships formed around a (sat-)
guru often led to the emergence of sampradāyas, denominations or sects, in various 
bhakti branches, the Vārkarīs being only one. Others include the Shrivaishnavas, 
Gauḍīya sampradāyas, Vallabhacharyas or Pushtimargis, Swaminarayanis, Lin-
gayats, Shaiva Siddhanta sampradāyas, Kabirpanthis, Raidasis, Ad Dharmis, Sat-
namis, and Sikhism, as well as many smaller ones. Regarding all these forms, one 
has to keep in mind the extremely diverse social backgrounds of bhaktas, as well as 
the variations in habitus – all this in the context of very different regional histories.
And, finally, there is the aspect of sevā (‘service’, Dienst): individual sevā 
to the Lord and, secondarily, sevā to other humans, other bhaktas or, in some 
sampradāyas, most prominently in Sikhism, to people in general. Sevā means 
25 According to Max Weber (1978, 63), ‘the Hinduistic religion as such’ does not know ‘congregations’.
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‘voluntary manual labor in service of the community […] [and] a deed of love and 
selfless service for fellow human beings’.26 Sevā, then, by this understanding, is 
fundamental for the obliteration of ego-centredness (in the Sikh context referred 
to by the term haumai) (Murphy forthcoming).
Continuity in bhakti, i.e. carrying and passing on practices and conceptualis-
ations, may then happen in different ways.27 It can mean institutional continuity 
of a sect or sampradāya involving admission rituals (dīkṣā). It can mean continu-
ity of a trans-regionally important religious centre (Braj-Mathura-Vrindavan) or a 
site of pilgrimage (Pandharpur). Institutional continuity can also relate to the can-
onisation of a series or ‘family’ of poets, as in the case of the Āļvārs and Nāyanārs 
in Tamil Nadu, or regarding the list of notable Lingayats in Karnataka, the vārkarī 
sants in Maharashtra, or the genealogy of the ten original Sikh gurus. In a different 
way other poet-saints establish regional interlinkages by cross-referencing each 
other’s poetry and perspectives (most famously among the North Indian sants, 
including the Gurū Granth Sāhib of the Sikhs). And finally, as we saw, institutional 
continuity can mean carrying on with a name, and this not just by venerating the 
name of a particular guru, but also and prominently by continuing composing 
using his or her name as ‘signature name’,28 by, more or less, reproducing his or 
her style of writing, and by continuing a tradition of performing and singing in his 
or her name.29 What holds such tradition, a mere body of stories and poems and 
mnemonic (performative) practices, together is then the respective name (Sangari 
forthcoming). In these cases, it is the local singers who continue, but also add to, 
the corpus which in this way is simultaneously changing.
The continuity in composing shows the availability of poems and songs for 
everyone. People may for example cite or sing songs attributed to Kabir on various 
occasions, like when they are working, in the fields or elsewhere. And this means, 
26 Nikky-Guninder Kaur Singh, Sikhism: An Introduction (London/NY: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 86, as 
quoted by Anne Murphy (forthcoming).
27 What I refer to here is being expressed in German by the word tradieren – i.e. weiterführen, 
weitergeben. This of course relates to ‘tradition’, but the emphasis here is on the act and process 
of carrying and passing on certain practices and thus establishing ‘a’ line of tradition.
28 Signature name (in Hindi chāp – seal, or bhaṇitā – speaker) as affirmation of the claim of 
authorship.
29 One might here make a linkage to Shahzad Bashir’s argument in Section 2.2 in this publi-
cation, who depicts the poetic selves displayed in Taqi al-Din Awhadi Balyani’s ‘Arafāt al-‘āshiqīn 
as both individualistic (‘individualistic through emphatic self-assertion’) and dividualistic 
( ‘dividualistic through the presumption of an identity shared across humanity’: the first-person 
voice indexing universality and projecting intimacy ‘while being emphatically impersonal in 
that it is bound to a genre that does not allow for a free relationship between voice and person’).
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aside from keeping a communal practice alive and going, that this religious mode 
also allows for everyone’s individual practice of bhakti anywhere, anytime.
All of this implies that the oral traditions are usually much broader and at the 
same time more diverse than what has been put down and passed on in writing. 
Canonisation of texts happened in some bhakti traditions of more closed char-
acter, and this in some cases already at a very early stage. Several collections 
of hagiographies were already mentioned. Some cut across sampradāya distinc-
tions or specific spiritual allegiances, like the Bhaktamāla. To this one can add 
anthologies, like the 9th/10th century Divya Prabandham collection of songs of 
the Āļvārs; the Tirumuṟai collection of poems of the Nāyanārs, finalised in the 
12th century; the Sikh Gurū Granth Sāhib (17th/18th century), and similar ones of 
other, smaller sant bhakti sects, like the Gurū Anyās of the Shivnarayanis (18th 
century), as well as the competing anthologies of Kabir’s poems (the Bījak of the 
Kabirpanth, the Pañcvāṇī or Granthāvalī of the Dadupanth, and the Kabir songs 
in the Gurū Granth), which also include poems written by later adherents of Kabir.
From a comparative angle, what seems impressive is the great variability and 
versatility of this religious strand that allows for ever new articulations under 
changing circumstances and for the emergence of new possibilities. Institution-
alisation happened in various ways and on various levels – practical, interac-
tional, literary as well as organisational – differing in form and intensity in each 
case. This includes of course occasional closures and moments or processes of 
de- individualisation – and a fortiori the re-emergence of social exclusion – but no 
overall closure. Not only did bhakti retain the capacity of new inventions of new 
ways – and this did not even stop with (late) modernity –,30 bhakti also kept on 
relying on the active involvement of individual bhaktas.
3  Intermediate: universal recognition  
and the limitations of critical alterity (in bhakti)
Bhakti represents an opening, spiritually and socially, concerning experiential 
articulation, and concerning possibilities of participation. Enunciations by the 
disadvantaged provide a particular window on the dynamics of bhakti. What 
stands out in the textual traditions is the attention accorded to ‘lay’ people, their 
strong presence in congregational publics, and actually the space created for 
30 Early modernity had actually seen a new flourishing of bhakti in Northern India (Dalmia, Faruqui 
(eds.) 2014). For examples of more recent, 19th and 20th century bhakti ‘sects’ see above fn. 6.
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their articulations. At least some of the bhaktas who became renowned are shown 
turning against religious functionaries who claim control or exclusivity of access 
to the Divine. This means, bhakti does provide for those excluded or marginalised 
the possibility to express their religiosities in a mainstream (which does not have 
to mean dominant) idiom, different from local, village, or group-specific cults. 
This has two implications. It allows for Dalit and low caste enunciations in an 
idiom shared with others, a third idiom that transcends the limitations of con-
flicting positions or discourses and that, on principle, is not owned by any one 
side (Fuchs 2001, 266; 2009, 31). Bhakti provides spaces, platforms, languages 
which give individual bhaktas from excluded and marginalised backgrounds, 
as well as women bhaktas, wider recognition and lets them appear as included 
– in performative contexts and gatherings as well as in anthologies, canonical 
hagiographies or other lists of prominent bhaktas. Put differently, the specific 
experiences and visions of the marginalised as well as of women, suffering from 
discrimination of different degrees, can thus be translated into a language that 
allows appealing to others and conveying one’s existential issues to the world – 
the issues and visions thus being universalised (issues and visions lose, to some 
extent at least, their ‘particularistic’ character).
On the other hand, this development does not necessarily signify interaction 
across social divides beyond the realm of spiritual practices, or the translation 
of a shared perspective on life into a joint social agenda transcending social dis-
tinctions. While one consequence, a kind of secondary wave of bhakti, thus is the 
advance of distinct articulations of bhakti from among the marginalised and stig-
matised (but not of women) in the form of separate socio-religious movements, 
these represent only disadvantaged sections of society, but continue to employ 
the universalistic language, the third idiom, provided by bhakti (e.g. the Kabir-
panth, Satnampanth, Ad Dharm, and other sampradāyas; Lorenzen 1987; Dube 
1998; Juergensmeyer 1982; cf. Fuchs 1999).
Even though the degree of social recognition in and through bhakti remains 
limited, bhakti is a confirmation of the fact that some generalised recognition of 
human dignity was felt required – and this even more so after the weakening and 
(forced) demise of Buddhism in mainland India.31 Bhakti thus depicts a propen-
sity towards the universalisation of religious ideas and practices, of possibilities 
of liberation and salvation. This appears of particular relevance in a context in 
which caste distinctions, hierarchy and the stigmatisation of sections of people 
have sedimented and seem deeply ingrained in the dominant social imaginary 
out of which they are continuously being reaffirmed.
31 On the demise of Buddhism see the remarks below in this text.
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It is this combination of opening and limiting that seems of particular 
 significance, and again and again has had the effect of hampering the unfold-
ing of the possibilities of religious individualisation. It is the social context that 
infringes on bhakti’s potentiality, while it remains at the same time a constant 
stimulus for bhakti. This shows in many ways. The movements triggered and led 
by low caste and ‘Untouchable’ sants in Northern India, like Ravidas (c. 1450–
1520?), Kabir and others, including the Kabirpanth (since 16th or 17th century32), 
the Satnampanth founded by Ghasidas (between 1820 and 1830), or the Ad 
Dharm movement (since the 1920s), mostly did not find support from among the 
better-off. Among the vārkarīs, the Untouchable saint-poet Chokhamela (between 
second half of the 13th century and 1338) still has largely Dalit followers only, 
while the non-Untouchable, but low caste Tukaram (1608–1649), after alleg-
edly having faced rejections during his lifetime, became the most venerated of 
the Maharashtrian sants. Exceptions are few and have had no larger impact. In 
the case of the Bavaripanth, whose first poet-saints are considered to have been 
Muslims, and the eponymous founder a female Sufi (late 16th century), later gen-
eration high caste sants seem to have continued railing against the Brahmanical 
ritual order and socio-religious discrimination and thus kept this counter- culture 
up (Luge forthcoming). In the case of the lists of the much earlier Tamilian Āļvārs 
and Nāyanārs, the inclusion of a small number of low caste bhaktas, like Nan-
danar (between 660–842 CE) or Tiruppan-Alvar (perhaps 8th to 9th century), 
looks like a sign of liberality, carefully orchestrated, and at the same time like an 
appropriation of the low caste bhakti voices. Friedhelm Hardy gives the example 
of Tiruppan-Alvar a particularly emblematic interpretation: the Untouchable, the 
prototypical humiliated person, represents in his eyes the exemplary human in 
need of redemption: ‘[…] metaphorically the untouchable symbolises the unliber-
ated man’s distance from Vishnu in saṃsāra33: he is “outside” the realm of grace 
and salvation’ (Hardy 1991, 149). This practice of qualified inclusion extended 
to the cases of women bhaktas, like Karaikkal Ammaiyar (c. 550 CE), Antal 
(10th century), or Mahadeviyakka (12th century); however taming the deviance 
of these women bhaktas was of a different kind. In comparison to the situation of 
bhaktas from ‘untouchable’ castes, women in comparison, overstepping rules of 
decency, are permitted a relatively wider scope of infringement of norms.
All this illustrates: Bhakti is not a stand-alone phenomenon; it is, in certain 
ways, ‘parasitic’. Bhakti interacts with and depends on the existence of other reli-
gious strands and other mārgas. And this would be the other driving-force behind 
32 Dates given differ; see Linda Hess 2009, 174.
33 Transmigration.
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bhakti. The constant renewal, renovation as well as continuation of bhakti pre-
supposes other (and usually dominant) modes of religiosity and other religious 
stances from which bhaktas over and again distance themselves and with which 
they have to find secondary accommodation, again and again.
Bhakti is not self-sufficient. Bhakti depends on a religious and social context 
within and against which it positions itself. It represents modes of individualisa-
tion that require an ‘other’. It is this more or less critical, nonetheless connected, 
otherness that is bhakti’s signature. At the same time, bhakti extends the Indian 
religious imaginary in a direction that is vital, that of a pervasive universality. 
Extrinsically, bhakti means challenging as well as compromising with other 
strands of religiosity. Intrinsically, bhakti stands for the universalisation of liber-
ation and of human dignity, for relationally based selfhood.
4  Evaluation: the bhakti sociology 
of individualisation
Bhakti is inherently and fundamentally, and intentionally, relational. Bhakti 
stands for highly dynamic participatory interactions among bhaktas and between 
bhaktas and the Divine. The interactions that define bhakti provide a model and 
framework of and for what can be considered exemplary social relationships (in 
the double Geertzian sense of model). Incorporated into the modalities of its 
functioning and inscribed into the visions and dispositions of bhaktas, this rela-
tionality allows the realm of bhakti to open out to the world that extends beyond 
the religious in the strict sense of the term. What is more, this micro-social model 
points towards a macro-social interconnection of Indian religions, a specific civi-
lisational modus characterised by synchronic ruptures as well as specific modal-
ities in which these are being tackled. In very particular ways, bhakti brings to 
life the triangularity of relationships that as such may not appear unique – the 
relationships between the individual bhakta, other bhaktas and the Divine – and 
in doing so encapsulates a particular kind of Weltbeziehung, of relationships with 
the world.34
34 Regarding the notion of synchronic intra-civilisational ruptures see below subchapter 6 
(Final note) and Fuchs (2018, 141): ‘The image of synchronic ruptures contends that the respec-
tive civilizational complexes and principles coexist in tension and that they interlace at the same 
time by way of the interactions of the agents and agencies involved.’
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4.1 The triangle
The dynamic, interactional triangular participatory relationship between the 
Divine or God, saint-poet or guru, and the congregation of (other) bhaktas, is a 
model that allows for a wide range of instantiations. Norman Cutler (1987) may 
have been the first to suggest such a model, however based on the semiotics of 
Roman Jakobson. Emphasising the inter- and transactional dimension of this 
constellation, several aspects stand out: First of all, all three poles or positions, 
not just that of the guru or poet, not just that of the Divine, but also that of the 
more ordinary human followers, represent agentive powers35; they interact with 
each other, act on each other, put demands on each other. Therefore, secondly, 
the constellation, being highly dynamic, allows for ever new arrangements – all 
three sides continuously interpreting each other, reacting to the others’ actions, 
and interpenetrating each other. Thirdly, built into this interactive triangle is a 
structural tension between authority and reciprocity: while the humans need 
the Divine and the guru, both God and guru also need the human followers 
(God pining for the presence of the devotees; in some cases the follower is even 
imagined to exert power over God).36 But whereas the spiritual context, through 
the experience of transcendence, provides for ways that this tension is lifted up to 
a higher unity (Aufhebung or sublation in the sense of Hegel), the tension lingers 
on in the more profane interactive contexts.
4.2 Alternative relations with the world (Weltbeziehung)
To spell out more concretely what the abstract model enshrines: Bhakti redraws 
the social landscape, or what has been called the relationship to and with the 
world – Weltbeziehung in German. This was not the first attempt at such redraw-
ing, as Buddhism in particular had shown earlier. Bhakti and Buddhism at the 
core share ideas of universality of the worth and dignity of each human, as 
well as of intersubjectivity, empathy and care for others. But bhakti has shown 
a longer perseverance, not just because important streams of bhakti had been 
involved in combatting Buddhism (and Jainism), in particular in certain South 
Indian regions,37 but also (and not withstanding bhakti elements in certain forms 
35 Conceiving of them as just ‘audience’, as Cutler does, seems too narrow.
36 This applies in particular to saguṇa forms of bhakti, or forms bordering on saguṇa. See e.g. the 
case of the bhakti of Vitthala (Vaudeville 1987b, 224); or the case of the Gītagovinda (esp. song X, 8).
37 Bhakti representatives seem to have stood at the forefront of these combats; see Champaka-
l akshmi 2011, 23f., 64–6, 72f., 438–60.
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of Buddhism and Jainism) because bhakti remained closely associated with what 
became regarded as the Brahmanically dominated  Hinduistic fold. Buddhism 
could be, and was, exteriorised; bhakti was not. Rather, the oppositional or devi-
ating stances that bhakti enabled, being bound to its counterparty, got at one and 
the same time confirmed and demarcated with the elimination of Buddhism.
We find Weltbeziehung, understood as relation to the world (an externalist 
stance), used by Weber in alternation with two other terms, Welteinstellung and 
Haltung zur Welt, attitude towards the world. Weber applied the term preferably 
to the attitudes of collectives, including attitudes he claimed whole civilisations 
to hold. He was led by the idea of confrontation with the world, as if social actors 
would be occupying an external or outsider position vis-à-vis the world, and as if 
the world itself would be constant, invariant and passive, independent of one’s 
interactions with(in) the world.38 The term was recently reintroduced (by Jóhann 
Arnason 2003, Hartmut Rosa 2016, and others, following Merleau-Ponty 1962; 
1968) to relate to the way humans feel situated in the world and interact with the 
world, which the human subjects help co-constituting (Fuchs 2016, 225; 2017d). 
Taking this understanding, one can state that bhakti represents a distinct and 
unorthodox Weltbeziehung, or better, stands for a group of alternative Weltbezie-
hungen which share a high degree of family-resemblance (Familienähnlichkeiten): 
world relations of connectedness. In our case, this is not just about relationships 
towards or with or in the world, but here relationality – or connectedness – actu-
ally designates the very focus of this kind of Weltbeziehung – connectedness as 
both experienced and desired. The world appears less as a world of hard objects, 
but as personalised and inter-personal. Looking more closely, this kind of Welt-
beziehung implies:
(1) The phenomenal world and the transcendent intersect, the transcendent 
actually becoming part of the phenomenal world. Picking up a term proposed 
by other authors in other contexts, but giving it a specific meaning, one may 
speak of ‘immanent transcendence’, without confining transcendence to 
immanence. Even when in tension, both dimensions are not necessarily seen 
as separate spheres, but as co-present, related and continuous.39 Other than 
saṃnyāsins, bhaktas do not attempt to leave the world.
(2) Including the divine relationship not only implies widening, expanding and 
surpassing the social into the transcendental, but also means transcend-
38 See the critical discussion in Fuchs (2017d).
39 For Kabir for example, there exists no opposition between worldly and transcendent, inner 
and outer, social and spiritual (Agrawal 2009, 36; comp. Hess 2015, 361). The unbroken continu-
ity of worldly and transcendent shows in Kabir’s ghaṭ sādhanā (spiritual practice in the body) – 
without ghaṭ sādhanā ‘social consciousness and criticism are impossible’ (ibid., 37 / 362). 
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ing the social world as it is, towards a world with better social conditions. 
This finds expression in depictions of a utopian society like that of ‘Begam-
pura’, the city where suffering and sorrow find no place, and where there 
is no exploitation (Callewaert, Friedlander 1992, 126; Omvedt 2008, 106f. et 
passim; Hess 2015, 373). At the minimum, this implies better relationships 
among each other within the respective community of bhaktas. The option 
is not one of escapism, but a change of the quality of relationships in the 
social world in general – even though this quest is getting blocked more 
often than not.
(3) Social and religious selves are hard to separate; they belong to the same 
world. This finds a parallel in the modes of literary presentation and the 
types of narrative. The poetic articulation refers again and again to the 
everyday – everyday practices and social placement – and combines this 
with metaphysical ideas and the search for liberation. ‘The ordinary’ 
becomes central, and becomes the space in which (the humanised) God 
appears and does wonders. The ordinary becomes the site of excess; ‘the 
ordinary becomes excessive and (thus) extraordinary’. There is both 
‘transgression’ of the ordinary, as also its ‘reconfirmation’ (Vasudha 
Dalmia forthcoming).
(4) The phenomenal, social world taken in this wide sense is at the same time 
getting reconceptualised. Kumkum Sangari (1990) has suggested the term 
‘feminisation’ for this. This term might not exhaust what is new, but can 
serve as a good entry point. What Sangari has in mind is an ideal that in 
many ways is different from the attitudes that dominate society, attitudes 
of dominance by force. Femaleness as ideal is meant as a ‘mode of immer-
sion in the world’, and an attitude of ‘willed servitude’ to God as ‘ground for 
agency’, or what she calls ‘[…] a humble yet powerful subalternity’ (Sangari 
1990, 1472, 1537f.). She regards this as a form of heightened reciprocity that 
takes ‘desire and subjection, femaleness and moral duty in its stride’. Bhakti 
offers direct salvation, ‘the intermediary position’ now belonging not to a 
human agent, like the husband or the Brahmin priest, ‘but to the female 
devotional voice’ (ibid., 1473). Femaleness thus understood and generalised 
becomes ‘the characteristic relation of all humans to god. God is the only 
male, all humans are female’ (ibid., 1538), and many male bhaktas have con-
sciously adopted this attitude ‘in order to gain spiritual advantage’. Implied 
is the humanisation of social relationships (equal human dignity) as well as 
a humanisation of God.
(5) This Weltbeziehung is thus to be seen as the opposite of a ‘flight from the 
world’, Weltflucht or even Weltablehnung in German. Flight from the world 
is what Indian religiosity has been made to stand for, with Max Weber as 
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the strongest proponent of this position within the social sciences.40 This 
is being reversed from two angles: (i) Certain forms of bhakti at least stand 
for an expressly positive attitude towards the world and to the body.41 In 
this, anguish about one’s separation from God, the feeling of the ultimate 
unattainability of the divine – viraha – is being combined with an intense 
love of God and a confirmation of one’s worldly existence as a human by 
God. (ii) At the same time, and this concerns the second angle, bhaktas 
make an effort to connect to other humans. Hierarchy and exclusion are 
seen as denials of relationality. What has been termed feminisation means 
the subversion of the hierarchical and an articulation of a desire for relation-
ality. The lack (or restricted existence) of connectedness to others becomes 
the trigger for the search of relationality. What bhakti thus expresses is the 
reality of the potentiality of relationality: a search for the validation of the 
basics of humanness.
(6) Finally, the relations and the identities of the actors involved appear not to be 
fixed, not stable: not only is the world of bhakti a world of constant interac-
tion and changing contexts, also the identities and names of the (prominent) 
bhaktas are not stabilised, but are ever freshly enacted (Sangari forthcom-
ing42). One might also describe bhakti as a sequence of changing states of 
closeness and remoteness vis-à-vis God, as shifting between being with the 
Divine (and with other bhaktas), and occupying a place and role in society. 
People, and this would include the poet-saints, move in and out of bhakti 
engagements; they shift between the everyday and the specific occasions of 
bhakti congregations and events.
40 For the Bhagavadgītā (between 200 BCE and 100 CE) though, in difference to bhakti as prac-
tised in later periods, Weber reserves a slightly different form of Weltbeziehung, that of ‘indiffer-
ence towards the world’; see Weber 1978, 194; 1958, 189.
41 Friedhelm Hardy, in his work on (Tamil) Krishna bhakti and Shrivaishnavism, uses phras-
es like ‘positive attitude to the world’, ‘this-worldly attitude’, ‘world-positive (Hardy 1983, 234, 
314, 447). Karen Pechilis Prentiss, in her work on Tamil Shaiva Siddhanta, talks of ‘[b]hakti’s pos-
itive valuation of action in the world’ as ‘a constitutive premise of bhakti’s thesis on embodiment’ 
and, additionally, of ‘two competing world views in bhakti: the perspective of renunciation and 
that of affirming life in the world’ (Prentiss 1999, 18f.).
42 Kumkum Sangari (forthcoming): ‘In the dissident devotional field, subject formation oc-
curs in variant repertoires; it is individuated and depersonalised, affirmative and nonposses-
sive,  relational (not contained within its own skin) and translational, contextual and mobile, 
oral/musical and textual, linguistic and performative, social and renunciatory, sectarian and 
multireligious, and everywhere implies a lack of fixture, an absence of full ownership of names 
and selves as is evident in the circulation, multiple attribution, substitution and reattribution of 
names, songs and stories.’
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5  Conclusion: at the centre – relationality 
of selves
Bhakti seems an exemplary, fertile platform for religious individualisation. Bhakti 
allows for developing very different articulations of participatory devotion, and 
for different individual experiences, and is instituted in such a way that new 
forms are always a possibility. This does not mean that all what sails under bhakti 
would be full-fledged individualisation, nor does this exclude conventionalising 
these formats or limiting the scope that individualisation can take. Regarding 
bhakti we can distinguish between different grades of individualisation. There is, 
first, the basic concept of individual devotion or participation in God and the spe-
cific types of Weltbeziehung connected with this.43 From this we can distinguish, 
secondly, the emphatic, sometimes idiosyncratic practices and constellations of 
bhakti, as also the many creative moments of invention of new articulations and 
paths of bhakti over a period of at least 1500 years. We can further distinguish 
between two prime modes of individualisation: the first, from within (Purāṇic or 
other) established bhakti traditions, changing the avenue and the access to the 
Divine for people; the other, individualisation vis-à-vis or against established tra-
ditions, especially ritual, renunciatory, tantric or other non-devotional religious 
traditions from which bhaktas try to dissociate themselves. In the last case, this 
is often closely interconnected with opposition towards practices of social exclu-
sion and hierarchisation.
Regarding the specifics of individual sampradāyas or cases of guru relation-
ships, the individualising moment can, and does, of course shade more or less 
quickly into one or the other form of routinisation of practices, without neces-
sarily repudiating the individualising sting. At this point one can also encoun-
ter secondary forms of individualisation, agency and deviance that attempt to 
overcome tendencies of routinisation. Characteristic of bhakti is the constantly 
renewed chance of a fresh start and of breaking free of conformity.
The basis of all this, or so I argue, is the core emphasis on and experience of 
the relationality of one’s self. In principle, a relational concept of self is nothing 
new nor is it confined to bhakti. As a general idea it was proposed by pragma-
tist thinkers like George Herbert Mead (Mead 1934; cf. Joas 1985).44 Bhakti prac-
tices and concepts could thus be seen as not just supporting such ideas, but as 
43 Certain forms of bhakti can also be read as illustrations of a notion of dividuality, as set out in 
Part 2 of this publication, that takes individuality/individualisation and dividuality as two sides 
of the same coin. See in particular the Introduction by Antje Linkenbach and Martin Mulsow.
44 For Psychology see e.g. Andersen and Chen 2002.
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forms of social thought existent before the term. Bhakti practices and concepts 
would thus add perspectives to the modern sociological (and psychological) 
ones. What interests here are the specificities of the bhakti forms of relationality. 
This requires that the question of self-hood be taken as an open one, difficult to 
conceptualise transculturally, but even intra-culturally, and waiting for further 
discussion in the future.45 Important is, concerning Indic traditions, that we take 
the discussions out of the confines of philological debates about terminologies. 
The fixation on ātman (the embodied, immortal self), or jīva (immortal essence), 
together with brahman (absolute being), and the debates about ahaṃkāra (ego- 
consciousness), and the many other connected philosophical terms found in 
Indian textual traditions46 had long obliterated any serious engagement with 
expressions of selfhood as found in actual social and religious practice. For this 
one would have to get back to individual cases of bhakti practice, something that 
I cannot do here. But I can refer to the forthcoming Bhakti and Self volume (Fuchs 
(ed.) forthcoming (a)). The model just used, that of the triangle, however allows 
some general observations.
It should be obvious from all that I have said that relationality in the perspec-
tive of bhakti appears as constitutive for the self, or more exactly, for a success-
ful (gelingendes) self. Persons develop individual strengths when reaching out to 
others, to connect and even unite with some other, and with the Other, or when 
they defy dominant ritual as well as social norms based on their connection with 
others and with the Other.
This widely shared ground allows for various fragmentary conclusions: On the 
one hand, there is the recognition, and thus constitution of one’s  self-identity, by 
or through one’s divine as well as human others.47 Here the relation itself defines 
the core, or lies at the core (type I). On the other hand, there is the discovery of 
the other, and thus the recognition by the other, within oneself (or one’s self). 
Here the relationship defines the path towards self-realisation (type II). Signifi-
cantly, this quest for self-realisation has throughout been seen as embedded in a 
supporting, caring, empathising relationship with other humans (Agrawal 2009). 
45 Highly pertinent and an excellent starting-point are the discussions in Mark, Thompson, Za-
havi (eds.) 2011 and Ganeri 2012; cf. Fuchs 2015.
46 Puruṣa or conscious entity and prakṛti or single creative power; the tattvas or constituents of 
being; manas or mind; saṃkalpa or imagination and volition; buddhi or the faculty of discrim-
ination (Malinar 2014); citta as those specific elements of one’s stream of consciousness which 
attention centralises (Buddhagosha; see Ganeri 2017).
47 Recognition here broadly taken in the sense of Axel Honneth (1996). For an adaptation as 
well as critique of Honneth’s views see Fuchs 1999 and 2017c.
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Both conceptions can thus be seen as forms or modes of recognition.48 Again, 
both these modalities can and would have to be further specified. An example 
regarding the first (type I) is the debate between the cat and the monkey models 
of grace and the concept of self-surrender (prapatti; Raman 2007).49 Regarding 
the second (type II), the task is more difficult. Here it is for everyone to make 
their own non-replicable experiences, and each of these remains inexpressible, 
an ‘untellable story’ – Kabir’s akatha kathā.
From an individualisation perspective, this then would also mean that the 
divine other, which represents the universal, appears ‘individualised’ as well: 
becomes, in a way, an individual other, or what one could call, taking another 
paradoxical expression, the ‘individual universal’ vis-à-vis each bhakta.
What relationality or connectedness, against the background of the coun-
tervailing forces, then allows for is to conceive of different aggregate states 
of the self. What we encounter on the one hand are affected selves, which 
means subject-states affected by others, socially by the oppressors one does 
not connect with, as well as by one’s peers, spiritually by the Divine; on the 
other hand different degrees of permeability (Durchlässigkeit) of selves. Per-
meability of selves does not mean relinquishing the Self: on the contrary, its 
very permeability seemingly helps constitute a resilient self (as Kabir exem-
plarily shows).50
Analytically we might distinguish different – contrasting – possibilities of 
relationality in the bhakti context: negative and positive, denied and affirmed, 
non-recognitional (contempt, disregard) and recognitional (reciprocal). On 
the social level the modes of reciprocity of selves stand in sharp contrast to the 
forces of divisiveness. The experience of shared belonging in bhakti conflicts 
with the everyday experience of the afflictions of difference (distantiation and 
discrimination). Put differently, and keeping caste divisions in view: divisive-
ness and shared belonging, distantiation and reciprocal relationality, or con-
nectedness, co-exist. Bhakti is not able to remove difference and divisiveness 
once and for all or for the entirety of social life; bhakti can only provide a 
48 The first stands for a search for union with, and at the same time experience of separation 
from, the Divine; the second for the internal discovery and experience of the Divine (within 
one-self).
49 The reference here is to the debate between the southern (teṅkalai) and the northern ( vaṭakalai) 
schools of Tamilian Shrivaishnavism regarding how to conceive of salvation through grace. The 
Teṅkalais are associated with the position that God acts entirely on his own and saves souls out 
of his compassion, ‘as a mother cat carries her kitten’. In contrast the Vaṭakalais are described as 
adhering to the position that salvation requires some effort on behalf of the devotees, ‘as a baby 
monkey clings to his mother’. See Raman 2007, ix, 11. 
50 For more detailed discussion of the permeability of selves see Part 2 of this publication.
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 counter-position. Socially, bhakti marks the tension between the relational 
and the non-relational, or non-connected, the positively relational and the 
negatively relational self.
Regarding this duality, again the inferences drawn can differ: On the one 
hand we find the argument that bhakti allows people, especially people in 
crisis or in subjugation, to look out for a point of stability, a Fixpunkt, in their 
relation with one’s others – other humans, as well as ‘the’ Other. The idea is 
that of an ‘embedded’ self, but a self embedded in an alternative social setting 
(Pauwels forthcoming). On the other hand there is the question which Kumkum 
Sangari (forthcoming) asks and which, at least for now, has to remain open: 
‘Can an unstable corpus (of texts, poems, identities etc.; MF) yield a stable self ’ 
or only shifting subject positions? Does then the point of stability remain a 
dream, a point of desire? Does individualisation in this case have to remain 
fluid? Or does this only apply to the name-giving bhakta, the saint-poet, not to 
the followers?
But is the idea of stability required for notions of self? Can we not also think 
of dispersed and moving selves? Significantly, Kumkum Sangari has added the 
notion of ‘multiple’ (or multi-directional) personae to the statement quoted 
above.51 What this would signify is an openness for and to diverse others, 
and for diverse constellations and situations, kept (clamped) together, even if 
loosely, by an instance (Instanz) constituting a person(a) or a self. In the case 
of the name giving bhakta or (sat-)guru this instance may be references to the 
core Divine, while socially it would be the interlocking articulations that keep 
what is ‘subdivided’ or scattered among those who speak in his or her name 
together, the clamp thus being ‘enlarged to a point of elasticity that threatens 
to snap the thread’ (Sangari forthcoming). But regarding the bhakta followers – 
participating in continuing and elaborating the name of the guru – would their 
identification with the name-giving bhakta as well as the Divine not translate 
into  consolidation of their own selves, and thus an inner instance that integrates 
their (multiple) personae? An identificatory stabilisation pairing the smaller 
with the larger self?
What we find in examining bhakti is not generalised mysticism, nor is the 
world of bhakti ‘other-worldly’ (in the sense given to the term by sociologists of 
religion). What we find are conceptualisations of forms of relatedness, or con-
nectedness, that go beyond our everyday sense of relation and communication 
and that allow broadening the pragmatist-phenomenological sociological per-
spective.
51 For this aspect too cf. Part 2, Section 2.2, of this publication.
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6  Final note: limitations of bhakti  
as individualisation and socio-religious 
alternative
Bhakti provides a socio-religious alternative only up to a point. This is the kernel 
of truth of the often-repeated characterisation of bhakti as a counter-tradition. 
This signals not just a dimension of power. Much more deeply, bhakti, in its imag-
inaries but even more so as an alternative formation, remains dependent on what 
it opposes and at the same time takes from. It might be that we can here find the 
key to explaining the long duration of bhakti – as a thorn in the flesh of external 
religion and oppressive conditions that people again and again picked up – a 
lasting, unresolved ‘inner conflict of tradition’, to adapt the famous phrase coined 
by Jan C. Heesterman (who himself had applied this to the relationship between 
societal values, centred on Brahmanical ritualism, and world-renunciation). Indi-
vidualising and emancipatory forces are thorns in the flesh of the dominant reli-
gious realm, of ritualism, world renunciation (vairāgya), knowledge (jñāna), and 
even of the other alternative that is being labelled as tantrism. It is the dominant 
religious realm that keeps a cap on expressions of individualisation.52
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Anne Murphy
Sufis, Jogis, and the question of religious 
difference: individualisation in early modern 
Punjab 
1 Introduction
We open with a verse from a mid-18th century Punjabi-language poetic narrative 
by Waris Shah, named for its heroine, Hīr:
hauka phire deṅdā piṅdāṅ vicha sāre “āo, kise faqīra je hovnā je” 
maṅga khāvnā kama nah kāja karnā, na ko chārnā, te nah hī chovnā je
żarā kana paṛāike svāha malnī gūrū sāre hī jaga dā hovnā je
nah dīhāṛ nah kasaba rozgāra karnā bādshāha phira mufta dā hovnā je
nahīṅ denī vadhāī phira jamne dī kise moe nūṅ mūla nah rovnā je
maṅga khāvnā ate masīta sonā nah kujha bovnā te nah kujha lovnā je
nāle maṅgnā te nāle ghornāi den dāra nah kise da hovnā je
khushī āpnī uṭhnā miyāṅ vāriša ate āpnī nīṅda hī sovnā je (Šābir 1986, 144f., v. 254).1
[Ranjha] calls out, wandering in all the villages, “Come, if you will be a Fakir!”
To eat what one begs for, and not to have to work: no grazing of cattle, no milking.
Just bore through the ears and cover the body with ash: with that, become the Guru of the 
world!
By day, no need to work and toil; free then of the Shah himself.2
No need to celebrate births, and no need to mourn at death.
Eat what one begs for, and sleep in a mosque! Do not plant anything and do not reap!
Asking from others with a terrible grimace, with nothing to give back!
Oh Waris! To wake when one likes, and to sleep when one is tired!
1 There is no critical edition of Waris Shah’s text; the version used here, edited by Śarīf Šābir 
1986, is well regarded (see comment, for example, in Shackle 1992, 259, fn 32; personal communi-
cation, Denis Matringe, September 2015). For limited discussion of the manuscript tradition and 
some exemplary printed editions, see Shackle ‘Transition’ and Deol 2002, 151f.; and Matringe 
2003, 228–30. I make occasional reference to another version (Padam 1998 [1977]) when a pre-
ferred reading is found.
2 Nadho Shāh is given in Šābir 1986 but in Padam (1998 [1977], 122, v. 252) this is bādshāh (and 
the verb is jovnā). The Padam is a more accessible reading, so is used here.
Note: Thank you to Martin Fuchs, Antje Linkenbach, Aditya Malik, Beatrice Renzi, Jörg Rüpke, and 
others involved in the KFG program at the Max-Weber-Kolleg for excellent feedback on an earlier 
version of this essay, and for an enriching stay at the Kolleg from May to July 2017.
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This verse provides a typical description of an ascetic: begging for alms, living 
outside of conventional norms, and smeared with ash; it also features attrib-
utes specific to the Nath Yogis – practitioners of Hatha Yoga, Shaivite ascetics, 
but more generally known in the vernaculars of north India as ‘Jogis’ – such as 
the wearing of mudrāṅ or large earrings bored through the center of the ear. But 
there is much more at work here than immediately meets the eye. This essay will 
explore what is at stake in a portrayal like this, and argue that the idea of religious 
individualisation – the subject of this volume – can provide a valuable tool for its 
analysis, focusing not so much the individual per se, but instead on individualis-
ation as a process or, perhaps even more, a kind of possibility, as a comparative 
rubric across religions that undergirds this  representation.
This portrayal takes place within a love story, a narrative known in Persian 
and Punjabi as a qissā. Ranjha3, the lover of Hir, is the figure described in the 
verse.4 Ranjha has taken on the guise of a Jogi after losing Hir in an arranged 
marriage to another. Her family had rejected him as a potential suitor due to his 
less elite caste status and his relative lack of wealth: he did not fare well when 
property was distributed among him and his brothers at his father’s death, and 
while he is also from a Jaṭ (agricultural caste) family, like Hir, his lineage was 
deemed less elite than hers. This series of events brings us to this verse, where we 
see Ranjha becoming a faqīr, a holy man (an originally Persian term) as a Muslim, 
but also as a Jogi. We can see this, indeed, in this verse, where he speaks in a 
complex and mixed idiom of the holy man or faqīr, mobilizing the imagery associ-
ated with the Nath Yogi tradition, while referring to taking refuge in a mosque. 
This persona is inhabited by a Muslim main character out of despair over losing 
his love (and, as will be discussed, is a self-conscious ruse to get her back – the 
theme of the inauthentic or disingenuous Jogi, is important here).
How do we explain the ease with which Ranjha takes on the identity of a Jogi, 
identified as he is in the text, as Muslim? What is at stake in such a move across, 
between and within religious communities?
Such questions are not of merely scholarly or historical interest. Anyone who 
works on the region from which this text hails, Punjab, faces a dilemma: how do 
we account for the violence within this once integrated society of Hindus, Sikhs, 
3 The hero’s given name is Dhīdo, but he is generally referred to by his caste name, Rāṅjhā, a Jaṭ 
clan from a place called Takhat Hazara. With diacritics, the name is Rāṅjhā.
4 There are many versions of the Hir-Ranjha story, including the sixteenth century version by 
Damodar, and brief mention in the Vars of Bhai Gurdas, and in the Dasam Granth. The narrative 
inspired a large number of kāfī or poems by Bulhe Shah, as well as several narrative versions in 
Persian. See Shackle 1992, 244–7, and footnotes 4, 5, 9, 10 on these pages. See also Murphy and 
Shahbaz, forthcoming.
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Muslims, Christians, and others, as it turned violently upon itself in 1947 at the 
division of the region into the new countries of India and Pakistan, shattering 
Punjabiness (or ‘Punjabiyat’) as a lived experience? This haunts everything we 
do in this field, no matter what our temporal focus. On the one hand, we see 
the fact of an integrated culture. Farina Mir’s (2010) recent work, for example, 
excavates the shared ‘Punjabi literary formation’, as she calls it, that brought 
people together in the late colonial period, challenging a prior scholarly preoc-
cupation with explicitly religious reformist and agonistic dynamics in the period. 
She is right to do so, for the cultural production that she highlights – colonial 
period versions of the qissā or ‘narrative literature’ tradition of Punjab that are 
part of the larger tradition that the text we examine hails from – does articu-
late a shared sense of ‘Punjabiyat’ or Punjabiness. Indeed, Waris Shah’s Hīr is 
perhaps the most quintessentially Punjabi text one might identify, the text that 
the anticolonial revolutionary Udham Singh sought to take his oath on when at 
trial; Singh was executed by the British in London for the 1940 murder of the 
former Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, Michael O’Dwyer, who had held office 
at the time of the infamous Jallianawala Bagh incident, when British troops 
fired on peaceful demonstrators in Amritsar, Punjab in 1919. He had at that time 
renamed himself Muhammad Singh Azād, taking on both a Muslim name and a 
Sikh name, with a surname, Azād, that means ‘freedom’ (Bhardwaj 2007; Fenech 
2002). Waris Shah’s text is thus central, as Jeevan Deol (2002, 142) has noted, to 
the ‘Punjabi episteme’, and continues to be a valued cultural resource on both 
sides of the Indo-Pakistan border, as is demonstrated by its availability in both 
scripts that Punjabi is written in: Gurmukhi, on the Indian side and associated 
strongly with Sikh tradition, and the Perso-Arabic script, popularly known as 
Shahmukhi in Punjabi, on the Pakistan side (Murphy 2018a). On the other hand, 
at the same time that we have this shared commitment to ‘Punjabiyat’, we have 
the harsh reality of violence and division, now engraved in a border that sepa-
rates a once integrated culture into two nationalised, religiously exclusive ones. 
While religion has thus taken precedence in defining difference within Punjabi 
society, there are and were also differences along the lines of class and caste (and 
the oft-forgotten category of gender, too, which has a particular significance in 
the text in question that will be touched on here). I will try to reconnect these 
social categories here, in at least preliminary terms, alongside a consideration of 
the religious (On gender, see Murphy 2018c.).
The problem, although stark in Punjab given the history of Partition, is 
however one that reaches far beyond it. The problem is a broad one: how do we 
account for the shared religious worlds that characterised the pre- modern period 
in South Asia overall (recognizing at times that religious difference could result in 
conflict at very particular historical junctures and locations). Is this pre- modern 
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religious world the utopia we seek, a kind of precolonial oasis outside of the 
storm of colonially constructed and now post-colonial conflict, as it has been 
construed in the work of some scholars and cultural critics? (Murphy 2015).
This problem is also a historiographical one, because the problem of exactly 
how to describe in historical terms the complex cultural and religious formations 
of South Asia continues to challenge scholarship. A wealth of scholarship has for 
instance highlighted the recent provenance of the term and idea of ‘Hindu’, noting 
its changing nature and, I think most usefully, its contrastive rather than substan-
tive sense (Ernst 2004 [1994], 22ff.; Lorenzen 1999; Pennington 2005). Thus, for 
example, we can see in eighteenth century Punjabi Braj texts that express Sikh 
communitarian perspectives that Sikhs were contained within a sense of ‘Hindu’ 
in broad contrastive terms, at the same time that Sikh positions were portrayed 
as representing a clearly separate religious/cultural tradition alongside other tra-
ditions that were portrayed as similarly distinct (some of which are now included 
under the umbrella term ‘Hindu’) (Murphy 2012a). The term, in such texts, seems 
to function akin to the term ‘gentile’ in the West, indicating what one is not, not 
what one is (Lorenzen 1999, 639f.). We do see the consolidation of a caste-inflected 
and simultaneously inclusive and exclusive Hindu identity in the eighteenth 
century (inclusive in its attempts to articulate forms of authority that would apply 
broadly, and exclusive in its imposition of caste and other regulatory devices that 
would define membership along hierarchical lines), reflecting the articulation of 
a range of religious identities in the period, only some of which were integrated 
into this newly emergent identity (Hare 2011; Hawley 2011; Horstmann 2011; Horst-
mann 2009; Pinch 1999). We see therefore the rise of Vaishnav bhakti as part of a 
broader adoption of a supralocal and less tantric/yogic form of religious life in the 
late medieval/early modern period, and a kind of Vaishnava-Mughal cosmopolitan 
synthesis, as described in different but important ways a decade ago in the work of 
Kumkum Chatterjee, Heidi Pauwels, and William Pinch, and more recently elabo-
rated by others (Pinch 2006; Burchett 2012, 40, 318; Pauwels 2009; Hawley 2015, 
75, 124, 225). Chatterjee has argued that ‘the cosmopolitanisms’ of this period that 
interest her ‘resulted from the use of Vaishnava elements certainly, but Vaishnava 
elements which were conjoined to Mughal and Rajput elements as well’ (Chatter-
jee 2009, 150). She thus views Vaishnavism as a ‘trans-regional phenomenon that 
developed, matured and grew stronger during the period of the later Delhi sultan-
ate as well as the Mughal empire’ (ibid., 151). This corresponded with increasingly 
centralizing and categorizing discourses within elite philosophical circles as well, 
as the work of Andrew Nicholson (2010) has shown. So, we do see historically a 
move towards increasing definition and consolidation, but one which simultane-
ously never achieves full descriptive applicability; that only occurred when such 
processes were accelerated, generalised, and bureaucratized by the exigencies of 
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colonial rule, when incorporated and homogenised religious identities were given 
unprecedented political weight within the mechanisms of British colonial govern-
ance, such as the census and the legal management of religious sites (Jones 1981; 
Murphy 2012b, Chap. 6).
2 A history of crossing
Full description and analysis of what pre-existed and accompanied such consoli-
dation, however, has proven elusive. In the early 1990s, in keeping with a general 
celebration of cultural hybridity characteristic of scholarly work at that time, 
Harjot Oberoi argued that in the pre-modern period ‘most Sikhs moved in and out 
of multiple identities grounded in local, regional, religious, and secular realities. 
Consequently, the boundaries between what could be seen as the Sikh “great” 
and “little” traditions were highly blurred: several competing definitions of who 
constituted a Sikh were possible’ (Oberoi 1994, 24f.).
This ‘older pluralist paradigm of Sikh faith’, he argued, ‘was displaced forever 
and replaced by a highly uniform Sikh identity, the one we know today as modern 
Sikhism’ (Oberoi 1994, 25). Oberoi’s idealised portrait of this ‘alternative’ world 
was in many ways overdrawn, disallowing the historical fact of the unfolding 
articulation of Sikh and other religious identities; this was its flaw. Yet, Oberoi’s 
argument captured something extremely important about the transformations 
associated with the nineteenth century, and the shape of shared cultural and reli-
gious practices that do not fit modern formulations of exclusive identity formation. 
There is something about this that makes sense: we know both intuitively and in 
scholarly terms that people perform particular identities and positions in ways 
that are  context-dependent, non-monolithic and variable, and it is not surprising 
to surmise that this is a basic feature of human self- and social-formation. This is 
perhaps as much a feature of pre-modernity as it is of modernity. We should expect 
therefore to see diverse, changing, pragmatic and idiosyncratic choices made by 
individuals in complex religious environments.
It is thus somewhat surprising that such an interpretation has been rejected 
wholesale by a range of scholars writing in the last decade. For example, in 
addressing the ‘two genres of religious poetry’ in ‘two distinct traditions’ (Sikh 
and Islamic) that provide us with our evidence of early Punjabi, senior scholar 
of Punjabi, Sindhi, and related traditions Christopher Shackle argues that while 
the interests of these traditions are in some ways strikingly parallel, Punjabi Sufi 
poetry cannot be ‘properly understood without wider reference to the larger reli-
gious and literary traditions by which it is so intimately informed’: that related to 
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Islam (Shackle 2015, xi). (This counters an earlier argument of Shackle’s (2000), 
where he found that class supersedes religious difference in this genre.) Franc-
esca Orsini expressed a parallel view in an insightful essay on the multi- lingual 
nature of north Indian literary production – work that is extremely valuable for 
understanding the complex religious moorings of Punjabi cultural production – 
to argue that ‘the alternative to selective single-language literary histories […] is 
not a narrative of “composite culture”’ (Orsini 2012, 242). Both narratives of differ-
ence and of syncretism and ‘composite culture’, she argues elsewhere, ‘have had 
to exclude much of literary production to prove their point’, but she also notes that 
‘an alternative to those flawed narratives is yet to emerge’ (Orsini 2010, 1). This is 
in keeping with a range of other scholarship. Scholar of Bengali Vaishnava and 
Islamic traditions, Tony Stewart (2001), provided a trenchant critique of the idea 
of syncretism, arguing in part that the term fails in explanatory terms because 
it wrongly assumes fully formed cultural/linguistic/religious identities that are 
then blended (see also overview in Hatley 2007, 360ff.). This has been reiterated 
by many others since, with related rationale, such as by Carl Ernst (2003), who 
also usefully critiques the deeply problematic idea of ‘influence’ in historiograph-
ical contexts. Farina Mir’s exploration of the practice of shrine veneration shared 
by members of different faith communities was similarly framed as a critique of 
the idea of the syncretic, although there is more to her argument that will be dis-
cussed below (Mir 2006; 2010, Chap. 5) Yet, even as Stewart’s critique is widely 
cited in works I refer to here, which reject the usefulness of the idea of the ‘com-
posite’ and syncretic, this denial all too often can end with reassertion of just 
the kinds of reified identities that Stewart argues against. This is not to say that 
there are no merits to this work; far to the contrary, there is much of value here. 
Timothy Dobe speaks of ‘code-switching’ as a way of addressing the complexity 
of affiliations and practices, which he rightly argues has the advantage of ‘assum-
ing that individuals are self-conscious and aware of difference’. This certainly 
does allow for a valuable interpretive frame for understanding certain kinds of 
cross-fertilisation and crossing. At the same time, however, he complicates the 
very notion of such a difference in code, itself, in his valuable discussion of the 
complex configuration of the faqīr figure (Dobe 2015, 25).
One important example of this tension, particularly important for the argu-
ment I will pursue further here regarding the romantic hero Ranjha, as a yogi, 
is the very important case of the Hindavi prem-ākhyān tradition, which was 
written in an early Hindavi vernacular from the 14th to the 16th centuries, with 
themes and tropes from diverse traditions we now call ‘Hindu’ and with Sufi mys-
tical underpinnings. Aditya Behl has argued that this work ‘embodies an Indian 
Islamic literary tradition, the acculturation of a monotheistic faith and a liter-
ary model into a local landscape’, where the Chishti Sufis ‘promoted a surface 
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liberalism of outlook’ that simultaneously asserted their own hegemony (Behl 
2012, 19, 22). He is able to accept literary mixing, arguing that the ‘formation of 
creolised or mixed literary genres implies a world of conversion and conflict, dia-
logue and intermingling’ (ibid., 13). In religious terms, however, he frames the 
Islamic as taking precedence. As I will make clear at the end of the paper, I do 
not in the end reject Behl’s stance; there are real reasons for taking it (which 
is why speaking of a fuzzy ‘sharing’ is so problematic). Here, I note the stance 
and its limitations: such criticism of ‘syncretism’ or mixing, or the ‘composite’ or 
amalgamation of cultures, can end in the reification of just such identities that 
are questioned within the critique, to leave us with that which is already formed, 
and which in the stronger forms of the argument adheres to itself fully in engage-
ment with the ‘other’. There are, no doubt, examples of just this very dynamic 
in the early modern period. We see this in Sikh mobilisations of Nath imagery, 
for example, whereby Guru Nanak takes a Nath vision of the esoteric quest for 
transcendence and uses it to assert a Sikh exoteric parallel practice, such as 
in the Sidh Gost section of the Adi Granth (for background, see Nayar, Sandhu 
2007). Here, clearly, a Sikh articulation is being served by reference to Nath prac-
tices. But this is not how all such representations work. To argue that they do 
work this way suggests the radical incompatibility of religions and civilisations 
– a ‘clash of civilisations’ perhaps, in the terms described by Samuel Huntington 
(1993). It seems clear, therefore, that some further work is required, as Orsini 
suggests. How do we move beyond both an idealised but vague and ahistorical 
notion of the ‘composite’ and what has amounted to the reinscription of bound-
aries, to negotiate a more nuanced position between these two poles that have 
thus far been staked out?
How differently can this problem be configured, if we focus on points of inter-
section instead? As Nile Green has suggested, in line with Stewart’s argument, 
we are missing something in asking how Hindus and Muslims came together at 
various points when ‘the people we label under these terms had perhaps not yet 
come to see themselves as “apart” in the first place, at least in terms of a doctrine 
and practice model of “religion”’ (Green 2008a, 1056). Commonality, not identity, 
might be a more fruitful way to imagine what has brought people together. This is 
Farina Mir’s approach to understanding shared piety: she sees piety functioning 
‘in its own terms’, ‘as a parallel arena of belief’, unconcerned with conventional 
religious difference (Mir 2010, 177, 182). My effort in this essay is parallel, but dis-
tinct. I argue here that the idea of religious individualisation, the topic of this 
volume, has something to offer us in the study of pre-modern, pre-communalised 
(that is, pre-reified and agonistic religious) South Asian cultural forms, and that 
in turn these forms have something to offer the KFG as a study of the applicability 
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of its theoretical premises.5 Attention to the dynamic of religious individualisation 
reveals not ill-defined mixing or a blending, or ‘fuzziness’, as described recently 
by Andrew Nicholson (2013), but instead a concerted and joint effort at something 
else, a kind of ‘entangled history’ where ‘ideas and practices that strengthen or 
trigger individualisation processes are transferred’ and experienced as a single 
thing (Fuchs et al. 2016, 11). This is what matters: the connections among the tra-
ditions brought together in the faqīr: the articulation of an individualizing ethos 
functioning to challenge religious and other (such as caste, gender) communitar-
ian formations, at the same time that these formations are recognised and repre-
sented. In the context of Punjab, this ethos was positioned outside of communi-
tarian formations that had stronger institutional foundation. This, I will suggest 
at the close of the essay, is also one of the reasons why ‘Punjabiyat’, or a shared 
cultural and religious ethos, did not prevail in providing an alternative in 1947.
First some context. If we are to look back in time for religious individualis-
ation in Punjab, the Sufi poets, such as Shah Hussain and Bulhe Shah, provide 
ample evidence. Here, in Bulhe Shah, we can see a direct relationship between 
individual experience and the breaking down of religious community barriers 
(e.g. Shah 2015, Lyric no. 40, p. 68f.). Bhakti or devotional thought and practice in 
both Sufi contexts and beyond both challenged and necessitated certain kinds of 
individualisation, both encouraging (indeed requiring) the articulation of an indi-
vidual self that then must be overcome (Fuchs et al. 2016, 11). Angelika Malinar 
has noted that ‘the “individual self” received a new recognition in the context of 
bhakti’, and that ‘further religious pluralisation seems particularly intense with 
respect to bhakti communities and can be considered as resulting from individu-
alisation process with respect to doctrine as well as practices’, fed by both asceti-
cism and devotion, two forces that remained in tension through the early modern 
period (Malinar 2015, 406; see also Pinch 2006). Martin Fuchs’ contribution to 
this volume directly assesses this issue. Along similar lines, Imre Bangha (2000) 
has similarly argued that ‘one can perceive a subtle move towards the importance 
of individual life and sentiments in various South Asian literary cultures between 
the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries’, in both Bhakti and secular contexts. This 
is the world out of which figures such as Waris Shah, and his poem Hīr, emerge.
The figure of the Jogi in this qissā by Waris Shah bears the traces of these his-
torical dynamics among religions in South Asia – within a long history of contact, 
5 While certainly it would be absurd to argue that there was no communal conflict (that is, along 
religious lines) prior to the colonial period, the evidence shows that the politicisation of religion 
within colonial administration was unprecedented, and that it had profound effect. The argu-
ment for a ‘pre-history’ of communalism in Bayly (1985) does not account sufficiently for the 
systemic way religion was mobilized to govern by the state under British rule.
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and of transitions among them.6 As White well notes, while later commentators 
and scholars have privileged ‘disengagement of the senses, mind, and intellect 
from the outside world in favor of concentration on the transcendent person 
within’ as a descriptive norm of what it means to do yoga, Jogis themselves have 
not been portrayed as ‘introversive or introspective – but rather always as extro-
vert, if not predatory’ (White 2009, 38). Jogis instead were very much of the world, 
on their own terms, with some engaging in warfare, state formation, and family 
life (Lorenzen 1978; Pinch 2006; White 2009, 223). At the same time, they did 
occupy a place outside of ‘convention’: White has them called ‘“others within”, 
standing as a constructed antitype to the good people of ordered society’. It is 
not surprising that individualizing forces can be linked to this kind of contingent 
position, on the outside (White 2009, 199).
There is a wide provenance for Sufi/Jogi synthesis, and it draws on diverse 
representations of the Jogi figure across traditions – including within Hindu tra-
ditions themselves. Nicholson has thus argued that ‘Yoga in classical India was 
like open-source software. It was distributed freely and modified by different 
authors, all competing to come up with the best version for liberation’ (Nichol-
son 2013, 498). We have a precursor to what we see in Hīr in the Sufi-Jogi figure 
at the centre of the Sufi prem-ākhyān or ‘love story’ tradition that Aditya Behl 
has examined at length, where the transformation of the hero into a Jogi in order 
to achieve his love is one of the ‘formulaic elements’ Behl identifies as common 
to the four texts he examines from the 14th to the 16th centuries, as a means to 
describe a Sufi mystical journey (Behl 2012, 23, 71, 95). He is clear, as I have men-
tioned, about the ways this synthesis is articulated: ‘the poet uses the highest 
spiritual value in yogic language to suggest a Persian mystical concept, reima-
gining Islamic ideology in Indian dress’ and ‘Daud [author of one of the works] 
turns this symbolic vocabulary away from the Nath-panth and uses it to express 
the Sufi mortification of the self’ (Behl 2012, 96). Here, Yogic themes are por-
trayed as a ‘dress’ that nonetheless expresses core or inherent Islamic ideas. In 
similar terms, Shaman Hatley discusses Bengali Sufi Yogic material by arguing 
that ‘although the sources for this yoga are clearly indigenous, primarily the 
Natha cult and at a later stage Sahajiya Vaisnavism, Muslim authors encode their 
disciplines within Islamic doctrinal categories and articulate them as integral 
elements of a Sufi praxis regimen’ (Hatley 2007, 352). The use of Jog in Qutb̤an’s 
Mirigāvatī (1503), and indeed the entire genre, ‘here reimagines Sufi ideology 
6 One of the most commonly portrayed interactions not only among Sufis and Jogis, but with 
other figures (such as the Sikh Gurus) was the miracle contest (Murphy 2012a; White 2009, 200; 
Burchett 2011).
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within an Indian landscape and reshapes rasa poetics in Sufi terms’ (Behl 2012, 
301). The Sufic mobilisation of yogic ideas and practice is most vividly seen in 
Shattari Sufi practice (Behl 2012, 240, 304; see also Ernst 2005, 29f.). Yet, as noted 
above, Behl sees this as still embedded within a hierarchy: ‘The characters in 
the story, and by implication the Sufis, are not exactly yogis; they are like yogis, 
only better, as they can use yogic practices and language framed within a Sufi 
romantic poetics. Through this seeming logic [the author of Padmāvat,] Jāyasī 
spells out the Chishti Sufi claim to superiority within a local religious landscape’ 
(Behl 2012, 176, see also 171).
There is a broad relationship here between Sufism and Yoga that speaks 
to this set of representations. As Ernst has explicated in great detail in recent 
scholarship, examination of the evidence of exchange between Sufism and Yoga 
reveals that ‘generalities about Hinduism and Islam are relatively useless for 
shedding light on the significance of the text’ he examines (Ernst 2003, 205; see 
also Ernst 2005, 42). Something else, then, is at stake in the act of cultural trans-
lation and exchange. Yoga is so fully translated into Islamicate (not always strictly 
Islamic) terms and ideas that a lack of a sense of ‘radical difference’ emerges, 
Ernst (2003, 223) argues, and thus, in one example explored by Ernst, Nizām 
al-Dīn Awrangābādī (d. 1730), in a comprehensive account of Chishti medita-
tion techniques, ‘fits yogic techniques into an Islamic framework that supplies 
the intentions and ultimate meaning that yogis may have been unaware of’ and 
includes an array of hatha yoga mantras that had for a long period been adopted 
to ‘Islamic themes and Sufi practices’ (Ernst 1999, 355). Thus, ‘yogic practices 
could be assimilated into a Sufi perspective without much effort. In short, there 
is no Sufi concept of yoga as a completely separate system. It would probably be 
safe to say that there was likewise no hatha yoga concept of Sufism as a separate 
entity’ (Ernst 2005, 42). For Awrangābādī, ‘yogic practices of non-Muslim ascet-
ics are simply one more set of parallel techniques that can be added to the mix’ 
(Ernst 1999, 357). Ernst has shown that this is the normative frame for the under-
standing and integration of yoga and its practices within Islamic understanding, 
drawing ‘upon frameworks – political, philosophical, theological, or occult – 
that were well domesticated in their own culture’ (Ernst 2016, 423). Indeed, as he 
notes, this is the nature of universals: that they are framed within the language 
of the speaker. At the same time, the finding of such commonalities is itself his-
torically constituted. As Nile Green has aptly shown, by the colonial period ‘in 
India’s increasingly communalised colonial public sphere […] Yogis and Sufis 
articulated rival forms of physical culture and religious identity in response to 
the wider crisis facing precolonial Indian lifeworlds’ (Green 2008b, 285; see also 
292, 307ff.). This inaugurated a period of denial of exchange, despite the fact that 
it was clear that ‘on the ground’ Sufis and Yogis were in frequent contact and 
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did cross-participate – there were Muslim Nath yogi orders that continued into 
the colonial period, and the colonial period meditational manuals explored by 
Green, while governed by a logic of difference between Sufism and Yoga, shared 
‘transcendent moral and ethereal goals for the bodily practices they promoted’.7 
Commonality remained, even as difference was asserted.
We have travelled far, but now return, to the example with which we opened: 
the portrayal of Ranjha as a Jogi. If we can see in lyrical Bhakti poetry such as that 
by Bulhe Shah formations of religious individualisation, what do we find here? 
There is some of the mystical in Waris Shah’s text, but not a great deal. When Hir 
is challenged regarding her love for Ranjha, and is forced to face the Qazi who 
would wed her to another, she invokes religious claims as well as the sanctity of 
love to support her position (Šābir 1986, v. 208; she does this again in Šābir 1986, 
v. 217). She tells us ‘Where the love of Ranjha has taken up residence, there can 
be no sway of the Kheras’, utilizing the same verb used at the beginning of the 
work to describe what happens when Sufi patriarch and probably most beloved 
Sufi saint of the region Baba Farid takes up residence in Punjab. At the end of the 
tale, we hear Ranjha’s commentary on his state at losing Hir, with lamentation 
at vijog or loss/separation: Ranjha does appear at times ready to truly embrace 
being a Jogi, in despair, and even exhibits some of the miraculous powers associ-
ated with this role (Šābir 1986, v. 607).8 So we see devotional elements, and there 
are certainly also allegorical ways to read the text, as scholars have highlighted, 
but these function on a high, summary level (Deol 2002, 146f.).
Much more than these elements, however, we have the mundane, the every-
day, and intense interactions between people, often in conflict. At times, the 
most appropriate way to think about this text may not be through analogies with 
high Sufi literature and the classical Persian masnavi, as is formally appropriate 
in terms of genre, but Parsi and other forms of traditional theatre, such as Nau-
tanki (indeed, there are moments when Bollywood does not seem far off). Satire, 
irony, and farce recur. Najm Hosain Syed, one of the foremost Punjabi literary 
critics in Pakistan, has thus called its primary mode ‘comedy’: a ‘comedy, though 
7 Green 2008b, 289 for quote, 290ff. and particularly 309ff. on the growing denial of shared 
participation; see Ernst 2005, 38 on Muslim yogi orders.
8 Ranjha promises to cure Hir (after this verse for some time the issue of Yogis and their me-
dicinal practices and their efficacy are debated); it seems he almost is a Jogi (Šābir 1986, v. 371). 
Ranjha proves himself to be a yogi to Sahiti through a simple test, and asks her to tell Hir to come. 
She agrees, and asks him for a boon, recognizing his power (Šābir 1986, v. 501). It is almost as 
if Ranjha is a Fakir at times: he says he has had enough of the world (Šābir 1986, v. 577). Later, 
Ranjha prays (Šābir 1986, v. 586) and Sahiti’s love, Murad, appears (Šābir 1986, v. 587). After this, 
the two couples escape.
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unrestrained to the extent of boisterousness, still more a means of irony than 
hilarity’ (Syed 2006 [1968], 45).9 How else can one explain the fantastic portrayal 
of young women physically attacking Kaido, Hir’s uncle, and destroying his 
belongings, because he has told Hir’s parents about her activities with Ranjha? 
Waris Shah describes this as being like the attack of the armies of Lahore on the 
city of Mathura, to the south of Delhi (Šābir 1986, 76, v. 141). How else do we view 
the portrayal of young women engaging in uncontrolled behaviour in public, 
wandering in the wild on their own, and the violent girl-fight between Hir and 
Sahiti, her sister-in-law, about Ranjha? (Šābir 1986, v. 548–58, v. 416–8). These 
instances contribute to the ethos of critique that pervades the text, as well as its 
sense of humour. We thus see a portrayal of the faqīr as a commonality, across 
religious idioms, in a spirit of alterity, but also, as the absurd. Indeed, Kaido, 
Hir’s evil uncle, is also portrayed as a mendicant or faqīr. Why is he so upset 
when Hir’s friends attack him, after he has revealed Hir and Ranjha’s secret love 
to her parents? He complains that his opium and drugs have been stolen from 
him! (Šābir 1986, 78, v. 144). Within the farce and mocking we see consistently 
one element: the articulation of social hierarchies and rules, in tension, and in 
rupture. Indeed, this is inherent in particular to the Jogi himself, Ranjha, who 
is questioned and accused of being a ‘fake fakir’ throughout, reiterating a trope 
about the suspect holy man that has a long pedigree in early modern South Asia, 
which some scholars have argued is tied to a turn away from yoga towards devo-
tional forms of religious expression, as discussed above, although this should not 
be too simply drawn (On farce and satire in Waris Shah’s text, see Murphy 2018c).
My argument here is, I’ll note, diverges from Jeevan Deol’s: he highlights an 
‘erotic counter-current’ that he believes ‘forms a part of the poem’s larger dis-
course of social critique, which has as its main target the hypocrisy of organised 
religion’ (Deol 2002, 146). I agree to a degree with this assessment, which Ishwar 
Dayal Gaur more recently also asserts; both Gaur and Deol focus on famous pas-
sages portraying Ranjha’s conflict with a mullah at a mosque, and Hir’s debate 
with the Qazi brought in by her parents to bring her in line, as exemplifying an 
explicit and direct challenge to religious authority (Gaur 2009, 103–6, 164; Šābir 
1986, v. 37–42; the incident in the mosque is also discussed at some length by 
Syed (2006 [1968] 48ff.). As Deol puts it, ‘throughout the qissah, qazis and mullas 
are associated with bad consequences, and they often have a considerable hand 
in bringing those consequences about’ (Deol 2002, 164–8; see 165 for quote). 
However, I would qualify this position; although certainly Ranjha’s exchange 
with the mullah mocks his authority, at other points Islamic religious figures 
9 For more on irony, see Shackle 1992, 249.
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are portrayed in a different light. A Qazi or legal specialist, called upon by Hir’s 
parents, is shown as attempting to mediate between Hir and her parents, noting 
the very real danger Hir is in, disobeying her parents and the norms of patriarchal 
society. The Qazi certainly exhorts Hir to adhere to social norms, but also clearly 
states that this is in order to save her life.10 Her family is portrayed, instead, as 
the source of threat (Šābir 1986, v. 209–16). We can see this in this example from 
the text:
qāžī ākhiyā khauf khudā dā kar māpe chiha chaṛhe chāhe mārnī ge
terī kiyāṛiyoṅ jībh khichā kaṛhan māre sharam de khūn guzārnī ge
jis waqat asāṅ ditā chā fatwaī us waqat hī pār utārnī ge
māṅ ākhdī loṛh khudā dā je tikhe shaukh dede vekh pāṛnī ge
variš shāh kar tarak burāīāṅ tūṅ nahīṅ aga de vicha nighārnī ge (Šābir 1986, v. 118).
The Qazi said, “Be fearful of God! If your parents are angered, then you will be killed.
Your tongue needs to be pulled out from your throat, otherwise your shameful blood will 
be shed.
The moment I give judgement, at that instant your time will come.
Your mother says that this is a calamity of God, and look, sharp impertinence tears at you.”
Waris Shah, renounce your bad deeds, so that you do not fall into fire.
Regarding this ‘erotic counter-current’, Deol further argues that the sexual nature 
of the text is ‘counterbalanced by a refusal to acknowledge explicitly the sexual 
nature of the relationship between Hir and Ranjha’ (Deol 2002, 161). Such a char-
acterisation of the sexualisation of Hir is untenable.11 Firstly, explicit sexual depic-
tions are not outside the classical and the literary as Deol asserts; as Behl’s account 
makes clear, in the prem-ākhyān tradition explicit sexuality was embraced. Hir 
and Ranjha also very clearly do engage in sexual intimacy; there is an involved 
description of Hir at the end of the text, after she visits Ranjha the faqīr, where all 
the marks of her love-making draw attention (Šābir 1986, v. 514–38). The debate 
regarding gender functions also far more broadly than just in relation to Hir’s 
sexuality – the figure of Sahiti, Hir’s sister-in-law, reveals this (about whom more 
below). The portrayal of Ranjha’s appearance, throughout the text, and its recep-
tion by the Jogis in homoerotic terms, also adds far more complexity than a focus 
10 Islamic norms have in the past and present offered less harsh realities for women than those 
in accordance with ‘custom’ in Punjab and other parts of Northwest India/Pakistan. For discus-
sion of this relationship in the British period, see Gilmartin 1988; see Nelson 2011 for the exten-
sion of this important discussion from the colonial period to the end of the twentieth century in 
Pakistani Punjab. Shah observes the tension between Islamic and rural/tribal systems in Sindh 
today (Shah 2016, 10).
11 On sexuality and gender overall in Waris Shah’s text, see Murphy 2018c. and Mann 2018.
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on Hir alone allows.12 Deol has emphasised this highly sexual nature of the text, 
but this is only one aspect of what has been called its ‘earthy’ nature, as has been 
noted above with the discussion of violence and the absurd (Deol 2002, 158f.). 
The portrayals of Hir’s sexuality, as well as Ranjha’s, thus contribute to an overall 
sense of farce and rupture that pervades the work, taking a common highly sexu-
alised portrayal of the heroine just a bit further, with a measure of mirth and farce, 
just as all the interactions in the work go just a step too far (Murphy 2018c). These 
features contribute, to be sure, to the ethos of critique that pervades the text, but 
the centre of that critique is found most volubly in the figure of the Jogi, and in 
the debates about gender that are linked to it. All of it, however, proceeds with a 
measure of mirth and satire.
The problematic and probably inauthentic status of Ranjha as a faqīr is a 
central theme of the work. As he tells us: ‘sānūṅ joga dī rījha tadokanī sī jadoṅ 
hīra syāla mahobat kītī’ (‘I have had a passion for jog ever since I fell in love with 
Hir of Syaal’) (Šābir 1986, 163, v. 284).13 It is she, in fact, who tells him to become 
a Jogi and return to her, after her parents and the Qazi (as it is portrayed in the 
story) decide to marry her off: ‘tainūṅ hāl dī gala maiṅ likha ghaliāṅ, turata ho 
faqīra teṅ āonā ī | kise jogi the jāīke baneṅ chelā, svāh lāīke kan paṛāonā ī’ (‘I will 
write to you about everything! Go and become a Fakir and return! Go and make 
yourself a Chela at some Yogi’s centre, put ash on your body and pierce your ears 
[as the Nath Jogis do]!’) (Šābir 1986, 125, v. 223). This begins an important theme: 
is Ranjha a real Jogi, or not? His indeterminate status as a holy man, as well as 
the theme of the ‘fake faqīr’ overall, are important themes. Immediately follow-
ing this is a long series of critical comments about Jaṭs, the caste that both the 
heroine and hero belong to, albeit with the hero from a less elite lineage within 
the caste group (e.g. Šābir 1986, v. 225–7, v. 600). This is a persistent feature of 
this text: commentary about social categories and their critique. Elsewhere I 
have called attention to the congruences between this preoccupation with caste 
and discourses over caste that are visible in Sikh texts dated to the 18th century. 
One such text, the Gurbilās Patshāhī Das, challenges the hegemony of caste and 
articulates new kinds of social order within the Sikh community (Murphy 2018b). 
12 The seeming acceptance of Ranjha by Balnath brings on disgust by the other jogis: Look, he 
is ready to give Yoga to this pretty boy! (Šābir 1986, 153f., v. 269). The other yogis complain, and 
the Yogis abandon their yogic implements (selhīāṅ topīāṅ and mundarāṅ) and get violent (Šābir 
1986, v. 271). (In between, Ranjha accuses them of slander: Šābir 1986, v. 270.) Then the Yogis 
repent and get Ranjha ready for his initiation.
13 However, as Christipher Shackle points out, Ranjha is described as a faqīr as soon as he 
leaves his home on the quest that will bring him to Hir, so in his adoption of full jogi status only 
means that ‘his implicit identity’ has been ‘explicitly revealed’ (Shackle 1992, 257).
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While some texts of this period in the same and other genres reassert the impor-
tance of caste – in keeping with casteist discourses that prevailed in Vaishnava 
contexts, for example, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, discussed 
above – others continued to challenge these formulations. In Waris Shah, we see 
both the articulation of operative social categories and their critique; the text 
asserts Jaṭ social power, but often the stance towards Jaṭs is also mocking and 
teasing (e.g. Šābir 1986, 162f., v. 283).
The text features an extensive description of the interaction of Ranjha with 
his would-be teacher, Balnath, the beginning of a long and varied engagement 
with the description of Jogi practices and what membership in the Jogi order 
entails:
ṭile jāīke jogī the hatha joṛe, sānūṅ āpnā karo faqīra sāīṅ
tere darasa dīdāra de dekhne nūṅ, āyā desa pardesa maiṅ chīra sāīṅ
šidaqa dhāra ke nāla yaqīna āyā, asīṅ chelaṛe te tusīṅ pīr sāīṅ
bādshāh sachā rab ‘ālmāṅ dā, faqar us de haiṅ wazīr sāīṅ
bināṅ murshidāṅ rāha nah hatha āve, dudha bājha nah hove hai khīra sāīṅ
yāda haqa dī šabara taslīma nihchā, tusāṅ jaga de nāl kīh sīra sāīṅ
faqara kula jahān dā āsrā hai, tāba’a faqar dī pīra te mīra sāīṅ
merā māuṅ nah bāpa nah sāka koī chāchā tāīā nah bhain nah vīr sāīṅ
duniyā vich hāṅ bahuta udāsa hoyā, pairoṅ sāḍīoṅ lāh zanjīr sāīṅ
tainūṅ chhaḍa ke jāṅ maiṅ hora kisa the, naẓara āūnā haiṅ ẓāhirā pīr sāīṅ (Šābir 1986, 145, v. 255).
Going to the place of the Jogis with hands in supplication, he said “Make us one of your 
own, lord Faqīr!
In order to have sight of you, I have come from across lands far and wide.
In faith I have come to believe that I am the student and you are the pīr
God is the true king of all the worlds, and the faqīr is his minister.
Without a guide one cannot find the path: how can one make rice pudding without milk?
Remembering the truth, with faith, respect and patience, what do you have to do with the 
world?
The lineage of faqīrs is the support of the world, obedient to the chief and leader of the faqīr 
way
It is as if I have no father or mother, no relative, no uncles, no sister or brother.
I have become detached from the world, take these shackles off of my feet
Besides you, where do I have to go? You, Lord, are True Pir to me.”
Dubious at first about Ranjha’s interest in the Jogi life, Balnath questions him 
(Šābir 1986, v. 256, 258). This leads into an extensive description of Yogi life and 
beliefs, something that is repeated later. We see a great deal more on Jogis and 
their beliefs when Ranjha finally comes to Hir’s village as a Jogi, and enters into 
a lively and extensive debate with Sahiti, Hir’s sister-in-law; here, the origins of 
Yoga are also discussed (Šābir 1986, v. 350). We do therefore see treatment of doc-
trinal religious content, as well as genuine interest in renunciation, such as Ran-
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jha’s declaration of the temporary and pointless nature of the world: ‘khwāba rāta 
dī jaga diyā sabha galāṅ dhana māla nūń mūla nah jhūriye jī’ (‘All these matters of 
the world are like a night’s dream; we must not lament the price of all our riches’) 
(Šābir 1986, 147, v. 259; see also v. 257, 261).
Balnath describes the life of jog as follows (giving here a short sample from 
a long soliloquy):
aisa joga de vā’ade bahut aukhe nād anhat te suna vajāūnā vo
jogī jaṅgam gaudaṛī jaṭā dhārī muṅḍī nirmalā bhekh vaṭāūnā vo
tāṛī lāīke nātha dā dhīāna dharnā dasvīṅ dvāra hai sāsa chaṛhāvnā vo
[…]
udiān-bāsī jatī satī jogī jhāta istrī te nahiṅ pāvanā vo
lakha khūbšūrata pari hūra hove żarā jīv nahīṅ bharmāvnā vo
kaṅda mūla te posta afīma bajiyā nashah khāike mast ho jāvanā vo
[…]
kāma krodha te lobha huṅkāra marana jogī khāka dara khāka ho jāvanā vo
ranāṅ ghora dā gāūṅdā phireṅ vahshī tainūṅ aukhaṛā joga kamāvanā vo
iha joga hai kama nirāsiyāṅ dā tusāṅ jaṭāṅ kīh joga thoṅ pāvanā vo (Šābir 1986, 150, v. 264).
These pledges of yoga are very difficult, to play the unstruck tune of the infinite, oh!
To exchange for the pure dress of the sect of Jogis: carrying dreadlocks on the head and the 
dress of a religious order, oh!
Adopting the stare of meditation, concentrate on the Lord, and raise your breath to the tenth 
door, oh!
[…]
The true Jogi lives in the forest and does not lay eyes on a woman, oh!
There might be a 100,000 beautiful fairies and nymphs, but do not mislead your life, oh!
Even without marijuana, roots, poppy, and opium, become intoxicated and enjoy! oh!
[…]
Destroying lust, anger, greed and ego, the Jogi becomes dust among dust.
Wandering around singing and staring at women – it is hard for you to earn Joga, oh!
This Joga is for the few without hope in the world. What can a Jaṭ like you hope to gain, oh?
This passage illustrates two debates that are interlinked through the narrative: 
the relationship between men and women (sexual and otherwise) and what it 
means to be a Jogi, true and false. Here we see description of the appropriate Jogi 
attitude towards women – and Balnath’s doubts that Ranjha could ever become a 
proper Jogi as a result. When the Nath leader further instructs Ranjha and directs 
him to look at women as sister and mother, Ranjha rejects this, invoking his status 
as a Jaṭ: ‘asīṅ jaṭa hāṅ nāṛiyāṅ kaṛanvāle asāṅ kachkare nahīṅ purovane nī’ (‘We 
are Jaṭs! We pull ropes. We don’t string glass pearls!’) (Šābir 1986, 162, v. 282).14 
14 The exact reference of the ropes is ambiguous, suggesting the ropes of cattle, or perhaps the 
drawstrings of trousers that are commonly worn in Punjab.
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The debate continues until finally higher forces, the mythical paṅj pīr or five holy 
men, intervene on Ranjha’s behalf (ibid., 164f., v. 285).
The exchange between Sahiti, Hir’s sister-in-law, and Ranjha comprises 
a major component of the narrative: 60 verses, with the scene continuing with 
further conflict among Hir, Sahiti, and Ranjha for more than 50 additional verses 
(ibid., v. 327–87).15 In some ways, Sahiti is the real heroine of the text: she speaks 
far more than Hir, and hers is a strong and independent voice: Pankaj Singh has 
called hers ‘the loudest and most aggressive voice contesting the idle, impatient, 
intolerant, egotistical, quarrelsome, boastful, imposter Ranjha’ (2000, 62).16 She 
challenges Ranjha in all things, arguing at multiple instances on behalf of women 
(in contrast to Ranjha, who adopts very critical views of women) (Šābir 1986, v. 
353). In this we see the conceptual centre of the work: a debate on the nature of 
women and men’s relationship, and the nature of women and men themselves, 
alongside the recurrent accusation that Ranjha is not a real Jogi. This debate is 
prefaced by Ranjha’s arrival in the village: he is popular with the young women. 
When Hir hears of his arrival, she wonders if it is him (ibid., v. 310). The poet 
describes the varied responses to the Jogi among the women: some trust him, 
some do not, some are generous, others are not; this is followed by discussion 
of different kinds of women, by caste (ibid., 191, v. 322, 325). Within a few verses 
Ranjha and Sahiti are directly at odds, with Sahiti accusing him of knowing Hir 
and being a fake Jogi (a theme that runs through the work) (ibid., 205, v. 342). The 
description of types continues, with debate on the nature of men and women and 
social categories, such as through these words of Ranjha (in which women do not 
fare well):
tusīṅ aisa jahāṅ vicha hora hoiā, paṅja seriyāṅ ghaṭa dhaṛvāiyāṅ diyāṅ
mard hain jahāz nakoiyāṅ de, ranāń beriyāṅ hain burāiyāṅ diyāṅ
haṛa māsa halāla harāma kapan, ehah kohāriyāṅ hain qašāiyāṅ diyāṅ (Šābir 1986, v. 353).
You are different in this world, you come up short by 5 units of measure
Men are vessels of goodness, and women are vessels of badness […].
Chopping up bones and meat without regard for Halal and Haram, these [women] are the 
axes of butchers!
15 Deol sees the debates between Ranjha and Sahiti as only sexual, but this I think misses their 
full content (2002, 162); he talks only briefly about Sahiti’s criticism of Ranjha as a faqīr, and not 
about their debates about gender (2002, 164).
16 Her view contrasts starkly with that of Syed, for whom Ranjha is ‘the essential human being 
[…] shorn of all recommendations of money or influence’ and is ‘the touchstone for the world’ 
(Syed 2006 [1968], 53, 57).
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In this we see the conceptual centre of the work: a debate on the nature of women 
and men, and their relationships, alongside the recurrent doubt that Ranjha is 
not a real jogi.
Hir and Ranjha achieve their goal in the end: after Hir and Ranjha escape 
and are caught, they make a successful appeal to a prince for mercy (Šābir 1986, 
v. 593). This victory is fleeting, however, since Hir’s family murders her to prevent 
their marriage. Hir and Ranjha’s almost-success, however, comes through Hir’s 
intercession: it is Hir who curses the town (her, not Ranjha) (ibid., v. 608). Ranjha 
only helps her enact her curse (ibid., v. 611). Of course, he gets credit for the 
curse, being the faqīr (or, so it seems) (ibid., v. 613). Who has the power here? 
Deol argues that Hir’s curse is ineffective without Ranjha’s help – that ‘the world 
will only heed the words of Ranjha’ – but I do not see this incident in these terms 
(Deol 2002, 158). The text at its very end calls this into question, even as the story 
quickly ends in Hir’s death, and then Ranjha’s.
3  Beyond/within the ‘composite’ and the problem 
of comparison
What do we see in Waris Shah’s Hīr? Firstly, we see a range of debates around 
caste, gender, and status, in jest and in mocking. We see a challenge to religious 
authority, as highlighted by prior scholars Deol and Gaur, but this reflects a larger 
questioning of social hierarchies overall. This indeterminacy of social position is 
most centrally articulated in the status of the Jogi and the theme of the fake faqīr, 
linked to the debate about the falsity of conventions and critique of authority. We 
also see a debate about gender, which does not centre around sexuality  primarily 
(as Deol 2002 argues), but around a comparison between men and women that is 
in turn linked to a challenge to social conventions and authority overall. 
It is clear that what is at issue in Sufi Yogic transformations such as we see 
here is not the naming of religion per se. The aim of this essay is to suggest what 
might be named in its stead. Fuchs has argued that ‘individualisation represents 
an attempt by social actors to fight and overcome conditions that limit or con-
strain them with regard to their spiritual as also their political wants and needs, 
their search for self-realisation, or even exclude them from participation in (reli-
gious as well as non-religious) communal life and from liberation’ (Fuchs 2015, 
336). We can see in this text, in this struggle against convention and authority, 
and the fluidity of movement in and out of social roles, the kind of individualis-
ation Fuchs describes. What we see in Hīr therefore are processes of individual-
isation that are both religious and social, reflecting a variety of operative norms 
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and diverse but shared religious individualizing processes (Malinar 2015, 387). 
The social critique in Waris Shah’s text is paralleled by a critique of caste across 
the board in other texts of this period, as has been noted, so we can see this as 
broadly applicable to the period: the eighteenth century was characterised by 
violence and change, as centralised Mughal power waned and successors vied 
for power in Punjab (and elsewhere). The religious and social individualisation 
visible in the text under examination reflects this environment. We must there-
fore argue for modification of Mir’s claim that the dynamics she sees in colo-
nial period versions of the Hir-Ranjha story reflect the unique pressures of that 
period, ‘the contemporary significance and reworking of social structures under 
colonialism […] [and the] expression of anxieties produced by the social mobil-
ity induced by colonial rule’ (Mir 2010, 132). We can see a similar dynamic, and 
movement towards religious individualisation, happening at this crucial juncture 
of the eighteenth century, amidst another period of tremendous social change. 
This allows us to see that the religious crossing we see is secondary to the common 
articulation of religious individualisation that this text describes, across social 
and religious roles, even as those roles themselves are described. Bernd-Christian 
Otto has described four aspects of individualisation: (1) enhanced ideas about 
individual choices/options, (2) a focus on the self or on creativity; (3) deviance 
and critique which can include ‘openly criticizing established religious norms, 
concepts, persons and/or institutions’ and (4) a focus on experience (inwardness, 
spiritual transformation, the move toward enlightenment – the link to bhakti or 
devotional traditions, mentioned earlier) (Otto 2017, 33–36). We can see aspects 
of all of these dynamics here. Religious individualisation is what links Jogi with 
faqīr, here, and both to a set of challenges to social norms and hierarchies.
What is at stake in the mixing of religious idioms here – that problematic ‘com-
posite culture’ that needs to be explained today – is a drive towards religious and 
social individualisation, common across religious identities (and problematizing 
other social identities, such as caste and gender). It is the mobilisation of different 
technologies of individualisation that is at stake in the capacious choices that are 
being represented. As with bhakti, the choice to cross boundaries is linked not to 
an amorphous and ill-defined ‘composite’ culture (as has been rightly critiqued) 
but to the strategic destabilisation of authorities, hierarchies, and categories of 
meaning in order to foreground a form of critique, a kind of social and individual 
possibility, as an aspect of this early modern moment of religious and social articu-
lation. A vision of alterity is embraced within this process of individualisation, and 
as such it depends as much on those very boundaries as it denies them, allowing 
us to account both for both the articulation of boundaries and their denial (instead 
of claiming, as the more assertive argument for the ‘composite’ did, the fuzziness of 
things in broad terms). Frances Robinson in a recent essay has argued that ‘Muslim 
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societies across the world have been subject to a prolonged and increasingly 
deeply felt process of renewal’ since the eighteenth century, but reflecting a longer 
dynamic (Robinson 2008, 259f.). This discussion attempts to bring some historical 
specificity to one instance of renewal, in Punjab, in the eighteenth century, before 
its modern forms that Robinson and many others have detailed.
The religious individualisation detailed here functions in particular with 
respect to the cultural resources of early Punjabi as a language and literature posi-
tioned in interstitial locations, rather than in courtly and institutional religious 
contexts, in the early modern period. This can help us to understand in a new 
way cultural production in early modern Punjabi outside of the court patronage, 
which has been associated with the achievement of literary vernacular cultural 
production in the subcontinent (e.g. Busch 2011). These questions, I believe, must 
fundamentally inform our understanding of religious identity in Punjab and the 
emergence of the language of Punjabi as a literary vernacular in the early modern 
period, and as a language of literature on the outside (Murphy 2019).
There are dangers to this argument, however, and I am well aware of them. 
First is the problem of any attempt to look across cultures/histories/religions to 
understand parallels. This argument can be seen to be akin to the designation of 
an underspecified ‘mystical’, for example, as a common religious core, regardless 
of historical difference, through the claim that the mystical is beyond descrip-
tion. If we fail to attempt comparison, however, we lack the ability to discern 
any explanatory or analytical mechanisms that ‘cross boundaries’ – which only 
reifies those boundaries themselves. This is the problem this essay began with. 
There clearly was, in short, something to compare and find in common for Sufis 
and Yogis, at particular times and in particular locations. I hope that the histor-
ically specificity engaged here allows us to avoid destructive simplification, to 
engage comparison in a way that discerns what was visible to some in their own 
time (regarding common technologies of knowledge production and physical 
transformation, for example). To put it simply, they have already compared and 
found commonality. It is a wonder why we have trouble doing so as well.
The second danger is related, although perhaps not in a way that is immedi-
ately apparent; it is also particular to the histories and contexts examined. Sufism 
has often been framed as ‘outside’ of Islam, as a way of domesticating it within 
the Indian national imaginary. As Partha Chatterjee noted in 1993, this national 
imaginary was built on claims to a Hindu classical past; we see the ramifications 
of this today in India. His words are worthy of long quotation:
The real difficulty was with Islam in India, which could claim, within the same classicizing 
mode, an alternative classical tradition. The nationalist past had been constructed by the 
early generation of the Bengali intelligentsia as a “Hindu” past, regardless of the fact that 
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the appellation was of recent vintage and that the revivalism chose to define itself by a 
name given to it by “others”. This history of the nation could accommodate Islam only as 
a foreign element, domesticated by shearing its own lineages of a classical past. Popular 
Islam could then be incorporated in the national culture in the doubly sanitized form of 
syncretism.  (Chatterjee 1993, 73f.; see also discussion in Ernst 2005).
This explains Behl’s decision to emphasise the Islamic nature of the prem-ākhyān 
tradition, to combat earlier efforts to ‘fit’ these texts within a ‘Hindi’ (not Urdu) 
literary canon by de-emphasizing their Islamic nature (Behl 2012, Chap. 1). We 
can see parallels in India today, where the absorption of a de-Islamicised and 
therefore ‘safe’ Sufism can accompany the continued exclusion of Muslims. The 
problematic of the binary of ‘composite’ vs. reified boundaries possesses urgent 
contemporary force. For this reason, I do not ultimately reject Behl’s characteri-
sation, his efforts to characterise the prem-ākhyān tradition as essentially Muslim. 
The politics of our day require it.
While terms like ‘mysticism’ are laden with both theological and ideo-
logical content, so too is any explanatory mechanism (and the effort to avoid 
one). (Green 2008, 1046ff.) The idea of religious individualisation as a process 
engaged by religious actors can perhaps allow us a heuristic device that moves 
beyond the binary of the undefined ‘composite’ and reified identity, to appreci-
ate a shared quest from within. There are two things which save us falling into 
simplistic evolutionary schema (both those that posit a simple rise or a fall in 
rationality, individualism or even religious ‘purity’): first, that religious individ-
ualisation is not a teleological process that reaches somewhere and is finished; 
instead, it appears in multiple cultural and historical contexts (and thus, for 
example, might have been a feature of Punjabi, Sufi, or Yogi contexts at multiple 
points in the past and today; here we name only one); and second, that this is 
not a simple opposition, that deindividualizing forces always accompany indi-
vidualizing ones, the striving towards ‘traditionality’ that Otto speaks of (Otto 
2017, 49). These are dynamic relationships, not simple oppositions. Thus, they 
rely upon each other, and this is why we see so often in Waris Shah’s text the 
articulation of both hegemonic forms of social organisation alongside their cri-
tique: the threat of violence against Hir (which eventually is fulfilled) by her 
family, when she dares to love Ranjha. They discuss violence as a means of re- 
establishing control, and she asserts the evil of killing daughters (Šābir 1986, 
v. 115). The social norm and its rupture are both present in the text, side by side. 
We are meant to sympathise with Hir, perhaps, but we also see the other side.
If we remain aware of the dangers of simplistic formulations along these 
lines, there is a broader possible explanatory power of this line of inquiry that 
brings us back to the problem articulated at the opening: the division of Punjab 
in 1947. A wealth of literature has demonstrated how contingent this division was, 
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how it could have gone, until very late in the day, either way. We can perhaps 
understand what was arrayed against it, through our line of inquiry here. If the 
cross-religious, the in-between, both as kind of bhakti or devotional experience 
(as we saw with Bulhe Shah) and as a form of religio-social critique (as with Waris 
Shah) was tied foundationally to religious individualisation, it was grounded 
outside of the less individualizing institutional realms that received patronage 
in the colonial period. At that time, colonial administrative mechanisms encour-
aged collective organisation that denied the religiously individualist, demanding 
the designation of exclusionary religious identities, for example, and imposing 
judgements about the definition of such identities that privileged classical and 
canonical texts that did not seat or voice the individualizing discourses that were 
so prevalent in the non-canonical such as Waris Shah. This allows us to think in 
clearer analytical terms about the forces that failed to prevail in 1947, given that 
they found no institutional purchase in a colonial environment that theoretically 
privileged the ‘modern’ but in practice gave voice to entrenched institutional and 
communal forces and denied recourse to any discourse of the individualised, 
marked as that discourse was by ‘mixing’, by the vernacular.17 It was in the colo-
nial period, we must remember, that Sufi ascetics and Nath Jogis came to be seen 
as competitors, rather than allies. Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims: all were under pres-
sure to deny their points of intersection, and to cleanse themselves of locations 
where other conversations were ongoing, outside of a clear community defini-
tion. Thus we have a way out of the fuzziness of ‘composite culture’, towards a 
specific and particular understanding of a capacious vernacular religious posi-
tioning on the outside, positioned here as a specific effect of religious individual-
izing processes that were excluded from power within the colonial frame. This is 
why shared forces did not find the social power to counter the forces of division 
that prevailed in 1947, as strong as they were. These particular, individualizing 
tendencies persist today, within religions18 and across them, and particularly 
within ongoing modern Punjabi vernacular cultural production that exceeds the 
interests of the state and religious hierarchies alike, across the Indo-Pakistan 
border (Murphy 2018a). But that is a story for another day.
17 There is a large literature that demonstrates the ways British rule contributed to the construc-
tion of “feudal” and non-modern cultural forms; one of the most compelling is Ali 1988.
18 As portrayed in the brilliant trilogy of films by Ajay Bhardwaj 2005; 2007; 2012.
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 Afterword: the social lives of religious 
individualisation
1 Looking beyond the individual
To consider the individual is to consider contexts, entanglements, and histories 
of the constitution of personhood in diverse locations: temporal, geographic, and 
cultural. Religious individualisation is enabled, taught, experienced, and denied 
within social contexts, and embedded within social relationships and structures. 
While the relevance of these has been denied by certain thinkers, as Andrés 
 Quero-Sánchez’s contribution makes clear through his work on the German Ideal-
ist philosopher Friedrich Schelling, these thinkers still recognise the constitutive 
nature of such particular entanglements – that which is not the Absolute, that 
which is contingent and incomplete – as a kind of threat to the Absolute of the Idea, 
in itself. Even in its denial and as threat, then, the social demands full  recognition.
The articles in this section present different refractive views of the social 
entanglements that constitute the conditions of possibility for religious indi-
vidualisation, and show how the intimate and dynamic relationship between 
such individualisation and the social ground can both give it life and prevent its 
flowering. We see how relationships to religious authority and/or divinity infuse 
particular force and meaning to relationships between co-religionists in Martin 
Fuchs’ exploration of bhakti, and simultaneously how individualisation can both 
challenge and enable particular forms of social engagements and forms of cri-
tique, in Anne Murphy’s contribution. Rubina Raja’s article shows how material 
culture represents an imprint or trace, a kind of relic one might say, of the indi-
vidual’s role within a larger social-religious matrix. The individual, in this case, 
is made visible within the material trace, but simultaneously expresses multiple 
socially embedded allegiances and choices. To consider the individual as being 
outside of the social, is, in this case, to misapprehend the conditions which allow 
for the individual’s emergence, and to ignore the ways in which the social func-
tions to provide a meaningful location for the individual.
Looking beyond the individual, then, is key to a full understanding of religious 
individualisation and of the ways in which connectivities and social contexts consti-
tute the individual in fundamental terms. As will be discussed below, this suggests 
that the individual should be seen as an inherently relational figure – the flawed 
particular, one might say, in the terms laid out in Quero-Sánchez’s article – as well as 
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a self that is not bounded, is internally ‘sub-divided’, shifting (Murphy, Raja, Fuchs, 
as well as the subject of Part 2 in this publication). At the same time, as explored in 
Part 3, institutionalising forces are therefore fundamentally tied to the articulation 
of the individual, representing the social dimension of the individualising drive.
2  Seeing the religious through the social  
and the social through the religious
Can religious experience and the religious exist without the social, without the 
group, the unit? Can the individual act within a religious setting without a rela-
tional (and in this sense social) framework? Can processes of religious individ-
ualisation exist without the social at its core? The articles in this section allow 
us to view the religious through the lens of the social and vice versa. The social 
functions as a platform for communication and the means for the constitution of 
the group, the event, the text, the inscription, and the monument. This, in turn, 
perhaps paradoxically, provides possibilities for expression of the individual. The 
social, however, is constituted differently, and this partly under the influence of 
respective processes of individualisation.
We see the possibilities for expression of the individual clearly in the case 
of the Palmyrene tesserae examined by Raja: how a highly structured religious 
framework and the events which took place within this framework over time 
allowed for a high degree of individualisation in terms of how the entrance tickets 
to religious banquets, commissioned by individuals, were shaped through the 
visual language which they carried. On the one hand, these tickets are evidence 
for individual choices; on the other hand they were responses to a social frame-
work around which the religious life in Palmyra was structured.
The same basic principle can be found in the case of bhakti, which is the 
topic of Fuchs’ contribution. Through providing religious individualisation for, 
in principle, everyone including marginalized people, bhakti is at the same time 
also based on the relational (individual-group, group-divine, individual-divine) 
as well as participational action. Through emphasis on connectedness and 
 self- affirmation, the religious is strengthened through the group and at the same 
time allows for a firm location of the individual and processes of individualis-
ation within this framework. Equally, the individual self is opened and opening 
out to others, ‘the’ Other, and the world, via its relations. In early modern Punjab 
literature, as presented by Murphy, processes of religious individualisation 
provide a framework within which religious as well as social differences are rec-
onciled, integrated and equilibrated through the individual and his/her actions. 
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Regarding both the Punjabi and the general bhakti cases, all this has to be seen 
against the background of the (rigid) rules that inform worldly social relation-
ships, which are both deeply hierarchical and gendered. In the writings of Schell-
ing, as presented by Quero-Sánchez, an absolute rejection of the social aspects 
of the religious is encountered. However, through this extreme rejection, it also 
becomes starkly clear that this sort of individualisation could not have been 
voiced without ‘bouncing’ off the group, family and friendships. In this extreme 
case, one (the individual and the individualisation process) could in fact not exist 
without the other (the group and the social).
Reversing the perspective and seeing the social through the religious, we see 
in all four cases in this section not only that the social provides a ground upon 
which processes of religious individualisation are, if not promoted, then at least 
made possible, but also how the religious mediates the social, at the very least 
within core arenas. The limits of the plasticity of the religious were invented, 
tried, pushed and broken down by individuals always while referring to a social 
framework, which created the relational basis of the individualisation process. At 
the same time, the religious, differently in each case, creates its own social. This 
coalescing of the religious and the social suggests factoring in what we describe 
below as a triangular relationship of the individual, the group and the divine, or 
the absolute ground. Mediated by practices through which each of these agential 
instances is experienced (ritual, material practices, text, performance, teaching), 
it is the dynamic between all three poles/nodes that keeps religious life vibrant, 
and which also is the source of changes and novel lines of approach. The lenses of 
the social and religious, when used to reflect upon each other, allow us to investi-
gate the processes and strategies of individualisation in a nuanced setting.
3 Interactional forms
In the above essays we have presented cases in which we see the individual (self) 
and the interpersonal brought closer together and related to what some call an 
underlying ‘Ground’, related to the ‘Absolute’ as described by Quero-Sánchez, 
or imagined in bhakti frames as a nirgun (formless) or sagun (with form) divine. 
This ground, absolute or divine, is included in a web of relationships with human 
selves and social formations, and this lends itself to notions of communication – 
relationships defined in or through communication. This ground or aspect of 
divinity is experienced as part of reality, part of one’s life and one’s relationships. 
At the same time, the experience of difference of the ‘Other’ (to whom one relates) 
persists. Thus the idea of transcendence within immanence, as invoked by Fuchs, 
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would have to be expanded. The image rather requires that we think of this third 
element in two respects simultaneously, on a horizontal level as constituted by 
the different actors or agents – the individual (self), other humans and ‘the’ 
Other – and with a vertical and paradoxical metaphor as a relationship to that 
which is experienced as the non-accessible.
The ‘Other’ here has a specific meaning. It is not so much, or not completely, 
the other as the unknown, unknowable and non-accessible, but it is that one 
with whom one shares something, or has something in common, and that one 
can thus address, experience, and expect responses from. The image itself then 
becomes one of intense (social) dynamic. In this sense the ‘Other’ is included in 
relationships with one’s human others.
The best way to depict this is that of a triangular model, but not one on a level 
plane. In this model the individual is not standing alone vis-à-vis the ground or 
divine, confronting God or ultimate reality, or being confronted by it. Instead, 
the individual, and the process of individualisation, grow out of social com-
munication and relationships. The relationships have to be looked at from the 
angle of all three positionalities involved, that of the respective individual, that 
of the co- religionists, and that of the divine, which seen from this perspective 
is both an agent and a patient, a subject of others’ actions, too. The way this is 
being addressed in the different contributions varies. It reaches from setting the 
basic frame of triangularity to a depiction and analysis of the different voices and 
actions within this setting. Moreover, the cases are distinguished in the way they 
represent these interactive dynamics.
4 The issue of representation
The triangular model proposed here indicates the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
representation in relation to the nodes that we hope to define. We have struggled 
with how to name its third node: it can be named as ultimate abstractness, reality, 
absolute, ground or divine. South Asian religions, for example, define aspects 
of this problematic through the terms sagun and nirgun, defining that which is 
named as either infused through the materiality of this world (‘sa’ = with, ‘guna’ = 
properties), or (with the second term) by its radical alterity from that world (where 
‘nir’ indicates lack). This reflects a larger conundrum in the conceptualisation of 
religion as a whole: the sometimes radically contradictory variety of definitions 
that exist for the transcendental force, presence, or way of knowing that is seen 
to undergird the religious as a category, beyond (although often intimately linked 
to) a literal and materialist understanding of the world. The inadequacy of our 
Afterword: the social lives of religious individualisation   319
representational abilities is an urgent issue in the case of this third node, but the 
issue in fact informs this whole discussion. Moreover, we speak of the self, but 
this is not intended to imply or denote a stable and unitary self. It, too, eludes 
easy and cross-culturally appropriate delineation, and the effort to define it is 
immediately undermined by the variety of its definition, experience, and artic-
ulation across cultural and temporal contexts. Instead, our operative notion of 
the self is one that is fragmented, performative, and contextually defined (comp. 
Part 2 of this publication); the same is the case for any understanding of the non- 
materialist aspect that might define the religious. However, any critique of the 
idea of religion that follows from this problem (and that might argue that religion 
itself does not exist) does not generally satisfy – given the strong parallels that 
persist despite differences, and because the heuristic value of a category is not 
necessarily limited by the problematics of its application.
Similarly, notions of the social must necessarily be flexible and multiple in 
their configuration, and must be seen as directly part of the self – the self here 
is a relational self, as Fuchs’ essay makes clear in the bhakti context, but can be 
generalised to a broader theorisation. Both material instantiations and textual 
representations here only gesture towards these elements, and these elements 
themselves are ‘fuzzy’ – they do not function as bounded entities, instead rep-
resenting a set of relationships that are dynamic. The three nodes delineated, 
which comprise our triangular form, thus function in dynamic relation, constitut-
ing and shaping each other in interaction.

Part 2:  The dividual self
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Introduction: the dividual self
Suddenly there is a young woman, in her mid-twenties, who arrives at the dhuni. She has a 
large, scarlet rhododendron flower in her mouth. She begins to circle the fire. People milling 
around move away to give her room, forming a circle of on-lookers. The elderly drummer 
who is sitting with his back to the wall of the small room beats his drum […] The young 
woman begins to dance to the rhythm all the while circling the fire. At one point she trips 
over one of the logs and falls badly on her side, almost into the fire. A middle-aged woman – 
her mother perhaps – tries to help her up. She continues around the fire one more time then 
she drags a large log that is partially burning with her to the edge of the temple floor to the 
left of the drummer and the small room. She is handing out coconut halves to pilgrims who 
come up to her to accept the prasad. “Who is this woman?” I ask people standing near me. 
“It is Devi, the Goddess,” they answer.1
The story outlined in the ethnographic vignette brings us to the heart of the questions 
taken up in Part 2 of the publication. Possession or embodiment is a phenomenon 
existing in the contemporary ‘modern’ world that makes us aware of the possibility of 
an experiential reality in which ‘the boundaries between an individual and her envi-
ronment are acknowledged to be permeable, flexibly drawn, or at least negotiable’ 
(Boddy 1994, 407). Embodiment presents us with a  multi-dimensional self and forces 
us to seriously rethink modern notions of individuality, agency and subjectivity.
The Kolleg-Forschungsgruppe has set itself the task to explore and compare 
processes of religious individualisation and its institutionalisation in histori-
cal perspective and across a wide range of geographically different regions. By 
investigating individualisation processes in a variety of non-secular (religious) 
and non-western contexts the researchers express a strong theoretical concern, 
namely to question the standard narrative of modernisation that considers 
individualisation as a specific phenomenon of western (early) modernity or 
(post-Reformation) Christianity. While the majority of investigations give proof of 
individualising ideas, narratives and practices in ancient, medieval and modern 
religious contexts of the Western and (South-)Asian  hemisphere – showcasing 
deviance, marginality and social critique, as well as more or less  successful 
processes of conventionalisation of individualisation – some of the investiga-
tions did not easily confirm a straight path to individualisation but opened the 
view for other, additional dimensions of self-constitution. Research on Roman 
Christianity, heterodoxy in 16th century Venice, or Persian literature of the 17th 
1 Aditya Malik, ‘The Swirl of Worlds: Possession, Porosity and Embodiment’; Section 2.3 of this 
publication.
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century draws attention to multiple identifications, dialogic forms of writing, use 
of pseudonyms, the split between the poetic and the prosaic self, and thus to a 
certain way of parting and pluralising the self, or acting with multiple personae. 
Other examples challenging the one-dimensional individualisation narrative are 
performances of divine embodiment, which can be encountered even in con-
temporary religious contexts as illustrated in the ethnographic vignette above. 
While a spiritual medium presents herself as a singular, individualised person, 
her agency has to be understood as a shared or complex one – the human and 
the divine merge in an individual body. To understand such ambivalences and 
multi-dimensionalities the research group engaged with debates in the social 
sciences evolving around the notion of the ‘dividual’ or ‘dividuality’.
The term ‘individual’ has become a commonplace even in contemporary 
everyday life and it easily escapes one’s attention that it is a word modified by a 
prefix. In-dividual presupposes something dividual, a divisible entity which was 
turned into something in-divisible. More recently the ‘dividual’ and its broader 
conceptual history has received some attention, for example in publications of 
Michaela Ott (2014) and Gerald Raunig (2015). Raunig traces the term in various 
societal and historical contexts and academic disciplines. He starts with Roman 
theatre and Greek philosophy, continues with Christian scholastic tradition, con-
temporary philosophy and anthropology, but pays special attention to processes 
of self-division in modern ‘machinic capitalism’, digitalised communication, 
economy and financial engineering. In her reflections on dividuality, Michaela Ott 
focuses solely on the present and suggests applying the concept of the  ‘dividual’ to 
understand the human condition in the context of modern realities. In particular, 
she explores the multiple bio- and socio-technological processes of (forced) par-
ticipation and appropriation of the contemporary human subject. Ott  recognizes 
the human subject as deeply relational and thus embedded in a web of relations 
and occurrences that have powerful effects although they are often imperceptible. 
While webs involve immediate persons, things, or events, Ott is mainly interested 
in those technological dispositives which spatiotemporally increase human com-
munication, interdependencies, possibilities of intervention and information  – 
in brief, which allow multiplication of participation (Teilhabevervielfältigung). 
However, such processes of ‘subjectivation’ are ambivalent, they have a flipside. 
They do not go along with increased autonomy and individualisation2 but carry 
aspects of objectivation. Based on the concept of ‘control society’, applied by 
2 Ott uses the term individuation in her text (2016, 19) to characterize participation under the 
auspices of boundedness, distinctiveness, autonomy and freedom. We replace individuation, 
which for the Kolleg-Forschergruppe indicates the ontogenetic process of a human being, with 
individualisation. Later and with reference to Ulrich Beck, Ott also talks about individualisation.
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Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, Ott asks whether freedom  actually turns 
out to be unfreedom, action to be patiency (2016, 26).3 She perceives the modern 
anthropos as embodied, governed, controlled and co- constituted by multiple 
others, embedded in partly unknown socio- technological dispositives of different 
scales (2016, 18). Against this backdrop of multiscale (inter-)dependencies, the 
modern human being appears increasingly self- alienated.4 Ott suggests capturing 
such de-individualising (deindividuierende) and self-alienating processes with 
the term ‘dividuation’ (2016, 27, 63).
Both authors, Michaela Ott and Gerald Raunig, have (re-)discovered the 
semantic field of ‘dividuum’ and ‘dividuality’ to especially describe contemporary 
processes of multiple and often forced participation of the human being in larger 
configurations, leading to de-individualisation: that is, unintended and unwanted 
partibility, loss of control and agency and thus self-alienation. While this is defi-
nitely an important and legitimate analytical approach, with the contributions of 
Part 2 of the Individualisation-volume we want to indicate and open up another 
trajectory for research and interpretation: one which (a) (positively) emphasises 
the existential moment of relationality and porousness between human beings, 
things, and the transcendent, and acknowledges the capacity of relevant actors to 
co-create the human being and her/his perception of the Self; and (b) recognises 
the human potential of partibility and multiple identification and belonging as 
creative and enabling forces in human interaction. As a starting point for an inves-
tigation into spatio-temporal ways of constructing the Self as in-/dividual, we will 
start our enquiry by looking into the anthropological debate on personhood.
The American anthropologist and South Asianist McKim Marriott was one 
of the first who took up the notion of the ‘dividual’ to characterise what, from 
an allegedly ‘emic’ perspective5, appears as the composite nature of the human 
3 Ott quotes literary and media scholar Mark B. N. Hansen, who sees agency no longer as the pre-
rogative of privileged single actors. He states: ‘Weit davon entfernt, eine unabhängige Kraftquelle 
zu sein, die von der restlichen Umwelt […] irgendwie abgeschnitten ist, operiert  menschliche 
Handlungsmacht als Konfiguration […] innerhalb größerer Konfigurationen’ (Hansen 2011, 366f., 
in Ott 216, 17). Ott states that in the light of the potency and spatiotemporal dynamics of those 
larger configurations it seems increasingly puzzling why an individual person still imagines her/
himself as an independent source of power and agency, as an undivided and distinctive individ-
ual (2016, 17).
4 Ott understands the basic relationship of human beings to their significant Others already as 
a form of dependency and thus as alienation: ‘Grundsätzlich selbstentfremdet, weil schon aus 
Gründen des Überlebens und Gedeihens auf menschliche Andere angewiesen und durch deren 
sprachliche Akte in seiner psychischen Realität mithervorgebracht […]’ (2016, 18).
5 The emic perspective refers to a view from within and Marriott claims to represent the 
 indigenous-Hindu view. The ‘emic’ is opposed to the ‘etic’ perspective, the external and 
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being in Hindu India (Marriott 1996).6 In contrast to the bounded individual of 
Western imagination, which relates as an undivided unity to other such unities, 
the Hindu person appears as open, permeable and divisible, constituted by incor-
porated relations and transactions. Marriott designates Hindu culture as a ‘trans-
actional culture’, characterised by institutional forms of giving and taking in the 
areas of kinship, parentage, services, ritual and worship.
To exist, dividual persons absorb heterogeneous material influences. They must also give 
out from themselves particles of their own coded substances – essences, residues, or other 
active influences – that may then reproduce in others something of the nature of the persons 
in whom they have originated. […] Dividual persons, who must exchange in such ways, are 
therefore always composites of the substance-codes that they take in […]. 
(Marriott 1976, 111)
The crucial point, so Marriott, is to understand that in Hindu contexts ‘those who 
transact as well as what and how they transact are thought to be inseparably 
“code-substance” or “substance-code”’ (Marriott 1976, 110) – the personal and 
the material element are seen as necessarily connected, as an entity. This has 
further assumptions: The substance-code-entities are of different quality and 
partible; the parts of substance-codes are in constant circulation; and all natural 
units (like persons) transform themselves by partition/division and absorption/
combination of substance-codes. With regard to the concept of personhood one 
has to conclude that a singular person is not individual but dividual.
Within the framework of composite personhood, hierarchical structures and 
caste relations open up for new interpretations. Marriot argues that in Hindu con-
texts strategies of exchange differ between castes, respectively varnas. In view of 
the fact that giving or absorbing substance-codes transform the composition of 
a person, those who consider themselves of high and pure status are constantly 
alert not to negatively influence their nature and composition by incorporating 
inferior, impure substance-codes. ‘Persons […] may preserve their particular com-
posite natures and powers by stabilizing […] their constituents, and by admitting 
into themselves only what is homogeneous and compatible […]’ (1976, 111).7
 objectifying perspective of the western socio-philosophical theories of society and action.
6 Marriott developed his approach by engaging with the theoretical works of Louis Dumont 
( especially Homo Hierarchicus 1970) and David M. Schneider (American Kinship: A Cultural Ac-
count 1968). Empirically he relied on Ronald Inden’s ethnographical studies on kinship and mar-
riage in West-Bengal. Deeply influential was also Marcel Mauss’ essay on ‘The Gift’ (1954; French 
original ‘Essai sur le don’, 1925).
7 Marriott distinguishes between four ideal-typical transaction strategies, outlined in ‘classi-
cal moral code books’ and observable in Hindu everyday practices in all South Asian regions 
(1976, 122–9). Firstly, the asymmetrical optimal strategy of Brahmins: the Brahmin, as member 
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South Asia scholars criticized McKim Marriott’s approach, especially for 
claiming an emic perspective while in fact applying abstract models and using 
mathematical language to illustrate the allegedly Hindu way of thinking (e.g. 
Moffat 1990). Another aspect seems to be similarly, or even more, problematic. 
Dividuality in Marriott’s argument is meant to explain and legitimise the power 
of normative codes grounded in Brahmanical ideology, and with that the belief 
in and acceptance of karmic destinies and hierarchical social relations. Further 
on, Marriott exoticises the Hindu concept of personhood by presenting it as the 
unbroken Other in comparison to the Western individual, imagined as absolutely 
free and self-contained.
McKim Marriott’s conceptualisation of dividual personhood did not cross 
the disciplinary boundaries of South Asian anthropology and even remained of 
limited influence within the discipline. When more than a decade later Marilyn 
Strathern re-introduced the concept of the dividual in her book The Gender of the 
Gift (1988), it made a far greater impact and triggered an intensive but also con-
troversial debate within anthropology and across disciplines.
According to the author herself, The Gender of the Gift can be read as ‘ethnog-
raphy of Western knowledge practices’. Strathern critically dismantles anthropo-
logical and feminist approaches and confronts them with what she constructs as 
Melanesian knowledge practices (1988, xi). As a starting point she challenges the 
Western assumption which claims that, also at the heart of Melanesian cultures, 
there ‘is an antinomy between “society” and the “individual”’ (1988, 12). Accord-
ing to Western conceptualisations, it is society (sociality) that connects individu-
als, creates relationships and works as a unifying force, gathering people together 
‘who present themselves as otherwise irreducibly unique’ and distinct from each 
other (ibid.). While Strathern considers sociality as a useful concept to describe 
the process of creating and maintaining relationships between individuals, she 
suggests a new vocabulary, which will allow describing social relationships also 
of the highest varna, is predominantly a giver; he does not accept any lower and imperfect forms 
of substance-codes in order to preserve his ritual purity and power. Secondly, the asymmetri-
cal pessimal strategy of Sudras: the Sudra is primarily a receiver of substance-codes that are 
considered valuable as they are coming from higher castes; the Sudra’s givings are limited to 
deferential services. Thirdly, the symmetrical maximal strategy of Kshatriyas: as a member of 
a politically and economically dominant landowning group, a Kshatriya strives to preserve his 
power through cooperation and alliance-formation by exchanging goods and women. Giving 
and receiving practices are balanced. Fourthly, the symmetrical minimal strategy of Vaishyas: 
members of this varna are traders, merchants, and highly skilled artisans; they do not own land-
ed property and are not involved in agriculture. They try to retain independence and economic 
mobility by minimizing exchange. They preferably give and take money, metal and grains and 
avoid goods attached to bodily substance codes.
328   Antje Linkenbach and Martin Mulsow
within an individual, or, in her own words, ‘to talk about sociality in the singular, 
as well as the plural’ (1988, 13). Based on Marcel Mauss’ idea of gift exchange and 
referring to the work of McKim Marriott, Strathern understands Melanesians as 
‘dividual’. Partibility and permeability are markers of Melanesian persons: these 
are the product of gifts, divine or human substances; they are constituted of the 
detached parts of, and relationships with, other persons through prior practices 
and exchanges (see Mosko 2010, 215). The following quote reflects not only the 
core of Marilyn Strathern’s theoretical approach but also of the New Melanesian 
Anthropology (NMA), which builds on her approach.
Far from being regarded as unique entities, Melanesian persons are as dividually as they 
are individually conceived. They contain a generalized sociality within. Indeed, persons are 
frequently constructed as the plural and composite site of the relationships that produce 
them. The singular person can be imagined as a social microcosm (1988, 13).
For Strathern, the plural and the singular – the collective and the person – are 
homologues. The collective as a unity of many is achieved by eliminating what 
differentiates them, and the same happens when a person is individualised: then 
the causes of internal differentiation are suppressed. She further highlights that 
a pluralised context can be the group, but it can also have a particular form – 
the dyad or the pair. In his ‘Strathernograms’, art anthropologist Alfred Gell has 
emphasized the importance of the dyadic structure, which underlies all (triadic, 
multiple) relationships (1999, 36). Why is the dyad, the pair so important? Single, 
composite persons do not reproduce, answers Marilyn Strathern: ‘it is dyadically 
conceived relationships that are the source and outcome of action’. Consequently, 
‘[t]he products of relations – including the persons they create – inevitably have 
dual origins and are thus internally differentiated’ (1988, 14). However, for two 
persons to be able to come together as a pair, each must eliminate the internal 
dualistic (and multiple) differentiation to become the unitary individual.
The dual structure of agency in Melanesian life-worlds contrasts with the Western 
concept that imagines persons in a ‘permanently subjective state’, being the sole 
cause and source of activity (1988, 338). In Melanesia, so Strathern, though the agent 
acts from her or his vantage point and consequently also for her- or himself, s/he 
always acts with another’s vantage point in mind; therefore cause and action, person 
and agent are split. The cause is the objectified person the agent relates to and with 
whom s/he wants to maintain or transform this very relationship. The agent is the one 
who, because of this relationship, is revealed in his or her action and constitutes a 
‘self’. However, activity and passivity, action and cause, subject and object are part of 
a mutual process and are evenly distributed. ‘The one and the same figure is both an 
object of the regard of others (a person) and one who takes action as him or herself on 
behalf of these others (an agent)’ (Strathern 1988, 273f.).
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To roughly summarise Strathern’s complex ideas: In Melanesia, sociality 
appears in two forms of plurality – the collective and the singular – and the sin-
gular plurality has also two forms: it appears as composite and dual (dyadic). 
As a dividual, the singular body manifests itself as partible and permeable, and 
represents a social microcosm of multiple relationships. However, dividuality 
is only one state of being. To be able to act, the singular dividual must become 
individuated: the multiplicities have, firstly, to be reconceptualised as dual, and 
then, internally, the dually conceived entity has to detach part of itself, to ‘shed 
half the dual form’ (1988, 275), namely that of the opposite sex partner, to be able 
to, externally, come together with another individual to form a pair. In her social 
life, a Melanesian person constantly moves from one state to another: ‘from a 
unity (manifested collectively or singly) to that unity split or paired with respect 
to another’ (Strathern 1988, 14). Although a person is intrinsically both dividual 
and individual, usually, and according to the social context, one of those charac-
teristics features more prominently than the other.
Marilyn Strathern’s book has been praised as ‘a milestone in Melanesian 
studies’, as the ‘culmination and synthesis of analyses of the person’ in anthro-
pology (LiPuma 1998, 74f.). However, it has also triggered critique. Relevant in the 
present context is the argument that she contrasts a widespread Western ideal or 
‘imaginary’ of the autonomous and detached individual with a Melanesian divid-
ual reality, which is in fact constructed from an idealist point of view. Strathern 
‘describes a world in which the real is an idea, or a system of ideas, signs, and 
so on […]’ (Gell 1999, 32). Gell even does not see the Melanesia of Strathern’s dis-
course as a real place that one could visit to verify or falsify the claims of the 
anthropologist; it moreover ‘stands for an intellectual project rather than a geo-
graphic entity’. Melanesia and Melanesian cultures are the ‘setting for a sustained 
thought experiment’ (Gell 1999, 34). Despite his critique Gell strongly emphasises 
the methodological usefulness of Strathern’s work, as it opens up new ways of 
imagining the person not as opposite to the social but as an inherently relational 
being. However, if we believe Edward LiPuma (1998, 74f.; 2000, 131), the strength 
of Strathern’s account of dividuality is also its weakness: a project, meant to rel-
ativize our own categories, can easily lapse into an essentialisation of the oppo-
sites and invite an ahistorical and relativistic reading. Melanesian and Western 
personhood then appear as incommensurable, the dividual as the ‘other’ of indi-
viduality.
A number of anthropologists concentrating on Melanesia and inspired by 
the work of Marilyn Strathern, took an effort to further develop her approach on 
dividual personhood; they especially aim to avoid her essentialist bias and, by 
following a historical approach and focussing on processes of social transforma-
tion, try to understand individuality and dividuality as two dimensions of both 
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the pre-modern and the modern Self. To this end, they argue, historical devel-
opments like the Melanesian encounter with colonialism and the colonial state, 
with Christianity, and with new forms of commodity exchange and labour in the 
context of capitalism have to be taken into consideration. They ask, whether and 
in which way Melanesian personhood became modified, reshaped, and altered 
within the new socio-historical contexts?
Most prominently, Melanesian Christianity was established as a major 
anthropological research area, in which concepts of personhood were dis-
cussed.8 The debate was triggered by an article of Mark Mosko (2010) in which he 
criticises scholars who present Melanesian Christian personhood as strictly indi-
vidualistic, and instead argues that Christianity lends itself to a dividualist inter-
pretation and tries to illustrate the dividual character of personhood and agency 
among Melanesian Christian communities. He sees the relations between Chris-
tians, and those between them and their deity, as based on forms of reciprocal 
gift-exchange: Jesus and the Holy Spirit are considered detachments of God, who 
enter people’s lives, are with them, help and heal them through ‘visitations’, and 
in return people give them praise through prayer, songs, sermons etc. Mosko 
argues that the concepts of partibility and detachment are deeply compatible 
with Christian ideas and teachings, a fact which could explain people’s willing-
ness to adopt the new faith as well as the rapidity of conversion in the region.
Edward LiPuma (1998; 2001) made the concept of dividuality fruitful for 
anthropological debates on the dynamics of Melanesian history and modernisa-
tion. He takes note of the fact that structures and processes of capitalism, the 
(colonial, national) state, international organizations (like The World Bank) 
and globalized Western culture engulf non-modern socio-cultural life-worlds – 
a process he calls an ‘encompassment’ of others (2001, 20). LiPuma recognizes 
that due to the powerful forces of encompassment, new structures and practices, 
but also desires, emerge and ‘the cultures and people of Melanesia are tellingly 
transformed’ (ibid.). For example, he highlights the mediating function of cap-
italist forms of labour and commodity exchange, which somehow reshape the 
cultural (dividual) form of the person in such a way that it ‘becomes progressively 
reified as a self-contained, self-shaping, independent agent’ (2001, 134). LiPuma 
strongly dismisses and argues against a perspective which disregards the com-
plexities of the transformation process, ignores the possible resilience of local 
social structures as well as conscious resistance against new influences, and 
8 See for example the following publications: Hess 2006; Mosko 2010; 2015; Robbins 2010; Err-
ington, Gewertz 2010; Knauft 2010. See also the contributions of Barker, Dureau, Scott and Wilkes 
in ‘Individualisierung durch Christliche Mission?’ (2015). Aparecida Vilaca (2011) tries to make 
the concepts of dividuality and partibility useful for an exploration of Amazonian Christianity.
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instead assumes an un-contradicted embracing of modern ideas and practices 
that do not leave traces of previous cultural particularities. LiPuma is convinced 
that both ‘dividual and individual aspects of personhood will vary across con-
texts for action’ not only in colonial and postcolonial Melanesia, but within any 
given culture (2001, 131); they are constitutive for personhood in all cultures and 
societies. LiPuma becomes even more explicit by arguing that the dual person, 
delineated by dividual and individual facets, is the ontological or existential 
form: The ‘person emerges from the tension, itself always variable and culturally/
historically shaped, between these two aspects of personhood and the ways in 
which they are objectified and embodied’ (1998, 75).
Tracing partibility and dividuality in an anthropological, but also in a dis-
tinctly modern, context is the merit of art anthropologist Alfred Gell. In his 
 foreword to Gell’s posthumously published book on ‘Art and Agency’ (2013), 
Nicholas Thomas highlights Gell’s concept of agency, applied to the field of 
art and strongly influenced by the thoughts of Marilyn Strathern. Actions are 
not expressions of individual will (the agent is not the one who causes events 
to happen, see above), but an outcome of mediated practices in which agents 
and patients are implicated in complex ways. Neither is the agency of the artist 
self-sufficient, nor is the art-product (the index) simply outcome and ‘end-point 
of action’, but a ‘distributed extension of the agent’ (Thomas 2013, ix). Gell does 
not restrict agency and patiency to human beings, but includes things and arte-
facts. They all possess a ‘kind of second-class agency’, which develops once they 
are interwoven into a texture of social relationships, are in conjunction with 
human associates (2013, 17), or as sociologist Jane Bennett (2010) would say, are 
part of an ‘assemblage’ (a term borrowed from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari). 
Gell also attests agency to the recipient of an artwork: here agency can manifest 
either as patronage or in the form of seeing, in which perception ‘goes beyond 
the information given’ (‘active spectator’); the recipient constructs the image of 
the thing perceived; the particular way of seeing comes as a function of previous 
experiences, etc. (2013, Chap. 3).
So far, the discussion on dividuality has clearly identified the problem-
atic status of a theory of modernity which contrasts the Western imaginary 
of individuality with the constructed ‘dividual other’ of social and cultural 
 anthropology. It has further highlighted the need to approach the question of 
dividuality versus individuality more broadly, namely from a historical as well 
as from an ontological angle. The historical (and praxis-oriented) perspective 
allows seeing the different and context-related ways in which dividual person-
hood may be transformed under conditions of ‘encompassment’ in colonial and 
postcolonial settings. It also allows identifying dividual aspects of personhood 
in Western modernity, and even may show how, in particular modern Western 
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contexts, real life conditions often contradict the idea of self-contained, inde-
pendent individual personhood and agency.9 The ontological perspective 
brings the (primary) relational sociality of the human being into focus. Rela-
tionality, as conditio humana, implicates openness, partibility and vulnerabil-
ity of the human subject even in its fully individuated form and in all social 
constellations, including modernity. While thus the co-existence of dividual 
and individual elements is constitutive for human subjectivity (personhood) 
throughout human history, the socio-economic and cultural challenges are 
decisive for the degree in which dividuality or individuality are required and 
valued in a particular historical formation.
The previous reflections may find support in Charles Taylor’s book, A Secular 
Age (2007). As one crucial aspect of the process of ‘secularisation’ in the European 
world, Taylor addresses the changes in human self-perception (‘sense of Self’). 
A modern social subject can no longer experience the ‘fullness’ of life by focussing 
her (his) highest spiritual and moral aspirations exclusively to God; in fact, these 
can now be related to different sources, even to those which deny God. Exclusive 
humanism, with its confidence in human powers of moral ordering, replaces an 
enchanted view of the universe, and a ‘buffered’ Self replaces a ‘porous’, vulner-
able Self which is open to a world of spirits and powers (2007, 26f.).
The enchanted world of Charles Taylor is the outer, the natural world, inhab-
ited by spirits, demons and moral forces, all endowed with thoughts and agency, 
and providing meaning. This world vanishes in a process of disenchantment, 
caused by the rise of naturalistic materialism and science. It makes space for a 
different world – or better, a world that is differently perceived – ‘in which the 
only locus of thoughts, feelings, spiritual élan is what we call minds’ (2007, 30). 
The only minds, however, are human minds; they are bounded, they are ‘inward 
spaces’, and thoughts, feelings, agency and meanings are situated within them 
(2007, 30f.). An inward/outward geography represents the separation between 
the inner world of the human mind and the outer natural world and is also mir-
rored in the new way of sensing the Self. While the ‘porous’ Self characterises a 
state of being in which the ‘line between personal agency and impersonal forces’ 
9 Karl Smith (2012) hints at the imbalance of the possibilities of individual agency and self- 
determination in patriarchal, multi-ethnic and class-based societies. He writes: ‘[…] men might 
be able to construct themselves as such, while women are expected to conform to socially as-
cribed roles. In multi-ethnic societies, the dominant ethnic group might permit individual au-
thorship, while oppressed and marginalised groups often have their identities ascribed by the 
dominant culture. In class-based societies, the dominant class might permit its members to au-
thor their individual identities (but only within clearly circumscribed parameters), while subor-
dinate classes are expected to perform their socially prescribed roles and so on’ (2012, 58).
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is not clearly drawn, the inner/outer boundary works as a buffer to the Self, ‘such 
that the things beyond don’t need to “get to me”’ (2007, 38).
While Charles Taylor concentrates on the significant transformations the 
human subject undergoes in its relationship to the outer world, he also traces 
changes regarding the subjective and the social world. All changes seem to be 
intertwined with an increasing consciousness of being an individual, and this 
sense of individuality could even pass over into atomism. On the subjective side, 
Taylor mentions shifts in identity,10 reflected in disengaged reason and the disci-
plined self-remaking as described in Norbert Elias’ ‘civilizing process’, including 
the ‘narrowing and intensifying of intimacy’ (2007, 300). Yet, such positive iden-
tity shifts also have a negative side: Boundaries can operate as limits, as ‘prisons’, 
which do not allow experiencing what is hidden by the instrumental-rational 
access to the world. The invulnerability of the buffered identity ‘opens it to the 
danger that not just evil spirits, cosmic forces or gods won’t “get to” it, but that 
nothing significant will stand out for it’ (2007, 303).
Regarding the social realm, Taylor asks whether disengagement – an attitude 
towards the natural world – is also carried out ‘in relation to one’s whole surround-
ings, natural and social’ (2007, 42). Living in an enchanted, porous world was, 
so Taylor, living socially – it was the whole society, which dealt with the positive 
and negative forces collectively, for example in ritual. By contrast, the modern, 
 disciplined, buffered individual ‘moves in a constructed social space, where 
instrumental rationality is a key value, and time is pervasively secular’ (2007, 542). 
‘Responsible individuals’ constitute societies ‘designed for mutual benefit’ (ibid.). 
However, there is also another side to the rationally constructed sociality. Taylor 
points to internal spaces of the modern buffered individual, which he considers 
pertinent for social relationality based on emotions. Discipline, self-control go 
along with an increase of privacy, which in turn demands intimacy.
Intimate space is, of course, social space, in that it is shared with (a few, privileged) others. 
But there is a close connection between inner space and zones of intimacy. It is in these 
latter that we share something of the depth of feeling, affinity, susceptibility, that we dis-
cover within ourselves. Indeed, without this sharing, be it in prayer, conversation, letters, 
without the sympathetic reception by close interlocutors, much of our inner exploration 
couldn’t take place (2007, 540).
Charles Taylor postulates a qualitative difference between the sense of Self of the 
pre-modern and the modern human being. While both pre-modern porosity and 
modern boundedness are most obviously apparent in relation to the outer ( objective) 
10 Taylor himself uses the notion of identity and speaks about ‘buffered identity’ (e.g. 2007: 136, 
300, 303ff).
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world, this qualitative difference also applies to the subjective and social world. 
However, if we take Taylor seriously, the pre-modern/modern difference seems to 
be not so clear-cut. Even in the modern constellation the individual as an emotional 
and a social being is characterised by a certain degree of permeability, which s/he 
can display in particular areas of life.
Pushing Taylor’s insights a bit further one could suggest recognising the 
porous and the buffered self not as dichotomy representing historical stages 
(pre-modern vs. modern, enchanted vs. disenchanted, engaged vs. disengaged), 
but as imagined end-points of a socio-historical continuum (see also Smith 2012). 
However, this does not mean that such ‘ideal-typical’ endpoints coincide with the 
social realities of personhood – persons are never only porous dividuals, nor unam-
biguously buffered individuals. Rather, the idea of a continuum allows acknowl-
edging the necessary co-existence of relational/dividual and individual aspects of 
the human Self, although in varying degrees. It would thus allow exploring ideas 
and realities of permeability and partibility on the one hand, of closeness and 
boundedness on the other, in particular historical and  socio-cultural contexts as 
well as in particular areas of life and particular situations.
So far we can conclude that throughout history persons move in different 
social contexts or areas of life – in which they relate to other persons, things 
(objects) and ‘not unquestionably plausible’ agents or authorities (the transcend-
ent, the divine)11 – and these contextual relationships require dividual as well as 
individual traits, each in different degrees.12 Thus in/dividuality always includes 
both the openness (relatedness) and partibility of human beings as well as their 
capacity to become more bounded, indivisible, possessive and autonomous enti-
ties under particular historical circumstances.
Having said this it seems fruitful to briefly relate our reflections on in/divid-
uality to another debate – the one on the notions of belonging and multiple 
belonging.13 This debate emerged as a continuation of reflections on ‘identity’, 
but rightfully claims to go beyond this concept and avoid its limitations.14 The 
11 Jörg Rüpke (2015, 348) defines religion ‘as the temporary and situational enlargement of the 
environment – judged as relevant by one or several of the actors – beyond the unquestionably 
plausible social environment inhabited by co-existing humans who are in communication (and 
hence observable)’.
12 This is also illustrated with reference to Bhakti in Section 1.2 of the publication.
13 Significant contributions in this debate come for example from Anthias 2002; 2006; Hage 
2002; Yuval-Davis 2006; Yuval-Davis, Kannabiran, Vieten 2006; Pfaff-Czarnecka 2013.
14 Identity, a concept deriving from psychology (Erikson 1980), relies on the drawing of sharp 
boundaries. In anthropology, but also in other social and political sciences it is strongly linked 
with the concept of ethnicity (Barth 1969; Nagel 1998) and ideas of nation and region (Anderson 
1983; Elwert 1998; Gellner 1994). Studies on diasporas and multicultural environments as a result 
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notion of ‘belonging’ perceives human beings in their multiple relations to their 
social, natural and transnatural environments and thus strongly highlights posi-
tionalities, connections and attachments. Looking into these dynamics and flex-
ibilities of personal belonging implies focusing on the ways persons ‘navigate’ 
diverse constellations of their life-worlds.
The concept of ‘belonging’ refers to ‘an emotionally charged, ever dynamic 
social location – that is: a position in social structure, experienced through iden-
tification, embeddedness, connectedness and attachments’ (Pfaff-Czarnecka 
2013, 13). Belonging has three dimensions: commonality, reciprocity, and attach-
ment. It is about sharing values, experiences, practices and relations (including 
with non-human beings, artefacts and landscapes); it is about loyalty, trust, 
feeling safe, having strong linkages and possibilities (ibid.). Regimes of belong-
ing such as families, ethnic groups, religious groups, or associations are defined 
through allegiances and bonds; to belong, they require particular orientations 
and moral commitments from those who want to belong. However, belonging 
(inclusion) also points to the other side of the coin – it always comprises exclu-
sion as its opposite.
From the perspective of a person in a particular socio-historical context, 
belonging is always multiple; not only do in/dividuals live in several life-worlds 
at the same time, these life-worlds are also internally differentiated, and they may 
conflict with each other. Thus personal attachments, allegiances and solidari-
ties have to be constantly negotiated, re-visited and re-formed – persons have to 
re-orient and re-position themselves – in short, they have to navigate the diverse 
constellations of belonging.
Multiple constellations of belonging and the need for at least some forms 
of personal manoeuvring are typical for all life-contexts throughout history and 
regardless of geographical location; however, they become especially evident 
with the ever-growing number of diverse socio-moral worlds and life-options on 
the way to modernity, as well as in situations of socio-political transition, (reli-
gious) conflict, or ecological risk, when established forms of coexistence begin 
to erode, and many people are forced to move to other geographical regions and 
adapt to new social environments.15 Such need for navigation of multiple con-
texts and belongings shapes not only a person’s behaviour and practice, but has 
of migration processes started to challenge concepts of identity and ethnicity (Gilroy 1991; Brah 
1996; Anthias 1998; Hall 2004). For a comprehensive anthropological discussion on identity and 
multiple identities, see Soekefeld 1999; for a discussion from the perspective of social and histor-
ical sciences, see Friese 2002.
15 See for example recent research in anthropology and sociology on the issues of diaspora, 
migration, refugees, displacement etc.
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impacts on the perception of the self. First of all it means that a person has to 
(tacitly or consciously) divide his/her orientation and allegiance, gain the ability 
to operate in various life-worlds and then integrate the multiple normative orien-
tations and positionings. The person presents her/himself as partible, as divid-
ual, and this may allow a pluralisation or even a hybridisation of commitment 
and action.
This idea of pluralisation becomes extremely relevant for the European early 
modernity (1500–1800). It makes a big difference whether we describe this epoch 
using concepts of teleological processes such as secularisation and individualis-
ation, or whether we think more cautiously in terms of a field of tension of plural-
isation and authority, within which we can find a place for other characteristics of 
the time (Schulze 1998; Müller et al. 2010). Pluralisation means here principally 
the multiplication of social environments, frameworks of orientation, religious 
confessions and world-views, all of which made absolute claims to validity and 
consequent demands for loyalty. There were no factors, such as privatisation of 
religion, tolerance, and democratic institutions, mitigating the intensity of this 
competition; it bore down with its full weight on individuals, who had to find a 
way to come to terms with this plurality. One reaction was often the reinforcement 
of authority: to hold fast to one’s own confession, way of living or world-view, if 
necessary under forcible imposition by a ruler. But this was not enough for some; 
there were certainly intellectuals or religious seekers who tried to steer their own 
course through the different possible social environments and systems of author-
ity, to adapt to and withstand pluralisation and to respond to it constructively. 
We can connect this new perspective on the early modern era with the debate 
on ‘multiple belonging’, at least as far as individuals are concerned. There were 
for example professors and politicians who carved out careers crossing confes-
sionally diverse territories with multiple conversions and reconversions (Mulsow 
2003), and there were libertines and freethinkers who devised conceptual con-
structs to give plausibility to their navigation beyond the reach of binding claims 
to the absolute.
Starting from this point, an alternative narrative to that of ‘individualisation’ 
in the European early modern era can be developed. This would be based on the 
idea, as with LiPuma and with our transformed approach from Taylor, that there 
have always been two aspects of personhood, one more individual and one more 
dividual. The individual aspect has often been described: from the self-assertion 
of the Renaissance person; the direct relation to God in Protestantism, further 
intensified in Spiritualism and Pietism; the moulding of the self by confession 
of sins; the Cartesian cogito; the discovery of autobiography; sensibility; and 
the Declaration of Human Rights (Van Dülmen 2001). But the altered awareness 
offered by the concept of dividuality is required to discover beside this a con-
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cealed history of dividualisation, which runs alongside it and complements it, 
and which paradoxically often made an individual and distinct standpoint possi-
ble precisely by means of dividualising strategies.
Various conceptual tools were available for these strategies; they were forged 
by individual libertines and freethinkers, in order to enable an understanding 
of themselves as navigating between different worlds with varying systems of 
authority and validity (Mulsow 2007, 106, 206ff.). Initially these tools were the-
ological distinctions, such as those between human beings in their originally 
biological nature (status naturae purae), and their condition as beings created 
by God (status gratiae). One could then ask the question whether, for instance, 
the philosophy of the ancient world, developed by thinkers who did not know of 
the Christian God, was one which saw the human being in ‘status naturae purae’, 
even though this was for Christians merely an abstraction from the full image of 
mankind. Or one could maintain that one was putting forward a particular thesis 
from the standpoint of the natura pura only, while abstracting from ‘grace’, i.e. 
from Christianity. In this way some Renaissance philosophers tried to carve out a 
free space in which they could speak freely, purely as philosophers (for instance 
on the mortality of the soul), while otherwise submitting to the views of the 
Church. In doing so, these thinkers split their personhood into a part which was 
independent of theological prescriptions, and another which respected them. 
(Mulsow 2012, 58–79).
In the late 17th century Samuel Pufendorf’s theory of natural law offered 
the possibility of refining this differentiation and of no longer expressing it in 
borrowed theological terminology. Pufendorf adapted the late scholastic doc-
trine of the personae morales (Kobusch 1997) for his own purposes, reframing 
it so that the different ‘personae’ which one could assume were something like 
social roles: one was at the same time, for example, a king, a father, a student of 
riding and an author, all according to the context one found oneself in. Shrewd 
proponents of the early Enlightenment such as Theodor Ludwig Lau saw in these 
concepts the opportunity to reformulate the free spaces which the Renaissance 
philosophers and libertines had created for themselves: an author could in one 
respect advance atheistic theories, and in another respect, privately so to speak, 
be nevertheless a good Christian (Mulsow 2012, 68). He would then have two dif-
ferent ‘personae’: an intellectual one in relation to his readership, and an inner 
one which rested on his private conduct. Lau related this notion to the contempo-
rary idea of an ‘eclectic’ choice of convictions – the idea that one should not be 
confined to a single tradition (secta), as this would lead to pointless demarcation 
disputes, but should be without allegiances and free to select from all traditions, 
choosing only what stood the test of one’s own judgement. The ‘persona’ which 
has this freedom is the intellectual one.
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We can see in this a ‘division of knowledge’ which became ever more 
 pronounced in the course of the 18th century, and which the theorist of literature 
Michael McKeon has described as a process of ‘domestication’ (McKeon 2005). 
This process goes hand in hand with experiences of, for instance, theatre produc-
tions, seeing and being seen, and increasing reflection on the question of what 
should be public and what should be private. The publication of the private, but 
also conversely the creation of imagined public realms, and the setting apart of 
a realm of the domestic and of the body, all contributed to the new sensibility for 
the division of knowledge. This was soon followed by philosophers such as Adam 
Smith, who no longer viewed the self as an ‘individual’ point, as Leibniz had rep-
resented it to be, but as something which was actually constituted only through 
being seen by others and in interaction with others. This was a social theory 
of the self (Haakonssen 1996, 131), through which Smith sought to understand 
morality as an attempt, founded in our gift of sympathy, to identify ourselves with 
the standpoint of an impartial observer.
To see the extent to which the idea of a dividual, social self – a self which con-
stantly distinguishes between its own position and the public space of observers, 
but which allows each to be dependent on the other – has gained ground in the 
thinking of modern times, we only need think of how this theory of Smith’s found 
its influential 20th century reformulation in the work of George Herbert Mead 
(Costelloe 1997). Mead stressed the importance of the distinctions between the 
‘I’, the ‘me’, the ‘self’ and the ‘mind’ – distinctions informed by language – and 
although Marilyn Strathern comes from another school of thought, some of her 
proposals are closely aligned with Mead’s: ‘it is through the separation of persons 
from one another that specific relations are created, and through relations that 
persons are defined […]’ (Strathern 1999, 16). Even the transactional analy-
sis developed by Eric Berne, though rooted to an extent in psychiatry, through 
its model of different ego states (child-like, adult-like, parent-like) – related to 
Freud’s structural model of the psyche – developed a possibility of analysing 
complex interpersonal communications in such a way that individual acts of 
communication can be thought of as emanating from different ‘egos’ or persons. 
In sociology, Bernard Lahire speaks of the ‘homme pluriel’, in the sense that in 
modern times one must be able to respond quite differently across a range of very 
different levels and situations (Lahire 1998); while theorists of literature examine 
‘relational authorship’, detaching the creation of works from exclusive depend-
ence on the individual.
These newer developments in the theory of dividuality make clear that an 
understanding of personhood in modern times cannot be based solely on the 
individual aspect – from the theoretical relation to the self, to self-awareness, 
to the ‘singularities’ of society (Reckwitz 2017) – but must always also include 
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the dividual. Whether we can deduce from this a process of dividualisation, 
which is consistently present alongside that of individualisation, is doubtful. 
Just as the Kolleg-Forschergruppe has already questioned the linear coupling of 
individualisation with modernisation and secularisation, we would not wish to 
describe dividualisation as a teleologically conceived thread, but as a moment – 
one which has taken on different forms again and again in different epochs and 
in different cultures, and which should always be taken into account, in any 
situation.
The structure of Part 2
By now it will have become apparent that we consider human beings being con-
stituted by both dividual and individual qualities. Part 2 of the publication lays 
emphasis on the dividual side of the human being, and we consider dividuality 
to manifest itself in a twofold way. Firstly, dividuality is the dynamic foundation 
of human sociality and individuality, indicating the irreducible relationality of 
social subjects and their openness towards fellow human beings across different 
temporalities and societies. This basic relationality is not necessarily acknowl-
edged in a respective social context and can be even suppressed in constructions 
of the Self, in social imaginaries and ideologies (e.g. in Western individualism).
Secondly, dividuality is a lived social reality and concrete social praxis in 
particular societies and social environments. Here social subjects may be aware 
of their relationality, permeability and their deep social bonds with others; they 
may also be aware of their partibility, allowing navigating diverse social contexts 
which require different ways of self-representation and action. However, while 
they possibly express this awareness in everyday life as well as in ritual practices 
and performances, they do not always and necessarily have an explicit (epistemo-
logical) concept of dividuality.
The three sections of Part 2 of the publication engage with different ways of 
understanding dividuality – in focus are in turn relationality, partibility and per-
meability. The distinct contributions refer to different geographies and temporal-
ities, and this is exactly why the texts have intertextual qualities – they speak to, 
enforce and supplement each other. However, while addressing multiple ways of 
conceptualising dividuality or in/dividuality, the authors do not claim to be able 
to cover all possibilities of how to approach the concept.
The contributions will only be introduced briefly at this point. An afterword 
to each section, written jointly by the respective authors, will summarise the 
papers and highlight their connections.
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Section 2.1 takes up dividuality as ontological basis and pre-condition of 
humanity and human sociality. All contributions develop their argument by 
looking into the Western scholarly tradition. Julie Casteigt and Markus Vinzent 
trace the development of relationality, reciprocity, respect and recognition in 
scholastic thinking, referring to the work of Albert the Great and Meister Eckhart. 
Antje Linkenbach, consulting debates in western intellectual history and con-
temporary phenomenological anthropology and philosophy, discusses empathy 
(sympathy) in its particular form of co-feeling the pain and suffering of fellow- 
beings and thus as basic element of morality. Arthur Bueno concentrates on the 
work of sociologist Georg Simmel, well known as an advocate of modern individ-
uality. Bueno carves out a different perspective in Simmel’s writings, in which 
a dimension of sociality comes into view that does eliminate and even blur the 
boundaries between individuals.
Section 2.2 focuses on dividuality as partibility. The contributors empha-
sise both the capacity of the person to move within different, often conflicting 
(religious) life-worlds and thus navigate multiple ways of identification and 
belonging, as well as the internal pluralisation of the person in literary accounts. 
Riccarda Suitner introduces the reader to the cosmopolitan, multi-religious envi-
ronment of 16th century Venice, discussing confessional eclecticism and multiple 
conversions. Shazad Bashir, in his account, tries to make us familiar with 17th 
century Persian poets and poetry, presented as a biographical dictionary com-
piled in Agra (India) by one single author. Here, in/dividualisation as partibil-
ity comes to the fore through the complexities of two voices, the prosaic and the 
poetic self. Martin Mulsow presents an analysis of pseudonymous philosophical 
and theological works from 17th century Europe, while Matthias Engmann directs 
attention to the pseudonymous writings of Søren Kierkegaard. Both contributors 
highlight the dialogic structure of the texts and the use of multiple pseudonyms, 
representing different (conflicting) theological positions or perspectives on exist-
ence.
Section 2.3 discusses dividuality primarily as porousness or permeability. 
The first contribution, the one of Harry Maier, brings us to Christian Rome in the 
1st century and effectively links the previous and this section. Maier examines 
a letter of the apostle Paul to Philemon, in which Paul asks Philemon to accept 
Onesimus, a previous slave, as brother. Maier shows that the protagonists are 
not only engaged in multiple roles, are polypositional and multifaceted, but are 
also interpenetrated by superior powers and, accordingly, reveal shared agency. 
Complex agency and embodied experience of openness to the divine are also at 
the centre of Esther Eidinow’s paper on ancient Greek divination. In addition, she 
draws attention to a reflexive sense of distance from self of those who (in a state 
of possession) gave and those who received oracles, creating a shared narrative 
Introduction: the dividual self   341
of the experience. Aditya Malik focuses on contemporary forms of embodiment 
in the Himalayan region of Kumaon (India); he refers to the example of a young 
woman embodying the Goddess in the temple of the God of Justice, Goludev. 
Malik poses the question whether the permeability of the individual person, 
realized in actual embodiment of the divine, results in radical alterity, in ‘being 
another’. The two last contributions again relate to Christianity. Christine Dureau 
reflects on the ideal of self-sacrifice as the core of Christian personhood, an ideal 
shared by missionaries and converts in the Salomon Islands (South Pacific). She 
sees Christian views as perfectly in line with ideas of dividual personhood char-
acterised by partibility, exchange of substances and thus by the significance of 
the gift. Jutta Vinzent investigates the field of visual art and concentrates on rep-
resentations of Christ’s crucifixion in (documentation of) performance art. She 
again brings up the issue of complex agency and raises questions concerning the 
authorship of the artwork, but also about the role of the spectator. Corporeality 
in art, in particular, evokes partibility and shared creativity, and creates sensual, 
embodied viewing.
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The subject as totum potestativum  
in Albert the Great’s Œuvre:  
cultural transfer and relational identity
1 Introduction
When Albert the Great comments on the eleventh proposition of the Liber de 
causis, an anonymous tractate that had probably been composed in Baghdad in 
the ninth century in the circle of the Neoplatonic philosopher Al-Kindi and that 
had been translated into Latin in the twelfth century in Toledo, he is confronted 
with a theory of identity that questions the Aristotelian conception of the subject 
as a substance. According to the theory of identity in the Liber de causis, the first 
metaphysical principles, which are substances such as Being, Life and Intelli-
gence, are not only defined by what they are in themselves but also by what they 
are in their causes and by what they are in their effects. So is it as well the case, 
according to the Liber de causis, of the soul and its faculties: the vegetative, sensi-
tive and intellective ones. Their identity is not only to be conceived of as substan-
tial (what they are in themselves), but also as relational (what they are in relation 
with others).
The cultural transfer of Neoplatonic Greek-Arabic metaphysics into the Latin 
world entails a change of paradigm in the idea of the individual as an isolated 
substance that constitutes an indivisible entity. Instead of conceiving of the iden-
tity as a substance in an atomic and static way, the Albertian appropriation of the 
Liber de causis theory offers a dynamic and relational conception of individual 
identity: far from excluding what is different from it, this conception includes it. 
This individual identity is, therefore, to be conceived of as a totality with what is 
different from its substance. Such a totality includes what is different from the 
individual substrate and is reciprocally included in it.
This dynamic and relational conception of the identity of the subject was not 
unfamiliar to the Middle Ages. The Greek and Latin Fathers of the Church had 
already applied the model of the perichôresis, or circumincessio, to conceive of the 
psycho-theological homology of the soul and its faculties with the divine persons, 
as they are described in the Gospel of John (for instance, in Jn 10:38 and 14:10): the 
Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father. And, in his De trinitate  (Augustinus 
Hipponensis 1968, 330, 29–331, 60–3), Augustine takes up this inheritance and 
conceives of the human soul as identical not exactly with its own substance but 
with the operations of its faculties: memory, will and intelligence. The soul does 
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not lie, therefore, under its operations, like a substratum. As a principle of life, the 
soul expresses itself through its faculties in different ways. These various modes 
of expression form, in return, the interiority of the soul. As in a Möbius strip, the 
inner and the outer are in the soul as a single act, a unique identity.
However, Alain de Libera, in his Archéologie du Sujet (Libera 2007, 287), 
asserts that this dynamic and relational model of the identity of the subject has 
only temporarily offered an alternative model to what he calls ‘attributivismus’: 
that is, the Aristotelian conception of the subject that the Middle Ages inher-
its. The ‘attributivismus’ model refers to the identity of the subject defined by 
the attribution of properties (qualities and faculties) to an individual substrate. 
According to Alain de Libera, soon the dominant conception of the subject as 
a substratum to which properties are attributed has annexed the Augustinian 
model according to which the identity of the subject includes differences and 
reveals itself through them.
In this paper, I would like to show, firstly, that Albert the Great introduces the 
categories of potentiality and relation into the conception of substantial identity 
inherited from the ‘attributivismus’ model. To do so, he appeals to the Boethian 
totum potestativum. Secondly, I would like to highlight that he is not completely 
satisfied with the Boethian attempt to conceive of a dynamic and relational iden-
tity. Especially, the hierarchical characteristic of the Boethian totum potestativum 
fails, according to him, to provide the means to think of a dynamic and relational 
totality in which the different powers are, simultaneously and reciprocally, in 
each other. However, Albert the Great finds this reciprocity in the Liber de causis.
2 Is the soul identical to its faculties?
The ‘attributivismus’ model appears in the conception of the soul that Albert the 
Great develops, in particular in his commentaries on the Aristotelian tractates 
(Anzulewicz 2012, 325–46) and in his anthropological synthesis De homine. But 
this conception, which is elaborated in a physical and anthropological frame, 
is put into question when it is transferred to a theological field. To expose the 
Albertian conception of the ‘attributivismus’ pattern of the identity of the soul 
as a substratum, I shall concentrate my attention on one of the texts in which 
the Master of Cologne contrasts it to an alternative model using the concept of 
totum potestativum. In their article upon totality in Albert’s Œuvre, Katja Krause 
and Henryk Anzulewicz, leaning on Pius Künzle and Dag Nikolaus Hasse (Sch-
neider 1903; 1906, vol. 1, 35, 38–40; vol. 2, 521f.; Künzle 1956, 43–158; Park 1980, 
506–8; Hasse 2008, 236f.; Müller 2009, 194–203; Hellmeier 2011, 66–9, 75f., 105f., 
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117, 131f., 152f., 233f., 298, 311, 313f.; Krause, Anzulewicz 2017, 116; Mahoney 1980, 
551f.), see in these two models of anthropologic identity (Albertus Magnus 2008, 
4, 38; 17, 65; 27, 26; Albertus Magnus 1968, 1, 7–3; 1, 20; Anzulewicz 2012, 336; 
Anzulewicz 2000, 149, n. 4) a compatibility. For my part, I shall defend a reading 
of Albert’s commentary on the first book of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, highlight-
ing the difference in the dynamics of what I consider as two distinct perspectives 
on the human soul. If one can speak about compatibility, it is then, in my eyes, 
in the same way as a cubist figure assembles on the unique plane of a painting 
several points of view that the spectator normally cannot see simultaneously. 
I propose to distinguish these perspectives on the human soul as different modes 
of being. They exist at the same time and concern the same subject but they 
describe different dynamics in which the human soul develops itself.
2.1 ‘Attributivismus’ model and totum potestativum
First of all, let us show how the ‘attributivismus’ and the totum potestativum 
models are different perspectives on the identity of the same individual subject 
and, more precisely in this case, on the human soul. In ‘distinction 3’ of his com-
mentary on the first book of the Sentences (Albertus Magnus 2015, 113, 9–22), 
Albertus Theutonicus asserts that the soul is not identical to its vegetative, sen-
sitive and intellectual powers. Those are only its properties. Albert develops the 
difference between the identity of the soul as a spiritual substance and its identity 
as a totality of powers in the following way.
Either the faculties of the soul follow the soul considered as a spiritual sub-
stance – that is they are consequences of the soul, which is regarded as their princi-
ple – or they belong to its substance, if the soul is considered as a substance acting 
upon the body and upon what is external to the soul (Hasse 2008, 237f.). Only 
under this second perspective, the soul is understood as a totum potestativum, 
that is, as a whole susceptible of powers, which are the vegetative, sensitive and 
intellectual faculties of the soul. This means that the soul, as a totality of powers, 
achieves itself in and through its vegetative, sensitive and intellectual faculties, 
when these are understood as properties of the soul and not as consequences of 
it. Therefore, the complete power of the soul is composed by the particular powers 
of its faculties. That is why they are called substantial properties of the soul which 
would not, without them, find the fulfilment of its own possibility of being.
So, on the basis of the distinction between the logical status of ‘consequence’ 
and of ‘substantial property’ that is attributed to the faculties of the soul, it 
appears clearly that the two patterns of conceiving of the soul are incompatible: 
the powers of the soul are consequences of a spiritual substance, according to 
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the ‘attributivismus’ pattern, whereas they are substantial to the soul when con-
ceived as a totum potestativum. The identity of the human soul can be described 
according to both patterns: the ‘attributivismus’ one and the totum potestativum. 
But each of them expresses a singular mode of being of the human soul and high-
lights different dynamics in which the human soul develops its own identity.
Secondly, Albert of Cologne demonstrates that neither according to the 
‘attributivismus’ model nor according to the non-attributivismus pattern, the 
human soul can be identified only to its faculties. Let us, first, concentrate our 
attention on the ‘non-attributivismus’ model of the identity of the soul and show 
how Albert emphasises its potentiality and relationality. We will take up the 
name that he gives to it: a totum potestativum. Albert’s conception of the identity 
of a whole of powers, or dynamic whole, consists in describing the potentiality of 
a totality. Let us précis Albert’s arguments. A totum potestativum does not point 
out the nature of the soul as a spiritual substance but as an acting substance. It 
is, therefore, a dynamic pattern of identity. Albert argues that the identity that is 
proper to the ‘non-attributivismus’ model is not essential but potential. In other 
words, the identity of the totum potestativum does not describe the attribution of 
properties to an essence which would be in itself sufficient to define the identity 
of a being. He gives a theological reason for it: the soul is not essentially what it 
has, that is its faculties, since only God is what He has (Albertus Magnus 2015, 
112, 58–60). But the identity of the totum potestativum intends to describe the 
potentiality of a totality and to stress how much the soul is present to its faculties 
and develops itself through them.
More precisely, when we say ‘the soul is its faculties’, for instance its senses, 
we attribute the totum potestativum as a predicate to the faculty to which the soul 
is present. In other words, it is true that ‘the soul is its senses’ only when it per-
ceives. Moreover, this limitation of the identification of the soul, as a dynamic 
whole, to its faculties is reinforced by the different degrees of presence of the 
soul to its faculties. There is, namely, a hierarchical identification of the whole 
to its parts according to the level that each part – vegetative, sensitive or intel-
lective – occupies in the constitution and in the action of the soul. The soul can 
be either incompletely or completely present to its different faculties: the power 
of the soul, its posse, is incompletely in the inferior faculties, that is to say the 
vegetative and the sensitive parts of the soul, and completely in the superior 
ones, the intellective part. The soul is completely present to the superior power, 
because the activity of the intellect always presupposes the power of the inferior 
parts. But even if the proposition ‘the soul is its intellect’, that is the predication 
of the soul to the superior part, is more adequate than its predication to the infe-
rior parts, nevertheless, it is not a completely appropriate predication (ibid., 113, 
23–33), because it is not an essential predication of an attribute to its subject, but 
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a potential and hierarchical predication of different powers to an active whole 
that develops them. Therefore, it is never possible to say properly that the soul is 
its faculties, because they are either consequential properties of a spiritual sub-
stance, according to the ‘attributivismus’ model, or powers of an active whole to 
which the soul is more or less completely present, according to the totum potesta-
tivum pattern. Moreover, according to the totum potestativum model, the mode of 
predication is only potential, and not essential.
Thirdly, from the point of view of categories, these two conceptions of iden-
tity are not compatible. They are different points of view on the same being and 
they define its identity according to different perspectives (ibid., 113, 36–8). The 
‘non-attributivismus’ model introduces, thus, not only a dynamic perspective on 
identity but also a consideration on its potentiality, that is, on its possibility to 
act and to develop its powers. It is a model of identity concentrated on what a 
being, taken as a whole, can become through its action more than on what it 
is according to its essence, or nature. Yet, posse, or the possibility to act and to 
become, belongs to the category of quality, whereas esse, or being, pertains to the 
quality of substance (ibid., 112, 63). As a consequence, the ‘non-attributivismus’ 
model differs from the ‘attributivismus’ one also from a categorical point of view: 
it considers identity under the category of quality, and not of substance. The 
question that the totum potestativum raises is not, therefore, ‘what is this being 
as a nature?’ but ‘which quality can a being acquire through the development of 
its powers?’; ‘which possibilities do its faculties endow it through their action?’. 
Thus, we understand that, even if the ‘attributivismus’ and ‘non-attributivismus’ 
models are not compatible, yet, they can be understood as different categorical 
points of view on the identity of a being. The qualitative point of view consid-
ers the possible becoming of a being as a whole that develops itself through its 
powers. The substantial point of view takes a being as an individual defined by 
a nature, that is a genus determined by a species, and considers its properties.
For example, if we say that the powers of the soul – which are its memory, 
its will, its intelligence – are the soul itself (Pseudo-Augustinus 1845, 789; Alex-
ander de Hales 1960, 64, 15–17; Bernardus Claraevallensis 1957, 57, 18f.; Albertus 
Magnus 2015, 113, 1–8), we identify the faculties, taken together, to the soul only 
as far as we consider here the soul as a totality constituted of parts endowed with 
powers. In no way are the faculties identified to the soul according to its essence 
(Albertus Magnus 2015, 113, 34–6). The faculties are not, indeed, a definition of 
the soul, insofar as they are not logical parts, like genus (animal) and species 
(rational). The identity of a totum potestativum is, thus, dynamic, potential, or 
better: virtual. ‘Virtual’ indicates, namely, a force (virtus) to develop oneself 
through one’s own powers. But the action of the faculties does not affect the 
nature of the soul. The action of the faculties happens to the soul as an accident, 
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that is, as a contingency that could have been different. The identity of a totum 
potestativum is, therefore, dynamic: a being is considered from the point of view 
of its relation with what is outside of it, or different from it. The identity of the 
soul as a totum potestativum refers to how and what the soul imagines, remem-
bers, desires, loves, understands… Such relations are constitutive of its being as 
a potential totality, that is, as a totality the identity of which is always defined 
by its tendency to develop itself through the relation with what is different from 
it. This kind of identity is, thus, called qualitative, in the sense of relational, and 
accidental, as far as it includes the contingency of the different relations that a 
being builds in the different circumstances of its existence in time and space.
Albert calls this type of relational and contingent identity also a qualitative 
identity, as opposed to a substantial or essential identity. With this distinction, 
Albert shows that, in these different modes of identity, the individual is always 
considered as a totality, that is, as a composition of parts that imply relations with 
each other. Moreover, he emphasises that the so-called individual is always a 
composition of potentiality and actuality. Therefore, with the distinctions that we 
will now explore, Albert extends to other modes of identity the dynamic, poten-
tial, relational aspects that he has underlined in the identity of the totum potesta-
tivum. Far from being an alternative secondary model, the identity that is proper 
to the whole of powers manifests some characteristics that could be common to 
other modes of identity, above all in the aspects of relationality and of potentiality.
2.2  The extension of potentiality and relationality  
to other models of identity
Albert exports the characteristics of potentiality and relationality that he finds 
in the ‘non-attributivismus’ model of the identity of the human soul to other pat-
terns of identity concerning the human being as a whole, body and soul. We will 
focus on the essential and on the substantial modes of identity.
2.2.1 Essential identity
The essential identity of a being concerns what is part of its essence (Albertus 
Magnus 2015, 113, 38–41). At first sight, this mode of identity belongs to the ‘attrib-
utivismus’ pattern. But Albert elaborates the mode of essential identity, so as to 
underline its potentiality and its relationality. He shows, namely, that, under an 
essential point of view, identity means also totality. Here, Albert deals with the 
totality that he calls the absolutely first composition of a reality, for instance body 
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and soul for a human being. Body stands for what a human being is as a substra-
tum, its quod est, and soul for what gives the body its form as the body of this precise 
individual (its quo est) (Schneider 1906, 393; Hasse 2008, 236f.). So body and soul 
are not stricto sensu parts of the definition of a human being, as genus and species, 
but they have the very logical functions of genus and species as matter and form. 
The function of matter is, namely, what is indeterminate and receives an identity, 
whereas the function of form is what gives determination to the compositum.
This definition of identity from an essential point of view applies also to spiritual 
beings, like the soul. The soul is, indeed, also a totality composed by its parts that 
cannot be matter and form, because matter is known from its potentiality to be 
moved and to change (Albertus Magnus 2015, 111, 36–40). As the soul has no matter, 
it is, therefore, rather constituted by quod est and quo est. Quod est differs from 
matter as the substrate of a hylemorphic compound differs from the potentiality to 
receive a form: in the same way as the substratum lies under the potentiality, quod 
est ‘lies under’ matter, as its condition of possibility (Albertus Magnus 2015, 111, 
47–51; Algazel 1933, 7, 23–5; Gilbertus Porretanus 1847, 1321B; 1966, 202, 86f.; Alber-
tus Magnus 1993b, 272, 50–273, 3). In some way, it is the condition of the possibility 
to become other than it already is. For this ground potentiality, according to Albert, 
there is no other definition than what can be predicated to what is: everything that 
can be attributed to a spiritual substance belongs to quod est as a set of all possibili-
ties. Therefore, the soul is essentially constituted of the very ontological foundation 
of matter itself, that is, of the possibility to be determined, on the one hand. And, on 
the other hand, the soul is composed of quo est, that is, of being in the sense of the 
essence in action. Quo est means the actualisation of the fundamental potentiality 
that the soul is (Albertus Magnus 2015, 111, 51–9; Boethius 2000b, 187, 26).
Thus, the individualisation of the being of the soul comes from its properties 
that, in their turn, follow the quod est. Not only does the essential identity of a 
being include its potentiality to become, through its determination, but also the 
essential identity of a totality evolves according to its properties, that is according 
to the determinations that can occur to the substance. Therefore, the essential 
identity describes a totality that includes the possibility to be determined as the 
condition of its own identity. And the unity between the principle of potentiality 
and the principle of actuality is much more important than the unity between 
matter and form in a hylemorphic compositum. When it comes to the soul, quod 
est and quo est are, namely, inseparable, whereas the form of a hylemorphic 
compositum is separable from its matter. Moreover, whereas the form of matter 
is the form of a part of the compositum, quo est is the form of the whole (Albertus 
Magnus 2015, 111, 60–8; cf. Boethius 1916, 215, 16–216, 2). Therefore, the essen-
tial identity of the soul is relational and dynamic: it relies on the most intimate 
relationship between the condition of potentiality and the condition of actuality.
354   Julie Casteigt
2.2.2 Substantial identity
The extension of the notions of potentiality and of relationality inside a total-
ity applies also to the substantial identity of a being. This substantial identity 
(Albertus Magnus 2015, 113, 41–54), for its part, considers the being of a composi-
tum inasmuch as it is composed. At first sight, this mode of identity belongs also 
to the ‘attributivismus’ model. Let us see how Albert elaborates the substantial 
mode of identity of the human being as a body-soul composition to bring out its 
potentiality and its relationality. In such a substantial totality, there are, namely, 
indispensable parts that achieve the potentiality (posse) of the soul as motor of 
the body and other parts that fulfil the being of the body, insofar as it is moved 
by the soul. Thus, in this perspective, both parts of the compositum are taken as 
correlative. In other words, they are considered under the aspect of their mutual 
relationship as active and passive terms: the soul, inasmuch as it moves the body, 
and the body, insofar as it is moved by the soul. Not only are the parts correlative, 
but the whole as well cannot exist without the substantial parts that contribute to 
the perfection of its substance.
Nevertheless, the parts of the substantial whole do not achieve the perfection 
of the whole in itself, but only in its parts as considered in themselves ( secundum 
se). The soul, for its part, is the perfection of the whole, whereas its substantial 
parts can only achieve perfection of the singular parts. In other words, they do 
not achieve the perfection of the soul in itself. But, in some way, they can be said 
to achieve the perfection of the soul inasmuch as the soul is the substance of the 
body and moves it. In the substantial conception of identity, the parts contribute, 
namely, only to an aspect of the identity of the whole. The parts cannot embrace 
the identity of the whole. The whole maintains its supremacy upon the parts. Only 
the upper part can have an influence on the totality in itself (secundum se). The 
body as such and the soul as such are not affected per se, in their own essence, 
by the other part of the composition. The relationality of the substantial totality is 
not reciprocal and total. The parts develop the potentiality of a specific part of the 
substantial whole.
Therefore, to describe the substantial identity of a compound Albert does not 
appeal to his distinction about the identity of the soul, that is, between the iden-
tity of a spiritual substance and the identity of an active substance. He does not 
either explicitly refer to the notion of totum potestativum in relation to substantial 
identity. Nevertheless, he transfers the relational, dynamic and potential concep-
tion of the identity of the soul as an active substance to the substantial identity of 
the human being as a compositum of body and soul. In the perspective of the sub-
stantial mode of identity revisited by Albert, each individual is to be considered 
as a totality that depends on the potentiality of its parts. Each part, depending on 
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its hierarchical grade, has a specific relation to the whole. Therefore, substantial 
identity appears as a relational, dynamic and potential conception of the identity 
of an individual that includes a variation according to the grades of potentiality, 
namely the degrees of capacity to achieve the whole or its different parts.
As a conclusion on the first step of this paper, it appears that there is another 
way of conceiving of the identity in Albert’s Œuvre that is alternative to the 
 ‘attributivismus’ model. This pattern is essentially dynamic, relational, orien-
tated towards the potentiality of the individual subject, conceived of as a total-
ity of powers. Albert calls this model totum potestativum, which means that the 
potentiality of the active subject is achieved through its powers (ibid., 113, 17–19). 
The second point is that the characteristics of the identity of the totum potesta-
tivum apply under certain aspects to the other conceptions of identity. They reveal 
that the identity of every individual can be considered as a totality that implies 
relationality between its parts. The conception of those parts depends on the dif-
ferent points of view adopted on the identity of the individual.
Under the aspect of its essence, an individual is, namely, a composition of 
potentiality and determination: either of matter and form for physical beings, or 
of quod est and quo est for spiritual beings. Thus also, a spiritual being which is 
not made up of matter is a totality that is composed of possibility, which is the 
condition for its being determined by the actualisation of its essence. Under 
the aspect of its substance, an individual is composed of indispensable parts. 
The superior ones achieve the potentiality of the soul as a whole, the inferior 
ones complete the potentiality of the body. They do not separately accomplish 
the potentiality of the whole. Therefore, Albert extends the main characteris-
tics of the identity model of the totum potestativum, that is, relationality and 
 potentiality, to the other conceptions of identity, namely essential and sub-
stantial. He reveals that they all deal with a compound that is considered as a 
dynamic totality that develops and achieves its own potentiality.
3 Hierarchy or equality?
3.1 Hierarchical relationality
To develop an alternative model of identity to the ‘attributivismus’, Albert has 
recourse to the notion of totum potestativum developed by Boethius in his De divi-
sione (Albertus Magnus 1913, 75; Boethius 1998, 38, 13–40, 1; 40, 25f.; cf. Schnei-
der 1906, 519f.; cf. König-Pralong 2007, 391–7; cf. Hasse 2008, 243f.). On the one 
hand, the whole of powers is distinct from the integral whole, or quantitative 
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whole: for instance the totality of points constituted by a line or the totality of a 
body constituted by its limbs. On the other hand, the totum potestativum differs 
from the non-continuous whole in which the parts are ordered to a first principle: 
the pastor for the flock, the chief for the people or for the army. Lastly, the whole 
of powers distinguishes itself from the universal whole (Libera 1980, 529–58; 
1981, 55–74), for instance the categories of horse or man for all the individuals 
that they comprehend. The whole of powers, for its part, is constituted and devel-
oped by its own powers.
Albert develops two main properties for the soul as totum potestativum. The 
first concerns the procession order of the faculties from the principle and the 
second regards the relation of inclusion. The powers to grow, to feel and to under-
stand flow, namely, from the soul, as the principle of life and movement. The first 
power, the vegetative, is included in the median one, namely the sensitive power, 
and both of these powers are included in the latter, the intellective one, as the 
triangle is included in the tetragon.
The second property is relative to the respective power of action of each 
faculty. All that the lower powers, the vegetative and sensitive ones, can do, the 
superior power, namely the intellective one, can also do. Moreover, the superior 
power can do it in an excellent and eminent way. But Albert asserts that this rela-
tion is not convertible, in the logical sense, that is, the relation is not reversible: 
the lower powers cannot do what the upper can.
Let us note at once that, in the tradition of the Latin authors invoked by 
Albert, the problem of the inclusion of the faculties of the soul and of their powers 
to act is that this is not reciprocal: a is in b which is, in its turn, in c. For its part, 
c concentrates all the power of action that it receives from a and b. Furthermore, 
c determines in its own way the powers that it receives from a and b. But this 
relation does not function in the opposite way. A and b cannot do what c can do.
The whole of powers is a hierarchy. The whole of powers, in its parts, is so that the first part 
is potestatively included in the following, or the median one, and the median one in the 
furthest one, as Aristotle says in the second book De anima (Aristoteles, De anima, lib. 2, 
cap. 3, 414b28–415a18 in Thomas de Aquino 1984, 87b and cap. 6, 91ab), that the vegetative 
<power> is in the sensitive one, and the vegetative and the sensitive in the intellectual one, 
as the triangle is in the tetragone. And, for this reason also, Dionysius (Dionysius Areop-
agita 2012, 25, 9–11; Dionysius Areopagita 1937, vol. 2, 823f.; cf. Albertus Magnus 1993c, 80, 
88–81, 2) and Boethius (Boethius 2000a, 149, 88–150, 91) say that all what the lower power 
can, the higher power can in a more excellent and eminent way, not the other way around.
 (Albertus Magnus 1895, 408b)
In the totality of powers, like the soul, the parts stand in a relation of inclusion 
of the lower powers in the highest one that possesses and can do more than the 
lower powers can do. This type of relations does not correspond in any way to a 
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relation of reciprocity. In these Boethian and Dionysian perspectives that Albert 
takes up, the soul is a hierarchical totality without reciprocal relations between 
its parts. Therefore, to resolve the problem of the full reciprocity of the relations 
in the soul as a totality of powers, Albert needs another model. He finds it in the 
eleventh proposition of the Liber de causis.
3.2  The solution of the Liber de causis for the reciprocal 
interiority of  cause and effect
At the end of the eleventh proposition of the Liber de causis, the Latin translation 
(Casteigt forthcoming) gives an example that describes the dynamics of reciproc-
ity in cause and effect. In the example, the anonymous tractate deals with the 
powers of the soul as well as the first metaphysical principles, in particular Intel-
ligence and Being. The example gradually enumerates how the sensible power 
of the soul is in the soul and, then, how the soul is in Intelligence, as a univer-
sal principle, and Intelligence in Being, as the upper principle, just under the 
unknowable and ineffable First Cause. The cause is, namely, in its effect on the 
mode of the effect that receives it.
And indeed, we abbreviate and say that the thing that acts (res agens) upon a thing on the 
mode of the cause is in it only on the mode according to which its cause is, as the sense 
<is> in the soul on an animated mode, the soul is in intelligence on an intellective mode, 
intelligence <is> in being on an essential mode, the first Being <is> in Intelligence on an 
intellective mode, Intelligence <is> in the soul on an animated mode, and the soul <is> in 
the sense on a sensible mode.
(Liber de causis, prop. XI (XII), in Albertus Magnus 1993a, 124, 78–82)
Unlike the non-reciprocal relations between the parts of the totum potestativum, 
the characteristic of this description is the reciprocity of the immanence of the 
cause in its effect, in the ascendant movement, and of the effect in the cause, 
in the descendant movement. How shall we understand res agens, so that the 
senses are in the soul on an animated mode and, reciprocally, the soul in the 
senses on a sensitive mode?
In order to account for this reciprocal immanence, Albert’s strategy consists 
in varying the meanings of ‘cause’. The senses are, namely, in the soul on the ani-
mated mode that is proper to the soul, inasmuch as they determine and achieve 
the soul through a sensation in act. Reciprocally, as the substratum that receives 
this determination, the soul confers its own mode to the senses. So, the senses 
and the soul are simultaneously causes of each other but each according to a dif-
ferent meaning. The senses, which come after (posterior) the soul, are causes in 
the meaning of what formally determines and achieves the soul. The soul, which 
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precedes (anterior) the senses, is a cause in the meaning of the substratum in which 
what comes after inheres on an inchoative, that is still indeterminate, mode.
Transferring the example taken out of the Liber de causis to the powers of the 
soul, each one is in the other one according to a relative rank: anterior, median 
and posterior grade. The relative order of the powers inside the soul conditions 
the reciprocity of their relations. The vegetative power of the soul is in the sen-
sitive power on a sensitive mode, and is in the intellective one on an intellective 
mode. In other words, what is anterior in the development of the soul, as a whole 
of powers, is determined as a sensation in the senses and as an intellection in the 
intellect according to an integrative process in which the soul expands its activ-
ity. And both the senses and the intellect lie in the vegetative faculty of the soul 
on a still indeterminate mode that remains as a potentiality for the development 
of the soul. The senses, in their turn, as the median part of the whole, are in the 
vegetative power as in their substratum (in the sense of determinable cause) on 
an indeterminate mode and they are in the intellect on an intellective mode, as a 
sensation achieved in an intellection. The intellect is, at its turn, in the senses and 
in the vegetative faculty as in its substratum on an indeterminate mode.
4 As a conclusion
Firstly, Albert does not only conceive of the identity of the subject on an ‘attribu-
tivist’ mode that predicates attributes to a substance. He also develops an alterna-
tive pattern that he identifies with the Boethian totum potestativum. The features 
of this model offer a dynamic perspective on identity. They underline the poten-
tiality and the relationality of the individual subject conceived of as a whole that 
develops itself through its powers.
Secondly, Albert highlights the potentiality and the relationality inherent 
to other modes of identity, such as the essential and the substantial ones. The 
identity of the individual is, namely, to be conceived of as a totality composed of 
potentiality and actuality, or of the fundamental possibility to become and of the 
determination of this possibility. The model of the totum potestativum empha-
sises that every individual is a totality that implies different levels of relationality: 
on the ground level of the condition of determination and reception of this deter-
mination, on the level of the first ontological composition of matter and form, on 
the level of a substance and its properties, or on the level of a whole of powers 
and its faculties.
Thirdly, the totum potestativum is a hierarchical whole in which the relations 
are not reciprocal. With this model, Albert cannot account for the equality of the 
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parts that entails their reciprocal immanence. But, following a Greek-Arabic-Latin 
translatio studiorum, that is, a transfer of texts and doctrines from Greece to the 
Latin medieval world through the Arabic cultural arena, he finds a model for this 
reciprocity of the relations between the powers of the soul in the eleventh proposi-
tion of the Liber de causis. Through a variation of the meanings of ‘cause’ – as sub-
stratum (determinable cause) and as determination (determining cause) – Albert 
explains that the lower powers of the soul are in the upper ones on the mode of 
the upper ones, that is as a determination, and that the upper ones are simultane-
ously in the lower ones, as in their substratum, on an indeterminate mode.
Albert the Great’s Œuvre offers, therefore, several models to conceive of the 
identity of a subject. They remain incompatible points of view on the same indi-
vidual. And they describe the identity of the subject under different perspectives 
and dynamics: the powers of the soul are consequences of the spiritual substance, 
according to the ‘attributivismus’ model, whereas they are substantial parts of the 
soul considered as a whole of powers, in particular. But Albert highlights, in each 
of the conceptions of identity that he displays, the relationality and the potential-
ity that each point of view on the identity of an individual implies. From a histor-
ical, geographical and, more generally, cultural point of view, it follows that the 
Albertian conception of the subject, as a completely relational, that is reciprocal, 
totality, requires not only a Greek-Latin translatio studiorum, but a more complex 
detour: from Greek through Arabic to Latin texts, cultures and ways of thinking.
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Markus Vinzent
Monism and dividualism in Meister Eckhart
1 Big Bang – monism and division
According to my former co-fellow of King’s College, Cambridge, the astronomer 
Martin Rees, ‘our universe sprouted from an initial event, the “big bang”’.1 Not 
the concept of this event itself, he sees as problematic,2 but the real challenge 
he sees in a unified interpretation of ‘electric, nuclear and gravitational forces as 
different manifestations of a single primeval force’.3 He maintains this primeval 
force and the big bang, even though he moves away from the idea of a single 
universe to embrace the more recent concept of multiple universes, each with its 
own big bang, a conceptual shift, he thinks, that is as radical ‘as the shift from 
pre-Copernican ideas to the realisation that the Earth is orbiting a typical star on 
the edge of the Milky Way, itself just one galaxy among countless others.’4 In his 
follow-up book, Just Six Numbers, Rees describes what he calls the ‘especially 
significant’ numbers, of which two ‘fix the property of space’, and another in par-
ticular captures ‘the seeds for all cosmic structures […] all imprinted in the Big 
Bang’, the number on which ‘the fabric of our universe depends’.5 Of course, as 
little as Rees wanted to invade the space of theologians and philosophers, so as 
little I’d like to tread on the grounds of astronomers and mathematicians which 
are extremely unfamiliar to me. Yet, it is interesting to note that while Rees sees 
the biggest move in his own approach as his shift away from an older universal 
monism, he is still wrestling with the idea of ‘a single primeval force’ – which he 
1 Rees 1997, 1.
2 Ibid. 2: ‘I would bet at least ten to one that there was indeed a big bang: that everything in our 
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does not substantially challenge, but only complements by other forces (captured 
in the essential numbers) that are seen as manifestations of the one primeval 
force, and by multiplying the idea of the product of the one force through the 
assumption of multiple Big Bangs and universes.
Moving back from contemporary astrophysics into past philosophy and the-
ology, we will see that Meister Eckhart (before 1260 – 1328) had conceptualised 
the first principle in another revolutionary way which might be compared with 
the Copernican turn, but in which he remained a loner. As I will show in this 
contribution, he thought of the first principle not as a unique, primeval force, 
monistic power or single divine Godhead, but as a dividual transcendental cause. 
Although this idea can already be found in his known Latin works,6 two recent 
manuscript re-discoveries allow us to gain a novel insight into this view which 
Eckhart had presented both to his scholarly audience at Paris in Latin and again 
to a lay-audience in the vernacular.
In these manuscripts, as I will detail below, we find core texts, in the form of 
Quaestiones on the topic of ‘relatio’, that seem to go back to a lost collection of 
Quaestiones that Eckhart presented at the University of Paris in the years 1311/1313 
when, for the second time, he held the chair of theology – a post reserved for for-
eigners, and an honour which prior to him was only granted to Thomas Aquinas. 
At the opening of the vernacular Quaestio, Eckhart’s interlocutors are 
portrayed as theologians who represent the long Christian (and Western 
 non-Christian) tradition, according to which the first principle was equally a 
single principle and monotheism taken in the numerical sense (‘Our God is one 
God’; ‘Do not worship another God beside me’). Consequently, the interlocutors 
saw in the single Godhead the ontological basis, the one God and Father, within 
which, according to the ecclesial tradition, the Trinity of Father, Son and Spirit 
were rooted, but both the generation of the trinitarian persons of Son and Spirit, 
and the production of this world were reserved for the Father in his generative 
and creative activity. The Father’s divine essence, the single Godhead, was seen 
as transcendant and beyond generation and creation. Just as with Rees and the 
one primeval force, the masters of Eckhart’s time could not conceive of an essen-
tially non-monistic first principle. In this regard, Eckhart developed a contrasting 
model of the first principle which to him was not only a theological or philosoph-
ical tenet, but – on the basis of his assumed interrelationship between natural 
sciences and ethical, philosophical and theological knowledge – was also seen 
by him as an alternative model that explains not only the generation of the Trinity, 
but equally the creation of the universe.
6 See Wojtulewicz 2017.
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2  The discovery of Eckhart’s Quaestiones 
on ‘relation’
Since the first edition of Eckhart’s vernacular works by Franz Pfeiffer from the 
year 1851, we have known of a vernacular Quaestio by the Dominican master on 
‘relatio’. Yet – because Pfeiffer had taken this text out of its context and, together 
with other excerpts that he made from a soon later lost manuscript, placed and 
understood this text as one of a series of ‘Sayings’ (‘Sprüche’)7 which by schol-
ars were seen as ambiguous, dubious or inauthentic material – the text had not 
attracted any attention. This has now changed for three reasons. 
First, in 2010 I made the re-discovery of a set of four Parisian Questions by 
Meister Eckhart ‘On the attributes [of God]’, to which was added the summary of 
a further Quaestio unearthed by Walter Senner8, and which are now all published 
by Loris Sturlese in a supplement to the critical edition of Eckhart’s works in the 
Kohlhammer edition9 with a joint German translation.10 
Second, as the last two of these re-discovered Quaestiones (now Quaestiones 
Parisienses VIII and IX) deal with ‘Relation’ and ‘Difference’, my attention was 
drawn to the afore-mentioned vernacular Quaestio of Eckhart on ‘relatio’ and I 
asked myself how this vernacular text relates to the re-discovered Latin Quaes-
tiones on the same topic of ‘relation’.11 
Third, and most importantly, by chance and scholarly attention, the famous 
manuscript ‘P’ (dated to the 1320s) had recently re-appeared, which contains 
the vernacular Quaestio on ‘relatio’, and parallels the same text as preserved 
7 Pfeiffer 1857, 606–14, nn. 31–48.
8 Vinzent 2012, 156–86; the previously already known and recognized Parisian Questions can 
be found in the critical edition by Bernhard Geyer in Meister Eckhart, Die Lateinischen Werke 
(hereafter LW), V 27–83; English translation of these previously known questions in Maurer 1974.
9 Sturlese 2011 and the added fragment of a Question, found by Pater Walter Senner, which 
was initially edited and translated in the mentioned article in Vinzent 2012, now published by 
Sturlese 2011, 488. 
10 Sturlese 2015; further studies on the new Parisian Questions have already been published 
or are under way: Vinzent 2015; Vinzent 2016; Mieth 2017a; Ian Richardson, Meister Eckhart’s 
Parisian Question on God’s omnipotence, Eckhart: Texts and Studies (forthcoming); Jana  Ilnicka, 
Meister Eckhart’s Parisian Questions on Relation and Difference, Eckhart: Texts and Studies 
(forthcoming); Markus Vinzent, Meister Eckhart’s Parisian Question on Absolute and Directed 
Power, Eckhart: Texts and Studies (forthcoming). 
11 This topic has been picked up by Jana Ilnicka for her PhD thesis which received the Erfurt 
University Prize, 2019. For an English publication of her results see the note before.
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in a Berlin manuscript (with some fragments in a Munich  manuscript).12 When 
Pfeiffer made his excerpts, ‘P’ belonged to a private collection at Giessen, 
Germany13; it was subsequently sold to the architect Hugo von Ritgen who 
restored the Wartburg Castle, close to Eisenach, Germany, in the late 19th 
century, and as a gift by the architect became one of the medieval props of von 
Ritgen’s restoration project. Since 1909 the codex was thought to have been 
lost,14 but in 2015 it turned up again in the small collection of manuscripts of 
the Wartburg. It was Balázs J. Nemes who was able to identify the manuscript, 
after he came to know of its existence through Klaus Klein (Marburg).15 Late in 
2014, Klein had directed Nemes towards an entry by Renate Schipke and Kurt 
Heydeck in the Handschriftencensus der kleineren Sammlungen in den östlichen 
Bundesländern Deutschlands from 2000.16 This notice – in which Schipke and 
Heydeck described and characterised Ms. 1361–50, Wartburg-Stiftung Eisenach, 
as a ‘collection of spiritual sayings, legends and teachings of mystics, amongst 
whom Meister Eckhart’ – had escaped the eyes of Eckhart scholarship.17 The 
entry was based on a description of the manuscript, made by Renate Schipke 
already ten years earlier in 1990, after the Berlin wall had come down and 
the danger of identified medieval manuscripts being snatched by Alexander 
Schalck-Golodkowski had gone.18 The report, however, had rested unread for 
a decade at the Wartburg, because in those years further restoration work of 
the castle, including the archive, had started and not come to an end by 2015. 
Still, even though Nemes had identified the manuscript, because of the build-
ing works at the castle it took a while to get access to the manuscript. Since 
the first inspection of the manuscript in April 2015, in collaboration between 
12 Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Ms. germ. fol. 986, 200vb-201rb. The Ms. 
germ. fol. 986 dates from the mid 15th century; Ms. germ. fol. 986 is known to Eckhart  scholars 
since 1940, see Quint 1940, 7–10. According to Nemes, the ms. belongs to a group of mss. with mys-
tical literature from Swabia and Alemannia, which derive from the Charterhouse Buxheim, 15th 
century, see Nemes 2015, 182–3, n. 15 and his description of this ms. in Manuscripta mediaevalia 
(online: http://www.manuscriptamediaevalia.de/?xdbdtdn!%22obj%2031257534%22&dmode;=-
doc#|4 [last  accessed 21st  September 2016], with further literature). On the Munic manuscript, 
see Schneider 1996, 559.
13 Pfeiffer 1857, IX, n. 15.
14 See Spamer 1909, 313, n. 3. Similar Bray 2013, 483, n. 11 and Gottschall 2013, 535.
15 See for this, and the history of the discovery of the manuscript and its provenience, 
Nemes 2015.
16 Schipke and Heydeck 2000, 68, n. 66. 
17 Ibid. ‘Sammlung geistlicher Sprüche, Legenden und Lehren der Mystiker, darunter Meister 
Eckhart’ (own translation).
18 Whether he had or would have touched such manuscripts, I don’t know and have not 
 researched; see, however, Blutke 1990.
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Nemes, myself and Julie Casteigt, we have been able to see the manuscript itself 
and photograph it. Since this time, Nemes and I have worked on the manu-
script, and we were soon joined by art historian Beate Braun-Niehr. As a first 
result, in the beginning of the year 2016, we showed the re-discovered codex to 
scholars and introduced the public to it during an exhibition that Jutta Vinzent 
mounted: ‘Performing Bodies. Space and Time in Meister Eckhart and in Perfor-
mances and Video Installations by Taery Kim, 24.01.2016 – 13.03.2016, Galerie 
Waidspeicher, Erfurt’.19 In the same year, we also jointly presented the finding 
to an audience in the Library at the Stadtbibliothek Weberbach, Trier, on 25th 
October 2016.
The importance of ‘P’ had not only been seen by Pfeiffer, but also by Heinrich 
Denifle and Josef Koch who had identified some of the excerpts, given by Pfeiffer, 
as redacted translations of Eckhart’s Latin, mainly exegetical, works.20 Loris Stur-
lese, therefore, put the redactor amongst those Dominicans of Cologne who, 
despite the condemnation of some of Eckhart’s views in the papal Bull De agro 
dominico of 1329, continued ‘to intensely care for the heritage of the deceased 
Master for some decades’.21 Whether or not we are dealing with Dominican stu-
dents of Eckhart from Cologne who translated Eckhart, or with Eckhart’s own 
translation – alternatives which, as Nemes has rightly pointed out, must not be 
mutually exclusive – still needs to be researched, particularly as the latter part of 
the re-discovered codex (the vernacular Quaestio on ‘relatio’ is contained in this 
part) has a parallel in another manuscript, preserved in Berlin, as mentioned 
above. Though the full study of the Wartburg manuscript has begun, it will take a 
while until we will be able the present a comprehensive account of the new find-
ing.22 In what follows, I will only focus on the short vernacular Quaestio on 
‘relatio’, as it provides us with the most concise summary of Eckhart’s teaching 
that relates to monism and dividuality and which I will read against the back-
ground of the Latin Quaestiones on ‘Relation’ and ‘Difference’ and Eckhart’s other 
works, informed by the successfully submitted PhD by one of my students, 
Jana Ilnicka.23
19 See http://www.erfurt.de/ef/de/erleben/veranstaltungen/ast/2016/123478.html#pk_cam-
paign=Redirector-Webcode&pk_kwd=ef123478 (last accessed 10th April 2017); see also the exhi-
bition catalogue: Vinzent and Wojtulewicz 2016.
20 For this and what follows see Nemes 2015, 181; Denifle 1886, 429–32 and Koch 1963, 148–9.
21  Sturlese 2007a, 131–2. See also Sturlese 2007b, 117: ‘Die “Eckhartisten” arbeiteten, als ob die 
Bulle “In agro dominico” überhaupt nicht existiert hätte.’ A survey on the production of spiritual 
literature in German and Latin during the first third of the 14th century is given by Schubert 2013, 
256–60.
22 See for a preliminary report Vinzent 2017. 
23 See Ilnicka 2018.
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3  The question ‘On relation’ of the  
Wartburg-Stiftung Eisenach, Bibliothek, 
Sign. Ms. 1361–50, fol. 87r-87v and Berlin, 
Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, 
Ms. germ. fol. 986, 200vb -201rb
Here is the text of this Qaestio, based on these two manuscripts from Wartburg 
and Berlin24:
24 Text and translation follow the critical edition with German translation by Ilnicka 2018. Some 
of the following ideas are also based on her PhD.
Eckhart, On Relation Own translation Structure
/1 Meister Eghart und ouch ander 
meister sprechent /2 daz zwei ding 
sind in gode: wesen und widersehen 
/3 daz da heisset relacio:
<1> Meister Eckhart and other 
masters too state, that there  
are two things in God: being and 
reflection, that is called relatio.
‘being and relation’
[Contra:] 
nu sprechend die meister /4 daz 
des vader wesen /5 den sun in der 
godheit niht gebird:
[The counter-argument:] 
Now the masters say that  
the Father’s being in the 
godhead does not give birth to 
the Son.
[Pro:] 
Wan [da] der vader nach sinem \/ 
[m.r.: wesen] ensiht niht anders 
danne in sin bloßes wesen /6 und 
schouwet sich selber da inne /7 
nah aller siner kraft /8 und da 
schouwet er sich blos an den sun 
/9 und an den heiligen geist: und 
sicht da mit dann einkeit sines 
selben wesens
Wen aber der vader ein widerschou-
wen und ein widersehen haben wil 
/10 sin selber in einer ander person 
/11 so ist des vader wesen in dem 
widersehnenne geberend den sun
[The argument:] 
<2> If according to his being 
the Father has in no other way 
insight into his bare being, and 
sees himself in there according 
to his entire power, he there 
sees himself bare without the 
Son and without the Holy Spirit, 
hence he sees then oneness of 
his very being. 
If, however, the Father wants to 
have a regard and a reflection 
of himself in another person, 
it is the Father’s being which 
gives birth to the Son in this 
reflection.
bare being, oneness 
and sameness 
reflection is consti-
tutive for persons 
in God
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Eckhart, On Relation Own translation Structure
/12 und wand er im selber in dem 
widersehen so wol gauellet /13 und 
im daz widerschouwen so lustelich 
ist /14 und wand er alle wollust hat 
eweklich gehebt /15 darumbe so 
muost er /16 ouch dis [wist] wider-
sehen 
<87v> eweklichen hauen: 
darumb so ist der sun ewig als der 
vader /2 und von dem wolgeuallen 
und von der minne /3 so vader unde 
sun ze samen havend /4 so hat der 
heilig geist sinen urspring:
<3> And as he is so delighted 
about himself in this reflection, 
and the regard is so desirable 
for him and as he had such 
desire for eternity, therefore he 
must have this reflection, too,
for eternity. 
The Son is, therefore, as eternal 
as the Father, and from the desire 
and love as they are enjoyed by 
Father and Son jointly, the Holy 
Spirit has its origin.
<3> the eternity of 
relation
vnd wan disv minne zwichchen dem 
vader und dem sun ist eweklich 
gewesen: darumbe so ist der heilig 
geist /5 als ewig als der vader und 
der sun: und hand die dri person 
niht wan ein bloßes wesen und 
sind allein underscheiden an den 
personen: wan des vaders person 
ward nie des suns noch des heiligen 
geistes person: und alle drie \/ 
[m.r.: sind] ein ander vremde an den 
personen /6 und sind doch ein in 
dem wesen
Hence, as the love between 
Father and Son has existed for 
ever, therefore, the Holy Spirit 
is as eternal as Father and Son. 
And the three persons have only 
one bare being and are different 
only with regards to the persons. 
The person of the Father, namely, 
was never that of the Son nor the 
person of the Holy Spirit. And all 
three are alien to each other with 
regards the persons, although 
these are one in being.
1 ouch < B; 3 da < B; 5 ensihet] sicht 
Gi2; 9 da mit dann] da niht wan Gi2; 
16 ouch] < Gi2; dis] ding B; 2 von 
der < B; minne] inne B; 4 nun] wan; 5 
niht wan] mit denn B
As the apparatus shows, there are a number of smaller text critical problems with 
this text, the most difficult being the understanding of ‘wan’ in 5.25 As the follow-
ing ‘Wen aber’ in 9 shows, the ‘wan’, too, has to be read as the start of a  condition, 
25 The difference in line 9r between niht wan] mit dann is contentwise irrelevant, but simply a 
variant expression. Line 16r dis] ouch ding might indicate that ‘ouch’ has dropped out from P. In 
contrast, in line 2v one character in B has dropped out of ‘minne’, so that only ‘inne’ remained, a 
phenomenon that we can also see in other places in B, where B seems to leave out characters or 
even words. Irrelevant with regard to content is also the difference in line 5v niht wan] mit denn B.
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Fig. 1: Wartburg-Stiftung Eisenach, Bibliothek, Sign. Ms. 1361–50, fol. 87r.
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Fig. 2: Wartburg-Stiftung Eisenach, Bibliothek, Sign. Ms. 1361–50, fol. 87v.
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Fig. 3: Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Ms. germ. fol. 986, 200v.
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Fig. 4: Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Ms. germ. fol. 986, 201r.
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not a cause. Only this, then, gives the text the proper structure of a Quaestio 
instead of a ‘Saying’, as it has been read in Pfeiffer ‘(Saying 34)’. The question 
opens with reference to ‘Meister Eckhart and other masters’. Eckhart and other 
masters agree on the position that ‘there are two things in God: being and reflec-
tion’, the latter being called ‘relatio’.26 The difference, however, between those 
other masters and Eckhart is introduced by the counter-argument ‘now’ (‘nu’). 
These masters reject the idea that it was the Father’s being that gave birth to the 
Son in the Godhead, a view that Eckhart tries to substantiate and explicate in this 
question. Indeed, he has explicitly stated this view in his Commentary on Exodus: 
‘The power to generate in the Father is in the essence rather than in paternity’,27 
hence God, the Father, does not generate the Son out of God as Father, but out of 
the essence of the Father, as God or Godhead. Unlike Bonaventure and Thomas, 
as I have shown elsewhere,28 Eckhart does not focus on ‘fatherhood’ as the per-
sonal property of the Father; instead, fatherhood expresses the relation between 
Father and Son. Although the relational nature of fatherhood is an idea which 
can also be found in Thomas, Eckhart stresses that the Father generates the Son 
insofar as he is God, in his divine nature, which is the reason why God as the 
agent also communicates his power to generate to the Son without turning the 
Son into the Father. For Eckhart, the Son is not only the generated one in contrast 
to the ingenerated Father, he is, like the Father, the generating God. 
Already in his Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici, homilies and lec-
tures on Jesus Sirach, the Meister noted the broad theological tradition, against 
which he developed his revolutionary view. Just like a self-defeating understate-
ment he starts with the admission that the ‘saints and doctors say rightly that in 
the Godhead the essence does not generate. Unanimously, the doctors also say 
that the power to generate is not an absolute power, but an essence together with 
26 This position is, indeed, one of Eckhart’s views as can be seen by Eckhart, Pr. 9 (DW I 147, 
5–8): ‘The first [category] that has most of being from which all things take in being, that is sub-
stance, and the last [category] which has the least of being, that is called relation, this is equal to 
the greatest in God which has most of being’ (‘Diu êrste, diu des wesens allermeist hât, dâ alliu 
dinc wesen inne nement, daz ist substancie, und daz leste, daz des wesens aller minnest treit, 
daz heizet relatio, daz ist glîch in gote dem aller grœsten, daz des wesens allermeist hât’).
27 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 28 (LW II 34, 1): ‘Potentia generandi in patre est essentia potius quam pater-
nitas’, and he refers to Thomas Aquinas, S. theol. I q. 41 a. 5: ‘Potentia generandi significat in recto 
naturam divinam, sed in obliquo relationem (scilicet paternitatem)’. The Divine essence as the 
power or potentiality for fatherhood of the Father – with the simple and clear difference between 
on the one side ‘the essence and its potentiality without personality’, and on the other the divine 
‘person’ – is expressed in another complex but highly important homily which stems with all 
likelihood from Eckhart’s pen; see Eckhart On Romans 11:33 in Jostes 1895, n. 19, p. 15, 28–32).
28 Vinzent 2012.
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a relation.’29 When we compare the latter statement, we see the parallel to the 
opening of Eckhart’s vernacular Quaestio. 
Already earlier Eckhart had expounded the argument that there are only two 
categories in the Godhead, namely essence and relation, and that ‘the essence as 
essence does not diffuse itself, because it is directed towards its inner self, not 
towards something else, and because it belongs to itself and is through itself, is 
namely always one in the Godhead’. Hence, essence and relation, as the two cat-
egories in God, make God the one who generates. But he adds that it is a ‘tricky 
question’ which of the two, the essence or the relation, comes first.30 In his work 
on Jesus Sirach, he seems to agree with Bonaventure, saying that ‘it seems nec-
essary that the relation is the reason for bearing fruits and for diffusion in the 
Godhead .., namely the Father does not speak the Word, nor generates the Son 
insofar as he is essence or substance, but insofar as he is principle .., and the 
principle, as the term “first” indicates, implies relation of order and origin.’31 A 
close reading of this passage, however, indicates that Eckhart is already moving 
beyond the saints and the masters, especially Bonaventure and Thomas, because 
he does not assert that the Father generates the Son, insofar as he is Father, the 
relative to the related Son, but insofar as he is principle, implying Eckhart’s own 
understanding of principle. Eckhart endorses this difference by adding that 
according to the Liber de causis it is not said that the first (in masculine form, 
primus) ‘is rich in itself’, but that the neuter first (primum) ‘is rich in itself’,32 
so that it is God – and not the Father – who with regard to the relation in him 
generates, just as it is God in his essence, yet not in his essence qua essence, but 
in his essence with relation, who generates the Son and creates all creatures. By 
using the Liber de causis, Eckhart is correcting both Bonaventure and Thomas. In 
addition to this, Eckhart is then solving the mentioned tricky question in his Com-
mentary on John that in the Godhead, wherein are only essence and relation, ‘the 
power to generate […] directly and more principally belongs to the essence rather 
29 Eckhart, In Eccl. n. 11 (LW II 241,1–3): ‘Propter quod optime dicunt sancti et doctores quod in 
divinis essentia non generat. Dicunt etiam doctores communiter quod potentia generandi non est 
absolute, sed essentia cum relatione.’
30 Eckhart, In Eccl. n. 11 (LW II 241,3–4): ‘Quid autem principalius, nodosa quaestio est.’
31 Eckhart, In Eccl. n. 12 (LW II 241,5–242,1): ‘Oportet igitur necessario quod relatio sit, ratione 
cuius est fecunditas et diffusio in divinis . . . pater enim non dicit verbum nec generat filium, in 
quantum essentia sive substantia, sed in quantum principium . . . Principium autem, sicut et li 
primum, relationem importat ordinis et originis.’
32 Eckhart, In Eccl. n. 12 (LW II 242,1–3): ‘In De causis enim dicitur: ‘primum est dives per se’. ‘Pri-
mum’ ait, non primus, quia ratione relationis sive ordinis habet deus diffusionem sive fecunditatem 
tam in divinis quam in creaturis.’
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than to the relation that is paternity’.33 Cutting a long thought process short, we 
can conclude that Eckhart is consciously moving away from the authority of pre-
vious masters and places the trinitarian generation, indeed, into the Godhead of 
the Father, into his being, though understood as a being with relation.
The same concept of a generation of the Son through the Father’s essence, 
God and Godhead, we find in Eckhart’s Latin Parisian Question VII. In this Quaes-
tio, Eckhart addresses again the topic of power and paternity. The problem here 
is whether ‘the Father generates through fatherhood, because’, as some say, 
‘through it [fatherhood] he [the Father] is constituted in his being’ – or whether 
the Father generates his Son through his divine essence, his nature, because it is 
not fatherhood that is the principle, but divine essence or nature. Eckhart gives his 
answer with reference to John Damascene – ‘Generating is the work of nature’ – 
the same reference Eckhart used in his second commentary on Genesis, borrowed 
from Thomas Aquinas.34 Here, in this Question, however, Eckhart deduces from 
Damascene the same anti-Bonaventuran and anti-Thomasian solution which we 
have already encountered before in Eckhart: it is divine essence that is the prin-
ciple and the essence makes the Father a father with his fatherhood. Not father-
hood or paternity, but God’s essence, being or nature (qua relation, of course) 
is the principle of generation; paternity is the Father’s property, while Father is 
the expression of an essential relation and a relational Godhead. Eckhart draws 
exactly the same conclusion as we have found in his commentaries: because the 
Father generates out of divine essence, God communicates the power to generate 
to his Son without turning the Son into the Father.35
4 Being and dividualism
The present short vernacular Quaestio, as we will see, provides not only a short 
introduction, but is also a concise summary of Eckhart’s teaching on God’s 
self-constitution, hence is a lens through which we can read how he conceptual-
ises a first principle that has to be understood not as a monistic, single primary 
force, but as a dynamic dividual.
33 Eckhart, In Ioh. n. 43 (LW III 36,4–5): ‘Potentia generandi in divinis in recto et principalius con-
venit essentiae quam relationi, quae est paternitas’; id., Pr. 103 (p. 336 Pfeiffer).
34 See Eckhart, In Gen. II nn. 44–5; 185 (LW I 512,3–14; 656,11–2), where it is even applied to the 
generation of creatures.
35 Eckhart, of course, goes even further and thinks of God communicating this power to his 
creation; see Pr. 100 (DW 4/1, 277,47–278,61).
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First, Eckhart deals with the potential idea of the Father’s ‘bare being’, his 
Godhead, which is the Father’s divine being in a pre-relational sense, hence the 
Godhead’s being prior to any trinitarian constitution of persons and, therefore, 
prior to any relation. 
<2> If according to his being the Father has in no other way insight into his bare being, and 
sees himself in there according to his entire power, he there sees himself bare without the 
Son and without the Holy Spirit, hence he sees then oneness of his very being.
To Eckhart, a pre-relational principle (‘Father’), that searches for itself, cannot 
lead to self-reflection, but only to a sheer seeing of oneness of bare being. As this 
principle is conceived not in a relational sense, but as bare pre-relational being, 
the Father is unable to see the Son and the Holy Spirit, but even worse, he even 
does not see himself. Hence he is without self-reflection,  self-understanding, 
without self. The following conditional phrase underlines this reading of 
the passage, as Eckhart moves to the next thought of a Father who longs for 
 self-reflection:
If, however, the Father wants to have a regard and a reflection of himself in another person, 
it is the Father’s being which gives birth to the Son in this respect.
This longing of the Father to see himself in a self-reflection leads to no other 
‘know yourself’ than to a giving ‘birth to the Son in this respect’. Seeing himself 
means that the Father is birthing the Son. Of course, these two ‘steps’ are not 
chronological events, but purely epistemological and conceptual discernments. 
This is not an easy text. The statement seems to carry two important argu-
ments. In the first conditional clause, Eckhart assumes, from the beginning, that 
according to the Father’s being and his Godhead as first principle he would be 
an entirely monistic entity, if he were not fundamentally dividual and relation-
ally structured, longing to see himself and with himself everything else. That is 
why he states in a first clause that if the Father had insight into his being –  if we 
assumed a monistic first principle – this resulted in nothing but a brutal facing 
of purity and bareness of being, not in self-reflection or knowledge. This is even 
true if we conceived that the first principle were using its entire power: the Father 
still would see nothing but oneness, neither himself, nor the Son nor the Holy 
Spirit. The ‘exclusively’, or better ‘barely’ (‘blos’), picks up on the ‘bare being’ 
(‘bloßes wesen’): indicating that in the reaching out by the Father for his being 
and for himself, the assumption of a monistic principle, is futile. This explains 
that neither the Father’s seeing into his pure and bare being, nor his looking for 
himself gives him a satisfactory self-reflection. He only sees a bare being. This 
interpretation, then, fits the concluding section that the Father ‘does not see 
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 anything but oneness of his very being’. Any introspection of the Father accord-
ing to his Godhead and into his being, and even his essentially  non-monistic 
reaching out for himself, ends not in a self-disclosure,  self-discovery, or 
 self-consciousness, as we would put it in contemporary terms. All that the Father 
sees is oneness; he does neither see himself as Father, nor does he see himself at 
all as self, but all he sees is oneness and sameness of his being, not even unity. As 
we will see in the next paragraph – such oneness and sameness of the Father’s 
being excludes him being a person, and equally excludes the Son and Holy Spirit 
being persons. As a result, in such oneness and sameness there would be no 
‘relation’, but only pure substance.
As a consequence of the rejection of such a monistic essentiality of the first 
principle, Eckhart develops the idea of the Father’s longing. 
As indicated, though Eckhart speaks of three, we are not able to call the 
three a Trinity of selves, as even the Father has no self as long as he is only 
looking at himself and seeking himself. Turning to him as Father, he is more 
being than Father, more Godhead than God. His act of seeing does not make him 
an agent. Neither, however, is being itself an agency. Being does not see being, 
and this is why Eckhart speaks of the Father as the one who has to reach out not 
for himself and his being, but for ‘a regard and a reflection of himself in another 
person’. 
Of course, one may ask at this point, why would the Father – who is all 
being, pure being, bare being – wish to be anything else? Can one be more than 
being? What seems tautological, paradoxical or perhaps even nonsensical, 
Eckhart has discussed in another text, not much easier than the opening of this 
present Quaestio. In his Predigt 67 Eckhart describes spiritual nature, i.e. the 
nature of angels and of the human soul, and he speaks about their essential 
oneness with God:
In all things spiritual one finds that the one is in the other as one and undivided. Where the 
soul is in her bare nature, detached and separated from all creatures, she would have in 
her nature, by nature, all the perfection and all the joy and delight that all the angels have 
without36 number and without multitude by nature: I have them fully with all the perfec-
tion and with all their joy and all their happiness, as they themselves have them in them-
selves; and everything I have in me distinctly, as I have myself in myself, irrespective of 
another, because no spirit excludes [Sturlese: includes] the other. The angel is not included 
in the soul; therefore it gives itself entirely to each soul, without hindrance from another 
and God Himself. Not only by nature, indeed: in nature, my soul rejoices in all the joy and 
all happiness, which God Himself rejoices in His divine nature, may He like or dislike it; 
because there, there is nothing but one, and where there is one, there is everything, and 
36 Quint and Sturlese here read: ‘with’.
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where there is everything, there is one. This has some truth. Where the soul is, there is God, 
and where God is, there is the soul. And if I told you that this were not so, I would say the 
wrong thing.37
Being ‘in the other as one and undivided’, in ‘bare nature’, but ‘detached’ and 
‘separated from all creatures’, all spritual things are one, which is God’s oneness. 
The spirituals’ oneness has to be conceptualised just like God’s oneness, as a full 
communication. As ‘communication’ already indicates – and the soul’s joy and 
happiness support this – this is an exalted state where there is union between 
the soul and God. And yet, as Eckhart will add, it is not the highest state that the 
soul can achieve. There is more than being one with God, there is more than joy 
and happiness for the soul. Although detached from all creatures, the soul in her 
communication with God still enjoys herself as self.
Now listen to me! There, above, she first grasps the pure absolûciô of the free being, that 
there is without a ‘there’, where she does neither take nor give; she is the bare beingness 
which is deprived of any being and all beingness. There she grasps God nakedly according 
to the ground, where He is beyond all being. If there still were being, she would take being 
into being; but there is nothing but one ground. This is the supreme perfection of the Spirit, 
to which one can get in this life in the way of the Spirit.
But this is not the greatest perfection that we shall ever possess with body and with soul, 
that the outer person will be fully held in having a substantiated personal being.38
With his ‘now listen to me!’ Eckhart often introduces one of his novel ideas (‘nova 
et rara’). Speaking about the soul, he mentions the pure detachment of the free 
being, giving us one of the rare Latin equivalents for this core notion of his: abso-
lutio. It is a state of the soul where she is even beyond unity with God, beyond joy 
and happiness, in a state where she ‘neither take[s] nor give[s]’. As in our Quaes-
tio, this state is called ‘bare beingness’ (‘blôze isticheit’).
In his commentary on this Predigt 67, one of the most difficult and equally 
most fascinating texts of Eckhart, Dietmar Mieth has pointed out39 that in this 
text the ‘higher’ being, the essential oneness with God, is not called the ‘best’ 
being. This differentiation makes one wonder: how can one amplify or intensify 
the ‘higher’ being? And what could be better than being one with God? What else 
than the essential oneness could be better for God as for the person, and what else 
could be the highest aim for both? Thus, again and again this highest aim was 
invoked by the neoplatonic teachers of the redditio and by the  Christian fathers 




in the teaching of the Visio beatifica. In his homily, Meister Eckhart explains that 
the pure spiritual being of angels might be higher than the bodily-spiritual being 
of humans, because the angel through its pure spirituality is unlimited and united 
with the divine being; however, so Eckhart, the personal being of human beings 
is better, even ‘the best perfection’, not only for human beings, but even for God 
himself. Why is this? God is only ‘self’, when he is a person, and this is precisely 
the kind of being that God chooses for himself. Personality, being with a partner, 
being Father with a Son, with the Spirit, with the creatures, being of the  god-human 
nature of Christ, being self as non-monistic principle, being as principally dividual 
is the highest form of being. This self, as we will see, is the foundation both for God 
as it is for humans. In his vernacular Question, Eckhart continues:
<3> And as he is so delighted about himself in this reflection, and the regard is so desirable 
for him and as he had such desire for eternity, therefore he must have this reflection, too, 
for eternity. The Son is, therefore, as eternal as the Father, and from the desire and love as 
they are enjoyed by Father and Son jointly, the Holy Spirit has its origin. Hence, as the love 
between Father and Son has existed for ever, therefore, the Holy Spirit is as eternal as Father 
and Son. And the three persons have only one bare being and are different only with regards 
to the persons.
Eckhart highlights the joy and delight about this highest state of being ‘in this 
reflection’, whereby ‘reflection’ is the translation of ‘widersehnenne’, which 
could also be rendered as self-reflection, or self-regard (‘widerschouwen’). The 
emotional terms used here (delight, desirable, desire, love) indicate that Eckhart 
is not only writing about a purely intellectual or ontological level of epistemol-
ogy, but that it is a fully embodied view of being and self. The first principle’s 
will – pars pro toto for any longing for self – only results in satisfaction and a full 
realisation of ‘self’, if such self – from the first principle to the last principled – 
is conceived of as dividual: as a self that only in the birthing of other selfs can 
become what is its highest being, namely self. Self, as understood by Eckhart, is 
only a dynamically productive self by birthing the other not as a dependent, hier-
archically subjugated other, but as a full and own self which in return becomes 
the birthing self of the principle self. Hence, the such conceived and birthed self 
is itself just like the first principle itself: a first, conceiving and birthing principle. 
Within this dynamically productive process of self-becoming there is no hierar-
chy between the selfs. They are only selfs as mutually birthing selfs which, if we 
compare Eckhart’s view to concepts of self-production in, for example, Idealism, 
are not evolutionary, nor teleologically or hierarchically conceived. To Eckhart 
there would be no ‘single primeval force’ that powered the big bang or any big 
bang, but the primeval force would be itself the result of a powering big bang or 
rather of powerful forces and big bangs. 
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Antje Linkenbach
The empathic subject and the question 
of dividuality
1  Introduction
Emotions and their history have recently become the subject of intense inquiry 
and research. Studies try to trace the role of emotions in philosophy, theatre, 
literature, social and cognitive sciences from a historical perspective. The focus 
hereby lies on the Western hemisphere and on the modern period (18th century 
until present).1
In her study of the history of concepts and debates on emotions since 1700, 
Ute Frevert asks about the relationship between individualisation – understood 
as progressive emancipation of the individual from religious, social and occupa-
tional bonds and commitments – and the discussion of the nature of emotions 
(Frevert 2014, 5f.). She argues that emotions or feelings document a specific 
quality of the individual and therefore are assigned a special dignity and value 
in modern society. Emotions connect human beings to one another, but also to 
nature and to objects. Frevert strongly highlights the social role of emotions: 
grounded in reciprocity, they facilitate social bonding and further social integra-
tion among human beings.
Taken to its logical end, Frevert’s statement of the social quality of emotions 
allows drawing the conclusion that emotions might influence processes of indi-
vidualisation in such ways that they probably counteract (mitigate, weaken) 
individual attempts of disentanglement, of creating impermeable boundaries 
between oneself and the outer as well as social world. Or, reformulating the argu-
ment in the form of a question and with reference to Charles Taylor (2007): do 
we have to take emotions into consideration when we ask about the relationship 
between a ‘porous’ and ‘vulnerable’ Self and a ‘buffered’ or ‘bounded’ Self?
In this contribution I am not going to look into particular emotions; my 
purpose is rather to focus on empathy, often described as emotional competence 
or emotional intelligence and referring to the capability of a person to experience 
and understand other people’s sentiments. According to recent neuro-scientific 
1 In Germany research is concentrated at the ‘Center for the History of Emotions’, which is part 
of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin; geographically the Center focuses 
on Europe, North America and South Asia. For a historical account of research on emotions in 
Europe in the last three centuries see Frevert et al. 2014. See also Landweer, Renz 2008.
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and philosophical research, empathy has an emotional and a cognitive dimen-
sion. Empathy ‘can be defined as a multidimensional process of recognising, 
understanding and feeling the sentiments of other persons and thus includes 
cognitive (recognition and understanding) as well as emotional (feeling) aspects’ 
(Schwenck et al. 2011, 265; transl. AL).2
Similarly to the interest in emotions, the notion and concept of empathy 
has gained scholarly attention across disciplines and the rise of its significance 
in European intellectual history, literature and public discourse since the 17th 
century has been well documented. Such increased attentiveness may indicate 
that empathy, by revealing the relationality and sociality of human beings, might 
also act as an obstacle to radical individualisation, based on the imaginary of 
a detached and self-contained individual. In other words and using another 
concept: empathy possibly triggers and supports dividualisation3; it possibly indi-
cates that individuals are partible and porous instead of bounded, that they are 
permeated, deeply affected and marked by the outside world – and the outside 
world consists of fellow beings, objects and ‘not unquestionably plausible’ agents 
or authorities as for example the transcendent, the divine (Rüpke 2015).
This article will discuss empathy in its particular manifestation of co-feeling 
with the pain and suffering of fellow beings. The text is organised into six sections. 
In the first section and as a starting point I present core ideas of the ‘anthropology 
of violence’ in order to show that in the context of human suffering empathy is 
closely linked to ideas of the communicability of pain, of healing and morality. 
Pursuing a socio-historical perspective, section 2 aims to illustrate the historical 
shift from a theological to a secular understanding of suffering which also, on 
the one hand, gave rise to individualisation, and on the other to an increased 
importance of morality and sociality understood as a result of human praxis. The 
next three sections focus on conceptual approaches: section 3 traces the concep-
tual forerunners of empathy and discusses ‘sympathy’ and ‘imagination’ in the 
intellectual landscape of the 17th and 18th centuries, followed by (in section 4) 
reflections on the relationship between empathy, language and understanding as 
2 German original: Empathie ‘kann definiert werden als ein multidimensionaler Prozess des 
Erkennens, Verstehens und Nachempfindens der Gefühle anderer Personen und beinhaltet 
damit sowohl kognitive (Erkennen und Verstehen) als auch emotionale (Nachempfinden) As-
pekte’ (Schwenck et al. 2011, 265).
3 For the concept of dividualisation see the introduction to Part 2 of this publication and the con-
cluding discussion of this article. For now it is sufficient to recollect that for the purposes of this 
article (as well as for the purposes of all other contributions to Part 2) dividualisation is not used 
in the strict sense as it is defined in New Melanesian Ethnography, but as an umbrella term which 
can encompass all those forms of the individual that do not subscribe to the bounded possessive 
individual of the Western discourse.
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a cornerstone for a desirable moral and social life; this section also touches upon 
the difference between empathic identification and unification (assimilation). 
Part 5 refers to contemporary approaches to empathy (neurosciences, phenom-
enological philosophy). Especially the philosophical approach demands inte-
grating different levels of empathic occurrences (cognitive, expressive, bodily, 
hermeneutic) in a model of empathy, thus claiming empathic capabilities for all 
human beings. In the final section (6) I will argue that, grounded in resonance 
and relationality, empathy seems to lend itself to the experiment of linking it to 
the idea and concept of dividuality.
2  Point of departure: understanding suffering  
and pain in the ‘anthropology of violence’
Anthropology of violence as a distinctive area of research is strongly connected 
with the name of Veena Das, anthropologist and sociologist from India, now 
based in the United States.4 Already by the late 1980s and early 1990s she had laid 
the theoretical foundations for the new anthropological approach to understand-
ing violence, suffering and pain as a social phenomenon (Das 1987; 1990; 1995).5
Violence is perceived as meaningful social action that cannot be reduced to 
its instrumental aspect; it equally contains expressive and symbolic dimensions, 
which even may marginalise instrumentality. For Das such a perspective presup-
poses a particular understanding of the human body, which has to be considered 
as space or territory for expressive and symbolic action. The body as territory can 
also function as memory through the inscription of pain – an insight gained from 
the works of Pierre Clastres and Friedrich Nietzsche. Clastres refers to rites-de-pas-
sage in so-called primitive societies. Here social membership is inscribed upon the 
4 In the United States, Veena Das (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore) started collaborating 
with scholars from the disciplines of social medicine, psychiatry and medical anthropology 
(among others Arthur Kleinmann, Harvard University, USA; Margaret Lock, McGill University, 
Canada). A number of seminal publications established the anthropology of violence as an inter-
nationally acknowledged field of research.
5 The field of anthropology of violence focuses on the social aspects of human suffering. They 
understand what they call ‘social suffering’ as ‘an assemblage of human problems that have 
their origins and consequences in the devastating injuries that social force inflicts on human 
experience. Social suffering results from what political, economic, and institutional power does 
to people, and, reciprocally, from how these forms of power themselves influence responses to 
social problems’ (Das, Kleinman, Lock 1996, XI). Authors focus, for example, on the Holocaust, 
the Bhopal gas tragedy, the Indian Partition, South African Apartheid.
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body through torture and pain – the price of belonging – and the wounds left on 
the body preclude forgetting. But whereas for Clastres the ritual equalises all par-
ticipants as members in a moral community, Nietzsche sees the relation between 
society and the individual as analogous to that of creditor and debtor. Sociality is 
based on a contract made by the debtor with the creditor, and in case the debtor 
would fail to repay, he pledges to submit something that he possesses – his body, 
wife, freedom or even his life. Here, infliction of pain on a person is seen as legiti-
mate, if this person has caused injury by failing in his obligation; and the infliction 
of pain creates memory, which is directed to the future. Following Clastres’ and 
Nietzsche’s interpretation, Das’ research on violent acts (rape, abduction and even 
murder) against women during the Partition riots, which accompanied the founda-
tion of the states of India and Pakistan in 1947, evokes the bodies of women – in the 
context of gendered ideologies – as being territory and memory, and thus function-
ing as ‘signs on which the violent dialogue of men was conducted’ (Das 1995, 186).
In contrast to sociological research on violence, which tended to objectify 
and victimise the affected persons, and which ‘privatised’ their suffering and 
thus denied them the ability to communicate pain, the new anthropological 
approach attempted to give space to the ‘voice’ of the people concerned.6 Here 
it is the anthropologist (the researcher) who takes the role of a witness and a 
listener, and by accepting the subject in the role of the speaker, establishes a 
dialogic relationship. After the riots which followed the assassination of Indira 
Gandhi in Delhi in 1984, a group of anthropologists and sociologists decided to 
engage in rehabilitation work. They concentrated not only on material help but 
tried to create a moral space for the expression of grief, guilt, pain, and mourning. 
The researchers argued that the women and children of males who were killed in 
the riots had a great need to tell their stories again and again. This is captured in 
a phrase uttered by one of the women and used by Das as a heading of one of her 
articles: ‘It is our work to cry and your work to listen’ (Das 1990).
The need to establish a culture of listening and a therapeutic space in the 
context of research on violence prompted the involved scholars to reflect on the 
problem of the communicability and the inalienability of pain. Relating to Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and his so-called private language argument,7 Veena Das formulates 
two central questions:
6 Research on violence in German sociology in the 1990s can serve as an example; see the vol-
ume Soziologie der Gewalt (1997), here especially the contributions of Trutz von Trotha, Birgitta 
Nedelmann, Wolfgang Sofsky.
7 Das refers especially to Wittgenstein’s Blue and Brown Books (German ed. 1984) and his 
Philosophical Investigations (1958). For reflections on the private language argument see e.g. 
 Schroeder 1998; 2007.
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When we talk about the communicability of pain, we ask whether it is possible to commu-
nicate one’s experience of pain to another person. In other words, is knowledge of private 
objects such as pain only possible for the individual subject, or is it communicable? The 
second question, about the inalienability of pain, is to ask what it means to “have” a pain.
(Das 1995, 194)
With Wittgenstein she then argues that the statement ‘I am in pain’ is not simply 
declarative or descriptive of a purely personal experience (sensation), but it is 
a (moral) complaint and an invitation to share. It addresses other persons and 
therefore marks not the end, but the beginning of a language game.
While it seems that pain is communicable, it might still be inalienable. Are 
my pains only those which are felt in my body or can I feel pain in the body of 
others? Veena Das extrapolates from Wittgenstein’s texts that, at the level of phil-
osophical grammar, he denies an individual ownership in pain: my pains are 
those to which I give expression, and a person’s expression (of pain) may indicate 
that the pain is located outside his or her body:
In order to see that it is conceivable that one person should have pain in another person’s 
body, one must examine what sorts of facts we call criteria for a pain being in a certain 
place. […] Suppose I feel a pain which on the evidence of the pain alone, e.g., with closed 
eyes, I should call a pain in my left hand. Someone asks me to touch the painful spot with 
my right hand. I do so and looking round perceive that I am touching my neighbour’s hand.
(Wittgenstein 1958, 49; quoted in Das 1995, 195)
Veena Das emphasises that Wittgenstein’s ‘brilliant formulation that my pain may 
be located in another’s body, and that the pain of the other may be experienced in 
my body’ indicates that there is ‘no individual ownership in pain’ (Das 1995, 195). 
The possibility of sharing pain has a clear moral significance as it allows gener-
ating compassion and concern. It also may generate the wish to ease the other 
person’s suffering and thus create a therapeutic space. Das invokes Drew Leder, 
an American philosopher, who demands ‘forming one body’ with the sufferer:
[…] one-body-compassion for my sick friend leads me to do what I can for her: hold her 
hand, offer words of comfort, bring her food, fix her bedclothes. I give over my motoric 
possibilities to be guided by her desires. If she is thirsty, my hands fetch her drink. If she is 
weak, my limbs supply her strength. We act as if we were one functioning body, her “I can” 
supplemented by my abilities, her wishes fulfilled by my work. 
(Leder 1990, 163; quoted in Das 1995, 195)
A central concern of the anthropologists following the new approach to under-
standing violence and suffering is ‘healing’. Drew Leder hints at the importance 
of healing when he states that lending one’s abilities to the sufferer means also 
to bring relief to this person. Suffering, he says, ‘is the experience of isolation’, 
it ‘disrupts communion with the natural and the social world’ and thus the 
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 one-body experience can act as a healing force (Leder 1990, 161). Listening to 
 narratives of violence, lending one’s body to those in pain, all this might allow 
the affected person(s) to heal, to become able to get back to ordinary life. Though 
the ordinary will always remain imbued by the memory of the severe disruptions 
that happened, ‘descent into everyday life’ (Das 2007, 15) seems to be the only way 
of repairing and ‘remaking a world’ after trauma.8
The anthropology of violence emphasises the possibility of communicating 
and sharing pain even under conditions of deep social disruption, and stresses 
the healing force of both. It thus reveals a particular social and moral quality 
of the human being, namely empathy: the emotional capability to feel with the 
other, to get marked by (the pain of) the other and even feel compelled to lend 
(part of) one’s body to ease this pain. Empathy apparently presupposes vulner-
ability and thus a porous, partible body-mind entity. At this point it seems fruit-
ful to relate the anthropological discussion with the broader cross-disciplinary 
debate on empathy,9 which has proliferated in recent decades in the disciplines 
of history, philosophy, social and cognitive sciences.
3 Human suffering and the birth of fellow feeling
While human emotions are anchored in the biological nature of human beings, 
the way emotions are realised and socially evaluated, and are the subject of lan-
guage and reflection, is dependent on time and cultural context. The cultural 
grammar of emotions as well as theories of emotions are historically contingent 
(Frevert, 2014; Wilkinson, Kleinman 2016). On this assumption, any statement 
about empathy – here understood as the emotional competence to relate to the 
suffering of others – needs to be historically located and contextualised. First and 
foremost one has to take into consideration that there might be variations in the 
way people relate to and comprehend human suffering in the course of history. For 
the purpose of this paper I want to relate to the already referenced study of Wilkin-
son and Kleinman and, following their analysis of relevant scholarly work from 
the Western context,10 briefly inquire about the socio-historical  circumstances 
8 See the title of a publication edited by Veena Das and others (2001).
9 Empathy refers to the Greek word pathos, which means to suffer, to endure. The word is a 
neologism invented by E. B. Titchener in 1909; he used ‘empathy’ to translate the German word 
Einfühlung, common in the German-speaking world in hermeneutics, aesthetics and psychology.
10 I am aware that in other cultural and religious contexts the meaning of suffering, the role of 
emotions and empathy have been and are differently interpreted.
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under which the meaning of human suffering becomes interpreted as an explicitly 
social condition, which demands moral commitment and prompts empathy. This 
is to ask about the origins and dynamics of ‘moral individualism’, that is the dis-
position to show pity and sympathise with those who suffer (Wilkinson, Kleinman 
2016, 26f.).11
Understanding human suffering in social terms presupposes a radical 
shift in the relation between human beings and the transcendental (or god). It 
requires, so Wilkinson and Kleinman, a departure from a theological interpreta-
tion. In the European Middle Ages and early modernity, devoted to the tradition 
of Christianity, a consensus about the cause and meaning of human suffering 
prevailed.  Suffering was often understood as sent by God, not only as punish-
ment for wrongdoing but also to redeem his creation from sin. Hardship and pain, 
which people experienced in various forms, like earthquakes, floods, famine, and 
diseases, was invested with moral and divine meaning. Especially in Protestant 
cultures, with their emphasis on predestination and attainment of salvation 
solely through God’s grace, the ‘doctrines of Providence’ had the greatest impact 
on public and personal affairs. The belief in the rightness of God’s judgement, 
the meaningfulness of his signs, was highest in the 16th and 17th centuries; and 
it went along with an impulse in the direction of individualisation. In order to 
rightly interpret and understand God’s ways, each individual had ‘to examine his 
conscience, motivations, and actions in light of biblical teachings on the means 
to […] salvation’ (ibid., 32).
In the second half of the 17th century, providentialism increasingly lost its 
explanatory power. Intellectuals and educated circles, upwardly mobile groups 
and political movements worked against what they considered superstition and 
irrational belief. Also amongst lower classes scepticism about the promises of 
reward in the next world for patiently enduring the evils of the present was not 
unusual. Wilkinson and Kleinman support this argument by invoking the schol-
arly works of Ann Thompson (2003) and Jennifer Herdt (2001). Thompson, who 
has analysed sermons and Christian writings from the 17th century, argues that 
the post-Reformation (Puritan) way of interpreting suffering was replaced by the 
conviction that God’s ways are beyond understanding. Herdt concludes from her 
research, on Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth and his influence on other Lat-
itudinarians (17th century English theologians from the University of Cambridge), 
that new theological emphasis is laid on the idea that God feels with those in pain 
11 Other scholars have also attempted to trace the history of empathy, for example Jeremy Rifkin 
(2009), who gives a sweeping account about empathy in the world’s civilisations up until today, 
and Lynn Hunt (2007), who traces empathy as a precondition for the invention of human rights.
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and suffers along with them. In the figure of Christ as the incarnated God, the 
creator himself relates to human beings with compassion, and in consequence 
God is seen as more responsive to, but less responsible for human suffering. Herdt 
further argues that the work of the Latitudinarians marked a transitional phase 
in European intellectual history. Divine passibility (God’s capability to respond 
emotionally to his creation) promoted secularising tendencies within senti-
mentalist ethics in the culture of Enlightenment. It was the philosopher Francis 
Hutcheson (1694–1746) who was the first to take up the humanitarian interpre-
tation of Christianity and advance the idea that human beings are distinguished 
by a God-given ‘moral sense’, and thus by the capacity for a morally grounded 
sentiment of fellow feeling.
By the end of the early 19th century the attitude towards human suffering had 
undergone a radical transformation. Suffering had become increasingly morally 
unacceptable and was criticised as something that has a mundane, secular cause. 
Social circumstances, conditional for these causes, could and should be changed. 
People responded to public execution of punishment with disgust and started 
campaigning against such spectacles (Hunt 2007). In literature and theatre, sen-
timental novels and plays proliferated and the audience celebrated their shared 
humanity (Hunt 2007; Mullan 1988). While the new sensibilities and manifes-
tations of compassion were de facto recent or ‘modern’ phenomena, they were 
considered as expressions of ‘natural instinct’ (Wilkinson, Kleinman 2016, 39). In 
their capacity as natural moral feelings they enabled a new imaginary of sociality 
and moral conduct.
Two main reasons seem to account for the cultural constitution of the com-
passionate orientation of human beings in the 18th and 19th centuries (ibid., 
43f.): the process of civilisation (as outlined, eg., by Norbert Elias), and/or experi-
ences of individualisation in the wake of the emerging capitalist economy. In the 
first case, compassion is seen as a by-product of internalised self-restraint and 
sublimation; in the second, it is assumed that the involvement of individualised 
people in market relations created new bonds and moral responsibilities. Capi-
talist market structures also are considered seminal for the emergence of a new 
middle class for which sentimentalism became a form of mass entertainment. 
The demand for ‘partaking in the pleasure of tears’ led to a ‘cultural manufacture 
of fellow-feeling’ and also laid the foundation for a profitable business (ibid, 44).
In order to sum up the transformation of European ideas on human suffering 
since the Christian Middle Ages, which are interlinked with changes in emotional 
conditions, we have to highlight three aspects: (1) a shift from a theological to 
a secular interpretation of the causes of suffering; (2) recognition that the con-
ditions of life are a result of human praxis and therefore subject to change; (3) 
an ongoing trend to individualisation and the acceptance of social and moral 
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responsibility for fellow human beings, expressed in a compassionate relation-
ship to the other. To put it in the words of Wilkinson and Kleinman:
Social life is emphatically portrayed as moral experience; and it is further assumed that by 
moral feeling we stand to acquire a vital part of our knowledge of society. On these grounds, 
it is widely accepted that social dispositions are manifested in the moral outrage experi-
enced in the face of human suffering and then when touched by the miseries of others we 
are made consciously alert to social bonds. At its origins, the critical impulse that brings 
debate to the human social condition as such is allied to the conviction that social life is 
animated by our capacity to sympathize morally with the suffering of others.
 (ibid., 46; second accentuation AL)
4  Sympathetic imagination as social  
and moral force
Two eminent thinkers of the 18th century Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume 
(1711–1776) and Adam Smith (1723–1790), elaborately reflect on the moral senti-
ment of co-feeling as constitutive for sociality.12 In the centre of these reflections 
is the notion of ‘sympathy’.
In his main work, A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume challenges the 
priority of reason as a motive for social action and gives passions a prominent 
place in considerations about the human constitution and human society. Pas-
sions (or sentiment, feelings) are not expressions of private desires or interests, 
they are rather directed towards fellow human beings and ‘are so contagious, 
that they pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and produce 
correspondent movements in all human breasts’ (Hume 2001, 386). Passions 
advance communication among fellow human beings; the movement of passions, 
however, is enabled by ‘sympathy’, a ‘remarkable’ quality of human nature, both 
in itself and in its consequences (ibid., 206).
Interpreters of David Hume’s work emphasise that he understands sympathy 
as ‘a psychological mechanism that explains how we come to feel what others are 
feeling. It is not itself a feeling or sentiment […]’ (Morris, Brown 2014, section 7.2). 
The mechanism of sympathy brings a person from the ‘idea of what someone is 
feeling to actually experiencing the feeling’ (ibid.); and for that four steps are 
needed: first, to have an idea of the other’s feeling; second, to become aware of 
the resemblance, the associative relation between me and the other (including 
12 For the reception on Hume and Smith I refer primarily to Mullan (1988), Haakonssen (2002), 
Morris and Brown (2014), Agosta, undated).
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the awareness that I feel closer to those who are near to me in time, space, and 
through family relationships); third, to become aware of myself; and finally, the 
perception of the other is transmitted by force and vivacity to my perception. 
Hume summarises: ‘[…] sympathy […] is nothing but the conversion of an idea 
into an impression by the force of imagination’ (Hume 2001, 273; emphasis AL).
Adam Smith integrates the theory of imagination, developed by Hume, as a 
central element of his work on moral sentiments. For Hume and for Smith, so Knud 
Haakonssen, the imagination is a mental faculty, which spontaneously searches for 
order, coherence and agreement in the world and so enables people to ‘create a distinc-
tively human sphere within the natural world’ (Haakonssen 2002, xii).  Haakonssen 
distinguishes two forms of imagination in Smith’s work: ‘theoretical’ imagination, 
directed towards things and events, and ‘practical’ imagination, concerned with 
persons as agents. This latter form of imagination is what Smith calls sympathy and 
what he considers crucial for human morality. It is a mechanism or process to reach 
out to other people, to understand the other’s point of view and prepare moral assess-
ments – it is not the assessment itself.13 Smith describes this process vividly:
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the 
manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the 
like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, 
our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us 
beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception 
of what are his sensations. […] It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of 
his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, 
we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, 
and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of 
his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether 
unlike them. His agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have 
thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and 
shudder at the thought of what he feels. For as to be in pain or distress of any kind excites 
the most excessive sorrow, so to conceive or to imagine that we are in it, excites some degree 
of the same emotion […].  (Smith 2002, 11f.)
Through sympathy as an act of imagination a person comes to understand other 
people’s feelings. However, this is for Smith a mutual process, because in the 
same way as the other as a moral being is a creation of ‘my’ imagination, I am as 
13 ‘Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow 
of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, 
without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion what-
ever’ (Smith 2002, 13). Smith, however, is not always consistent in his use of the term and some-
times seems to use sympathy as synonymous with compassion.
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well an act of ‘his/her’ imagination. Moreover, in this act of imagination lies an 
even greater significance: while people interact, they learn to see their own senti-
ments and feelings with the eyes of others:
The central point is that we only become aware of ourselves […] through our relationship 
to others. When we observe others, we notice that they observe us, and one of the most 
urgently felt needs for sympathetic understanding is to appreciate how they see us. […] Our 
understanding of how others see us […] shapes our view of who we are and how we stand in 
[…] relationships in life.  (Haakonssen 2002, xv)
Haakonssen is convinced that Adam Smith was very much aware of the fact that 
the human being in its personal and moral existence is constituted by social rela-
tionships and mutual interaction with (significant) others: ‘[…] one only learns to 
see oneself as a person and as a member of a moral universe of agents through 
sympathy with other’s view of one’s identity and situation in the world’ (ibid.).14 
Human beings are social beings and they can only act in the world on the basis 
of sympathetically imagining the others’ expectations: persons anticipate the 
assessment of themselves by others and adjust their own behaviour in a social 
setting according to the need of agreement or conformity, or to avoid conflict. 
With that, human social beings ‘internalize the external spectator and respond to 
this figure of the sympathetic imagination’ (ibid.).
Besides grounding social life in interaction, Adam Smith also lays the foun-
dation for a social rationale of morality, thereby dismissing the idea of a universal 
morality as well as ascribing it to the authority of conscience and thus finally to 
God. Like other ‘conventions’ morality is a result of adaptation to the respective 
circumstances humans live in and is thus historically and socio-culturally con-
tingent.15 To establish the social basis of morality Smith imagines the ideal of an 
‘impartial spectator’, ‘the man within the breast’ (Smith 2002, 182), who judges 
(similarly to a third person) without bias and serves as a ‘moral compass’ (Hunt 
2007, 65). This imagination, Haakonssen emphasises, is itself an act of mutual 
sympathy, as we try to understand the way the ideal impartial spectator – not 
limited by prejudice, ignorance and so on – would sympathise with us and so 
appraise us (Haakonssen 2002, xv).
14 The insight that taking the role or the perspective of the other is paramount for the develop-
ment of the human personality was developed by G. H. Mead and became central for the prag-
matist approach to philosophy, sociology and social psychology.
15 Haakonssen argues that setting aside the ‘ancient divide over the issue of nature versus arti-
fice in morality’ is Smith’s most original contribution to moral philosophy. According to Smith ar-
tifice is natural to humankind and there is ‘no condition in which people do not generate moral, 
aesthetic and other conventions’ (Haakonssen 2002, xii).
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Arguing that the capability of imagining an impartial spectator presupposes 
involvement in self-reflexive mutual social interaction also means presupposing an 
autonomous Self. Lynn Hunt puts it bluntly, saying that autonomy16 and sympathy 
go together for Smith (Hunt 2007, 65). Smith’s approach to human sentiment and 
sympathetic imagination therefore qualifies as a pioneering statement about the 
constitution of morality, sociality and personhood under conditions of modernity.
5 Sympathy, language and understanding
The 18th century emphasis on sympathy and the natural sociability of humanity 
coincides with an emerging interest in language as a main means of communi-
cation.17 Hans Aarsleff (2006) gives an account of the main debates in the phi-
losophy of language in the 17th and 18th centuries and reconstructs the ‘rise of 
rhetorical expressivism’ – the development from a cognitive to an emotive theory 
of meaning. Aarsleff emphasises the innovative shift that happened in the 18th 
century: for the first time language was seen as a basic social institution and, as 
a historical phenomenon, was analysed in historical terms.18 Aarsleff considers 
the work of Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, especially the Essai sur l’origines des 
connaissances humaines (1746), as pivotal for the understanding of speech and 
knowledge as ‘aspects of our natural history’. Condillac’s significant contribu-
tion lies in two main arguments: against the Cartesian view that knowledge orig-
inates in the mental life of a silent, isolated individual, he claims that meaning 
arises in dialogue, and discursivity as a condition of knowledge is a function of 
public speech. He further argues that language owes its origin to ‘a combina-
tion of instinctually affective communication and reflectively conceived artificial 
signs’19 (Aarsleff 2006, 451). Condillac thus established the idea that language, as 
16 Autonomy in this context refers to an ontogenetically fully developed, morally accountable, 
self-reflexive person (in the sense of Lawrence Kohlberg’s post-conventional morality), and not a 
 de-contextualised, a-social and self-contained individual, assuming him/herself as a privileged 
locus of action and reason.
17 I thank Knud Haakonssen for having drawn my attention to reflections on language in the 
17th and 18th century and their relevance for the discussion on empathy.
18 See Haakonssen 2016; Haakonssen has edited a volume honouring Hans Aarsleff and his 
seminal work on language as part of a contextualist intellectual history.
19 Condorcet differentiates between accidental signs (signs that trigger an unexpected recall), 
natural signs (cries that nature has established for the sentiments of joy, fear, pain etc.), and 
instituted signs (those we ourselves have chosen; they have an arbitrary relation to our ideas); 
see Aarsleff 2006, 460.
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a system of signs, cannot be private, but results from social intercourse, and the 
‘language of action’ (emotive expressions, natural sociability and sympathy) pro-
vides a proto-language. For Condillac, so Aarsleff, ‘the essence of humanity is the 
activity of the mind that is generated when thinking is cycled into action by signs 
and their use in dialogue. Without language, there is no humanity’ (ibid., 463f.).
Aarsleff makes a valid argument by indicating the similarities between the 
work of Condillac and that of the later Wittgenstein. He highlights that both 
scholars argue against the Descartian dualism of body and mind, oppose the view 
of language as emerging from the privacy of an individual mind and stress its 
ultimate grounding in sociality, and they see in action the beginning of language: 
‘The language of action initiates a game that occurs within a form of life, and, like 
a game the language of action carries no implication that it is guided by reason’ 
(ibid., 468).
The analogy between Wittgenstein’s theory of language and that of 18th 
century scholars leads me back to the anthropology of violence and the reflec-
tions on the communicability of pain. Considering the fact that languages come 
from and still carry some marks from the expressive language of action, already 
the cry of pain is a sign that addresses somebody and awaits a response. It means 
moving out of isolation, locating my pain in the body of another person who then 
experiences my pain in her/his body. The cry of pain is an appeal to the other, a 
plea to communicate, the beginning of a language game (as mentioned above). 
The centrality of language as facilitating communication even in suffering, and 
with that consolidating social bonds and sympathic relationships, has been 
strongly emphasised by Veena Das, and it is worth quoting her again:
In this movement between bodies, the sentence “I am in pain” becomes the conduit through 
which I may move out of the inexpressible privacy and suffocation of my pain. […] Pain in 
this rendering is not that inexpressible something that destroys communication or marks 
an exit from one’s existence in language. Instead, it makes a claim on the other – asking for 
acknowledgement that may be given or denied. In either case, it is not a referential state-
ment that is pointing to an inner object.  (Das 2007, 40)
The reflections on the communicability of pain and the centrality of language in 
this process carry the implicit assumption of understanding not only as a cognitive 
phenomenon but also as function of experience. The willingness to let the suffer-
ing of the other happen to me, capture, take hold of me, means to share the other’s 
pain and – even if not fully – experience the other as somebody in pain. I, as an 
individual person can experience and so understand the sentiments of another 
individual, the You, because of our common sociality and linguistic faculty.
In the context of his reception of Condillac’s Essai, Denis Diderot presents 
some further thoughts on the question of the relationship between language and 
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individuality. He asks: What happens to individuality in the process of communi-
cation? Diderot’s answer evokes the poverty and insufficiency of language, which 
he considers unable to grasp the richness and multitude of personal feelings, and 
he states that in a successful communication we have to surrender part of our 
individuality, with the consequence that ‘we never precisely understand, we are 
never precisely understood’ (Diderot, in Aarsleff 2006, 471).20
Diderot seems to bring forward two different but interrelated arguments: 
firstly, he addresses the impossibility of fully partaking in the sentiments of 
another person (because of the richness of the other’s personal feelings and the 
lack of linguistic means to express them) and so points to the limits of commu-
nication and understanding. Secondly, he emphasises the limits of individualis-
ation and with that hints at the impossibility of becoming (and being) a totally 
bounded and in every respect self-sufficient and self-determined subject. Com-
munication (sociality) uncompromisingly requires sacrificing part of one’s indi-
viduality and so dividing oneself, and at the same time communication (sociality) 
is never encompassing, absorbing the individual (being much more than what 
is transmittable in language and communication). It is the dialectics of the rela-
tionship between individuality and sociality that is here at stake, historically and 
culturally contingent and demanding specific research.
The reflections on communication and understanding have an additional 
dimension: they can throw light on the difference between sympathetic imagi-
nation perceived as either based on relationality between individuals, or thought 
about as identification, or unification. For this purpose we have to turn first to 
Martin Buber (1970) and then to Karl F. Morrison (1988).
‘Man becomes an I through a You’ writes Buber (1970, 82), and he explains:
The basic word I-You can be spoken only with one’s whole being. The concentration and 
fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be accomplished 
without me. I require a You to become; becoming I, I say You. All actual life is encounter.
 (ibid., 62)
Buber’s message is explicit: without intersubjectivity there is no Self, and only 
an inter-subjectively constituted relational Self has the capacity for sympa-
thetic imagination and can reach out to others.21 In the course of his argument 
20 Individuality remains in the way we speak (the accent), but not what (the words, the lan-
guage) we speak (Aarsleff 2006, 471f.).
21 Dan Zahavi (2012) understands the inter-subjectively constituted or ‘interpersonal’ Self as 
the core or minimal self: ‘a self, whose self-experience is constitutively dependent upon others, 
i.e., whose self-experience is mediated through others’. This core self is complemented by the 
narrative self, thus forming the ‘complex Self’.
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it becomes evident that he makes a clear distinction between I and You being in 
relation, and I and You being in a process or state of unification or identification, 
which shows itself particularily in religious contexts. Buber opposes religious 
ideas that either see God as merging into the Self by stripping the latter of all 
subjectivity (unification), or imagine the Self as the divine, the ‘One that thinks 
and is’ (identification). To explain the first case Buber refers to Christian thinking 
and especially to the works of Meister Eckhart22; for the second case he takes 
examples from Indian religions – the Upanishads and the teachings of Buddha. 
The problem for Buber is that both forms of religious imagination ‘annul relation-
ships’ (ibid., 132), ultimately conditional for the formation of the human subject 
as a separate and ‘whole being’ and thus for his capability to encounter others.
The historian Karl F. Morrison looks for identification processes – processes 
where relationships merge into identity – in Western literature, theology and 
art. His investigation identifies four forms in which processes of assimilation/
identification occur: cosmological, sacramental, metaphysical and epistemolog-
ical.23 The goal of all mimetic processes, so Morrison, was self-extinction – ‘to 
reduce the symmetry of “I” and “you” through stages of diminishing likeness and 
increasing identity’ (Morrison 1988, 32). Morrison argues that the desire to assim-
ilate or identify with a (human or trans-human) counterpart is grounded in the 
longing to fully understand the other. He therefore introduces the concept of the 
‘hermeneutic gap’ to explain the human desire to move from the symmetric rela-
tionship between ‘I and You’ to the ‘I am You’.
While both sympathetic imagination and identification (or unification) go 
beyond cognitive (spiritual, intellectual) ways of sharing meaning and include 
bodily and sensual forms of reaching out to the other, they also display a fun-
damental difference: sympathetic imagination, as a necessary moment in the 
encounter of relational Selves, gives evidence of the social foundation and the 
moral potential of the human being. As Leder remarks with reference to Max 
Scheler, ‘to experience true sympathy for others (Mitgefühl), it is necessary to 
retain a sense of their otherness’ (Leder 1990, 162); the moment ‘our identities 
22 It should be emphasised that Buber’s interpretation of Meister Eckhart is not uncontested; 
see the contribution of Markus Vinzent in Part 2 of this publication.
23 He traces the cosmological identity of God and the world from Vedic to European / Mediterra-
nean text and his examples show the entanglement of thoughts and histories; sacramental com-
munion shows in his opinion for example in ancient mystery cults and Christian sacraments; 
references to metaphysical unity can be discovered in Greek philosophical ideas about identi-
ty of parts and the whole, the continuous process of generation and the immanence of god in 
the world. Epistemological identification seems to be reflected in likeness between knower and 
known, lover and beloved, and in theatre and art, between actor and character (impersonation), 
artist and work, beholder and work.
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blur, I can no longer speak of concernful relation’ (ibid.). In contrast, the blurring 
of identities or total identification seems to marginalise sociality and moral com-
mitment. Instead, it takes into account the desires of the ‘I’ to complement one’s 
own Self or lose one’s Self in order to achieve a state of absorption, an imagined, 
idealised unity – be it with the divine, the species, or the cosmos. Identification 
is often based on a feeling of deficit and/or estrangement. It aims at completion 
or absorption; it aims at one-ness with the other and means the end of sociality, 
morality and communication.
6  Empathic occurrences: relationality, resonance, 
and articulation
In recent decades, research on empathy proliferated in the fields of biological 
and cognitive sciences, as well as in social sciences and in philosophy. Especially 
the neurosciences engage in extensive investigations about the neural correlates 
of empathy and study brain activities particularly in those brain areas consid-
ered relevant for intersubjective performances.24 The new insights and explana-
tions about the biologically grounded human capacity for and mechanisms of 
empathy led Fritz Breithaupt, scholar of cultural studies and cognitive sciences, 
to the conclusion:
The cognitive sciences not only provide astonishing insights into the mechanisms of 
empathy, but also show us that people cannot help but empathise with others. Evidently, 
much of our capacity for understanding one another on an intellectual and emotional level 
stems from our inherent ability for mimicry, along with fundamental neuronal possibilities 
that allow us to experience the observed behaviour of others as our own actions. 
(Breithaupt 2009, 8; transl. AL)25
24 Research on the empathic capacity of humans is located within the wider field of the search 
for ‘neural correlates of consciousness’, which tries to understand the ‘nexus between the vir-
tuality of an external existence and the internal dynamics of biological information-processing’ 
(Metzinger 2000, 3). For an overview see the compilation of Metzinger (2000); for neuroscientific 
and medical research regarding empathy see Watt and Panksepp 2016; Hein 2011; 2016. Prima-
tologist Frans de Waal (2012) traces the evolutionary history of empathy by discussing research 
on empathy among animals, especially monkeys and apes; a controversial debate developed 
around the discovery of mirror neurons, labelled as ‘the most hyped concept in neuroscience’ 
(Kilner, Lemon 2013).
25 ‘Die Kognitionswissenschaften geben uns nicht nur erstaunliche Aufschlüsse über die Mech-
anismen von Empathie, sondern zeigen auch, dass Menschen wohl gar nicht anders können 
als mit anderen mitzufühlen. Die Fähigkeit des intellektuellen und emotionalen Verstehens von 
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In line with this argument, Douglas Watt and Jaak Panksepp (2016) analyse a 
range of definitions of empathy and identify three basic components in all of them: 
‘feeling what someone is feeling’ (affective resonance/contagion); ‘knowing what 
someone is feeling’; and ‘having some intent to mitigate suffering’ (Watt, Pank-
sepp 2016, 11). Empathy, which they define as a ‘prosocial process essential for 
the mitigation of suffering’ (ibid., 3) thus refers to affective as well as to higher 
cognitive processes and indicates the human capacity for moral concern.
While approaches from cognitive sciences so far seem to focus on the affective 
and cognitive capacity developed by and existing in an (isolated) individual human 
being (who only in a second step enters into a relationship and reaches out to fellow 
human beings), philosophical approaches influenced by pragmatism start from the 
assumption that the cognitive capacities of an individual are already intersubjec-
tively constituted. Thiemo Breyer (2015) presents an elaborate attempt in this regard 
and discusses empathy from a  philosophical-anthropological-phenomenological 
perspective, building on a basic and necessary embodiment of human relation-
ships to the world, to others and to oneself.
Breyer starts by criticising approaches from cognitive sciences for being 
reductionist, as they seem to understand human empathic capacity basically 
as a result of sub-personal (neuronal) activities or higher cognitive processes. 
Empathy, so his argument, happens here in the self-contained system of the 
observer and he pleads for an alternative interpretation, which builds on the par-
adigm of embodied cognitive science26 and the idea that empathy occurs in the 
open space of bodily encounter and social and linguistic interaction between Self 
and Other.
Taking the specific manner, in which intentional states are connected in the context of sec-
ondary personal episodes of reciprocal reference of I and You as a starting point, one then 
has to ask the epistemological question regarding the psyche of the stranger the other way 
anderen beruht offenbar zu einem nicht unerheblichen Teil auf angeborenen Fähigkeiten zur 
Mimikri und auf basalen neuronalen Möglichkeiten, die uns das bei anderen beobachtete Verh-
alten wie das eigene Handeln erleben lassen’ (Breithaupt 2009, 8).
26 Breyer refers to the paradigm of 4E Cognition (2015, 30). He argues that 4E Cognition has 
become the label for philosophical approaches focussing on embodiment. The human mind is, 
first of all, embodied; in its embodied condition it is also extended, embedded and enactive. 
Embodied relates to the nexus between cognitive states and the particularities of the body they 
inhabit. Extended indicate that processes of the mind reach into the sensory system and the 
motoric functions; senses are not passive receptors of outer influences but are also shaped by 
cognitive factors. It also points to the instrumental use of auxiliary tools, for example when cal-
culating. Embedded relates to the fact that cognition happens in spacial, instrumental and cul-
tural contexts. Enactive highlights the fact that the human organism creates its world in a process 
of actively structuring it.
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around: “how am I able to make a meaningful distinction between my own state of mind 
and being and yours?” This question is different from the one that has usually been asked 
in the “Theory of Mind,” namely “How can I access your states of thought and being from 
my own outside perspective?”.  (Breyer 2015, 47; transl. AL)27
Breyer presents a complex model of empathy, which builds on relationality and 
starts from the realities of an intersubjective encounter (ibid., 48ff.). Empathy 
thus develops through various levels of empathic occurrences: bodily resonance 
(leibliche Resonanz), understanding of expressions (Ausdrucksverstehen) and 
understanding of the alien Other (Fremdverstehen).
The human being is never in a cognitively neutral state, but has always to 
cope with transitions from one mood to the next. The emotional atmosphere is a 
medium through which the world appears to human beings and through which 
they also experience others. However, the atmospheric space of encounter (Begeg-
nungsraum) and the atmospheric conditions are always (already) intersubjec-
tively shaped. It is the human body that functions as soundboard for atmospheric 
conditions by translating the space-tuned phenomena into self-resonance,28 and 
this elementary capacity to resonate is the precondition of empathy.29 Breyer con-
ceptualises a common, an empathic space that is formed by the two partners of 
an intersubjective encounter:
The other co-designs the empathetic space by allowing me to develop a deeper understand-
ing of his/her circumstances. This means that the other, him/herself, provides me with the 
supporting structures and elements that give rise to my empathic relationship. Emotions 
do not linger or erupt in the physical interior of an isolated subject, but reach out into 
the atmospheric space, which can hold multiple subjects and, thus, enables processes of 
empathy.  (ibid., 50; transl. AL)30
27 ‘Von der spezifischen Art des Zusammenhangs von intentionalen Zuständen in den zweitper-
sonalen Episoden der reziproken Verwiesenheit von Ich und Du aus gesehen, stellt sich nämlich 
die epistemologische Frage nach dem Fremdpsychischen anders herum: “Wie kann ich zwis-
chen meinem und deinen Zuständen überhaupt sinnvoll unterscheiden?” – nicht wie in der The-
ory of Mind üblich: “Wie komme ich von meiner Perspektive aus an Deine Zustände von außen 
heran?”’ (Breyer 2015, 47).
28 ‘Der Leib fungiert […] als Resonanzboden für Stimmungen, indem er “die stimmungsräumli-
chen Phänomene in seine Eigenresonanz” überträgt’ (Breyer 2015, 49).
29 Hartmut Rosa tries to make research on empathy fruitful for his theory of resonance (Rosa 
2016, ch. V).
30 ‘Der Andere gestaltet […] den empathischen Raum mit, in dem ich ein Verstehen seiner 
Zustände entwickeln kann, das heißt er selbst stellt unterstützende Elemente für meinen Em-
pathiebezug bereit. Gefühle spielen sich […] nicht im psychischen Innenraum eines vereinzelten 
Subjekts ab, sondern greifen in den Stimmungsraum aus, der mehrere Subjekte umfassen und so 
empathische Prozesse ermöglichen kann’ (Breyer 2015, 50).
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From the primary level of bodily resonance, that is allowing oneself to be 
affected (pathisches Sich-affizieren-Lassen; ibid., 49), one reaches the next level 
of empathy, where the significance of specific expressions can be understood 
(Audrucksverstehen). These expressions may be universal (based on instinct and 
affect; conditions like pain, fear, anger); social (socially shaped according to par-
ticular norms; ideas of shame, honour, pride); or cultural (conventionalised forms 
of bodily communication – like gestures – which require learning processes for 
understanding). The third level, understanding the alien other (Fremdverstehen), 
with the basic modi of simulation, inference, and theorisation, requires from the 
subject the ability of changing perspective and recourse to a pool of acquired 
knowledge. This form of understanding is directed towards comprehending the 
specific mental state of the other, its context, or the possible further consequences.
Flexibility of perspectives is an important criterion for higher-level types of 
imaginative empathy and Breyer identifies two different ways of changing per-
spective (ibid., 169ff.). The first is egocentric transposition – to try to find out how 
I would feel in the place of the other; the second – allocentric transposition – is 
to enter the internal world of the other and try to explore how the other is feeling. 
However, both forms of change in perspective are limited and do not allow one to 
really experience the emotional state or the sentiments of the other. Instead of the 
imaginative empathy (evoked previously by Adam Smith) Breyer introduces inter-
personal empathy as an even higher form of empathising: here the other is concep-
tualised as a person equipped with agency, who is actively involved in the shaping 
of the empathic situation and its interpretation. The paradigmatic site for such an 
encounter, in which the limits and possibilities of empathic feeling and understand-
ing are negotiated and communicatively processed, is the dialogue (das Gespräch). 
Language seems therefore a precondition for higher-level empathic communication.
To underline the significance of the interconnection between the corporeal 
and the linguistic functions in human interaction, Breyer refers to the pragmatist 
philosopher Matthias Jung and his integrative anthropology based on the concept 
of articulation (Artikulation), which he defines as
the basic anthropological fact that people explain their own life circumstances and direc-
tions to others by articulating motoric impulses and lived qualities, or in other words, trans-
forming structured schemata of action and syntactically organised chains of symbols […]. 
When human beings articulate themselves, they generate meaningful structures by realis-
ing specific physical – or in the most fundamental sense physiological – patterns. 
(Jung 2009, 12f.; transl. AL)31
31 In the German original: ‘die anthropologisch basale Tatsache, dass Menschen ihre Lebens-
vollzüge für sich und andere verständlich machen, indem sie erlebte Qualitäten und motorische 
Impulse artikulieren, sie also in gegliederte Handlungsabläufe und syntaktisch strukturierte 
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Jung’s theory of human articulation accentuates the essential role of embod-
ied communication in human existence. Due to its expressivity and the possibil-
ity for articulation of meaning the human body is designed for communication. 
Communication encompasses a continuity of indicative-receptive experience, 
 bodily-physical expression and propositional judgements (see also Breyer 2015, 
57ff.). Focussing on the interrelation of body, expressivity and language – or, with 
other words, of somatics and semantics –, Jung identifies five functions of the 
body for linguistic (phonetic) articulation (ibid., 59ff.): Facilitating communica-
tion (mitteilungsermöglichend) – phonetically, mimically, with gestures; linguistic 
(sprachlich) – embodied language, speech; para-linguistic (sprachbegleitend) – 
bodily articulations like gestures, mimicry; replacing language/speech (spracher-
setzend) – autopoetic function, bodily expressions (cry of pain, blushing); limit-
ing language/speech (sprachbegrenzend) – psychosomatic factors, stuttering.
The foregoing brief discussion of the most recent phenomenological 
approaches to empathy strongly highlights the nexus between empathy, corpo-
reality, inter-subjectivity and language. Now it is time to ask whether such an 
approach might influence and probably alter the conception of the (modern) 
individual.
7  Empathy, dividuality and the (modern) 
individual: concluding reflections
Showing empathy, for example with a person in pain, requires recognition 
of the other as other, or, with the words of Martha Nussbaum, to be aware ‘of 
one’s own qualitative difference from the sufferer’ (Nussbaum 2001, 328; cited in 
Breyer 2015, 208). Breyer concludes that the empathic subject exposes a twofold 
attention (attentionale Spaltung oder Dopplung), as it focuses on the other as 
other, while simultaneously being aware of the difference between one’s own 
Symbolketten transformieren. […] Wenn Menschen sich artikulieren, erzeugen sie sinnhafte 
Strukturen, indem sie jeweils bestimmte physische – in den basalen Formen physiologische – 
Muster realisieren’ (Jung 2009, 12f.). 
Jung claims that his theory of articulation differs substantially from alternative approach-
es in philosophical anthropology: it emphasises the difference between the human species and 
other living beings (holism of difference) by simultaneously insisting on evolutionary continuity; 
it evenly emphasises the intrinsic embodiment of mind (Geist) and its categorical difference to an-
imal intelligence; and it postulates primacy of the sign in contrast to ideas (Gedanken) (ibid., 20).
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 experience and that of the other.32 Only an autonomous subject,33 endowed with 
affective, cognitive as well as social and moral capacities, is in command of such 
twofold attention.
It seems plausible to say that empathy presupposes some sort of partibility or 
divisibility as an important attribute of the individual. While I am fully aware of myself, 
I can also reach out to the other and let myself be affected or marked by her or him, 
so that for example the other’s pain can be located in my body and so can wound me. 
Empathy also means vulnerability, it signifies the fragility of individual boundaries 
and thus a certain porosity or permeability of the Self. Such an understanding of the 
Self may help to give a more precise account of the nexus between empathy, corpo-
reality, inter-subjectivity and language: empathic relations are, firstly, mediated by a 
space of encounter, in which porous beings, on the one hand, express themselves by 
emitting expressive and semantic signs (emotions, feelings, speech, paralinguistic 
expressions), and, on the other hand, imbibe those of the others. Secondly, commu-
nication happens through bodily-physical and linguistic forms of articulation, pre-
supposing an individual, autonomous, but partible and permeable Self (i.e. without 
rigid boundaries). Thirdly, such communication includes receptivity with regard to 
others, listening, experiencing and understanding the multiple forms of expression 
and speech, thus allowing empathic understanding even if language fails. Fourthly, 
and in the case of suffering and pain, empathy as moral capacity enables mitigating 
the suffering of others and initiating processes of healing by lending one’s body to 
the other, listening and creating a therapeutic space.
Having moved quite far in questioning the idea of a self-contained, bounded 
individual, it might be rewarding to explore in which way the concept of divid-
uality, mentioned at the beginning of this paper, can have some interpretative 
relevance in the debate on empathy.34
32 In German: ‘bei der sich das Selbst einmal auf den Anderen als Anderen und einmal auf die 
Tatsache der Differenz zwischen fremdem und eigenen Erleben richtet’ (Breyer 2015, 208).
33 Judith Butler pleads for a notion of autonomy that takes into account the relationality and social-
ity of human beings. ‘Given over from the start to the world of others, it bears their imprint, is formed 
within the crucible of social life; only later, and with some uncertainty, do I lay claim to my body 
as my own, if, in fact, I ever do […]. [I]f I build a notion of “autonomy” on the basis of the denial of 
this sphere of a primary and unwilled physical proximity with others, then am I denying the social 
conditions of my embodiment in the name of autonomy?’ (Butler 2004, 26). In other words: ‘If I am 
struggling for autonomy, do I not need to be struggling for something else as well, a conception of 
myself as invariably in community, impressed upon by others, impinging upon them as well, and in 
ways that are not fully in my control or clearly predictable?’ (ibid., 27). See also fn 14 of this paper.
34 I limit myself to basic comments with regard to the concept of dividuality. Dividuality as well 
as its possible proximity to Charles Taylor’s concept of Self is discussed in more detail in the 
introduction to Part 2 of the publication.
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More recently, the concept of dividuality gained considerable significance in 
the discipline of anthropology through the work of Marilyn Strathern on gender 
in Melanesia (1988), although it was earlier introduced into the anthropological 
discourse by McKim Marriott in his study on Hindu transactions (1976). Strathern 
wanted to highlight and conceptualise the difference between the (ideal of the) 
Western individual and her understanding of Melanesian personhood. While in 
the Western context relations are considered external to the clearly bounded indi-
vidual, in Melanesia, however, relations are seen as being within, or incorporated 
in the individual: ‘Melanesian persons are as dividually as they are individually 
conceived’ (Strathern 1988, 13). Dividuality thus refers to the fact that Melanesian 
persons are multi-authored and composite beings: they are the product of gifts, 
divine or human substances; they are ‘constituted of the detached parts/relation-
ships of other persons through prior agentive elicitations and exchanges’ (Mosko 
2010, 215). A singular person (an individual) can be imagined as dividual, or, as 
Strathern frames it, ‘as a social microcosmos’ (Strathern 1988,13).
The way ‘dividuality’ is used in the work of Marilyn Strathern has two major 
shortcomings. First of all, Strathern’s conception of dividuality  postulates a 
container idea of the person, in which objects and relations deriving from others 
are incorporated in the sense of distinct substances and added to the original 
substances of the person. In contrast, we have to consider these in-fluences 
not as self-contained substances, but as permeable, merging and mingling 
with each other and with the existing qualities of a person, thus giving rise to 
a unique entangled personhood with a distinct agentive potential. Secondly, 
Marilyn Strathern’s approach to conceptualising dividual personhood repro-
duces a dichotomy between Western and non-Western, modern and pre-modern 
contexts. Scholars from the same discipline and with the same regional focus 
question such polarisation. Mark Mosko (2013) argues that people from north 
Mekeo (PNG) reproduce dividual patterns even in the contemporary (modern) 
context of local capitalist market economy. He also shows that Christianity – a 
‘highly significant context of Western culture’ – is premised on personal parti-
bility, and he refers to the relations between Christians, and between them and 
their deity (Mosko 2010). For Edward LiPuma ‘all societies encode relational, 
dividual aspects of personhood’, and ‘persons emerge precisely from that 
tension between dividual and individual aspects/relations’ (LiPuma 1998, 57). 
The idea of dividuality thus transcends the anthropological context and can 
help us to understand aspects of modern Western personhood as well. Analysis 
and description of dividuality, and the relation between dividual and individual 
dimensions of a person, however, must take into consideration the realities of 
the particular life worlds of human beings and not the imaginaries in which they 
are grounded.
The empathic subject and the question of dividuality   405
To support the idea of the co-existence of dividual and individual aspects of 
a person it seems useful recalling Charles Taylor’s reflections on the Self and his 
idea of the ‘porous’ and the ‘buffered’ Self (Taylor 2007). In the course of human 
history human beings undergo significant transformations in their relationship to 
the outer world, but also to the subjective and the social world (see introduction 
to Part 2 of this publication). Taylor describes persons of the European medieval 
ages as ‘porous’, in this way expressing that a person (a Self) is vulnerable, open 
to spirits, demons, and cosmic forces (Taylor 2007, 38), which all can and do exert 
influence. These forces, so Taylor, ‘can take us over’ (ibid., 34), they can ‘pene-
trate’ us (ibid., 35). In contrast, the ‘bounded’ self of the modern, contemporary 
Western world has built a boundary between the inner and outer worlds, between 
human mind/human agency and objects or things. This boundary is essential, 
it works as a buffer, ‘such that the things beyond don’t need “to get to me” […]’ 
(ibid., 38), and the Self can see itself as largely invulnerable. Yet, while Taylor 
seems to be convinced of the effectiveness of the inner-outer boundary under 
modern conditions, he has to admit that even the modern buffered individual has 
porous internal spaces in which sociality and emotions can take root.
For a more adequate conceptualisation of the Self (of personhood) in his-
torical perspective, which takes into account the interdependence of dividual 
and individual aspects, one has to push Taylor’s approach a bit further. Charles 
Taylor constructs the porous and the buffered self as a dichotomy, representing 
historical stages of selfhood within the Western world (enchanted vs. disen-
chanted, engaged vs. disengaged). It is precisely this dichotomy which one has to 
put into question, not only in the light of the phenomenon of social relationality 
and empathy, but also in the light of contemporary forms of relating to the outer 
world, like spiritual embodiment, Christian self-sacrifice or the reception of art 
work (as discussed in the contributions of A. Malik, Ch. Dureau and J. Vincent in 
this publication).
In this article I have argued that the empathic subject can take on the suffer-
ing and pain of others; it is partible and vulnerable, its boundaries are fuzzy, per-
meable or porous. This means that in the reality of life, even under conditions of 
modernity and despite the dominant imaginary of the self-contained individual, 
dividual aspects or qualities are important features of the Self, of the person as 
a social, moral being. I therefore suggest understanding porousness and bound-
edness as qualitative markers on a socio-historical scale or continuum, which 
takes into consideration social realities as well as ideological  constructions of per-
sonhood. Persons are never only porous dividuals, nor unambiguously buffered 
individuals, they neither dissolve in the social nor are they immune against social 
relationships. The idea of a scale or continuum would allow not only acknowledg-
ing the co-existence of relational/dividual and individual aspects of the human 
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Self in society, but notably engaging in  socio-historical studies of their relation 
in theory and praxis. We need to explore ideas and realities of permeability and 
partibility on the one hand, of closeness and boundedness on the other, in par-
ticular historical constellations, socio-cultural contexts and situations.
The example of empathic relationships towards the suffering subject illus-
trates that a human being – from its beginning relationally and communicatively 
constituted – is a partible and permeable being – vulnerable, marked by and 
receptive to the suffering of other. Even in the social fabric of modern societies, 
a social subject encounters areas of life in which openness and permeability is 
desirable and empathy or emotional competence are counteracting processes 
of unleashed individualisation. This is however not to deny that a society con-
sists of multiple other areas in which a person must act and behave in a more 
 self-contained way.35 In sum: for a human subject to lead a successful social life 
in a particular socio-cultural and historical context and to act according to situ-
ational challenges, it has to be partible and permeable (porous), but it must also 
have the ability of containment (boundedness). A social subject needs to be divid-
ual and individual, or better, it has to be an In/Dividual.
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Arthur Bueno
Simmel and the forms of in-dividuality
1  Introduction
The work of Georg Simmel is widely known for the case it makes for a strong 
connection between modernity and individualisation (see Frisby 1984/2002, 
63–80; Lichtblau 1997, 25–38, 83–98; Honneth 2002; Rosa, Strecker, Kottmann 
2007, 92–113). In his sociological theory as in The Philosophy of Money, in his 
writings on intellectual history as in his aesthetic and metaphysical essays, 
a  perspective on modern culture is advanced according to which the latter 
is distinguished from other historical epochs by a peculiar accentuation of 
individuality. The process of individualisation is generally understood as a 
progressive release of the individual from forms of community, such as those 
often identified with the European Middle Ages,1 that inhibited the develop-
ment of personal freedom: against dissolution within an encompassing whole, 
modern individuals sought to detach themselves from levelling social bonds 
by strongly affirming their own boundaries, their ‘self-responsibility’ and 
‘self-contained singularity’ (Simmel 2004 [1918], 249; see also Simmel 1989 
[1890]).2 Characteristic of this view is the assumption that the historical fore-
grounding of individuality is an inherently conflictual process. The emergence 
of the modern individual is thereby regarded not only as the outcome of strug-
gles against previous forms of social organisation, but also as bringing forward 
new tensions of its own. Although Simmel argued at times that these conflicts 
have their ultimate foundation in a trans- historical antagonism between the 
1 Being aware of the problematic aspects of such account of the medieval period, Simmel pre-
ferred to ‘leave undecided whether the Middle Ages actually lacked in such a degree the features 
of individuality’ and rather stress the latter’s ‘fundamental accentuation’ from the Renaissance 
onwards (Simmel 2004 [1918], 249).
2 Simmel’s writings are referenced in this text according to their English translations, whenever 
these are available. All quotations were compared with the German originals (as published in the 
Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe) and often modified for the sake of precision. Where an English 
version was not available, the translation is mine.
Note: Previous versions of this paper were discussed at the conference Religious Individualis-
ation in Historical Perspective (Eisenach, June 2017) and at the Max-Weber-Kolleg, Erfurt. I would 
like to thank everyone who offered comments and criticisms on these occasions. This work was 
generously supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Coordination for the 
Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES).
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individual and society (Simmel 2007 [1917]; 1950 [1917]), equally crucial to his 
perspective is the claim that precisely in modernity this opposition achieved 
its zenith.
It is for no other reason that he so often presented the forms taken by the 
modern individual in dualistic terms, the most notable of which is the opposition 
between 18th-century quantitative and 19th-century qualitative individualisms 
(Simmel 1995 [1901–02]; 2002 [1903]); 1997 [1904/1918], 215–26; 2003 [1912/1918], 
151–78; 1950 [1917]; 2004 [1918]). In the latter distinction, in fact a contrast is 
developed that can be seen to permeate the entirety of Simmel’s oeuvre. Such 
antithesis was already central to his writings even before its explicit articula-
tion as two kinds of individualism – as attested by his essays on money pub-
lished in the 1880s and 1890s, in which the modern economy was seen to rely 
on the predominance of quantitative over qualitative dimensions of experience 
(Simmel 2013 [1889]; 2013 [1896]; see also 2011 [1900–07]). Moreover, Simmel 
subsequently developed a series of other oppositions that, despite their differ-
ent analytical backgrounds and spatiotemporal settings, display a homologous 
structure. In his sociological theory, he advocated for a corresponding differenti-
ation between social and extra-social dimensions of the individual (Simmel 2009 
[1908]); his analysis of modern urban and economic life similarly relied on a con-
trast between intellectual and sensible individualities (Simmel 2002 [1903]); and 
his late aesthetic and metaphysical essays brought forward a congruent distinc-
tion between Romanic and Germanic individualisms (Simmel 2005 [1916]; 2007 
[1917]; 2007 [1918]).3
Less visible, however, is the fact that these analyses present not only dif-
ferent figures of in-dividuality, with its accentuated sense of independence and 
self-sufficiency, but also distinct modes of in-dividuality marked by an openness 
to being permeated by something other than oneself. In fact, when one follows 
the thread of these dualisms in Simmel’s work it becomes clear that, despite an 
initial focus on the boundedness of the in-dividual, forms of in-dividual porosity 
come to acquire over time an increasingly significant role. This has decisive con-
sequences not only for the interpretation of his oeuvre but also, as I will argue, for 
a general assessment of modern life. After all, if the latter can be seen as charac-
terised by an accentuation of particular kinds of in-dividuality, it is equally true 
that different figures of in-dividuality have surfaced in connection with, and as 
3 Despite the differences one can identify in Simmel’s work concerning the notions of individ-
uality (i.e. the actual form taken by the individual), individualisation (i.e. the social process by 
means of which individuality is accentuated), and individualism (i.e. an ideal that might guide 
this process), these terms are often employed in a combined or interchangeable manner.
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a reaction to, this process. The internal rifts of the modern in-dividual,4 as they 
can be reconstructed from Simmel’s work, point thereby to a core aspect of the 
conflicts of modernity.
2 Quantitative and qualitative in-dividualisms
The distinction between two modern forms of individualism was formulated by 
Simmel at several moments of his intellectual trajectory (Simmel 1995 [1901–02]; 
2002 [1903]; 1950 [1917]; see also 1997 [1904/1918], 215–26; 2003 [1912/1918], 151–78). 
Each of these texts presents a different point of departure: in 1901, the political-ideal 
starting point arises from the internal contradictions of the ideal of freedom and 
equality that animated the French Revolution, and which was seen to provide an 
adequate expression of that historical situation; in 1903, the historical-cultural 
starting point is the modern individual’s struggle to preserve its existence against 
the threat of being swallowed up in a social-technological mechanism; in 1917, the 
social-philosophical point of departure is the fundamental and insoluble antago-
nism between social and individual life, that becomes especially acute in moder-
nity. Despite these differences, in all such instances modern forms of individualism 
are grasped as reactions to, and expressions of, the conflicts manifested in Euro-
pean societies since the 18th century. To examine the tensions between and within 
these ideals amounts, therefore, to probing into some of the main oppositions of 
modern life: ‘The external and internal history of our time takes its course within 
the struggle and in the changing entanglements of these two ways of defining the 
individual’s role in the whole of society’ (Simmel 2012 [1903], 31).
It was, then, as a reaction to the dominant social configuration that a new 
concept of individuality emerged in 18th-century Europe. In this period, says 
Simmel, ‘individual forces found themselves in the most unbearable antagonism to 
their social and historical commitments and formations’. Prevalent institutions then 
appeared as outdated and unfairly constraining, ‘as slave shackles under which one 
could no longer breathe’ (Simmel 1995 [1901–02], 50). It was in this context that a 
negative ideal of individual freedom emerged whose premise was a wide-ranging 
refusal of dominant forms of social organisation. Corporatist and ecclesiastical ties 
were then considered mainly responsible for coercive and unjust relations among 
4 Pyyhtinen (2010, 140–4) has previously argued for the presence of an ‘in-dividual’ in Simmel’s 
writings. As used here, the expression has a different (and complementary) meaning: it does not 
refer primarily to the duality indivisible/divisible, but rather to the opposition closed/open, or 
atomised/permeable.
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people, so that, as Simmel emphasises, ‘one concluded that with the victory over 
those institutions […] all the inequalities in the world would disappear’ (ibid.). 
Within this framework, existing forms of social organisation were understood 
not only as unjust but also as artificial: they would consist in external constraints 
imposed on natural human freedom. Underlying this emerging ideal was, therefore, 
the notion that it would only take the fall of those social commitments which forced 
the individual into unnatural paths for society to move from oppression to freedom, 
from ‘historical unreason’ to ‘natural reason’ (ibid.). A general and negative ideal of 
freedom, as liberation from the subjugation of prevalent institutions, was premised 
on a similarly general notion of equality, as the natural condition of every human 
being on the basis of which a rational society could be founded.
Crucial for the emergence of this ideal was not only the wide-ranging opposi-
tion to the established social order, but also the philosophical rationalism of the 
18th century, the focus of which was precisely ‘the general man, man in general’:
‘Just as the literature of the revolutionary period continuously speaks of the people, of the 
tyrant, of freedom in general, just as the “natural religion” contains providence as such, 
justice as such, divine education as such, so too the universal abstract man […] is always 
and everywhere the same, apart from everything that distinguishes human beings from 
each other’ (ibid., 50f.).
According to this conception, every individual would contain a rational kernel that 
is essential to itself as well as the same in all human beings. That is why freedom 
and equality could be regarded as inextricably connected in a single ideal:
‘if man were only set free, then his merely human essence, which the historical commit-
ments and corruptions had covered and distorted, would come forward again as his true 
self, and the latter would be the same for everyone because it constitutes the universal 
human being in us’ (ibid., 51).
The liberation of the individual from external constraints was thereby under-
stood as the unshackling of an abstract, rational humanity possessed in equal 
measure by each and every one.
Equally important for such an ideal was the notion that each human 
being, in addition to taking part in a common abstract humanity, is and should 
be an in- dividual. In opposition to the surviving norms of the Middle Ages, 
the  18th- century notion of universal equality did not imply a social fusion into 
which human beings enter as members of a community, as parts of a substan-
tive collectivity. They rather emerge as a set of isolated, legally or axiologically 
equal individuals. In Fichte’s words: ‘A rational being must simply be an indi-
vidual – but precisely, not this or that particular individual’ (ibid.). This ideal 
is hence in-dividualistic in the sense that, against previous forms of direct 
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 subordination of the person to the social whole, it asserts the boundedness 
and the autonomy, the self-sufficiency and self-responsibility of the individ-
ual. Yet it is quantitative in the sense that the human being is conceived as pos-
sessing the same abstract nature as any other and thereby as a commensurable 
or interchangeable element, different from others only in a ‘numerical’ sense.
There is hence an important affinity between this form of individualism and 
the modern money economy. As the ideal of quantitative in-dividuality was defined 
in opposition to existing social institutions, so the development of the modern 
economy was also marked by a break with the kinds of social bonds character-
istic of the European Middle Ages. Due to its abstract and quantitative character, 
money detaches the elements it connects: slipping as an ‘insulating layer’ between 
person and property, as well as between the total personality and the social circle 
to which it belongs, it allows for a larger development of personal independence 
(Simmel 2013 [1896], 245). As Simmel remarks, monetary remuneration guarantees 
in several contexts a higher measure of freedom, since in payment in cash the indi-
vidual does not deliver the totality of her self, but only the impersonal results of her 
work. However, this freedom is widely understood as a merely negative one, i.e. as 
freedom from something and not freedom for something, given the fact that money 
establishes a personal domain of reserve and choice which might remain, none-
theless, an empty realm of pure possibility. On the other hand, given its abstract 
nature money also reconnects that which it separates: its status as a universally 
recognised means of exchange offers ‘grounds for an immediate mutual under-
standing’ among human subjects in such a way that, according to Simmel, it would 
have been partially responsible for the emergence of the idea of the ‘universally 
human’ by the end of the 18th century (Simmel 2013 [1896], 51). The same process 
that made people and things unrelated to each other also created renewed and 
extremely strong connections among them: since it cannot be immediately con-
sumed, money always points to the other participants in the economic system and, 
more generally, to the totality of economic exchanges. It is no coincidence, there-
fore, that the doctrine of freedom and equality could be regarded as the intellec-
tual foundation of the modern economic order, with its formally equal competition 
between rational, free individuals: ‘According to the new theory, the natural order 
of things saw to it that the unlimited competition of all resulted in the harmony of 
all interests, that the unrestricted striving after individual advantages resulted in 
the optimum welfare of the whole’ (Simmel 1950 [1917], 83).
This ideal of negative freedom and abstract equality would, however, appear 
as problematic in the following century. In contrast to quantitative individual-
ism, another conception emerged which dissolved the previous synthesis: the 
grounding of equality upon freedom, and freedom upon equality, was broken by 
a renewed emphasis on inequality.
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‘Just as equality in the eighteenth century, so now inequality in the nineteenth only needs 
freedom to emerge from its mere latency and potentiality and to dominate all of human life. 
Freedom remains the general denominator even if its correlate is the opposite of what it had 
been’ (ibid., 78).
If freedom can now be connected to inequality, it is because the latter is no longer 
understood in the same manner. While the 18th century affirmed the individual’s 
negative freedom against the ‘external’ inequality produced by illegitimate social 
norms, the 19th century emphasised a form of positive freedom associated with 
the development of each one’s ‘internal’ inequality in relation to others.
‘It seems that, as soon as the ego had become sufficiently strengthened by the feeling of 
equality and generality, it fell back into the search for inequality. […] First, there had been 
the thorough liberation of the individual from the rusty chains of guild, birth right, and 
church. Now, the individual that had thus become independent also wished to distinguish 
himself from other individuals’ (ibid.).
The emphasis is no longer on being a free individual as any other, but rather in 
being a peculiar one that can be replaced by no other.
Despite the differences between these individualisms, they both share a fun-
damental impulse: that according to which ‘the individual seeks its self as if it 
did not yet have it, and yet, at the same time, is certain that its only fixed point 
is this self’ (ibid., 79). But if 18th-century individualism saw the self as a centre 
of rational autonomy bounded to a general law equally valid for all,  19th-century 
individualism found within itself an incomparable and obscure peculiarity. 
While the former is associated with the ‘unquestionable clarity’ of ‘a conceptually 
demonstrated rationalism’, the latter is oriented by the ‘enigmatic unfathomable-
ness’ of ‘very obscure instincts’ (ibid.).
It is no coincidence therefore that, according to Simmel, it was in a work of 
art that this form of individualism appeared in its first full elaboration. Though 
intimations of this conception are already displayed in Lessing’s, Herder’s and 
Lavater’s writings,5 it is in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship that one 
sees, for the first time, ‘a world which is based exclusively on the individual 
peculiarities of its protagonists and which is organised and developed only on 
5 Even if Simmel associates each form of individualism with a different century in European 
history, it is clear by his treatment of the subject that this temporal attribution should not be un-
derstood in a clear-cut manner: not only intimations of qualitative individualism can be found in 
the 18th century – and, as we will see, also in the previous ones – but the same applies to quan-
titative individualism, whose origins can be traced back to earlier times. Moreover, it becomes 
evident that, for Simmel, both these traditions continued to be developed beyond the centuries 
in which their clearest expressions emerged.
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this basis’ (ibid.). Philosophically, says Simmel, this new ideal was expressed in 
Schleiermacher’s claim that each individual is a synthesis of the forces that con-
stitute the universe, yet one that is each time incomparable and entirely unique. 
Its core idea was ‘that the absolute only lives in the form of the individual, and 
that individuality is not a restriction of the infinite but its expression and mirror’ 
(ibid., 81). As in the previous century, a connection is thus established between 
nature and the individual. However, the former no longer appears as a homogene-
ous universal that is equally present within every human being, but rather as an 
infinite multiplicity of forces expressed within each one in a unique and obscure 
manner. Hence its association with ‘mystical-fatalistic’ ideas and its proximity, 
against ‘the bright rationalism of the Enlightenment’, with Romanticism (ibid.).
This worldview’s characteristic emphasis on singularity did not only apply to 
the individual, but also to other cultures. Valuing ‘the fascinating beauty of the 
Middle Ages, which had been neglected, and of the Orient, which had been despised 
by the activistic culture of a liberal Europe’, the Romanticists were, after Herder, 
the first to absorb and emphasise the uniqueness of historical realities (ibid.). Such 
a valuation of singularity was accompanied, however, by an equally accentuated 
search for oneness. Lying behind the interest in cultural worlds different than 
one’s own was the notion that a sort of unity could be achieved, or discovered, that 
would be more felt and sensuous than reflective and rational. As Simmel empha-
sises, ‘Novalis wanted his “one spirit” to transform itself into infinitely many alien 
spirits; the “one spirit inheres, as it were, in all objects it contemplates, and it feels 
the infinite, simultaneous sensations of a harmonious plurality”’ (ibid.). It is in 
this sense that 19th-century individualism is connected to a conception of human-
ity that highlights not the abstract man-in-general, but ‘the concrete totality of the 
living species’ (ibid., 80). But as Novalis’ quotation also indicates, the emphasis on 
the concreteness of sensations led, on the other hand, to an equally accentuated 
interest in the smallest singularities, in every minor contrast of experience: ‘Above 
all, the Romanticists experienced the inner rhythm of the incomparability, of the 
specific claim, of the sharp qualitative differentiation of the single element’ (ibid., 
81f.). Such a tendency was already present in Lavater, who ‘so stubbornly pursues 
the special characteristics of man’s visible and inner traits that he cannot find his 
way back to man’s total individuality, but remains arrested in his interest in the 
completely individual and single’ (ibid., 82). Accordingly, the Romanticist ‘feels 
its way through an endless series of contrasts’ in such a way that each of them 
appears, at the instant it is being experienced, ‘as something absolute, completed, 
self-contained, but at the next moment it is left behind’ (ibid.).
Both these strivings – toward concrete singularity and concrete totality – will 
also reflect in a new conception of society, understood as a ‘total organism’ com-
posed of heterogeneous elements. Such an idea contrasts with the 18th- century 
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ideal of a social order consisting of atomised, undifferentiated individuals held 
together by a law that ‘restrict[s] the freedom of the individual to the point where 
this freedom can coexist with that of every other’ (ibid., 83). This sort of mechan-
ical unity, ‘put together through the mere addition of isolated and equal indi-
viduals’, could not be more foreign to the society envisioned by 19th-century 
 qualitative individualism, with its striving for a social whole that rises from and 
above individual interactions ‘as a unit which cannot be found in the individual, 
not even as some sort of proportionate quantity’ (ibid.).
A crucial question faced by 19th-century individualism is, then, how to conju-
gate these two tendencies so as to achieve a concrete social totality that preserves 
the concrete singularities it assembles. At the level of social relations, the latter 
can be understood as a project akin to Novalis’ notion of ‘one spirit’ that is able 
to maintain a harmonious plurality without relinquishing the infinite contrasts 
in sensation. But, as Simmel here considers it, the path taken by  19th-century 
individualism was a different one. As a solution to that problem, it advanced a 
restrictive understanding of the qualitative personality, so that the latter could be 
integrated into the social whole. ‘The individualistic requirement of specificity 
does not make for the valuation of total personality within society, but for the 
personality’s objective achievement for the benefit of society’ (ibid., 80). In this 
framework, the individual does not contribute to social life with all the infinite 
nuances and contrasts of its concrete personality, but only as bearer of an objec-
tive task, the performer of a particular role in the division of labour. Though qual-
itatively specific, this role is nevertheless detached from all others, with which it 
is bounded only through an abstract law or medium, such as money.
All those ‘infinite contrasts in sensation’ that make up a personality are 
hence limited to how they come to be expressed in a particular objective perfor-
mance. Accordingly, the concreteness of society is also restricted, with the har-
monious plurality of the social organism being understood as an interrelation 
between distinct individual labours. Thus conceived, this form of individualism 
certainly contrasts with the previous one: while the 18th century emphasised the 
equal nature of rational individuals, the 19th rather highlighted the distinctive 
character of each personality. They are both marked, however, by an atomised 
conception of the individual – whether the latter is conceived as a bearer of equal 
rights, or as someone who performs a specific role within an economically differ-
entiated society. The identification of qualitative individualism with the notion 
of a society organised on the basis of the division of labour amounts, therefore, 
to a restriction of its in-dividual aspects; it tends to convert this ideal into just 
another version of quantitative in-dividualism. Though it is discernible in Sim-
mel’s account of 19th-century individualism the outline of a fully qualitative 
in-dividuality, this possibility ends up being held in check.
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3 The sociological in-dividual 
Tensions of this sort are also manifest in Simmel’s sociological theory. His writ-
ings not only address the differences between those two forms of individualism; 
they are also affected by them. The paradoxical intertwinement between these 
ideals, as well as the social conflicts they manifest and to which they respond, 
find expression in the concept of individual articulated by Simmel in his sociology. 
Nowhere this appears more clearly than in the 1908 excursus on the a priori condi-
tions of sociation (Vergesellschaftung), whose starting point are precisely the diffi-
culties attached to the fact that sociation consists of relations between individuals.
Crucial for Simmel’s sociology is the argument that, given the qualitative 
peculiarity of each human being, a lacuna is inherent to their reciprocal relations: 
it is impossible, after all, to completely know an individuality different from our 
own. ‘It appears as though each person has a mark of individuality [Individual-
itätspunkt] deep down within, that can be reconstructed internally by no one else, 
for whom this mark is always qualitatively different’ (Simmel 2009 [1908]: 43f.). 
In order to get around this unavoidable gap, each social participant must rely on 
some kind of generalisation of the other, ‘a blurring of her contours’ (ibid., 44). 
The image thus obtained is characterised by dislocations that do not consist in 
mere illusions stemming from faulty or biased experience, but are rather funda-
mental modifications which convert a person into a social being. ‘We represent 
all people […] as the type of human to which their individuality allows them to 
belong; we think of them, aside all their singularity, under a general category that 
certainly does not encompass them fully and that they do not completely match’ 
(ibid.; emphasis added). In social relations, we see the other not according to the 
whole of its personality but as a bearer of certain roles (officer, colleague, worker, 
etc.) and attributes (moral or immoral, independent or dependent, etc.). Such a 
process always involves, furthermore, some kind of typification: ‘In order to take 
cognisance of people, we view them not according to their pure individuality but 
framed, highlighted, or even reduced by means of a general type […] with which 
their pure being-for-itself does not coincide’ (ibid.; emphasis added).
However, the knowledge of another human being via general types does 
not simply veil her pure being-for-itself. Typification has itself an individualised 
character: a set of general categories is combined so as to lead to a hypothetical 
construction of the other’s personality, thus endowed with a certain unity on the 
basis of its fragments one is allowed to perceive.
‘[T]he view of the other broadens these fragments into what we never actually are purely 
and wholly. The fragments cannot be seen only juxtaposed, but as we fill in the blind spot 
in our field of vision, completely unconsciously of course, we construct the fullness of its 
individuality from them’ (ibid.).
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From a plurality of fragments and their corresponding categories a complex, 
yet typified, image of the individual is formed which relies on the uniqueness of 
its real personality but is not identical with it. ‘The praxis of life pressures us to 
shape the picture of a person only from the bits of reality empirically known; but 
even that rests on […] the transformation of the actual fragments into the gen-
erality of a type and into the completion of the hypothetical personality’ (ibid.).
This basic procedure, by means of which the other’s personality takes on 
a knowable and communicable form, functions as an a priori of all recipro-
cal actions between individuals: it is a practical assumption held by them and 
without which social relations could not take place. This constitutes what Simmel 
calls the first a priori condition of sociation. In line with the Kantian foundations 
of his 1908 Sociology,6 Simmel furthermore highlights the schematic aspect of 
those operations of social generalisation.
‘The civilian who meets an officer cannot free herself at all from the reality that this indi-
vidual is an officer. And, although being an officer may be pertinent to this personality, her 
image still prejudices toward the schematic type comparable to it in the representation of 
the other’ (ibid., 45; emphasis added).
In this regard, the a priori categories of sociation function similarly to the Kantian 
categories of understanding (Verstand) that form the immediately given data into 
objects of knowledge:
‘Because the generalization is always at the same time more and less than the individuality, 
[…] those alterations and reformulations are in fact what obstruct this ideal knowledge of 
the [real] self even while being precisely the conditions by which the relationships that we 
know alone as social become possible’ (ibid.).
Yet while asserting the significance of these a priori generalisations for the estab-
lishment of forms of sociation, Simmel points again to their insufficiency. That 
lacuna inherent to reciprocal actions between individuals is somehow bridged, 
but not entirely solved, by schematic categories. There is always a remainder, 
something that evades generalisation. Even when the latter takes the form of an 
individualised type, ‘[h]overing above all this […] is the idea of a person’s real, 
absolutely individual indubitability’ (ibid.). As a consequence, everything that 
resists typification via a priori categories will appear as an extra-social quality of 
the person:
6 On this issue, see Cantó-Milà 2005, 69–78, 113–5; Köhnke 1996. On the current relevance of 
such a framework, see Cantó-Milà 2018.
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‘We know that the civil servant is not only a civil servant, the merchant is not only a mer-
chant, the officer is not only an officer; and this extra-social being [außersoziale Sein] – its 
temperament and its fated outcome, its interests and the value of its personality – may 
alter very little the essential operations of the civil servant, the merchant, the soldier, and 
yet it gives opposing aspects to every one of them, always a particular nuance and a social 
persona permeated by extra-social imponderables’ (ibid., 46).
The process of sociation hence leads to a splitting of the individual. While the 
social being of a person corresponds to the image made of her via schematic cat-
egories and types, the extra-social being consists in the qualitative aspects of her 
‘pure being-for-itself’ that do not fit such generalisations. It is no coincidence that 
these extra-social qualities are so often described in approximate terms – as the 
‘tone’ or the ‘imponderables’ of the personality, its ‘temperament’ or ‘nuance’ 
(ibid.). They point, after all, to those aspects of the individual which resist catego-
risation. Crucial for Simmel’s sociology is therefore a distinction between ‘social’ 
and ‘extra-social’ whereby the former refers to reciprocal relations mediated by 
general categories and the latter to the qualitative aspects of the personality that 
are not incorporated into such schematic types, thus appearing as a realm situated 
beyond social activity. This Außerdem, as Simmel also calls it, refers to the per-
son’s ‘absolutely individual indubitability’ and, as such, to the limits of sociation.
However, this limit itself will be taken into account by the schematic forms of 
knowledge that make reciprocal actions possible. The fact that ‘every member of 
a group is not only a part of society but also something else’ (ibid., 45) is reckoned 
by the very same typifying categories that mediate relations between individuals. 
The distinction between social and extra-social being is not simply established by 
the sociological observer, but practically assumed by the participants themselves. 
They do not relate to each other only ‘as bearers of the social roles falling to them 
just at that moment’, but ‘differentiate one another just as much […] according 
to whatever degree of that “besides” [Außerdem] they possess or permit’ (ibid., 
46). Social generalisations incorporate within themselves, in schematic form, the 
recognition of their own insufficiency. This is what constitutes for Simmel the 
second a priori of sociation.
The individual in its full qualitative peculiarity thus appears, in Simmel’s 
sociological theory, as the vanishing point of social life – even if, as just seen, 
this vanishing point is recognised as such within the schematic forms of soci-
ation. Accordingly, society is defined ‘as a purely objective schema, […] as an 
arrangement of contents and accomplishments’ which does not incorporate the 
 individual’s entire existence, but only its qualitatively particular, yet detachable, 
performances (ibid., 49; emphasis added). Society hence appears as ‘an intercon-
nection of qualitatively distinct phenomena’ which find its clearest example in 
bureaucracy (Beamtenschaft), conceived as ‘a definite organization of  “positions” 
420   Arthur Bueno
with a predetermined set of skill requirements that exist detached from their 
respective office holders’, and in which ‘new entrants find unambiguously spe-
cific posts, just as though these positions were waiting for them and to which their 
energies must harmoniously conform’ (ibid., 50; emphasis added). Even if, in con-
trast to the bureaucratic structure, the positions in society are not produced by a 
purposeful design, its
‘phenomenological structure […] remains an arrangement of elements, of which each 
person takes an individually defined position, a coordination of objectively and, in its social 
significance, meaningful […] functions and functional centres; in this process the purely 
personal, the inwardly productive, the impulses and reflexes of the real “I” remain entirely 
outside consideration’ (ibid.).
Such a conception of society is, Simmel asserts, practically assumed by social 
actors and therewith constitutes the third a priori of sociation7: ‘That every indi-
vidual is directed according to one’s own quality in a definite position inside of 
one’s social milieu […] – that is the presumption under which the individual lives 
out a social life’ (ibid.). Sociation cannot take place without the practical assump-
tion of a correlation between the individual life and its environing social circles, 
without the presupposition that its intrapersonal particularity is integrated into 
the life of the social whole and finds a particular place within it. Nowhere does 
this appear more clearly than in the category of vocation (Beruf), which is char-
acterised by the assumption that a ‘socially functional activity is consistently the 
expression of inner capacity, that the wholeness and durability of subjectivity 
practically objectivises itself by way of its function in society’ (ibid., 51). Thus 
conceived, the category of society assumed by individuals in their social dealings 
appears as a ‘harmony […] between the structure and life process of society on the 
one hand and the individual make up and predispositions on the other’, as an 
‘unbroken interconnected reality’ (lückenlose Wechselwirksamkeit) (ibid.; empha-
ses added).
This is, as Simmel emphasises, a phenomenological depiction of society 
and not a psychological one: it refers only to the ‘social content’, to ‘the kind 
of existence and accomplishments offered objectively socially by every element’ 
(ibid., 50). As in the discussion of the two previous a priori conditions, the totality 
of one’s personality – with its unique and unmistakable ‘innate qualities, per-
sonal associations, and lived destinies’ – is, for the most part, left outside the 
frame. The distinction between phenomenological and psychological perspec-
7 In line with this third a priori, Fitzi (2017) developed a wide-ranging interpretation of Simmel’s 
oeuvre as a theory of ‘qualitative societal differentiation’.
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tives hence recasts the earlier opposition between social and extra-social being: 
everything that is not expressed in the form of an objective, functional perfor-
mance appears as a psychological element situated outside the social realm, as 
an Außerdem. Here as well, there is always something that evades schematisation. 
Even if social life only becomes possible on the basis of an ‘unbroken’ concept of 
society, the latter never comes to shape reality without fail or remainder: if this 
were the case, ‘we would have the perfect society – […] not in the ethical sense 
or eudemonistic perfection but conceptually: i.e., not the perfect society but the 
perfect society’ (ibid., 51). As an a priori condition of sociation, the category of 
society is at the same time presupposed in its perfection and imperfectly real-
ised. There is always something in empirical social life that is not entirely grasped 
by this category, that evades its unbroken interconnectedness. Once again, as 
Simmel sees it, this is the case of those qualitative aspects of the personality that 
resist schematisation and manifest a certain ‘unpredictability’ (ibid.).
To be sure, such a conception of society does incorporate the qualitative 
peculiarity of each individual: it relies, after all, on the idea that ‘there exists a 
position-and-performance in society for each person, to which one is “called,” 
and an imperative to search for it until one finds it’ (ibid.). However, the per-
sonality only takes part in society to the extent that it accomplishes an objec-
tive performance within a structure of detached and schematised, even if qual-
itatively differentiated, social functions. Similarly to how Simmel presented the 
ideal of  19th-century individualism, here solely those qualitative aspects of per-
sonal experience are taken into consideration which fit the image of a society 
organised, as in the modern economy or the bureaucratic structure, in terms of 
detached roles performed by atomised in-dividuals.
As indicated by the presentation of these three a priori conditions, Simmel’s 
sociology is structured around a reiterated demarcation between a categorially 
schematised ‘social’ and its ‘extra-social’ remainders. Within this framework, the 
personality only takes part in social relationships in the shape of a detached and 
typified in-dividual, even if a qualitatively distinct one. And what does not fit this 
in-dividual form can only partake in social life as long as it is itself framed within 
a categorical distinction – e.g., the one between social and extra-social being. 
Accordingly, society consists in a schematic structure of detached positions that 
leaves out a great deal of the ‘tones’, ‘nuances’ and ‘imponderables’ that consti-
tute the personalities involved, as well as, one could say, their reciprocal relations.
This is, however, only half of the story. Such a view is transformed as long as 
one considers a specific argument presented by Simmel in this excursus. As seen 
above, while addressing the second a priori he argues that the forms of sociation 
can be classified according to how much of that extra-social element, that Außer-
dem, they admit within themselves. From this perspective, each form of  sociation 
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can be located at a specific point within a continuum of different balances 
between social and extra-social elements. At one of the poles of this continuum, 
Simmel locates those kinds of relationship we call love and friendship. Here, the 
extra-social being – i.e. that which the individual keeps in reserve beyond the 
activities directed toward the other – approaches the zero point:
‘[T]here is only a single life that can be viewed or lived from two angles, at one time from the 
inside, from the terminus a quo of the subject, then however, while nothing has changed, 
from the perspective of the beloved, from the category of the subject’s terminus ad quem, 
which absorbs it completely’ (ibid., 46).
Thus conceived, love and friendship are forms of sociation marked by a total 
pervasiveness: here the extra-social component, the Außerdem of social activity, 
vanishes ‘because its content is wholly absorbed in the turn toward the other’ 
(ibid.). It is as if that lacuna which Simmel deemed inescapable, the impossibility 
of fully knowing another individuality, were here overcome. Each of the lovers or 
friends presents herself entirely to the other, without reserve, so that their whole 
personalities enmesh and emerge as a single life. Their qualitative nuances and 
imponderables, their personal temperament and uniqueness are all shared with 
one another and absorbed in social activity. In such cases, the schematic com-
ponent of sociation – previously taken as a synonym for ‘social being’ – equally 
disappears. Given the absence of distance between individuals, they find them-
selves immersed in a single life immediately given to both of them, so that there 
is no longer the need for general types as mediating figures between closed, 
inscrutable personalities. In fact, the opposition itself between a schematised 
‘social’ and a qualitative ‘extra-social’ does not hold here. Against Simmel’s own 
previous assumptions about the a priori conditions of sociation, his arguments 
on love and friendship point thereby to instances in which social life achieves a 
 non-schematic form.
Inversely, the distinction between social and extra-social being is particularly 
intensified in the forms of sociation that Simmel situates at the other pole of the 
continuum: namely, ‘the phenomena of modern culture as they are determined 
by the money economy’ (ibid.). While love and friendship represented the van-
ishing point of extra-social being, where everything is shared and nothing is kept 
outside the relationship, economic relations are where the Außerdem reaches 
its peak. This is so because in the money economy, says Simmel, the individual 
approaches the ideal of absolute objectivity as bearer of an economic function:
‘the individual life, the tone of the whole personality, has disappeared from the performance; 
people become only the bearers of settlements of performance and  counter-performance as 
determined by objective norms, and everything that does not fit into this sheer thingness 
has also as a matter of fact disappeared from it’ (ibid.).
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This form of sociation hence relies on the most radical distinction between 
social and extra-social being, between schematised individuality and deeper per-
sonality. To the extent that one partakes in these relationships merely as a bearer 
of economic performances, most of her temperament, her qualitative nuances, 
her deeper mark of individuality is kept in reserve. The extra-social being thus 
reaches its maximum point: ‘The “besides” [Außerdem] has fully taken up into 
itself the personality with its special colouration, its irrationality, its inner life, 
and it has left to those social activities only those energies, in pure abstraction, 
which specifically pertain to the activities’ (ibid.). Since here what is socially 
performed by the individual (‘social being’) is entirely devoid of personal tone, 
almost the whole of personality is removed to the domain of the Außerdem 
(‘extra-social being’).
One can find in Simmel’s sociology, therefore, a differentiation between 
two forms of sociation which is homologous to the previous distinction between 
forms of individualism. On the one hand, relations established within the money 
economy constitute the institutionalised form of quantitative in-dividualism: in 
them, almost everything that is qualitative about individual life is excluded from 
the domain of the social and relegated to the domain of the extra-social. There 
is a gap between the personalities of each of those involved, which can only be 
bridged by schematic categories and generalisations. On the other hand, love and 
friendship emerge as forms of sociation in which the opposition between sche-
matic sociality and qualitative extra-sociality dissolves: here, neither the nuances 
of the personality are relegated to the domain of the extra-social (on the contrary, 
they fully permeate the reciprocal relations), nor social life is characterised as the 
domain of schematic categories (it is rather thoroughly marked by those personal 
imponderables). Love and friendship thus constitute the institutionalised form 
of qualitative in-dividualism: the form of sociation in which personalities fully 
enmesh and permeate each other to the point of appearing as a single life.
Important as it is to bear in mind this distinction between two forms of soci-
ation, it is equally crucial to take into account its consequences for the whole 
of Simmel’s sociological project. The latter relies, as we saw, on the assump-
tion that sociation has a necessary generalising and typological character, 
and that everything which evades schematisation must recede to the realm of 
extra-social being. However, while this framework seems suitable to examine 
quantitative forms of sociation such as the one presented by the modern money 
economy, it fails to be so concerning relationships, such as love and friendship, 
in which sociality rather takes on a non-schematised, fully qualitative charac-
ter. So once again, as in the case of Simmel’s arguments on modern individu-
alism, the consideration of forms of qualitative individuality points toward a 
potential that is simultaneously held in check. Here, as before, the possibility 
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of  qualitative  in- dividuality is at once presented and tamed, i.e. submitted to 
the general framework of quantitative in-dividuality. In such a perspective, the 
enmeshing of two qualitative in-dividualities into ‘a single life’ can only appear 
as irrational, inscrutable, or extra-social. Simmel’s comments on love and 
friendship point, nevertheless, beyond his own conception of social life as a 
schematic relationship between in-dividuals.
4 Intellectual and sensible in-dividualities
The distinction between the two forms of individuality outlined so far can 
be further developed on the basis of another set of Simmel’s writings: those 
dedicated to a diagnosis of modern culture. While his analysis of 18th- and 
 19th-century ideals presented a contrast between a quantitative in-dividual and 
a qualitative in-dividual (even if the latter ended up being significantly restricted 
in favour of the former), his sociological writings indicated that the human being 
itself can be split into two parts: a schematic in-dividuality and a fully qualitative 
 in-dividuality (even if the latter was, for the most part, removed to the inscruta-
ble depths of an extra-social Außerdem). As Simmel’s arguments also indicate, 
such restrictive understanding of qualitative individuality is a crucial feature of 
bureaucratic structures and economic relations, where only that which takes a 
schematic form is socially shared, while most qualitative aspects of the person-
ality are kept in reserve. Hence the importance of addressing his diagnosis of 
modern (economic) life: in the latter, one can find not only a similar distinction 
between quantitative and qualitative parts of the individual, but also indications 
of how they might come to interrelate in different social settings.
Indeed central to Simmel’s depiction of modern individuality is a homolo-
gous distinction between two forms of social relationship: one marked by the 
predominance of an intellectual attitude toward the world, and another in which 
prevails a sensible stance with regard to persons and things. For Simmel, modern 
culture is characterised by an unprecedented extension of ‘intellectual relation-
ships’ (verstandesmäßige Beziehungen) over ‘sensible relationships’ (Gemüts-
beziehungen) – a process whose psychological consequences become especially 
clear when one compares the life in the metropolis and in the small town (Simmel 
2002 [1903]).
As presented in his famous essay on ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’, the 
differentiation between these two forms of social relationship relies on a corre-
sponding distinction between two psychic agencies (referred to via expressions 
such as ‘layers of our soul’, ‘psychic organs’ or ‘inner forces’; ibid., 12), one of 
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them prevailing in each of the respective modes of relation to the world. On the 
one hand, the psychic agency that Simmel calls Gemüt takes root in the ‘more 
unconscious layers of the psyche’, which can only accommodate to the changes 
and oppositions of phenomena through ‘commotions and inner upheavals’. The 
Gemüt hence constitutes a more ‘sensible’ psychic agency, which stands closer 
to the ‘depths of the personality’. On the other hand, the Verstand ‘has its locus 
in the transparent, conscious, higher layers of the psyche’. It is a psychic organ 
more distant from those commotions and upheavals, which makes it ‘the most 
adaptable of our inner forces’ (ibid.).
As a psychic agency closely connected to the ‘depths of the personality’, 
the Gemüt is understood as more primary than the Verstand. In order to ground 
in psychological terms his sociological argument about the preponderance of 
relations of Verstand in modern life, Simmel had thus to provide an ontogenetic 
explanation regarding the development of this psychic agency under certain 
social conditions. Such a process is analysed from two different perspectives. At 
first – in what can be called an energetic model – the ontogenesis of the Verstand 
is understood as resulting from the impact of shocks from the outside world, in 
response to which this higher organ is developed as a protective layer. Accord-
ing to Simmel, when subjected to ‘the swift and uninterrupted change of outer 
and inner stimuli’, the human being feels an ‘intensification of her nervous life’ 
against which she needs to protect herself (ibid.). The more pronounced these 
conditions, the more distressing it is to react only on the basis of the inner com-
motions of the Gemüt, so that the psychic apparatus is led to the development 
of a ‘protective organ’ against the threat of uprooting posed by the constraints 
and discrepancies of the external environment: as Simmel states, one then ‘does 
not react with the Gemüt, but above all with the Verstand’. It is by means of this 
process that, according to him, the intensification of the nervous life results in a 
corresponding ‘intensification of consciousness’ (ibid.).
It is clear, therefore, that this general process of differentiation of the psychic 
apparatus, resulting in the development of a specific agency, the Verstand, 
will be modified according to the intensity of the stimuli present in the exter-
nal reality which the individual has to confront. Hence, social contexts marked 
by the occurrence of ‘lasting impressions […] which take a regular and habitual 
course and show regular and habitual contrasts’ require a smaller ‘quantum of 
consciousness’ and allow, so to speak, a more open and less defensive response 
by the Gemüt; while those contexts in which predominate ‘the rapid crowding of 
changing images […] and the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions’ demand 
a more pronounced action of the Verstand, resulting in a more intellectualistic 
psychic life (ibid.). With its slower, more habitual and more smoothly flowing 
rhythm, the small town can orient its relations on the basis of mood and feeling, 
426   Arthur Bueno
which ‘develop most readily in the steady equilibrium of unbroken customs’. 
The metropolis, ‘with the tempo and multiplicity of economic, occupational and 
social life’, demands in turn a more pronounced action of the Verstand, resulting 
in a more intellectualist form of life (ibid.).
But the predominance of the Verstand in modern psychic life is also under-
stood from another perspective. The metropolis is not only characterised by an 
increased social complexity, with its faster pace of life and its greater stimulation 
of the senses. It is also the locus of the money economy, whose intrinsic connec-
tion with the logic of Verstand reveals itself in a set of common features. Both are 
defined by a ‘pure objectivity in dealing with people and with things’: the Ver-
stand is indifferent to all genuine individuality, since, Simmel claims, ‘relation-
ships and reactions [that] result from [individuality] […] cannot be exhausted with 
logical operations’ (ibid.); for its part, in the monetary principle there is equally 
no place for the individuality of phenomena, given that ‘money is concerned only 
with what is common to all: it asks for the exchange value, it reduces all quality 
and individuality to the question: How much?’ (ibid.). The money economy and 
the logical Verstand thus appear as examples of a particular kind of relation to 
the world, a certain form of life that Simmel called ‘intellectual relationship’ 
(verstandesmäßige Beziehung): marked by a pure objectivity, indifferent to the 
individuality of people and things, this form of life was defined in opposition to 
another, called ‘sensible relationship’ (Gemütsbeziehung), in which the qualita-
tive peculiarity of persons and things is felt, as Simmel states, in its ‘full sensible 
shading’ (gemütvollere Tönung) (ibid.).
One must bear in mind the specific meaning of individuality in this context 
in order to understand Simmel’s argument. Individuality does not mean here the 
characterisation of the particularity of a person or thing as a crossing point of 
general determinations, each of them designated by a logically universal concept. 
Understood in this way, individuality would remain within the limits of Verstand, 
inasmuch as each singularity would present itself as the mere result of a spe-
cific conjunction of objective, universally valid determinations, albeit in distinct 
measures in each case. It points, instead, to something that escapes this purely 
objective or quantitative conception of individuality, concerning rather a given 
quality, a specific ‘colouring’ that cannot be reduced to a ‘general and schema-
tised form’ or a set of them. In other words, the concept of individuality to which 
Simmel refers in this context is not defined by what is ‘equally attributable to all’, 
but rather by what is qualitatively ‘peculiar and unschematised’ (ibid., 14).
Each of these two forms of life, as their names indicate, is defined by the pre-
ponderance of a particular psychic agency. The contrast between the psychic organs 
of the Gemüt and Verstand takes on here a distinct character in relation to the first 
model: now the difference between them is not only a matter of degree – that is, of 
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the amount of consciousness involved in each – but rather based on a fundamental 
opposition in how people and things appear within them. While the Gemüt involves 
a consideration of people and things oriented by their qualities and peculiarities, 
by their ‘full sensible shading’, the Verstand deals with persons and things ‘as with 
numbers, that is, as with elements which, in themselves, are indifferent, but which 
are of interest only insofar as they offer an objectively measurable accomplishment’ 
(ibid., 12). Hence it is frequent in intellectual relationships that a ‘formal justice’ 
is associated with a ‘brutal harshness’: its objectivity is ‘ruthless’ because, like 
everything else in this form of life, the parties’ moral attitudes and interests are 
not subject to ‘any divergence from its set path because of the imponderability of 
personal relationships’ (ibid., 12f.). In short, while the Gemüt’s relationship with 
reality is qualitative, individualised, attentive to a ‘defined spectrum of colours’, the 
Verstand’s relation is quantitative, general, ‘flat and grey’ (Simmel 2013 [1896], 60; 
Simmel 2002 [1903], 14).
To this second characterisation corresponds a difference in the underlying 
mode of ontogenetic explanation. A central premise of Simmel’s argument in this 
second model – which can be called dispositional – is that certain forms of life, 
once disseminated, contribute to shape the subjects’ psychic structure accord-
ing to the specific relationship with the world they give rise to. So, the fact that 
a certain psychic agency displays common traits with a particular form of life 
would indicate the occurrence of a process of internalisation, via sociation, of the 
latter’s characteristic logic. Such an argument implies a conception according to 
which the psychic apparatus deals with the external reality not only by devel-
oping a protective layer against excessive stimuli, but also by constituting such 
layer as an agency that – shaped, so to speak, in the image and likeness of that 
reality – provides the psychic apparatus with the means to adjust to it. Verstand, 
in this regard, does not constitute solely a psychic organ that ‘preserves subjective 
life’ (as in the first model), but also an inner force ‘capable of adaptation’ (ibid., 
12; emphasis added). It acts as an instance of mediation between social reality 
and the commotions of that deeper, unconscious force called Gemüt. Thus, to 
the extent that these forms of life are incorporated by the Verstand and shape it 
according to their logic, they leave their mark on the psyche as a whole, including 
the psychic layer closer to the ‘depths of personality’, the Gemüt.
One can now see how Simmel’s sociological splitting of the individual into 
a schematic and socially categorised being, on the one hand, and a deeper and 
fully qualitative being, on the other, does not only concern its relations with 
others. It is not only a matter of what is, or is not, shared by the individual within 
social relationships. The split between a schematic and a fully qualitative self is 
also an internal one. It takes the shape of a psychologically conflictual relation 
between Verstand and Gemüt in which the logic of the former can even come to 
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‘colonise’ that of the latter: by participating in intellectual relationships, as seen 
above, the individual internalises their schematic and objectifying logic, which 
then comes to function as an organising principle of the psyche. In economic and 
bureaucratic forms of sociation, the human being thus becomes schematised not 
only for the other, but also within itself. It becomes not only externally, but also 
internally, an in-dividual organised in quantitative terms.
The question, then, is what happens to psychological experience in the 
opposite form of social relation, namely the one that Simmel called ‘sensible rela-
tionships’. This is not, however, a topic that he addressed in this context. While 
his essay on the metropolis provides a complex depiction of the psychological 
consequences of modern intellectual life, it does not offer an equally detailed 
account of sensible relationships and the specific kind of intrapsychic dynamics 
they entail. In this case, as in his historical and sociological analyses presented 
above, one can find only scattered and underdeveloped indications of how fully 
qualitative forms of sociation and in-dividuality actually look. Yet this issue can 
be further articulated by resorting to some of Simmel’s late writings.
5 Romanic and Germanic in-dividualisms
In Simmel’s late works one can find, once more, a contrast between two kinds of 
in-dividuality – now in the form of a distinction between Romanic and Germanic 
individualisms. This opposition stands out in relation to the previous ones given 
its cultural-geographical emphasis. While the former referred, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to antagonisms internal to modernity (Enlightenment versus Roman-
ticism, bureaucracy and economy versus love and friendship, metropolis versus 
small town), the latter points to a much wider temporal scope, going back to 
the Renaissance period – and even to classical antiquity – on the Romanic side 
and to the Middle Ages on the Germanic side. Yet this contrast made its way into 
modernity, and by articulating it, Simmel expressed an undeniable concern with 
contemporary issues, not the least of which was the First World War (see Simmel 
1999 [1917]).
What is significant for our purposes here is less the cultural-geographical 
(and somewhat exaggerated) opposition between two peoples or ways of life and 
more the fact that this distinction noticeably, though for the most part not explic-
itly, recasts the previous ones. As the 18th-century ideal of freedom and equal-
ity defined itself against the then-dominant corporatist and ecclesiastical ties, 
Romanic individualism is now seen as a reaction to the forms of collectivity that 
prevailed in the Middle Ages. Attempting to release itself from the binding forms 
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of medieval community, the Italian Renaissance was marked by a strong accentu-
ation of individual particularity, a striving for presenting oneself as independent 
and unique. Simmel considers this tendency ‘especially well illustrated by the 
story that for a time at the beginning of the epoch there was no general fashion 
in men’s clothes because everyone wished to dress in a unique fashion’ (Simmel 
2005 [1916], 89). Accordingly, Renaissance portraits accentuated individual par-
ticularity to such an extent that ‘the representation of the human being could not 
be strange, exclusive, or characteristic enough, up to the point of the grotesque’ 
(ibid., 87). And yet, when one looks at the aesthetic representations of Romanic 
individuals, one might discern a certain uniformity of style, ‘a common ethos and 
attitude to life’: seeking to accentuate their individuality, they present themselves 
at the same time as bearers of a type. Along with ‘a passionate accentuation of 
one’s own singularity’, Romanic individualism hence displays as well a ‘basic 
striving for the general’ (Simmel 2007 [1917], 67).
That is not, however, a sign of incoherence. What allows for this conjunction 
of individual particularity and stylised commonality is, above all, the specific 
character of the latter. The generality that is strived for in such context is not 
of a concrete kind: it does not involve a longing for Gemeinschaft, a ‘collectivity 
or any practical amalgamation into an encompassing figuration, or a merging of 
individuals into some greater totality’ that would dissolve their individualities 
(ibid.). Rather, what is at stake is a ‘generality akin to the concept’: a form or law 
that determines a number of individual existences, each of which represents it 
in a certain manner. All freedom, differentiation and individual excellence are 
thereby sought within the limits of this conceptual generality; they are nothing 
more than particular manifestations of universal attributes. In the Romanic 
context, Simmel says, ‘[a]ll individual characteristics are generalities’ and the 
human being is nothing but ‘a plurality of generalities’ (ibid.).
For that reason, the Romanic individual displays – as the one articulated by 
18th-century Enlightenment – a quantitative character: ‘the will to power that 
infused the individuals of the Renaissance realises itself in a perhaps only quan-
titative, singular increase of traits that in the last analysis are typical’ (Simmel 
2005 [1916], 87). In contradistinction to Simmel’s depiction of quantitative indi-
vidualism, however, its Romanic variety is characterised by a striving for being 
different from others, for distinguishing oneself. In this regard it resembles the 
restrictive, in-dividualistic interpretation of the 19th-century ideal, as well as the 
individual as performer of a specific role in the division of labour. Significantly 
enough, Simmel now characterises this orientation toward distinction as a ‘soci-
ological’ one: indeed, here one finds again that same articulation of typified par-
ticularity and schematic generality that was ascribed to the socialised individual 
in his 1908 Sociology. Common to these different figures of in-dividuality is, in any 
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case, the fact that they all rely on a typical and abstract form of generality which 
provides the measure of either their equality or their inequality.
‘Everywhere […] where there is comparison (however much its result is diversely exhibited) 
there are common premises making comparison possible – a common standard that in our 
case means in particular a common idea of the human of which, so to speak, some quantum 
is contained in each personality that, however differently arranged, permits all of these 
incompatible forms to be infused and governed by a sense of common style and general 
type’ (ibid., 89). 
This is a crucial dimension of the contrast between Romanic and Germanic indi-
vidualisms: for the latter, ‘sociological’ difference vis-à-vis other beings is irrel-
evant. This form of individualism is marked by a striving for singularity that 
sharply contrasts with the Romanic focus on the different quantities each one 
possesses of a plurality of general features. The Germanic individual does not 
distinguish itself from others on the basis of a comparison made possible by the 
reference to a law-like generality, but rather affirms the incomparable peculiarity 
of its being: it ‘seeks individuality only within the unique self, and is deeply indif-
ferent as to whether this implies a type of some kind or to whether individuals 
can exist more than “just once” in the world in a numerical sense’ (ibid., 68). In 
this regard, such a conception is akin to the (non-restricted) ideal of qualitative 
individualism,8 as well as to the (allegedly extra-social) indubitable personality 
and the Gemüt-oriented individual of sensible relationships. In the framework 
of Germanic individualism, ‘an individual life grows from its own roots, respon-
sible for itself alone, unpreoccupied by whatever phenomena such roots might 
have pushed up among people of any comparable nature’ (ibid.). The ‘roots’ of 
individuality in this conception thus differ from the set of particular features that 
characterise the Romanic individual: whereas the latter’s attributes are particular 
(quantitative) instantiations of general forms, the roots of German individuality 
are (qualitatively) peculiar, irreducible to any type, concept or general law.
The difference between Romanic and Germanic individualisms reflects, 
according to Simmel, two different modes of knowledge. The form of cognition 
characteristic of the latter proceeds by ascribing general categories to an indi-
vidual life (‘a person is clever or stupid, generous or petty, good-natured or 
8 It is no coincidence that Simmel mentions as representatives of Germanic individualism, 
among others, some of the key figures of 19th-century qualitative individualism: ‘Rembrandt’s 
depiction of the human figure, fusing soul to body and body to soul; Beethoven’s depths of mu-
sical yearning and formative impulse; Herder’s and Schleiermacher’s conceptions of the human 
essence; Walther von der Vogelweide’s pictures of existence, and those of the German romantics 
in general, and of Kierkegaard, Ibsen and Selma Lagerlöf’ (Simmel 2007 [1917], 68).
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 malicious’; ibid., 66). However, this mode of knowledge is only secondary and, 
so to speak, external. By characterising an individual in terms of a set of general 
categories,
‘what I learn is only that they have manifested themselves yet again in such and such a 
combination in the case of this particular human being. I do not, thereby, know this human 
being from within, but rather my knowledge flows from concepts that I have already brought 
with me’ (ibid.; emphasis added).
In order to know which of the concepts already available are applicable to a 
person, Simmel says, one would have to rely on a form of primary knowledge that 
does not proceed via general concepts.
‘The first stage of this immediate knowledge has already been acquired at the moment in 
which – in brief – the person enters the room. In this very first moment we do not know par-
ticular facts about him, nor any of the aforementioned categories. Nevertheless, we still know 
a tremendous amount: the person, and that which is unmistakable about the person’ (ibid.).
This intuitive, ‘completely indivisible’ mode of cognition is, for Simmel, what 
characterises the Germanic sensibility in opposition to the Romanic one. Now, 
among those thinkers and artists taken as representatives of Germanic individu-
alism, one stands out in particular. Rembrandt, to whom Simmel dedicated one 
of his last books, was viewed as especially capable of giving artistic form to that 
primary and immediate knowledge. ‘Out of his portraits shines above all essen-
tially that which we know about a person at first sight, as something completely 
inexpressible, as the unity of her existence’ (ibid., 67). Whereas Renaissance art 
is directed toward individual attributes, conceiving the human being as a type or 
a plurality thereof, Rembrandt’s ‘understanding of the [personal] totality encom-
passes to a higher degree a melting into, an empathy, that, in the moment of 
 contemplation, allows the subject-object setting to immerse into the greater indi-
visibility of intuition’ (ibid.; emphasis added). In his artistic works, each depicted 
moment is grasped not on the basis of logical atemporal forms, but through the 
qualitative becoming of this person, i.e. ‘out of the life that is shaped as its own 
singular stream, even though, of course, fed by countless impersonal inflows’ 
(ibid., 89).
Such emphasis on the qualitative singularity of the person will, however, 
lead Rembrandt further away from any form of in-dividualism. Precisely the 
focus on the singular stream of an individual life draws him toward the imper-
sonal flows that surround and feed it. This move becomes especially marked, 
Simmel argues, in Rembrandt’s last period. ‘Life now is no longer directed 
through the strongly individualised movement of a soul, but spreads beyond 
the singular being as such toward a vibrancy that completely overwhelms all 
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limitations of this particular human life’ (ibid., 90). As a result, representa-
tion becomes more obscure. While one could still describe Rembrandt’s earlier 
figures in terms of specifiable psychological qualities (‘“this one is proud,” 
“that one rustic,” the “third of superior intelligence”’), in a late portrait such 
as Titus this falls away completely: ‘everything is flowing, vibrant life with no 
conceptually fixed, specifiable point therein’ (ibid.). To be sure, the focus is still 
the life of one person. However, the task of representing the latter in its ‘pure 
nakedness’ – i.e. in its qualitative aspects and not the quantitative differences 
in relation to others – demands the painter to follow, so to speak, a path from 
the singular stream of an individual life to those vibrant flows that overwhelm 
its limits.
‘What is decisive is completely unclear; maybe the rhythm of oscillation of the smallest 
parts; maybe the relative proportion of the mix of more latent and more current liveliness 
that is everywhere present. In any case, the essential psychological singularity has receded 
into the far distance. It now stands at the periphery of life in which the central differences 
are merely those of the rhythms of its flowing and its powers’ (ibid., 91).
The move away from in-dividuality thus suggested cannot, however, be fully 
accomplished in Rembrandt’s portraits. Despite their openness to the impersonal 
flows that feed and overwhelm the depicted individual, they can point to these 
vibrancies but, as it were, not show where they are coming from. As a result, 
the portrait acquires a paradoxical form which affirms as much as negates the 
boundaries of individual life.
‘Here is something decisive that remains in the limitation of the personality, but somehow, 
however, pushes back each describable quality […]. [I]t is as though the life of this person 
were admittedly absolutely their own, and not detachable from them, yet raised above all 
the individual things that one may say about them; as though a stream of life flowed that, 
although not washing over its shores and as though it were as a whole a totality of unmistak-
able unity within itself, nevertheless creates no wave of singular characteristic form’ (ibid.).
While representation remains here within the shores of a personality and its qual-
itative unity, the latter does not appear as a set of clearly identifiable attributes 
but rather as flows whose limits are blurred as much as they blur the individual 
boundaries in which they are located.
But how can one understand, after all, these flows contained within the 
limits of an individual life and which nevertheless overwhelm it? The answer 
becomes clear in the moment when Simmel turns away from Rembrandt’s indi-
vidual portraits in order to address his pictures with several figures. Only now, 
says Simmel, one can speak of the ‘mood’ (Stimmung) in the appearance of a 
painting. For mood ‘is something interior, personal, perhaps something  singular 
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for each, which has nevertheless extinguished all particularity of contents of rep-
resentation [Vorstellungsinhalte]’ (ibid., 100; see Simmel 2007 [1913], 26–9). In 
the paintings with more than one figure, one can see how those sensible qualities 
of life that are no longer differentiated, those flows with blurred and blurring 
boundaries, permeate each other and come to appear as a common atmosphere.9
‘In The Jewish Bride, the figures are like the tones of a chord that is certainly not external to 
those individual tones; however, they are merged in the chord into a construct that cannot 
be displayed pro rata in each separate tone. A tender life, as if held still, is entirely con-
tained in each of the two figures and nevertheless continuously overflows them and extends 
into a shared atmosphere wafting around them’ (Simmel 2005 [1916], 100).
A mood, like a chord, is internal to the individual elements of which it is made; it 
is contained in each of them and yet also something beyond them. ‘The fact that 
this sphere is above individuality constitutes the form in which it is present within 
individuality’ (ibid.).10
Here the individual no longer appears as a distinctive element with clear-cut 
boundaries, connected to others only by means of external, law-like forms. The 
mood is a ‘dissolved and dissolving sphere’ within which individual life, in its 
full qualitative character, is both superseded and preserved. ‘A higher unity has 
absorbed the being-for-themselves of the individuals, whose singularity falls away 
in the face of this unity and yet nourishes it with the ultimate generality of their 
life’ (ibid., 100–101). The mood corresponds therefore to a form of  in-dividuality 
that does not lack personal borders but is nevertheless pervaded by impersonal 
vibrancies. More precisely, it constitutes a sphere in which the difference itself 
between personal and impersonal is obscured or complicated.
To the extent that within this shared atmosphere the individualities perme-
ate each other in the most intimate sense, the significance of the mood extends 
beyond the particular attributes of the fleeting situation. Although the move-
ments and gestures of those involved are certainly transitory, through them a 
sphere emerges in which these individual lives (even if only for a moment and in 
a certain sense) come to form a single one.
9 On the notions of Stimmung and atmosphere, see Rosa 2016, 633–44, and Linkenbach, in this 
publication.
10 Simmel’s characterisation of the mood in harmonic terms is congruent with his views on 
music presented in other essays: ‘Music […] transcends ideas by representing life immediately. 
[…] [It] comprehends the tidal flow of its being, its dissonances, its loss and recovery, and its 
ceaseless movement toward resolution and redemption’ (Simmel 1986 [1907], 92). On this topic, 
see Kemple 2009.
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‘In The Jewish Bride, […] [h]ow the man leans toward the woman and embraces her, how her 
hand touches his – at once encouraging and calming – this is not a transitory movement. 
At the same time, it is not a typical gesture that, as in classical art, would indicate some-
thing general beyond these personalities. It belongs entirely to the individual, but it forms 
itself initially in that stratum in which the life of the individual arises like a homogenous 
sphere from the appearance, dissolving all determinations tied to singularities. Now, here 
this life encloses two related figures and achieves its zenith […] all the more impressively as 
it fused them, in a way that is logically inexpressible, into a shared life without abandoning 
its source in each separate figure’ (ibid., 101; emphasis added).11
6 Conclusion
By following the thread of Simmel’s different contrasts between forms of individ-
uality, one can see how a depiction of the quantitative in-dividual is repeatedly 
invoked as a crucial feature of modern social life and its main institutions, such 
as the money economy and bureaucratic organisations. Equally remarkable is 
that, in this context, even one’s qualitative peculiarity can come to be shaped 
in such a way that the person assumes a schematised, atomistic, in-dividualised 
form – as bearer of a singular, yet objective achievement in a money-mediated 
division of labour, or as member of a totality structured on the basis of particu-
lar detached positions. As we saw, this understanding of the individual and its 
relations with others comes to dominate Simmel’s own conception of sociology, 
where schematic individuality tends to be considered synonymous with social 
being. Yet Simmel’s writings also recurrently display the figure of a qualitative 
in-dividual whose life is permeated by the lives of others. In his comments on the 
Romantic project of a concrete whole as a harmonious plurality of infinite singu-
lar contrasts; on love and friendship as forms of sociation in which a single life 
emerges that absorbs the personalities’ being-for-themselves; on Gemüt-based 
relationships in which persons and things are considered in their full qualitative, 
unschematised shadings; and on the mood (Stimmung) as a sphere in which two 
separate lives are superseded and preserved within a shared one – in all these 
figures, a dimension of sociality comes into view that does not simply elimi-
nate the boundaries between individuals (and their properties), but rather blurs 
11 If, as Podoksik (2010, 145) correctly observed, ‘Simmel’s final notion of individuality may […] 
be seen in terms of a constant tension between the idea of separate and unique individuality and 
the idea of individuality as a reflection of the totality of life’, the reference to the in-dividual’s 
situatedness within a shared mood allows – so I argue – to preserve such a tension and super-
sede it.
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them to the point where they enmesh and constitute a common concrete totality 
without entirely losing sight of their concrete singularities.
Thus conceived, the in-dividual appears indeed to be more prominently fea-
tured in certain forms of sociation or social milieus (e.g., love and friendship, the 
small town). But it is not at all exclusive to them. In-dividuality, as Simmel under-
stood it in his late work, constitutes a primary and intuitive mode of relation to the 
world that can be associated in different ways with secondary modes of relation, 
which involve in-dividuals with definite attributes and bounded by general laws 
or forms. It refers, in other words, to a qualitative common life that can come to 
be shaped and articulated into schematic universals. How these two dimensions 
of sociality (intuitive and categorical, common and universal, in-dividual and 
in-dividual) interrelate will then define the lineaments of each form of life. In this 
regard, characteristic of modernity is the fact that highly schematic and quan-
titative forms of in-dividuality predominate to such an extent that a qualitative 
common life might come to appear as non-existent or only possible in very limited 
forms, as inscrutable or removed to the depths of personal intimacy. It is as if the 
experience of in-dividuality could take place solely in residual and extraordinary 
phenomena, or else in the restricted (and actually in-dividual) form of schemat-
ically detached positions and properties. If this is correct, then it does not come 
as a surprise that a longing for extraordinary in-dividual experiences might arise 
precisely as a result of this ordinary dominance of in-dividual forms. One can thus 
understand why modern life appears, for Simmel as much as for us, to take its 
course ‘within the struggle and in the changing entanglements of these two ways 
of defining the individual’s role in the whole of society’ (Simmel 2012 [1903], 31).
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Afterword: dividual socialities
Dividuality is neither simply a counter-concept to individuality, nor simply 
complementary to it. Instead, it is also the dynamic foundation, the processual 
primary basis, from which individualities emerge. In order to move away from 
an understanding of the individual as an autonomous, singular, self-contained 
and isolated ontological being, dividuality underlines the continuous and inevi-
tably social nature of all individuals. Hence, individualization encompasses both 
the dividual and individual dimensions capturing the dynamics of belonging 
and becoming. From the outset, dividuality points to the individual as part of 
the social fabric – to one’s ability to reach out and open up to others, while at 
the same time long for self-development. Self and others are no opposites either, 
but dividuality expresses them as a moving social continuity that gives contours, 
sometimes even edges, mutual shapings and re-shapings, and stands for attrac-
tion, interpenetration and repulsion. Bridging the existing distinctions between 
the individual subject, the process of individualization, the concept of individu-
ality and the ideal of individualism, dividuality encompasses all four notions as 
their dynamic foundation. Despite the fact that the foundational dividual sounds 
as being non-individual, dividuality is not a pseudo-ontological condition of indi-
viduality, but these two are mutually and intrinsically interwoven.
The articles presented in this section outline the historical trajectory leading 
from an ontological construction of personhood, self and individual to more 
dynamic, mutual, reciprocal and non-hierarchical models, which lend themselves 
to contemporary cultural and sociological concepts of dividuality and individuality.
While a dominant line in western tradition from contemporary astrophysics 
back to Plato and Aristotle assumes a primordial single hierarchical principle, which 
mirrors the nature of the individual, the first contribution on Albert the Great by Julie 
Casteigt shows that Albert develops the concept of the identity of the individual dif-
ferently. Starting from the self as a substance to which properties either substan-
tial or accidental are attributed, Albert goes beyond this Aristotelean substantial 
model of identity, building on Augustine and Boethius by introducing potentiality, 
the dynamic inner relationship of the faculties of the soul. Still dissatisfied with this 
model, he is inspired by Neo-Platonic, Islamic and potentially further Eastern sources 
and envisions a conception of mutual relationality of the faculties of the soul.
The chapter by Markus Vinzent on Albert’s student, Meister Eckhart (ca. 
1260–1328), presents Eckhart’s idea of the first principle as ‘dividual’. According 
to him, there is no first principle without what is principled, and yet, principle 
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and principled have to be conceptualized not only as mutual inner relationality, 
but as strict reciprocal relation. Any principle only becomes what it is, it cannot 
be without what it principles, and no principled is only a product of a hierarchical 
prior principle, but is itself the principle for it being principled. The sphere might 
be the highest form – in good Platonic tradition – but according to Eckhart it is 
not the best form. The best form is the dividual, as the respectful condition of 
you and I. Respect is the form of recognition and self-recognition. The significant 
other is not entirely other, but the signifier of the self and vice versa. Dividuality 
stands for co-constitution of any self and other. Co-constitution happens through 
reciprocal interpenetration, which simultaneously is differentiation.
The dividual nature of the human being, set out in philosophical terms, is 
always culturally conditioned and thus leads to another dimension of dividual-
ity (see introduction). People are born into specific social contexts, at particular 
times and in concrete spaces. The lived reality of the dividual and individual, 
and the social imaginary of the individual and dividual are expressed in varying 
symbolics, cultures, religions and semantics, as shown by the next two articles.
Starting in the seventeenth century, as the third contribution by Antje Linken-
bach highlights, the social qualities of sympathy and empathy are conceptualized 
as counteracting and weakening individual forms of superiority, disentangle-
ment, and maintaining impermeable boundaries between oneself and the other. 
In the context of suffering, sympathetic and empathetic abilities are closely linked 
to ideas of communicability of pain, healing and morality. Sympathetic imagina-
tion is the moral and practical imaginary looking out for the sentiments of others 
by putting oneself into the place of the other, while empathy, as conceptualized 
by recent philosophico-phenomenological approaches, creates a contact room of 
bodily resonance and communication, where, for example, a cry is enough to 
make one reach out to and touch the other, establish a relationality and trigger 
dividuality. Through empathy the self becomes understood as one deeply affected 
and marked by the other, and the other by the self, within a mutual and reciprocal 
communicative process. In contrast to the medieval Eckhart, the article stresses 
the qualitative difference between the self and the other, mitigated by the parti-
bility and divisibility of the self, which allows for intersubjectivity.
In the last chapter of this section, Arthur Bueno addresses Georg Simmel’s 
series of homologous distinctions between two forms of individuality: quantita-
tive and qualitative, intellectual and sensible, Romanic and Germanic. While in 
the former the individual appears as an entity composed by a set of clearly defined, 
bounded and abstractly universal attributes, the latter emphasizes the singular 
sensible shadings that characterize each individual life, blurring its boundaries 
with others and the world. Quantitative individualities relate to one another 
through the mediation of general law-like forms (e.g. money, defined cultural 
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lifestyles, or social norms) that make their properties comparable, commensura-
ble, and by the same token, either distinctive or common. Implied, in this case, 
is a relation between particular in-dividuals and general patterns. Qualitative 
individualities, for their turn, find themselves embedded in rather indeterminate 
and shared – though heterogeneous and possibly conflict- ridden – atmospheres 
which they jointly create. Crucial, here, is the entanglement between singular 
in-dividuals and pervasive moods. While for Simmel both forms of individuality 
are part and parcel of modern life, some of life’s most central institutions (e.g. 
science, the money economy, and the bureaucratic state) are seen to rely on the 
prevalence of quantitative individuality, which would even display a tendency to 
‘colonize’ the totality of cultural life. In this context – and in line with discourses 
on sympathy and empathy developed since the seventeenth century – Simmel 
views the model of qualitative in-dividuality, with its emphasis on co-created 
spaces of bodily resonance and sensible communication, as a possible counter-
weight to the excesses of the quantitative in-dividuality.
From a methodological point of view, these four contributions aim at illus-
trating the diversity of the levels (ontological, psychological, sociological) on 
which dividuality as a dynamic, reciprocal and non-hierarchical condition for 
identity can be studied. They vary the focus on the identity of the individual taken 
in herself or himself and in relation with social elements, highlighting the meta-
physical foundations of the different conceptions of her or his dividual identity as 
well as their different social expressions.

Section 2.2: Parting the self
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Reading the self in Persian prose and poetry
Let us start with a thought experiment. Five hundred years from now, when I am 
long dead and forgotten, a reader comes across this essay and other writings I 
have published. How would such a reader understand the referent to be asso-
ciated with my use of the word ‘I’ in such documents? Would she be justified in 
claiming to know me as a human subject based on having read words that invoke 
the grammatical first-person pronoun? I suspect not, despite the sense of inti-
macy my usage intends. But the lack of direct knowledge would be due neither 
to an insincere use of the pronoun on my part nor to a fault in her reading. The 
complication is that the ‘I’ invoked in my academic publications is a genre-bound 
evocation. In using it, I am taking up a posture allowed by conventions of aca-
demic writing as it is practised today. This ‘I’ has a tempered relationship with 
my full human subjectivity. It cannot bear the burdens of my other uses of the 
same pronoun in conventional speech, such as when I talk to a family member, 
or address a shopkeeper, or struggle to make myself understood by someone who 
does not know English. The word ‘I’ is a quasi-homonym that can refer to variant, 
although often interconnected, parts of my existence as a being in the world.
I spend my time trying to understand and interpret people who lived, and 
wrote, hundreds of years ago. The thought experiment I begin with is helpful for 
me to undertake such work. The uses of the first-person pronoun I come across in 
evidence from the past available to me are, simultaneously, conditions of possibil-
ity for my work and barriers that mask my access to the people who composed the 
texts. A writer’s use of ‘I’ allows me to locate a piece of evidence in spatiotempo-
ral terms relative to my own understandings. It brings to mind a living body like 
my own, the shared corporeal form warranting interpretability across time and 
space. But the commonsensical affinity is an illusion because of the intermediacy 
of matters such as genre, posture, rhetorical positioning, and bias with respect to 
the immediate circumstances in which the original text was produced. On the side 
of production, these factors stand between the written ‘I’ and the person who pro-
duced it. On my side, current intellectual and sociohisotircal limitations condition 
me to understand the materials in ways far removed from the originating context. 
The problem of interpreting an ‘I’ that comes to us from social contexts long dead 
provides a venue to think productively about interoperability between individuality 
and dividuality. In one sense, the first-person pronoun is the most concrete marker 
of individuality, the grammatical assertion of one person distinguished from others. 
Yet, as indicated above, invocation of the pronoun necessarily signifies only a part 
of the putative individual, subject to rules of linguistic genre and social situation. In 
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this sense, the ‘I’ is a marker of dividuality, conditioned by the fact that the human 
subject is socially constituted by all that surrounds her. As seen in the written ‘I’, 
individuality and dividuality are the proverbial two faces of the same coin.
I propose to utilise the individuality-dividuality distinction as a tool for 
exploring literature that contains extensive use of the first-person voice. My spe-
cific quarry consists of materials in Persian. I believe my conceptualisation of the 
problem extends to other contexts and literary traditions, but I leave it to spe-
cialists in those fields to adjudicate its usefulness. As discussed extensively by 
now, the academic debate regarding in/dividuality has its roots in ethnographic 
work invested in categorising cultures presumed to have differing ways of con-
stituting human subjectivity. The ethnocentrism that characterised the initial 
formulations has been criticised through showing that cultures that were char-
acterised initially as individualistic or dividualistic could, as easily, be described 
as belonging to the opposite category (e.g. Smith 2012). What, then, is the benefit 
of retaining the distinction as a part of analytical approaches to human cultural 
situations? For me, the in/dividuality distinction does have value, not as a way to 
categorise cultures but as a lens that can help us parse certain types of materials 
and situations. Analysing invocations of the first-person voice seems to me to be 
an especially significant instance in this regard.
1 A resurrection of poetry
I wish to draw out the relationship between the first-person voice and in/dividuality 
by concentrating on a single, lengthy work composed in India in the 17th century 
CE that is exemplary for the problematic at hand. The work is an artful description 
of the lives and work of individuals described as practitioners of the art of com-
posing poetry in Persian over a period of about seven centuries (c. 950–1650 CE). 
The work’s framing comes from a single compiler, although it introduces us to the 
voices of thousands of authors. I will first provide a brief description of the work 
and then analyse the way the first-person voice figures in it.
Taqī al-Dīn Muḥammad Awḥadī Daqqāqī Balyānī’s ʿArafāt al-ʿāshiqīn va 
ʿaraṣāt al-ʿārifīn (The Resurrection Ground of Lovers and the Courtyards of Knowers) 
is one of the most extensive biographical dictionaries of Persian poets ever com-
posed (Gulchīn Maʿānī 1985, 2:3–21). Initiated during the period 1613 – 1615 CE in 
Agra, India, it was added to by the author until his death circa 1640. It contains 
entries on more than 3500 poets, distributed over nearly seven centuries and 
throughout the Persian-writing sphere spread over Iran and Central and South 
Asia. Published for the first time in 2009 and 2010 in seven- and  eight-volume 
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modern editions on the basis of five manuscripts, this work has received minimal 
scholarly attention besides being cited occasionally as a source of information 
for one or another poet. Since the publication of the printed editions, the work 
has begun to be mined to comment on literary and social patterns relevant for the 
early modern period in Iran and India (e.g. Āl-i Dāvūd 2008; 1996). The work is an 
exceedingly long unified narrative in which the author’s first-person voice inter-
polates his reportage on poets, dead and alive. The work’s narrative is prefaced 
by an account of the author’s birth and early years in Iran, his passage to India, 
and subsequent travels in northern and southwestern parts of the subcontinent. 
But a far greater use of the first-person pronoun in his work occurs in citations of 
poetry attributed to the thousands of poets that are his subject. The work’s monu-
mentality can be gauged from the fact that the printed versions run to nearly five 
thousand pages.
Balyānī’s valuation of poetry as speech worthy of extensive archival atten-
tion derives from his view of the relationship between the cosmos and the human 
ability to vocalise. This is encapsulated in the following cryptic description, part 
of the introduction:
It is written and remembered that the world is a shell that contains the pearl that is Adam, 
and Adam is the shell that contains the pearl that is the world. This is so because the shell sur-
rounding the pearl that is the world is speech, and speech is the pearl that lies within Adam’s 
shell. Then it follows that every pearl in the realm of speech must be like a shell and every shell 
in the realm of speech must be like a pearl. Indeed, God has a treasure under his throne, which 
is touched by prophets and flows on the tongues of poets.  (Balyānī 2010, 1:8)
This statement needs unpacking in some detail to understand Balyānī’s conceit 
regarding the status of poetry and poets. The first sentence evokes equivalence 
between the macrocosm and the microcosm, the world and the human being. A 
commonly held view in Balyānī’s context, the effect of this understanding is that 
the human person is thought to encompass all that can come to pass in creation. 
The second sentence begins by locating the source of the equivalence in speech: 
the ‘shell surrounding the pearl that is the world’ is a reference to the divine 
command ‘be’, as described in the Quran and its predecessor texts. God’s speech 
in the form of this ‘be’ created the macrocosm and hence, in a fashion, contains 
it. The sentence then continues to the effect that the foremost quality of the micro-
cosm (Adam) is that it possesses speech. Overall, then, we are presented with the 
picture that God’s speech initiated the creation of the world and the world is con-
summated by the human being capable of speech. Human capacity for language 
is a creative force that echoes the initial divine ‘be’ that gave rise to the world.
In the third sentence, we move to speech itself, which is represented as bifur-
cated into ‘shell’ and ‘pearl’. Every bit of speech has an outward form and an inner 
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precious quality, the two aspects being distinct but conjoined. A ‘pearl’ of speech 
is a specimen beautiful on the outside; but this pearl is itself a shell that contains 
something valuable inside of it, namely its pearl-like meaning. The pearl/shell, 
inside/outside binary can get ever deeper indefinitely in that all external forms of 
speech give rise to meanings, which can then be expressed in more speech, which 
has meanings, and so on.
The conclusion of this understanding comes in the last sentence, which iden-
tifies prophets and poets as those human beings who have the most intimate con-
nection to God’s treasure, meaning speech. Prophets ‘touch’ this treasure, since 
God doles it out to them in the form of scriptures that they then convey to other 
human beings. And the treasure flows endlessly on the tongues of poets in the 
form of the precious speech they create and share with others. God’s initial ‘be’ 
creates the world, and poets recreate it in the continuing flow of their words. Poetic 
speech also marks the human being’s intermediary status between God and the 
world. Balyānī’s description gives poetry a generative function in the working of 
the world, and poets are a special class of humanity: the lovers and knowers men-
tioned in Balyānī’s title (The Resurrection Ground of Lovers and the Courtyards of 
Knowers). They also actuate an eternal, quasi-divine function pertaining to the 
cosmos. Poetic voice and capacity are understood as constants in the world even 
as poets come and go, live and die. Poets’ corporeal presences are vehicles for the 
continual generation of poetry as a cosmologically essential presence.
Although biographical dictionaries dedicated to poets and others had been 
a staple of Persian literature long before Balyānī’s lifetime (see Gulchīn Maʿānī 
1985), his work contains a unique organisation tied to his overall attitude to lan-
guage. He creates a multi-level order that criss-crosses between language, space, 
and time. Balyānī asks the reader to imagine time as a vast plain akin to the plain 
of ʿArafat in Mecca that figures prominently in the annual rite of the hajj. People 
who go to the pilgrimage are required to stand in this plain for several hours 
during one day as a preview for the resurrection that is expected to happen at the 
end of time. In Islamic eschatology, God is expected to reconstitute all humans 
to be present at such a plain once the world has been dissolved. Balyānī’s invi-
tation to imagine time as a resurrection plain self-consciously mimics the divine 
function, except that his purview is limited to the segment of humanity that con-
sists of Persian poets. As in the ultimate resurrection, Balyānī’s resurrection col-
lapses the normative sequencing of time and allows people from all periods to be 
present simultaneously in a single narrativised place.
The resurrection ground – a representation of embodied time consisting of 
poets’ lives – is then imagined as a space split into twenty-eight courtyards that 
correspond to the letters of the Arabic alphabet. In this process, time that had first 
become space is now divided into the building blocks of language. Each courtyard/
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letter is then divided into three enclosures that contain poets divided between ‘the 
ancients’ (mutaqaddimīn), the ‘middle period ones’ (mutavassiṭīn), and the ‘lately 
arrived ones’ (mutaʾakhkhirīn). Poets are placed in the enclosures within the court-
yards on the plain according to where their poetic pen names (takhalluṣ) occur in 
the alphabetical order. The division into enclosures brings a temporal structure 
back into the scheme, although the categorisation is now subordinate to the rule of 
language embodied in the alphabet. Time is first eliminated and then  re-established 
as a sub-category within the linguistic abstraction that is the alphabet.1
Balyānī’s work sticks to the proposed order throughout and contains reports, 
of widely varying lengths, on about 3500 poets, with brief comments on their lives 
together with samples of poetry and comments on their literary value. Islamic 
eschatological narratives emphasise the fundamentally individual nature of the 
event of the final resurrection. On that day, human beings are supposed to answer 
for their deeds without aid from anyone else. Balyānī’s poetic resurrection effects 
this as well in that the alphabetical categorisation eliminates calendrical or genea-
logical time sequencing. Moreover, the organisational scheme dispenses with geog-
raphy, ideological belonging, and social hierarchy such as the differences between 
king and pauper or men and women. The catalogue of poets also includes some 
Hindus, and Balyānī has special praise for satirists, antinomians, and characters 
described as religiously deviant, whose verses mock those invested in normative 
Islamic authority. The sum of these characteristics is a narrative that contains an 
alphabetical resurrection of individuals on a homogenising plain, committed to 
giving exemplary language primacy over other forms of categorisation.
An overall assessment of Balyānī’s work reveals him as a person with a 
remarkably prodigious memory, a talent for taxonomy, and firm belief in his own 
authority to judge the worth of poetic expression in Persian. We might consider 
his presentation an instance of what is today called ‘big data’, whose efficacy 
is predicated on processing voluminous information combined with a deliberate 
loss of particularising details. He delights in appreciating both the exemplary and 
the unusual when it comes to versified expression in Persian. He sees poets con-
temporary to him as belonging to a transhistorical class that together carries the 
weighty burden put on poetry as an aspect of the cosmos.2
1 The conceptualisation of some of Balyānī’s other works also indicates a concern with alphabe-
tisation and imagery associated with the Kaʿba. For example, his Surma-yi Sulaymanī (Solomon’s 
Collyrium) (Balyānī 1985) is an alphabetical dictionary of difficult vocabulary encountered in 
Persian. His long poetic works include Kaʿba-yi dīdār (Kaʿba of Sight) and Kaʿbat al-ḥaramayn 
(Kaʿba of the two sanctuaries) (Balyānī 2010, lxi).
2 Although very extensive, Balyānī’s work also has clear geographical biases in terms of the way 
the Persian poetic tradition is covered. Particularly for the contemporary period, his greatest 
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2 A tale of two voices
With this overall picture in mind, let us now move to consider the question of in/
dividuality in Balyānī’s work. My point of concentration is the first-person voice, 
for which the work has two contrasting pivots. It deploys an autobiographical 
narrative in prose that, first, introduces the author to the reader, and is then used 
continually throughout the rest of the work to indicate Balyānī’s opinions. This 
voice occurs also in accounts of the author’s personal encounters with those he 
had met and decided to include in his work. This usage bears comparison with my 
own use of the word ‘I’ in academic work, together with its attendant limitations. 
That is, it conveys an aspect of the authorial person as this could be articulated 
in Persian prose in a work that is a mixture of memoir and poetic prosopography, 
executed in an especially innovative form. In this paper, I refer to this usage as 
the ‘prosaic self’.
The clear majority of Balyānī’s text consists of citations of Persian poetry, 
distributed into more than 3500 entries pertaining to poets identified by name. 
Taken together, the massive poetic corpus presented in the work is replete with 
the first-person voice, although this usage is very substantially different from 
the autobiographical self. This is the universal poetic voice, bound to a set of 
well-known literary tropes, which all poets adopt to create linguistic products 
understandable to audiences initiated into the discourse. This utilisation – which 
I refer to as the ‘poetic self’ – can appear, on the surface, to be deeply personal. 
However, the poetic self refers to the universal human subject, and poetic speech 
encapsulates a persona available for adoption by those who wish to compose 
this type of poetry. The poetic self enables claims of linguistic virtuosity based 
on the ability to inhabit the imaginary universe presumed to surround the poet. 
Although exceedingly ‘self-centred’, the poetic self is a highly generalised subject 
position fundamentally distinct from poets as complex living persons. However, 
as I will discuss, the poetic voice is not impersonal; it is a tropological vehicle for 
the expression of personality.3
How are the prosaic and poetic selves encountered in Balyānī’s work individ-
ualistic and dividualistic? This question constitutes the frame for my assertion 
praise is reserved for people of his own type, namely Iranians who had made names for them-
selves in Iranian or Indian courts. A complete evaluation of Balyānī’s view of the poetic tradition 
would be a massive undertaking that has yet to happen.
3 For an excellent discussion of the construction of the poetic persona in Persian as this per-
tains to the early modern period see Losensky 1998. The point about the literary self as a generic 
convention is not exclusive to Persian and has been discussed in the context of many literary 
traditions.
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that debates over in/dividualism can help us engage productively with complex 
literary products. The analytical distinction between individuality and dividual-
ity helps us to see the contrast between the two types of selves critical to under-
standing not just Balyānī’s work but the overall way in which pre-modern Persian 
literature relates to the societies in which it was produced.4
I would like to preface my presentation of the work’s details by summarising 
a set of conceptual conclusions. Stating these in advance should help to clarify 
my choices of examples. I contend that both the prosaic and the poetic selves 
are equally individualistic and dividualistic, but in contrasting ways. The prosaic 
self, the grammatical subject of autobiographical comments in Balyānī’s work, 
is individualistic through outside designation. This self describes its uniqueness 
through matters such as the date and conditions of the author’s birth and his 
undergoing particular experiences in circumstances that are described through 
reference to external historical events. The prosaic self is substantiated as a 
unique entity also through references to appreciation by others, such as when 
kings and connoisseurs of poetry and religious thought are reported to remark on 
his extraordinary gifts.
The prosaic self is dividualistic through subordination to authoritative social 
and discursive patterns. Balyānī’s work is rooted in the autobiographical voice’s 
appeals to normativity as this is produced through external social structures. 
Balyānī defines himself for the reader by emphasising an exalted genealogy 
and the fact that he had received poetic inspiration directly from God. In prose, 
he is keen to portray himself as someone who is a part of existing hierarchies, 
a cog in the wheels of time and society rather than someone who stands apart 
through exception. The individualistic and dividualistic sides of the prosaic self 
both portray the author as rooted in social settings. As an individual, the prosaic 
self is constituted through the appreciation of others, while as a dividual, it is 
marked by adherence to norms and values of the societal settings within which 
it is ensconced.
The poetic self is also both individualistic and dividualistic, although on dif-
ferent grounds. Its individualism has an assertive voice that speaks often in the 
first person and insists on its difference from the listener and the world at large. 
4 The prosaic and poetic selves under discussion map to a variety of ways in which the first per-
son can be invoked in Persian literary speech. The commonest forms are the words man (I) and 
mā (‘we’ used to indicate a singular), but authors can refer to themselves through a wide variety 
of euphemisms such as ‘the writer’ (navīsandeh), ‘this wretch’ (īn ḥaqīr), and so on. For current 
purposes, I am limiting myself to the strong binary contrast between prosaic and poetic selves, 
without getting into the intricacies of why certain forms are used to invoke one or the other in 
particular discursive circumstances.
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The poetic self is individualistic through emphatic self-assertion rather than by 
appreciation from the outside. It is marked by a fierce independence that often 
requires rejection of norms. The individualistic side of the poetic self is also emo-
tional, even sentimental; it is a vehicle for the expression of feelings that are seen 
to convey the uniqueness of its circumstances and reactions.
The poetic self’s dividualism rests on its claim to universality. It is dividu-
alistic through the presumption of an identity shared across humanity. Although 
poetic first person assertions describe intimacies that seem exceedingly personal 
on the surface, it is a mistake to take these on face value as simple expressions 
of the circumstances of the poet who composed the verses. All substantiations 
of the poetic ‘I’ are posture-driven products. Poetic virtuosity consists of innova-
tive uses of generic language that turn well-worn tropes into new and evocative 
expressions. The first-person voice we encounter in poetic speech indexes a uni-
versality that the discourse presumes as being present in all humans in varying 
capacities. Somewhat paradoxically, the poetic ‘I’ projects intimacy while being 
emphatically impersonal in that it is bound to a genre that does not allow for a 
free relationship between voice and person. The poetic ‘I’ is thus a dividual part 
that is understood to go into the making of the complex human person. When it 
comes to the poetic self, both the individualistic and dividualistic elements are 
focused on internal states of the human person. The social sphere is certainly 
implied but does not drive the formation of the self as in the case of the prosaic 
self. With these conceptual formulations in mind, let us now see how the issues 
play out in the details of Balyānī’s work.
3 The prosaic self
The preface to Balyānī’s work contains an extended autobiographical narrative 
that, he says, he is providing because it contains circumstances ‘not devoid of 
peculiarity’ (Balyānī 2010, 1:16). He traces his paternal genealogy to a famous 
Sufi master separated from him by seven generations. His parents got married in 
Isfahan, Iran, and his father left for India soon after Balyānī  was conceived, where 
he died before his son’s birth on 3 Muḥarram 973 AH (31 July 1565 CE). Weaning 
from his mother suddenly at the age of one, Balyānī claims that, from that point to 
the age of fifty, he could remember almost everything that had passed in front of 
his senses ‘like etchings on stone’. This seemingly eidetic memory helped him to 
excel during a traditional education in the religious and philosophical sciences. 
He had an aptitude for poetry as well, although his mother and other guardians 
dissuaded him from it, considering it frivolous in comparison with the religious 
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sciences that he was expected to master thoroughly on account of his genealogi-
cal heritage and evident talent. He says that he acquiesced to this restriction only 
until the age of twelve, when his mother passed away as well, leaving him com-
pletely orphaned (Balyānī 2010, 1:18–20).
Between the ages of twelve and twenty, he spent time in Isfahan, Yazd, and 
Shiraz, becoming ever more adept at many kinds of learning. His inward concen-
tration on the development of his connection to God led him to experience a vision 
of the Prophet Muhammad, a customary marker of divine favour in this socioreli-
gious context. At twenty years old, he became attached to the blind Safavid king 
Muḥammad Khudābandeh (d. 1595–96), from there on becoming a part of courtly 
life in Iran, principally due to his extraordinary facility with Persian poetry. The 
apogee of his career in this regard was an incident that occurred in Isfahan in 1598 
CE. The reigning king Shāh ʿ Abbās (d. 1629) had just come back to Iran from Central 
Asia after defeating his Uzbek rivals and had decided to make Isfahan the empire’s 
new capital. To commemorate the event, the city’s monuments were lit up with 
lamps at night. In a carnivalesque atmosphere, a competition was held for the best 
quatrain describing the city’s illuminated condition. Judged by the king himself, 
Balyānī claims that his following verses won the competition that evening:
Isfahan’s square, shining like the moon and the Pleiades,
casts a hundred marks on the chest of the highest celestial sphere.
This is no illumination! Rather, spread in front of the king,
are stars fallen from the sky in poses of prostration.  (Balyānī 2010, 1:29)
After a few years with the court, Balyānī parted company from the Safavid estab-
lishment and spent some years traveling, with stays in Yazd, Isfahan, Qazvin, 
and Shiraz, in Iran, and Shiʿi holy shrines in southern Iraq. He then decided to 
undertake a journey to India in 1606. While on the way, he heard the news of the 
death of the Mughal king Akbar (d. 1605) and upon arrival in Lahore, he stayed for 
a year and a half as a part of the court of the new Mughal king Jahāngīr (d. 1627). 
He then moved to Agra together with the court, the same association also leading 
him to travel to Gujarat, where he spent three years, followed by a return to Agra 
in 1611–12, when he could not arrange for a passage to Arabia via sea to perform 
the hajj. He states that he was in Agra at the time of writing the introduction, 
working assiduously to complete his massive compendium of Persian poets in the 
years 1613–15 (Balyānī 2010, 1:30–32).
In addition to the narrative in the preface to the work, Balyānī’s autobio-
graphical voice – the prosaic self – permeates the fabric of his narrative in the 
form of indicating his first-hand knowledge of poets contemporary to him. Some 
prominent examples, picked from various bins in the alphabetical organization, 
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are: Bībī Turān Shāh, a princess known for her intellect and poetic talent (Balyānī 
2010, 2:926); Jismī Hamadānī, whom he describes as a person from Hamadan who 
had arrived in India in the antinomian garb of a Qalandar and was now resident in 
the Deccan (2:1046–53); Rāy Manōhar, a Hindu prince who had been taken into the 
Mughal court and was regarded as an accomplished poet in Persian (3:1587–93); 
Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥasan Shafāyī Iṣfahānī, who was fifty-seven years of age in 1613 and 
had been known to the author most of his adult life (4:2239–52); Fikrī Khurāsānī, a 
specialist in quatrains, who cultivated a bizarre outward appearance while being a 
part of the court of Akbar (5:3312–19); Qulī Khān Bēg Mujrim, an Iranian nobleman, 
both a poet and a musician, who had travelled to India with Balyānī (6:3467–73); 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Naẓīrī, an Iranian emigre who had done very well in India as 
a Mughal official and had died in Gujarat (7:4439–69); Shaykh ʿAlī Naqī  Kamra-yī, 
whom Balyānī had known as a close companion in Iran, hearing the news of his 
death after arrival in India (7:4476–93); Qāżī Nūrī, whom his teacher had nick-
named ‘jackass’ despite his skill in composing poetry (7:4504–17); Mīr Vālahī 
Qumī, known equally as a musician and a poet (7:4558–72); and Vaḥshī Bāfaqī, a 
poet regarded as a legend in his lifetime due to the freshness of his composition 
(7:4581–95). Needless to say, this list can be extended to hundreds of names.
When Balyānī speaks in the first person in prose, his voice substantiates the 
entity I have called the narrative’s prosaic self. Throughout its instantiation – 
in both autobiographical and prosopographical forms – the prosaic self is given 
external framing. This includes reference to dates in the Hijri calendar, through 
which his life is pegged to an impartial temporal scale. Then there are the refer-
ences to normative authoritative structures such as his kin, other poets and schol-
ars, and kings of the Safavid and Mughal dynasties. These elements represent 
diachronic structures of authority that feed into his self-presentation, whether 
directly or through implication.
The work’s prosaic self can be read as being both individualistic and divid-
ualistic, as I indicated in the conceptual summary above. On the individualistic 
side, Balyānī clearly portrays himself as special, both as a distinct person who 
came into being at a certain time, and as someone who possesses extraordinary 
capabilities that have had a hand in defining his life’s trajectory. But the sense of 
specialness rests, ultimately, on his self-inscription into structures of authority 
that define his social setting. His prosaic self depends on being incorporated into 
matters such as genealogies, political structures such as empires, and social hier-
archies to which he subscribes and aspires. The prosaic self is constructed in the 
middle between the individualistic and dividualistic aspects of his being. In his 
self-description in prose, he is both an exceptional person and someone whose 
significance is based on being ensconced within the sociopolitical reality that 
surrounds him.
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4 The poetic self
The distinction between the prosaic and poetic selves that I have drawn is 
affirmed explicitly in Balyānī’s own presentation: his catalogue of poets 
includes an entry on himself. His pen name was Taqī, placing him under the 
letter ‘t’ in the scheme of his work, in the enclosure meant for the most recent 
poets. His description of himself in this entry references the autobiographical 
narrative at the beginning of the work but provides little extra detail that would 
allow us to substantiate him as being situated within specific temporal and 
social structures. Self-described as a poet, he appears quite different from the 
prosaic self. He treats himself as he would all other poets whom he has decided 
to include in his work on account of their poetic compositions. He enumerates 
the amounts and types of poetry he has composed over his lifetime, describ-
ing also what has been lost and what remains with him. As in the case of all 
the other entries on poets, much of his entry on himself consists of samples of 
poetry. I will provide translations of three examples that can give a sense for the 
range of his poetic expression. For present purposes, I suggest that we regard 
Taqī (i.e. Balyānī) as an example for the overall paradigm of the poetic self we 
encounter in his work.
The following couplet is an example of the expression of a highly personal 
sentiment: 
Moonfaced one, the day I saw your silvery form,
of a morning, naked in the hammam,
by the evening, as stars made their appearance, 
from desire for you, my spirit had melted, oozing out from my pores. 
(Balyānī 2010, 2:925)
In this example, the focus is squarely on the relationship between the body and 
emotions. The verses manage to interweave the heat of the hammam and of the 
passion, placed in a day and night cycle that withers body and spirit. The verses’ 
effect is created through poetic/conceptual alliteration between the revealing of 
the beloved’s form by the removal of clothes, the rising of desire from within the 
self, the shining forth of the stars with the coming of darkness, the pouring of 
sweat from the skin pores, and the gliding of the spirit out of the body.
In contrast, the following verses also locate the self in the body but now with 
the aim of emphasising the self’s separation from presumed normative conduct:
‘Farewell, heart, as I fasten pilgrim’s garb, headed for the beloved’s sanctuary.
I tie up the provisions, determined to travel to the Kaʿba of hopefulness.
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God, make me steadfast in being an unbeliever!
Like someone non-Muslim by birth, I tie the knot of the zunnār belt’ (Balyānī 
2010, 2:913).5
In this instance, the poetic self acquires its distinctiveness through being devoted 
to the beloved. Opposite to the melting of the spirit in the first case, here outward 
distinction, manifested in the form of non-Muslim clothing, provides evidence 
for the self’s radical transformation through the way love has affected it. The 
tie created by the fact of falling in love reverberates to clothes, provisions, and 
socioreligious bonds in the verses’ imagery.
The last sample I provide is a full ghazal (a short poem in rhyming couplets), 
a lengthier text that exemplifies a cascading series of complex topoi that are a 
part of the poetic self encountered in Balyānī’s work:
‘I am the one who, like heart, is the king of the celestial throne.
Like intellect, I am ruler over the clime of perfections. [1]
My mind is the tavern of the hidden world.
My intellect is the manifesting place of sanctity’s witness. [2]
My speech is sister to the beloved’s ruby lips.
I am fellow resident in the abode that is the patience of lovers’ hearts. [3]
Like the evening of separation, there is no deliverance from my sorrow. 
Like the day of affliction, I am not an aid that saves from oppression. [4]
I am the flute’s exile: what, after all, grieves me in life?
I am the flute’s mourning: what tragedy, after all, has afflicted me? [5]
In companions’ sight, I am a precious stone lit up in fire.
In the enemy’s eye, I am a diamond needle piercing through silk. [6]
A knight and two rooks make moves, play the game.
In the arena of grasping speech, I am glory and dispel oppression. [7]
Like Anvarī of the age, I do not have pearls of speech.
When speechlessness is divine favour, I am Ẓahīr. [8]’ (Balyānī 2010, 2:916f.).
On its surface, this poem reflects an absolute focus on the speaker, the poetic self, the 
first-person pronoun being present in every couplet. It lays out distinctions accorded 
to the self in a boastful way, also showing this self to be an immensely capacious 
entity. However, the poem’s grander implications come to light once we see it as a 
densely intertextual paean to the traditions of Persian poetry, referencing thematic 
5 Much utilized in poetry to signify concurrent unbelief and faithfulness, the zunnār was a 
coloured belt required to be worn by non-Muslim men in public in certain early Muslim societies.
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resonances and directly invoking famous predecessors. Although a full explana-
tion of the contents of this poem would require too much space in the context of 
the present discussion, I will provide a summary mapping between the text and the 
larger tradition for us to appreciate its various associations.
The poem can be divided into four parts. Following the numbers I have assigned 
to verses, these are: (i) 1 and 2 are references to cosmology; (ii) 3 through 5 are plays 
on the presumed world inhabited by the lover, the chief stock character in Persian 
poetry; (iii) 6 and 7 contain hyperboles concerned with the poet’s presumed role 
in social and courtly settings; and (iv) 8 refers to two earlier poets, providing us a 
way to identify the location of the poem’s usage. The first two verses are a play on 
the interconnection between the macrocosm and the microcosm. In the first, ‘heart’ 
and ‘throne’ are references to the doctrine that the place of the heart within the 
human being is the same as that of the celestial throne, mentioned in the Quran, 
in the cosmos. This identification was the basis for complex theories in which the 
human journey into the innermost part of one’s being was also seen as a climb up 
the cosmic ladder to be in the proximity of God. Such journeys were imagined to take 
place through cultivating one’s intellect as well as the capacity for becoming the 
subject of divine self-manifestation. The point of the second verse is to claim that the 
speaker’s mind has become such a place of manifestation and that he has attained 
the intellectual maturity to become a witness to the divine in the deep sense.
Verses 3 through 5 relate to the presumed game of love, in which the poet 
takes on the role of lover, and God or another human being can be the beloved. 
The first hemistich of the third verse refers to the expectation that speech of love, 
i.e. poetry, comes into being through unrequited love. The poet/lover pines for 
the beloved, who either shuns or remains coy. But speech produced in this way 
holds such charm that even the non-acquiescent beloved cannot but let it flow 
on the lips. The second hemistich of the third verse invokes a different part of the 
love tale: here the poet takes on the expected role of suffering patiently while the 
beloved remains unattainable. The fourth verse hinges on the ‘evening of sepa-
ration’ and ‘day of affliction’, stock scenarios against which lovers’ patience is 
tested. Here the poet takes on the characteristics of experiences associated with 
these durations. The fifth verse continues with the theme of grief and mourn-
ing, this time by reference to the mournful sound of the reed flute. The flute’s 
voice is a direct reference to one of the most famous poems in Persian literature: 
the Mas̱navī of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 1273) that begins by comparing the flute’s 
voice to the cry of the human soul searching for the divine (Papan-Matin 2003).
The poet as a stock character is expected to possess tremendous mental alac-
rity that allows him to use his power over language to acquire social mastery. The 
traditional proving ground for this to happen is the royal court, presumed to be 
split into warring factions vying for resources and the sovereign’s favour. The sixth 
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verse refers to this situation, indicating the poet’s great value to his friends and 
his deadliness when in the role of a conniving enemy. The first hemistich of the 
seventh verse continues this scheme, transferring it to action on the chessboard, 
a courtly game. The second hemistich then identifies the game in play as that of 
understanding and producing speech, the domain in which the poet claims excel-
lence. Finally, the last verse refers to Awḥad al-Dīn Anvarī (d. c. 1150–80) (Anvarī 
1961) and Ẓahīr al-Dīn Fāryābī (d. 1201) (Fāryābī 2003), early Persian poets regarded 
as masters of composing panegyrics for kings and other elite patrons. The citation 
of these two as the poet’s predecessors makes it nearly certain that Balyānī’s own 
poem was written for use in the setting of the Safavid or Mughal courts.
My explanations of the Persian verses in English do the original no favours, 
even as they may make the matter more understandable to readers unfamiliar with 
the allusions. It seems counterproductive and tawdry to disassemble the poem’s 
carefully constructed affect into humdrum rationalisations. But there is an impor-
tant lesson in the contrast in that it provides a sense for what Balyānī is after in his 
evaluations of poetic production in Persian. As in other poetic forms, the verses 
are spectacularly economical deployments of language in the service of conveying 
ideas, emotions, interpersonal relationships, and so forth. The examples I have 
provided from Balyānī’s entry on himself aim to substantiate a part of the concrete 
content associated with the poetic self as it comes across in his work. Multiply this 
by thousands and we have a sense for the experience of reading the work at length.
As I hope is clear by now, the poetic self is highly invested in individualistic 
self-evocation that can very easily extend to posing radical challenges to ideo-
logical and societal norms. Balyānī’s verses describe him as lusting after a naked 
person he has seen in the baths, and he openly professes repudiation of Islam and 
taking up the garb of non-Muslims while pursuing a beloved. However, as evident 
in the last example, these and other invocations of individualism index long-
standing traditions. The poetic self is a voice shared among all the poets Balyānī is 
keen to showcase in his monumental work. The ‘person’ who speaks in this voice 
is present in all human beings, although it never encompasses the full humanity 
of a particular individual. The poetic self is then dividualistic in the same measure 
as the seeming individuality registered in its strident statements in verse.
5 Conclusion
I hope to have shown that the debate regarding in/dividuality provides us ana-
lytical tools to undertake assessments of complex literary products. This deploy-
ment of the distinction is heuristic rather than descriptive, its value residing in 
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the degree to which it helps us to comprehend texts in context. When we encoun-
ter a work such as the one I have explored, we are presented with the challenge of 
imagining the social world that gave rise to it but is no longer available for direct 
observation. Balyānī’s work is, on the surface, replete with references to the first 
person. If we take all ‘I’s and its equivalents present on face value, the work is 
rendered utterly contradictory and incoherent. For example, the authorial self 
affirms religious norms while also stridently flaunting them. It is self-effacing, yet 
also boastful and invested in seeing itself as the exception. It delights in claiming 
novelty of thought and expression while also proving bound to received tradition 
in the utmost. In this situation, the distinction between individualistic and divid-
ualistic aspects allows us to generate a conceptual basis for resolving the contra-
dictions, thereby making the work a window onto the social world of its origins.
In the approach I have taken, it is crucial that the contents of the terms indi-
vidualism and dividualism are not taken as standard based on data coming from 
any given society or textual base. That is, no particular characteristics should be 
allowed to be seen as inherent in what we understand by the two terms. Rather, 
the contents of the terms must be derived from a careful analysis of the data at 
hand. In the case of Balyānī, I hope to have shown that we have a single work 
that has two types of selves, each with its own distinctive forms of individuality 
and dividuality. Individuality and dividuality are relative rather than absolute 
descriptors. The two cannot be taken as universal substantives, and their asso-
ciations need to be constituted from the specific examples we are exploring. Any 
meanings we can assign to them must be recovered from the specifics of the data 
we are confronting rather than through a priori presumptions.
My perspective on individuality and dividuality cashes out in the way it 
allows me to think productively about the societies that were the origins of the 
literature that I seek to interpret. By thinking about the question as I have done, 
I can understand Balyānī as both a being rooted in his world and as someone 
who acted upon the world as an individual, projecting himself as different from 
others who surrounded him in various circumstances. This is an important and 
 non-trivial analytical benefit that derives from the discussion of in/dividuality. 
Reading genre-bound literature produced in societies to which we have no direct 
access is a challenging matter. We are mistaken to read this material simply as a 
reflection of a formalised world, in which human actors were nothing but autom-
atons carrying out societal scripts dictated to the last rule. But it is equally prob-
lematic to take on face value assertions of selves we find in these works, in the 
form of the use of first-person pronouns and otherwise. We cannot regard the 
words that meet our eyes as literal self-ascriptions of the people who produced 
the works. The in/dividuality paradigm provides a systematic and systemising 
approach to explore literature that is simultaneously virtuosic and a product of 
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tradition. It allows us to imagine our subjects as complex beings existing between 
the poles of interiority and exteriority.
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Riccarda Suitner
The good citizen and the heterodox self: 
turning to Protestantism and Anabaptism 
in 16th-century Venice
In the following pages, I wish to discuss conversions within the specific context of 
the so-called ‘Radical Reformation’, tackling issues such as their similarities with 
and differences from other types of intra-Christian conversion, and the legal and 
psychological implications of this decision. The Venetian Republic lends itself 
best to a survey of this type, particularly during the period between the 1540s 
and 1560s. These years saw numerous conversions to Protestantism and at the 
same time the high point of the local Anabaptist movement. Furthermore, these 
decades saw the first trials of the Inquisition, which as we know was established 
in 1542 but only came into full force very slowly; during the period of interest here 
it had not yet succeeded in radically undermining the organisation of Venetian 
heterodox groups as it did in the second half of the century. Finally, for numer-
ous reasons the conversions of inhabitants of these regions were rather different 
from those that took place elsewhere. The analysis of the modalities with which 
factors such as conversion, Nicodemism, confessional eclecticism, and exile 
came to interact with each other in some milieus of this city provides an excellent 
example of the exercise of individual religious choice in early modern Europe – 
which is here strictly related to other phenomena such as plurality of personae 
and of multiple religious ‘identities’, and thus with ways of ‘parting the self’.
1  Embracing the Reformation in early 
16th-century Venice
The authorities of the Venetian Republic had numerous reasons to close one eye 
to suspected cases of heterodoxy and to allow non-Catholic individuals at least 
to reside on its territory. One of these was the web of commercial relations with 
the populations of central Europe and the Ottoman Empire, often mediated by 
Jews. The Fondaco dei Tedeschi, the Fondaco dei Turchi, the Jewish ghetto and 
Note: I am very grateful to Shahzad Bashir, Antje Linkenbach, Aditya Malik, Martin Mulsow and 
Jutta Vinzent for discussions during the preparation of this article.
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their various synagogues (though some crypto-Jews lived outside the ghetto) were 
among the places intended to spatially delimit confessional divisions. The latter 
were on the one hand aimed at preventing contacts with the Italian population 
and simultaneously (at least in the eyes of the Venetian authorities) also served 
in some ways to ‘protect’ these religious minorities from potential attacks by the 
local population.
Obviously, that adopted in Venice was a concept of ‘religious tolerance’ 
typical of the early modern period which has little in common with the current 
meaning of this expression (for a detailed analysis of this notion see Forst 2003; 
Salatowsky, Schröder 2016; Vollhardt, Bach, Multhammer 2015). This was a 
sort of paternalistic concession, made essentially for reasons of convenience, 
of a minimal number of rights, on the part of a religiously homogeneous and 
cohesive community, to individuals seen as posing a potential danger to the 
social order; they could not expect to become fully integrated, but merely to be 
‘tolerated’ and not to risk death or forced conversion. Not coincidentally, these 
groups were permitted only to perform specific jobs and were obliged in various 
ways to ‘signal’ their difference. For example, Jews had to wear a specific type 
of hat and, if they were students at the University of Padua, paid higher uni-
versity fees (see Ravid 2003). Furthermore, spaces were divided in accordance 
with rigorous confessional criteria, we can think for example of the Fondaco 
dei Turchi or the Jewish ghetto; in the case of multi-confessional spaces, these 
were conceived to allow the authorities simultaneously to isolate and to control 
non-Catholic individuals. A well-known example of such spaces is the casa dei 
catecumeni, established in imitation of similar institutions disseminated around 
the Ottoman Empire, where, when necessary, conversion processes were regu-
lated (as an introduction to the link between space and conversion in the early 
modern period see Marcocci et al. 2015; specifically on the casa dei catecumeni 
see Matheus 2013).
All of this, obviously, had only a minimal impact on the Catholic,  Italian- speaking 
population, towards which – and particularly towards those who turned to Protes-
tantism – there was no need to demonstrate any sort of ‘tolerance’. Nonetheless, 
the penetration of the Reformed ideas into Venetian territory was easier than else-
where in Italy, given the larger volume of international contacts and the existence – 
mentioned above – of foreigners in the city, alongside other factors: the flourishing 
and relatively free book industry; and Venetian political independence, pervaded 
from the earliest centuries of its history by a strong anti-Roman – and therefore 
anti-Papal – sentiment that led it to demand and practise a strong autonomy in 
decision-making also expressed in matters of the repression of religious dissent 
(classic studies on Venetian history are Lane 1973; Zorzi 1979; Landwehr 2007; 
Bouwsma 1968; specifically on the Venetian  Inquisition see Grendler 1977; Pullan 
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1997; Del Col 2012, 342–94). The  dissemination of Lutheran and Calvinist doctrines 
on Venetian soil – though mainly ‘second hand’ – and above all of the works of 
Erasmus and perhaps also those of Servetus (see for instance Seidel Menchi 1993; 
Felici 2010; Ongaro 1971), suddenly opened up a range of options: conversion to 
Lutheranism, Calvinism or one of those more ‘radical’ versions of the Reformation 
that, harking back to preconciliar Christianity, rejected the Trinity and the baptism 
of infants. In the two former cases, the two possibilities open to the convert were 
dissimulation or flight.
The ‘dissimulative’ approach is so-called Nicodemism, a famous term thought 
to originate with Calvin, who introduced it in 1543 with specific reference to Italian 
crypto-Protestants (though the practice was widespread and theorised not just by 
Juan de Valdés and other Italian reformers, but also in some German reformed 
circles to the ‘left of the Reformation’, like that of Otto Brunfels), initially studied 
by Delio Cantimori, Antonio Rotondò, Carlo Simoncelli and Carlo Ginzburg, and 
later by numerous other scholars. The expression designated, in modern histori-
ography, the doctrine of the permissibility of religious simulation, the deliberate 
concealment of Protestant belief beneath a veil of Catholic observance (Cantimori 
1948; Rotondò 1967; Ginzburg 1970; Simoncelli 1979; Biondi 1974; Eire 1985). Often 
the Nicodemite attitude culminated, as we know thanks to the numerous tran-
scripts of trials held in the Venice State Archive, with an abjuration that could be 
followed by a conviction or otherwise, often entailing the death penalty.
One Nicodemite was Paolo d’Avanzo. This young man, aged about thirty, 
from Città di Castello, a small town in present-day Umbria, worked in the 1560s 
in the Rialto area for the Florentine leather merchant Michelangelo Baglione (see 
Archivio di Stato Veneto, hereafter cited as ASVE, Savi all’eresia, b. 29, file ‘Paolo 
d’Avanzo’, fol. 1r: ‘Paulo d’Avanzo […] prattica in Rialto et veste alla forestiera 
giovane di 30 anni in circa con poca barba’). The first charge laid against him was 
that of a conversion to Calvinism, the second that of owning forbidden books. 
The second charge was dropped after a search in the house of Donato Baglione, 
the son of the merchant under whom he served, where no subversive books were 
found. The accounts given by the various witnesses who testified during the 
trial against him from 1568 onwards and his own evidence provide us not only 
with insights into the life of a young emigrant to Venice, but above all with an 
idea of the concrete stages involved in a conversion in Venice at this time. The 
young man had relatives in Geneva and an uncle, Pompeo, in Lyon. The latter 
had fervently praised the sermons of the local Huguenot community, whilst his 
relatives in Geneva had convinced him of the superiority of the Calvinist doc-
trine amongst those of the Reformed world. He himself had travelled to Geneva 
for work. D’Avanzo was just an errand boy, but he nonetheless had the opportu-
nity to travel, and came into contact not just with other merchants but also with 
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the  different social classes in the city of Venice: the Buccella family, the doctor 
Ludovico Abbioso, Paolo Moscardo (ibid.).
Among those who chose the second alternative – to emigrate abroad – some 
succeeded in attaining a status very close to full integration (Cantimori 1939). 
This is true of Guglielmo Gratarolo, a student of medicine first in Padua and then 
at the Collegio dei fisici in Venice. The bibliography on Gratarolo, rather than on 
religious issues, focuses mostly on his keen interest in alchemy and the natural 
sciences and on his activity as editor of Pietro Pomponazzi’s works. Indeed, if we 
examine his religious views as well, we see that he survived a first trial that ended 
with an abjuration (see ASVE, b. 10). After fleeing the Veneto in 1550, Gratarolo 
settled in Basle in 1552, where he edited the works of Pietro Pomponazzi for the 
printer Pietro Perna, and became a professor and dean of the local university. In 
Switzerland Gratarolo became one of Michael Servetus’ harshest antagonists and 
a defender of Reformed orthodoxy, going so far as to report the owners and sup-
pliers of forbidden literature to the authorities (see Church, 194–201; Thorndike 
1941, 600–16; Maclean 2005; Doni 1975; Pastore 2002; Gallizioli 1788).
The very different cases of Gratarolo and d’Avanzo are a good illustra-
tion of the two main routes to conversion in the Venetian Republic during the 
mid-16th century: commercial relations with foreign countries, and the cos-
mopolitanism of the élite at the University of Padua, constantly fed by rela-
tions between Italian professors open to Reformed ideas and foreign students 
(see Suitner 2016b, with further bibliography). In both cases we are dealing 
with a dualism between a simulated Catholic faith and the Calvinist faith with 
which people intimately identified. The choices made by the two converts and 
their consequences, though, were entirely different: Gratarolo chose emigra-
tion, which in the long term saved his life, whilst the young errand boy hid 
his genuine faith for as long as possible and was ultimately prosecuted by the 
Holy Office. Whilst in the former case this dualism was ‘overcome’ by emigra-
tion – allowing for a new ‘reconciliation’ between faith and ‘area of residence’, 
previously separated, – in the latter we are dealing with a conflict between 
inner faith and outer faith that in the territory of the Venetian Republic could 
not be overcome.
However, Gratarolo and Avanzo had one thing in common: they turned to one 
of the main confessions then in the process of institutionalisation in the Reformed 
world and led by clearly identifiable ‘figure-heads’. At that time, Lutheranism 
and Calvinism had gradually constructed their own theological orthodoxy and, 
aside from a few multi-confessional contexts, were firmly rooted in specific ter-
ritories. By contrast, other stories of conversion from Roman Catholicism were 
completely different. For example, Anabaptism and Antitrinitarianism, excluded 
from the so-called process of ‘confessionalisation’, were beliefs stigmatised both 
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in Reformed and Catholic territories.1 In yet other cases, to be discussed in the fol-
lowing pages, this conflict could not be overcome since in the mid-16th century – 
an era of cuius regio, eius religio (‘whose realm, his religion’) whose implications 
are exemplified in different ways in the events considered above – embracing 
Anabaptism implied the absence of a physical ‘place’ to which converts could 
legitimately emigrate.
2 Turning to the ‘Radical Reformation’
In mid-16th century Europe, the various confessions had not yet reached a defini-
tive configuration, and this was even truer of Venice. During this phase, a general 
fascination with Protestantism presented Italian religious dissent, influenced by 
its highly composite doctrinal background – Machiavellianism, the philosophical 
mortalism widespread at the University of Padua, the ideology of the mendicant 
orders, the heritage of Savonarola’s preachings, Valdesian groups – a multiplic-
ity of options in terms of religious criticism. The works of Luther, Calvin and 
Erasmus, furthermore, were often known only indirectly. The doctrinal nuances 
to be espoused by a reformed religion capable of taking root in the states of Italy 
were not clear even to those who had rejected Catholicism or those who were 
preparing to do so.
If we leaf through the transcripts of the section ‘Savi all’eresia’ of the Vene-
tian trials held between the 1540s and 1560s, we find that the sympathisers of 
the Reformation share a particular series of convictions: the non-belief in tran-
substantiation, in the intercession of saints and the worship of their images; a 
positive predisposition towards salvation through grace and the non-existence of 
Purgatory; the condemnation of the sale of indulgences. On key doctrinal issues, 
however, there was complete disagreement. The Pope was seen by some as one 
prophet among the many, by others as the Antichrist; some believed in the virgin-
ity of Mary, others thought that she was simply a pious woman and yet others that 
she was a prostitute (since otherwise, we read in some confessions to the inquisi-
tors, she would certainly not have given birth in a cave, under such unsuitable cir-
cumstances); the soul is sometimes considered immortal, at others material and 
mortal. Apparently minor differences in the interpretation of issues such as the 
mortality or otherwise of the soul, the difference between the soul of the damned 
and that of the just, the rapport between the soul of animals and that of humans, 
1 The geographical and chronological extension and the legitimacy itself of the notion of ‘con-
fessionalisation’ have been widely debated; see Brady 2004.
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led to radically different conceptions of religion and the form to be taken by the 
concept of ‘Reformation’.
Some people arranged to read texts by Reformers at clandestine meetings, 
some discussed them cautiously with their students or foreign clients, some came 
into contact with the Reformed world through travel abroad, and some attempted 
a sort of ‘practical application’ of their beliefs, such as the parish priest of the 
church of San Pantalon in Venice who, while celebrating Mass, deliberately 
‘forgot’ to declare the transubstantiation of the host into the body of Christ (ASVE, 
Savi all’eresia, b. 19).
The way in which these beliefs were ‘assembled’ and personally (re)inter-
preted differed less from group to group (since their boundaries were not always 
particularly clear), and more from person to person. Very frequently, individuals 
did not adhere to an ‘orthodox’ version of Lutheranism or Calvinism but created 
their own personal, eclectic interpretation, essentially a fairly ambiguous and 
hybrid religious identity. All this was true of many sympathisers of Calvinism 
and Lutheranism, whose dissemination in Italy never went beyond the initial 
stage and came to an almost complete halt in the second half of the century. This 
was even truer of Anabaptism, a credo in a yet more embryonic state, with few 
reference texts, difficult to find, without a developing orthodoxy and character-
ised – if I may use a contemporary expression – by an evident lack of leadership. 
We are indeed still far from the phase of Socinianism proper. In fact, if we wish 
to seek out a phase during which Antitrinitarianism developed a normative and 
‘institutionalised’ structure, we should look to the specific context of eastern 
Europe from around the 1570s. These decades saw the work of various intellectu-
als who took Antitrinitarianism to the heights of theological refinement: Giorgio 
Biandrata, Fausto Sozzini and Ferenc Dávid. This is a doctrinal level completely 
different from that which had characterised, for example, Venetian and Paduan 
non-conformism a few decades earlier, which we discuss in these pages. It is no 
coincidence that this phase marked the first time that we can associate Antitrin-
itarianism with a specific territory. In Transylvania, in 1568, the legitimacy of 
the Unitarian confession was sanctioned and legally recognised alongside Cal-
vinism and Lutheranism. Conversions to Unitarianism increased progressively, 
especially from the 1570s onwards (see Caccamo 1970; Wien, Brandt, Balog 2013; 
Balázs 1996). With the exception of this short-lived phase in some regions of 
Eastern Europe where some sovereigns included these faiths among those that 
could be legitimately practised within state borders, Anabaptism and Antitrini-
tarianism never enjoyed political protection in early modern Europe.
In contrast to those drawn to mainstream Reformation, very few Italian 
Anabaptists had direct contacts with relatively well organized foreign communi-
ties during these decades. One exception was the professor of anatomy Niccolò 
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 Buccella. Buccella had Anabaptist sympathies: he had undergone a second 
baptism and preached the free interpretation of Scripture and the inequality of 
the persons of the Trinity. He was influenced in his heterodox views, like various 
other Venetian physicians of his generation, by contacts with the students of the 
natio germanica at the University of Padua and by the debates on radical Aristo-
telianism and mortalism that had been held for some time in the Facultas arti-
starum. On the one hand, Buccella held a series of basic convictions common 
to Venetian Protestantism: the critique of worshipping images of saints, of tran-
substantiation and of indulgences (but not of the cult of Mary, as was by con-
trast typical of other Anabaptists of the time), the non-existence of Purgatory, the 
nature of the Pope as a usurper. However, he combined these theories with ideas 
drawn both from the philosophical discussions taking place at the University of 
Padua and from the convictions of Moravian Anabaptists (Stella 1961–1962; Stella 
1967; see also Suitner 2016b, with further bibliography). Unlike many others, his 
knowledge of Anabaptism was not second hand; he had travelled to Moravia 
himself, where he had come into contact with local Anabaptist communities. For 
this reason, he was able to give accurate testimony to the inquisitors, together 
with his travelling companion Francesco della Sega, on the organisation of the 
Moravian community: on the practice of the second baptism of adults ‘with pure 
and simple water without any ceremony’, demanding a declaration of faith in the 
resurrection of Christ for the sins of humankind, on the attempts to practice the 
sharing of property, on radical pacifism (ASVE, Savi all’eresia, b. 19).
The convictions most widespread among the Italian sympathisers of Anabap-
tism were the sole validity of baptism received as an adult and the affirmation of 
the human nature of Jesus Christ. On the exact form to be taken by the critique 
of postconciliar Christianity there was complete disagreement, as demonstrated 
in exemplary fashion by the confession of Pietro Manelfi in 1551 (Ginzburg 1970). 
There was no unitary approach to issues such as the status of the soul before 
and after death, the essence and power of angels and demons, the Resurrection, 
the relationship between Old and New Testament, the characteristics of Hell and 
Purgatory nor a long series of other issues.
This heterogeneity particularly characteristic of Venetian Anabaptist groups 
also implied an extreme ‘fluidity’, the potential for not remaining ‘rooted’ in a fixed 
religious vision, changing one’s position over time. It is as if for some individuals, 
once the process had been ‘triggered’, it could no longer be stopped: they continued 
until they found the religion most suited to their own selves, to their own inner life. 
‘Multiple’ conversions are much more common – and well-documented – personal 
developments in the two following centuries, for example in Holland during the 
17th and 18th century, with converts who reached deist positions if not those of the 
so-called ‘Radical Enlightenment’ (see Israel 2001). Obviously, many sympathisers 
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of Antitrinitarianism or Anabaptism who eventually became atheists, or adopted an 
undefined form of scepticism or agnosticism (and who sometimes became Catho-
lics again at the end of their lives), did so as a result of multiple migrations and 
a combination of various factors: opportunistic motives given the need to simply 
survive in a foreign country on the one hand, the condition of being perennially 
uprooted and contact with other cultures on the other. This is, for instance, true of 
two Italian physicians: Simone Simoni and Agostino Doni. Starting from Averroist 
positions in line with Venetian/Paduan medical circles, during the stages of his 
exile (Geneva, Paris, Heidelberg, Leipzig, Basel, Cracow), Simoni passed through 
Antitrinitarian and later clearly atheist positions before eventually reconverting 
to Catholicism (see Verdigi 1997; Suitner 2016b). Doni, also an exile in Swizerland 
and Poland, highly probably integrated Michael Servetus’ theory of the single spir-
itus into his work De natura hominis, strongly depending upon Bernardino Tele-
sio’s natural philosophy (Suitner 2019). These cases of migration are of a different 
kind from that of Gratarolo treated above. Here we don’t see a conscious choice 
of a country which guaranteed the possibility of practising the ‘true’ faith; migra-
tion instead triggers the acquisition of a new and more complex religious identity, 
showing us how strong the religious dimension of biographical experience is. Fur-
thermore, in some cases – particularly those involving physicians – the sources for 
accusations of atheism and/or Antitrinitarianism were not always reliable, as such 
charges were often mixed up with professional rivalries.
In any case, this is a phase and a generation after that of the mid-16th century 
under discussion here, and one that saw the migration of the so-called ‘Italian here-
tics’.2 The discussion of the implications of migration for the development of the self 
exceeds the purposes of this paper, which concentrates on groups of dissenters in the 
Venetian Republic and not specifically on the later exile of some of their members. 
Anyway, it is worth mentioning that the connection between the crossing of borders 
and the emergence in Europe of processes of individualisation has been stressed on 
several occasions, with particular reference to the mobility of Renaissance intellec-
tuals (see for instance Elias 1987). There is undoubtedly a close relationship between 
religion and specific individual biographical models, and between biographical and 
religious experience. By contrast, biographical models may also have influenced the 
religious practices (or their absence) of individuals (see Nassehi 1996, 11). Further-
more, migration studies stress more and more the ‘multiple belongings’ and the 
‘internal plurality’ triggered by migration (see for instance Pfaff-Czarnecka 2013), 
concepts which seem to be useful in the debate on the in/dividual.
2 The expression eretici italiani del Cinquecento was famously introduced by the homonymous 
book of the Italian scholar Delio Cantimori.
The good citizen and the heterodox self   467
Whilst some citizens of the Venetian Republic passed directly from Catholi-
cism to the Radical Reformation,3 moving from Lutheranism to Anabaptism was 
in fact far more frequent. In 1551 or 1552, Nicola d’Alessandria visited some nuns in 
Treviso, to whom he explained the doctrine of the Anabaptists. The nuns turned 
out to already be very well informed on Lutheran doctrines, but after discussing 
them with their guest they agreed that those of the Anabaptists were even better, 
and declared their intention to leave the convent to undergo adult baptism:
‘In Utine del Frioli sono de molti Lutherani, sì come ho inteso da Nicola da Treviso et da 
maestro Iacometto suo compagno, etiam, de Treviso: et ho inteso dalli sudetti che questa 
estate, cioè questo iulio et iunio passato, essendo Nicola da Treviso nella sudetta cità, ribat-
tezzò dui, li quali non cognosco né so il nome; de più me disse ch’era stato per mezzo di certi 
Lutherani in uno monasterio de monache, se ben me ricordo de san Francesco, dove parlò 
con loro della dottrina Lutherana et le ritrovò in detta dottrina essere molto bene istruite, 
et così cominciò a parlare la dottrina anabattista, cioè il battesmo, et loro accettorno tal 
dottrina et domandorno, secondo mi dissero li sudetti, il battesmo; ma perch’erano ancora 
nel monasterio et non potevano uscire non furno rebattizzate da Nicola, benché l’eshor-
tasse ad uscire del monasterio per ribattezzarsi; et loro dissero che se possevano il fariano’ 
(Ginzburg 1970, 81f.).
A significant detail is that these nuns lived in seclusion. As such, we do not know 
how their story ended, and whether they decided to leave the convent or not. The 
conversions of the religious, generally described as sfratati, reappear constantly 
in the transcripts of trials. In general, these were former members of mendicant 
orders (Capuchins, Franciscans), receptive not only to critiques of the corruption 
of the Roman church but also attracted by the nature of Venetian Anabaptism: 
its pacifist leanings, the radical return to the text of the Scriptures and the Chris-
tology of the Synoptic Gospels (on pacifism see for instance Ginzburg 1970, 48: 
‘Maestro Giovan Maria spataro, ma non fa più ‘l maestro, perché gli anabattisti 
non vogliono alchuno he facci arme, né dipintori, anabattista’).
There are also people who became atheists after turning to Lutheranism and 
Anabaptism: for example, those Neapolitan groups, studied by Luca Addante and 
Massimo Firpo, who later moved to Padua (Addante 2010; Firpo 1990). These are 
disciples of Juan de Valdés, who on the basis of a more esoteric and exclusively 
oral level of doctrine, probably already theorised by their leader, bent his teach-
ings in a more radical direction to ‘espouse’ ideas that had very little to do with 
the Reformation, such as the denial of the redeeming power of the life of Christ, 
3 George Hudston Williams’ monograph The Radical Reformation (1965), as is well known, gave 
its name to this set of doctrines.
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and not just of his divine nature, the condemnation of both the Old and the New 
Testament and, in some cases, of all forms of religion.
A series of social, economic, cultural and confessional factors made it pos-
sible for part – albeit a tiny part – of the population of the Venetian Republic of 
the mid-16th century to develop the feeling that they had been given the potential 
to choose the confession most suited to their own inner needs, be it Anabaptism, 
Lutheranism, Calvinism or even an atheism not devoid of evidently blasphemous 
undertones. This close connection between individual choice, conversion and an 
approach that we could describe as ‘confessional eclecticism’ is fairly unusual 
in Europe at this time. Actively seeking out a religion suited to oneself clashed 
stridently with the iron-clad territorial criterion then prevailing and with the very 
mindset of this period, which ‘could not conceive of religion as a sphere sepa-
rate from other domains of being’ (Luebke 2012, 4). The best-known example of 
the application and crystallisation of this principle is the Augsburg confession of 
1555 (the celebrated motto cuius regio, eius religio famously dates to a few years 
later), which, not coincidentally, offered Lutherans and Catholics the possibility 
of migration, but excluded Anabaptists and Antitrinitarians.
The first generation of Venetian Anabaptists is representative of individual 
religious choice; their religious identity is pluralistic, fragmented and eclectic, 
lacking in dogmatic coherence and loyalty to a single confession. The same could 
be said for all those who adopted the teachings of the magisterial Reformation in 
an eclectic and personal, hybrid fashion, a highly ‘spurious’ reformed thought.4 
In general terms this is certainly an expression of individualisation unconceiv-
able without the major shift starting from the Reformation, but that should be 
considered a separate phenomenon, in opposition to the gradual establishment 
of reformed orthodoxies in other countries. It seems to me that the events under 
discussion here are a good demonstration that individualisation is not a single, 
almost supra-historical process, but a multiplicity of discontinuous processes 
resulting from specific networks, factors and contingent situations.5
The phenomenon of the radical fringes that emerged at the margins of the 
Reformation and long persecuted in Europe had, among other things, long-term 
theological consequences. Consider, for example, the Mennonite and Amish com-
munities in North America. Both, though they are now fragmented into numerous 
4 In particular the works of Massimo Firpo offer a detailed picture of the multiplicity of influenc-
es typical of 16th-century Italian heterodoxy.
5 For a summary of the state of research of the KFG – which has shown that individualisation is 
not linear and progressive, but is characterised by strong discontinuities and gaps – see Suitner 
2016a. The Christian Middle Ages and ancient Rome had for instance their own concept of reli-
gious individuality: see Rüpke 2013; Rüpke, Spickermann 2012; Mieth, Löser 2014.
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subgroups with specific beliefs and slightly different practices, originated from 
the migration of non-conformist communities established in 16th-century Europe, 
especially the Anabaptist community, with which they share many fundamental 
principles, including opposition to the baptism of infants and radical pacifism. 
The diversity of American religious sects and congregations, in an apparently 
paradoxical way, can be considered simultaneously an expression of individ-
ualism and conformity. These communities are an integral part of a context in 
which individualisation has become a rule, a specific feature of national religious 
culture. As Richard Madsen has pointed out,
‘religious individualization is the American religion […]. The geography of American reli-
gion is coming to resemble an archipelago of little islands of strongly held faith. The popu-
lation of these islands is somewhat transitory, because restlessness is built deeply into the 
core of American religious culture. The restlessness is not so much a result of the weakness 
in faith. It is a result of the very strength of the fundamental promises of the American reli-
gious individualism’.6
In relation to our Venetian context – and without claiming to be making rigor-
ous comparisons – we could mention the growing attention paid in recent years 
in anthropological studies to multiple identities and the fragmentation of the 
personal identity of the individual. This research has called into question part 
of the narrative proper to the so-called ‘modernisation theory’, which presumes 
an opposition between a pre-modern and/or non-European ‘dividuality’ and a 
Western ‘individuality’, a dichotomy between the dividualised/collectivistic/rela-
tional and the individualistic personhood.7
In opposition to this viewpoint, which theorised a presumed internal uniform-
ity of the non-Western and Western blocs, scholars have spoken of a ‘fluidity of the 
boundaries that define the contours of one’s persona’, as a consequence of which 
‘personae (whether they be individualistic or collectivistic) have various modes of 
being; these modes of presence are inherently plural and diverse’, of ‘personhood 
6 Madsen 2009. See also Fuchs, Rüpke 2015, 3: ‘it is of specific interest to determine and research 
constellations in which individualized relationships with the Supreme as well as with human 
others becomes a social trend, a defining feature for at least certain sections of society […]. The 
approach allows to capture paradoxical constellations, in which individualization is made into a 
norm or even becomes stereotyped’.
7 See exemplarily Strathern 1988 on gender relations on Malanesia, and Geertz 1974: ‘the West-
ern conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and 
cognitive universe; a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organised 
into a distinctive whole and set contrastingly both against other such wholes and against a social 
and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within 
the context of the world’s cultures’.
470   Riccarda Suitner
as defined and shaped by a multiply authored, relational nexus between individual 
autonomy and the collective’ (Appuhamilage 2017; see also Sökefeld 1999). This is a 
fascinating debate arguing that pluralism and the fragmentation of the self should 
not be considered the exclusive prerogative of pre-modern and non-European con-
texts, in opposition to individualisation, but rather an integral part of it. This posi-
tion seems to me to be confirmed, with all the due distinctions, by the reflections 
made on the Venetian heterodox groups of the mid-16th century, with their more or 
less conscious struggle for the search of an individual form of religion, their rejec-
tion of any form of dogmatism, and their ‘multiple’ religious choices which, instead 
of juxtaposing and replacing themselves on one another, gave result to ‘hybrid’ 
forms of religiosity.
A different matter are the clear conversions to a Reformed confession, also 
discussed above. Regardless of whether this conversion is made explicit by a 
migration, or concealed by the practice of Nicodemism, the religious identity of 
the person is clearly defined. The outcome of forced retractions may be highly 
dramatic, such as suicide. A famous example is that of Francesco Spiera, a lawyer 
from Cittadella (near Padua), who turned to Lutheranism and was forced first to 
dissimulate and later – once discovered – to abjure. In despair at having betrayed 
his faith and certain that he was therefore destined for eternal damnation, Spiera 
let himself die of hunger and depression in 1548, leading to a heated debate in 
erudite Italian circles (Curione, Calvin, Gribaldi, Gelous, Scrymgeour 1550).
Alternatively, there may be a ‘happy ending’ – as in the case of Guglielmo 
Gratarolo, who decided to emigrate to a region where he found an entire com-
munity and pre-defined system of dogmas to support his choice. In this case, 
the Nicodemitic opposition is between a ‘genuine’ religious identity (that of the 
Calvinist) and a fictitious identity (that of the Catholic) that is not truly heartfelt. 
These two identities do not form a whole, and are not both intimately experi-
enced. The premise here is the confessional state with its identification of reli-
gious and political/civic identity; the ‘exception’ of migration forms a coherent 
part of this picture, aimed at reappropriating this lost genuine identity.
We are not dealing here with a dividuality in the sense in which it is used in the 
most recent anthropological debate, ‘in the sense of permeability, porosity, and 
openness’ (Linkenbach, this publication; see also Smith 2012), nor with a duality 
resembling that of the libertines and the ‘free thinkers’ of the two following centu-
ries. Underlying the latter was a deliberate doctrine of dissimulation and a distinc-
tion between different personae, roles and levels of communication in a complex 
stratification of levels. This meaning of dividuality could, for example, take con-
crete forms in the opposition between author and private individual, between the 
persona of an author of texts for a bourgeois audience and the persona of an author 
for an audience of ‘insiders’, or in a series of  conscious  dissimulation strategies 
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and literary practices such as a play with different pseudonyms by a single author, 
the use of fictitious letters or the composition of dialogues in co-authorship (see 
on this Mulsow 2012, 58–79 and in this publication). Furthermore, these practices, 
attested mostly in 17th-century Socinian and pre-Enlightenment, ‘rationalist’ 
Huguenot milieus, show how even the strategies of religious dissenters belong-
ing to the ‘left wing of the Reformation’ – including confessional eclecticism and 
 multiple conversion – had become more ‘aware’ in comparison with the undoubt-
edly more naïve religious fluidity of Venetian Anabaptists treated in the previous 
pages. The ‘double truth’ that is the expression of their world has nothing to do 
with the opposition between theology and philosophy, or between two different 
theological truths; it does not form an integral part of the structure of confessional 
states (but rather a foreign presence), and presupposes a complete identity of the 
individual only in the simultaneous presence of all their different identities.
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Martin Mulsow
Dividualisation and relational authorship: 
from the Huguenot République des lettres  
to practices of clandestine writing  
1  Complementary questions
Relational authorship has recently been discussed in the contexts of literary 
studies and of the history of knowledge.1 I would like here to bring these discus-
sions together with another concept: that of dividuality. While relational author-
ship looks at the collaboration of different authors or actors in the creation of a 
single work, the theory of dividuality is concerned in particular with the division 
of a single author into distinct personae, which manifest themselves in different 
works, or indeed within a single complex text. On the one hand, a work which 
emerges from a network; on the other, a network in a sense within an author, or 
the author as a networked plurality. Each of these would seem to be a case for 
a social epistemology – at least where the works in question deal with aspects 
of knowledge – but the question arises: what is the relation between these two 
things? Are they complementary phenomena? Or are the questions and perspec-
tives arising from these two approaches quite different to each other? This is what 
I want to examine here.
In doing so I will in fact look at texts that deal with knowledge, specifically 
texts which are largely philosophical and theological, and I will concentrate on 
the period around 1700. My approach to the Enlightenment will therefore take in 
a ‘long’ 18th century, which had already begun in the debates, often in French, 
from the 1670s onwards, with Simon, Le Clerc, Bayle, van Dale and Fontenelle.2 
The Enlightenment developed not least out of theological disputes and 
debates critical of religion, and as the names mentioned here suggest, Huguenot 
thinkers were at the centre of the fray (Haase 1959). It may therefore be legitimate 
to focus on these writers, at least at the outset of this investigation. In a later 
1 See e.g. the conferences organized by Carlos Spoerhase and Erika Thomalla, ‘Werke im Net-
zwerk. Relationale Autorschaft im 18. Jahrhundert’, held in Berlin, 11–12.5.2017, and Bielefeld, 
16–18.11.2017. 
2 See the still classical work by Hazard 2013, but also Israel 2001.
Note: Translated from German by David Finch.
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part of this essay I will then make the transition, as seamlessly as possible, from 
instances of dividualisation to questions of relational authorship. I will consider 
the theoretical implications of a social epistemology of authorship throughout 
this essay, and especially towards the end.
2 Dialogised theology
As has been said, the most sophisticated combatants of the early modern Répub-
lique des lettres were Huguenots; their experience of emigration, especially after 
1685, made them international in outlook, militant and quick to respond to new 
intellectual currents. The plurality of the situation, in terms of Cartesianism, Spi-
nozism, Lockean empiricism, chiliasm, Socinianism and critical studies of the 
Bible, led – I suggest – to a ‘dialogised’ form of writing, and even to a splitting of 
authorial personae.
As is well known, the idea of ‘dialogism’ was introduced into literary theory by 
Mikhail Bakhtin, to address the ‘polyphony’ found in many novels of the modern 
era, from Rabelais to Dostoevsky (Bakhtin 1984). The concept has since become 
almost a commonplace – in contrast to the monological world of the Middle Ages, 
in which a single world view was largely predominant, Bakhtin sees in the ‘open 
Galileian world of many languages, mutually animating each other’ and of compet-
ing world views, a dialogism expressed in ambivalent and hybrid forms of language 
and in the linguistic variety of the characters. There arises in the novel an ‘interac-
tion between different contexts, different standpoints, different horizons, different 
expressive systems of emphasis, different social languages’ (Mair 2015, 578f.). 
The starkness of the opposition here between the medieval and the modern 
has been often criticised, but for the moment we will let it pass. More important, 
it seems to me, is the productive use Klaus W. Hempfer has made of this view for 
our understanding of the Renaissance dialogue (e.g. Hempfer 2002), a use that 
was not at the forefront of Bakhtin’s thinking (as his understanding of dialogism 
was not primarily that of the direct disposition of language in the dialogue form). 
But this approach brings new aspects to the fore, especially where the language 
of knowledge, of science and the humanities, is concerned: the Renaissance 
dialogue often addresses typical humanistic themes such as morality, politics 
and history, but also metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. If polyphony 
occurs here, one would conjecture that it is a direct reflection of the pluralised 
worldview of the early modern period (Mulsow 2000; Müller, Österreicher and 
Vollhardt 2010). These dialogues set out competing viewpoints in the form of 
arguments, not without some rhetorical flourishes. What they also demonstrate 
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however is that in the 15th or 16th century it was not yet possible to give open 
expression to all competing viewpoints. While writers such as Lorenzo Valla or 
Poggio Bracciolini could present an Epicurean or a proponent of a free monetary 
economy as a figure within a dialogue, they were not free to identify openly with 
these positions (e.g. Schmitz 2004). Whether and to what extent real social net-
works and circles of debate were behind these dialogues, is a question I wish to, 
and must, leave open here. I want only to stress that the reader was left to draw 
his or her own conclusions, while the author disclaimed all liability, as a neutral 
moderator between divergent points of view (Mulsow 2007, 102–7). Renaissance 
dialogues therefore reflect on the one hand the beginnings of pluralisation, and 
on the other, concealed speech in an unfree context. 
A field long closed to this form of dialogue was of course that of theology. 
Here no pluralisation was allowed – on the contrary, following the de facto plu-
ralisation of the Reformation, which was experienced by some as a catastrophe, 
the different denominations were all the more concerned to ensure that dogmatic 
monologicity prevailed within their spheres of influence. But the new and urgent 
discussions of theological and exegetical questions, reinforced by critical philol-
ogy, could not be stopped (see e.g. Van Miert et al. 2017). This is particularly clear 
in two cases, which touch on the area of clandestine literature: of texts which 
could only be distributed in manuscript copies, or which were printed in small 
numbers and kept hidden from the general public.
The first of these is well known – Jean Bodin’s Colloquium heptaplomeres, 
from 1596 (Bodin 1857; see Gawlick and Niewöhner 1996). The author is not iden-
tified by name in the text, which can be ascribed to the famous political theorist 
only by means of internal evidence. The text itself puts forward no identifiable 
and unequivocal position, rather, as the title tells us, it gives us a conversation 
between seven speakers: a Catholic, a Lutheran, a Calvinist, a Jew, a Muslim and 
two non-confessional figures, one of whom appears to be a kind of Deist, the 
other a kind of sceptical Naturalist. The exchange between these figures purports 
to promote tolerance, but some of the arguments of the last two figures are critical 
of religion and open to a reading that leads to more radical conclusions, conclu-
sions that deny the continued justification of Christianity.
Much less well-known is a dialogue by Christian Francken from 1593, between 
a theologian and a philosopher. Francken was one of the many religious seekers 
after truth of the 16th century; he began as a Catholic and a Jesuit, became a 
Lutheran, slid from there to Antitrinitarianism and went to Poland. He later moved 
to Siebenbürgen, where the nonadorantist strain of Antitrinitarianism was in the 
ascendancy. And, from being an Antitrinitarian, Francken eventually – at least 
possibly – became an atheist. That is the case at any rate if he identified with the 
position of the sceptical-atheistic philosopher in his Disputatio inter theologum et 
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philosophum de incertitudine religionis Christianae. As with Bodin, this is not une-
quivocal. Francken leaves the question open, but the possibility of his atheism 
remains strong (Francken 1593; see Simon 2008).
I would therefore say that both Bodin and Francken are early cases of 
 philosophical-theological dialogism. They remained exceptional for the moment, 
but by the second half of the 17th century at the latest, the epistemic situation 
had become so complex that dialogistic forms of writing took hold in theology, 
absorbing and expressing a polyphony of viewpoints.
This can be seen first, and even before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 
at the Calvinist Academy of Saumur, where theological and classical studies 
were pursued in the tradition of Duplessis Mornay, Moyse Amyraut and Louis 
Cappel (Kretzer 1975). In 1674 at Saumur, Tanneguy Le Febvre, in his Epistolae, 
was the first to discuss philological questions in the form of a fictional exchange 
of letters (Ribard 2008). In 1681 the Arminian theology student at Saumur, Jean 
Le Clerc, took this as a model and, in his pseudonymous Epistolae theologicae, 
used fictional correspondents to present a range of mutually relativising theolog-
ical positions.3 These letters surely reflect actual discussions between students at 
Saumur, relating to sceptical views on the Trinity, Cartesian philosophy, and his-
torical and philological Bible criticism – there may be a network of participants in 
the background here too – but the point I want to make is that they are practising 
a new form of hypothetical writing.4 The theory of relational authorship takes a 
close interest in letter-writing networks, and all the more so when a number of 
letters are combined to make up a book.
The frame of Epistolae theologicae is provided by an anonymous (fictional) 
editor who presents himself as a friend of the – pseudonymous – Liberius a 
Sancto Amore, whose name adorns the title page. According to this editor, the 
texts contained in the work originated as adversaria, as notes and observations 
made while reading, and were then formulated as letters. Many of the views have 
an experimental status, says the editor: they have been expressed in private con-
versation in order to test them out (‘saepe se expertum in familiaribus confabula-
tionibus’) (Le Clerc 1681, praefatio).
The ‘letters’ published within this framework are all written by Liberius, 
but are addressed to different recipients. The first letter, from August 1679, is to 
a ‘Firminius Parrhasius’, and develops its argument on the premise that Christ 
is coeternal with God the Father. It tests out a theory of the hypostatic union of 
the two natures of Christ, which employs Cartesian concepts. But the letter which 
3 On Le Clerc see Barnes 1938; Pitassi 1987.
4 In the followings paragraphs, I adapt passages from a previous essay: Mulsow 2005.
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follows undermines precisely the premise on which the first letter is based. This 
second letter purports to have been written on New Year’s Eve 1678 to ‘Ambrosius 
Theographus’, but is further framed and distanced by being solely an account of a 
‘Ludovicus Solinus’, a friend of Theographus’ uncle, who conducts a discussion, 
or comparison of views (a collatio), with two of his nephews, to whom he poses 
certain questions. This ‘Solinus’ is introduced as someone who has had to leave 
his home country and now resides elsewhere. It is almost as if one were being 
asked to see him as one of the Socinians who had been driven out of Poland. 
In any case, cultural transfer is built into this framing. The discussion between 
Solinus and his nephews is nothing less than a theological experiment in vivo: 
far removed from all theological debates, Solinus has instructed both nephews 
in Hebrew, Greek and Latin and then set them to read the Bible without any com-
mentary. For three years they have studied entirely separately from each other. 
The question Solinus now poses is: what standpoint do they take on the question 
of the Trinity? One arrives at the position of the Reformed Church, the other at 
that of the Socinians. A dispute between the two brings no solution, and three 
friends brought in to arbitrate cannot decide on a victor.5 The moral of the story is 
therefore that if Scripture is so equivocal and unclear on this matter, we must be 
prepared to tolerate different opinions, and thus also those of the Socinians. The 
relational authorship of the positions, which is to an extent built into the text, is 
equirelational – the Reformed Church and Socinianism are equal in value. Accord-
ing to the Epistolae theologicae, the common ground in other questions – that God 
possesses all perfections, that He wishes to redeem mankind and that Christ died 
for this – suffices, alongside a shared morality, for a mutual acceptance.
The third letter, to a ‘Coelius Optatianus’, claims to have been written a 
little later, in February 1679. This Coelius has supposedly read Liberius’ first two 
letters, at the home of ‘Amicus’. Coelius wishes for a ‘thorough explanation of 
the three modi of thought in the Godhead’. But Liberius must now admit to a 
difference in starting points in relation to his first letter. ‘Before I had read the 
discussion, it was my view that the mystery of the Holy Trinity – which I assumed 
can be proved from Scripture – can be explained in this way, and I thought that 
it was therefore not necessary that I should write to my Solinus on this matter 
[…]’ (Le Clerc 1681, 95f.). Now however, for Liberius, the given of the Scriptural 
guarantee of the Trinity is suddenly no longer secure. The rational reconstruc-
tion of the Trinity which follows has therefore a merely hypothetical character. 
This hypothetical doctrine presents a kind of psychological model of the Trinity: 
5 On Socinianism and its relation to the Reformed Church see Daurgirdas 2016; Mulsow 2018, 
chapter 13. On the question of toleration, see Marshall 2006.
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‘Although [God] is one, He can bring forth simultaneously any number of differ-
ent sequences of thought, and therefore the persons in Him can be various. God 
thinking in a certain way is called the Father, in another way the Son, in another 
the Holy Spirit’ (Le Clerc 1681, 103). These are therefore the ‘modi cognoscendi’ 
of the ‘series cogitationum’: the ‘modus’ of the Judge (the Father), of the Mediator 
(the Son) and of the Comforter (the Holy Spirit).
EPISTOLAE THEOLOGICAE
friend (editor)




nephew 1: Remonstrant nephew 2: Socinian
Liberius praises this theory – which is perhaps inspired by Spinoza’s or Male-
brache’s terminology – as not open to the charge of Sabellianism (as in this 
modalistic view the persons are consecutive and not side by side), and sees it 
therefore as a possible alternative to Socinianism: this standpoint is ‘as probable 
as the Socininian one’ and is consistent with ‘right reason’.
Hypothetical questions and considerations of probability are being weighed 
up here. The probabilism of the 17th century throws its shadows. If we examine 
more closely why Le Clerc in particular developed a dialogised form of this kind, 
we come upon the role of Erasmus of Rotterdam in this phase of the history of 
theology, and in this way the Renaissance dialogue is present once again. Le 
Clerc’s great edition of 1703–1706 of the works of Erasmus is only the late and 
external sign of this effect. Erasmus stands, as Stefano Brogi has said, for the 
combination of philological exactitude, liberal reasoning and rhetorical finesse 
(Brogi 2012). Perhaps, following Pocock’s ‘Machiavellian moment’, we can call 
this development of theological polyphony in texts by a single author the ‘Eras-
mian moment’.
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3 The pluralisation of masks
When the Academy of Saumur was dissolved in 1685, complex argumentations, in 
which authors split themselves into a kaleidoscopic array of possible positions, 
were carried forward into exile, in particular in the Dutch Republic (Mulsow 
2010). In 1687, Noel Aubert de Versé, a Socinian and friend of Le Clerc, presented 
in Le Tombeau du Socinianisme, – a merely ostensible refutation of Socinianism – 
the fictional letters of a ‘Basilius von Ankyra’ to one ‘Eudoxus’. In fact, the matter 
is even more complicated: the book is a seeming riposte to the Le Protestant paci-
fique by a Seigneur de la Guytonnière from 1684, a text which was in fact also 
written by Aubert de Versé. So the author is operating under different pseudo-
nyms, playing them off against each other.6
Aubert de Versé is not an easy author to interpret, and was not, even for his 
contemporaries. He changes repeatedly back and forth between Protestantism 
and Catholicism; in Paris he collects his pension for reconversion but then returns 
to Holland. He is therefore greatly mistrusted by both sides. It is said that he will 
hire his pen to anyone who will pay him, and even his Protestant comrades in 
arms such as Pierre Bayle regard him with suspicion, despite the fact that he is in 
the forefront of the fight against Bayle’s close personal enemy Pierre Jurieu.
The most consistent element in Aubert’s writings is his Socinianism, or more 
precisely, his rejection of orthodox forms of the Trinity. This said, it seems to have 
been relatively unimportant to him whether he associated with liberal Catholics 
(with Gallicans and Oratorians), or with liberal Protestants. But as far as Socini-
anism was concerned, his writings show an attempt to bring together Arian posi-
tions, like those of his friend Christoph Sand, with Socinian viewpoints. At the 
same time, he brings these theological themes into contact with the new philo-
sophical language of Cartesianism and Spinozism (Scribano 1988). 
In this way, a game of deception and misdirection arises which is even more 
perplexing than Le Clerc’s already confusing Epistolae theologicae. We can say 
of Aubert that the theological dialogism demonstrated by Le Clerc is extended 
throughout his entire intellectual life as an author, and that in the pseudonymous 
disputing personae of his writings and his changes of confession he embodies the 
multiplicity of viewpoints circulating at the time.
In his Le Tombeau du Socinianisme Aubert uses, like Le Clerc, patristic- 
sounding names as cyphers for different hypothetical viewpoints. At the end of 
the book, he prints the already mentioned letter from one ‘Basilius of Ankyra’ to 
‘Eudoxus’. This ‘Basilius’ expresses a textually critical view of the Bible, as did 
6 On Aubert de Versé, see Morman 1987.
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Le Clerc’s ‘Solinus’. ‘Now to conclude this work’, writes Aubert, ‘I wish to include 
here a letter written to me by a friend, whom I shall call Basilius of Ankyra, on 
the subject of the Trinity […]. Here we find a quite new hypothesis on the Prologue 
to the Gospel of St John, a view completely contrary to my own, but which so 
destroys my previous conception that I am seized by enthusiasm, and which on 
reflection compels me to say that this is not a hypothesis, but a truth which seems 
to me divinely inspired’ (Aubert 1687, 169).
I cannot go into the detail of the theological discussion here, but it is probably 
clear that with Aubert, even more than with the dialogues of the Renaissance, a 
complex dialogism is at work. The author is torn this way and that between the 
diverse exegetical and dogmatic possibilities of thinking a doctrine of the Christian 
Trinity which no longer holds Christ to be co-original with the Father. He wants to 
give voice in his work to the ambivalence and indecision in relation to the possibil-
ities, but at the same time he needs to give due consideration to a wide variety of 
interests, according to whether he wants to recommend himself to the Catholics or 
to the Protestants, whether he needs to camouflage his Antitrinitarianism as ortho-
dox, or even, as he was forced to do in his later work Anti-Socin, to demonstrate the 
orthodoxy of his views by writing a retraction of his earlier works (Aubert 1692). 
Aubert squirms under this forced dividualisation, while employing almost every 
trick in the book when it comes to ‘Persecution and the Art of Writing’.7
7 See the well-known work by Leo Strauss 1959.
TOMBEAU DU SOCINIANISME
Seigneur de la Guytonnière:
Basilius von Ankyra Eudoxus
Anti-Socin
Protestant pacifique
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4 Dividualisation
A note on the idea of dividualisation may be useful at this point; I have already 
used the term repeatedly here to refer to the division of the persona of the author. 
The term is intended as counterpart to the term ‘individualisation’, not in order 
to deny the process of individualisation in the modern period in Europe, but to 
extend it and round it out. For what the idea of individualisation does not encom-
pass, and even obscures, is the – occasional – internal pluralisation of the human 
being which occurs when persons are obliged to act differently on different levels 
(with multiple personae), or to adopt a stance in relation to positions of equal 
validity. As we have seen, this can lead to the formation of corresponding forms 
of text. I suggest the term ‘dividualisation’ to describe this phenomenon. 
I have in mind here a theoretical discussion in anthropology, which (in 
response to Marcel Mauss’ essay on the notion of the person as ‘a category of the 
human mind’) has developed around Melanesian forms of personhood.8 Since 
about 1990, Marilyn Strathern has written of the ‘dividual personhood’, while 
the anthropologist of visual art Alfred Gell used the term ‘distributed person-
hood’.9 Strathern’s meaning is that Melanesians typically interact as composite 
beings. They are the product of gifts, contributions or separations from others; 
they form a relational multiplicity, in relation to other persons. Where, from a 
Western standpoint, an observer might see only people exchanging objects, from 
their own point of view they are exchanging parts of themselves as persons. Gell’s 
concern in this is to take the fact that personhood can be in a sense extended into 
objects, and to use it to deepen our understanding of art, not only Melanesian art, 
but also of phenomena in Western modern and contemporary art. 
Two lessons can be drawn from this. The first is a certain scepticism as to the 
universal applicability of the concept of the individual. But the other is the possi-
bility of adding to and broadening this concept, through the notion of ‘dividualis-
ation’. The anthropological description becomes especially interesting when it is 
related to Western contemporary life: not only is it possible to dispute the necessity 
of the link between Western contemporary life and individualisation, but as we have 
seen, it is also possible conversely to assert the relevance of non-Western dividual 
personhood for the contemporary West. Mark Mosko has recently suggested that 
a key to Christian conversion experiences can be found in the ‘dividual person’ 
(Mosko 2010). He also contrasts this idea with that of ‘possessive individualism’, 
8 See as well the introduction to this section.
9 See Strathern 1988; Wagner 1994; Gell 1998; Fowler 2004; Ulbrich and Jancke 2005, 32ff.; 
 Rampley 2005.
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a term coined by James Macpherson in 1962 in relation to the theories of Hobbes 
and Locke (Mosko 2013). Edward LiPuma goes on the offensive, suggesting that 
the model of dividual personhood could provide an impulse towards a concept of 
interpersonal freedom in contemporary societies, one which would include other 
people without tipping over into new forms of dominance (Li Puma 2000).
In using ‘dividualisation’ here as a term for a process of increasing internal 
pluralisation, in the sense of a habitual adoption of techniques to adapt to and 
withstand social and intellectual pluralisation and de-authorisation, I am not 
relying simply on importing Melanesian anthropology. We should not of course 
place too much weight on parallels with ‘dividual persons’ on the other side of 
the world; these parallels are weak, and are not much more than a stimulus to 
thought – but perhaps a useful one, as they allow us to see the other side not only 
of individualisation, but also of relational authorship. This is especially relevant 
when the networks, the relations – the multiplicity so to speak – shift to the inte-
rior of the single author.
5 Fictional or real Greeks?
It will of course be necessary to determine in each case exactly where the tran-
sitions lie between a merely epistemically intended dividualisation and dissolv-
ing of boundaries of the authorial persona, and the dividualisation of a real 
person as a strategy of dissimulation. Intellectuals such as Aubert de Versé were 
able without difficulty to pretend, against their true convictions, to reconvert to 
Catholicism, in order to travel to France to collect a pension, before returning to 
Holland and resuming their polemical activities. Such tactics reached their most 
extreme form in the case of Jean Aymon: Aymon was a Huguenot who wrote, for 
strategic reasons, a tract on the possible reconvergence of the Catholic and Prot-
estant churches. In 1706 he gave out that he wished to reconvert, and obtained a 
passport to enter France, where he inveigled his way into the confidence of the 
Royal Librarian (Goldgar 1995, 174–80). He used this to purloin the manuscript 
of the Council of Jerusalem (1672) and remove it to Holland, intending to publish 
it in support of the Calvinist side in the dispute over the Perpetuité de la foy de 
l’eglise, concerning the continuity of the doctrine of the Eucharist from early 
Christian times onwards.10 This he did in 1708, with his Monumens Authentiques 
De La Religion Des Grecs, et De La Fausseté De Plusieurs Confessions De Foi Des 
Chrétiens Orientaux.
10 On this dispute see Zwierlein 2016, 124–42.
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While the pseudonyms adopted by Aubert and Le Clerc were still those of fic-
tional Greeks such as ‘Basilius of Ankyra’ and ‘Ambrosius Theographus’, Aymon 
now introduced a new twist. In purloining documents from the Greek Orthodox 
Church, his tactic was to make real Greeks speak for his cause. As in the documen-
tation battles between the confessions a hundred years earlier, for instance between 
Goldast and Gretser (Mulsow 2007, 145–90), it was considered most effective to let 
the ‘res ipsa’ speak – the documents themselves, which were not so mutable and 
assailable as the differing theological positions. The Monumens Authentiques was 
not concerned with the question of the Trinity, but with that of the Eucharist, the 
Communion. Here the battle lines were drawn somewhat differently. On the one side 
were the Jansenists around Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, who had taken the 
field to demonstrate to the Crown their otherwise disputed Catholic loyalties, and on 
the other side were the Huguenots around Jean Claude, who questioned whether the 
Transsubstantiation had been a doctrine of the early Church. Against him, Arnauld 
and Nicole arrayed their huge work on La Perpetuité de la foy, in which they claimed 
to show on the basis of authentic documents that precisely this doctrine had been 
maintained throughout the whole course of Christian tradition since earliest times. 
But thanks to the purloined codex Aymon was now able to produce letters from 
the Patriarch of Alexandria and Constantinople, Kyrillos Loukaris, whose dogma 
in relation to the Eucharist appeared decidedly Protestant in tone (Aymon 1708, 
1–199).11 This was in many ways more resounding as an argument than the ‘Basil-
ius’ invented by Aubert, with his hypotheses of an early forgery of the Prologue to 
the Gospel of St John, for which he had no evidence. The network standing in this 
case behind the author, or rather publisher, Aymon, is a real if merely adapted one, 
that of the Patriarch Loukaris, a network with which Aymon was not personally 
acquainted at all, but which he had in a sense made his own, through his theft. 
6 Relational authorship
Aymon’s case, which was discussed with great ambivalence in Huguenot circles, 
also shows the reverse side of the pluralisation of personae and authorship: in 
situations such as this, not only could one author be several persons, several 
authors could also work on and refine a single text. We move here from divid-
ualisation to relational authorship. Between 1710 and 1716 for instance, Aymon 
and a few friends who were also freethinkers were occupied with preparing for 
 publication the manuscript of a work of the radical Enlightenment, Traité des 
11 On Loukaris, see Hering 1968.
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trois imposteurs. This tract was inspired by Spinoza and reinforced with ideas 
critical of religion originating with Hobbes, Vanini and others.12 It is more of a 
compilation (an ‘unfixed text’13) than a stand-alone piece of writing and was 
probably cobbled together in the years before 1700 by a student or admirer of 
Spinoza (possibly Jean-Maximilien Lucas or Jan Vroesen) as a hard-hitting atheist 
polemic intended for a wide readership. 
The manuscript had lain for some years in the library of the Rotterdam 
Quaker Benjamin Furly, a friend of John Locke and of many freethinking, mostly 
Huguenot intellectuals. The text was then discovered by a group of men which 
included Jean Aymon, as well as Jean Rousset and the publishers Charles Levier 
and Thomas Johnson. They decided to publish it in print. This was a highly auda-
cious plan, as even in liberal Holland the publication of an atheist text was an 
almost suicidal undertaking. Despite this, Aymon and Rousset improved some-
what the style and language of the text, making it perhaps rather more incisive, 
and Levier did in fact print the work in 1719 under the title Espirit des Spinoza, 
though in only a small number of copies, which were sold ‘under the counter’. 
TRAITÉ DES TROIS IMPOSTEURS




Jean Aymon Jean Rousset Charles Levier Thomas Johnson
Authorship was therefore relationally shared out: many heads were involved. We 
should distinguish between the voices passively present in the text, through their 
12 See the edition by Schröder 1994. On this work and its composition, see Berti, Charles-
Daubert and Popkin 1996.
13 See Sabel and Bucher 2001.
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inclusion in the compilation, such as Hobbes, Spinoza and Vanini; the compiler 
(Lucas); and the relational authors in the actual sense – Aymon, Rousset and 
Levier, the producers of the final text. They are ‘actually’ relational in the sense 
that they knew each other and acted together, with collective intentionality.
How was it that Aymon, who was after all a defender of the Protestant cause, 
had a hand in this undertaking? One reason was surely that Aymon, like Aubert, 
was an adventurer who relished taking part in dangerous games of this kind. One 
would need to be some kind of daredevil to carry out an undercover commando 
operation on the library of the King of France – and to polish the style of an atheist 
pamphlet. Another reason may be that Aymon’s dogmatic substance had begun 
to erode, as both a cause and a consequence of his changes of persona. To fight 
for the cause of the Protestants in Church politics was one thing, to believe in the 
letter of their dogma was another. There were in fact a number of intellectuals 
in the Netherlands who themselves no longer quite knew what to believe in any 
more. Whether they became sceptics, like Pierre Bayle, or simply concerned them-
selves with money and publishing success, like some booksellers, was no longer of 
prime importance. They found they had a taste for such little games as printing the 
text which was to become the most notorious work of the Enlightenment. Scholars 
have spoken of a ‘grey identity’ in relation to eroded intellectuals of this kind. 
But what does Aymon’s participation mean here in the light of our interest in 
dialogism and multiple pseudonymity? It shows us a complementary phenome-
non: not an author who divides himself into several personae, but a text which 
has several progenitors. Interest in phenomena of multiple authorship has been 
aroused only in very recent times, with the questioning of the category of the 
author itself and the development of the theory of social networks. We need not 
necessarily speak of multiple authorship, but can instead, as I have here already, 
use the concept of ‘relational authorship’. In doing so we join with the newer rela-
tional sociology14 of for instance Donati and Archer, who have explored the impli-
cations of the fact that in relations between persons – in networks – a variety 
of different reflexive references to a shared ‘we’ always play a part (Donati and 
Archer 2015). It is important to reconstruct historically such reflexive references, 
where groups of free-thinking intellectuals work together on writing a text, or 
views are pseudonymously advanced that can only be fully explained in relation 
to a shared cause. As I have stressed in the case of the Traité des trois imposteurs, 
‘actual’ relationality and reflexive reference to a ‘we’ is only present where there 
is mutual acquaintance and reference by writers to each other. 
14 See in general Emirbayr 1997.
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With ‘unfixed’ texts which grow slowly and are laid down layer by layer, as 
new authors extend, manipulate and rewrite the text, the question is more com-
plicated. But whatever the case, we must ask: what kinds of connections in what 
kinds of networks were decisive? Were the connections strong or weak? What 
kinds of concern for what kind of ‘we’ were present? What is the collective inten-
tionality of a militant confessional or post-confessional grouping?15
7 Partially reflexive relationality
Let us turn to a case where, as with the Traité, several people work on a single text, 
but where there is clearly no reflexivity in the narrower sense – that is, no per-
sonal acquaintance between those responsible for the final text. I remain here in 
the field of clandestine literature, and in the period around 1700. The text known 
as the Symbolum sapientiae is an openly atheist work, written in the years around 
1690, which advances its arguments on the basis of a strict – and crude – natural-
ism.16 The author may have been a Wittenberg lawyer, Georg Michael Heber, but 
we do not know this for certain, and there are only a few indications of this. The 
text was distributed in only a small number of handwritten copies, and therefore 
had hardly any effect, despite its undoubted philosophical quality. The atheism 
it puts forward is of a sceptical kind. For its legally trained author, the burden of 
proof lies with those putting the case for the existence of God, while numerous 
objections can be brought to bear against it. 
There are in fact a number of variants of this clandestine manuscript, which 
contain extensive additions to the text. Textual comparisons allow us to identify 
the anonymous author of these changes as Johann Georg Wachter, another radical 
author of the early German Enlightenment. Wachter must have obtained a copy of 
the Symbolum, perhaps in the years following 1710. Spinozist that he was, he identi-
fied so strongly with the text that he empathetically inscribed himself into it. Wach-
ter’s additions, which organically interpolate single words,  half-sentences, and 
sometimes even whole passages into the flow of the argument, give the original text 
a somewhat differently nuanced orientation. The emphasis now lies rather more on 
a Socratic scepticism which is aware of its own limits, and on the hidden existence 
of the wise man who lives apart, unknown to society (Mulsow 2002, 241–7).
What has happened here? To what extent is the final clandestine text – a 
typical example of its kind – the product of relational authorship? Only in a 
15 On collective intentionality see Searle 2011.
16 The edition edited by Canziani, Schröder and Socas 2000. See also Mulsow 2018, chapter 11.
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restricted sense, as a result of what I call clandestine ‘networks over time’ (Mulsow 
2008; Mulsow 2014, 231). These are connections through which later radical, often 
isolated, authors align themselves with earlier thinkers who are often anonymous 
and therefore unknown to them by name, whose texts they acquire or transcribe 
and read intensively, so intensively that they sometimes even intervene in and 
extend the texts. There is reflexivity here in only one direction: the later partial 
author, in this case Wachter, identifies himself as part of a ‘we’ with the earlier 
author, Heber, but without the earlier author being able to respond, either being 
dead or knowing nothing of the later writer. 
8 Dividualisation and personae in natural law
In conclusion let us examine how the different forms of dialogism, of dividualis-
ation and of relational authorship relate to other types of division – in particular 
those motivated by natural law, which we also find around 1700, and which the-
orise the division of a person into several functions or roles. This is a line which 
extends from Samuel Pufendorf through Adam Smith to modern times (Kobusch 
1993; Mulsow 2012, 58–79). Did the breaking down of boundaries between dif-
ferent schools of philosophy and religious confessions after 1685, in particular 
the boundaries surrounding Socinianism, lead to a blurring of the boundaries 
around the personhood of the author?
The relation between theological dialogism, as we find it in Le Clerc and 
Aubert, and dividuality based in natural law has not been remarked on up till 
now. But it is quite clear. In defence of his own freethinking books, Theodor 
Ludwig Lau, a student of Thomasius, invoked Pufendorf’s concept of the persona 
moralis in the sense of a separation of roles. In his Meditationes philosophicae 
de Deo, Mundo, et Homine of 1717 Lau also saw himself, like the editor of the 
Epistolae theologicae, as a moderator, presenting various hypotheses for con-
sideration, or as a theatre director, bringing different works to the stage without 
pronouncing in favour of any particular one. Where Le Clerc had spoken of specu-
lative intellectual games within a small circle (‘saepe se expertum in familiaribus 
confabulationibus’), Lau spoke similarly of proposals and suppositions ‘merely 
problematically expressed’, i.e. purely for the purposes of discussion (Lau 1719, 
preface). For Lau, reaction to pluralisation and retreat beyond the reach of legal 
or theological liability are two sides of the same coin, as they had been for some 
Renaissance freethinkers. That Pufendorf’s social theory now offered a language 
in which to describe this was welcome, but not actually necessary for the forma-
tion of a writing strategy.
490   Martin Mulsow
Lau is certainly a compiler, like his slightly earlier counterpart in Berlin, Frie-
drich Wilhelm Stosch, an assiduous reader of Le Clerc’s Epistolae theologicae.17 
Both writers practised relational authorship only in the restricted sense that they 
put together different positions in the manner of a puzzle. This is undoubtedly 
dialogism, in the form of eclecticism, but is not explicitly presented as a mixture 
of opposing viewpoints. The dialogism emerges rather more implicitly; we notice 
it when it becomes clear that, with both Lau and Stosch, the eclectic mix of argu-
ments from Locke, Gassendi, Spinoza, Toland or Thomasius is not really consist-
ent. From a systematic philosophical standpoint each of these books is a disas-
ter – bad amateur philosophy. But both authors insist that their texts are to be 
read more as reading notes, as a kind of Reader’s Digest of positions which are 
naturalistic and critical of religion, and which seem to them worth discussing. 
Dialogism is to be seen here more as a retraction of claims to authorship, as a 
moderator’s citation of the origins of the ideas presented. The actual dividuality 
of a figure such as Lau can be discerned rather in the distinction between a (sup-
posedly) private Christian persona and an atheistic authorial persona, where this 
authorial persona is in fact the disclaimed one of the Reader’s Digest compiler. It 
is only here that Lau employs Pufendorf’s concept of different personae morales 
or roles, and argues that, even though as a ‘weak’ author he sets out a pano-
rama of heterodox positions, as a private man he can still go to church like a good 
Christian (Lau 1719, § 2; see Mulsow 2012, 67ff.).
17 For Stosch’s use of the Epistolae, see Mulsow 2018, chapter 13.
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That is as may be, but the connection was established at any rate between 
the division of roles, dividuality, eclecticism and dialogism. We should remember 
that dialogism in the context of scholarship does not produce a ‘wild’ polyphony, 
such as Bakhtin found in Rabelais’ texts, but one which is highly controlled, tac-
tical and precisely calibrated. This is how we should also see the dividuality of 
authors such as Le Clerc, Aubert or Lau: it is a very precisely considered dividual-
ity that takes into account a hundred different circumstances, and encompasses 
all shades from the innocent to the criminal – as with Aymon.
This brings me to my conclusion. In the light of what we have reconstructed 
here, Søren Kierkegaard’s strategy, in the 1840s, of making various pseudo-
nyms in his writing speak against each other, in order to force the reader exis-
tentially to declare his position (Nun and Steward 2015), is actually an almost 
anachronistic readoption of the old pseudonymity-games from the confessional 
confrontations of the 17th century. As we know, in Either/Or, a fictional editor, 
‘Victor Eremita’, presents first the papers of an aesthete ‘A’, also containing 
a ‘Seducer’s Diary’ which is merely published by A, and then the papers and 
letters of an ethicist ‘B’, which respond to A. Other pseudonyms appear in other 
works by Kierkegaard: in Repetition, a recluse named ‘Constantin Constantius’ 
debates with a ‘young person’, while Fear and Trembling, which appeared at 
the same time, is supposedly written by a ‘Johannes de Silentio’. The Concept 
of Anxiety is attributed to a ‘Vigilius Haufniensis’, the Philosophical Fragments 
to a ‘Johannes Climacus’. It is true that the early Romantics around Friedrich 
Schlegel had been the first to lay the groundwork, with their theory of irony, 
for Kierkegaard’s distancing techniques (Strohschneider-Kohrs 1960), and in 
the 19th century the pluralisation of the persona was no longer by any means 
the only possible way to respond to the pluralisation of world-views. In fact, 
we can say that a central aspect of the history of theory in the 18th century 
consisted in responding to the dilemma of absolute claims to truth in a plural-
ised epistemic situation, and using concepts of tolerance, eclecticism and the 
privatising of religion to offer ways of thinking which mark a new stage in the 
structure of social semantics.18
But for Kierkegaard these adjustments were unsatisfactory. He saw them as 
a levelling of Christianity, which was now merely ‘tepidly’ practised alongside 
bourgeois existence in a way that no longer had any bearing on the individual. He 
therefore strove for a renewed intensification of the claim to truth, no longer on a 
18 For structural Shifts like this see above all Luhmann 1980–1995; for a ‘communication reform’ 
already around 1700 see Gierl 1997.
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dogmatic level, but conceived of as a commitment for the subjective existence.19 
The result however was a reprise of some of the paradoxes of the early modern 
period. Perhaps this is why what Kierkegaard practised reminds us so strongly 
of Le Clerc’s Epistolae theologicae. Kierkegaard’s role as a protagonist of modern 
individualisation is undisputed. Should we not therefore also recognise the early 
adventurers of theological dialogism as protagonists of this kind? As protagonists 
of an individualisation through dividualisation? And should we not use the theo-
ries of relational authorship and of epistemic networks to pay closer attention to 
the networks around the texts, the networks around the authors and the networks 
in the authors?
I have not discussed here ‘normal’ networks between authors and their pub-
lishers, or authors and their correspondents, nor large-scale learned works such 
as Vincent Placcius’ Theatrum anonymorum, which could not have been compiled 
without the collaboration of a large number of scholars – as Placcius himself 
says in his subtitle: ‘from contributions and their comparison by learned men 
throughout Europe’ (Mulsow 2007, 217–45). It is perhaps an irony of history that 
Placcius required a whole relational network of collaborators to trace those I am 
concerned with here: the multiple personae in Placcius’ title engraving, shown as 
if dangling from the ceiling on a washing line. 
I have been concerned here only with more ‘acute’ cases of relational author-
ship, where theologians faced with an accelerating pluralisation of world views 
felt they had no other option than to depict the whole complex network of mutu-
ally undermining positions in a single book; or where ‘fluid’ intellectuals tried 
to shake off their persecutors through tactical changes of pseudonym, while 
remaining on the lookout for new possibilities to reposition themselves; lastly, 
where underground authors had no sooner got their hands on a clandestine 
manuscript than they had added their own writing to it, and sometimes pub-
lished it as well.
As we have seen, a relational analysis of these authors must address the 
whole complexity of the intellectual situation, for without it, these ‘hommes 
pluriels’ (Lahire 1998) would not have emerged. This may be a special case from 
the point of view of literary studies, but I would point out that it is often pre-
cisely the ‘acute’ cases, the cases where the extraordinary is the norm, the dif-
ficult cases, where the structures of a phenomenon are revealed with particular 
clarity.
19 See the contribution of Matthias Engmann to this section.
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Disunited identity. Kierkegaard: 
traces towards dividuality
1  Introduction
In Kierkegaard the self has a dissonant structure. The self is not only a relation of 
different relation-poles but also a relation related to itself (see the famous defi-
nition of the self in Sickness unto Death). That implies, besides other points, that 
the self is simultaneously related to the external and the inner reality: a conglom-
erate of one’s own subjective actuality including the surrounding world, social-
isation, personal actions, body, thinking, normative values (ethics), (possible) 
religious convictions etc. Relating all that together, therein lies self-awareness. 
Vigilius Haufniensis, the pseudonymous author of The Concept of Anxiety, names 
it ‘self-consciousness’ (SKS 4, 443/KW 8, 1431), i.e. the consciousness of the self (as 
embodiment of the person’s subjective actuality). It represents self-reflexivity and 
the ability to evaluate one’s own possibilities, actions, and convictions in life. In 
other words: the self is a multilayered and self-reflected web (or set) of relations.
However, when it comes to the systematic examinations of being oneself or 
how self-identity is characterised in Kierkegaard, the secondary literature gives 
almost exclusively a line of interpretation in which Kierkegaard is considered as 
a philosopher who develops an understanding of identity as ‘unity’. This per-
spective on Kierkegaard has its own justification insofar the terminology and 
argumentation Kierkegaard uses and develops (especially in his pseudonymous 
works) often implies ‘continuity’, ‘wholeness’, and/or ‘completeness’.
This article takes another stance. The aspect of identity will be examined in 
the light of ‘dividuality’, which is understood here as the multiplicity of hetero-
geneous and juxtaposed self-views in the individual. The perspective is, there-
fore, to look at the subjectivity of the individual and his/her self-understanding; 
thus the following explanations offer an interpretation of subjectively recognised 
identity in its hermeneutic structure and existential instantiation.
Firstly, I will discuss identity and its conditions by combining the category of 
becoming and the social embeddedness of the individual.2 Hereby, I refer to the 
1 For the citation of Kierkegaard’s writings, see the references.
2 I need to emphasise here that this article looks at the ‘social’ foremostly as an immanent and 
important structural aspect of one’s self-relation.
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pseudonymous voices of Johannes Climacus (Philosophical Fragments and the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript) and Judge Wilhelm (Either-Or). Secondly, I will 
show how the Pseudonyms of Kierkegaard’s literary production themselves give 
an example of a multilayered self-view of the individual. Accordingly, this article 
looks at existential self-awareness by considering both the literary form and phil-
osophical content of Kierkegaard’s work.
2 Existential becoming and social embeddedness
In opposing the philosophy of idealism, Kierkegaard offers a philosophy of the 
concrete individual. Johannes Climacus, for example, develops the category 
of ‘concrete thinking’ (e.g. SKS 7, 303/KW 12.1., 332), which is understood as 
 self-reflexivity that considers ones concrete embeddedness into the world. For 
the purposes of this article, two aspects of this embeddedness are most impor-
tant: the becoming and the social embeddedness of the individual.
2.1 Becoming
Johannes Climacus is the pseudonymous voice in Kierkegaard which discusses 
Dasein or existence from an ontological perspective of becoming, which has to 
be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, becoming means to ‘become sub-
jective’3 which implies not only an instantiation process of existential actuality 
as increasing self-awareness, but also a becoming new by looking in new and 
different ways on the already existing personality. On the other hand, becoming 
includes the constant becoming of the world, which implies constant change and 
unpredictability.4 As long as the individual is part of the world, he/she is also 
changing.
From an existential and, therefore, subjective perspective, both understand-
ings need to be combined. The individual recognises him/herself by considering 
the facts of change and uncertainty. It implies that being oneself (identity) is with-
drawn from any kind of descriptive objectification and/or factual stabilisation. 
The self is not a fixed actuality. Increasing self-awareness, which is intended by 
3 See the Postscript, part two, section two, chapter one. For a short discussion, see Dalferth 
2006, 242f.
4 ‘The perpetual process of becoming is the uncertainty of earthly life, in which everything is 
uncertain’ (SKS 7, 85/KW 12.1, 86).
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Climacus, has to be seen, then, as a process of always changing views of oneself. 
Consequently, identity dissolves in the fluidity of change.
One the one hand, Kierkegaard does of course not emphasise such conclu-
sion, because of his permanently stressed point of self-decision.5 However, on 
the other hand, we will see that the immanent interpretation of Kierkegaard’s 
thought underlines the structural importance of this conclusion.
2.2 Social embeddedness
Kierkegaard’s philosophy of existential concreteness implies a distinct awareness 
in the individual of how he/she becomes the person he/she is. The conditions 
of actual self-awareness are, firstly, social embeddedness, and, secondly, how 
the individual interprets him/herself out of this social embeddedness. By that, 
Kierkegaard gives, especially in Either-Or, the first suggestions of a sociology of 
identity, almost 60 years before Georg Simmel. However, regarding the first point, 
Judge Wilhelm notes, that the self ‘is not an abstract self […], but a concrete self 
which stands in living interaction with these determinate surroundings, these 
conditions of life, this order of things. The self which is the aim is not just a per-
sonal self, but a social, a civic self’ (SKS 3, 250/EO, 5536).
Like George Herbert Mead, Wilhelm does not underline the idea of entelechy 
for the individual. The self appears as fundamentally relational. Every self-relation 
is intertwined with the society in which the person is located. That implies, firstly, 
that the individual is confronted with a number of ideas and narrations of what it 
means to be oneself,7 through which he/she interprets his/her own person. (This 
is important for our discussion of the pseudonyms.) Secondly, it implies that the 
inner and the external worlds of the particular person are always entangled; thus 
the self becomes an expression of a singularly developed participation in the sur-
rounding community and cultural contexts. It means, on the one hand, that char-
acter traits are always an expression of socialisation.8 On the other hand, it might 
5 Beside the long explanations in Either-Or, part two, we can read in the Postscript: ‘Through the 
decision in existence, an existing person […] has become what he is. If he sets aside, […] he has 
lost himself and must start from the beginning’ (SKS 7, 443/KW 12.1, 489).
6 On Either-Or I use the translation by Alastair Hannay; see the references.
7 ‘[F]or instance, cultural structures such as educational, political, religious, and economic in-
stitutions offer various ideas about selfhood. Thus, there are a variety of different possibilities of 
selfhood that compete with each other for the attention of each person’ (Jothen 2014, 50).
8 The individual ‘has these abilities, these passions, these inclinations, these habits subject to 
these external influences, […] influenced thus in one direction and thus another’ (SKS 3, 249f./
EO, 552).
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imply, more generally, that the self is fully determined by the external world. But 
such a perspective thwarts Wilhelm’s understanding of freedom as the capability 
of choosing between alternatives and possibilities in life as the basis of choosing 
the self. (Wilhelm takes hereby an ethical stance; only those possibilities are worth 
including in one’s self-view which express and relate the individual to the obliga-
tions of socially practiced humanity.) However, although the individual can choose 
between alternatives of action in self-becoming, the individual is also determined 
by all the alternatives and possibilities he/she does not consciously choose in life. 
That gives, thirdly, a picture of one’s self-determination. The self needs to be seen 
always as a heterogeneous expression of an actively willed development of choices 
and, at the same time, as a passively occurring determination by the imposing and 
impinging external reality with which the individual is confronted. This empha-
sises, fourthly, the aspect of contingency: not only in the sense of uncertainty and 
coincidence, but also in the concrete sense of historical contingency. The self is 
determined by the historical-political point of time, the topographical place, and 
the social position (class) the person is born into (it is no coincidence that Wilhelm 
characterises the self as a ‘civic self’). From an existential perspective, the indi-
vidual has to deal with that historic contingency. If the individual wants to under-
stand its own identity, it has to deal with its socio-historical givenness of identity.
2.3 Contingency and self-choice
If we focus more on contingency and relate it to the self-awareness of the indi-
vidual, then it is important to consider how the individual relates him/herself 
to his/her own past, present, and future (see also Engmann 2017, 162f.). From 
such biographical point of view, the future is a concrete expression of contin-
gency. The single person does not know what will happen; the future includes in 
its ambiguity the stabilisation as well as the loss of the current self-being. Such 
unpredictability also applies to the past, since it too was full of socially impacted 
possibilities. The biographical self is, therefore, just one emerged possibility out 
of different possibilities of self-being. The present represents this possibility in 
its actuality which is furthermore only a transition into the possibilities of future.
Thereafter, the biographical self is characterised by an openness of possibil-
ities. However, at the same time, the self is precisely that particular and definite 
self it became through its socialisation. Having such inter-esse between openness 
and cohesion of the self in mind, it is important for our discussion when Judge 
Wilhelm notes, ‘[T]he self […] contains an infinite multiplicity inasmuch as it has 
a history, a history which he acknowledges identity with himself. […] [H]e is only 
the one he is, with this history’ (SKS 3, 207/EO, 518). Out of all the possibilities 
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of how his/her own biography could have been, the individual has to take the 
standpoint that the factually emerged biography needs to be taken as basis for 
his/her own identity; thus the individual relates and positions him/herself to his/
her concretely experienced socio-cultural embeddedness, and, therefore, to all 
the impacts which have an influence on his/her own self-view(s). The individual 
chooses, then, its being in all its contingency,9 and chooses, therefore, its own 
self-acquisitions from the socio-cultural environment10; it chooses ‘absolute con-
tinuity with the reality one belongs to’ (SKS 3, 237/EO, 541). The individual takes, 
thereby, responsibility for what he/she became,11 even though the individual has 
no full control over what he/she became. And precisely by that, the individual 
recognises the actuality of manifold possibilities in life and keeps that awareness 
of potentiality as basis for its own self-view12: that it can ‘become something else 
and more’ (SKS 7, 122/KW 12.1, 130).
In the light of contingency, self-choice describes a process in which the 
individual ‘produce[s] himself’ (SKS 3, 239/EO, 543) by becoming aware of his/
her dependency and potentiality. To say it in dialectical terms: the individual 
chooses, in his/her givenness, the openness of self.
2.4 Self-interpretation
By taking responsibility for socio-cultural self-determination, our interpretation 
implies that the individual subjectively identifies him/herself with the external 
impacts and influences on the own person. The conditions for such a subjective 
creation of identity are the distinct perception and retroactive interpretation of the 
own person in time. This does not mean that the individual reacts only passively. 
Through self-interpretation, the individual gives his/her personality a contour. 
The hermeneutic process of self-understanding implies then, that the individual 
traces and shapes the development of personality by embracing and negotiating 
9 ‘Everyone can, if he wants, become a paradigm man, not by wiping out his contingency but by 
remaining in it and ennobling it. But he ennobles it by choosing’ (SKS 3, 249/EO, 552).
10 ‘The individual thus chooses himself as a diversely determined concretion […]’ (SKS 3, 240/
EO, 543).
11 ‘The individual is […] aware of himself as this definite individual, with these aptitudes, these 
tendencies, this instinct, these passions, influenced by these definite surrounding, as this defi-
nite product of a definite outside world. But in becoming self-aware in this way, he assumes 
responsibility for it all’ (SKS 3, 239/EO, 542).
12 ‘[H]e chooses himself as a product; […] As a product he is pressed into the forms of reality, in 
the choice he makes himself elastic, he transforms all of his outwardness into inwardness’ (SKS 
3, 239f./EO, 543).
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the perceived values, roles, and self-narrations. By taking the thoughtful percep-
tion and reception of his/her own personality seriously, the individual discovers 
consciously and productively the surface and the hidden parts of his/her own 
being, and confronts him/herself with both the trustworthy and shameful charac-
ter traits of the own personality. To deal with such unavoidable multiplicity truth-
fully defines self-responsibility regarding the hermeneutics of  self-understanding. 
The individual reaches, then, honest and upright self-acceptance.
Such self-acceptance is not to be confused with equanimity since the con-
stant actuality of becoming prevents any kind of finished self-understanding. 
This is an important point. As long as life is ongoing, the person is constantly 
in the progression of time and gets confronted with external reality and inner 
actualisations, thus the person’s own self-understanding is never finished. 
Insofar as identity depends on the subjective perception of life, the individ-
ual has to recognise a constant possibility of change. Such correlation between 
life-perception and the consciousness of self-change emphasises the process 
of self-understanding necessarily more as a process of self-discovering than 
of self-determining. By that, one’s self-understanding is based on a constant 
learning in which the individual acquires the own self through self-discovery. 
Such self-learning does not only connect the individual more closely to him/
herself but expresses and remains as an existential striving for which Johannes 
Climacus notes, ‘[T]he continued striving is the consciousness of being an 
existing individual, and the continued learning the expression of the perpetual 
actualization, which at no moment is finished as long as the subject is existing’ 
(SKS 7, 117/KW 12.1, 122).
Finding identity is, hereby, an active search in which the individual becomes 
an observer of itself (and its surroundings) and interacts hermeneutically with 
the overlapping self-aspects and -narrations. As observer of itself, the individual 
is part of the observed system that changes by the sheer fact of observing and 
the involved intentions. By that searching, the individual’s identity is changing 
the result. In other words, the identity recognized through a conscious/deliberate 
self-perception is different from the self-awareness of a non-searching individual. 
The immanent contingency of the searching process itself shows that identity is 
always a process with open ends and indefinite results.
If the individual takes the conscious stance that permanent becoming and 
openness characterise the development of the socially and culturally determined 
self, he/she is confronted with an ongoing epistemic lack of self-transparency. 
Identity emerges only through its ongoing self-discovery and actual implemen-
tation by the becoming individual, which, by that, never can reach an ‘Archime-
dean point’ overlooking the whole personality. Therefore, the individual always 
has to deal existentially with the expected and unexpected, from the external 
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world as well as from his/her own ‘inner world’. Existential self-awareness always 
includes the negative. One way to handle such lack of self-transparency is the 
constant negotiation between the external impacts on the own person and one’s 
self-hermeneutical processes, thus all the socio-cultural and personal impacts 
on oneself have to be balanced out.13 Self-awareness and  self-understanding 
occur then as a continuous adding of self-knowledge and simultaneously as a 
constant denying of what the individual might know about him/herself. By that, 
the self appears as palimpsest, i.e. a multilayered interpretation of what the 
person is and becomes,14 which implies furthermore that the individual embod-
ies this multilayered interpretation and interprets such embodiment at the same 
time; thus one’s self-relation occurs as a constant re-interpretation of (lived) 
 self-interpretations.
This point becomes very clear, if we look at the biographical dimension of 
identity creation. As long as the individual is socially embedded, which includes 
for Wilhelm also the ‘family’ (SKS 3, 207/EO, 518), he/she is confronted with dif-
ferent stories of him/herself, also from that part of the past of which the indi-
vidual has no concrete memory. But as long as these stories are reconstructed 
through the memory of the ones who are narrating them, the individual is con-
fronted with fragments of memory and interpretations. From the existential 
standpoint of becoming subjective, the individual has to relate him/herself to 
these interpretations, which purport to understand his/her personality, by inter-
preting them. This is, of course, also the case in terms of one’s own memory, 
which is always fragmented, reconstructed, coloured by emotions, interpreted. 
There is no objectivity in memory. To relate subjectively to one’s own memories 
for self-understanding, turns out always as a process of self-interpretation-in-
terpretation.
13 There is a short passage in Either-Or in where Judge Wilhelm proposes a striving for 
 self-harmony. ‘The person who has chosen and found himself […] has himself as specified in all 
his concretion. He has himself, then, as an individual who has these abilities, these passions, 
these inclinations, these habits subject to these external influences, and who is influenced 
thus in one direction and thus another. He has himself, then, as a task in a way in which the 
task in essentials is that of ordering, tempering, kindling, repressing – in short bringing about 
a proportionality in the soul, a harmony that is the fruit of the personal virtues’ (SKS 3, 249f./
EO, 552f.).
14 Edward F. Mooney underlines this understanding of identity too: ‘We can take the self that’s 
found or received as a fluid mix of capacities and aspirations and convictions, of relationships 
and roles, of character traits and sensibilities, more or less in and out of environing strands of 
culture and convention’ (Mooney 2002, 218).
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3 Pseudonyms
From a subjective point of view, personal identity is a multilayered structure of 
narrations, interpretations, and interpretations of self-narrations and –interpre-
tations: unfinished, never fully transparent, and always impacted by the diverse 
reality of the individual. Even though the self is, therefore, determined by the 
socio-cultural context, one’s self-interpretation(s) is not meant to create finished/
stable self-image(s) (for oneself and/or the public sphere). The important existen-
tial point above all, is to take the personal stance of subjective openness to the 
openness of the self. That implies simultaneously the awareness of potentiality, the 
focus on the discovery of the constantly emerging personality, and the awareness 
that existence is always an interpretation of life-and-self-perception. To conclude 
in short terms, however, identity is characterised as an open self-narration. The 
interesting point now is that Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous production gives an 
emblematic example for that. The guiding question is how the individual becomes 
aware of him/herself, if he/she is confronted with the pseudonymous works. The 
answer will help us to concretize the structure of subjectively recognized identity. 
The perspective on the pseudonyms I will take does not examine the poetic role of 
Kierkegaard’s literature, but looks instead at its existential function.
3.1 Pseudonymity and existential appropriation
In Kierkegaard’s opposition to the philosophy of idealism and its aim to explain the 
wholeness of the ‘world’ by systematising it thoroughly, he not only implements a 
philosophy of the concrete individual but presents the subject of concreteness in 
forms of self-narrations (and not systematisations15): his pseudonyms.
The relation between Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms can be interpreted fore-
mostly in two ways. Firstly, the pseudonyms are authors within an author: simply 
different fictional perspectives and positions on the matter of existence and/or jux-
taposed approaches to life and its possibilities. The person Kierkegaard represents, 
then, a transcendental subject unifying an array of different texts (see e.g. Adorno 
2003, 20). Secondly, Kierkegaard and his fictional pseudonyms are separate writers. 
The (not very detailed) individualities of the pseudonyms embody various stances 
on existence by their poetic actuality. This appears firstly in the pseudonyms’ 
15 Of course, books like The Concept of Anxiety or the Concluding Unscientific Postscript have 
a strong tendency of systematisation, but no one should overlook the inherent gaps in their 
 systematisations and the constant performative change between systematic language and narra-
tive passages. See Engmann 2017, 81–95.
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self-descriptions, and secondly in their responding to their fictional existence as 
earnestly and ironically as if they lived concretely. The name Kierkegaard becomes, 
then, one more pseudonymous personality (see e.g. Hagemann 2001, 69).
However, Kierkegaard’s communicative aim regarding his pseudonyms lies 
in his understanding that the idea of human existence inherently implies the 
interpretation and presentation of its possibilities (see Deuser 1985, 75). In this 
regard, the reader of the pseudonyms gets confronted with manifold perspectives 
and positions on how to deal with existence. (This is mirrored by the social narra-
tions which tell the individual how to be oneself.) The textual presentation helps 
the individual to understand his/her own life-situation, how to read and relate 
to the world and oneself.16 The artificial concreteness of the pseudonyms sup-
ports that existential effect. Fictionality opens up the possibility of dramatising 
the inner sphere, and engaging the reader by dramatising the existential thought. 
On the one hand, the reader mirrors him/herself in the pseudonyms, i.e. one has 
the impression of finding sides of one’s own personality in the pseudonym’s 
descriptions. On the other hand, the reader recognises (unexpected) possibilities 
of the self. In both perspectives the reader becomes subjectively involved in the 
intended existential process of thought through an opening up of the reader’s 
frustrations and curiosities; thus the usage of pseudonyms gathers the reader’s 
imaginative capacities and focuses them on the important matter, the complex 
reality (see Mooney 2013, 206).
For a better understanding we have to consider the fields of existential appro-
priation and (Socratic) maieutics. Both encourage the reader’s free response across 
a range of affect and content. The reader’s own reflection – on the presented exis-
tential situation in the context of someone else (the pseudonym) – impacts ret-
roactively the own stance to him/herself: namely by finding new perspectives on 
and positions to the given life. Existential appropriation is a process to increase 
self-awareness and to become new by actualising one’s own possibilities, initiated 
by a guiding example. However, such guidance ultimately needs to be left behind 
since appropriation is not imitation but a personal articulation of what is read, 
without actually repeating it. Self-appropriation is an ‘act of self-activity’ [Selv-
virksomhedens Akt] (SKS 7, 222/KW 12.1, 244) and implies the autonomy to take a 
critical position (to the text) with the aim of actualising the own self-being.
16 If the one reads, for example, Constantin Constantius, the pseudonymous author of Repe-
tition, then he/she can read the following lines: ‘I cannot rise above myself. I cannot find the 
Archimedian point’ (SKS 4, 57/KW 6, 186). Constantin mentions here the important point that 
was made above. The reader becomes confronted with an idea of existing, which implies a never 
finished and in-transparent self-understanding.
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3.2 Hermeneutics of openness 
In the process of personal appropriation, the reader interprets (in a self-reflexive 
manner) Kierkegaard’s interpretations of ‘existence’ as presented in juxtaposed 
narrations of poetic individuals and their dialogue.17 As long as the pseudonyms 
embody existential possibilities, the reader reaches hermeneutically only possi-
bilities of possibilities of understanding. The reader not only constructs his/her 
own interpretation of an open narration of ‘existence’, Kierkegaard intends that 
particular effect by the pseudonymous form of the presentation of the content. 
The reader’s confrontation with the pseudonymous production contains, then, 
a specific retroactive effect: the reader recognises his/her own interpretative 
existence, unattainable in its full potentiality of meaning; an important point we 
made above.
To support this point, we have to consider firstly, that inner differences char-
acterise the pseudonymous production. The presentation of various viewpoints 
on existence embodies talk about the same issues in different contexts and situ-
ations. Hence, the reader is always confronted with the matter of existence, but 
in the way of ‘heterogeneous thought worlds’ (Poole 1997, 159). Each pseudonym 
talks about existence in a context-dependent manner, which implies that all the 
given and verbally identical concepts (like ‘the ethical’, ‘inwardness’, ‘truth’, 
‘faith’ etc.) have to be read and understood out of their differences. If the reader is 
to interpret ‘existence’ for him/herself, it has to be done out of the specific situa-
tion and context of the considered pseudonym. Consequentially, there is no uni-
vocal meaning of words, which impacts furthermore the existential appropriation 
of the reader. The various presented meanings provide a hermeneutics at hand 
which opens up the horizon of understanding; thus the reader sees him/herself 
in the light of multiplicity and potentiality.
Another important point emerges from the relationality of the pseudonyms. 
For our discussion here, it is less important that the pseudonyms are fictional 
representations of individuals who are always engaged in world-relations.18 If the 
reader wants to understand him/herself through the pseudonyms, he/she has to 
consider his/her own cultural and social relations. However, more important is 
the dialogical structure of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous production. The fictional 
personalities are not isolated islands of existence-interpretations. They are entan-
gled by commenting on each other. Therefore, the contextualised hermeneutics 
17 In the following I will consider only argumentative points which are related to Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymity. For a different perspective regarding the hermeneutic status of Kierkegaard’s ter-
minology, see Engmann 2017, 81–9.
18 See, for example, Climacus’ self-description: Engmann 2017, 100–8.
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of each pseudonym open up to a multilayered and intersectional palimpsest of 
added, denied, and corrected meaning. Such complex dialogue includes possible 
perspectives, positions, and attitudes of the reader who interprets the pseudon-
ymous writings. From the standpoint of existential appropriation, the reader is 
already and always part of the pseudonyms’ dialogue and thereby involved in the 
palimpsestical narration of ‘existence’.
If the individual discovers him/herself by reading the pseudonyms, he/she 
recognises not only the openness of self-interpretation but also its embeddedness 
in already existing ways of understanding the meaning of life and self.
3.3 Disunited identity
If we consider now that one person created the pseudonyms as different perspec-
tives and positions (on the same issue), the latter then represent the contradic-
tory sides of that person, corresponding on and fighting with each other. The 
pseudonymous production shows, on the existential level, the complex web of 
inner conflicts of every living person (see Carlisle 2006, 36f.): that no one is fully 
consistent. Kierkegaard gives an emblematic example for all the contingencies, 
ruptures, breaks, gaps, more developed sides, suppressed and restrained parts 
etc. of one’s own personality, which appears then – hermeneutically and struc-
turally – as an open unity.
If the personality is (systematically) an unfinished palimpsest, the  self- 
appropriating individual has to resist existentially the temptation of avoiding 
contradictions. Such kind of rejection and/or process of harmonisation of one’s 
own personality would undermine complexity and the sheer fact of reality, which 
is never a simplifiable point of concern. Embracing the openness and recognising 
the fact of being ‘simultaneously old and young, happy and sad, single and legion’ 
(Mooney 2013, 198), the reader of Kierkegaard understands him/herself in all his/
her inner juxtaposition and multiplicity. To maintain that in lived consequence 
expresses an existential honesty (truthfulness) and a responsibility for oneself.
Such way of self-actualisation includes that any conscious and intended cre-
ation of public self-images avoids self-honesty and -responsibility (see Stewart 
2015, 108ff.). Hence, actualising one’s own self-appropriation by sticking to just 
one of the pseudonyms (a created image) erodes hermeneutically the whole idea 
of existential self-awareness. Therefore, existential appropriation leads system-
atically to the personal knowledge of all the different voices in oneself, to recog-
nising them all as meaningful, but accompanied by the awareness that no single 
voice represents oneself completely, although it says something (limited) about 
oneself.
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Insofar as the different voices represent not only different personal character-
istics, attitudes, and convictions, but also different self-narrations, we have to con-
sider two points. As long as the different self-narrations are juxtaposed in oneself, 
the individual is divided into different self-articulations. At the same time, these 
self-narrations and -articulations are constantly overlapping in oneself; therefore, 
the individual constantly lacks self-transparency. Given the fact that nobody knows 
all the different layers of their own personality, since their mixture is practically too 
complex, existential self-awareness expresses here again only an epistemic approx-
imation of self-understanding. The interpretation of oneself is never finished and 
never fixed. And the existential task is to live with that without working against it.
4 Conclusion and outlook
The interpretation advanced by this article underlines the structure of the self as a 
multilayered web of relations, since subjectively recognized identity is a multilay-
ered structure of narrations and interpretations, unfinished and  in-transparent. 
Kierkegaard’s presentation of thought in the literary form of different masks (pseu-
donyms) not only underlines that point but adds the aspect of direct  experience 
of the inner conflicts in the self-awareness of every individual. The philosophical 
content of Kierkegaard’s work, hereby, mirrors the form of its presentation and 
vice versa. This is also the case in regard to existential potentiality and determin-
ing dependency.
In the light of existential self-appropriation, the individual depends on the 
meanings of self given by the pseudonyms. Even so, the individual has to ‘go his 
own way’ (SKS 7, 251/KW 12.1, 277); becoming aware of the own self is a process 
of self-discovery, in which the individual reacts upon the given meanings and 
possibilities of self. The same systematic characteristics arise in terms of social 
embeddedness, insofar as the self-understanding and identity of the individ-
ual depend on the socio-cultural environment, in which he/she discovers him/
herself by reacting to the impacting influences.
This kind of reaction to the socio-cultural environment as well as to exter-
nal meaning sources needs to be seen in the light of freedom, and therefore in 
the light of self-choice. Regarding existential appropriation, the individual has 
to reflect and concretise the given self-possibilities of the pseudonyms in his/
her own ways. The, hereby, underlined autonomy of the individual, to choose 
between self-possibilities (or not), mirrors the self-choice regarding social embed-
dedness, in which the individual has to deal with different self-possibilities in life. 
Insofar as this article suggested and argued for an understanding of self-choice as 
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 choosing the openness of the self (out of its social and cultural givenness), it takes 
its own systematic stance between an esthetical understanding of freedom and 
the ethical quality of self-choice as it is presented by Kierkegaard in Either-Or.19
Given these three main characteristics – the multilayered structure of iden-
tity, the self-discovery in dependency, and the freedom in self-choice –, personal 
identity needs to be seen, then, not only as an open awareness of the self but also 
as an organic nexus of changing and overlapping self-interpretations, concrete 
self-actualisations, and personal positioning. The identity is never just given and 
19 The two pseudonymous voices in Either-Or, the esthetician A and ethicist B (Judge Wilhelm), 
have different approaches on self-awareness that emerges through the way of living. ‘A’ is in-
terested in the possibilities which life offers, and he tries out and practises his own personality 
in those given alternatives of life, but without choosing any of the alternatives as a base for a 
stable personality. ‘A’ wants to enjoy the play of different masks (possibilities of personality), 
because he does not want to betray his freedom of oscillating between different possibilities. 
‘B’ contradicts that, because any kind of mask denies for him the true personality and leads to 
 self-distraction. He insists on choosing, and that can be read as a process of finishing the person-
ality in a stable self-picture that denies further possibilities of the self.
The interesting point for our given interpretation of identity emerges if we consider that the per-
spective of ‘A’ productively contradicts the perspective of ‘B’ (see Gräb-Schmidt 2017, 198–203). 
‘A’’s stance, that one should not finish one’s own personality by choosing, takes it seriously that 
the individual is always bound to social roles, personal masks, and different narratives of the own 
personality. By that, ‘A’ insists not only on a process of taking over the roles, masks, and narratives. 
He also recognises the juxtapositions and contradictions in the self. This implies that ‘A’ refers 
to the fact of the givenness of identity, and that every individual has to deal with the multilay-
ered expressions and conditions of the own personality. In that way, ‘A’’s point of view represents, 
on the one hand, very neatly Kierkegaard’s play with the pseudonyms, namely the fact of the 
 non-onesidedness of the personality; and he asks, on the other hand, how responsible it is to cut 
the own self off from its potentiality.
However, such multilayeredness recognises ‘B’ too. The concept of self-choice is simply the 
reaction to this awareness. However, as we showed above, ethical choice does not necessarily 
imply fixating the self. It can also mean to choose, on the one hand, the givenness of self (roles, 
masks, narrations) and, at the same time, the openness of the self (potentiality). But this spe-
cific way of looking at ethical choice seems closer to the stance of ‘A’ than of ‘B’, because the 
earnestness of holding the possibilities of self becomes important. If we combine the matter of 
(ethical) choice with the stance of ‘A’ like this, we should not overlook the exegetical fact that 
‘A’ does not want to fixate himself. He wants to keep ironic distance from any kind of willed 
 self-determination. Thereby, he misses the energetic effort to understand truly the own person-
ality, which is in contrast to the existential aim of ‘B’.
Precisely in here lies the systematic character of the interpretation of subjectively recognised 
identity given in this article. It combines the esthetical characteristics of freedom with the existential 
(inward) quality of the ethical self-choice. Therefore, it brings together the recognition of existential 
possibilities (the multilayered personality) with the willed and intensive energetic effort to contour 
the self. By that, this article differs from the offered perspectives in Kierkegaard’s Either-Or. Nev-
ertheless, it takes these perspectives seriously and brings them into a new systematic conclusion.
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never just freely chosen, but a constant interpretation and instantiation of self-
views and -stances.
Interpreting Kierkegaard like that gives, thereby, also an idea of how exis-
tential striving for truthful self-understanding wants ‘to construct a life which 
makes sense, but also to gain a sense for one’s life which one cannot construct’ 
(Campbell 2000, 48). To understand life, the individual has to understand him/
herself in life. And if the individual understands that he/she cannot understand 
him/herself as a whole, the individual understands life equally as a well and 
web of potential meaning that lies beyond the own understanding. From here, 
we could refer to Kierkegaard’s understanding of existential religiousness. The 
permanent becoming and creation of one’s personal identity would, then, turn 
out to ‘receive’ the self from the meaning source as such, God.20
However, we can, finally, examine four important points on the given inter-
pretation of self and identity by drawing lines to more (or less) current philosophy.
Firstly, identity appears as an inter-esse (a term used by Climacus: SKS 7, 286/
KW 12.1, 314) between a ‘porous’ and ‘buffered’ understanding of the self. Using, 
hereby, the terminology of Charles Taylor in a (more or less) associative way, it 
is important to underline that Kierkegaard insists on the openness (porousness) 
of the self, since any hermetic understanding of the self cuts down the concrete 
actuality of human self-relations and their inherent contingencies.
Secondly, identity is never a stable wholeness of self-understanding, a posi-
tion which was mirrored in the first half of the 20th century by many philosophers, 
e.g. Heidegger or Dewey. Dewey said, ‘The whole self is an ideal, an imaginative 
projection’ (Dewey in A Common Faith; see Joas 2000, 145). Like Kierkegaard, 
Dewey shows that the individual can never recognise and actualise the whole self 
since every self-reflection and every (social) action gives only an understanding 
and an awareness of sections of one’s personality (see ibid., 144f.). This aspect 
points not only to the self-understanding illustrated through the pseudonyms, 
but also to the process of self-learning and -discovery in social embeddedness.
Thirdly, insofar as identity represents a web of inter-related and overlapping 
self-stances, particularly shown by the pseudonyms, the individual does not only 
recognise an inner plurality or multiplicity, but also recognises the other (not to 
be confused with ‘stranger’) – or better: the possibility and actuality of other-
ness – in him/herself. This perspective correlates with Hannah Arendt’s exam-
ination of Socrates’ insights into the structure of thinking as such. In thinking, 
the individual engages in a dialogue with him/herself and is, therefore, in his/
20 On the concept of receiving in a more general perspective, see Ringleben 1983, 101–7. On re-
ceiving in Wilhelm, see Mooney 2002; in Climacus, see Engmann 2017, e.g. 278–81.
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her thought processes always a ‘split unit’ (see Arendt 2016, 56f.). The individ-
ual stays, thereby, in relation to him/herself but cannot be congruent with him/
herself. Self-congruence implies the non-actuality of thinking. Therefore, the 
thinking individual has to be understood as a unity of plural voices. This, by its 
core conflictual, situation points precisely to the given interpretation of identity 
as a web of hermeneutic thought processes (self-interpretations).
Fourthly, the inter-relationality of identity with the external reality and inner 
self-actualisations gives a basis for a systematic comparison with current socio- 
theoretical philosophy. As long as personal identity is always an actualisation 
through the embeddedness in socially given ways of living, identity in Kierkegaard 
can be related, for example, to some aspects of Rahel Jeaggi’s (2014) understanding 
of Lebensform (‘way of living’). Jaeggi argues that Lebensformen, such as the family, 
are compounds of social practices and attitudes which determine the structure of 
human world relations and offer, therefore, the framework for our social appropri-
ations of values and rules, our actions and self-understanding. Insofar as the indi-
vidual is always withdrawn from strict control of his/her Lebensformen (see ibid., 
119), the individual is also withdrawn from the full control of the self-being that 
emerges through his/her Lebensformen. This points to the analysis of this article.
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Afterword: parting the self
This section consists of four case studies in which human selves are either 
observed or theorised as being subject to disaggregation. Each article highlights 
a distinctive facet of the interdependence between processes of individuation and 
dividuation, whereby we see our collective theoretical interest play out in diverse 
sociohistorical settings. Juxtaposing data spread between sixteenth, seventeenth, 
and nineteenth-century Europe and seventeenth-century India and Iran, we note 
convergences while retaining cognizance of historical contingencies and specifi-
cities of literary forms.
The articles are concerned with the self’s construction as an entity that is, 
simultaneously, embedded in a social setting and differentiated from it. In our 
work, dividuality is an especially productive interpretive gesture rather than a 
straightforward descriptor. This approach allows us to correlate cases that are 
starkly disparate on the surface. We notice an overarching commonality in that 
the self’s divisibility always indexes freedom of human action to various degrees. 
Thinking of the self as divisible affords access to the complexity of our historical 
and philosophical interlocutors that would be obscured if we were to insist on 
individuality as the primary fulcrum of analysis.
Our cases are concerned with social settings in which human subjects con-
front a plurality of ideas and practices as a stark quotidian fact. To take up the 
contributions in chronological order, Riccarda Suitner’s work is concerned with 
the religious situation in sixteenth-century Venice, a site where the diversification 
of religious (and other) thought associated with early modern Europe bubbles 
up all over the place in the archive. Following stories of individuals – above all 
belonging to the first generation of Venetian Anabaptists – who confront this 
world through interaction, absorption, resistance, and continual change, the 
self’s hybridity seems to be a relevant phenomenon in a society still dominated 
by the principle of religious and confessional conformity. A series of social, eco-
nomic, cultural and confessional factors made it possible for part (albeit a tiny 
one) of the population of the Venetian Republic of the mid-sixteenth century to 
develop the feeling that they had been given the potential to choose the confes-
sion most suited to their own inner needs. This interplay of individual choice and 
an approach definable as ‘confessional eclecticism’, lacking in dogmatic coher-
ence and loyalty to a single confession, shows that pluralism and the fragmenta-
tion of the self could be considered an integral part of individualization.
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The massive seventeenth-century work on Persian poets and poetry, written 
in India and explored here by Shahzad Bashir, also showcases a vast world of 
ideas and literary patterns. In this case, however, the in/dividuality paradigm 
helps to parse the single-authored work into a multiplicity of self-expressions that 
are anchored in the difference between prosaic and poetic first-person speech. 
Bashir’s literary analysis raises the important question of how we imagine the 
author as a human subject. One possibility is to see the prosaic/poetic differ-
ence as a formalization of the dividual self that we can presume to have been the 
author’s personality in his lived environment. However, the literary difference 
has its own logic tied to diachronic discursive continuities in the way Persian 
literature can be considered a tradition. We then need to be cautious about extra-
polating directly between literary topoi and existential and social claims about 
the author. Concentrating on dividuality as reflected in the literary form cautions 
against buying into straightforward paradigms for the human subject. Rather, 
dividuality works as a conceptual intervention that invites more complex ways of 
understanding the text and the society where it was created; (on the question of 
the relationship between author and text see also III.2).
The dynamic between literary expression and confessional or personal iden-
tity plays out in a parallel but different way in Martin Mulsow’s analysis of pseu-
donymous theological works from seventeenth-century Europe. Here authors 
deliberately operationalize dividuation as a way to contend with the world and to 
seek advantage within it through highly sophisticated rhetorical means. Mulsow 
draws on Bakhtin’s concept of ‘dialogism’, which has been developed for the 
analysis of the many voices included in modern novels. In the scholarly field 
however, Mulsow emphasizes, dialogism does not produce a ‘wild’ polyphony, as 
Bakhtin claims for the texts of Rabelais, but a highly controlled, tactically accu-
rate balance. In this sense the dividuality of such authors as Jean Le Clerc, Noel 
Aubert de Versé, or Theodor Ludwig Lau is to be assessed: it is a very carefully 
weighted dividuality, which knows all shading from innocent to criminal, as in 
Jean Aymon. Mulsow complements dialogism and dividuality with the notion of 
relational authorship, which describes not the several persona in one author but 
rather the several authors behind one work.
Mulsow ends on a note about Søren Kierkegaard. This provides the transition 
to Matthias Engmann’s contribution. Engmann’s work on Kierkegaard’s concep-
tualization of the ever-transforming self posits this self as an entity suspended in 
the interstice between the fragmented experience of ordinary time and space and 
the felicitous unity attributed to God. Kierkegaard’s advocacy, aimed at processes 
of self-reflection, is manifested in both his theoretical work and in his famous 
pseudonymous practice that deliberately leverages the self’s dividuation as a 
basis for his philosophy.
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Our cases highlight individuation and dividuation as co-constituting processes. 
Using these terms heuristically allows us to bring the interdependency between 
self and society into higher relief. Transplanting theoretical insights between the 
articles illuminates common topics, such as: the relationship between migration 
and identity formation; literary ingenuity as a means for inventing, or escaping 
from, selves; notions of connections between the interior and exterior parts of the 
human person; and the effort to simultaneously authorize and  de-authorize the 
self that is a pervasive feature of the human condition. While there is a ‘prosaic 
self’ in Balyani (Bashir), there is an ‘editor self’ in Le Clerc (Mulsow), and in Kier-
kegaard pseudonymous selves frame the interaction between the different pos-
sible existential positions (Engmann). While the Italian heretics of the sixteenth 
century were still overwhelmed by the plurality of possible dogmatic deviances 
and reacted with eclectic and fluid theological views (Suitner), the late seventeenth 
century theologians deliberately mirrored the complex discussions in their works 
and strategically chose sides or changed allegiances (Mulsow). In Kierkegaard, 
the play with pseudonyms is employed in order to make the search for truth ‘fluid’ 
again in a static Biedermeier situation of external Christianity (Engmann). In Per-
sianate India, the ‘poetic self’ in Balyani finds the freedom to talk in an antinomic 
and embodied way (Bashir).

Section 2.3: Porosity, corporeality and the divine
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Paul’s Letter to Philemon: a case study 
in individualisation, dividuation, and 
partibility in Imperial spatial contexts
1  Paul the impresario
Paul’s letter to Philemon (composed in c. 55–56 or 56–61, depending on whether 
Paul is writing from an Ephesian or Roman prison) is a virtual laboratory for a 
discussion of themes of individualisation amongst Pauline Christ believers in the 
first century. As we will see, it also furnishes useful data for the discussion of 
dividuation, that is a study of the ancient individual as partitive, or a composite of 
social relations, supernatural powers, and material objects (Mosko 2010; Strath-
ern 1988). Philemon offers a useful case study in processes of both individualis-
ation and dividuation in a Roman imperial period emergent religious movement 
we today call Christianity.
In 25 short verses (335 words), Paul becomes an impresario managing an 
elaborate set of roles into which he casts the letter’s three chief protagonists: the 
apostle Paul, Philemon, and a slave named Onesimus. The letter shows Paul’s 
role as a religious entrepreneur who marshals a set of cultural codes and expecta-
tions to articulate a set of prescriptions that result in an unanticipated reversal of 
social norms. To the degree that this is the case, we can see that Paul is engaging 
in what Rüpke (2013, 3–38) identifies as de-traditionalisation, a sine qua non of 
processes of individualisation in ancient contexts.
As the letter unfolds, Paul, Philemon, and Onesimus (as well as a few other 
minor characters) find themselves occupying different positions on the apos-
tle’s stage in a rhetorical tour de force in which the imprisoned narrator masks 
a command in the form of an appeal to pursue a course of action that Philemon 
may otherwise have been reluctant to carry out. As this piece of rhetorical delib-
eration proceeds, the players find themselves clothed by the narrator with one 
costume in one or two verses, only to find themselves in new ones for a quick 
scene change in the next. As the rhetorical deliberation develops we discover a 
host of characters trying on the clothes of a shifting set of identities. The play, 
however, takes place on the larger stage of what our director sees as a cosmic 
drama. In this drama, roles must quickly change because all things are subject 
to a dynamic refurbishment that renders old ways of conceiving of identities and 
selves obsolete and requires a whole new imaginary of persons and their roles 
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in a new work of divine creation. Here human actors are remade and given new 
scripts to follow. It is this that makes Philemon such a fascinating study in the 
forms of religious individualisation and dividuation that arise from an eschato-
logically oriented religious movement.
2 A brief history of interpretation
Traditionally the letter has been read as a response to a situation in which a slave, 
Onesimus, has run away from his master, Philemon, to seek refuge with Paul, a 
prisoner. The slave has been converted to Christ belief while with the apostle, 
who is now sending him back to his master with a letter pleading on his behalf 
not to punish him but to receive him as a new convert, and to free him to help 
with the Gospel mission of the apostle to the Gentiles (for the traditional reading, 
following Luther, Lohse 1973, 187, 188). In recent years, the traditional reading 
has been contested, with some arguing that there is no compelling evidence that 
Onesimus was a fugitive, only that he was sent at Philemon’s bidding, was con-
verted by Paul, and then returned to his master with a letter asking that Phile-
mon free (or loan) his slave for the mission (Arzt-Grabner 2010, 113–42; 2004, 
131–43; Lampe 1985, 135–57; Harrill 1999, 135–8; Bellen 1971, 18,78; Wolter 1993, 
229–31; 2008, 169–80). Certainly, the letter remains a topic of debate amongst 
those who use it to argue that Paul accepted or rejected the institution of slavery 
(Barclay 1991). The writing has also served an important role in a kind of entan-
gled historical reading amongst some African American biblical interpreters, 
who, following a liberationist strategy of a hermeneutics of retrieval, have tried 
to show how the Letter to Philemon forms part of a long tradition in which Paul 
is seen as tolerant of slavery (Barton 2016, 47–58). African American scholars 
point out that the epistle nowhere portrays Onesimus as a fugitive slave and that 
such a reading reflects more the social position of an interpretive tradition than 
it does the text itself. Further, they note, the apostle thus does not use the logic 
of his Gospel to demand Onesimus’ release but instead assumes that Philemon 
can be both brother and master. Callahan (1997) has proffered the case that the 
relationship between Onesimus and Philemon was not that of slave and master 
but, rather, that of brothers, and that Paul’s letter seeks reconciliation rather 
than manumission.
The more traditional historical debate has focused on whether Paul endorsed 
slavery. In the period before the American Civil War, Philemon functioned as an 
important piece of evidence for both sides of the anti-slavery/pro-slavery debate 
(Callahan 2012, 143–56). Pro-slavers argued that the letter, taken together with 
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the Household Rules (Col. 3.18–4.1; Eph. 5.22–6.9; 1 Pet. 3.18–3.7; 1 Tim. 2.8–15; 
3.2–13; Tit. 1.5–9 – a hierarchically arranged list of duties assigned to husbands, 
wives, children, master, slaves), in which Paul (both parties assumed Paul 
wrote everything the New Testament ascribes to him, a position many scholars 
contest) exhorts slaves to be obedient to their masters, shows that the apostle 
tacitly endorsed, if not directly promoted, slavery. Abolitionists pointed out that 
Paul urged Philemon to release his slave and encouraged slaves to seek their 
freedom where possible (1 Cor. 7.22), thus showing his opposition to slavery. In 
fact, this debate could itself form the backdrop for an interesting case study in 
questions of the individualisation of slaves in the slavery debates of the 18th 
and 19th centuries, and of how the Epistle to Philemon played a crucial role in 
 de-traditionalising slavery to affirm the rights and individuality of every person. 
Here, however, we focus on the place of the letter to Philemon as a letter in its first 
century context, since it furnishes us with a fascinating case study of first-century 
individualisation and notions of divine presence in constituting religious identity 
more broadly.
3 The anthropological turn
There is a school of New Testament scholarship that would contest the very pos-
sibility of evidence of individualisation in a document of the first century. Start-
ing in the 1980s, a group of biblical interpreters, who went on to form a seminar 
called The Context Group, turned to the tools of cultural anthropology to study 
the Bible.1 Arguing that biblical scholars too often import modernist assumptions 
into ancient data and thereby misinterpret ancient evidence with a contemporary 
mindset, they turned to cross-cultural comparison with modern Mediterranean 
and contemporary peasant cultures in order to create models appropriate for 
the interpretation of the Bible, whose texts, they argued, were far closer to tradi-
tional peasant ways of seeing the world than they were to those of the Enlighten-
ment and the industrial west (for a general introduction, Esler 2000, 3–25). The 
members of the Context Group were, and continue to be, extraordinarily prolific 
authors who together have published dozens of monographs, commentaries 
and scholarly articles, convened international seminars, and supervised scores 
of doctoral theses. The result has been a transformation of the field of biblical 
studies, especially in North America and Great Britain. Today, if one picks up a 
1 For the Context Group, ‘The Context Group: A Project on the Bible in its Socio-Cultural Con-
text’, http://www.contextgroup.org (cited 31.12.2016), of which the author is a member.
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New Testament introduction in the English-speaking world one sees evidence of 
leading concepts of the Context Group invoked without citation as received schol-
arly wisdom.
In 1981, Bruce Malina, one of the pioneers of this approach, published The 
New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology. In it he distilled an 
array of anthropological field studies, largely by scholars publishing in the 
1960s, in order to identify what he described as ‘pivotal Mediterranean values’. 
These, he argued, were the coordinates that should guide any exegetical study of 
biblical texts that seeks to avoid cultural anachronism and remain faithful to the 
probable meanings of ancient texts. The values include honour and shame, the 
dyadic personality, the idea of limited good, kinship structures, and concerns 
over purity and impurity. In Malina’s treatment, these are what define a Med-
iterranean peasant society and what we can generalise as the primary charac-
teristics of the contemporary cultures of the Mediterranean Basin, which in turn 
furnish us with the means to engage in culturally appropriate investigations of 
the first century. Behind his approach is Braudel’s representation of the longue 
durée, presented in The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of 
Philip II (1949), although Malina pays little attention to the shifting dynamics 
of Mediterraneanism (the many Mediterraneans, the French historian insisted) 
of the Braudelian enterprise. It is notable that although anthropologists have for 
decades now contested an idea of ‘the’ Mediterranean (Herzfeld 1984; 1987; de 
Pina-Cabral 1989), Mediterraneanism and the abstract totalising generalisations 
that marked an earlier generation of anthropologists now passes wie es eigen-
tlich gewesen within the New Testament guild and reproduces itself through its 
many media.
For our purposes here, we will attend to Malina’s pivotal value of the ‘dyadic 
personality’. For Malina and others, this phrase refers to a notion of the indi-
vidual and the self that characterises pre-industrial, peasant culture. Applied 
to the ancient Mediterranean context, the central insight of the concept is that, 
unlike in the case of modern people for whom individualism and introspection 
form central aspects of their social identity, the ancients had neither an interest 
in, nor indeed a capacity for, introspection, and had no notion of the individ-
ual. Instead, ancient people conceived of themselves as occupying social roles 
and carrying out the obligations associated with them. They were relationalists, 
not individualists. While the modern self is a bounded unit, the ancient self was 
social and inter-related. Thus performance dictated by the traditions associated 
with time-sanctioned societal scripts is what created social identity. As people 
were governed by codes of honour and shame, this meant that there was little 
deviation from these prescribed relational roles without the severe consequences 
of social marginalisation. 
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On this account, we can only speak of individuals in the ancient world as 
people governed by psychosocial roles – more or less flat characters practicing 
their daily lives in the company of others without reference to an interior life. The 
exclusive reference point for the ancients was to the others outside oneself and it 
was by reference to these that one knew oneself and undertook daily practices. 
Mediterranean dyadism contrasts with modern individualism through its deter-
minative group orientation.
A dyadic personality is one who simply needs another continually in order to know who he 
or she really is […]. Such a person internalizes and makes his own what others say, do, and 
think about him because he believes it is necessary, for being human, to live out the expec-
tations of others. That person would conceive of himself as always interrelated to other 
persons while occupying a distinct social position both horizontally (with others sharing 
the same status, moving from center to periphery) and vertically (with others above and 
below in social rank). Such persons need to test this interrelatedness, with the focus of 
attention way from ego, on the demands and expectations of others who can grant or with-
hold reputation. Pivotal values for such persons would be honor and shame, not guilt. 
(Malina 1981, 55)
Malina’s mention of guilt here refers to a modern theological sensibility that 
reads ancient biblical texts, especially those from Paul, as a solution to the 
human dilemma of how a guilty sinner can stand before a righteous God. On this 
model, Martin Luther and, before him, Augustine, possessed the quintessential 
introspective religious consciences of the west (Stendahl 1963). As ancients had 
no interest in, or perhaps even capacity to experience, guilt and had their entire 
psychosocial make-up dedicated to what others thought of them, any attempt to 
discover first-century people as individuating selves must be anachronistic at 
best. Malina goes on to state,
The dyadic personality is an individual who perceives himself and forms his self-image 
in terms of what others perceive and feed back to him. He feels a need of others for his 
very psychological existence, since the image he has of himself must agree with the image 
 formulated and presented by significant others, by members of significant and person- 
sustaining group like family, village, even city and nation. (Malina 1981, 55)
We can freely acknowledge the obvious point that ancient people were not like 
us moderns and that we cannot step into the past with our understandings of 
personhood. However, when stated in as bald a form as that offered by Malina, it 
is a gross distortion of the evidence to replace guilt-ridden modern individualists 
perpetually given to existential crises with a set of ancient cyphers who had no 
real capacity to conceive of themselves except through menus of social roles and 
the perceptions of others. The strength of Malina’s approach is to draw attention 
to the role of social expectation and codes of honour as important ‘sources of 
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self’ (Taylor 1994) in Antiquity. Michael Trapp (2007), in his survey of person-
hood and its relation to ethics and social identity in the Hellenistic and Roman 
period, confirms some of what Malina contends, albeit without reference to social 
scientific models in the service of a Braudelian Mediterraneanism. Trapp points 
to the importance of conformity in the making of ancient selves and to the kind 
of quirky individualism modern people celebrate as a problem to be overcome 
rather than an identity to be nurtured and promoted in others. What Malina 
fails to perceive, however, is that actors always have choices about how they will 
conduct the practices that belong to the duties and obligations they are tasked 
with living. Nor does he appreciate that psychosocial interactions are, while rela-
tional, far more complex than the ‘dyadic’ model permits. It is true that ancients 
were members of collectives such as families, cities, and social strata, and that 
they negotiated their lives by reference to social scripts. But it does not follow 
that they did not do such things in idiosyncratic ways. The problem is that while 
Malina’s dyadic person resolves the problem of not reading ancients as moderns, 
it creates another, even more serious, problem by turning ancients into little 
more than individualised versions of group stereotypes. Further, while we cannot 
speak of ancient selves as modern individuals, neither should we turn them into 
simple functions of social expectations and exchange. 
Charles Taylor’s (2007, 35–41) notion of the porous self of the pre-modern 
period is useful here. The phrase describes a non-bounded self that is subject to 
and constituted by innumerable phenomena (spiritual powers, powers of objects, 
religious rituals, magic, relationships with physical surroundings and natural 
phenomena, shifting identities in varying situations, gift exchange, and so on) as 
well as interpenetrating others through different kinds of media (spells, prayers, 
sacrifices, gifts, invisible transference of parts of oneself into another, etc.). The 
porous self is one capable of interpenetration and relationships that moves far 
beyond the enacting of traditional roles. Instead of speaking of selves as dyadic, 
as Malina does, we should therefore consider them ‘polyadic’, polypositional, 
and multifaceted. They were not at all like modern selves and individuals, but 
they were selves and individuals nonetheless.
This is where attention to Paul’s letter to Philemon is helpful, because it 
invites us into a world that is neither modern nor flatly ‘Mediterranean’ but, 
rather, points to forms of agency that unfold within a set of culturally expected 
roles. The value of Paul’s letter to Philemon is not that it assures us that honour 
and shame are guiding categories in the life of ancients (which they surely were), 
nor that we can see people governing themselves by reference to the perception 
of others (which they most assuredly did). Such notions can readily be detected 
in Paul’s letter to Philemon and thus could be invoked to sustain Malina’s overall 
model. It is rather that we see creativity in how a set of religious beliefs create new 
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possibilities for social performance and for casting those performances within a 
new set of narratives. We see the agency of a religious entrepreneur negotiating 
social codes and expectations in new ways to bring about ends that conform to a 
novel set of religious beliefs and practices.
4 Dividuation and partibility
A more promising and valid avenue for cross-cultural anthropological discussion 
of individualisation in the Letter to Philemon can be found in a recent study of 
dividuation and relationality in Melanesian culture. Here the self is not comprised 
by a static set of psychosocial roles but rather by interpenetrating relationships 
with people, places, and objects. Strathern (1988), in her study of gender in Mel-
anesian culture, deploys the term dividuation in reference to persons ‘frequently 
constructed as the plural and composite site of relationships that produce them’ 
(13). The dividual is both single agent and cause of effects, but it is also multiple. 
‘The singular must also be seen with respect to the two forms out of which unity 
is composed – the multiple or composite person and the dividual. Here what is 
taken for granted are the multiple external relations in which a person is embed-
ded […]’ (275). This means that when a person acts as an in/dividual s/he is also 
acting as a plurality: ‘a person in the form of a dividual, is potentially one of a pair 
[in taken-for-granted relationships], or may know him or herself as a composite 
microcosm, potentially bounded as a unit’ (275). On this model, a person acts as 
a subject but does so self-reflexively, that is, in view of the observation of others 
(whether real or imagined), such that an in/dividual act also becomes a united 
act of a group that the actor performs and is judged thereby to be successful or 
not. Strathern furnishes the example of a woman giving birth, which is an action 
by an agent but also a microcosm of social relations:
what gives the event its unique character is how well or in what manner a particular rela-
tionship is made “to appear” on that occasion. That evaluation defines the occasion. The 
event thus submits the self, the agent, to scrutiny in its capacity as a person from the 
vantage of another and thus subjects it to aesthetic judgment (278).
The notion of a Mediterranean dyadic relationship is thus too simple and 
restricted. On the model of dividuality, the role of the other is not simply to script 
a stereotypical set of performances and behaviours according to which one knows 
oneself and the other. On the contrary, there is a rather more dynamic relation-
ship: ‘The character of the other provides the context that determines whether the 
agent perceives her or himself as effective in a dividual and multiple mode’ (278).
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A further feature of dividuality, where there is both individual agency and a 
microcosm of social relations, is partibility, that is the constitution of a person 
through gifts, contributions, and the splitting off of or detachments of others. 
Mosko (2010, 215–40) has studied the manner in which conversion to Christianity 
is effected in particular Melanesian cultures ‘through elicitive exchanges involv-
ing parts of their persons and corresponding personal detachments of God, Jesus, 
Mary, Holy Spirit, the Devil and so on’ (215). He describes how, in conversion or 
other forms of religious transformation, a person’s composition changes through 
attachments to the contributions of others or through detachments from one 
agent to another.
Through acting, partible persons are decomposed, anticipating and evincing recognition 
of their externalized capacities through the responses of corresponding patients (or victims 
[i.e. in magical spells]). For me to detach the appropriate part of myself so that it will be 
effective in drawing forth a desired part of another person (i.e. his or her sister in marriage, 
a shell valuable, or a ritual spell) I must be able to conceptualize the internal capacities 
of both myself and my exchange partner so that I can strategically externalize that part 
of me which will be successful in uncoupling the part of the other person which I desire. 
Through these kinds of elicitations, persons stimulate one another to action and reaction. 
Every action – or transaction – is in this way both conventional and innovative. 
(Mosko 2010, 218)
Thus dividuality and partibility offer a way to conceptualise a non-western form 
of in/dividualisation wherein selves are not buffered but porous, and are found in 
roles and practices even as they are constructed from a variety of causal agents, 
including those of gift exchange. This last point is especially important for an 
understanding of the kind of individualisation under investigation in this treat-
ment of Philemon.
5 Narrative worlds and personae in Philemon
Such cross-cultural social scientific studies prove especially useful in the inter-
pretation of ancient biblical texts. Distant comparisons between New Testament 
writings and other pre-industrial cultural systems free one from modern assump-
tions and allow one to enter imaginatively into other cultural social worlds. While 
one cannot simplistically impose the anthropological study of Melanesia onto 
ancient Mediterranean Christ religion, there is nevertheless sufficient ‘fit’ to allow 
comparison and thereby to bring aspects of biblical texts and the religion they 
represent into relief. In what follows I present first an account of the narrative 
world of the letter to Philemon and then draw on notions of a dividual and parti-
ble self to explore aspects of the correspondence that have not yet been explored.
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Norman Petersen’s notion of ‘the sociology of narrative worlds’ (Petersen 
1985, 17–29) provides a valuable approach to the evidence for, and forms of, indi-
vidualisation, dividuality, and partibility in Paul’s letter to Philemon. With the 
help of the sociology of knowledge, he invites a study of Paul that considers the 
apostle and his letters as belonging to intersecting narrative worlds: the narra-
tive we create as historians looking onto the past, Paul’s narration of the world 
around him, and the implied narrative that lies within, embedded and behind 
each letter in his corpus. This implies a dynamic set of relations at multiple levels 
of investigation. What he means by a ‘sociology of narrative worlds’ is a study of 
‘the symbolic forms and social arrangements that sustain the lives of the actors 
who inhabit such [narrative] worlds’ (17). Petersen goes on to consider two fea-
tures of such forms and arrangements, namely the structures of social arrange-
ments within a group and the meanings maintained by the group. My own pre-
dilection is to speak of roles and drama, rather than ‘groups’, because there is a 
tendency by Petersen – under the influence of the sociology of knowledge – to 
reify social performance and render it too static. This follows as well from his 
use of Geertz’s (1973, 87–125) notion of symbol systems as models of and models 
for reality. Without diminishing Geertz’s anthropological insights concerning 
the importance of attention to how symbols create and prescribe actions within 
reality, it is more fruitful when considering the issues of in/dividualisation in 
Philemon, and arguably the corpus Paulinum more generally, to consider lived 
practices, competing commitments, and creative appropriations of symbol 
systems. Cultures are dynamic lived realities that are remade in each encounter 
in  sometimes-unpredictable ways (de Certeau 1984). To put it differently, while a 
set of symbol systems may serve to define reality and ethical codes, not all people 
will interpret reality identically or act uniformly. A host of factors, such as gender, 
social status, and psychological factors, result in idiosyncratic ways of seeing and 
acting within the world. This calls for a more dynamic model for the interpreta-
tion of narrative worlds and the roles that unfold within them.
To follow Rüpke (again), Philemon points toward practices de-traditionalisation, 
namely the reconfiguration of behavioural norms, cultural patterns, and reli-
gious beliefs for new purposes.. The net result is new modes of performativity 
that result in individualisation, here understood as the emergence of new modes 
of action and practice guided by a particular religious narrative and its differ-
ing, and by no means always internally self-consistent, interpretations amongst 
various social actors. To put it differently, even those who inhabit the same reli-
gious narrativisation of the world will not occupy it in the same way, or even tell 
the same story at all times to themselves or to one another. The Letter to Phile-
mon is one moment created by one storyteller and directed towards others who 
will receive and retell the story in their own ways. However, when considered 
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from the perspective of dividuality and partibility, the letter also creates selves 
and others, both via detachment (the letter as expression and token of self) and 
attachment (the letter’s arrival and its effects – considered to elicit a transforma-
tion of self-identity – in reading).
Paul pitches this re-traditionalisation in the particular modality of one 
patron/religious entrepreneur communicating with another with respect to 
a third party. At one level the social codes are maintained, but this serves as a 
backdrop for their deconstruction at another level. It is within a shifting narra-
tive configuration of identities that social roles are de-traditionalised, thus cre-
ating actors for new roles and self-understandings. Here there are others who 
help to shape the perceptions of a self and by reference to whom one sees and 
interprets oneself. To consider this self-other interrelation in a kaleidoscopic nar-
rative fashion avoids the error of Malina, who would make Paul’s letters all stage 
setting, props, and cultural generalities, but leave no room for real actors. It also 
avoids the limitations of the approach taken by Petersen, who would make of 
Paul and his audiences all group and no individuals. My interest is in the way 
Paul furnishes us with people to place on Malina’s stage and within Petersen’s 
group, and on the unique roles he gives them to play in a surprising narrative 
twist that serves to individualise them, as well as on the way the letter conceives 
interpenetrable and partible in/dividuals. We will see directly that the Letter to 
Philemon reflects the acting out of a small scene in a larger apocalyptic drama, 
into which Paul inserts his characters, thereby seeking to transform the broader 
setting. Here there is a capacity for the actors to detach parts of themselves and 
to attach to others, resulting in new constructions of what constitutes an individ-
ual and relationships amongst actors. To demonstrate this, we will need to look 
beyond the confines of our 335 verses to the larger Pauline corpus and the sources 
of self the apostle identifies there.
First, however, it is necessary to take a closer look at the players in the 
particular scene represented by the Philemon letter. In order to get the full 
measure of Pauline de-traditionalisation and in/dividualisation in the epistle, 
it is helpful to chart the set of roles Paul invokes and how he (usually implic-
itly) reverses them by bringing them into association with one another. What 
I mean by roles is a set of more or less stable cultural codes and prescribed 
practices that an ancient might expect someone inhabiting the role to perform 
in the accomplishment of their duties. I begin by offering a table of the roles the 
letter invokes. I want to conceive this more as a list of dramatis personae than 
‘roles’ because, following de Certeau’s theorisation of daily practice as well as 
Strathern’s observation concerning agency that is simultaneously constituted 
by the individual and the group, I want to show that we are dealing with prac-
tices and dynamic relations that have the power to affect one another rather 
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than with static identities. The following lists these practices and relationships, 
following the NRSV translation of the Greek, together with the verses in which 
they appear.
1. Paul
a. prisoner of Christ Jesus (1, 9, 23)
b. prisoner for the Gospel (1, 9)
c. brother of Philemon (7, 20)
d. old man/ambassador (9)
e. father of Onesimus (10)
f. Onesimus as ‘my own heart’ (14)
g. master (13)
h. partner with Philemon (17)
i. patron of Onesimus (18)
j. author (19)
k. ‘in Christ’ (20)
l. client of Philemon (20, 22)
m. master of Philemon (21)
2. Philemon
a. dear friend (1)
b. co-worker (1)
c. house church host (2)
d. love for the saints and faith (5)
e. evangelist (6)
f. patron (2, 7, 19, 20, 21)
g. brother of Paul (7, 20)
h. brother of Onesimus (16)
i. servant/slave (8, 21)
j. slave owner (11, 16)
k. partner (17)
l. Paul’s client (19)
m. ‘prayer’ (22)
3. Onesimus
a. Paul’s child (10)
b. once useless now useful (11)
c. servant/slave (12, 16)
d. Paul’s heart/proxy for Paul (12, 17)
e. proxy for Philemon (13)
f. brother (16)
g. ‘in the Lord’ (16)
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4. Others
a. Timothy – brother (1)
b. Apphia – sister (1)
c. Archippus – fellow-soldier (1)
d. Epaphrus – fellow-prisoner in Christ (23)
e. Mark, Aristarchus, Demas, Luke – fellow workers (24)
The table, as abstract as it is, offers occasion for a few preliminary observations. 
First, it reveals the plurality of roles Paul ascribes to the characters of his letter 
and the speed with which he exchanges them. Second, these roles can be broken 
down into a set of categories that relate to solidarity (the frequent use of ‘co’ or 
‘fellow’ and ‘partner’); friendship, patronage (host, owing of self), clientship 
(guest), the household (father, sister, child, master, slave), the body (‘heart’), reli-
gious belonging/location (‘in Christ’), government (ambassador), imprisonment, 
and the army. Third, we can see here that Paul is playing at a register of keys and 
following a score not directly visible in the letter itself but presumed throughout 
it. Finally, and most importantly, this is what makes the letter such a fascinating 
case study in what might count as individualisation, as well as dividuality and 
partibility. The letter provokes Philemon to realise Paul’s desired outcome, which 
is to receive Onesimus as Paul’s own self and then to free (or loan) him for the 
apostle’s (that is to say, God’s) task of proclaiming his Gospel. 
One witnesses a straightforward script that combines notions of friendship 
together with those of patronage, but also a social account of one giving a piece or 
part of oneself to another that results in a change in the other. Thus, on one level, 
Paul addresses Philemon as a social equal when he refers to him as co-worker, 
dear friend, and partner. He is cognisant of the fact that since Philemon welcomes 
an assembly of believers in his household, Philemon is also a patron. Indeed, the 
apostle is bound to him on the basis of a cultural script of exchange of favours: 
Paul will reimburse Philemon for anything the return of Onesimus may cost the 
master and he relies on his hospitality, even as Philemon owes to Paul his own 
self as a convert to Christ belief. 
From the perspective of dividuality and partibility, the gift exchange of 
hospitality, patronage, friendship, and favours binds both actors together and, 
in doing so, also changes them. When Paul describes himself as Onesimus’ 
father and Philemon’s brother he is describing a changed set of relations that 
go far beyond the metaphorical status of religious roles and practices. This lan-
guage describes transformations of relationships both through the imparting 
of spiritual gifts from God and through attachment to spiritual gifts that are 
tokens of the presence of a partible deity that inhabits believers, as well as of 
partible selves. In sending Onesimus, Paul sends Philemon ‘his heart’ – that 
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is to say a part of himself that now enters into Philemon’s social world and 
changes him through a ritual of eastern Mediterranean gift exchange. Such gift 
exchanges establish both equalising and hierarchical relations between these 
actors. In offering Onesimus welcome, Philemon welcomes Paul as a friend 
as welcoming a part of Paul’s own self; in sending him, Paul expresses his 
fatherly presence and reminds Philemon that he too is the host’s father, indeed 
Philemon owes Paul his very life (‘you owe me your very self ’ – v. 19). Do these 
obligations cancel each other out? Or are they arranged hierarchically so that 
any bonds of gift exchange that might exist nevertheless appear in a hierar-
chy of benefits and returns? Without saying it, Paul clearly wants to affirm 
such a hierarchy. Thus it is that he can command by requesting that Philemon 
does what Paul wishes. Paul (as a proxy for Christ) retains the privilege of a 
primary locus of agency, even as such privilege is disavowed by his repeated 
self- representation as a prisoner.
Yet if there is a hierarchy of gift exchange, it is an inverted one that can be 
seen in Paul’s inversion of normal indices of status. There are two stage sets in 
this letter: the one is Philemon’s house church and the other is Paul’s prison. 
Between these settings, selves are imparted and reconstituted in a unique new 
microcosm of a recreated social world. The presence of the house church looms 
large as the epistle’s backdrop. The epistle is a personal letter to Philemon but, 
as v. 3 indicates, the recipient is also host to the Christ assembly that meets in his 
house. The other setting, the prison, is more important for the apostle’s rhetor-
ical purposes: Paul represents himself as a prisoner four times (vs. 1, 9, 10, 13), 
thus making his imprisonment a critical motif in his epistolary character. The 
social shame of imprisonment is, however, inverted when Paul describes himself 
as a ‘prisoner of Jesus Christ’ (vs. 1, 9) and his jail time as ‘imprisonment for the 
gospel’ (v. 13). The fourth reference (v. 10) makes the prison the locale of Paul’s 
exercise of patriarchal authority in becoming father to Onesimus, ‘my child’ 
(v. 10). It is clear that this is no normal Roman jail: Paul is not Rome’s prisoner 
but Christ’s, and his cell is a setting for adoption into a new family of believers. 
This makes for a topsy-turvy identity, as can be seen in the inversions of v. 8: ‘[T]
hough I am bold enough in Christ to command you to do your duty, yet I would 
rather appeal to you on the basis of love – and I Paul, do this as an ambassador 
[presbytēs], and now also a prisoner of Christ Jesus [desmios Christou Iēsou]’ (my 
translation). This imprisonment has changed Paul in the same way that detach-
ment from a divine power that now inhabits him changes him: he is not a prisoner 
of Rome, but of Jesus Christ (1, 9). Location imparts to him a new status which 
creates a modality of self that allows the imprisoned apostle to issue commands 
from a superior social location. Here he is in prison but, more critically, he is also 
‘in Christ’ (v. 20). With the apostle is ‘his heart’ which he has sent in the guise of 
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Onesimus to Philemon to refresh is an extension of this identity: ‘I am sending 
him back to you, sending my very heart’ (v. 12); ‘refresh my heart in Christ’ (v. 20).
Modern Western notions of the buffered self quickly lead one astray when 
encountering this language. This is a world in which agency is distributed 
through gift exchange that makes selves partible and dividual, as well as inter-
penetrable. The setting here is, thus, not neutral but, rather, a locus of agency; 
it inhabits Paul even as he is within it. Here, in his oxymoronic representation 
of himself as ambassador/prisoner, Paul undertakes a wholesale revision of cul-
tural expectations. This allows him to reconceive whatever duty Philemon the 
slave master has towards his property Onesimus as a new set of priorities that 
reflect Paul’s own reversal of identity, inscribed by the overlay of his narrative 
world onto his physical setting of imprisonment. This helps to turn Onesimus into 
a brother of his erstwhile master, even as both are brothers with Paul. The apostle 
creates a new set of fictive kinship relations in that all the players in our drama 
are children of their heavenly father, God. Indeed, how they will be a father and 
brothers is the product of their own idiosyncratic behaviours. But whether they 
will be such is ultimately determined by their audience, namely God, who wit-
nesses the outcomes and behaviours of these exchanges. We are not, of course, 
in the village of a woman giving birth in Melanesia. However, the transactional 
observational culture of that setting offers an interesting means for making a 
cross-cultural comparison that we might otherwise miss when confined to study 
that is strictly lexicographical and oriented towards the sociology of knowledge, 
or indeed towards outmoded 1960s anthropological analysis.
Agency and identity here are much more sophisticated than traditional 
avenues of interpretation usually permit. In the case of our characters, it remains 
only for Philemon to get up to speed on Onesimus’ new status as a believer and 
to receive him no longer as slave but also as brother, ‘both in the flesh and in 
the Lord’ (v. 16). They share an interpenetrating transactional set of relations 
made possible through divine habitation. Under such a new set of relations, it is 
hardly appropriate for Paul to invoke his right to command Philemon (as though 
an apostolic master over the person who owes him his life). Rather, he should 
appeal to Philemon to act voluntarily (v. 14). Here Paul borders on the language 
of master and slave himself. He does not want to compel or force Philemon to do 
anything (v. 14) and he wants Onesimus to act as proxy for Philemon: ‘that he 
(Onesimus) might be of service to me in your place during my imprisonment for 
the Gospel’ (v. 13) – again marking the capacity of selves to fuse with others in 
new constellations of dividuality.
The way that the letter flips relations between patrons and clients, slaves and 
masters, freedom and imprisonment, shows a complex revision of social identi-
ties and protocols even as it communicates a set of dynamic dividual identities. 
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Paul as religious entrepreneur improvises on social hierarchies and practices of 
exchange, as well as indices of honour and status, in a way that both inscribes 
and undermines traditional understandings and relocates actors within a con-
stellation of new interpenetrating realities. The result is a dynamic social script 
that cannot be apprehended by reference to a simplistic notion of dyadism but 
requires instead attention to the subtle reworking of cultural scripts in the par-
ticular social situation created by a slave, a master, an assembly of religious 
adherents, and a religious founder. It is practice and both individual agency and 
collective identity that together create a process of in/dividualisation, not a time-
less and static cultural phenomenon. Porous selves practice a set of social inter-
actions and are in turn changed by them.
6 Cosmic in/dividuation
The letter attests to the importance of a religious imaginary in processes of indi-
vidualisation (Fuchs 2015, 333–5). The letter to Philemon, as indicated above, is 
but a scene in a much larger drama that Paul conceives of for himself and those 
around him. It is on the basis of a larger imagined drama that the forms of de- 
traditionalisation of social roles, created by Paul’s appeal to Onesimus’ master, 
take shape and create new possibilities for social performances and identities. 
It is to this larger social and religious imaginary that this essay now turns.
There is debate as to whether Paul is an eschatological (Wright 2013; 2015) 
or apocalyptic thinker (Beker 1982). While appeal to an Inter-testamental form 
of Jewish apocalyptic has been used with too heavy a hand to interpret Paul’s 
uncontested letters (thus, Sanders 1977), it is important to recognise that, for the 
apostle, there is a radical refashioning underway that will be realized through a 
reformulation of human relations in an impending advent of Christ. ‘For the Lord 
himself will descend from heaven with a cry of command, with the archangel’s 
call, and with the sound of the trumpet of God’ (1 Thess. 4.16). Paul conceives of 
an old age passing away and a new one arriving (2 Cor. 5.17), even as he antic-
ipates the second coming of Jesus with all the fanfare one discovers elsewhere 
in Second Temple apocalyptic literature. Because of the in-breaking of this new 
order, social horizons are being reformed.
‘[T]he appointed time has grown very short; from now on, let those who have wives live as 
though they had none, and those who mourn as though they were not mourning, and those 
who rejoice as though they were not rejoicing, and those who buy as though they had no 
goods, and those who deal with the world as though they had no dealings with it. For the 
form of this world is passing away’ (1 Cor. 7.29–31).
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Perhaps one might gloss this text with an additional phrase: and masters treat 
slaves as brothers and sisters, and those imprisoned in Christ Jesus as ambassa-
dors of the Gospel. For Paul, all traditional arrangements are in a process of being 
recast: ‘For as many of you were baptised into Christ have put on Christ. There 
is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is no longer male 
and female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (Gal. 3.27–28). Slaves and masters 
are brothers and sisters, those imprisoned are most honoured, traditional gender 
arrangements are recast, and imperial powers are being swept away in favour of 
a new means of governance and human sociality.
It falls outside the strict confines of this essay to chart all the nuances of this 
recasting of social relations. Suffice it to say that, in the light of this renewal that 
is ‘even now but not yet’, Paul represents a profound de-traditionalisation of 
social roles and hierarchies in favour of a new set of possibilities for exercising 
social agency and identity. Paul does not see a gradual coming of a new order 
but a radical break in the present social order and a sweeping away of old reali-
ties in favour of a new ones. An old creation in bondage to sin and death is being 
renewed and is indeed groaning with birth pangs as the new one is arriving 
(Rom. 8.22–23). This allows Paul to prescribe new sets of social relations in the 
midst of a passing order: male-female relationships are not defined primarily 
by marriage and the household (assuming that Paul did not write Colossians or 
Ephesians), men and woman should not marry if they can help it, there is no 
longer slave and free, Jew or Greek, male and female. A new thing has come and 
old things are passing away. This creates the stage for the de-traditionalisation 
of social roles and behaviours and the emergence of new personae living out 
roles in unique and unanticipated ways. In terms of the composition of selves 
and identities, for Paul this reality that is passing away is marked by the pene-
tration of the self by the Spirit. Paul conceives of identities that can be possessed 
by a partible and dividual God, as well as identities that can at one and the same 
time be ‘in the Spirit’ and ‘in Christ’, and even joined to the death of Jesus in 
crucifixion.
We are all too familiar with this language and, from a modernist theolog-
ical point of view, tend to overlook the way in which it marks dynamic iden-
tities being constructed by powers that are detached from God and which 
inhabit Christ believers. Paul uses the language of ‘the gifts’ or ‘fruits of the 
Spirit’, which moderns are inclined to understand with a rationalist mind-set 
as qualities or characteristics. But as the gift of glossolalia and ‘the tongues of 
angels’ indicates, this hardly conforms to the modest Protestant ideals of good 
behaviour. When Paul speaks of spiritual gifts, he means divine powers that 
inhabit a porous self and take it over, activate it, and constitute it. Nor is this 
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a momentary possession through ecstasy; it is clear that Paul means that this 
is an ongoing spirit possession through which behaviours are shaped and that 
one can call others to obey by resisting that other form of possession, namely 
possession of ‘the flesh’. The ‘flesh’ is also for Paul a resident that is a hostile 
reality in a partible property (Rom 7.14 – ‘of the flesh, sold into slavery under 
sin’), with which the apostle and his believers battle. They know both ‘the fruits 
of (or from) the Spirit’ and ‘the works/fruits of (or from) the flesh’ (Gal 5.16–26). 
Both are impartations of the divine and semi-divine that inhabit and motivate 
them. By the same token Paul can talk about his ‘heart’ coming into Philemon’s 
household qua Onesimus. Bi-location is, on this account, a capacity that not 
only the gods possess, albeit in the apostle’s case it is possessed in the form of 
gift exchange. Paul as entrepreneur is creating this order even as he reveals it, 
in the form of the letters he sends to communities advising, admonishing, and 
encouraging forms of behaviour consistent with a developing series of visions 
for a new set of realities. These letters are also physical objects which mediate 
God’s presence, since they are transmissions from Christ via the apostle (Rom. 
1.7; 1 Cor. 1.3; 2 Cor. 1.2; Gal. 1.3; Phil. 1.2), even as they are instantiations of the 
apostle’s own presence.
The Letter to Philemon offers both a snapshot of de-traditionalisation in a 
process of the individualisation of actors as well as a window into a way of con-
ceiving divisible and partible selves. It is unclear how these identities were prac-
tised on the ground. Paul leaves Philemon with the authority to do what he will 
with his slave, even as he crafts a rhetorical case that suggests otherwise. How 
can one be both brother and master/slave? Is it the case that  de-traditionalisation 
only occurs in particular ritualised contexts of Eucharistic celebrations and 
baptism? Or is it that brotherly affection forms an incentive for masters not to 
treat their slaves harshly, thus investing them with an identity they might not 
otherwise achieve until manumission? If Philemon manumits Onesimus as an 
act of patronage, thus turning his slave into a client, what on-going obligations 
will the freedman now owe his master? Or, if Onesimus purchases his freedom, 
will he still share a social bond in a new form with his former master? In other 
words, does de-traditionalisation relate only to certain salient conditions and, 
if so, how does it spill over into the practices of other traditional identities and 
leave its mark there? Religious imagination, religious entrepreneurship, ritually 
conceived identity, and the practices of daily life in a new spatial imaginary (the 
form of the world passing away; the prison cell as agent of a new identity; a world 
undergoing birth pangs even as a creation comes into being) – all of these work 
together to reveal divisible and partible selves and to offer new possibilities of in/
dividualisation in old settings.
536   Harry O. Maier
7 Appendix
Paul’s letter to Philemon2 
1 Paul, a prisoner of Christ Jesus, and Timothy our brother, to Philemon our dear 
friend and co-worker,2 to Apphia our sister, to Archippus our fellow-soldier, and 
to the church in your house:3 Grace to you and peace from God our Father and 
the Lord Jesus Christ.4 When I remember you in my prayers, I always thank my 
God5 because I hear of your love for all the saints and your faith towards the 
Lord Jesus.6 I pray that the sharing of your faith may become effective when you 
perceive all the good that we may do for Christ.7 I have indeed received much joy 
and encouragement from your love, because the hearts of the saints have been 
refreshed through you, my brother.8 For this reason, though I am bold enough 
in Christ to command you to do your duty,9 yet I would rather appeal to you on 
the basis of love – and I, Paul, do this as an old man, and now also as a prisoner 
of Christ Jesus.10 I am appealing to you for my child, Onesimus, whose father 
I have become during my imprisonment.11 Formerly he was useless to you, but 
now he is indeed useful both to you and to me.12 I am sending him, that is, my 
own heart, back to you.13 I wanted to keep him with me, so that he might be of 
service to me in your place during my imprisonment for the gospel;14 but I pre-
ferred to do nothing without your consent, in order that your good deed might 
be voluntary and not something forced.15 Perhaps this is the reason he was sepa-
rated from you for a while, so that you might have him back for ever,16 no longer 
as a slave but as more than a slave, a beloved brother – especially to me but 
how much more to you, both in the flesh and in the Lord.17 So if you consider 
me your partner, welcome him as you would welcome me.18 If he has wronged 
you in any way, or owes you anything, charge that to my account.19 I, Paul, am 
writing this with my own hand: I will repay it. I say nothing about your owing 
me even your own self.20 Yes, brother, let me have this benefit from you in the 
Lord! Refresh my heart in Christ.21 Confident of your obedience, I am writing to 
you, knowing that you will do even more than I say.22 One thing more – prepare a 
guest room for me, for I am hoping through your prayers to be restored to you. 23 
Epaphras, my fellow-prisoner in Christ Jesus, sends greetings to you,24 and so do 
Mark, Aristarchus, Demas, and Luke, my fellow-workers.25 The grace of the Lord 
Jesus Christ be with your spirit.
2 Unless otherwise stated I cite the NRSV.1
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1παῦλος δέσμιος χριστοῦ ἰησοῦ καὶ τιμόθεος ὁ ἀδελφὸς φιλήμονι τῶ ἀγαπητῶ καὶ συνεργῶ 
ἡμῶν 2 καὶ ἀπφίᾳ τῇ ἀδελφῇ καὶ ἀρχίππῳ τῶ συστρατιώτῃ ἡμῶν καὶ τῇ κατ᾽ οἶκόν σου ἐκκλησίᾳ· 
3 χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ. 4 εὐχαριστῶ τῶ θεῶ 
μου πάντοτε μνείαν σου ποιούμενος ἐπὶ τῶν προσευχῶν μου, 5  ἀκούων σου τὴν ἀγάπην καὶ 
τὴν πίστιν ἣν ἔχεις πρὸς τὸν κύριον ἰησοῦν καὶ εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἁγίους, 6 ὅπως ἡ κοινωνία τῆς 
πίστεώς σου ἐνεργὴς γένηται ἐν ἐπιγνώσει παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν εἰς χριστόν· 7  χαρὰν 
γὰρ πολλὴν ἔσχον καὶ παράκλησιν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀγάπῃ σου, ὅτι τὰ σπλάγχνα τῶν ἁγίων ἀναπέπαυται 
διὰ σοῦ, ἀδελφέ. 8 διό, πολλὴν ἐν χριστῶ παρρησίαν ἔχων ἐπιτάσσειν σοι τὸ ἀνῆκον, 9 διὰ τὴν 
ἀγάπην μᾶλλον παρακαλῶ, τοιοῦτος ὢν ὡς παῦλος πρεσβύτης, νυνὶ δὲ καὶ δέσμιος χριστοῦ 
ἰησοῦ 10 παρακαλῶ σε περὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ τέκνου, ὃν ἐγέννησα ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς ὀνήσιμον, 11 τόν ποτέ 
σοι ἄχρηστον νυνὶ δὲ [καὶ] σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ εὔχρηστον, 12 ὃν ἀνέπεμψά σοι, αὐτόν, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν τὰ 
ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα· 13 ὃν ἐγὼ ἐβουλόμην πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν κατέχειν, ἵνα ὑπὲρ σοῦ μοι διακονῇ ἐν τοῖς 
δεσμοῖς τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, 14 χωρὶς δὲ τῆς σῆς γνώμης οὐδὲν ἠθέλησα ποιῆσαι, ἵνα μὴ ὡς κατὰ 
ἀνάγκην τὸ ἀγαθόν σου ᾖ ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἑκούσιον. 15 τάχα γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἐχωρίσθη πρὸς ὥραν ἵνα 
αἰώνιον αὐτὸν ἀπέχῃς, 16  οὐκέτι ὡς δοῦλον ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ δοῦλον, ἀδελφὸν ἀγαπητόν, μάλιστα 
ἐμοί, πόσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον σοὶ καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ καὶ ἐν κυρίῳ. 17  εἰ οὗν με ἔχεις κοινωνόν, προσλαβοῦ 
αὐτὸν ὡς ἐμέ. 18 εἰ δέ τι ἠδίκησέν σε ἢ ὀφείλει, τοῦτο ἐμοὶ ἐλλόγα· 19 ἐγὼ παῦλος ἔγραψα τῇ ἐμῇ 
χειρί, ἐγὼ ἀποτίσω· ἵνα μὴ λέγω σοι ὅτι καὶ σεαυτόν μοι προσοφείλεις. 20 ναί, ἀδελφέ, ἐγώ σου 
ὀναίμην ἐν κυρίῳ· ἀνάπαυσόν μου τὰ σπλάγχνα ἐν χριστῶ. 21 πεποιθὼς τῇ ὑπακοῇ σου ἔγραψά 
σοι, εἰδὼς ὅτι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἃ λέγω ποιήσεις. 22 ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἑτοίμαζέ μοι ξενίαν, ἐλπίζω γὰρ ὅτι διὰ 
τῶν προσευχῶν ὑμῶν χαρισθήσομαι ὑμῖν. 23  ἀσπάζεταί σε ἐπαφρᾶς ὁ συναιχμάλωτός μου ἐν 
χριστῶ ἰησοῦ, 24  μᾶρκος, ἀρίσταρχος, δημᾶς, λουκᾶς, οἱ συνεργοί μου. 25  ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου 
ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν.
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Esther Eidinow
Self as other: distanciation and reflexivity 
in ancient Greek divination
1 Introduction
This essay examines some of the ways in which the practice of oracular consultation 
in ancient Greece – as both an individual experience and a cultural  institution – 
expressed and, in turn, reinforced the sense of the mortal self as dividual and 
subject to uncertainty. It argues that both those who were possessed and gave 
oracles, and those who received oracles would have experienced a sense of ‘distan-
ciation’, that is, a reflexive sense of distance from self. In the space created by that 
sense of distance was located the potential to perceive oneself as intersubjective, 
prompted by an understanding of the role of the divine in mortal life, and a strong 
sense of irony, generated by comprehension of the contrast between divine and 
mortal knowledge. This was linked, in turn, to a profound acknowledgement of the 
persistent presence of uncertainty in mortal experience. The sense of distanciation 
was, in the case of both oracle giver and oracle receiver, generated not only by the 
embodied experience of openness to the divine, but also by participation in the 
shared narratives of such experiences – and by the relationship between the two.
In making this argument, I am building on two previous articles, details 
of which I include here at the request of the editors, because it will help to make 
more apparent the connections between this essay and others in this publication, 
as well as give a fuller overview of this essay’s argument (Eidinow 2013; 2019a 
respectively). The first article, ‘Oracular Consultation, Fate, and the Concept of 
the Individual,’ sets out to explore how those who consulted oracles perceived 
 themselves as ‘individuals’, examining the conception of the self that they 
held, and how this influenced their expectations of the oracular process and 
its outcome. As a first step, the article seeks to make explicit common models 
of the self in current Western culture, which tend to picture the self as ‘more 
autonomous from other people and outside influences […] than in other times 
and places’ (Strauss, Quinn 1997, 28). Indeed, Clifford Geertz has suggested that 
this idea of the self, as ‘a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational 
and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgment, and 
action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other 
such wholes and against its social and natural background’ is ‘a rather peculiar 
idea within the context of the world’s cultures’ (Geertz 1983, 59). The article raises 
some alternative models of the self, which will also be relevant to the essay in this 
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publication: specifically, it focuses on the idea of the ‘dividual’, which conceives 
of the body and self as comprising a ‘microcosm of relations’ (Strathern 1988, 
131). While this is most starkly seen in analyses of conceptions of self in non- 
Western cultures (for example, and in particular, in Marilyn Strathern’s research 
in the Highlands of Papua, New Guinea), as others have argued, this kind of 
relationality with others can also be observed as an element of  self-conceptions 
in Western cultures: the self emerges in different cultures, ‘precisely from that 
tension between dividual and individual aspects/relations’, as Edward LiPuma has 
suggested (LiPuma 1998, 56–61, and quotation 57; his italics). The article goes on 
to explore how a relational model of the self could be useful in understanding 
the process of oracular consultation: it argues that there is evidence that ‘ancient 
Greek men and women conceived of the self in relational terms, and that this 
relationality included interdependence with supernatural forces (and, in turn, 
their inter-relations) with regard to both individual character and life-course’ 
(Eidinow 2013, 37). Looking more specifically at the evidence for oracular con-
sultations, it posits that ‘those who consulted Oracles perceived themselves to 
be engaged in working out their circumstances in communion with supernatural 
forces’ (ibid., 32).
The second article, ‘τύχα at the Oracle of Zeus, Dodona,’ develops these ideas: 
from an analysis of the Dodona oracle question tablets, it argues that among 
those supernatural forces, T/tyche appears to have played a particularly signifi-
cant role in the framing of possibilities by consultants of that oracle. Rather than 
providing evidence of the attempt to master T/tyche, the explicit references to it 
can be argued to indicate acknowledgment of the continuing presence of uncer-
tainty in daily life – even in a context of oracular consultation and the attempt 
to seek answers from Zeus (Eidinow 2019a). As that article argues, while, at one 
level, being simply an expression (and reinforcement) of uncertainty about the 
future, the appearance of T/tyche across the corpus of texts also evokes a key 
epistemological contrast inherent in oracular consultation, insofar as it juxta-
poses divine foreknowledge with mortal lack of knowledge about future events. 
The present essay sets out a further strand of this overall view of the onto-
logical (and experiential) framing of oracular consultation in ancient Greek 
culture. Looking at oracular consultation from the points of view of both those 
who gave and those who received oracles, this essay will explore the interac-
tions between narrative and action, the ways in which these prompted pro-
cesses of distanciation and reflexivity, and how these shaped, and were shaped 
by, the perception of self.
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2 Distanciation
The concept of ‘distanciation’ can best be illustrated through a case study of spirit 
possession made by the anthropologist Michael Lambek (2003). The individual 
in question, a young man called Ali, was from the Western Indian Ocean island 
of Mayotte. During an initial period of training in the French army at Nantes, he 
became very ill ‘every time he put on his uniform or set foot on the military base’ 
(ibid., 45); he identified the illness as rheumatism, and described how he became 
almost unable to walk. His mother, who was upset and frightened by Ali’s deci-
sion to join the army (the Gulf War had just begun at this time) explained to Ali 
that the symptoms were sent by the family spirit, the trumba ny razaña. Trumbas 
are Malagasy spirits, who usually belong to the royal Sakalava descent group 
(dating back to before 1700); they ‘occupy’ specific mediums (ibid., 57 n. 7; see 
Lambek 1981; 1993; 2002). Ali’s mother’s trumba was a male spirit and had inhab-
ited a number of members of the family (Ali’s mother, his wife’s father’s older 
brother, several of Ali’s older sisters).
Lambek has noted how the trumba ‘serves, in part, as a sign of the unity, dis-
tinctiveness, and continuity of the family’ (Lambek 2003, 47 and citing Lambek 
1988). But there are other implications of possession that are important here. 
Observing the effects of his experience on Ali, Lambek argues that lives that 
are lived in the presence of, or with the experience of, possession are lives that 
‘become objects of contemplation, interrogation, identification, and edification 
for those around them’; the process of possession is both an immediate – and 
painful – experience and one that is ‘distanced and objectified sufficiently to be 
available to others in the form of a narrative’ (Lambek 2003, 54 and 55, respec-
tively). He goes on to observe that this is an ‘intrinsically ironic’ experience, in 
which irony is understood as ‘a disconnection between a speaker and his inter-
locutor, or between the speaker and that which is spoken about, or even between 
the speaker and himself’ (ibid., 51 quoting from Trilling 1971, 12 for the definition 
of irony). 
Although Lambek does not use the term ‘distanciation’ in this chapter, Janice 
Boddy’s afterword to another collection on this topic (in which Lambek’s contri-
bution discusses the possession of a young man by a sailor spirit) offers a helpful 
and apposite reflection on this theme (Boddy 1998 [she discusses Lambek 1998]). 
Boddy notes how the process of relating to spirit(s) and the experience of posses-
sion mean that both spirits and host are increasingly objectified: she observes how 
the ‘complex interplay between distinctive persons housed in a single material 
body creates a potential for “absence” or detachment of body from person that is 
productive of reflexivity’ (ibid., 258). Moreover, those who witness or participate in 
the episode of possession may also experience distanciation, presumably because 
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of the way it prompts both reflection among those observing on the potential for 
them to experience something similar themselves, and, therefore, reflexivity, that 
is, consideration of the nature of their own personhood.1 
Drawing on these ideas, this essay suggests that ancient processes of divi-
nation may have prompted a similar experience of ‘distanciation’. The parallel 
works most obviously for those who were described as being possessed and deliv-
ering oracular pronouncements, such as the Pythia. However, while I will discuss 
this aspect first, I will suggest that recipients of oracles also experienced dis-
tanciation, engaging in a resulting process of reflexivity, specifically because of 
their participation in the entextualization of their own and others’ experiences.2 
This shaped their engagement with and understanding of the oracular process as 
ironic; and, as such, it also played a key role in establishing the self as crucially, 
even dangerously, relational in its composition, and indeterminate in its future. 
3 The possessed
The idea that the Pythia was considered to have been possessed is not generally 
cast into doubt. The answer to the question of how this occurred, however, has 
been theorized in a variety of ways. Indeed, scholarship on the role and behav-
iours of the Pythia can be described as reflecting the cultural frames of those 
providing the analysis, with a particular emphasis on the factor of her gender in 
dictating assumptions about her role and activities (as Lisa Maurizio has clearly 
analysed: see Maurizio 1995, esp. 70–72). In contrast, Maurizio has demonstrated 
in detail how parallels from anthropological explorations of possession in differ-
ent cultures may offer a different perspective, which returns agency to the figure 
1 Lynch (2000, 27–34, cited in Stausberg 2006, 628) has ably demonstrated how widely the term 
‘reflexivity’ has been used across the humanities, and the potentially problematic breadth of 
its meaning. However, there are some basic meanings that are helpful in exploring the possible 
interaction between oracular consultation, oracular narratives, and people’s sense of self. In 
this essay, I draw on Babcock’s helpful differentiation between reflection and reflexivity, which 
is, appropriately, first introduced through consideration of the myth of Narcissus. She observes 
of the mythic figure (Babcock 1980, 2): ‘He is reflective, but he is not reflexive – that is, he is 
conscious of himself as an other, but he is not conscious of being self-conscious of himself as 
an other, and hence not able to detach himself from, understand, survive, or even laugh at this 
initial experience of alienation’.
2 In this latter group, I include both the individual or group making the divinatory enquiry, and 
the individuals or groups who will have heard or read about the enquiry and its result in some 
other (narrative) context, be that an oral or written account.
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of the Pythia ‘as the conduit of divine knowledge’ (Maurizio 1995, 84). This essay 
accepts her argument that the Pythia’s was a culturally mediated form of posses-
sion, not one that was physiologically induced by substances or gases, and was 
most likely an altered state of consciousness.3 
This still leaves open, however, what has become one of the key questions 
to beset scholarship on the oracle at Delphi: the extent to which the Pythia was 
responsible for her own pronouncements. Again, it is possible to chart the changes 
in scholarly responses: earlier scholarship asserted that the Pythia’s utterances 
were incomprehensible and incoherent, reflecting her (it was assumed) frenzied 
state (e.g., Bouché-Leclerque 1880, 96f.; Flacelière 1938, 104f.; 1965, 50–52; Parke, 
Wormell 1956a, 33; Whittaker 1965, 26; Burkert 1985, 116). More recently, schol-
ars have observed that the ancient sources suggest rather that the Pythia spoke 
directly, and coherently, to those who came to consult her (e.g., Flower 2008, 217 
adduces the accounts that tell of the Pythia being bribed). Important variations to 
this argument have been made: for example, some propose that the Pythia gave 
answers directly to consultants, but these were likely to have been brief (e.g., a 
straightforward yes or no, or a selection of one of two alternatives), and were then 
developed into elaborate hexametrical poems by poets employed at the sanctu-
ary for these purposes (Fontenrose 1978, 11–57; McLeod 1961, 320; Bowden 2005, 
22–5, and 33f.). In contrast, other scholars have observed that there is no reason 
why a woman, living in a culture in which she was used to hearing and speaking 
epic poetry and prayers, could not have composed these lines herself (Maurizio 
1995, 84–86.; Flower 2008, 221).
It is helpful here to consider why the question is so difficult to answer. In part, 
obviously, this is because there is no evidence that illuminates for us the Pythia’s 
own experience of her role and possession (as for Lambek’s Ali, above); reflec-
tions on this aspect must be drawn, as best we can, from observers’ descriptions 
of these consultations. In turn, it is important to note that for the Greeks them-
selves, it appears not to have been an issue.4 Evidence shows that the god himself 
was understood to have spoken: this includes epigraphic records of oracles deliv-
ered at Delphi; while literary references to consultations are phrased in a similar 
3 See Lehoux 2007 for discussion of the evidence for and against the idea that the Pythia 
was drugged. See Chalupa (2014) for an assessment of the Pythia’s state during consultations 
as exhibiting many of the symptoms of (intentionally and routinely) induced patterned dis-
sociative identity disorder and Deeley (2019) on ‘a cognitive reconstruction’ of the Pythia’s 
 possession.
4 At least that is, until Plutarch writes a dialogue on ‘The oracles at Delphi no longer given in 
verse’ (Mor. 394D–409D).
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way.5 Fuller descriptions of the process of consultation offer further detail. As an 
example, consider the story of Croesus’ so-called ‘test’ of the oracles, as given 
by Herodotus.6 The Pythia’s response to Croesus’ initial question is well known:
I know the number of the grains of sand and the extent of the sea,
And understand the mute and hear the voiceless.
The smell has come to my senses of a strong-shelled tortoise
Boiling in a cauldron together with a lamb’s flesh,
Under which is bronze and over which is bronze. (Hdt. 1.47.3; trans. Godley)
Exactly who is understood to be speaking – woman or god – is not made clear: 
the ambiguity surrounding the identity of the giver of the oracle is maintained 
by Herodotus, who observes that the ambassadors enter the megaron (where the 
Pythia is seated) and ask their question of the god; the Pythia then replies with 
these words, which claim a set of more-than-mortal abilities (Hdt. 1.47.2). The 
response focuses on the speaker’s physical senses and emphasises how far they 
reach: the verses proclaim their owner’s capacity to see detail (grains of sand) 
and distance (the sea’s measures). It then boasts of the speaker’s capacity to hear 
the voiceless, and understand what is senseless. 
The story is, of course, a traditional tale, and as other sources suggest, the 
imagery it employs was proverbial (Pind. Ol. 2.95–10; Pind. Ol. 13.43–46; Pind. 
Pyth. 9.43–49). While it offers little information about the process of oracular 
delivery, it may, nevertheless, give some insight into how this culture understood 
some aspects of the experience of possession. The invocation of the senses – 
sight, smell, hearing, and comprehension – indicates that human physical func-
tions continue, but are, as it were, extended to discern what (to all intents and 
purposes) is not normally perceptible by mortals. 
Are we to understand that the Pythia herself undergoes these remarkable 
sensory experiences? Again, this is part of the puzzling intersubjectivity of the 
Pythia, as Herodotus evokes it. Something similar is described as happening 
to the prophetess Cassandra, as she is depicted in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, 
although in her case, the information she receives, which leads her to proph-
esy, comes in the form of visions and smells of events that are temporally, 
5 Epigraphic examples include: IG II2 4969 (Attic, mid-fourth century BCE; [ὁ] θεὸς ἔχρησεν); 
I. Epidamnos T 514 (decree of Epidamnos, erected at Magnesia on the Maeander, third centu-
ry BCE; ὁ ′Aπόλλων ὁ ἐν [Δελφοῖ]ς ἔχρησεν); IG II2 3178 (Attic, early imperial period; ὁ Πύθ[ιος 
ἔχρησεν). Literary examples: Thuc. 1.118.3 (with 2.54.4) and 126.4. (While the god is referred to as 
giving the oracular pronouncement, the verb used is distinctive –ἀναιρέω, e.g. ὁ δὲ ἀνεῖλεν; see 
discussion Fontenrose 1978, 219–23).
6 Scholarship has generally condemned Croesus’ behaviour, but see Eidinow 2019b.
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rather than physically distant, that is, they have yet to happen (Aesch. Ag. 
1214–41, 1256–94 [visions], 1309 [smells]). Cassandra introduces her experi-
ence of prophesy in terms that suggest she finds it unpleasant.7 Her seeming 
reluctance to prophesy seems to be accompanied not only by distress at what 
she is seeing, but also by physical pain: she mentions her ‘agony’ and the ‘fire’ 
that comes upon her. But we must be cautious in drawing any general conclu-
sions. Τhis is, of course, a character for whom the gift of prophecy is difficult 
(her prophetic powers were a gift; but her punishment, for refusing sex with 
Apollo, was that her prophecies were not believed): we might expect it to be 
unpleasant (Aesch. Ag. 1207).
Indeed, the idea of being ‘possessed’ or entheos (meaning literally, ‘the 
body has a god within it’) was also, in some other tragic cases, portrayed as 
a result of divine punishment, in the form of extreme emotional or physical 
illness.8 For example, in Euripides’ Hippolytos, Phaedra is sick with passion – 
and the chorus ask her if she is entheos or ‘possessed’; the gods who are named 
as potentially responsible include Pan, Hekate, the Korybantes or Kybele, or 
even Dictynna, who may be punishing Phaedra (for an unknown error).9 This 
vision of erotic possession is atypical, or rather, it is characteristic of its (tragic) 
genre; as suggested by Xenophon’s comments in the Symposium, when he 
describes how those possessed by gods, ‘have a tendency to be sterner of coun-
tenance, more terrifying of voice, and more vehement’, in comparison with 
those inspired by Love who have ‘a more tender look, subdue their voices to 
more gentle tones, and assume a supremely noble bearing’ (Xen. Symp. 1.10; 
trans. Marchant).
Nevertheless, the potential for prophetic possession to become pathological 
is suggested by the account by Plutarch of the frenzied response (followed by 
her death) of a Pythia at Delphi who was forced to prophesy unwillingly. Various 
physical symptoms are provided in the description: the priestess’s harsh voice 
is a sign that the ritual is not proceeding as it should, along with a comparison 
7 Aesch. Ag. ll. 1214–16 (trans. Smyth): ‘Ah, ah! Oh, oh, the agony! Once more the dreadful throes 
of true prophecy whirl and distract me with their ill-boding onset.’ ἰοὺ ἰού, ὢ ὢ κακά./ὑπ᾽ αὖ με 
δεινὸς ὀρθομαντείας πόνος/στροβεῖ ταράσσων φροιμίοις δυσφροιμίοις. Cf. l. 1256: ‘Oh, oh! What 
fire! It comes upon me!’ παπαῖ, οἷον τὸ πῦρ: ἐπέρχεται δέ μοι.
8 The question of the meaning of entheos, and the closely related term enthousiasmos and their 
many manifestations, is greater than the remit of this essay can support; but see discussion 
Dodds 1951, 64–101 (87, n. 41 for the phrase ‘the body has a god within it’); see also Bremmer 
1984, 267–86; Burkert 1985, 109–11; Graf 2009.
9 Eur. Hipp. 141–50; I am not here discussing the possession of the maenads, which uses the 
same term (e.g., Soph. Ant. 964, also, in a simile for martial frenzy, Aesch. Theb. 497), and see 
Lyk. Alex. 28 with n. ad loc. in Hornblower 2015.
548   Esther Eidinow
of her physical response to ‘a laboring ship […] filled with a mighty and baleful 
spirit’ (Plut. Mor. 438B-C; trans. Cole Babbitt). In the end, Plutarch describes how 
the woman becomes frenzied and runs towards the exit, before throwing herself 
down, and dying a few days later. If we are trying to understand better the expe-
rience of possession, then this account seems to describe the feeling of an inner 
force with which the woman was struggling. The focus on the Pythia’s voice is 
also noteworthy, especially since, in a passage close by, the Pythia, when she is 
in the right mood to surrender to the god, is compared to a musical instrument, 
prepared and tuneful (Plut. Mor. 437D-E).
As noted, these passages provide an observer’s perception of mantic posses-
sion, and perhaps are better described or understood as revealing to us some-
thing of how ancient Greek society imagined the possible gamut of experiences 
involved. The insights they offer are further reinforced through descriptions of 
mantic possession that, while engaging less impressive supernatural entities, 
offer further detail. The chorus leader in Aristophanes’ Wasps introduces one 
rather surprising example, in which the poet is cast as the possessing spirit. In a 
description of how the poet has behaved in the past when practising his craft, he 
compares him to a possessing spirit called Eurycles: ‘At first it was not openly but 
secretly, giving assistance to other poets, slipping into other people’s stomachs in 
imitation of the prophecy and method of the seer Eurycles, that he poured forth 
many comic words’ (Ar. Vesp. 1019f.; trans. Sommerstein 1983). Eurycles was, 
according to a scholiast, a prophet who manifested himself through others; in 
this passage, the name may be meant to indicate the mouthpiece of the spirit, or, 
indeed, the spirit itself. Indeed, that it is impossible to tell which is meant – the 
spirit, or the body that is possessed by the spirit – may also provide some insight 
into the cultural perception of the phenomenon of spirit possession.
Either way, Aristophanes’ description offers a rather vivid image, albeit, a 
brief, and above all, a comic image, of one way in which a possessing spirit may 
have been understood to inhabit a mortal body. But to explore how this picture 
of the possessing spirit actually being within the body was more than simply a 
literary image, we can turn to other references to possessed seers. In particular, it 
appears that the mention of the ‘belly’ as Eurycles’s hiding place is for more than 
comic effect. It is surely a reference to the engastrimythoi (lit. ‘belly talkers’, also 
often translated as ‘ventriloquists’), who were seers who gave prophecies from 
their stomachs and are mentioned, in passing, in a Hippocratic treatise, Epidemics 
(see Hipp. Epid. 5.63, 7.28; the case studies are the same). The passage gives some 
idea of what belly-talking looked or rather sounded like: the patient, Polemarchos’ 
wife, is said to have ‘breathed like a diver who has surfaced. She made a noise from 
her chest. It was something like the so-called belly talkers make’ (trans. Smith). 
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Further information about the behaviour of individuals who claimed to be 
possessed is given by an admittedly later source: Lamprias in Plutarch’s dialogue 
De defectu oraculorum (Plut. Mor. 414E). He describes the so-called Pythones, 
who were once called Eurycleis – a change of name that suggests that the cultural 
framing of ‘possession’ had by now begun to elide the idea of Delphic posses-
sion with other similar phenomena. The Pythones were seers who claimed that 
the god would enter their bodies and speak through their mouths and voices ‘as 
instruments’; the Greek term (organois) suggests a tool (an inanimate object) but 
can also be used to indicate an organ ‘of sense or apprehension’, which indicates 
a more interactive relationship with the divine in this instance (see LSJ s.v. for ref-
erences); it also brings back to mind the earlier description of the Pythia herself 
in terms of a musical instrument – and the harshness of her delivery when the 
timing of consultation was awry. 
This brief overview of descriptions of mantic possession is not intended 
as an explanation of the physical or mental states of the Pythia and other pos-
sessed seers. Rather, it is intended to provide some insight into the larger cultural 
framing of the divine-mortal interaction understood to take place during such 
possession. It suggests, through a variety of imagery, a picture of the possess-
ing spirit and the mortal body as separate entities, which somehow must find 
a shared material space. It may be that another reference to Eurycles, which we 
find in Plato’s Sophist can further our understanding of how that sharing was 
imagined. In that passage, the Eleatic Stranger is using possession by Eurycles 
as an analogy for the position of the so-called opsimaths (or ‘late-learners’), and 
their arguments concerning the impossibility of the many to be one and the one 
to be many.10 While the surrounding argument is complex, the simile is straight-
forward: again, as Alan Sommerstein has observed, it indicates that Eurycles was 
a spirit that others carried within them (Pl. Soph. 252C).
Because they are obliged in speaking of anything to use the expressions ‘to be’, ‘apart’, 
‘from the rest’, ‘by itself’, and countless others; they are powerless to keep away from them 
or avoid working them into their discourse; and therefore there is no need of others to refute 
them, but, as the saying goes, their enemy and future opponent is of their own household 
whom they always carry about with them as they go, giving forth speech from within them, 
like the wonderful Eurycles [ton atopon Euryklea]
The language of Plato’s description is also helpful here, specifically, the phrase ton 
atopon Euryklea. This is translated here as ‘the wonderful Eurycles’ (Sommerstein 
10 Pl. Soph. 252B: They are ‘the very men who forbid us to call anything by another name be-
cause it participates in the effect produced by another’ who ‘would be made most especially 
ridiculous by this doctrine’ (trans. Fowler here and below).
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1983, ad loc. translates as ‘the weird Eurykles’). This underlines how extraordinary 
is or was the behaviour of this spirit (or, as above, the prophet that possessed him), 
but perhaps there is some further word play involved, as well. The term atopos can 
also mean simply ‘out-of-place’. This would perhaps be a more fitting adjective for 
the context: the Eleatic Stranger points out that the arguments of the opsimaths 
mean that they cannot use the term ‘is’, which puts them in an impossible posi-
tion, ‘Because they are obliged, in speaking of anything, to use the expressions 
“to be”, “apart”, “from the rest”, “by itself”, and countless others; they are pow-
erless to keep away from them or avoid working them into their discourse.’ The 
Eurycles analogy thus provides an image for the way in which the sophists’ own 
language carries the arguments of their opponents within it, and, in that context, 
the description of Eurycles as atopos or ‘out-of-place’ reinforces this argument. But 
it also inadvertently further illuminates the concept of possession, since (drawing 
here on the language used in this passage to describe the opsimaths’ arguments) 
it is an image of something ‘apart’ and ‘by itself’, which is, simultaneously, inter-
mingled with what surrounds it. This image of possession, by drawing attention 
to the presence of the  supernatural body as both embodied and disembodied, 
also creates the objectification of the mortal body. Moreover, in this formulation, 
the alien and threatening nature of this idea is powerfully reinforced by the image 
of the enemy who already dwells within the household, and how this presence 
makes it impossible to avoid, in the end, betraying oneself.11
Altogether, these passages suggest that the idea of possession was one that 
prompted both individual and broader cultural reflection and reflexivity. In these 
narratives, we find a possessed character depicted as disconnected from their own 
words and actions, perhaps even threatened, by the presence of a supernatural 
entity. We cannot of course describe the individual characters as they experience 
distanciation, as Lambek does Ali, since we do not have evidence that provides 
such first-person insights. But it is possible to argue that these narratives model 
a process of distanciation, providing powerful descriptions that evoke aspects of 
the experience, be they observable physical indications, such as heavy breathing 
or frenzy; or reports of internal symptoms, such as pain; or imagery, for example, 
comparing the presence of another individual within the body to an enemy within 
the household. 
11 This naturally also prompts thought of the rhetoric of Lysias 1, in which a man pleads to be 
found not guilty for killing his wife’s lover. In that speech, the enemy within the household is 
not only the lover who has inveigled his way into the home, but also the child he may potentially 
engender in the defendant’s wife. 
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A number of these narratives also provide examples of reflexivity around the 
phenomenon of possession. The nature of this reflexive discussion varies, as we 
might expect, by genre: tragedy, in particular, has a form that encourages reflex-
ivity, especially, but not only, through the meditations of the Chorus. For example, 
in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, Cassandra herself demonstrates reflexivity, consider-
ing her own role in the divine plan that she foretells.12 Witnessing her posses-
sion prompts the chorus to meditate on their own situation and the nature of 
man and his fate (Aesch. Ag. 1331–42). Comedy, too, is able to provoke reflexivity, 
using similar dramatic techniques, albeit to different ends. In the passage from 
Wasps, the Chorus Leader appeals for the audience’s support for the playwright, 
who is compared first with an inspiring spirit, then with a mythical hero, facing 
down politicians, who are in turn, described as monsters (Sommerstein 2002). 
The Chorus Leader’s initial comparison of the poet to a possessing spirit, inspir-
ing other writers, positions the poet as secretly, almost supernaturally, powerful, 
and again implies the objectification of the body of the possessed, inhabited by 
the possessing; person and speech are separated. But in this analogy, the dis-
embodiment of possession is reversed: the connection between the person and 
their words is remade, when the poet is writing his own poetry openly (phaneros), 
running risks on his own account (kath’ heauton), ‘holding the reins of Muses of 
his own, not someone else’s’. Indeed, not only is he thus reintegrated, he is also 
whole in the sense that he is courageous, a guardian against evils (alexikakos) 
(Ar. Vesp. 1043).
Whether presented for comic, tragic, philosophical, or medical purposes, 
narratives of possession reveal a cultural understanding of how the presence of 
the supernatural could splinter the self. Insofar as they evoked the objectifica-
tion of mortal and supernatural bodies, these narratives modelled for their audi-
ence the process of distanciation, with all the risks that entailed; in turn, through 
the forms provided by their different genres, they provoked, I would argue, both 
reflection and reflexivity on the relationship between mankind and gods. But the 
experience of possession was rare: a more common experience was the consulta-
tion of the possessed. In what follows, I want to argue that those seeking oracles 
would also have experienced the distanciation created by the co-presence of the 
supernatural. 
12 E.g. Aesch. Ag. 1314–20 (trans. Smyth): ‘Nay, I will go to bewail also within the palace my own 
and Agamemnon’s fate. Enough of life! Alas, my friends, not with vain terror do I shrink, as a bird 
that fears a bush. After I am dead, bear witness for me of this – when for me, a woman, another 
woman shall be slain, and for an ill-wedded man another man shall fall. I claim this favor from 
you now that my hour is come.’
552   Esther Eidinow
4 The consultant
In trying to understand what the process of oracular consultation offered its users, 
scholars have tended to argue that it provided a sense of reassurance and con-
trol.13 While there is much to be said for this argument, it is interesting to note how 
it resonates with current ideas of the self – as an autonomous, decision- making 
agent, who aspires to increasing self-direction – and posits an understanding of 
ancient Greek selfhood that may be of marked appeal to our  modern-day sensi-
bilities. Indeed, it elides a puzzling dilemma posed by our ancient sources, which 
suggest that while individuals sought some direction from an oracle, they did 
not necessarily understand it as providing them with greater autonomy. As an 
example, consider the interaction between Socrates and Xenophon at the begin-
ning of the Anabasis: Socrates makes it clear that Xenophon has asked the oracle 
the wrong question, but will nevertheless have to carry out its instruction (Xen. 
Anab. 3.1.5–3.1.8).
In this part of the essay, and building on the arguments of my previous arti-
cles (as described above in the first section of this essay), I would like to challenge 
the current characterization of oracular consultation, and suggest instead that 
the process of consultation did not, or not only, move options into the world of 
enquirers – as one commentator has put it (Iles Johnston 2005, 301). Rather, or in 
addition, it ‘moved’ the self, or rather, the self-perception of the self. I will argue 
that this was achieved, at least in part, through processes of distanciation that 
encouraged individuals to consider themselves in objectified terms within the 
process of oracular consultation – a process that drew particular attention to the 
role of the divine in crafting the course of a mortal life. 
It could be argued that such a reperceiving of self would begin as soon as an 
individual set out to consult an oracle: the decision was one that demonstrated 
a move from reflection to reflexivity. It revealed a capacity to detach oneself from 
a simple awareness of self-in-a-state-of-uncertainty (reflective), requiring one to 
envision oneself as an individual who might enter the process of seeking divine 
help and be changed (reflexive). The separation of self-as-ritual-enquirer from 
self-as-everyday-actor was also an embodied process, marked by a series of rit-
ualized actions, including preparation for travel to a sanctuary, as well as those 
rituals, more strictly defined, that took place within the sanctuary, such as puri-
fication and sacrifice. In this context, oracle stories might be regarded simply 
as records of previous consultations; in some cases they would have provided 
13 For example, and drawing from recent literature: Johnston 2005, 301; Burkert 2005, 30; Dillon 
2017, 37 highlights reassurance, hope and guidance.
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guides to correct ritual behaviour and attitudes. But I want to suggest that they 
played a further crucial role: helping to generate the self as oracular consultant. 
By providing a narrative structure within which to frame the experience of oracu-
lar consultation, they created what we might think of as a feedback loop, drawing 
those who were consulting an oracle into a process of reflexive self-textualization.
4.1 Self and other (self)
We start with the evidence of the oracle stories: exegetical narratives that circu-
lated in both oral and written forms. These narratives were created, in the first 
instance at least, either as part of the ritual that took place within the oracular 
sanctuary or as part of the ritual of transmission by means of which the oracles 
were transformed into oracle stories and then transmitted across wider society.14 
As noted above, we may argue, with Lisa Maurizio, that the verse-oracle type of 
oracular statement that is recorded in, for example, Herodotus’ Histories, was pro-
duced by the Pythia (Maurizio 1995; 1997); or we may prefer (with Hugh Bowden, 
for example), to think of this type as the product of the telling of an oracle story, 
developed after a consultation event that had in fact produced a much simpler 
response (Bowden 2005).
The details of the process of production of these stories are of less importance 
to the argument of this essay than the fact of their circulation, on which I will focus 
here.15 However they were originally formulated, the oracle stories were, through 
their repetition and transmission, repeatedly reconstituted in a new context, 
where they demanded a novel engagement from a broader audience (Barber 
2003, 326). The circulation of these stories suggests that they were themselves 
sources of reflection: their existence suggests, as Barber puts it (in discussion of 
African oral genres), ‘a consciousness of text as something created in order to be 
expounded, recontextualized and reflected upon’ (ibid.). But we can also argue 
that they were prompts to a crucial reflexivity. Within the texts themselves, the 
14 Of course, the process of their production is significant: in the case of the former, that is, 
if these are the words of the Pythia, then this is a process of entextualization, in which these 
oracle verses are reconstituted in a new context, where they demand a novel engagement from a 
broader audience (see Barber 2003, 326); in the case of the latter, the development of stories from 
simple monosyllabic responses by the Pythia would add a significant layer of exegesis to the pro-
cess of entextualization, but exegesis that includes riddling is exegesis that obscures rather than 
explains, and which, in turn, requires further exegesis (the resolution of the riddle). 
15 If these verses do represent the words of the Pythia, then this is a process of entextualization, 
defined as ‘the process of rendering a given instance of discourse as text, detachable from its 
local context’ (Silverstein 1996, 21).
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content of these stories, even those of clearly mythical origin, resonated with real-
life concerns. As an example, consider the many questions posed by individuals 
at Dodona about their hopes for children, and how these same anxieties appear 
in the stories of Kings Aigeus, Laios, Akrisios, Xuthos and Kephalos.16 But as well 
as drawing out shared experiences, these stories set the individual in a larger 
cosmological context than the everyday, since they also described, implicitly or 
explicitly, the intersubjectivity of mortal and divine. Not only did these stories 
describe episodes of possession (in the person of the Pythia), but they also made 
it clear that the gods and other supernatural forces were profoundly involved in 
the co-creation of the course of each mortal life.
As grist for this reflexivity, oracle narratives conveyed a strong sense of the 
resulting indeterminacy of the oracular consultation. These narrative framings of 
the experience of oracular consultation juxtaposed mortal concerns and mortal 
ignorance with divine knowledge, and underlined the gulf that existed between 
the two. In these stories, the oracular solution did not necessarily respond to the 
question that an individual had asked; what an individual heard at an oracle, he 
or she might well not understand. Indeed, in these stories, the central message 
could even be phrased as a riddle, from which the ‘hidden meaning’ must be 
elicited. 
This aspect in particular resonated with both the context and the form of 
actual oracular consultations. By this, I do not mean that the responses to  real-life 
consultations were (necessarily) delivered as riddles. Rather, the complexity 
(whatever its form) of oracles in oracle stories indicated that actual oracular pro-
nouncements might also have needed to be ‘worked out’. This narrative element 
reinforced the cosmological context of consultation, specifically the distance 
between mortal and divine knowledge.17 In turn, as I have argued (see above), 
there is a surprising emphasis on the presence of T/tuche in the oracular question 
16 Aegeus of Athens: Plut. Thes. 3.5; Apollod. 3.15.6; Eur. Med. 679, 681 (cf. for detailed referenc-
es Fontenrose L4). Laios: Eur. Phoen. 17–20 (1598 f.); Soph. OT 713 f., 853 f., 1176 (906–8) (cf. for 
detailed references Fontenrose L17). Akrisios: Pherekydes 3.10J (cf. for detailed references Fon-
tenrose L23). Xuthos: Eur. Ion 70 f., 534–7, 787 f., 1533 (cf. for detailed references Fontenrose L28). 
Kephalos: Arist. Fr. 504 (Rose) (cf. for detailed references Fontenrose L82). For examples of the 
questions asked at Dodona see Eidinow 2013.
17 Maurizio 2001, 40, n. 14 suggests that only a third of the oracles we possess are likely to have 
been ambiguous. It is worth noting that even a ‘yes/no’ response from an oracle will require 
discussion of meaning in the sense of what actions should follow. A similar observation is made 
by Karin Barber in her analysis of Yoruba divinatory texts (1999, 31; her italics): ‘Yoruba texts […] 
are made up of free-standing elements that signal that they require or are capable of completion 
or expansion that is not necessarily performed within that text at that moment. That is, they 
function as citations of something larger which is not actually present.’
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tablets from Dodona, suggesting that those who visited the oracle did not expect 
the outcomes of their consultations (i.e., the responses they received) simply to 
be fulfilled. The idea that the gods’ meaning or intent might emerge unexpectedly 
was also reflected in the form taken by real-life consultations, which in their for-
mulation, acknowledged the broader unseen forces shaping future events.
The implications of these observations are that, while an individual may 
have turned to an oracle for guidance about the future, we should be cautious 
in suggesting that their aim was simply and straightforwardly to acquire a sense 
of control. Indeed, the aesthetic of the oracle narratives was intrinsically ironic, 
and I would suggest that it was matched in actual oracular consultations by a 
strong sense of reflexivity and (related) indeterminacy.18 Turning back briefly to 
Lambek’s work, we see how, in the example of his case study’s illness (which he 
regards as an art form equivalent to a narrative), this ‘invites all who encounter 
it to contemplate agency and its limits, dignity and its vicissitudes, individuality 
and its relational entailments, hope and contingency, the essential uncertainty of 
life’ (Lambek 2003, 55). Such moments of reflection on and dialogue with oneself 
are opportunities for questioning the status quo, with regard to both the natures 
of oneself, or selves – the self that observes and the other that is observed – and 
the structures within which those selves operate. In Lambek’s case study, an 
illness could raise questions for his subject (Ali), indicating how his life could 
be different if his physical body was different. An oracular consultation is, in a 
similar way, likely to have been an occasion that provoked reflexive considera-
tion about the self as other, and on the multiple, possible other lives – and other 
selves – that might emerge as a result of interaction with the divine. 
5 Conclusion
This essay is part of a larger argument that oracular consultation was not, or not 
only, a way of achieving self-mastery or a greater sense of agency, as is commonly 
argued in scholarship. Rather, it suggests, oracular consultation would have 
involved acknowledgment of the intersubjective nature of the self, and engage-
ment with a sense of uncertainty, especially in situations of risk. I have argued 
elsewhere that an oracular consultation was an event that marked the multiple 
different social and cosmic forces that shaped who a consultant was and the 
course of his or her life. Here, I have tried to explore the possible experiences 
18 Babcock 1980, 5. As Babcock has observed, there is an ‘intimate connection between reflex-
ivity and indeterminacy.’
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of those who participated in these rituals, examining possession and oracular 
consultation as activities that resulted in processes of distanciation and reflex-
ivity. As a result, rather than (or as well as) eliciting a sense of control, oracular 
consultation was an experience through which an individual, who conceived of 
herself as embedded in a larger social and cosmological nexus, would confront 
the indeterminacy of her future and the forces shaping it. 
Realising that this argument goes against current trends in scholarship on 
this subject, I end with a final suggestion, which includes some consideration 
of contemporary views of the self. One of the reasons why we, in modern times, 
find oracle consultation so compelling is that it challenges the overriding cul-
tural conception of the individual – as an autonomous agent exercising rational 
choice. It would be easy to accept this characterisation and, in response, to 
dismiss ancient Greek ritual practice as ‘superstitious’, but the answer may not 
be so simple. Instead, I would like to suggest that the fascination that oracles still 
provoke arises, at least in part, because they reveal a more uncomfortable possi-
bility: our underlying sense of ourselves as composite, that is, as constituted by 
a network of visible and invisible relations, and the resulting limits of our own 
agency and knowledge. 
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Aditya Malik
The swirl of worlds: possession, porosity 
and embodiment
A boundary is not that at which something stops,
but as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which
something begins its presencing.
Martin Heidegger
1 Possession: mixing bodies and selves
Janice Boddy, in her wide-ranging review of the scholarly literature on  possession, 
begins with a concise definition:
Spirit possession commonly refers to the hold exerted over a human being by external forces 
or entities more powerful than she. These forces may be ancestors or divinities, ghosts of 
foreign origin, or entities both ontologically and ethnically alien […] Possession, then is a 
broad term referring to an integration of spirit and matter, force or power and corporeal reality, 
in a cosmos where the boundaries between an individual and her environment are acknowl-
edged to be permeable, flexibly drawn, or at least negotiable. (Boddy 1994, 407)
But what exactly does it mean to say that ‘the boundaries between an individual 
and her environment are acknowledged to be permeable’? Is it even conceiva-
ble as ‘modern subjects’ to know what this means not just in a theoretical sense 
but in real, experiential terms? Is it possible to understand rather than reduce 
and explain away possession within the ideological and discursive framework of 
modernity? – Modernity defined as a series of rejections, acts of distancing, and 
binary oppositions: mind–body, secular–religious, public–private, individual–
community, nature–culture, rational–nonrational, Occident–Orient, and so on.1
What are the implications of Boddy’s statement for our understanding of the 
‘I’ that seemingly constitutes the core of a person? It could be argued that the 
dominant mode of experiencing self in the context of recent modernity is defined 
by the category of the individual who is an entity bounded above all by their body 
and mind. Moreover, the category of the individual marks off a self that is forged 
1 Included in its many rejections is the notion of religion: ‘of a sacramental view of reality and 
of anthropomorphic conceptions of the divinity, as well as even more radically […] any notion of 
transcendence’ (Benavides 1998, 190).
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out of an irreducible set of irreplicable circumstances. Individuals are both sin-
gular and unique, determining their destiny through the application of will that 
makes them active agents rather than passive on-lookers of the passage of their 
lives. The ‘I’ that simultaneously occupies as well as produces the category of the 
individual is constituted by thought. This shift in the notion of self occurs through 
the epistemic radicalism of Descartes whose thought is founded on the idea of 
profound doubt through which ‘[he] can affirm that he is not nothing because 
he is conscious of being something in and through the very act of consciousness 
itself’ (Winquist 1998, 227). Thought causes the notion of ‘I’ to arise which then in 
turn views itself as a separate, bounded entity consisting of a body and mind with 
singular and unique thoughts and experiences. Within this framework, the think-
ing, conscious ‘I’ begins to occupy a place of primacy over being as ‘the point of 
reference for the determination of meaning […]’ (ibid.). However, this dominant 
mode of identifying the question of self is radically challenged by the phenom-
enological enquiry of Heidegger that seeks to reinstate the ontological question 
of being as the fundamental question of philosophy. What does ‘I’ signify in the 
context of an enquiry into being rather than thinking?2 What would an under-
standing of possession mean in the latter context?
The following case study from the Central Himalayas will show that the ‘I’ 
and its corollaries of the person, of the individual, of singularity, and of agency 
cease to have primacy as points of reference. They seem to be on ‘hold’ or in 
suspension as other forces ‘take over’ and operate, as boundaries dissipate 
allowing for ever widening circles of divine or malevolent agency in which, as 
Becker notes, ‘persons suddenly and inexplicably lose their normal set of mem-
ories, mental dispositions, and skills, and exhibit entirely new and different sets 
of memories, dispositions, and skills’ (Smith 2011, 3). The acknowledgment of 
permeability between the individual and their environment has fundamental 
implications for self and its other. Clearly, an acknowledgement of permeability 
of ‘flexibly drawn’ boundaries implies that self and other are not simply oppo-
sitional, nor complementary, nor even relational. The relationship may involve 
all of these possibilities, and yet go beyond them to be identified through equiv-
alence, enmeshing, continuity. It may involve a Moebius-like quality in which 
the inner and outer merge seamlessly, creating only a mirage-like impression of 
separate surfaces (Handelman, Shulman 2004, 44). On one level, the difference 
between self and other appears real, but on another level it may become illusory. 
Thus we require some other, radical way of imagining the conundrum of self and 
2 Although Heidegger does talk of Thinking (Denken) that belongs to or arises from being (Sein). 
See Heidegger (1954).
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other that seems to lie at the very nucleus of the phenomenological enquiry into 
being, particularly in relation to possession. It is insufficient to explain such dis-
tinctive articulations of self and other implicit in possession in terms of ‘culture’, 
since this relativises the theoretical force of these formulations, devolving them 
to the status of objects rather than instruments of thought (Das 1995, 33). To put 
this in perspective, should we say that the philosophical conclusions of Husserl, 
Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Levinas with regard to the question of being, and 
of self and other are culturally situated, and arise, to rephrase Boddy, ‘in a cosmos 
where the boundaries between an individual and her environment are acknowl-
edged to be impermeable, inflexibly drawn, or not negotiable’? The reversal of 
the ‘anthropological gaze’ toward the ‘demystification’, for example, “of ‘univer-
salist’, ‘objectified’ categories of Western sociology [or anthropology, philosophy 
etc.]” (Das 1995, 33) raises several deeply problematic yet critical issues if we are 
ever to move beyond being ‘culturally solipsistic’ while legitimately formulating 
alternative theoretical frameworks derived from the philosophical speculations 
of ‘other’ cultures.
2 Alterity: the possibility of being another?
The foregoing discussion brings me to an examination of another, for the pur-
poses of this paper, critical term: alterity – perhaps the very cornerstone upon 
which religion and religious experience is grounded. As Csordas (2004, 164) 
states: ‘Alterity is the phenomenological kernel of religion. Insofar as alterity is 
part of the structure of being‐in‐the‐world – an elementary structure of exist-
ence – religion is inevitable, perhaps even necessary.’ But what does alterity 
mean, and how am I using the word? Alterity has most recently been employed 
in post-colonial studies to indicate the existence, and condition, of the colonised 
and culturally ‘other’. ‘Otherness’ therefore pertains to the linguistic, political, 
epistemological, and imperial mechanisms through which the culturally and 
colonised ‘other’ is constructed. From an anthropological perspective alterity is 
understood ‘as referring to political, racial, ethnic, gender, class, religious other-
ness – the otherness that is the occasion for identity politics, war, conflict, vio-
lence’ (Csordas 2004, 173). Amongst these many divisive and colonising aspects 
of otherness, there is also the important sense in which it is used to describe the 
condition of women in both first and third world situations as being the ‘other’ of 
562   Aditya Malik
men.3 But as Arendt points out: ‘alteritas or otherness belongs to everything not 
just to the marginalized […] difference is our human condition.’ Moreover, ‘“alter-
ity” reconceived in terms of multiplicity opens the possibility for the community 
of plurality […]’ (Cutting-Gray 1993, 41). The re-conceptualisation of alterity as 
multiplicity brings us to a further philosophical differentiation of the term. Chris-
topher Macann develops an extended and nuanced threefold understanding – an 
ontological alterity (human being–being), an ontic alterity (subject–object) and 
a reflective alterity (consciousness and what it is consciousness of) – that distin-
guishes difference from distinction:
Difference always presupposes a whole that is differentiated. Distinction begins with isolated 
entities that then have to be related. So distinction takes its start in a world that has already 
been differentiated to the point that the whole has been lost sight of and all we can see is 
analytically reducible objects. (personal communication; see also Macann 2007)4
Following on from this, I use the term in a layered, stratified sense that carries 
traces of the meanings outlined above, but also applies a different sense. Since 
my case study involves an aspect of South Asian culture which speaking from 
a colonial context can be regarded as ‘other’, my use of alterity includes the 
meaning it has as describing the ‘culturally other’. I also use it in the sense of 
women being ‘other’, as the event I will be recounting from the Central Himalayas 
reveals. The fact that women are viewed as ‘other’, is particularly relevant to the 
discussion of possession when we take into account the seemingly overwhelming 
preponderance of the participation of women in rituals of possession in the vast 
majority of scholarly materials collected from different cultures (see Bourguignon 
2004, 557). As Bourguignon and others attempt to explain, women – because of 
their lesser status to men and the concomitant condition of emotional, financial, 
social, and domestic oppression – utilise the complex ritual, narrative, as well 
as somatic and psychological mechanisms of possession to regain and reinstate 
their voice through socially and religiously legitimate means. The embodied state 
of alterity expressed through the ritual processes of possession then becomes, in 
this explanatory model, a channel for symbolic action. The religious or spiritual 
views expounded by the women (or men) in such ritual contexts are in reality 
3 See also Hannah Arendt’s study of Rahel Varnhagen, a Jewish woman who presided over a 
premier intellectual salon in 18th century Berlin, as a dual issue of otherness; in Cutting-Gray 
1993, 38.
4 Further, in Levinas’ work and also in the work of Hegel, the ‘other’ becomes the foundational 
reference for the possibility of ‘self-consciousness’. To be self-aware means being aware of the 
‘other’. Alterity may also refer to that which in a Judeo-Christian context is wholly other – a 
 divine presence, the infinite, or God.
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not what they are being stated as (the presence of divine or malevolent beings); 
rather these are mostly ‘unconscious’ strategies adopted by socially deprived 
actors. Bourguignon’s (2004, 558) view of possession as symbolic action, with 
its heavy bias toward ‘etic’ explanations, is problematic inasmuch as it endorses 
a particular view of the ‘other’ (both in the sense of culture and of gender) while 
propping up a set of values and possibilities germane to modernity.
And, finally, most critically, I use the word alterity to describe the possibility 
of multiplicity (and permeability) in the phenomenal world and the possibility 
of divine presence in human life. But there is a radical departure from the usual 
philosophical understanding of the ‘other’, whether human, non-human, or 
divine. In fact, I would like to bring in the notion of ‘another’, rather than ‘other’. 
Ghassan Hage (2009), for example, talks about the anthropological gaze as being 
about the possibility of being another. This idea, he suggests, implies the idea 
of excess that is grounded in potentiality rather than actuality. Any given social 
situation or identity has the promise of being more than what it appears to be, 
is represented as or perceived to be. Actuality, on the other hand, is grounded 
on a notion of ‘what is’ or of stasis and ‘predictability’ rather than in a dialec-
tic that can result in an unpredictable (re)configuration of ‘what is’. Hage calls 
the ability to be another ‘radical alterity’. Radical alterity thus moves beyond the 
chasm between self and other upon which much of anthropological, historical 
and philosophical thought is based. It is important here to acknowledge the pow-
erful persuasiveness of ‘actuality’ as a pervasive perception of what is considered 
to be real. The ‘real’ as that which is limited, immovable, bounded.5 The ‘real’ as 
a commitment to fixity and petrifaction under the paradoxical guise of progress, 
change, and modernity – as the justification for cynically continuing to operate 
in the way ‘things have always been’. The ‘real’ is based on what our senses tell 
us and on what the social conversations around us tell us. Not only do our senses 
and their filtration through social conversations tell us what is real but also what 
is true. There is a ‘collapsing together’, so to speak, between the real and the true 
in the world of actuality. Hage points out that the markers of this world are both 
fatalism and naturalness. In other words, the actual world is presented as though 
it is a given and naturally existing condition in which events take place in a pre-
determined and therefore fatalistic manner. And yet, it is only on the basis of 
the recognition of the existence of ‘actuality’ and of its limitation that something 
more can be felt, conceived and imagined. The recognition of the power of limita-
tion inherent in pledging oneself to actuality, in fact, simultaneously transforms 
5 I am using ‘real’ in contradistinction to Lacan’s use of ‘The Real’ that denotes the unnameable, 
authentic, infinite, being or self that is prior to language and independent of our sensory experience.
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into the realisation of a deep ‘misrecognition’. Only then can the world of poten-
tiality and possibility be created and experienced.
Thus, for example, in Upanishadic and Vedantic thought neither divinity nor other 
sentient and non-sentient entities are fundamentally ‘other’ (anya). The perception of 
difference or ‘otherness’ rests on objects possessing name (nama) and form (rupa), 
but not on ontological difference. On the level of Being or Self ( atman-Brahman), 
there is, in fact, no ‘other’. Ultimately, all there is, is ‘Self’, ‘Consciousness’ or ‘Being’, 
although this cannot be directly apprehended through language, and is not based on 
a distinction between objects within the world. It is ‘not this, not this’ (neti neti). The 
philosopher Shankara, however, states that Brahman or ‘It’
can be indirectly designated for example, by the word “I”. The word “I” directly denotes 
my ego (ahamkara), but since the ego is a reflection of the true Self, as the mirror image is a 
reflection of the fact reflected in it, one can use the word “I” nonmetaphorically to indicate 
the Self. But all such usage presupposes […] the operation of ignorance, a failure on our part 
to discriminate the true Self from the jiva, ego, or whatever. (Potter 1981, 60)
Therefore, while on a purely phenomenological and linguistic level there is an ‘I’ 
and a ‘you’ and a ‘world’, on an ontological and experiential level these distinc-
tions dissolve leaving no separation between me, you, and the world. In other 
words while our everyday experience and perception based on our senses (indriya) 
tell us that there are ‘others’, these are not as radically different and unreachable 
as some of the philosophical traditions outlined above would have us believe:
One has to recognize a difference in levels of understanding, between reality and appear-
ance. On the highest level, on which awareness of reality […] occurs, there is no possibil-
ity of difference. From the lower level, the level of appearance, myriad distinctions are of 
course apparent, but this is entirely the work of avidya or ignorance […]. At the heart of our 
confusion is the notion, due to avidya, that my consciousness is different from yours or from 
anything else at all. (ibid., 62, 70)
While this perspective may seem historically and culturally antiquated, being 
ascribed to ancient India, it is a perspective that is found, at least on a discursive 
level, amongst many members of India’s contemporary population both rural and 
urban. As both a philosophical position and as ‘popular’ discourse it needs to 
be taken as seriously as the philosophical traditions of Descartes, Heidegger and 
others. In Vedantic thought alterity is reconceived as multiplicity, but this multi-
plicity encompasses more than the immediate arena of human relationships, more 
than the multiplicity of cultures and individual perspectives. In theory it covers 
all possible entities, and all past, present and future possibilities. It approaches 
Arendt’s notion of a ‘community of plurality’ through the simultaneous acknowl-
edgment of the reality of multiplicity on the one hand, and its dissipation, dis-
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solution and illusory nature on the other, through ‘non-duality’. Can we state 
that this philosophical position also informs, to a large extent, the predominant 
cultural understanding of the relationship between self and other in the Indian 
context? This claim should not come as a surprise, since Cartesian thought, which 
has its roots in abstract and complex philosophical debate, also permeates the 
dominant structuring of the social and political world in the post-Enlightenment 
era. Modernity as an ideological discourse and institutional foundation itself is in 
many ways a product of the divisions created by Cartesian thought: mind–body, 
religious–secular, organic–mechanic, analytic–synthetic, subject–object and so 
on. And, while non-philosophers may not be aware of the intricacies of Descartes’ 
and subsequent philosophers’ thought, their ideas occupy an elemental, and yet 
largely unreflected place in the world of everyday transactions and discourse.
Pertinent for our understanding of these differently constituted parameters 
of selfhood, are also Piatigorsky’s (1985, 217) observations on a phenomenology 
of Indian religion in which he discusses, among other categories, ‘the structure of 
religious consciousness’ which ‘can be defined as a complex whole, the related ele-
ments of which produce in their totality a complete model of religious behaviour, 
i.e. of the religion’. Piatigorsky applies the idea of ‘the structure of religious con-
sciousness’ to various aspects of Hindu religion, including that of the concept of god 
(deva) that ‘implies a specific kind of differentiation fundamentally different from 
the concept of God (and from pagan gods) in Mosaic religion’ (ibid.). The concept of 
‘a god’ is particularly relevant for our conceptualisation of possession in the Indian 
context, since
[t]aken at a given time and in a given place […] a god is present as an istadevata (chosen 
deity), that is, a phenomenon in which the idea of the god momentarily present coincides in 
time and space with that of his devotee and is merged with him in the context of a particular 
subjective religious situation. As in the case of atman-brahman, the subject and object of 
worship are not opposed to one another but seen as two instances of manifestations of the 
same entity. (ibid., 219)
This notion of identity or equivalence between subject and object, particularly in 
the instance of worship and ritual, is crucial to how we view ‘possessed bodies’ in 
the Indian context. The body is the middle ground, so to speak, in which both the 
dual and the non-dual manifest, in which human and divine interchange, swap 
around, merge, become one, but also become two. The interactive, ‘in-between 
space’ is the space of ritual in which presence is urged and drawn out into exist-
ence but is never taken for granted.
Following on from this, I contend that non-duality is a framework within 
which to place our understanding of possession in the Indian cultural and reli-
gious situation. Non-duality is a context in which the question of self and other, 
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of alterity, is addressed in a fundamentally distinct manner from how ‘Western’ 
situated philosophical ideas address the question. It may be counter-argued that 
the philosophical position of non-duality briefly outlined above is merely indic-
ative of a single standpoint within several other divergent philosophical systems 
in India, and that the former represents an elite if not exclusive view that has little 
bearing on the so-called level of folk or popular religion and culture to which 
possession rituals belong. However, it can be asserted with good reason that 
the manner in which the question of multiplicity in the phenomenal world and 
diversity within the social universe is ‘explained’ on a popular, non-elite level, 
is through precisely the same philosophical discourse: the ‘many’ is the ‘one’.6 
Difference, while ‘real’ on the level of everyday transaction, is ‘illusory’ on a tran-
scendental level. This transcendental level becomes immanent if the misrecogni-
tion of the reality of the ephemeral person-individual is acknowledged.
What this implies is the possibility of a multi-dimensional, porous, permea-
ble, fluid identity, self, even ‘no-self’ or self as ‘no-thing’ that not only reinforces 
but also elicits a full engagement with the world. The notion of a ‘decentred’ or 
even non-existent self approaches the phenomenological and existentialist view 
of self and of being that is carved out against the background of nothing. However, 
the existentialist view of nothing and of self as ‘no-thing’ is accompanied by a 
fundamental mood of anxiety, fear, and dread, and an angst-filled, nihilistic 
response. This mood can be broadly described as a condition of alienation which 
itself can be likened to being ‘ensorcelled’ or ‘diseased’ in an ontological sense: 
‘Becoming “ensorcelled” is a slow process of […] devolving toward an alien “oth-
erness” […]. All forms of objectification contribute to this process’ (Handelman, 
Shulman 2004, 213f.). Thus we have somewhat overlapping conclusions regard-
ing the nature of self or being. The responses to and scope of these conclusions, 
however, diverge and vary (see also Sax 2002, 9). The existential view overlays 
nothing with a particular pessimistic meaning: that life has no purpose as such 
(Sartre), but it also reinstates nothing as the ontological background for the cre-
ation of all possibility, and of something (Heidegger). The focus is primarily on 
6 The matter of what constitutes folk or popular religion within Hinduism, both on a concep-
tual and ethnographic level, is one that has received considerable attention through the work 
of Sontheimer (2005) and Fuller (1992). Stereotypically, folk Hinduism has been considered as 
being devoid of the kind of metaphysical and philosophical reflection that signifies Brahmanical 
Hinduism. However, this is indeed questionable, as this view mirrors the prejudices ‘elite’ forms 
of religion might harbour toward ‘non-elite-folk’ forms of religion. It is important, though, to 
note the sheer corporality and immediate presence of gods or goddesses in folk religious ritu-
al and practice, unlike in the Brahmanical situation in which deities may exist in a separate 
 extra-terrestrial location (svarga) (Sontheimer 2005, 315).
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the being of human being, and on the possibility of inter-subjectivity as framed 
by social and political relationships between human individuals. In the Indian 
context, in contrast, the  constructed nature of the social, phenomenal self is seen 
as the source of an existential condition of bondage which in turn gives rise to 
feelings of fear, anxiety, anger, greed, power, violence etc. because of a funda-
mental misrecognition involving the illusory, ephemeral nature of the bounded, 
therefore limited, individualised, egocentric self that is concerned with its own 
immediate survival (this can be extended to include community, religion, tradi-
tion, territory, nation). Freedom from these forms of constraint lies in the admis-
sion of the primordial misrecognition in which the ‘deconstruction of the phenom-
enal self is only a necessary step toward coming to know the real Self, which is not 
to be confused with the phenomenal personality or ego’ (Sax 2002, 15). Brahman, 
like Being (Dasein) in the phenomenological enquiry of Heidegger, is also nothing 
as it cannot be circumscribed through language nor identified through objects, 
and yet it is the non-existent ground from which something, i.e. the phenomenal 
world, arises.7 The Self or Brahman is thus not limited in any way by the condi-
tions of the  four-dimensional world consisting of the co-ordinates of space and 
time. Thus there is no need or indeed possibility to ‘protect’ or ‘defend’ ‘It’, as ‘It’ 
has no boundaries. This misrecognition or ignorance (avidya) applies not only to 
the being of human being, but equally to the being of all sentient and non-sentient 
entities. The  re-conceptualising of alterity to encompass multiplicity, as Arendt 
suggests, is not confined to human  inter-subjectivity, but to an ever-widening orbit 
in which both human and non-human, living and non-living participate. But even 
the condition of complete self-knowledge that Brahman represents is not – as 
pointed out earlier – a constant. This knowledge, to take the Shaiva Siddhanta view 
which both coincides with and diverges from the Advaita perspective, is fragile, 
tending toward rigidity and brittleness and, in fact, a loss of  self-knowledge that is 
counteracted through a dynamic interactive process in which Shiva (as non-dual) 
unfreezes aspects of himself that have succumbed to closure, limitation, and a 
lack of movement (Handelman, Shulman 2004, 212). Ritual action involving the 
body, particularly in the form of dance (see below), is the movement through 
which divine knowledge and presence is  re-created or ‘unfrozen’.
The possibilities of ‘self’ explored above are intertwined in any discourse of 
possession, particularly in the South Asian context. Thus, for example, to return 
7 Heidegger’s notion of Being, like the concept of Brahman, is peculiarly disembodied. As Chris-
topher Macann points out: ‘Heidegger investigated the question of being from the standpoint of 
a Dasein that was never allowed to be its body. One has to bring Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
together to allow for an investigation of being from the standpoint of a human being whose being 
is defined in terms of its being a body’ (personal communication).
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to Boddy’s brief definition, she uses the term ‘individual’ in the sense that, as we 
have seen, is grounded in Western notions of person and self. Linked to this is the 
idea of ‘permeability’ and ‘flexibility’ when it comes to boundaries between indi-
viduals and their environment. The latter possibility is grounded in non-Western 
notions of self and of person that, at least in the Indian context, have no fixed, 
lasting reality. The hermeneutics of possession therefore uses a hybrid language, 
crisscrossing – perhaps unconsciously – between the notions of individuality and 
fixity which researchers themselves carry and ‘blurred’, fluid boundaries and 
identities encountered in the field. I argue in this essay that our understanding of 
possession and of alterity as divine intervention involves a mixing together of dif-
ferent voices, ideologies, and ‘life-worlds’ in a dynamic, ‘swirling’ conversation. 
These entangled, hybrid, perhaps fused, and yet oftentimes divergent views of self 
are a crucial component in arriving at a critical, and possibly radical new under-
standing of what we have been calling ‘possession’, and how we talk about it.
The discussion of ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’ notions of subjectivity outlines 
the framework in which I will present the following ethnographic case study of a 
Hindu deity in the Central Himalayas. Before presenting these materials, I found 
it necessary to first lay bare the categories and concepts that are inextricably tied 
up with the colonial and post-colonial enterprise of scholarship, particularly 
the scholarship dealing with South Asia. As Peter van der Veer, in his review of 
Asad’s work, points out:
the project of modernization, which is crucial to the spread of colonial power over the 
world, provides new forms of language in which subjects understand themselves and their 
actions […] it is almost impossible to escape these categories of western history, such as 
“public” and “private”, “religion” or “history” when writing the history of other societies. 
  (van der Veer 1995, 366)
Much of what I am exploring then is my own attempt to unravel the taken-for-
granted conceptual underpinnings and biases of the way I perceive the powerful 
experiences I have encountered during my fieldwork with regard to Goludev, the 
Central Himalayan ‘God of Justice’ (nyay ka devta).
3 Central Himalayan possessions
Goludev is the principal deity (istadevata) of almost all ‘high’ and ‘low’ caste com-
munities, including Thakur (Rajput), Brahman and Dalit, located in the northern 
Indian province of Kumaon, a mountainous region that borders on Nepal in the 
east and Tibet in the north, flanked by some of the highest peaks in the Indian 
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Himalayas. There are several shrines and smaller temples of Goludev scattered 
over the region, but the deity’s main temples are situated in Chittai (Almora 
dist.), Ghoda Khal (Nainital dist.), and Champavat (Pithoragarh dist.). The loca-
tion of these temples is linked to Goludev’s biography, with each temple being 
connected to different incidents in his life. For example, the temple in Champa-
vat, which is the smallest of the three temples, is linked to Goludev’s birthplace, 
and the capital of his father, King Jhal Rai. The temple in Ghoda Khal, where the 
incident described below involving the young woman embodying the Goddess 
takes place, is associated with Bhagoli Mehra, a woman devotee of Goludev who 
draws the deity to this location to deal with the abuse she is encountering from 
her in-laws.
The journey from Champavat to other locations traces a movement of the 
deity, driven by the pursuit of justice, across the region, which then gets estab-
lished as the kingdom of Kumaon under his jurisdiction. Significantly, his pow-
erful sense of justice derives from his own experience of injustice as a child.8 
Goludev’s devotees are able to solicit his intervention in matters of justice (a cat-
egory used here to cover a wide range of life concerns) in two predominant ways. 
The first way of requesting his mediation is through the submission of written 
petitions (manauti) in his main temples mentioned above that are also described 
as ‘courts of justice’ (kaccheri). The second manner of soliciting his advice and 
intervention is through an oracular ritual called jagar (see Malik 2009; 2011; 
2015; 2016).
The petitions can be written on official stamp paper but also on blank 
sheets. These are offered to the deity in his temples, where they are hung 
together with hundreds of brass bells that are gifted to the deity if the petitions 
are successfully dealt with. The petitioners’ concerns are varied: conflicts over 
 land-ownership and property, success in examinations, health, business deals, 
marriage, divorce, children, mental problems, addiction, enemies, lotteries, 
elections, success with job applications (see Agrawal 1992; Malik 2015; 2016). 
The second important manner, besides petitions, in which Goludev deals with 
matters of justice (and indeed healing) is through what may, in conventional 
terms, be described as an oracular trance ritual, but which I will refer to as 
a ritual of embodiment called jagar (see Malik 2011). Jagar means ‘waking’, 
‘staying awake’, and is sometimes translated as ‘night vigil’. The jagar can 
therefore be described as an intense ritual of ‘awakening’ for both deity and 
devotees (see Krengel 1999, 281).
8 For a synopsis of Goludev’s biography, see Malik 2016.
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The jagar has two main actors: a singer or bard called the jagariya (literally 
‘awakener’) and the person entering into a so-called trance who is called the dan-
gariya (see Malik 2009). Both jagariya and dangariya, in contrast to the high-caste 
priests of the larger temples of Goludev, may often, though not always, belong to 
low-caste Dalit communities. The dangariya is, more importantly for the ques-
tions that will arise below regarding the young woman’s embodiment as the 
Goddess, also called nacnevala (dancer). Like written petitions, the concerns of 
devotees during a jagar can vary, though often the presence of the deity is used to 
establish the hidden causes of illness, misfortune or injustice (see Krengel 1999; 
Leavitt 1997).9
4 The woman who is goddess
My case study focuses on a young woman who is ‘spontaneously’ possessed 
by the Goddess in the temple that was established through Bhagoli Mehra, the 
woman devotee of Goludev mentioned above.10 The young woman embodies 
the Goddess (Devi) during the Navaratra festival, the festival of nine nights, 
which celebrates the deeds of the Goddess ending with her slaughter of the 
buffalo-demon, Mahishasura, who has usurped control of the universe from 
the gods. By slaughtering the buffalo-demon, the Goddess is able to restore 
balance – dharma – in the world. This narrative dealing with the God-
dess’s warring deeds is first found in a Sanskrit work from the 6th Century 
CE called the Devi-Mahatmya (see Coburn 1991). It is subsequently narrated 
along with extensive instructions for the ritual propitiation of the Goddess 
in a 12th Century CE Sanskrit work called the Kalika-Purana (see van Kooij 
1972). In addition, the story has almost universal occurrence across the Indian 
 sub-continent in the form of narratives, and ritual enactments often involving 
animal sacrifice.
9 Jagars are most often performed in the environment of a devotee’s home into which the singer 
and dancer are invited. Immediate family members, but also a wider public from the village 
participate as the audience.
10 While this incident happens outside the ritual framework of the jagar, it is not uncommon 
that a person may embody a deity within the sacred space of the temple.
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4.1 The setting
Several hundred families and pilgrims are visiting the temple and performing 
puja (worship) in front of the shrine of Goludev. Diagonally opposite the shrine, 
in front of a set of three-pronged trees, is a dhuni (sacred fire) that is smouldering 
with large logs, and halves of dry coconuts that have been split open for pilgrims 
to take home the tender kernel as prasad (consecrated food). A few metres behind 
the dhuni, along the outer wall of the temple, there is a small newly erected room 
with pictures of Rama, Sita, Lakshmana and Hanuman. Inside the room, whose 
doors are wide open, the uncle of the priest of the Goludev temple sits reciting 
the story of Rama from the Ramcaritmanas.11 The recitation continues uninter-
ruptedly during the day over the entire 9–10 days of the Navaratra festival. Pil-
grims visit the priest’s uncle, who is himself a priest of the temple of the goddess 
in another village, for blessings. A family performs kanya puja with a group of 
young girls.12 It is perhaps the third or fifth day, perhaps even later into the festi-
val. It is late morning, approaching noon.
4.2 The incident
Suddenly there is a young woman, in her mid-twenties, who arrives at the dhuni. 
She has a large, scarlet rhododendron flower in her mouth. She begins to circle 
the fire. People milling around move away to give her room, forming a circle of 
on-lookers. The elderly drummer who is sitting with his back to the wall of the 
small room beats his drum; there is a distinctive but somewhat weak rhythm. The 
young woman begins to dance to the rhythm, all the while circling the fire. At one 
point she trips over one of the logs and falls badly on her side, almost into the 
fire. A middle-aged woman – her mother perhaps – tries to help her up. She con-
tinues around the fire one more time, then she drags a large log that is partially 
burning to the edge of the temple floor to the left of the drummer and the small 
room. She is handing out coconut halves to pilgrims who come up to her to accept 
the prasad. ‘Who is this woman?’ I ask people standing near me. ‘It is Devi, the 
Goddess’, they answer.
The young woman moves away after a short while from where she is sitting 
and positions herself in an area about two metres in front of the main shrine. 
11 This is a retelling of Ramayana in Avadhi-Hindi by the poet Tulsidas: 16th Century CE.
12 This involves the worship, feeding and giving of gifts to seven pre-pubescent girls who are 
treated as manifestations of the Goddess (Shakti).
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There are crowds of people either sitting or bending under the low-lying roof of the 
shrine. A priest sits inside the shrine and another stands in front reciting in San-
skrit, conducting puja for groups of families clustered around the narrow opening 
of the small shrine. There is a lot of bustle and noise from the people talking, the 
recitation, the ringing of bells. Amidst the loud recitation and ringing of bells, 
the young woman speaks in a clear, strident voice that is audible above all the 
clamour. She asks a straightforward question that initially flusters the priest: ‘Who 
are you worshipping? Do you know who you are worshipping?’ The priest stops his 
recitation and begins to answer hesitantly that it (i.e. the puja) is for Goludev. But 
she continues asking questions in an even louder, more penetrating voice: ‘For 
whom are you performing puja? If you don’t even know for whom you are doing 
puja, then what exactly is it that you are doing? You should perform puja for each 
individual family in a clear manner, not collectively for everyone!’ After a short 
time, the young woman moves from her position near the shrine to the room in 
which the elderly priest is reciting episodes from the Ramayana. She begins to take 
slow steps around the priest, sprinkling consecrated water over the white cap he is 
wearing. The priest does not look up or stop his recitation. She sits down in front of 
the priest, swaying slightly to the rhythm of his recitation. Before I enter the small 
room, I have a brief conversation with the priest of the temple. He asks me whether 
I have had darshan (‘seeing’, audience) [of the young woman]? I answer in the 
affirmative, but he continues in a somewhat derisive manner that he’s not sure 
about this darshan – he doesn’t quite understand what’s going on here… it could 
be anything, he can’t say. I ask him: ‘Is it Devi?’ He says one can’t say for sure…
4.3 The conversation
After a while the young woman stands up and begins to have a conversation with 
her family members:
I’ll tell you after six months. No one has asked me yet! If no one has asked me what should 
I say? No one has come here. People from the family should come here. If anyone dies in 
your family, if someone’s head gets cut off, it’s not my responsibility… even if I come into 
anyone’s body… if anything happens… if anyone gets killed. I told them to phone up and 
call people [from the village]. Now I’m going to fulfil your wishes and everyone else’s in 
the temple [but not those who haven’t come here]. I came to the temple to tell you this. This 
temple has [only] one rule, which is, if they get money they will perform puja, otherwise 
they won’t. [i.e. they are only interested in money]. If they get money they will perform 
puja. This drummer only plays if he gets money in his pocket. The temple stays open for 24 
hours and so should the drummer [be here and play]… this drummer’s desires will never be 
fulfilled… his stomach will never be satisfied… I’m telling you this… If anything happens to 
anyone else, I’m not responsible. I’m responsible for the family who came with me.
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5 The swirl of worlds
Whereas possessed bodies were likely to be approached as anachronistic bodies influenced 
by beliefs that the scholar did not hold, I have argued for an approach that both acknowl-
edges that the possessed body is powerful and that scholarly studies of possession are pro-
duced by a desire to be in proximity to alterity, which is often masked as an intellectual 
desire to explain the possession… Mary Keller (2002, 103)
How do we frame, represent or understand this ‘incident’? Can we claim that 
this is indeed divine embodiment? Or is this the only way an otherwise socially 
oppressed young woman can articulate her ‘voice’?
Let us look at what is she saying and doing. Her words seem all along to be 
unflinchingly critical. There is a quality of straightforwardness to them as she 
speaks both to the temple’s priests but also to her own family. Her comments about 
the temple and its custodians are bitingly precise, uncovering their corrupted and 
lax operation of what, according to her, ought to be a pristine location of worship 
and service. Her speech toward her family is reproachful and threatening, point-
ing out that they and others have not granted her the attention she deserves: But 
then she also turns to blessing the family who has gathered around her, while 
making it clear that people from the village who did not heed her call to come to 
the temple on that day would not be blessed. Moreover, her speech has the nature 
of a foreshadowing, of a prophecy; it is even oracle-like. She expresses a pur-
posefulness and foreknowledge of her actions. At the same time there is a cryptic 
quality to what she is saying, a sense of some purpose that is still hidden from the 
view of her family and onlookers: a purpose to her presence at the temple that 
will be revealed only in time. These pronouncements and their implicit but simul-
taneous meanings as being threatening, revealing, hidden, critical, reproachful, 
benevolent, and foreknowing taken together create the conditions for authority, 
power, and sovereignty that she, as Goddess, exemplifies. Her pronouncements 
also make it clear that the Goddess is aware of her own capacity to ‘occupy’ a 
body for the purposes of such a visitation. By virtue of this  self-conscious state-
ment, the Goddess is also making a vital distinction between herself and the body 
she ‘instrumentalises’. The Goddess’ pronouncements importantly represent a 
prophetic voice. Prophetic not just in the sense that it alludes to something in 
the future being revealed or a prefiguration of present events, but also in that 
it represents a voice from within the religious institution itself that is intensely 
critical of the corrosion that has crept into the structures of that very institution. 
The Goddess’ statements are both dissenting and rejuvenating at the same time, 
with the explicit rationale of restoring the original purpose – indeed dharma – of 
the temple and its functionaries. She mirrors the objective of the Goddess in texts 
such the Devi-Mahatmya and Kalika-Purana toward the  restitution of a cosmic 
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order that has degenerated on account of the  entropy-creating usurpation of 
power in the world through demonic forces. In addition to the force of her speech, 
the Goddess’ movements with regard to her own body but also through differ-
ent spaces of the temple compound are significant. Her actions are designated as 
nacna (dancing), which is also used to describe the actions of a person appointed 
to embody a deity during a jagar. Her movement across different spaces of the 
temple involves a circular motion around the sacred fire and the priest who is 
reciting the Ramayana. But it also involves her sitting directly opposite the deity’s 
image in front of his shrine, and, after she has circled him, sitting opposite the 
priest. The circular movement around the fire, and the priest, are indicative of the 
clockwise circumambulatory steps (pradaksina) that pilgrims or devotees under-
take while paying their homage to a sacred object or person as the case may be. 
While the sacred fire is an obvious choice in terms of importance in the geog-
raphy of the temple, the reason for her election to circumambulate the priest is 
not immediately apparent. This seems to be connected to the strong, yet ‘invis-
ible’ charismatic attraction of the priest who single-mindedly and passionately 
pursues his uninterrupted chanting of the story of Rama. Throughout this event, 
the priest does not waiver in his concentration or allow himself to be distracted, 
even though the young woman walks closely around him, laying her hand on 
his head as a form of blessing, and even sprinkling consecrated water over him. 
Later she sits down facing him in close proximity, just as she has done in front of 
the main image of the deity, although there the crowds of devotees keep her from 
getting as close as she does to the priest. The Goddess’ presence is thus made 
known through a series of significant utterances but also bodily movements iden-
tified as dance resulting from her circling the sacred fire and the priest.
Returning to the questions put at the beginning of this section: How do we 
explain what is going on here? Is it divine embodiment? Or is the young woman 
expressing her ‘voice’? In other words, does it involve the Goddess’ agency or 
the woman’s? I consider it worthwhile at this point to introduce some ideas put 
forth by Mary Keller (2002) who uses Asad’s work on the ‘Genealogies of Religion’ 
to critically appraise the question of possession, agency, and women. There are 
several important issues that Keller raises, particularly with respect to the notion 
of agency that in post-colonial scholarship is ‘cheerfully’ attributed to third-world 
subjects, in particular to the ‘rediscovery’ of women as agents. Keller (2002, 62f.), 
while emphasising the need to historicise scholarly discourse in terms of culture 
and power – particularly with regard to the concept of ‘religion’ – signals the pecu-
liarity of the attribution of ‘voice’, that is both withheld and granted by the same 
instance of authority, namely, ‘imperialism’ (in the colonial context) and ‘global 
capitalism’ (in the contemporary political context). Keller,  following the work of 
Asad, suggests that the notion of a bounded or ‘buffered’ person only arose in 
The swirl of worlds: possession, porosity and embodiment   575
the post-Enlightenment epoch in which several radical divisions were made, the 
most significant being perhaps the division between the state and the church, 
but also, through the work of Descartes, as pointed out previously, the division 
between mind and body. Within these far-reaching alterations to the  view of 
society and human beings’ place in the world, the foundations for the idea of an 
autonomous individual or rather agent were also laid. Asad argues that the idea of 
an autonomous individual in charge of her/his destiny replaces the ‘pre-modern’ 
understanding of person and of body that was not as an autonomous agent but 
as an instrument through which divine power  (disciplina) could flow. He states 
that the modern, privatised notion of religion specifically, and modernity in 
general, ‘extinguishes various possibilities’, one of them being perhaps a notion 
of the religious body and ‘human subjectivity to be at the disposal of God’s will’ 
(ibid., 56). Furthermore, he argues that agent does not equal subject (‘where the 
former is the principle of effectivity and the latter of consciousness’); they ‘do not 
belong to the same theoretical universe’ (ibid., 63f.). Keller develops this idea in a 
new framework for understanding possession, particularly possession involving 
women, in her notion of instrumental agency. Instrumental agency, in distinction 
to the idea of autonomous agency, suggests the possibility of agency not based 
on the idea of a bounded, discreet individual, but rather on that of the body as a 
field upon which various socio-biological forces converge, and that is open to the 
work of divine power: ‘The body that navigates these systems is understood to be 
instrumental rather than self-constituting; it is tempered by social and biologi-
cal forces’ (ibid.). Consequently, Keller argues that ‘[p]ossession is not a symbol 
for action; it is action or disciplina that produces knowledge in the bodies of the 
possessed. The possessed body is an instrumental agency – a body marked by 
its activity’. Simultaneously, Keller suggests that instrumental agency, rather 
than being a matter of individual volition and intentionality, is created through 
the agreement of a social group or community. Here again, agency shifts from 
being located in the private, and perhaps even isolated realm of the individuated 
self, to that of the shared space of the public realm. The critical issue then of 
how we view and approach the phenomenon of ‘possession’ rests on our con-
ceptualisation of what constitutes agency and person or rather ‘subject’. As I 
have already pointed out, in the Indian context, the reality of the social subject is 
deconstructed because it is based on a false apprehension of the concreteness of 
a bounded, individualised self.
I maintain that it is valuable to use Keller’s idea of instrumental agency as 
being created through a set of ‘social and biological forces’ by taking this further 
to include, in a deeply constitutive manner, different voices making up a conver-
sation that embraces divergent pronouncements: those that affirm the  presence 
of the Goddess, those that are sceptical or doubtful of it, and even those that 
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downright deny its possibility. For example, the young woman’s family and 
several visitors to the temple affirm the presence of the Goddess; the main priest 
of the temple occupies an ambivalent or sceptical position. Scholars, however, 
are unsure, since to agree with the devotees’ perspective would be tantamount 
to surrendering scholarly distance and objectivity. But to completely deny the 
possibility of the ‘reality’ of what is happening would amount to too much objec-
tivity, and the extinguishing, as Asad puts it, of ‘various possibilities’. All these 
 perspectives – those of the young woman’s family, the devotees, the drummer, 
the priest, the Goddess, the scholars – constitute the ‘reality’ of the Goddess’ 
embodiment-presence. Her embodiment is made up, so to speak, of a ‘swirl of 
worlds’: each given by a different set of concerns, but none, however, being nec-
essarily privileged over another.
6 The play of conversation
The notion of a ‘swirl of worlds’ is inspired by Hans-Georg Gadamer’s exposi-
tion of ‘Dialogue’ and ‘Conversation’. Gadamer uses the metaphor of conversa-
tion to describe how we can enter into a dialogue that leads to understanding 
 (Verstehen).
[It] is a process of two people understanding each other. Thus it is a characteristic of every 
true conversation that each opens himself to the other person, truly accepts his point of 
view as worthy of consideration and gets inside the other to such an extent that he under-
stands not a particular individual, but what he says. The thing that has to be grasped is the 
objective rightness or otherwise of his opinion, so that they can agree with each other on a 
subject. (Gadamer 1979, 347)
Gadamer maintains that knowledge is not fixed or static but that it arises out of 
a dialogic process of interaction. This dialogic process requires each ‘speaker’ 
or ‘participant’ to both acknowledge and ‘unconceal’, so to speak, their inher-
ent prejudices or ‘horizons’.13 Without engaging in this process of revealing or 
‘unconcealment’ of prejudices, there can be no fruitful dialogue or understand-
ing. While Gadamer (2004, 361) stresses the importance of texts and their inter-
action within a history of interpretation, his idea of conversation is particularly 
crucial because it suggests the aural and spoken nature of dialogue and  therefore 
13 See also Smith, M. K. (2001). I prefer to use the word ‘concern’ rather than prejudice to in-
dicate the issues or questions speakers are dealing with in their lives that they then bring to a 
conversation.
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‘emergent’ nature of knowledge. Gadamer’s idea of conversation – like his notion 
of play (ibid., 104f.) – can be likened to a medial plane in which the subjec-
tivity of the speakers (or players as the case may be) is not in the foreground. 
It is the conversation (or game) that is in the foreground, having an existence 
that is almost independent of the speakers; the speakers’ subjectivity is held in 
abeyance, much like the subjectivity of a possessed person. The speakers, in 
fact, enter and explore the emerging terrain of the conversation that unfolds as 
they speak. This is quite distinct, for example, from a discussion or debate that 
involves one speaker convincing the other speaker through argument or persua-
sion of the validity of their point of view. A dialogue, on the other hand, involves a 
willingness to be open such that third possibilities emerge from the conversation 
that may or may not have the quality of a conclusion. In fact, the ‘end’ of a conver-
sation may be ‘inconclusive’: the point being one of revealing or ‘unconcealing’ 
a series of insights or questions that the theme of the conversation calls upon or 
draws out from itself. Following on from Gadamer’s notion of a conversation, I 
elucidate a ‘swirl of worlds’ as follows.
Individual human beings or communities represent ‘points of view’ or hori-
zons (to put it in Gadamer’s terms) that are constituted by inherent and often 
unexamined interests or concerns that determine the constraints or limitations 
of any given horizon. Each horizon represents a world that is constituted by ideas 
(language) and actions (practices). In encountering a phenomenon like ‘posses-
sion’ we are confronted by a convergence of points-of-view or horizons, each car-
rying its own set of concerns. Assuming that the body in possession is played 
upon by ‘social and biological forces’, that are themselves constituted by a chorus 
of voices, the ‘reality’ of possession is made up of a set of hybrid discourses and 
practices consisting of academic and non-academic ideologies concerning self, 
body, power, agency and so forth together with academic practices (fieldwork) 
and non-academic practices (ritual). I am describing this as a swirl because of 
the shifting, indeterminate, and fluid nature of the interactions between these 
horizons, which, like spoken conversation, is constantly moving or changing, is 
sometimes fragmented like utterances, and is both ephemeral and unpredictable. 
Moreover, the notion of a swirl also suggests an interplay of voices that coalesces 
into an unconscious eddy that is not always self-reflective in the sense Gadamer 
suggests of ‘unconcealing’ hidden prejudices and given, ‘always-already’ ways of 
perceiving.
The scholar’s perspective is given by a set of concerns that are philosophi-
cally grounded in the binary categories of modernity, some of which I mentioned 
earlier (private–public, religious–secular, mind–body, human–divine, subject–
object etc.). The woman’s family’s and the devotees’ concerns, on the other hand, 
are certainly not given by this set of concerns. There is no primary philosophical 
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concern with the division between the religious and secular or mind and body or 
human and divine; rather it is about ‘seeing’ the Goddess and gaining her grace 
and blessings for everyday matters. The main priest’s perspective is given by a 
concern to maintain the manner in which he runs and administers the temple. 
It is not beneficial for him to have a young woman (or Goddess for that matter), 
publicly proclaim that the temple is a purely financial enterprise not seriously 
interested in being what a temple ought to be: a place of service, worship, and 
refuge for devotees.
Gadamer also argues that dialogue is about suspending the notion that any 
one perspective is more privileged (or more ‘right’) than another. Each horizon is 
equal inasmuch as it simply represents a particular horizon and nothing more. 
The critical point is that scholarship, particularly the scholarship on possession, 
attempts to ‘escape’ this swirl of (equal) worlds by assuming an ‘objective’ posi-
tion. By participating in a secular, rational, scientific discourse, scholarship is, in 
fact, that construction of knowledge which attempts to put an end to the swirling 
by claiming it occupies more than just the status of an interpretation (in Gad-
amer’s sense): that it is elevated to the position of scientific truth. By presenting 
itself in this manner it precludes us from seeing the multiple potentials inherent 
in different situations. But if we are to take the idea of dialogue seriously, then 
we must consider that scholarship itself is but one perspective within a ‘swirl’ of 
perspectives, interpretations or points-of-view. The point of the foregoing explo-
ration is to make Gadamer’s notion of dialogue applicable to our understanding 
of possession: a dialogue, in its most open form, can lead to the formulation of 
something that is beyond the initiatory statements of each speaker, and the hori-
zons of what they initially know. Thus can we – as scholars – imagine an emer-
gent and continuously expanding context which acknowledges a world in which 
we can be another?
7 Possession as radical alterity
I began this paper by saying that I would examine the possibility of alterity in 
the context of what is commonly called ‘possession’. ‘Alterity’ as the possibil-
ity of the participation and intervention of the ‘divine other’ in human life, I 
have indicated, exists because of, and through a social conversation involving 
several voices and perspectives belonging both to the scholar and also devo-
tees. I will conclude my presentation of materials from the Central Himalayas 
by some further remarks about ‘possession’, and about ‘alterity’ in the context 
of  ‘possession’. First, I would like to point out again that there is a steady pre-
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occupation, indeed almost fixation, with possession within several scholarly 
disciplines including anthropology, religious studies, sociology, linguistics, and 
medical disciplines.14 Both the desire to study possession and to explain it within 
frameworks that objectify it and are, in fact, experientially disengaged from it, I 
am arguing, stem from the challenge that possession poses to the dominant view 
that religion itself is separate from the public domain permeated by the secular, 
being rooted in the private domain of individual belief. But more than that, pos-
session occupies one of the significant interstices of the modern age by trans-
gressing and transcending binary categories with which modernity so dearly 
identifies itself. Modernity crystallises through a series of acts involving critical 
distancing: the individual from community, community from cosmos, culture 
from nature, equality from hierarchy, mind from body, and so on. These acts of 
distancing, furthermore, necessarily result in sets of binary, oppositional cate-
gories since modernity itself is predicated and defined on the fundamental dis-
tancing between the modern–innovative–new and ancient–traditional–old. We 
cannot know whether we are the ‘moderni’ unless we can contrast ourselves with 
that which we define as ‘antiqui’ (see Benavides 1998). The discursive category 
of modernity therefore must continuously create, and, in its political manifesta-
tions also intentionally perpetuate the existence of antagonistic dualities without 
which it loses legitimacy and force as an intellectual and political ideology. To 
continue along the lines mentioned previously, to be modern then is to both live 
and fervently believe in a society that values and, indeed, sustains divisions 
between public–private, human–divine, human–nonhuman–animal, secular–
religious, individual–community, mind–body, and last but not least, bounded/
buffered self–porous/permeable self. While these dichotomous categories may 
seem neutral on paper, in practice they are far from impartial. Thus these opposi-
tional categories involve a suppression in many instances of one of the pairings: 
the secular is clearly valorised over the religious, which may continue to exist, 
but only in the private sphere; humans are valorised over non-humans, espe-
cially animals, such that their survival can take place at the cost of the extinction 
of several thousand other species; the mental (mind) is valued over the biological 
(body) that it can presumably control, understand and analyse; individuals are 
given priority over the community in their quest for personal success and so on. 
It is to live in a political state that administers fixed categories of social  identity in 
which excess is undermined and even denied. Moreover, individuals are driven by 
14 As Boddy (1994, 407) notes: ‘In contrast to anthropological accounts of the body or of time, 
spirit possession has […] rarely missed a theoretical beat […] the subject is thematic for the dis-
cipline as a whole in its confrontation with the Other, continuously affirming our identity as 
anthropologists.’
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an inner capacity to shape and manage their lives. Responsibility and cause are 
redirected almost totally in all possible domains – psychological, legal, social, 
financial, educational – to the individual or to extensions of the individual such 
as parents, siblings, peer groups. There is little recourse in the context of moder-
nity to invoke forces or powers that lie beyond or even hidden within individuals’ 
capabilities when it comes to the explanation of their actions.15
Possession, however, challenges these precise yet value-laden categorisa-
tions that lie at the source of modernity and its expression in the modern secular, 
nation state, and therefore there is a necessity to explain possession through 
reductionist categories. Possession is somehow that very ‘vestige’ of the past (the 
‘pre’ or ‘non’ modern and traditional) – like its larger problematic counterpart 
religion – which shocks, amazes, and perhaps even embarrasses us in its con-
tinued, even thriving, survival within the realms of the scientific, technological, 
and rational. To allow possession to represent what it is, that is, the possibility of 
a multi-dimensional self in which self and other are identified through ‘equiva-
lence, enmeshing, and continuity’ while operating in a public rather than private 
ritual domain, and the possibility of alterity in the sense of divine ‘intervention’ 
as such (whether in the public or private domain), is to question the foundations 
of a modern secular state built on the notion of the bounded, separate individual 
who is in complete control of her/his life and destiny. Possession, therefore, in a 
fundamentally distinctive manner forces us to rethink modern notions of agency 
and subjectivity. As the possibility of quite literally being another, possession 
thus represents the tangible prospect of a ‘radical alterity’ which goes beyond 
even its social, secular meaning. In view of the somewhat uncertain status of the 
ideological arrow of modernity and of progress in terms of the ecological and 
political disasters we are encountering today, divine embodiment represents one 
possibility of an alternative understanding of ‘self’, and of other ways of being for 
human beings, that we can take seriously if we are to authentically explore new 
possibilities for the future of being human.
15 The idea of a subjectivity that is not solely rooted in ‘conscious’, personal volition, is, of 
course, close to the experience of many artists, writers and creative individuals including schol-
ars and scientists. Although creative insight may be often experienced as spontaneous, ‘unex-
plained’ or even ‘channelled’, this fact rarely enters scholarly discourse, as the latter has to do 
with the very opposite of ‘insight’ and spontaneity, namely reason, logic, argument, and rational 
thought.
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Christine Dureau
‘Greater love …’: Methodist missionaries, 
self-sacrifice and relational personhood
In recent years, the relationship between conversion, culture and personhood 
has been a key issue in anthropological approaches to Christianity. From one 
perspective, the force of Christian ideation stimulates reflection on existential 
and ontological truths. Working with recently converted Urapmin people, Joel 
Robbins (2002; 2004) argues that conversion prompts or compels a shift to more 
individualist understandings of the person and erodes relational values because 
of Christianity’s premise that individual souls have discrete fates. For Robbins 
(2007), with whom the individualising argument is most famously associated, 
anthropologists have been prone to ‘continuity thinking’ in depicting conversion 
in terms of cultural resilience and disregarding the very real impetus for change 
represented by Christian ideas. For others, such claims risk overplaying the effi-
cacy of exogenous ideologies, underplaying the hermeneutic possibilities of 
Christian texts, discourses and principles, side-lining social forces and contexts 
and ignoring the extent of cultural interplay in conversion and later contexts.
Discussion of the issue is often constrained by overdrawn contrasts between 
Western and non-Western personhood, vague deployments of ‘dividual’ and ‘indi-
vidual’1 and limited historical and denominational contextualisation. Anthropo-
logical discussions of personhood also articulate with, but pay limited attention 
to, longstanding questions about Christianity’s relationship to personhood in the 
Western heartlands whence emanated the great proselytisation projects between 
the 18th–20th centuries.
I turn the lens back towards one group of European missionaries (see also 
Lindstrom 2013), analysing published and unpublished materials associated 
with the late 19th–early 20th century Australasian Methodist Missionary Society 
(AMMS), based in Sydney, Australia, which oversaw Methodist missions in the 
1 Relationships between the concepts individual, individuality and individualism is often ob-
scure. For my purposes, the individual is the particular person, who can be thought of inde-
pendently of others and, in Christian cosmology, as having a unique soul. They reveal themselves 
in their individuality, that is their persona and particular characteristics, an understanding that 
Mauss suggests is universal.
Individualism and individualist, by contrast, suggest an elevation of the individual as cul-
tural value, as in libertarian political histories, sociobiological reductionism, or ideological 
 celebrations of self-interest.
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Pacific and, to a lesser extent, more widely.2 To the textual impetus stressed 
by some and the cultural and political contexts adduced by others, I ask about 
models of personhood among some of those who tried to convey Christian 
messages. I touch on relationships between missionary and indigenous out-
looks on Simbo, Western Solomon Islands, at the end of my chapter, but my 
primary focus is on European Methodist missionaries’ understanding of moral 
personhood. I suggest that late 19th–early 20th century Methodist values of 
self- sacrifice, and their markedly corporeal religiosity, evince aspects of divid-
ualist personhood, despite the denomination’s close association with individ-
ualism, and challenge simplistic associations of Christianity with a single form 
of  personhood.
I particularly focus on two key figures associated with the mission in the 
Western Solomons, Rev. Dr George Brown (1835–1917) and Rev. John Francis 
Goldie (1870–1955). Brown, with long missionary experience in Samoa, New 
Britain and New Guinea, had served as President of the NSW Conference before 
becoming General Secretary of the AMMS Board of Missions. He had long advo-
cated a mission in the Solomons and, in 1902, led the inaugural mission there 
before leaving Goldie as Chair, a position the latter then occupied for 48 years.
The two men, who fell out bitterly within a few years, were radically differ-
ent. Brown was a gregarious hail-fellow-well-met character, making friends with 
natives, traders, government officials and journalists alike, and generally man-
aging convivial relationships with missionaries of diverse persuasions. Goldie, 
almost his diametrical opposite, was infamously problematic – egocentric, 
ungenerous in interpreting others’ actions, power hungry, self-interested, unre-
lentingly hostile to other missions and at odds with colonial officials and other 
2 Until 1922, when the New Zealand church separated, the AMMS operated on behalf of Austral-
ia and New Zealand. Missionaries of European origin came from both countries, and, in German 
colonial fields, Germany. In the Society’s earliest days, most missionaries of European heritage 
were British, but by the period covered here, most were born in Australia or New Zealand or had 
immigrated while very young. Of the two I consider, Brown arrived in New Zealand as a young 
man and married into a prominent missionary family there following his conversion. Goldie, 
35 years younger, grew up in Tasmania.
My focus is solely on missionaries of European origin, who are overwhelmingly privileged 
in the archive, almost silencing the voices of Islander missionaries. Throughout AMMS history, 
Polynesians, mainly from Samoa, Tonga and Fiji, constituted by far the majority of missionaries, 
although they were rarely granted that title. Once missions were well established in Melanesian 
regions, missionaries from those areas also moved to newer fields. My sense is that an account of 
their understanding of Methodist personhood would reveal an even stronger stress on relation-
ality, porosity and self-sacrifice.
‘Greater love…’: Methodist missionaries, self-sacrifice and relational personhood   585
colonial actors (e.g., Carter 1985; Garrett 1982). Yet, different as they were, they 
shared an understanding of self-sacrifice as key element of Christian personhood 
and missionary practice.
1  Dividual and individual persons and 
anthropologists
As Marcel Mauss (1985 [1938], 14) phrased it, those societies that ‘have made of 
the human person a complete entity, independent of all others save God, are 
rare’. His essay on the person and self, published in English in 1985, sketched a 
historical account of how the self became, not just ‘rational substance, indivisi-
ble and individual’, but, eventually, ‘a consciousness and a category […] identi-
fied with self-knowledge and the [sic] psychological consciousness’ (ibid., 20). 
For Mauss, this individual self was exclusively Western: ‘It is formed only for us, 
among us’ (ibid., 22). Marilyn Strathern’s The Gender of the Gift (1988) apparently 
demonstrated this point.
Strathern posed a heuristic contrast between Western and Melanesian 
notions of the person, opposing a Western conceit of the individual as bounded, 
complete and possessing their own selfhood to hypothetical Melanesian models 
of the person as dividual, constituted as a composite being out of the totality 
of their relationships with others and made so through partibility. For Melane-
sians, she posited, the person was made as corporeal and social being through 
exchanges of parts of selves.
Strathern adapts McKim Marriott’s (e.g., 1976) concept of the Hindu ‘divid-
ual’ to carry her critique of anthropological approaches to gender relations in 
Melanesia, which she saw as constrained by problematic grounding in Western 
individualist presumptions.3 In particular, she argues, feminist analyses of Mel-
anesian persons are unreflectively informed by the proprietary expectations of 
3 Strathern describes her focus as Melanesian gender relations but the book is largely directed 
against interpretations of those Papua New Guinea (PNG) Highlands societies said to be charac-
terised by gender antagonism and female exploitation. It is with this in mind that she repeatedly 
asserts that she is not claiming that Melanesians see things as she outlines them, so much as 
developing an imaginative heuristic opposition between ‘Melanesia’ and the ‘West’ in order to 
challenge the ways ‘we’, her ubiquitous construct, conceive of relationships in Melanesia. As 
such, it is, as much as anything, an exercise in adamant relativism.
The book develops her earlier concerns with the tension between anthropology’s discipli-
nary cultural relativism and the political commitments of feminism (e.g., 1981; 1985). For a severe 
critique, see Kirby 1989.
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Western personhood in which persons own or control their own activities, iden-
tities, bodies, etc. She also criticises ‘society’ as a flawed abstraction because 
scholars conceive of it as composed of relationships between (ideally) autono-
mous individuals. These understandings, she asserts, lead scholars to depict sit-
uations in which individual persons clearly do not possess themselves as forms 
of inequality and exploitation, interpretations which she sees as inapplicable to 
 dividually-oriented Melanesia.
For Strathern, the dividual, as a composite person, is constituted out of parts 
of others, corporeally made through directly or indirectly ingesting their sub-
stances, for example, when women transmit their husband’s seminally-conveyed 
patrilineal substance through their breastmilk or when the food that they produce 
is gifted to, and consumed by, others. Here, elements of the self are detachable 
and passable to others, constituting transformations of land, substance and 
labour, just as the self is made through others’ detached and conveyed parts in 
the kin, affinal and wider social exchanges of quotidian and ritual life.
Like Marriott, Strathern’s analysis was definitively regionally focused. 
However, while her gender analysis was criticised (e.g., Biersack 1991; Jolly 1992; 
Josephides 1992), the idea of the dividual was widely taken up as anthropologists 
noted its utility in diverse contexts and the value of its challenge to Eurocentric 
perceptions that the individual is universally taken to be the fundamental human 
agent. This dissemination has depended on significant conceptual slippage (see 
also Robbins 20015, 178 n. 4). In particular, it is often stripped of key elements. 
For Strathern, relational values – a stress on persons as properly enmeshed in 
relationships with others, rather than individually autonomous – are a necessary 
premise to ideas of giving and taking substance, but insufficient in themselves to 
constitute dividualism. Her dividual is not only relational, but definitively com-
posite and partible.
In much literature deriving from Strathern, though, ‘dividual’ refers more 
generically to properly relational persons. The dividual is variably painted as 
permeable, open to other forces or the forcefulness of others, corporeally open 
through the senses, emotions, etc., morally judged according to their participa-
tion in sociality. This synonymising sometimes risks bleeding out the conceptual 
traction of the ‘dividual’ ideal type, suggesting the need for careful conceptual 
delineation (Weber 1977 [1904]; Gerring 1999).4
4 A further consequence of the concept’s wide application is that Strathern’s West–Melanesia 
distinction is transformed into a West–Rest binary: the individual distinctively Western, others 
dividualist. In fact, her ‘Melanesia’ was unduly generalised and conceptually problematic (Kees-
ing 1992), largely drawing upon a limited range of societies in inland PNG New Guinea. While 
she addresses other Melanesian ethnographic data, she consistently returns to those inland and 
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Still, the concept’s diffusion opens up productive questions about relation-
ships between personhood, culture and social and cultural change. In many 
ways, the disciplinary debate about Christian in/dividualism is now void. Many 
scholars have noted that the dividual–individual distinction is overdrawn and 
observed the frequency of relational forms of personhood in the heartlands of 
individualist ideologies. And the point that both individualist and relational 
modes of personhood can be found in any given cultural world has been widely 
taken up (e.g., Conklin, Morgan 1996; LiPuma 1998; Kusserow 1999). Most would 
now agree that forms of individualism and dividualism are best treated as ‘dynam-
ics that mutually implicate each other’ and are variably present and available to 
individuals in different contexts (Bialecki, Daswani 2015, 272).
As Bialecki and Daswani (2015, 285) note, the challenge now is to problem-
atise the dividual–individual binary while avoiding the banal ‘milk-and-water 
claim that all humans are admixtures of both’. Even Robbins, who, in a sense 
launched the debate, has moderated his early depiction of Christianity as ‘unre-
lentingly individualist’ (2004, 293) to more recently (e.g. 2015) stressing the 
tension between collective and individual personhoods in some forms of Christi-
anity. The continuing salience of the distinction, then, lies in the ways in which it 
enables us to more fully map the scope and variability of personhood and, within 
Christianity, the social and historical dynamics of relationships between dividu-
alism and individualism as they manifest in different times and places. It is in this 
context that I consider one of the reputed heartland religions in the development 
of individualism. I characterise Methodist missionaries as both individual and 
quasi-dividual, suggesting that their efforts to enact the ideal of Christianity as a 
global community of fellow believers, each possessing unique souls, reflect both 
understandings.
2 Methodist in/dividuals: ‘heart, soul, and mind’
Scholars have long noted affinities between Christianity, the emergence of indi-
vidualist understandings of the person and the contraction of collective forms of 
sociality in Euro-American societies (e.g., Weber 2001 [1905]; Mauss 1985 [1938]; 
Dumont 1985). Mauss links the long unfolding of cultural emphases on individual 
highlands societies for the drivers of her argument. Elsewhere in the region, such as the West-
ern Solomons, some of the characteristics she attributes to the dividual are arguably discernible 
but, as Robbins (2015, 178 n. 4) notes of Urapmin, the concept is inapplicable ‘in its canonical 
Melanesians sense’.
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being to early Christianity and sees Protestantism as particularly contributing to 
its consolidation. Max Weber famously developed a complex account of the rela-
tionship, rejecting the idea that Protestantism tout court seeded modern individu-
alist orientations. Surveying a range of denominations and historical periods, he 
insisted that the particular implications of particular theologies at particular his-
torical moments (Calvinism in 16th-century Europe and Methodism in  19th-century 
North America) were crucial elements in the web of capitalism, modernity and 
individualist personhood. E. P. Thompson (1963), singles out English Methodism 
as playing a distinctive part in taming worker intransigence, undermining commu-
nal life and nurturing capitalist worldviews and a worker persona compatible with 
the needs of emerging capitalism, depicting the two as co-emergent.5 These formu-
lations contain little sign of Christianity as a monolithic thing that, in and of itself, 
generates a single mode of personhood, albeit Mauss’ brief account threatens it. 
Even Thompson, with his sometimes simplistic treatment of religion as a justifying 
ideology, insists on the significance of particular Christian forms.
Methodism, itself, was incredibly diverse in its forms and emphases. It was 
characterised by what David Hempton (2005, 7) portrays as a fruitful ‘dialectical 
friction’. Among the several apparent contradictions that Hempton notes, two are 
particularly germane to my argument. It was, he says, ‘a movement of discipline 
and sobriety, but also of ecstasy and enthusiasm […] [and] a voluntary associa-
tion of free people, but also specialized in rules, regulations, and books of disci-
pline’ (ibid.). Theologically, too, it drew on only partially compatible influences: 
Lutheran authoritarianism, Calvinist guilt, disciplined asceticism and ‘obsession 
with personal salvation’, and Arminian insistence on universal salvation, among 
others (van Noppen 1995).
Members juggled the dangers of backsliding with the hopefulness of salva-
tion, a tension partially resolved by its stress on self-improvement (ibid., 701). 
Although this was ideally directed at the inner life, many Methodists inter-
preted social success as indices of spiritual standing. But the idealisation of 
 self-improvement also informed the sense of ethical imperative to engage in good 
works for many Methodists, such as the AMMS missionaries, in a religion with 
a longstanding missionary orientation. These multiple simultaneous dialectics 
go some way to explaining the religion’s many schisms as well as its capacity to 
adapt to diverse circumstances (cf. Hempton 2005). And they gave shape to the 
ways in which Methodist personhood could partake of both individualism and 
5 Weber’s and Thompson’s accounts are as infamous as famous. Both are widely criticised for 
empirical inaccuracy and Thompson for his hostile attitude to the Methodism in which he was 
raised. Yet, they remain crucial contributions to understanding the historical/cultural location 
of personhood.
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dividualism. As Hempton (2005, 34) notes, it ‘tempered enthusiasm with disci-
pline and rugged individualism with communal accountability’.
Methodism was famously individualist. Each member was understood to 
have been personally saved and converted. Testimonials, presented in collective 
contexts and showing archetypal features, were taken to be personal accounts 
of direct relationship with God, a relationship furthered through personal bible 
reading and private prayer in order to ‘[work] at their own salvation’, as one of 
Brown’s and Goldie’s contemporaries, Joseph F. Anderson (1920, 69) phrased it. 
Further, the expectation that Methodists strive for self-improvement as a man-
ifestation of their salvation, a self-growth that spilled over to worldly life, was 
frequently articulated in terms of individual responsibility and achievement.
Missionaries reflected this orientation. Applicants were understood to have 
been individually called and expected to give an account of their personal conver-
sion and to teach personal responsibility and industriousness in the field (Dureau 
undated [a]). The hagiographies, biographies, autobiographies and biographical 
snippets in Methodist media highlight individual as much as collective achieve-
ment. Brown’s autobiography, for example, is very much an account of a famous 
individual, clearly intended to vindicate his own actions and stances and sustain 
his reputation (e.g., 1908, 250–87). And self-sacrifice, as the term suggests, was 
understood as autonomous, personal endurance of the hardships of their calling. 
But, in understandings of the ideal Christian, notions of an individual soul 
and self-owned body were imbricated in relational, open forms of personhood, 
self-sacrifice being one instance of this only partially-bounded individual.
Methodism was assertively a religion of experience, drawing on Wesley’s 
perception that ‘experience leads and theological reflection follows’ (Skuce 2012, 
17; cf. Rall 1920). Ritual practices like united prayer, revival, exhortation and tes-
timony, passionate hymnody and love feasts,6 generated a ‘feeling, penetrable 
self’ in the communitas of collective effervescence (Anderson 2012, 8; Turner 
1969; Turner 1971/72). ‘Such were the places, par excellence, where the Methodist 
message moved from print to voice, from individualism to community, from cog-
nition to emotion, and from private to public’ (Hempton 2005, 79).
Methodist hymnody and love feasts exemplify this intersection of ideation and 
embodiment. Hymnody was how ‘the followers of the Wesleys learned their theol-
ogy’, ‘an expression of individual and corporate affirmation, an aid to memory, a 
trigger of  religious emotion, and a creator of spiritual identity’ (Chilcote 2014, 157; 
6 Anderson described the love feast as a ‘simple meal, or feast of love […] kept by the early Chris-
tians, which, […] was revived by Mr. Wesley, and is observed now by the Church […], largely as a 
preparation for the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper’ (1909, 58; see also Bucke 1963; on longstand-
ing criticisms of love-feasts for reputed licentiousness, see Hempton 2005).
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Hempton 2005, 100; see also van Noppen 1995; Wallace 2009). And well into the 
20th century, an American Methodist, Emory Stevens Bucke (1963, 11), described 
the love feast as ‘a place of joyous witness for Christ’ which ‘affects some hearts 
more deeply than any formal sermon’.
While revivals and love feasts were occasional, even the less intense weekly 
services, with their hymns, preachers’ rhetorical skills and build-up to the sermon 
as the highpoint of the service (Wood 2015), reinforced a spirituality marked by 
both intellect and passion. Such experiences, explicitly intended to provoke emo-
tional and spiritual intensity, a passionate embodied sense of oneness of commu-
nity and spirit, and leaving individuals with a sense of openness to their fellows 
and penetration by the Holy Spirit, challenged the self-possessed individual.7 In 
significant part, then, Methodist personhood was properly entangled with others 
and experienced as porous. As the American Episcopalian Methodist, Harris 
Franklin Rall (1920, 486), put it, ‘its [early] constant stress on the indwelling and 
enabling Spirit of God was a real preparation for the God of our present faith, 
working not as irresistible power exercised from without, but in the immanence 
of a moral and personal presence’.
In an address to novice missionaries in 1901, Brown reflected this porosity, 
admonishing them to be open to spiritual forces:
[Y]ou must have the Comforter, even the Spirit of Truth, dwelling with you and in you, you 
must be strengthened with might by His Spirit in the inner man, that Christ may dwell in your 
hearts by faith, as the essential condition of the faithful ministry. […] Filled with that Spirit, 
you, too, in His name and by His power, can and must seek and save that which is lost, and 
point them to the Lamb of God. (AMMR 1901, 5, my emph.)
7 The extent to which Methodists embraced emotive rituals varied historically, denominational-
ly and geographically. Turner (1971/72, 197; see also van Noppen 1995; Hempton 2005) points to 
processes of gradual routinisation as it became a more middle-class religion, entailing a progres-
sive ‘[inhibition] of the expression of emotion and enthusiasm […]. A propensity to sing hymns 
loudly is probably the only survival of past emotions’. My sense is that he overstates the totality 
of the decline. At least as late as the 1960s, for example, the then-chair of the Methodist Mission 
in the Solomons, Rev. George Carter, instigated a revival there. In the early 20th century Aus-
tralasian Methodism, with which I am concerned, styles and expectations of ritual performance 
and experience varied according to denomination – Wesleyan, Methodist, Primitive Methodists, 
etc. – and were patterned by state, class and local histories (O’Brien, Carey 2015).
The mission’s historical remainders distort the mix of emotion and sobriety in favour of the 
latter. Archived materials reflect administrative requirements and legalistic regulation. Publica-
tions, more inclusive of subjective material, are phrased in more reasoned terms than events were 
experienced or they deploy symbolic shorthand, such as referring to opening a meeting with ‘a 
hymn’ or to preaching from a particular text. Such materials drew upon the semantic–emotional 
domain of their community but are opaque to later readers (see also Hempton 2005, 7, 56).
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While such accounts of openness are easily read metaphorically, there is 
literalness to Methodists’ innumerable evocations of spiritual penetrability (cf. 
Turner 1971/72). All of this suggests that the person was understood as tripar-
tite. Anderson (1909, 60), citing Wesley, asserted that a Methodist ‘is one who 
[…] loves the Lord his God with all his heart, soul, and mind, and strength’, a 
phrase he used repeatedly. In this understanding, Methodists must be filled 
with God’s love and driven by it; they must think on things religious and 
improve their knowledge through education and cultivating rational thought; 
they must be open to the Holy Spirit. And their good works must be informed 
by all three. As Brown (AMMR 1901, 3) put it in his address to new missionaries, 
‘You must serve him with all your powers bodily, intellectual, spiritual, and to 
do this effectively you must take care that all are in the highest possible state 
of healthy efficiency’.
This conception of an enmeshed, open person of body, mind and soul was 
reflected in Methodism’s social and missionary orientation. As Anderson (1909, 
62) phrased it, the ‘building up of the Church by leading men into its commun-
ion and fellowship’ was indissolubly tied to ‘the development of activity in all 
that relates to social, civic and industrial betterment’, an imperative expressed in 
the social gospel.8 Stressing Christian responsibilities in the world, the universal 
potential for salvation and Christ’s ministry of healing (Langmore 1989; Stanley 
2009), social gospel advocates envisaged the truly Christian person as oriented 
towards both self-improvement and nurturance of the inner self (an individualist 
stress) and outwards, away from introspection, and towards the betterment of 
others (a relational stress).
In 1910, the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference, with representatives 
of Protestant churches from Britain, Europe and North America, proclaimed 
the theme that had driven the enormous missionary effort of the previous 150 
years, ‘The world for Christ!’, encapsulating a shared aspiration to see human-
ity encompassed in Christian community. But, as demonstrated by the intense 
pre-conference debates and negotiation about which denominations might 
be included and the conference wrangles and compromises, denominational 
(and other) differences generated as much disagreement as agreement about 
that envisaged Christian world (Stanley 2009). For Methodist missionaries, the 
Christian ecumene valorised by the Conference was a vision, not of individ-
uals individually converted and committed, but of intimate oneness arising 
8 The Solomons mission was established as an industrial mission, the pre-eminent form of 
 social gospel to those who were thought of as primitive or savage peoples, incapable of receiving 
the gospel directly (Dureau undated [a]; Stanley 2009).
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from shared faith, understandings, sentiments and experiences in collective 
gatherings and the imagined emotional community (Rosenwein 2002) of their 
religion.
So, the individual was simultaneously individually saved and in individual 
relationship with God; they were penetrable, open to spiritual force and emo-
tional fellowship; they were relationally entangled with others. And, impelled by 
Methodism’s missionary orientation and expectation that salvation be expressed 
in good works, missionaries sought to convey the Word to, and radically trans-
form the social worlds of, others. With their often-intransigent insistence on 
 radically remaking local moralities, aspirations and worldviews, the AMMS 
missionaries promoted individualism against indigenous forms of moral person-
hood, which they typically disdained as communistic (Dureau undated [a]). But 
what strikes me is the extent to which such concerns with promoting individu-
alist native characters coexisted with ideals of bringing others into fellowship 
through self-denial.
3 Sacrificial suffering
Methodist missionary literature of the time is notable for the frequency with 
which the missionary life is represented as one of self-sacrifice. For Brown (1892, 
9), speaking as retiring President of the New South Wales and Queensland Con-
ference, ‘a daily manifestation of the spirit of self-denial and self-sacrifice, which 
He [Christ] demands are essential to the possession and development of a true 
spiritual life’, a position that he sustained during his years abroad. In 1875, 
writing to a cousin about his decision to remain in the mission field instead of 
returning home to his wife and children, Brown expressed this understanding: 
‘I feel it to be a great sacrifice and feel it still, but one who is not ready to deny 
himself has certainly not learned the lesson of self-sacrifice which the life of our 
Lord teaches us’ (quoted in Reeson 2014, 85). Within five years, he made a far 
more devastating sacrifice.
In 1880, Brown returned to his station in the Duke of York Islands in New 
Guinea after several months travel, looking forward to reuniting with his wife, 
Lydia, and the three young children he ‘had left so well and strong’ (Brown 1908, 
346). However, he found the station deserted, the house in disarray and two small 
new graves the only indication as to why. As became obvious, two of his chil-
dren had died, and Lydia, shattered, had left with another missionary couple. 
 Re-joining her, they united in their grief and accepted their children’s deaths as 
God’s will (ibid., 345–51).
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In 1907, Goldie and his wife, Helena, suffered a similar loss: a dysentery epi-
demic had hit the area, leaving Helena and their daughter, Nellie, near death. 
And, although probably not due to dysentery, his 10-month old son, ‘just the bon-
niest little chap that ever lived – as strong and well as could be up to last Sunday 
week’ – had died (AMMR 1908, 2). Like the Browns and others, the Goldies sub-
mitted their grief to God who ‘never makes a mistake’ (ibid., 3) and remained 
in the field to continue evangelizing. Missionary publications are replete with 
accounts like Brown’s and Goldie’s, the theme of the suffering, and occasionally 
dying, evangelist suggesting their sense of the immensity and value of their task 
of evangelizing the world.
As Maya Mayblin (2014) suggests, sacrifice is far from restricted to the ritual and 
destructive instances, like animal sacrifice, on which anthropologists have classi-
cally focused. Describing the unmarked, undramatic form of much self-sacrifice in 
the lives of the Brazilian Catholics with whom she worked, she calls on anthropolo-
gists to consider its frequent mundanity. John Dunnill (2003) makes a similar point 
about conflations of sacrifice with blood offerings, despite the extent to which bibli-
cal accounts are marked by ‘the ordinariness of most sacrifice from the perspective 
of those who practice it […], a set of practices embedded in the commonplace busi-
ness of life’ in order to integrate ‘life into a relation with divinity’ (2003, 81f., passim).
In the missionary literature, too, undramatic experiences, scattered through 
diaries, letters and published materials, are frequent. There are innumerable 
references to years of separation from older children repatriated for their edu-
cation; of repeated ill health, death scares and complicated childbirth without 
medical help; of missionary wives’ arduous domestic work with limited resources 
in primitive conditions and loneliness far from kin and subject to their husbands’ 
prolonged absences; of the myriad discomforts of stations and travels and the 
frustrations of trying to communicate across linguistic and cultural differences. 
These accounts are often markedly corporeal, evoking bodily suffering – pain, 
tiredness, illness, etc. – as emblematic of self-sacrifice. AMMS missionaries saw 
themselves as giving their blood, sweat and tears and conceived of their lives as 
gifts of themselves. Goldie (MOM554 1920), for example, described ‘Mrs Goldie 
[…] [as having] slaved in school and college and hospital – gladly giving her 
strength for these people who claim such a big place in her heart’.
Such accounts, at least as much as the great dramatic accounts of danger-
ous voyages and grievous losses, suggest the missionary life conceived as one 
of self-sacrifice.9 They suggest that missionaries’ ideological individualism 
9 It might be argued that it was children who were often sacrificed, given that they died or expe-
rienced hardships because of their parents’ decisions to go to the field. Maurice Bloch (1992) ar-
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depended on ideals of self-surrender in order to bring others into Christianity. 
True Christians accepted suffering, acknowledging the unrepayable debt estab-
lished by the Crucifixion: just as Christ suffered and died for humanity, so mis-
sionaries must live in ‘a spirit of self-sacrifice and self-denying love’ (Brown 
1908, 73, passim).
Indeed, self-sacrifice was taken to be a fundamental aspect of missionary 
work. In 1902, when Brown led the inaugural mission group to the Solomons, the 
Australasian Methodist Missionary Review (AMMR) reported that
a large number of people assembled […] to say good-bye. […] Those who were there saw 
ample evidence of the fact that the unity of faith and works may call for a great self-sacrifice. 
No one could witness the partings on the wharf without feeling certain that faith and love to 
God triumphed over the dearest ties. (AMMR 1902, 4)
Suffering was not to be sought. Brown (AMMR 1901), for example, stressed that 
missionaries were to care for themselves in order to best fulfil their task. But it 
would come. Going so far as to liken missionary effort to the Crucifixion, Goldie 
observed:
Twelve years in pioneer mission work has taught us that the road to victory is via Calvary. 
[…] There is no power that will influence heathen people but the power of love, and love 
means [missionary] sacrifice. The hands of Christ’s servant must bear the print of the nails. 
 (Goldie 1914, 571)
This unusually explicit and dramatic metaphor is echoed in the numerous evo-
cations and accounts of hardship and missionaries’ willing suffering. Even when 
authors do not explicitly claim self-sacrifice, their accounts repeatedly conjure 
that theme, ubiquitously evoking missionary life as an elevated example of Chris-
tian self-sacrifice.
gues that the thing or person sacrificed serves as proxy for the sacrificer, establishing an identity 
between the two. From this perspective, child deaths were the most exquisitely awful of proxies, 
the child as proxy for the parent (see also Bloch 1992, 26f.). But, so far as child deaths were un-
derstood in terms of adult suffering, self-sacrifice obviates this proxy: the sacrificer explicitly is 
the sacrifice. In the several pages (345-53) of Brown’s autobiography dedicated to his children’s 
deaths (and Lydia’s and other missionaries’ near deaths during his absence), the missionaries’ 
anguish bleeds off the page and his details are overwhelmingly devoted to the adults’ suffering 
as they battled their own illness, strove to save the children and dealt with their deaths. Simi-
larly, Goldie’s brief letter postulates that his son may have died of appendicitis and manifestly 
conveys his grief, but says nothing of the suffering his child must have experienced. What is 
conveyed in both accounts is the missionaries’ suffering – in losing their children they suffered, 
sacrificing themselves.
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There is little doubt that accounts of suffering were intended to stimulate 
the home support and donations on which the missions depended (Thomas 
1992; Samson 2013). They also contributed to the establishment and mainte-
nance of the imagined emotional communities that linked Christians at home, 
missionaries abroad and convert populations (Haggis, Allen 2008). Scholars 
have also noted how Victorian and Edwardian women deployed the ideal of the 
self- sacrificing woman to justify their own missionary aspirations (e.g., Midgley 
2006; Hill 2007).
But beyond such instrumentality, accounts of self-sacrifice convey something 
of the import that missionaries and their supporters ascribed to evangelization 
and of how Methodist missionaries imagined the moral person. For missionaries 
and others, being Christian entailed proffering oneself on behalf of others’ salva-
tion, the ultimate expression of Christian love. In 1899, Brown (AMMR 1901) led 
a voyage of interested Christians to Melanesia, hoping to stimulate support for 
the society’s work, particularly for the envisaged Solomons mission. His account 
of the voyage, published in the AMMR, is immediately followed by an extract 
from the Philadelphia Methodist, characterising missionary work as the epitome 
of Christian being, grounded in transcendence of the self on behalf of others:
The missionary spirit is the truest sign of individual Christian and Church life. […] [M]ission-
ary enthusiasm […] teaches sacrifice and service as its essential features, and reacts upon 
the soul with redoubled effect when keyed up to the highest pitch of sublime heroism in the 
battle for Christianity and humanity. (AMMR 1901, 7)
Sacrifice is an inherently social act, typically understood as governed by the logic 
of exchange and participation in relationships of reciprocity, a meaningful com-
munication with noumenal beings like gods, spirits and ancestors publicly com-
municated in the material world (Hubert, Mauss 1964 [1898]; Mayblin 2014, 347). 
For Mauss, as part of ongoing exchanges between cosmic and earthly realms, it 
implies a gift ‘made to men in the sight of the gods’ (2002 [1925], 18, 20f.). As such, 
it is intentional, marked by future orientation, often understood as soliciting a 
desired outcome.
In Christian cosmology, though, sacrifice lies ‘beyond the bounds of normal, 
reciprocal exchange’ (Mayblin 2013, 345; Hubert, Mauss 1964 [1898], 100f.). For 
missionaries and their interlocutors, sacrificial instrumentality was ideally elim-
inated in favour of selfless concern for others. Good works should reflect their 
relationship to God rather than being means of acquiring grace, and they should 
be an aspect of Christian praxis, reflecting a constant awareness of Calvary as the 
gift of salvation. So far as self-sacrifice could be understood in terms of exchange 
or reciprocity, this was inevitably a case of permanent, irreversible debt: Chris-
tians forever indebted for the Crucifixion and their own offering of self at most 
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an obligatory, unworthy emulation, ‘destined, in some a priori sense, to be onto-
logically obsolete’ (Mayblin 2014, 352).10 Missionary sacrifice, then, was a reflec-
tion of Christ’s work of salvation by bringing heathens into communion, Goldie’s 
likening of his life to Calvary only a somewhat extreme expression of the under-
standing.
4 In/Dividual missionaries and Christian persons
Does Christianity’s fundamental premise, that each individual has a unique, 
immortal soul that transcends corporeal mortality, make it an individualising 
religion? Alternatively, does belief in the Crucifixion and the numerous New Tes-
tament accounts of compassionate outreach to others index a fundamentally rela-
tional mode of moral being? It is impossible to ignore the individualist aspects of 
many accounts of self-sacrifice. In conjuring the nails of the cross, Goldie certainly 
implied his own heroism. Brown (1908), more complexly, also constituted himself 
as hero and many other accounts are awkwardly placed between  self-iteration 
and spiritual concern. But my concern is not whether individuals achieved the 
near-impossible task of putting aside their own spiritual and worldly concerns. 
Nor is my primary aim one of deconstructing discourses of self-sacrifice. Rather, 
I am interested in what such tropes say about models of Methodist personhood 
at that historical moment. In particular, how can these understandings be under-
stood relative to questions about the relationship between dividualism, individu-
alism and Christianity more widely?
In the abstract, idealisations of self-sacrifice suggest a moral model of rela-
tional personhood. Methodists could be fully, morally, human only in relation-
ship with God and other Christians and by expressing themselves through good 
works. And salvation, understood as achieved through the self-gift of Calvary, 
was perceived as the ultimate relational act. But, as Mosko (2015, 376) notes, 
God’s gift was not, in fact, free. It morally obliged the reciprocity of ‘further 
10 The value and status of sacrifice is very vexed in Christian theology. For many, Calvary marks 
the culmination and end of sacrificial religion. For others, self-sacrifice is oppressive – feminist 
theologians, for example, have criticised Christian associations of self-sacrifice and virtuous 
womanhood. For still others, the true Christian embraces the suffering on Calvary by humiliat-
ing their own flesh (by flagellation, fasting and other privation) or ‘offering up’ their suffering. 
In other contexts, Calvary serves as imperative to accept suffering on behalf of others. For still 
others, ‘a positive understanding of sacrifice’ – one shed of violence and conceived in terms of 
small recompense to God and eucharistic sharing – ‘remains intrinsic to Christian faith’ (Dunnill 
2003, 93; Kirwan 2007).
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gift offerings (e.g., with confession of sin, prayers, songs of praise, tithes, 
 glorifications, good works)’.
Methodists expressed their obligation less economistically, elaborating 
themes of love, joy, fellowship and salvation as a free gift, subject only to its 
acceptance. But this acceptance established a vertical relationship of sub-
mission: of self-will to God’s will, of self-interest to the care of others, of self- 
sacrifice to the quest to extend Christendom. The vertical relationship with God 
must be expressed in the horizontal relationships of fraternity and sorority with 
other Christians. The solo Christian engrossed only in their relationship with 
God was incomplete because they had accepted His love for themselves alone. 
There is, then, a seemingly endless recursive movement between individual 
self and personal salvation experienced in one’s own embodied soul and self-
hood on the one hand, and, on the other, collective, emotional and spiritual 
openness, expansive sociality and self-surrender. Missionary self-sacrifice epit-
omised these vertical and horizontal, individual and relational themes, their 
suffering, offered upwards to God, simultaneously fostering horizontal earthly 
relationship.11
Christianity has been profoundly linked to the global dissemination of 
models of the person as a bounded, unique individual (Keane 2007; Robbins 
2015), although this is often unduly stressed over other forces (see also Lindstrom 
2013, 247). But Methodist missionary personhood was marked by a sense of both 
a unique, indivisible, but porous, interiority – the Christian individual – and of a 
less bounded, properly self-giving and relational exteriority.
Even allowing for this doubled self-containment and openness, it would 
force the concept to interpret Methodist personhood in terms of the partibility 
and composite personhood of Strathern’s ‘dividual’. Still, missionary materials 
do highlight how, even in this profoundly ideologically individualist denomi-
nation at the height of its willingness to impose its own versions of civilisation 
11 For missionaries, there was a third aspect of Christian relationality. Mirroring the hierarchi-
cal relationship with God, their sacrifices placed them in vertical relationship with converts. 
Drawing converts into the wider Christian community through their self-sacrificing gifts of 
proselytisation, the missionary was constituted as gift to heathen humanity, as Christ had been 
gift to humanity. They seem to have comfortably accepted this hierarchy in colonial missions, 
although it undermined the ideal of co-equal Christian fellowship. The contradiction was re-
solved by rendering converts eternal children, not yet capable of religious adulthood (Thomas 
1992). Their self-sacrifices constituted debts acquired by converts and implied clear expecta-
tions of reciprocity. In Goldie’s accounts (e.g., 1914), for example, those who rejected conver-
sion, decided to attend other missions – SDA, RC or Anglican – or sought to read their bibles for 
themselves are characterised as duplicitous, ungrateful, troublemakers or as embracing ‘creed 
without conduct’.
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and human development, these Methodist Christians enacted and experienced 
porous religiosity and relational imperatives.
Goldie went so far as to ascribe the rapid conversion of the Western Solomons 
to missionaries’ suffering. Years after his son’s death, he depicted pre-Christian 
society in terms of evil indigenous sacrifices, juxtaposing it to a Christian life 
wrought by missionary sacrifice:
Was it worth while [sic]? Could the reader […] see the crowd of bright, intelligent boys and 
girls, clean, alert, bending over their work with happy eagerness […] [and] the people […] 
reverently and intelligently joining in the service of praise on the very spot where […] men 
who had been on headhunting raids came to offer sacrifices and to take part in cannibal 
feasts, he would say, “Yes, it is worth while”. (Goldie 1922, 6)
Many other missionaries, perhaps less grandiloquently, made similar claims.
World religions gain traction in new locales by becoming substantively mean-
ingful. This may result from their fundamental contrasts to cultural hegemonies, 
as when the individualist connotations of particular Christianity ideas challenge 
relational values (e.g., Robbins 2002). But in other contexts, synergies between 
indigenous and exogenous values may be decisive, as many Pacific theologians, 
stressing affinities between indigenous cultural values and Christianity, have 
observed (e.g., Boseto 1983; Namanu 1996; see also Forman 2005).
Despite their best efforts to do so, AMMS missionaries did not determine 
local expressions of Christianity (Dureau 2012). But the sense that individuals, 
as individuals, must simultaneously surrender their individual selves to collec-
tive being echoes many Melanesian understandings of the person as incomplete 
in and of themselves. Resolute harbingers of new forms of personhood, ideo-
logically disposed to individualist models, missionaries nonetheless idealised 
the transcendence of individual being. Working in a region where the person 
was ideally dividual, their message, conveyed in industrial training, school and 
the ritual life they shared with converts, apparently resonated with indigenous 
personhood.
On Simbo, a century and more after Christianity arrived as an element in a 
coercive colonisation, relational personhood is celebrated as both indigenous 
and fundamentally Christian moral personhood (Dureau undated [b]). People 
stress moral personhoods contextually and largely understand persons as pos-
sessing individual souls, but fully developed only when able to transcend the 
unitary self. In contemplating death, most worried little about the fate of discrete 
souls (cf. Robbins 2002) and described the afterlife as the time when they will be 
reunited with dead kin.
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Challenging personhood:  
the subject and viewer of contemporary 
crucifixion iconography
1 Introduction
Vanessa Beecroft’s Black Christ (2006) is a relatively large digital c-print (230 x 
180 cm) of a black Sudanese teenage boy (Fig. 1, see appendix). At first sight, it 
represents exactly this: a black teenage boy. However, is this really the case? The 
title hints at the representation of something else and the body’s pose confirms 
that this is not simply a photograph of a boy, but a representation of the crucified 
Christ. Such iconography brings into question two issues: first, as a photograph, 
it presents (rather than represents) corporeality of a boy who is not, as in painted 
or sculpted crucifixions scenes, an imagined figure and thus seemingly removed 
from the reality of a human being’s fleshly body as a model for the representa-
tion of Jesus Christ. Second, the art work’s title and the body’s pose assume an 
art object that brings into consideration spiritual perception. In other words, 
one may ask: Is this photograph really an autonomous art work representing an 
individual person characterised by being male, black and adolescent or a per-
sonhood which is marked by plurality, representing something other than itself 
but, at the same time, presenting a black body? And is this other not existent in 
a relatedness essential to its understanding rather than being simply a replace-
ment? Differently from painted crucifixions, does not the art form in which the 
work is executed make it more complex than perceiving the image just as the 
crucified Christ?
Despite many differences, performance art and photographs of the body 
have in common that they play with corporeality. As such, the art works are not 
only objects, but their corporeality (re-)presents and constructs personhood. Pre-
vious literature has argued that they do so regarding identity or self, assuming 
that what is represented is an autonomous individual (Biro 2007; Simpson 2004; 
Watt 2001). In light of recent discussions in anthropology, which have problem-
atised the conception of the individual, this essay asks to which extent one can 
speak of the representation of personhood as individual or, as such conceptions 
in anthropology suggest, as dividual, whose characteristics remain pluralis-
tic, conflicting, competing, antagonistic and intersecting, mostly because they 
foreground that a person is part of something else or consists of diverse parts 
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rather than being a unit of oneness, completeness and sameness which neglects 
 partiality (Sökefeld 1999).
The urgency of this question is underpinned by literature which deals with 
modern and contemporary art, that knows of the term dividual. Differently from 
anthropology, however, this literature has not been applied to personhood, but 
objects. It was particularly Paul Klee (1922) and Gilles Deleuze (1986 and 1992) 
who developed a theory of the dividual in the light of painting and early cinema. 
Scholars, such as Joanna Latimer (2009), Glenn Peers (2012) and Michaela Ott 
(2015) have used the term dividual in view of Frida Kahlo’s self-portraits, Byz-
antine art, and new technologies, respectively. Hereby dividuality is defined by 
fragmentation and fragility, unstableness and leakiness (Latimer 2009). Peers 
uses the term to describe ‘quasi-objects’ that are only superficially objects as 
opposed to ‘discrete entities like individuals’ (Peers 2012). Ott has based her 
book on Deleuze’s concept of partiality. She interprets ‘dividual’ as part-taking 
and cites particularly new technology as a reason for the end of the ‘distinc-
tiveness and authenticity of the art work’ (Ott 2015, 62). Consequently, she then 
applies the term ‘dividual’ to digital art works circulated over the Internet, such 
as Ursula Biemann’s Egyptian Chemistry (2012), a multi-channel video installa-
tion, with which the artist attempts to penetrate real and virtual realities (Babias 
2012). Some contemporary artists also call their work ‘dividual’, including Victor 
Timofeev, who explores hybrid worlds (Hoare 2011).1 Furthermore, an artist 
couple under the name Dividual Notes, collaborating on Facebook, produces and 
publishes digital photos from everyday life (Dividual Notes 2017). Here dividual 
(though not specifically defined) is understood as being produced by more than 
one artist and able to be shared with others who can contribute to the work via 
the Internet. These publications illustrate how widely the term can be used. A 
common denominator, however, is the foregrounding of partiality rather than 
wholeness in the sense described above.
The Christian iconograpy of the crucifixion has received a large number of 
publications; contemporary crucifixions scenes have usually only been consid-
ered regarding their sincerity, which has led to polemics often dismissing entire 
art works without allowing any second look. For James Elkins, contemporary 
Christian art is characterised by two types, existing simultaneously side by side, 
namely ‘serious’ religious art and that which he describes as ‘sceptical, ambig-
uous, anti-religious, mystical, spiritual’ (Elkins 2009; 2004; Elkins, Morgan 
1 The Latvian-born, Berlin-based artist Viktor Timofeev (*1984) grew up in New York, studying 
at Hunter College, New York from 2002 to 2008. In 2011, he titled one of his works (ink on paper) 
192.128.13.15 [Residual Dividual], a work which exploits the basics of digital pictures. For his web-
site, see http://www.viktortimofeev.com.
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2008). These types also differ in their materiality (including original versus 
reproducible versus original). In response to Elkins, Aaron Rosen assumes one 
type of contemporary religious art, emphasising the works’ complexity and 
providing deeper interpretations to some of the most contested ones (Rosen 
2015, 18).2
The reason for this essay’s focus on crucifxions in photography of the body 
and performance art is that their corporeality heightens in particular the issue 
of enacting personhood as dividual or individual. Such art works play not only 
with the doctrine of the crucified Jesus as part of a Trinity with the Father and the 
Sprit, but also with notions of art and spirituality in a sophisticated and complex 
manner. This is not to say that dividuality in art objects cannot become visible 
through other art works; however, I would argue that crucifixions in art forms 
which foreground corperality provide a body of works which openly aim at some-
thing beyond being simply an individual art work, an image representing Chris-
tian iconography or an object revered – candidly manipulating the viewers’ spirit-
uality, religious beliefs and aesthetic expectations. The analysis of such works in 
the light of personhood will provide insights into conceptions of the dividual and 
individual. In the following, I will first outline anthropological understandings 
of the dividual, then apply such personhood to the represented in crucifixion art, 
before exploring the viewership constructed by such art works.
2 Anthropological understanding of personhood
Individuality has been defined as ‘indivisible’, and in terms of society, the small-
est unit to which society can be reduced. It also has been described as fixed, 
autonomous and self-reflective. In recent years, scholars have increasingly ques-
tioned whether subjects are self-contained or rather can be broken down and 
thus deserve to be called dividual. In this light, dividuality has been described 
as permeable, relational and positional. They, therefore, usually do not speak 
of ‘subjects’ but ‘personhood’ or self (Smith 2012, 52). As the discussion about 
the individual and dividual has so far been dominated by anthropology, divid-
ual personhood has often been associated with pre-modern, non-Western con-
2 Rosen also suggests that the soaring number of such themes in art has to be seen in light of the 
increase of ‘charismatic groups’. Rosen refers to scholars who even suggest that we may enter a 
period of ‘desecularisation’ (Rosen 2015, 18).
606   Jutta Vinzent
cepts (e.g. Strathern 1988; Fowler 2016; Smith 2012).3 Although there are several 
definitions of dividuality, the term is not a synonym for deindividuation, if the 
latter is understood as a defiance of individuality or mourning of the loss of the 
 self-contained individual. Instead, dividuality would rather celebrate the partial-
ity of the self, either as division of the self in a process of constant segmentation 
or as the abandoning of or detaching from a self-contained individuality.
Anthropological approaches, such as that of Marilyn Strathern, posit that the 
idea of the individual involves that any plurality is encompassed or eclipsed, so 
that the person is characterised as whole and holistic, self-reflective, ‘complete’ 
and autonomous (Strathern 1988, 13–5). Dividual personhood, instead, brings 
plurality to light by detachment of the self. Therefore, the dividual can be under-
stood as divisible, permeable and mutable. This means really two different per-
spectives on personhood. For Strathern, this difference has an impact on power 
relations. While the first produces hierarchy, the second leads to egalitarianism. 
Strathern’s definitions are primarily concerned with the formation of social rela-
tions through cultural artefacts and rituals. However, as shown below, her ideas 
on personhood can also be applied to depicted personhood and to the viewer-
ship which the art works bring to the fore. Although the following is not about 
social systems at large or rituals in an anthropological sense, the art works under 
discussion represent, construct and form social relations and as such are acts 
that mark society. In a narrower sense, the kind of art form chosen for discus-
sion involves particularly two subjects or personhoods, namely the represented 
 crucified.
3 Dividual personhood in crucifixion
Images of crucifixions executed in such art forms arguably offer a number of 
possibilities in which dividuality can be discussed, of which two seem the most 
obvious, namely the meaning of dividuality for the Christian iconography of the 
crucifixion and for the corporeality of the person who represents the crucified.
3 As Mistress of Girton College, Cambridge, Strathern had herself portrayed as two half-length 
figures, one reading and one gazing out of the portrait, seemingly illustrating her concept of 
dividual personhood (see Daphne Todd, Portrait of Marilyn Strathern, painting, Girton College, 
University of Cambridge, 2001). Feminist studies are interested in the dividual, because it can be 
argued that the individual is constituted as a discrete person, as ‘somebody’, whereas the divid-
ual would be ‘anybody’ or even ‘nobody’.
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In Christian belief, Jesus is the mediator between God and human beings. 
He is the Son, who with the Father and the Holy Spirit forms the Trinity: one God 
in three divine persons. How that relationship has been formed, whether hier-
archically, relationally or correlationally, has been the topic of centuries-long 
discussions in Christian doctrine. In light of the understanding of dividual and 
individual as outlined above, one can assume a dividual God, divided into three. 
Jesus, however, can be described as an individual, historically real. However, 
the crucifixion scene pinpoints that the personhood of Jesus can also be seen as 
partly human (embodied in Jesus’s suffering) and divine, because he is the son 
of God. Hence the iconography of the crucifixion itself is a topic that addresses 
dividual personhood.
Apart from the iconography, crucifixions executed in body and perfor-
mance art play with personhood as dividual because of the art form. In pho-
tographs, such as Beecroft’s Black Christ, and in performance art, it is a real 
person (either the artist or another person) who represents Jesus. Usually it is 
the artist himself. In performance art, the person representing Jesus is part of 
the art work but also a real person who continues to live on and has lived before 
this art work. The person presented in the art work can therefore be seen as 
becoming part of something else, namely the art work representing Jesus, but 
is also part of a lived reality. Such type of presentation (rather than representa-
tion) has been related to the dividual by Peers, though not for photography or 
performance art. According to him, Byzantine culture knew of what he terms 
‘quasi-objects’, objects which did not ‘re-present’ but were understood as ‘pre-
senting’ reality. Peers calls this ‘quasi-object’ dividual (Peers 2012, 437).4 Such 
understanding is reminiscient of Hans Belting, who has been credited as the 
first art historian to provide insights into the role of Christian iconography 
being perceived as presentation rather than representation by medieval spec-
tators (Belting 1994). However, he assumes that the image (regardless of the art 
form in which it is executed) presents subjects without acknowledging the par-
tiality of the figure, who belongs to both the image as object and to the divine, if 
one were to follow Peers. In this way, one could differentiate in terminology two 
4 Peers illustrates his argument by quoting from Michael Psellos, an eleventh-century Byzantine 
intellectual monk, who described a painting of a crucified Jesus not as a Platonic shadow, but as 
a medium through which the viewer can enter ‘that other body and know with one’s own body 
the painful sacrifice of Christ’ in his writings. This process is ‘contradictory, for the audience […] 
is still embodied, and his viewers have their sense perceptions intact, but the eyes desire to see 
the crucified Christ to such a degree that each viewer would rather be nailed to the cross also’ 
(Peers 2012, 438).
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ways of describing not only the art work, namely as presence and likeness (the 
latter of which involves representation), but also the viewer as either dividual 
or individual.
Surely, imagining partiality might be more difficult for art forms which 
involve painted or sculpted figures than, as in our case, those which are based 
on corporeality of a real person who is both part of the art work and of a lived 
reality. Furthermore, surely, one can stress both the wholeness and the partiality, 
as also mentioned by Strathern and outlined above, particularly, as this discus-
sion shows, when corporeality is involved. Individual or dividual is arguably a 
differentiation in perspective rather than in facts as such.
There are, however, art works which drift such perspectives further apart, 
because of the challenge of how far the artist goes in (re-)presenting the ico-
nography of a dying Christ. This is illustrated by Sebastian Horsley’s Crucifix-
ion (2000), a performance which was undertaken by the artist in preparation 
for a series of paintings on the topic (Fig. 2, see appendix). Horsley, who trav-
elled to the Philippines for his performance, was nailed to a cross and passed out 
(Bräunlein 2009). He only avoided serious injury because by-passers interrupted 
the performance (Kerr 2015; Horsley 2004; 2016). In this respect, it reminds of 
performance artists of the 1970s, such as Chris Burden – who performed Trans-
Fixed at Speedway Avenue in Venice, California, on 23rd April 1974 – and Andrew 
Drummond, whose Crucifixion Performance took place at the CSA gallery in 
Christchurch, New Zealand from 1978. The artists in these works did not want 
to die as a self-sacrifice like Christ. They only accepted the suffering which 
made them part of something else to a certain degree, but they finally decided 
to remain alive. This decision marks the transition from a dividual experience 
(or an attempt to have such an experience) to becoming ‘just’ a human being, 
which foregrounds an individual personhood characterised by wholeness and 
reflection as described above. Schechner differentiates most usefully between 
a performance as theatre/entertainment or as efficacy/ritual (Schechner 1993, 
621). While the former is characterised by individual creativity and an audience 
who watches, appreciates and critiques the performance, the latter refers to the 
performer being possessed or in trance, includes audience participation, and 
discourages criticism. Accordingly, ritual relates to a dividual personhood, while 
theatre to an individual. While Schechner’s differentiation is most useful, offer-
ing a clear distinction between the two forms of performances, the examples of 
Horsley, Burden and Drummond illustrate the transition from one kind of perfor-
mance to the other.
Differently from Horsley, Hermann Nitsch’s series of Crucifixion performed 
together with the Orgies Mysteries Theatre, of which the first took place at the 
artist’s estate in Prinzendorf, Austria from 3 to 9 August 1998 (Jarosi 2013; Karrer 
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2015; Grant 2011; Jones 2011), seems rather theatre than ritual.5 Nitsch uses actors 
and his performances are highly staged, indeed theatrical: for example, a crucified 
and blindfolded man was held still under a bloody calf carcass, substituting the 
person, in a performance of the piece at the Fondazione Morra in Naples in 2002 
(Fig. 3, see appendix). In other performances of his piece, Nitsch replaces the cru-
cified body with animal bodies. Both kinds of performances, however, the ritual 
and the theatrical, demonstrate that the Christian iconography of the crucifixion is 
a particular challenge to the crucified’s personhood as dividual. It brings matters 
to a head more than experiences of self-sacrifice as described by Dureau in this 
publication, or of being possessed, the topic of Malik’s essay in this publication.
Body art executed in the medium of photography, such as Beecroft’s Black 
Christ (Fig. 1), does not count as performance art in a narrow sense. Peggy Phelan 
would even deny any link to performance, as for her, only in the immediate present 
does performance exist (Phelan 1993, 146). In contrast to her, Jones argues that 
performance art does not only consist of the act as such, but is interrelated with 
its documentation (Jones 1988, 16). She goes so far as to say that without its docu-
mentation, there is no performance art as such (ibid.). If such a close relationship 
exists, one may conclude that Beecroft’s c-print is the result of a performance. 
The boy must have been asked to pose, so that the artist could take photographs, 
of which this one has been selected. As arguably with all art using the body or 
body parts as media, though particularly in film and photography, the moment of 
performativity is still oscillating through the print.
4  Permeable viewership: reflection, 
transcendence and embodied affection
Beecroft’s Black Christ does not only shape the personhood of the represented, 
but also that of the viewer (Fig. 1). However, what kind of personhood? Con-
ventional literature on perception assumes the viewer as an individual, despite 
some of the publications acknowledging that the process of looking involves a 
detachment from the self. On the basis of these approaches, the following section 
asks whether and how the viewer’s personhood can be seen as dividual, fore-
grounding its partiality. For this purpose, Deleuze’s model of the dividual, which 
he applies to film stills, will be appropriated, because it offers a solution as to 
how the dividual as partial (namely the film still) is related to the whole (the film) 
5 Nitsch had already acted out such performances as early as 1957.
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(Deleuze 1986, 18). For Deleuze, it is not a question of perspective, but the divid-
ual is related to the whole in a process bound together by movement, as also 
described in more detail at the end of this essay. Therefore perception is assumed 
as consisting of moments (like film stills) distinguished from each other, while 
at the same time, these moments stand in a relationship to each other (through 
movement between them, forming a whole as perception). In the context of reli-
gious iconography, one can identify moments of reflection, transcendence and 
embodied affection, as the viewing experience arguably reacts to pictures’ effects 
(Mitchell 1998; Bredekamp 2010). To underpin this argument, I will first focus 
on contemporary crucifixions which are seemingly unproblematic and then on 
those which have been discussed as controversial to the extent of having led to 
iconoclasm and socio-political upheavals.
Brian Catling’s Processional Cross (2013), produced for St. Martin-in-the-
Fields in London, consists of a simple cross (Fig. 4, see appendix). Two pieces 
of wood are tied together by a string, alluding to St. Martin who tore his cloak in 
two to give half to a beggar. The cross’ rough pieces of wood, used as a reminder 
of Jesus’ cross, are covered but still noticeable under the cast of a strong yet light-
weight aluminium, gilded in white gold leaf. As such the cross is not only without 
a body, but also abstracted and enriched in a way which allows for a trace of emo-
tional perception, as the viewer envisages Christ carrying and dying on the cross. 
For the artist, making the cross was ‘overwhelming, both in the excitement of the 
concept and the enduring nature of its meaning […]. Design is not enough, I need 
the struggle and tension that only ever comes through deep feeling, prolonged 
thought, and the work of the hands’ (Catling 2017).
The artist believes he has created an object which is not only the product 
of reflection, but also of personal affects, namely touch and feeling. He empha-
sises these affects, because of the religious character of the art work. Although 
the object’s singularity and exceptionality play an important role for the artist, 
for the name of the artist is still mentioned by the church, Processional Cross 
aspires to create a relationship between object and viewer by which the object, 
an abstracted cross without a body, becomes the mediator of a perception which 
aims at a spiritual experience. If one follows research which has aligned the 
spiritual with the aesthetic, one can also call it an aesthetic experience (Kuspit 
2009; Koss 2006).6 In any case, it signals a relationship between the viewer and 
6 Discussing the relationship between the aesthetic and spiritual experience, Kuspit draws on 
a number of critics (Clement Greenberg), artists (Piet Mondrian and Barnett Newman), philoso-
phers and psychoanalysts (Jacques Derrida, Rudolf Otto and D. W. Winnicott, Erik Erikson, Erich 
Fromm and Silvano Arieti) (Kuspit 2009). See also Juliet Koss (2006), who describes Einfühlung 
as the ‘reciprocal experience of exchange and transformation – a solitary, one-to-one experience 
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God (or the sublime), in which the object becomes only its mediator. In this reli-
gious (or aesthetic) experience, the viewer is not self-reflective. By referring to 
Kant, Deleuze describes the sublime in view of the individual and of God: The 
sublime
unleashes in our soul a non-psychological life of the spirit, which no longer belongs either to 
nature or to our organic individuality, which is the divine part in us, the spiritual relation-
ship in which we are alone with God as light. Thus the soul seems to rise up again towards 
the light; but it has rather rejoined the luminous part of itself, which only had an ideal fall, 
and which fell upon the world, rather than being engulfed in it. The blazing has become the 
supernatural and supra-sensible. (Deleuze 1986, 59f.)
In other words, the viewer experiences personhood as detachment from the 
reflective self (Mosko 2010).7 As such the art work shapes the personhood of the 
viewer, torn between spiritual belief and reflecting upon the art work in a process 
of constant negotiation. Understanding viewership as such stresses the divid-
ual, partial character of the viewer’s personhood rather than the perception of 
a self-contained individual as presupposed by the long and substantial body of 
scholarship on perception theories (e.g. Mulvey 1975; Mitchell 1986; Kemp 1998).
In assuming viewership as dividual, one has to differentiate two different 
types of partiality in this process: firstly, the moments of reflecting versus believ-
ing, held together by movement of the mind; and secondly, the moment related to 
the religious/aesthetic experience which produces a movement between viewer 
and God (respectively the sublime), detached from a self-reflective, cognitively 
ordering mind: namely what Hartmut Rosa, who has recently published a book 
on resonance and sociology, has called the decoupling of emotion and resonance 
(Rosa 2016, 289). Although one may argue that any religious or aesthetic experi-
ence aims at such a decoupling of the self, I would argue that spiritual art makes 
these two types of perception more visible.
created, as it were, by both viewer and object, destabilizing the identity of the former while an-
imating the latter. Physical, emotional, and psychological, the process of Einfühlung placed the 
spectator at the center of aesthetic discourse’. In the same article, Koss argues that this experi-
ence (Einfühlung) was always thought of as an individualistic experience and not as something 
that could be experienced as a group. She cites a work by the filmmaker Peter Kubelka from 1971 
which was addressed at a spectatorship simultaneously individual and communal; communal, 
as the film was shown in a cinema to several people, and individual because the viewers could 
not see each other, but only the screen.
7 Mark Mosko describes this vertical experience as becoming part of Him and He becomes part 
of onself (Mosko 2010). For him, this is a dividual relationship, whereas I would argue that it is 
not only a detachment from the reflective-self (and thus dividual), but also a belief in a unity 
with God.
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Some contemporary art works with religious subjects play with the viewer’s 
resonances. The viewer can reflect upon such images in the discourse of contem-
porary art, but because of the religious iconography, these images also play with 
the expectations of the believing viewer, arguably hindering a truly felt dividual 
experience, as, for example, of those who undergo what Malik describes as being 
divinely embodied (rather than possessed) in his essay in this publication. Reli-
gion can arouse strong affects, even if (or perhaps because) contemporary art 
only fashions Christian iconography. Regarding representations of the crucifix-
ion, Gilbert & George’s mixed media print Was Jesus Heterosexual? (2005, Astrup 
Fearnley Museet, Oslo) was described by a then British MP for the Conservatives 
as ‘blasphemous in the extreme, as [they] will find out when finally they stand 
before the Son of God’ (cited after Rosen 2015, 9). Andres Serrano’s Immersion. 
Piss Christ (1987, Southeastern Center for Contemporary Art,  Winston-Salem, 
North Carolina), consisting of a photograph of a small crucifixion replica sub-
merged in urine, has been the focus of verbal and physical attacks, suffering van-
dalism during an exhibition at the National Gallery of Victoria in Melbourne in 
2011, which was discussed particularly in the tabloids (Anon. 2011). Many exam-
ples could be added that demonstrate that such art may only use Christian ico-
nography to provoke, so that artists benefit financially and in reputation from 
their works being widely reviewed (Rosen 2015, 15). Such strong reactions result 
in many (mis)readings and (mis)uses of works with a religious theme through 
political and religious fanaticism. For example, while Serrano’s Immersion. Piss 
Christ has offended Christian viewers, who felt that the image was blasphemous, 
Rosen argues that it can also be interpreted as a work that meditates on ‘the 
torments and degradation of Christ’ by using urine (Rosen 2015, 15). In similar 
lines, Wendy Beckett, the Catholic nun who became well known as an art critic, 
viewed the work as a statement on ‘what we have done to Christ’, that is, ‘the way 
contemporary society has come to regard Christ and the values he represents’ 
(Beckett 1998). Similarly, Damien Hirst’s God Alone Knows (2007) can not only be 
defamed as contemptuous, but can also be seen as an installation that ‘under-
score(s) Jesus’ humanity, emphasising the raw, bestial nature of his torments. 
Indeed, Hirst’s crucified sheep carcass simply provides an unusually visceral 
embodiment of Christ’s identity as the Lamb of God’ (Rosen 2015, 49).
Differently from Rosen, who disregards the polemic of these images in order 
to understand them on a deeper level, Elkins views such images as in a cate-
gory different from ‘serious’ Christian art, creating therefore two kinds of reli-
gious art objects which exist simultaneously, but with distinct differences in aims 
and strategies: namely polemic and ‘serious’ religious art. Following Elkins, one 
wonders how to account for historical and contextual factors. There have been 
several art works whose religious iconography has created dispute in the past 
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(and thus would belong to Elkins’ ‘other’ History of Art), but which have now 
been firmly accepted as ‘serious’. Furthermore, who says that reproductions of 
art works, a feature ascribed to polemic Christian art by Elkins, are not taken 
‘seriously’? What about those reproductions of works produced by famous artists 
such as Durer and hung in Christian households for the purpose of veneration? 
Is it not a question of the relationship between object and viewer rather than the 
object per se as to whether an art object is serious or polemic? I would therefore 
suggest a model that is based on mental spaces and gaps in the process of per-
ception.
This model begins with the observation that religious works, because of their 
iconography, raise certain expectations by the viewer. Secondly, viewers recall 
mental images of religious iconographies from pictures seen before with which 
the viewers compare the image in front of them, both as images and conceptions.8 
This produces a gap, which can be explained with the play between reference, 
deference and difference, a mechanism which Griselda Pollock has ascribed to 
the avant-garde (Pollock 1992, 14). Although in relation to a different subject, her 
concept explains well how the art works in question refer to Christian iconog-
raphy, even sometimes to a specific image by a specific artist. Their rendering, 
however is different, but only by deference – a term which recalls Jacques Derri-
da’s notion of différance – sometimes also referred to as espacement or ‘spacing’, 
because the difference is between binary elements (Derrida 1963). And the larger 
this space, the difference, the gap between the image in front of the viewers and 
that of their mind is felt by the viewer, the deeper the aggravation. Such an expla-
nation would not need an assumption of two different types of religious art. In 
addition, spacing as a form of distancing and approaching is a model whose ingre-
dients remind us of the way in which the viewer’s dividuality can be explained.
The use of the body, body parts and bodily fluids in art works seemingly 
enlarges this gap between images and therefore the aggression against works, 
particularly when exploited in works of Christian iconography. For example, Cat-
ling’s Processional Cross discussed above does not use any body at all. Therefore, 
it does not produce such a gap. However, why? It can not only be explained by 
Christian doctrine which renders human identification with Jesus as God suspi-
cious, but also with Julia Kristeva’s notion of the ‘abject,’ which leads to the topic 
of embodied viewing.9
8 Arguably, this viewing process is general and thus also applicable to ideas about beauty and 
taste as well as religious works.
9 For embodied viewing, see also discussion of emotions and the relevance of suffering in Antje 
Linkenbach’s essay in this publication.
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Unlike many depictions of the crucified Christ, the body in Beecroft’s Black 
Christ is strangely intact, almost aestheticised, emphasised through the cracked, 
marmorised and almost plane background (Fig. 1). There are no signs of pain and 
wounds, as one might expect from a crucifixion. The cross is even missing, so the 
viewer’s concentration is solely on the body. This depiction prompts a voyeuris-
tic view that searches the body for such signs, only finding the white loin cloth, 
which, typically of many crucifixions, is to hide the genitals. But instead of having 
a desexualising function, it awakens the body’s eroticism (Steinberg 1996). This 
eroticism is underpinned by the young age of the boy, unusual in view of conven-
tional representations of a much older Jesus on the cross. The viewers, becom-
ing aware of their gazes, are shamefully reminded of their criticism of the artist, 
because the artist has lured the viewers into doing the same as what they accuse 
of the artist, namely treating a Sudanese boy as inferior and an object and voyeur-
istically abusing his teenage body, aggravated by being a white artist. As this is a 
representation of the crucifixion, Beecroft achieves, in her execution of the body 
as black, exactly the treatment of Jesus before and during his crucifixion: namely 
as being laughed at and despised, as described in the New Testament and in the 
interpretations in patristic readings. Differently from many crucifixion depictions 
reminding us of Jesus’ suffering, Beecroft also achieves an effect whereby the 
viewer is not only an on-looker, but an accomplice of those who treated Jesus that 
way, perhaps not even realising and not repenting his/her own action.
Beecroft’s Black Christ plays with the viewer who is used to identifying pain 
with the iconography of the crucifixion. Representions of the wounded and suf-
fering Jesus, but also those by Serrano and Hirst, make use of what Julia Kris-
teva has called the ‘abject’ (Kristeva 1982; Fletcher, Benjamin 2012). Urine and 
flesh confront the viewer with a corporeal reality, which breaks down the dis-
tinction between the self and the other, as the viewer is drawn towards his/her 
own body, according to Julia Kristeva’s theory. This is interesting in our context, 
because abjection describes a process by which the viewers are detached from 
their self-reflective selves.
While any art work using indexical signs can lead to abjection, contempo-
rary art with religious themes arguably articulates the relationship of abjection 
loudly. Indeed, Beecroft exploits racial stereotypes for her purposes, which some 
consider problematic. The artist seemingly restores superiority of the white – for 
whom the black was object and possession in the colonial past – in contemporary 
art. The viewer is baffled because s/he assumes a different kind of treatment of 
such iconography, as described above. This is what the artists play with: they 
provoke, shock, because their imagery recalls a certain way of portraying Chris-
tian themes which are present in absentia (namely in the mind of the viewer who 
‘compares’ them with what is in front of him/her). Serrano’s Immersion. Piss Christ 
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encompasses this ‘difference’ not only by appealing to imagined pictures, but by 
using a photograph of a replica crucifixion which he then modifies with urine, a 
substance that many cultures identify with uncleanness, filth and assault. The 
religious iconography produces a gap between the image and the viewer’s expec-
tations, as explained above. The urine as fluid of the body, spilt over the rep-
resented Jesus, lets the viewer identify bodily with the image, experiencing the 
image as abject, because its corporeal reality (the urine in this case) breaks down 
the gap between the viewer’s self and the presented image. The viewer feels with 
the body of the image and detaches from his/her own body.
Thus, religious iconography using corporeality produces two movements: 
the religious/aesthetic aspect distances the viewers from their self containment 
through aspiring to something higher, while the corporeality detaches the viewer 
from their self horizontally, breaking down the barrier between viewer and image. 
These movements are in constant negotiation.
Corporeality can mobilise senses other than the visual. Regarding rep-
resentations of the crucifixion, smell is dominant in Cosimo Cavallaro’s Sweet 
Jesus (2005, in possession of the artist), which is made of chocolate and thus 
following the iconography and medium used by artists such as George Heslop’s 
Jesus on the Cross (2006) and Richard Manderson’s Trans-Substantiation 2 (1994). 
Differently from them, however, Cavallaro sexualises Jesus; his genitals are not 
hidden with a cloth as in Manderson’s sculpture, or sculpted less pronouncedly 
as by Heslop. Even if one rejects these works as kitsch because of their material, 
one should, nevertheless, be reminded of the existing Christian iconography of 
the Sweet Jesus, which is based upon the Bible. Psalm 119, for example, reads: 
‘How sweet are Your words to my taste! Yes, sweeter than honey to my mouth!’
Returning to the senses, sound is particularly exploited by video art, such 
as Mark Wallinger’s Via Dolorosa (2002, Israel Museum, Jerusalem), which uses 
a part of Franco Zeffirelli’s film Jesus from Nazareth from 1977. The scenes, which 
tell of the passion of Christ from Jesus’ presentation in front of the people until his 
crucifixion, are blacked out by a rectangular pane. This hinders the view of the 
film, which is only visible beyond the rectangle’s border, reducing the film to a 
small frame. In Mulvey’s terms, the ‘pleasure’ which lies in looking is denied. Such 
refusal leads to ‘a sense of separation and playing on their [the viewers’] voyeur-
istic phantasy’ (Mulvey 1975). Despite her assuming an ‘individual subject’, she 
still speaks of a ‘separation’ that happens in the process of viewing. This separa-
tion, as I would argue, is the reason for understanding the viewer’s personhood 
as dividual rather than individual, because the viewer’s perception becomes part 
(‘dividual’) of something else, instead of being self-contained.
Of course, as images, moving and still, these art works are primarily directed 
at the visual; thus, the felt, smelt, tasted and heard experiences are always 
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multi-sensual, further detaching the viewer from his/her own body by feeling 
with the represented crucified Jesus.
Both types of affected moments, the religious and the sensual, can also 
involve ‘real’ corporeality: embodied viewing has in some cases led to the destruc-
tion of art work (as has been mentioned above) and the literal turning away or 
closing of one’s eyes to distance oneself from the image in an attempt to protect 
the unity of the personhood. Furthermore, Christianity embraces a belief in incar-
nation, heavily discussed in theological doctrine as to how God can become a 
human being. Moreover, the Catholic Church has canonised stigmatists, includ-
ing Francis of Assisi and Padre Pio of Pietrelcina, who have experienced sores 
in locations of Jesus Christ’s wounds created by his crucifixion (Davidson, Fritz- 
Morkin 2009; Giovine 2009; Nickell 1993).10 Such stigmata have also played a role 
in contemporary performance art by artists such as Franko B and Bálint Szom-
bathy (Richards 2008).
Crucifixions exploit both moments, the religious/spiritual as well as the 
abject. However, they seem to defer the viewer in different directions: while 
the former is a striving towards a vertical resonance, the latter is a yearning 
towards the self as body. Yearning and striving increase the space of deference. 
They also seemingly tear apart the viewer who attempts to negotiate cognitively 
bodily and spiritual experiences. Indeed, the viewer is denied a split of the self 
through religious/aesthetic moments and forced to a self-split because of the 
abjection. As the perception consists of two movements in different directions, 
images with religious iconography and corporeality produce a wider gap than 
those that are abstract, such as Catling’s Processional Cross, a work in which 
corporeality is missing (Fig. 4). The wider gap, however, can lead to the viewer’s 
frustration, which may result in some of the reactions to religious images as 
described above.
The issue here, however, is, that contemporary religious art plays on the 
notion of viewerhood as an indivisible individual. If Western personhood 
(and I would add, particularly that of the white heterosexual man) only sat in 
10 See also Therese Neumann von Konnersreuth (1898–1962) who has been venerated for her 
stigmata and for whom the Catholic Church began the process of beatification in 2005.
For the meaning of partibility and permeability, see also Emma-Jayne Graham (2017), who ex-
plores their significance for body-part votives at Etrusco-Latial-Campanian sanctuaries in Late 
Iron Age central Italy. Her findings seemingly have parallels with the Catholic rituals mentioned 
above. Graham argues that the power of the divine beings to heal the living permeated the as-
sembled body-part votives and the bodies of the living, while the practice of deposition shaped 
the divinities as ‘multi-authored persons, composed of the bodies, prayers and offerings of 
human supplicants’.
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relation to modern Western ontologies which have tended to privilege indivisi-
ble understandings of the world, as, for example, argued by Philippe Descola, 
religious art would not provoke anything spiritual or aesthetic, nor would body 
and performance art be abject (Descola 2013). Indeed, artists creating religious 
works can only play with different moments of perception, if one assumes any 
viewer’s perception as consisting of dividual moments. If the white hetero-
sexual viewer is understood as a person with a perception which only knows 
of self-reflective observation, religious art works would not have the power 
with which these are seemingly equipped in a Western world dominated by 
monotheistic religions. Particularly the experience of embodied viewing runs 
contrary to anthropologists’ ideas of Western personhood – by which the indi-
vidual presupposes a detachment from the body to see things ‘objectively’, 
enabling the subject to produce a clear and distinct view of what is – namely a 
‘complete’ and autonomous individual (Latimer 2007, 53). It would be impos-
sible for the viewer as individual to experience transcendence and abjection. 
Instead perception seems to be rather like what Strathern describes for the 
dividual personhood, namely as a self who is constructed as ‘the plural and 
composite site of the relationships that produce’ it (Strathern 1988, 13). In other 
words, anthropological scholarship may well assume a dominance of self as 
a  self-reflective individual in the Western world, but the West also knows of 
moments in perception other than reflective, namely the spiritual, the sublime 
and the abject, as shown above. This would mean that crucifixions in particular 
and religious works in general presuppose and create a dividual viewerhood in 
the sense coined by anthropology. The outcries against and shock about con-
temporary religious art as described above, produce an understanding of view-
ership denying any pluralistic perception. Interpreted only bodily (by ignor-
ing reflection and spirituality), such works foreground individual rather than 
dividual perception.
Because of using a body, the image is a literal sign, what Peirce would call 
indexical (as being the Sudanese boy), is iconic (the body of the Sudanese boy as 
image), and is a symbolic sign (as Jesus) all at the same time. Such representa-
tions have therefore particularly raised critics’ eyebrows. Baert and Van Gelder 
begin their book on Fluid Flesh with the question as to whether and how are ‘we 
able (and allowed) to think of the divine in a corporeal way? […]. From the very 
center of the “body-religion-art” triangle, a force is pulsating between taboo and 
embrace’ (Baert, Gelder 2009, vii). One could therefore conclude that Beecroft’s 
Black Christ establishes a relationship to the viewer that is different from that of 
other representations of crucifixions. The art work seemingly defies any fixity and 
thus also questions in which way one can speak of dividual or individual person-
hood as mutually exclusive, which brings me to my last point.
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5  Constituting personhood as an enacting 
dynamic process
As shown above, the dividual can be understood as permeable as well as divisible 
in view of crucifixions executed in photography and performance art in which 
corporeality is foregrounded. Art works as such create a  viewer-personhood, 
which brings something else into question, namely the role of a dynamic process 
in defining personhood, which also helps overcome a problem created by 
anthropological conceptions of personhood that perpetuate dividing the world 
into the West and the rest. Although Strathern wants to avoid the mistake of 
Western views on feminism being simply extended to indigenous cultures such 
as the Milanesians (Strathern 1988, 7), her perspective draws a black-and-white 
picture of the world with stark contrasts, introducing a neo-Primitivism in which 
Western societies are characterised by individuality and indigenous societies 
by dividuality. The latest scholarship in anthropology has asked whether the 
dividual and individual are not necessarily only opposites, but aspects which 
are both necessary for the forming of personhood. Chris Fowler, for example, 
does not dismiss the oppositional properties as such (indivisible and divisible, 
fixed and mutable, permeable and impermeable, individualist and collectivist, 
essential and contextual), but puts them in an ‘axis of relationality’ (Fowler 
2016, 402).
Furthermore, Fowler advocates against merely stating ‘whether personhood 
is divisible or indivisible’, but to bring to the fore ‘the extent to which each can 
be identified, through what media, in what contexts and assemblages, and so 
on. Appreciating the ways that personhood is distributed in time and space with 
respect to bodies, objects and materials is the goal’ (ibid., 403). Although such 
an understanding allows for a precise differentiation of personhood beyond the 
usual patterns, it still assumes individual and dividual (as well as the other prop-
erties) as oppositional pairs, seemingly excluding that both can be considered as 
part of constituting personhood in a dynamic process.
As the investigation into the viewership of images of crucifixions shows, 
such a divide into dividual or individual is neither necessary nor actually factual. 
Although providing two different perspectives, personhood can also be under-
stood as being characterised by both dividual and individual moments, if one 
takes on the contextual conception of dividuality by Klee, developed in the artist’s 
pedagogic notes taken while teaching at the Bauhaus from 1921 to 1931 (Klee 1922; 
Kudielka 2002). Referring to objects, the artist defines the dividual as the oppo-
site of the individual, whereby the individual can also become a dividual and the 
dividual an individual, depending on the perspective. By refering to a fish, Klee 
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states that the fish is a dividual in light of an aquarium, the latter which would be 
the individual. He then provides a list of individuals and their depending dividu-
als like a syntax series: ‘trunk – wood fibres, wrinkles in the bark; tree – leaves, 
branches, twigs; forest – tree; forest region – particular forest’ (Klee 1922, 266). 
These examples illustrate that Klee sees the in/dividual in a  continuum, in which 
the definition of dividual and individual depends on the relation formed between 
them. Applying his ideas to personhood, dividual and individual moments both 
define personhood, depending on the relationship which these form. In the 
context of describing the relationship between art object and viewer, the viewer 
is an individual; but while experiencing the object, the viewer is dividual, becom-
ing detached from the self and part of something else through spirituality, tran-
scendence and affection.
Furthermore, taking on Deleuze’s conception of the dividual in cine-
matographic images, outlined in his book Cinema I. The Movement-Image, con-
stituting personhood is a process rather than an ontologogical essence, as it only 
wins formation when being enacted (Deleuze 1986). For Deleuze, the duration 
of the film consists of parts, whereas images, when seen in duration, become a 
film. These images are themselves thought of as immobile, though there is move-
ment between them. This movement makes the images into a film. Later in his 
book, Deleuze spells out that these parts, the cinematographic images, have ‘two 
facets, one of which is oriented towards sets and their parts, the other towards 
the whole and its changes; it is this that we must examine – the movement-image 
for itself, in all itself, in all its varieties and both its facets’ (ibid., 61). The latter 
image is connected via movement with other images to form a whole, an indivis-
ible continuity, a duration consisting ‘in time’. In terms of viewer-personhood, 
I would suggest that personhood is both individual and dividual, mobile and 
immobile. In the present, in the now of the moment, personhood is dividual, 
while in view of its future (and past) in which moments are put together, per-
sonhood becomes a whole, an indivisible continuity, characterisations that can 
be applied to the individual, because this continuity is thought of as mobile, in 
flux, in a continuous process of becoming, never constituting essentiality. If this 
continuity is thought of as indivisible, one cannot conclude that the continuity 
consists of moments. As soon as one recognises such moments, one fixes them 
and thus changes fundamentally this continuity into something essentially dif-
ferent, namely into a dividual that is characterised by movement in space rather 
than in duration.
For performance art such a conception would mean that the still image of 
those works (as well as photographs of the body) documented as a film, would 
be dividual and, combined with other such ‘immobile’ stills by movement, form 
a ‘whole’ of the documented performance piece. According to Deleuze, however, 
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dividual is understood as stable and immobile in contrast to anthropological 
understandings that emphasise fluidity and mobility. The enactments of Horsley 
and Nitsch are dividual as they consist of stills which are part of the entire per-
formance, while the entire performance as a whole constitutes personhood anew 
with each viewing.
For the personhood of viewers, such a conception would not only mean that 
perception can be considered as a set of moments, consisting of religious/aes-
thetic, embodied, as well as cognitive elements that dynamically form a whole, as 
described above, but also that the viewer’s perception and relation to the world 
is constituted in this way.
Apart from the viewership and the medium, the dynamic process of dividual-
ising and individualising can also be applied to the iconography of the crucifixion. 
To return to the image from the beginning, Beecroft’s Black Christ enacts dividual 
personhood by being a Sudanese boy and, at the same time, the (re-)presentation 
of Jesus Christ in view of its Christian meaning (Fig. 1). The  representation as the 
divine (as part of the Trinity) is underpinned by an aesthetically pleasing body 
that mystifies the depicted beyond the representation of a simple individual (Grant 
2013). In other words, Beecroft’s Sudanese boy is not only representing Jesus Christ, 
he is the Son of God and thus God itself through the process of crucifixion accord-
ing to Christian belief. Criticism of the image and other representations of the body 
as God, which express outrage that a human body can personify Jesus Christ on the 
cross, prove that crucifixions go beyond a simple symbolic reception. Nowhere else 
comes this more to light than in performance art pieces of the crucifixion, where 
the symbolic character seemingly disappears behind the corporeal presence of the 
body-artist. Stripped of the iconography, however, the photograph becomes also 
just that of a teenage black boy who has lived his life before the image was taken, 
in other words, constituting an individual person in a historical setting.
Appendix
List of Illustrations
Fig. 1: Vanessa Beecroft, Black Christ, 2006, digital C-print, 76 × 59 cm © the artist.
https://oneroom.eu/products/vanessa-beecroft-vbss-006-mp-2006
Fig. 2: Sebastian Horsley, Crucifixion, 2000, still of a performance © the artist.
https://www.dazeddigital.com/art-photography/article/39534/1/extreme-art-marina- 
abramovic-carolee-schneeman-jenny-saville-glen-luchford
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Fig. 3: Hermann Nitsch, Crucifixion, 2002, still of performance at the Fondazione Morra, Naples.
https://kunstistkrieg.blogspot.com/2012/10/arnulf-rainer-hermann-nitsch-e.html
Fig. 4: Brian Catling, Processional Cross, 2013, sculpture (aluminium gilded in white gold), 
St. Martin-in-the-Fields, London © the artist and St. Martin-in-the-Fields, London.
http://www.modusoperandi-art.com/projects/st_martin_in_the_fields_the_processional_cross
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Afterword: porosity, corporeality  
and the divine
Focusing on porosity, embodiment and the relationship to the divine highlights the 
wider pertinence of the concept of dividual personhood. The dividual has conven-
tionally been opposed to the individual as an alternative conceptualisation of per-
sonhood (e.g. Marriott 1976; Strathern 1988) or thing (e.g. Klee 1922; Deleuze 1986). 
Although this is widely acknowledged as a heuristic, the literature repeatedly reifies 
it, treating different cultural regions and/or historical periods as essentially divid-
ualist or individualist. However, religious experiences, ideals, performances and 
theologies highlight the significance of non-individualist orientations in diverse 
times and places, including those archetypally associated with the individual.
Our articles, stressing the links between human relationships to the divine 
and porous corporeal being, focus on cultural ideals of openness to human or 
non-human forces and substances and the interplay of dividual and individual 
being. In such contexts, the person is often conceived as characterised by bodily, 
including sensory and emotional, openness. This may connote volition, as when 
the young woman in Aditya Malik’s account of possession opens herself to a god-
dess’s visitation, or desire such as when the viewers of crucifixion performances, 
described in Jutta Vinzent’s contribution, expose themselves to the art work, or 
embodied intersubjective porosity as described in Harry Maier’s analysis of the 
communication between the apostle Paul and his associate via a slave. The ques-
tion of the extent of volition is raised by the different accounts of possession that 
are found in ancient Greek sources, as Esther Eidinow shows. By contrast, we 
encounter also widespread belief in vulnerability to forces like the evil eye. There-
fore active and passive openness may co-exist, as in Christine Dureau’s account of 
Methodist missionaries’ simultaneous solicitation of, and surrender to, the Holy 
Spirit. As these examples suggest, porosity can include intersubjective, divine, 
experiential, cultural, aesthetic and emotional dimensions. It can involve a host 
of intercommunicative, interpenetrating forces that result in the emergence and 
constitution of in/dividuals, as well as their unmaking and remaking.
These understandings challenge the typical markers of modernity as charac-
terised by, even dependent upon, the pre-eminent ethical value of the bounded 
autonomous individual who, while enmeshed in social relationships, partic-
ipates in them as a single unit. As these articles demonstrate, not only do we 
need to consider these dynamics in themselves, but also the ways in which they 
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have been presented and the power of their contextualisation. While Christianity 
has been widely associated with the emergence of this putatively modern person 
(e.g. Mauss 1985[1938]; Weber 2001[1930]; Dumont 1985), the three contributions 
on Christianity in this section, ranging from the religion’s earliest days, through 
high imperialism to contemporary art works (Maier, Dureau, J Vinzent), suggest 
a historical trajectory of simultaneous in/dividuality. Eidinow’s article raises 
the range of scholarly explanations, which, over time, have been put forward to 
explain the Pythia’s experience of possession, and which can be seen to reflect 
contemporary concerns about women’s social role. And, as Malik demonstrates, 
modern subjectivities can be profoundly resistant to colonialist and progressivist 
associations between being modern and being individual.
Indeed, the religious domain shows that surrendering self-containment – 
in possession, altered states of consciousness, responses to sacred imagery – is 
equally characteristic of the modern person. It is easy to relegate South Asian 
spirit possession to some kind of premodern remnant, for example, but it is 
crucial to recognise that such practices are prevalent in modern conditions and 
express contemporary forms of religion. Such practices are not different in kind 
to the effects on viewers aimed at by crucifixion performances or Methodist emo-
tionality in an empire that proudly celebrated its modernity. Similarly, when we 
contemplate our futures, is our sense of the limits of our own agency and vulner-
ability to unseen forces and events so different from that felt by ancient Greek 
men and women? Acknowledging facets of personhood otherwise ignored or mis-
represented in modernity’s master narrative of the emergence of the sovereign 
subject as modern person, challenges not only the idea that moderns are defin-
itively individuals but also presumptions that the modern West alone has claim 
to the idea of the individual: a dividual approach breaks this cultural script and 
unmasks its political and ideological power to privilege one cultural formulation 
over others.
Porosity suggests the possibility of constantly shifting modes of being, of 
openness to others, to the divine, to things. For example, Harry Maier’s article 
deals with a New Testament text which understands porosity as a quality of rela-
tionships between God, humans, people and the natural world as well as material 
objects. Additionally, it conceives of correlative interpenetrating relationships 
entailed in various forms of institutionalised sociality such as between masters 
and slaves. Paul is simultaneously slave, father, son. The experience of oracular 
consultation, whether as prophet or consultant, similarly institutionalised poros-
ity, demanding acceptance of the presence of supernatural forces within one’s 
life. Greek literary descriptions of these events suggest that they, too, appreciated 
the resulting intersubjectivity, and the ambiguous status of personhood, moving 
between dividual and individual. A person who opens herself to becoming a 
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medium of a deity, as in Malik’s article, may be simultaneously divine and human 
or move between the two states. Similarly, the artists who perform a Crucifixion 
do not merely represent the crucified Jesus as, for example, in paintings of the 
Crucifixion, but are the crucified one because they themselves embody it. But this 
also delimits their dividuality: ultimately, they either substitute their body with 
that of an animal or stop the performance in order not to die. In other words, the 
artist moves between dividual and individual personhood. Similarly, Methodist 
missionaries oscillated between individualist and dividualist modes, promoting 
individualism and welcoming emotional intersubjectivity and the Holy Spirit’s 
bodily-spiritual penetration.
The performances and collective experiences outlined in these examples 
highlight the affective, transcendent sense of divinely-inspired openness of 
religious being. They suggest that porosity and corporeality are profoundly 
co-constituent, insofar as the body offers the ‘route of entry’ for outside influ-
ences. Here, we include emotions, bodies, roles, personae and responses to 
places or locales which render bodily being as intersubjective, inter-physical 
processes. These accounts aim not only to write about material being, but also 
to explore, in turn, how cultural scripts, patterns of memorialisation, narra-
tivise the body. The embodied dividual can be refracted, given to possession, 
gifted, immersed in the collective, corporeally redefined, spread out, while 
remaining an individual under negotiation and construction.
The literature on the dividual stresses embodiment, but often in a para-
doxically disembodied, immaterial, abstract manner. In Strathern’s work, for 
example, the dividual is constituted out of the totality of relationships to others 
as expressed and conveyed through bodily fluids and food, itself a transforma-
tion of embodied work. Yet the sheer physicality of these exchanges is strangely 
missing from her account. By contrast, our contributions suggest something 
much more immediate. Maier’s article looks at embodiment as a gift to others. 
Eidinow’s contribution emphasises how the process of possession may also have 
been explicitly corporeal, involving changes in voice and bodily state, perhaps 
also accompanied by pain, with the possessed person thrown into an alternate 
state of embodied consciousness.
Emotional states often seem central to these dividual – divine relationships. 
Oracular consultations occur at moments of profound uncertainty, even crisis: 
they demonstrate clearly how individuals have the potential literally to become 
new in a reinvented universe. Methodist missionaries’ accounts of suffering 
provoke emotional responses, creating an intersubjective oneness with readers 
who are swept along by an imaginative empathy in which the missionaries’ expe-
rience becomes their own. Crucifixion performances depend on a similar sympa-
thy, aiming at an emotional, bodily resonance in the viewer.
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The emotional intensity described above can include surrendering the 
control that is ideally a constituent of the modern person, undermining the prob-
lematic binary chain of West – rest; individual – dividual (self-control – lack of 
self-control; rational – irrational). Notions of the divine since at least the Enlight-
enment have measured and normalised human divine relationships in terms of 
ontological otherness; noumenal beings are other than human, dwell in alternate 
realms, are beyond the natural and are subject to rational dismissal; humans are 
of the real world, the world of nature and the empirically verifiable. The concept 
of dividuality undermines this strong division, highlighting understandings of 
the divine as entangled with/in the human and the cultural, capable of penetrat-
ing, even making, individuals and selves.
Aesthetic forms offer powerful modes for achieving intersubjectivity. Viewing 
art aims at a fluid divide between the self and the art object; with religious art, the 
object has the potential for spiritual reconstitution. In ‘playing’ the divine or per-
forming divine scripts (J. Vinzent, Malik), the self ‘becomes’ divine, embodying it 
for the moment of performance and enacted identity. Shared cultural narratives 
of possession or oracular consultation both expressed and shaped the experience 
of intersubjectivity.
For scholars like Strathern, the concept of the dividual challenges claims that 
particular forms of relationality necessarily express stratification; indeed, some 
forms of dividualism can be interpreted as egalitarian modes of personhood: the 
dividual implying that all of its constituent parts are of equal value. By contrast, 
the concept of the individual, as Jutta Vinzent puts it, favours inequality, because 
it involves eclipsing, suppressing or encompassing parts for a unity, therefore 
producing hierarchies. This is not to suggest a blunt binary: porous religious 
embodiment can be horizontally inclusive, directed towards sociality, or verti-
cally hierarchical, as when it is oriented towards deities. Sometimes it is almost 
coercive. Paul rhetorically obliges his readers through his evocation of kin and 
emotive relationship; the goddess possesses her avatar.
Ritual and performance thus potentially dislocate and relocate the individual. 
The self who is not/divine is in/dividual even as the god is in/dividual by virtue 
of their simultaneous unique identity and unified relationships with other agents. 
Thus, Maier conceives of Paul as inhabiting a divine spirit, while the same spirit 
resides in others. Eidinow evokes the ritual of oracular consultation as an embodied 
process, marked by a series of ritualised actions, which begin with preparations for 
travel to a sanctuary. Jutta Vinzent considers contemporary Christian iconography 
whose objective is to establish a relationship between the viewer and the divine. In 
Dureau’s account, Methodist missionaries ideally approached the divine by accept-
ing suffering in emulation of Calvary and emblematic of the need to transcend the 
self by gifting life experience in inadequate recompense for the gift of salvation.
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Porosity, corporeality and relationships to the divine are thus intertwined. 
What does it mean to leave ‘myself’ behind and be open to other forces? Is poros-
ity necessary to transcendence, which calls for the impossible to enter the realm 
of the possible? The sacred world is one of interpenetration, of openness, of the 
possibility of being within another. Historically, scholars have found this diffi-
cult to understand or accept with regard to the Pythia. Paul feels his heart and 
gives it to Onesimus who carries it within him. Such doubled being often entails 
empathic pain, as in the Methodist missionaries’ shared accounts of the sublime 
anguish of child loss. In performance art, the nature of this empathy is ambigu-
ous. The pain of the crucified affects the viewer – you feel what you see – but can 
I, as artist or onlooker, embody Christ?
Gifts such as Paul’s leave deep traces, or perhaps wounds that paradoxically 
relieve profound pain, carving out meaning in a world occupied by imperfect 
bodies, slaves, masters, prisons, God. The emulation of a likeness again represents 
an opening, one that shares in a being or self which is, however, incessantly under 
construction. One is this and one is that. These are neither mere roles, nor acting 
nor mere representations, but the act of profoundly being something. The corpore-
ality of the person is marked by emotion, fragility, and uncertainty, seeking solid 
ground within the disappearing horizon of time and existence. A pervasiveness 
of being permeates the body of God and the woman who is Devi, the goddess. A 
person surpasses herself or himself by being ‘possessed’, which itself is an act of 
surrender that involves fervently believing in the possibility of being open to the 
unknown. We know so few of the Pythiae by name.
Dividuality, in conclusion, points toward open-ended, processual realities that 
exceed single definitions, cultural performances or scripts. It points toward dynamic 
lived individuality under permanent construction and in perpetual flux. To argue that 
under such conditions there are no individuals but only roles and cultural scripts is 
not only to run roughshod over the immense diversity of human experiences, under-
standings and histories, but also to suppress aspects of the modern self, which is 
similarly in/dividual under its own particular cultural and social conditions.
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Introduction: conventions and contentions
The practice of studying only institutional documentation means that scholars miss all 
“lay” material, and helps explain why we still know so little about religious individualis-
ation among non-institutionalised women and the common faithful. What is worse, it helps 
explain why we still fail to recognise the reciprocal influences of leading churchmen and 
spiritual women in developing lay devotion and lived spirituality in the later Middle Ages. It 
also helps us realise that searching for “institutionalisation” is only one aspect of our task, 
which has to be complemented by the search for “conventionalisation”, that is to say the 
study of constant, formalised, and recognised conventions and practices that regulate and 
stabilise individual initiatives in societal forms.1
In her contribution to this publication, Anneke Mulder-Bakker points to a two-
fold ambivalence often encountered by scholars working on religious individ-
ualisation. Particularly in premodern scenarios, we are used to a focus on elite 
literature and therefore tend to overlook the impact of ‘lay’ material on processes 
of religious individualisation. At the same time, Mulder-Bakker’s contribution 
shows that such ‘lay’ impulses rarely enter the history books: either because pow-
erful elites or conventions prevent them from becoming institutionalised, i.e., 
from gathering stability over time by affecting larger groups of people; or, because 
they lose their individualising impetus over the course of their assimilation (and, 
eventually, expurgation) by established religious traditions or institutions.
How can processes of religious individualisation in all their multifacetedness 
gather stability over time and become relevant not just for a select few but for a sig-
nificant number of people? Are there cultural strategies that help preserve those 
ideas, texts, practices, or sets of experiences for future generations that foster 
processes of religious individualisation, eventually eliciting the support, or even 
prompting the formation of, religious traditions or institutions proper? As indi-
cated in the main introduction to this publication, these questions were among 
those focused upon during the second funding period of the research group 
‘religious individualisation in historical perspective’, and they are also the main 
focus of this present part entitled ‘Conventions and Contentions’. We used the 
term ‘institutionalisation’ for the perspective outlined above, and thereby wanted 
to move away from the analytical focus on individual actors in favour of broader 
social dynamics that indicate processes of enhanced dissemination (e.g., through 
group formation), stabilisation (e.g., through ritualisation), standardisation (e.g., 
1 Anneke Mulder-Bakker, ‘Lived Religion and Eucharistic Piety on the Meuse and the Rhine in 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries’, Section 3.1 of this publication.
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through the canonisation of texts), or even the establishment of ‘regimes’ of reli-
gious individualisation. To this end, we called for interpreting religious individ-
ualisation in context with, and in relation to, other religious strands as well as 
non-religious social spheres, including processes of, or eventual relapses into, 
de- or non-individualisation.
In hindsight, this appears to be quite an ambitious project and the final 
outcome presented in this part is more ambiguous than we had anticipated. 
This discrepancy may be due to three particular issues: (1) religious individu-
alisation is itself a multifaceted phenomenon, or even refers to a range of dif-
ferent phenomena subsumed under the same umbrella (justifiably or not: see 
Otto 2017), so that one wonders to which of these various processes the term 
‘institutionalisation’ might actually refer; (2) the composite ‘institutionalising 
religious individualisation’ was hence either too narrow, ambivalent, abstract, 
or complex to plausibly be localised in the data of most scholars who partook 
in our project; (3) the idea itself seems to entail some unresolved tensions, or 
ambivalences, that are difficult to conceptualise, let alone identify in histor-
ical scenarios. These ambivalences mostly pertain to the observation that, as 
soon as religious individualisation affects religious groups or prompts their 
formation, dynamics of normativisation or standardisation may undermine its 
initial impetus and instead lead to compulsory, normative or other forms of 
pseudo- or counter-individualistic group dynamics. Yet such relapses may not 
be inevitable and the task was, therefore, to find those subtle  in-between-cases 
in which dynamics of religious individualisation had become relevant for 
larger groups (i.e., not only for some outstanding individuals) and gathered 
some stability over time while dynamics of homogenisation, dogmatisation, or 
the suppression of individual deviations had not (yet) led to  backlashes into 
de- or non-individualisation.
Due to these conceptual difficulties and ambivalences, ‘institutionalisation’ 
did not make it into the title of this part of the publication, and the term also 
figures only occasionally in the contributions assembled here. Yet the idea that 
processes of religious individualisation can gather stability over time and inform 
religious groups or foster their foundation remains in the background, so that it 
is necessary to – briefly – explain what we had in mind by making use of the term 
‘institutionalisation’. Obviously, our understanding differs from standard theories 
in economics, social sciences, or law, according to which different types of insti-
tutions are distinguished (formal and informal: North 1990) and institutions are 
demarcated from conventions and other social norms. If one differentiates formal 
and informal institutions, the former usually provide a set of (predetermined and 
textualised, e.g., legislative) rules that are enforced by a third party – usually the 
state –, thus shaping, stabilising, and governing human behaviour. In contrast, 
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informal institutions may relate to customary law, may not be textualised, and 
may only be enforced by social sanctions (e.g., through forms of ostracism or 
‘othering’). Formal institutions very much represent collective rationality and 
are thus to be demarcated from informal institutions, which may only reflect the 
preconceptions and worldviews of particular (but eventually powerful) groups. 
Consider, for instance, the formal institution of marriage and – now in parts of 
the world – same-sex marriages, and on-going reservations and objections in the 
respective populations against the latter – which would then represent an infor-
mal institution. In contrast, certain types of fashion may be generally accepted 
and/or unquestioned and thus be considered neither formal nor informal institu-
tions but, rather, mere conventions.
With this in mind, our idea of ‘institutionalising religious individual-
isation’ did not, of course, envisage the formation of fully-fledged ‘institu-
tions’ of religious individualisation. These would be analogous to, say, law 
in modern nation states or, in the realm of religion, the foundation of a 
church  – which today often functions both as an organisation as well as a 
formal institution that is granted certain rights by society at large. We wanted 
to analyse socio-historical processes and group dynamics that, on a some-
what smaller scale, trigger the enhancement of religious self-determination, 
the pluralisation of religious options, the facilitation of religious deviance, 
the development of elaborated notions of the self, or the realisation of intense 
‘experiences deemed religious’ (Taves 2009) within religious groups or a 
larger number of religious actors over longer periods of time and in different 
historical scenarios. Quoting from our initial call for papers, we invited con-
tributors to look at the following processes: ‘(i) the dissemination of certain 
patterns of self-practices (bodily, emotionally, spiritually); (ii) the ritualiza-
tion of certain modes or patterns of communication of an individual actor or 
person with other persons or actors, including especially the not immediately 
plausible one(s); (iii) the emergence of spaces of choice or freedom (in various 
meanings of the term) of the individual vis-à-vis the wider group or category 
of reference; (iv) the creation of forms of sociality, community or collectivity 
that provide relatively unconstrained social (including religious) spaces for 
enabling the development of one’s personal options or paths’.
Over the course of preparing the contributions and editing this part of the pub-
lication, and due to the ambiguities in the notions of ‘institution’ and ‘institution-
alisation’, we – that is, the contributors and editors –, felt the need for a change 
of vocabulary, from which the title ‘conventions and contentions’ emerged. What 
do we mean by this formulation? To begin with, institution/alisation, at least in 
its economic or legislative sense, necessitates the capacity to sanction deviant 
(religious) thought or behaviour, and thus seemed too broad. At the same time 
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it was also too specific to deal with a multitude of the more nuanced settings 
that we tend to find in historical cases. In fact, ‘conventions and contentions’ 
rather points to an on-going interplay between established dynamics of power, 
cultural norms of behaviour, patterns of belief and other societal structures at 
large – ‘conventions’ –, and the human tendency to question and deviate from 
such structures, independent of whether this is an un- or self-conscious act, 
whether it is performed individually or socially, or whether it involves secrecy or 
publicity. This is not to say that ‘conventions’ inevitably lead to deviations and, as 
it were, ‘contentions’, but we do assume that those historical scenarios that point 
to dynamics of an enhanced dissemination, stabilisation, or standardisation of 
religious individualisation are often influenced by the aforementioned interplay. 
The goal of this part of the publication was, therefore, to identify the dynamics 
of the stabilisation of religious individualisation from a ‘grass-roots’ perspective 
and with a particular focus on group formation in all its fragility, controversiality, 
and mutability.
With all this in mind, the rationale for the present part of the publication was 
to explore the dynamic interplay between ‘conventions and contentions’ and the 
impact of this interplay on the institutionalisation of religious individualisation. 
To that end, we assembled and compared case studies that cover different reli-
gious environments and historical scenarios, focusing on South Asia, the Medi-
terranean, and Europe from antiquity to the recent past. For analytical reasons, 
we decided to divide these case studies into two groups: the first group focuses 
on ‘practices’ and the second on ‘texts and narratives’. While the contributions 
to the first section thus ponder the impact of practices – ritual is foremost but 
contributors also consider economic or bureaucratic practices – on processes of 
religious individualisation and their eventual institutionalisation, the second 
section focuses on the impact of texts, narratives, and the relevance of the author 
and readership to such processes.
In both sections, our case studies reveal that detecting and analysing forms 
of institutionalisation of religious individualisation is a complicated task. The 
case studies in section one indicate that practices, foremost ritual practices, have 
a two-fold, or ambivalent, quality when it comes to religious individualisation: 
they may enhance individual agency, provide new options of behaviour, facilitate 
critical or deviant thought, or yield extraordinary experiences. However, they may 
also take on a shared, stereotypical, or even normative character, thus making 
it hard to consistently confirm a causal relationship between ritualisation and 
religious individualisation. Section two shows that the written word lends itself 
more readily to conventionalisation, and possibly, institutionalisation. Literary 
and religious texts have often set in motion particular discourses that empower 
and promote religious individualisation, particularly with regard to ideas of 
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personhood and individuality. It is, however, the ‘modes of circulation, valori-
zation, attribution, and appropriation’ (Foucault 1977, 137) that provide insights 
into the cultures and social relations that embolden paths of religious individ-
ualisation. In other words, it is the production and modification of the ‘author 
function’ that indicates the emergence of institutions, these in turn valorise the 
exemplary ‘individual/author’. The figures discussed in the ‘texts and narratives’ 
section are the ‘founders of discursivity’, the prime movers of particular currents 
of thought, although subsequent texts and writers gave retroactive force to these 
founders, since these latter contributors were the critical perpetrators of the dis-
course in which they took part.
Let us briefly summarise the contributions to both sections. Section one, 
on ‘practices’, traces the institutionalisation of religious individualisation with 
a focus on practices, particularly ritual practices (Patera, Ramelli, Mulder-
Bakker), but also economic (Hermann-Pillath) and legislative (Nijhawan) 
 practices. Ioanna Pateria, in a paper entitled ‘Individuals in the Eleusinian Mys-
teries: Choices and actions’ ponders the ‘individualistic’ elements in this ancient 
Greek ritual, an endeavour which turns out to be difficult, due to the public and 
normative nature and context of the ritual. In a similar vein, Ilaria Ramelli, in 
her article ‘Institutionalisation of Religious Individualisation: Asceticism in 
Antiquity and Late Antiquity and the Rejection of Slavery and Social Injustice’, 
describes patterns of religious individualisation in ancient monasticism and 
the surrounding debates on slavery. She, too, arrives at an ambivalent result, as 
dynamics of de-traditionalisation, an enhanced focus on individual salvation, 
or preliminary ideas of human rights and ‘dignity’, are accompanied by various 
de- or  counter-individualising dynamics, such as binding monastic rules, ritual 
standardisation, or the recurrent desire for tradition(alisation) in ancient ascetic 
milieus. Anneke Mulder-Bakker, in her piece ‘Lived Religion and Eucharistic Piety 
at the Meuse and the Rhine in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries’, outlines 
processes of religious individualisation in some exemplary lay religious women 
in late medieval Europe. As these women failed in prompting greater dynamics 
of religious individualisation, but nonetheless became exemplary figures in later 
hagiographies, Mulder-Bakker speaks of ‘conventionalisation’ (understood as 
the formation of ‘stable, formalised and recognised conventions and practices, 
which regulate and stabilise individual initiatives in societal forms’) rather than 
 ‘institutionalisation’.
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath’s chapter ‘Religious Individualisation in China: 
A Two-Modal Approach’ outlines a fully-fledged economic theory of religious 
individualisation based on the religious market model (RMM). Choosing 
modern China as his example, Hermann-Pillath distinguishes two basic modes 
of economic exchange – market exchange and gift exchange – and explains 
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the institutionalisation of religious individualisation as well as backlashes 
into de- or non-individualisation as a dynamic interplay between these two 
exchange modes. Michael Nijhawan, in his paper ‘Migrant Precarity and reli-
gious individualisation’, shifts our attention to legal – or bureaucratic – prac-
tices, namely those geared towards controlling the residence, activities, and 
eventual deportation of Sikhs seeking asylum in post-1984 Germany. He shows 
how Kafkaesque bureaucratic necessities and procedures – such as the asylee’s 
frequent dependence on court orders, work permits, or monthly visa- renewals 
– lead to a variety of changes in their religious practices and self-perceptions 
that correlate to  processes of religious individualisation. These include certain 
forms of de- traditionalisation, creative re-interpretations of Sikh terminolo-
gies, or enhanced reflections on their religious self or self-hood. Finally, Bernd- 
Christian Otto’s piece ‘The Illuminates of Thanateros and the Institutionali-
sation of Religious Individualisation’ analyses the schism of a contemporary 
grouping of ‘learned magic’ (or ‘magick’, as it is called in modern practitioner 
literature). According to Otto, this schism illustrates the tension between a strik-
ingly individualist, anti-hierarchical, anti-dogmatic agenda on the one hand 
and competing (group) dynamics of dogmatisation, authoritarianism, secrecy, 
and power abuse on the other, thus, again, pointing to basic ambivalences in 
the idea of institutionalising religious individualisation.
Section two analyses the institutionalisation of religious individualisation 
with a specific focus on ‘texts and narratives’. The section is organised around the 
nexus of authorship, texts, audience, and the locations of individualisation and 
institutionalisation. Ian Henderson’s reading of Chapter 7 of Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans, ‘“…quod nolo, illud facio” (Romans 7:20): Institutionalising the unsta-
ble self’, reveals how Romans 7 has provoked particularly individualising reading 
traditions and reflections on the ‘I’ and the complexity of the Self. This text 
inspired and intensified conflicting discourses about personhood and individu-
ality between Torah and Gospel. Paul conjured up the confusing ‘I’ of Romans 7 
to haunt and destabilise the subsequent institutionalisation of Christianity. The 
many Pauls of this text ask the audience to question the nature and stability of 
the identity, self, and the ‘I’ in the text. Anne Feldhaus’ piece, ‘Individualisation, 
Deindividualisation, and Institutionalisation among the Early Mahānubhāvs’, 
discusses the Old Marathi literature of the 13th-century Mahānubhāvs as both a 
classic example of individualisation and its mitigation – revealing the tensions 
and contradictions in the processes of religious individualisations that emerge 
from textual sources. Her chapter examines the characterisation of two of the 
divine incarnations, Cakradhar and Guṇḍam Rāüḷ, in their Mahānubhāv hag-
iographies, and the account of the early years the disciples spent without the 
benefit of the incarnations’ presence, therefore attempting to maintain the divine 
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presence in narrative form (14th–15th centuries). In her contribution, ‘Religious 
Individualisation and Collective Bhakti: Sarala Dasa and Bhima Bhoi’, Ishita 
Banerjee-Dube, also dealing with an early Indian text, examines the Mahab-
harata in Odia ascribed to Sarala Dasa, the adi kavi, the originary (but not 
 necessarily the first) poet of vernacular Odia. She discusses Bhima Bhoi’s compo-
sitions and those attributed to him in order to trace the constitution and mobil-
ity of texts and author(s) in the very process of their actualisation in interpretive 
reading. Banerjee-Dube illustrates the force the audience and readership have on 
the text and, indeed, the ability to produce the figure of the author according to 
the needs of the recipients of texts. Moving to North India, Rahul Bjørn Parson’s 
chapter, ‘Individualisation and Democratisation of Knowledge in Banārasīdās’ 
Samayasāra Nāṭaka’, engages with the 17th-century Jain poet Banārasīdās in 
order to trace how the poet mobilises and transforms older Jain philosophical 
concepts of non-absolutism and may-be-ness for a new historical moment, one 
in which a growing interest in personhood and Self starts to inform a particular 
species of religious individualisation. Banārasīdās gives force to an idea of the 
Self in neutrality, resisting partiality, influence and dogmatism, in order to expe-
rience (anubhav) the true Self. Additionally, since the subsequent poets conform 
to the conventions of the genre of Adhyātmik (spiritual) poetry popularised by 
Banārasīdās, this study also serves as an example of how pathways of individual-
isation oscillate between innovation and conventionalisation.
In his contribution, ‘Subjects of Conversion in Colonial Central India’, 
Saurabh Dube explores the interplay of conversion, translation, and the life- 
stories of central Indian converts to Christianity in 19th and 20th-century India. 
Focusing on autobiographies and biographies of converts in the Chhattisgarh 
region of central India, Dube shows how the sources reveal an ambivalence 
towards and resistance against patriarchal power, the search for a local meaning 
and vocation, as well as a drive to vernacularise and localise Christian revelation, 
namely, to personalise and individualise the Word in the Indian context. Max 
Deeg’s chapter, entitled ‘Many Biographies – Multiple Individualities: The Identi-
ties of the Chinese Buddhist Monk Xuanzang’, discusses the East Asian Yogācāra 
master par exemplum and Chinese monk Xuanzang 玄奘 (600/602–664), in order 
to explore the ways in which individualisation has manifested in several histor-
ical narratives about one specific individual. Xuanzang’s biographies have been 
received, projected, and recreated repeatedly, from the time of the monk up to 
present-day film adaptations. Xuanzang’s different biographies reflect a rare his-
torical process during which many identities are constructed and multiple individ-
ualities are implied. Finally, in ‘Jewish emancipation, religious individualisation, 
and metropolitan integration: A case study on Moses Mendelssohn and Moritz 
Lazarus’, Sabine Sander closes this section of the publication with a discussion 
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of the path taken ‘out of the Ghetto’ by European Jews between 1750 and 1850. 
She examines the parallel biographies as well as the religious and linguistic writ-
ings of two German-Jewish scholars, Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) and Moritz 
Lazarus (1824–1903). Sander shows how the writings of Mendelsohn and Lazarus, 
as well as their life stories, both initiated and institutionalised processes of indi-
vidualisation, as well as the subsequent expression of these developments within 
the Jewish religion. Religious individualisation, particularly as manifested in 
texts, offered emancipation and self-development for European Jews, while at the 
same time informing European urban demographics and metropolitan growth.
The two sections of this publication, ‘Practices’ and ‘Texts and Narratives’, 
thus form a productive alliance. The ‘practices’ section reminds us of the blurred 
relationship between textual ideas, topoi and tropes, and the reality of praxis. It 
fleshes out the ineffability and some of the ambiguities inherent in processes of 
religious individualisation but it also points to certain requirements of institu-
tionalisation processes: without ritualisation, group formation, or the establish-
ment of textual traditions, religious individualisation may remain nothing but a 
niche phenomenon. The ‘texts and narratives’ section reveals some of the limita-
tions of language, at the point of the ineffable, as well as the (in)stability of the 
concept of the author. Here, unsurprisingly, the examples frequently deal with 
irony, akrasia, paradox, and contradiction. We see how texts are instructive in 
fathoming the limits of language, particularly with regard to the ineffability of the 
Self and the individual, especially when attempting to express this in a shared, 
universal code such as language. Against this backdrop, practices and rituals give 
us a glimpse of what may manifest in performance, action, resistance, or praxis, 
rather than mere words. The ambiguous results of the ‘practices’ section offer a 
sobering rejoinder to the ‘texts and narratives’ section, which trades in the more 
idealised realm of promise and possibility.
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Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
Religious individualisation in China:  
a two-modal approach
1  Introduction: individualisation, in society and in 
religion 
In current sociological and anthropological studies of China, the issue of 
 individualisation is prominent (Hansen, Svarverud 2011). On the one hand, this 
is a most general concept referring to ideas about modernisation as a project 
that enhances the rights of the individual and centres on individual aspira-
tions for fulfilling one’s goals and values in life. On the other hand, the notion 
relates to the more specific ideas of Ulrich Beck (2014, 91ff.) about ‘reflexive 
modernisation’ which highlights the autonomy and responsibility of the indi-
vidual  regarding the construction of her or his identity as a person (such as 
even individualising the choice of gender). The difference between the two 
approaches lies in the respective role of reflexivity. Applied to China, this boils 
down to distinguishing between two kinds of individualisation. For example, 
the upsurge of consumerism and self-centred moral attitudes as well as the 
growth of private entrepreneurship may be regarded as individualisation in the 
former sense. However, this process of individualisation is triggered by many 
policies actively promoted by the government, so that it may be conceived as 
a passive process of adaptation, lacking the criterion of reflexivity. An influ-
ential contributor to the debate, Yan Yunxiang (2010), therefore argues that 
individualisation in China is different from the Western form of individualis-
ation and can be characterised as ‘state-led individualisation’ or ‘authoritarian 
individualisation’.1
1 I cannot go into the details of the discussion, which is more complex, as Beck, for example, 
distinguishes between ‘individualism’ and ‘individualisation’. However, I think my description 
catches the gist of the argument. Important empirical studies on ‘authoritarian individualis-
ation’ have been presented for the educational sector in China, where persons are educated to 
become ‘individuals’, see, e.g., Hansen 2013.
Note: Thanks to Bernd-Christian Otto, Martin Fuchs and Philip Clart for extensive comments on 
an earlier version of this paper. Further, I learned a lot from presenting my ideas at the meet-
ings of the Kollegforschergruppe.
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From the angle of this section in our publication on religious individualisation, 
Yan’s argument refers to a peculiar pattern of institutionalisation of individualis-
ation, though evidently in a paradoxical way, as far as established Western notions 
of that process are concerned: Western observers would mostly tend to see individ-
ualisation as a process of establishing autonomy vis à vis authorities external to the 
individual. Therefore, I want to tackle the issue of individualisation in a different 
way. Evidently, both conceptions of individualisation in China take for granted that 
some form of ‘collectivist’ culture is the starting point from which individualisation 
proceeds. Indeed, characterising traditional Chinese culture and society as collec-
tivist and group-oriented is a staple across the social sciences, psychology, manage-
ment sciences, and economics.2 I wish to question this assumption and present the 
hypothesis that China traditionally manifested culturally embedded forms of indi-
vidualism, which are reflected in certain religious practices. By implication, current 
tracks of individualisation would not be interpreted as being connected to earlier 
forms of collectivism, but may stand in line with traditional forms of individualism.3 
In previous work (Herrmann-Pillath 2016a), I relied on the conceptual and empiri-
cal work of one of China’s foremost 20th century anthropologists and sociologists, 
Fei Xiaotong, in debunking claims about the ‘collectivism’ of Chinese culture, by 
combining it with recent research in psychology, sociology and cognitive sciences 
about the values and behavioural stances of the Chinese. In this argument, I already 
point towards Chinese religion as a potential area to further substantiate this claim.
In the current paper, I will present my case for individualism, ‘Chinese style’, 
by connecting the sociological debate to the discourse that is going on in reli-
gious studies about religious individualisation (Fuchs 2015), and which lies at 
the centre of this multi-volume collection of papers on the topic. In this discourse, 
the conventional idea about individualisation follows the established narrative 
about Western modernisation: For example, the secular trends following the Ref-
ormation, as one revolutionary step in individualisation, manifest phenomena 
such as increasing protection of religious freedoms of the individual and growing 
self-determination of religious choices, with a focus on individual religious 
needs and preferences and inner beliefs and spirituality. However, this master 
narrative is increasingly questioned, both regarding the historical record and in 
2 To mention just one example, extremely influential in economics and management sciences, 
in the Hofstede approach China appears as diametrically opposed to Western countries in the 
‘collectivism vs. individualism’ dimension, representing a strong case of collectivism (Hofstede 
et al. 2010).
3 Mirroring this reasoning, one can also argue that individualisation in China today does not 
exist in tension with the persistence of group-oriented behaviour, especially in traditional forms, 
see Barbalet 2016.
Religious individualisation in China: a two-modal approach   645
cross-cultural comparisons. As for the historical record, the historical ubiquity 
of deviant forms of religiosity, large local variations in religious expressivity and 
practice, or the strength of mysticism in Europe may indicate that the notion 
of individualisation hinges on an uncritical acceptance of hegemonic religious 
beliefs and organisations as a measure of evaluating these phenomena as mar-
ginal. Cross-cultural comparison, in turn, reveals the cultural embeddedness 
of the analytical notion of individualisation; therefore, we might be blinded to 
alternative cultural forms of individuality, or even might not be able to appreciate 
cultural forms that dissolve the analytical dualism between individual and group 
(such as covered by notions of ‘dividuality’, Mosko 2010).
I think it is worthwhile to build on this discourse in religious studies and 
raise the question of religious individualisation in China.4 This question has its 
own interest, but will also contribute to the wider debate over individualisation 
in Chinese studies more generally. I will argue that the Chinese religious domain 
manifests many forms of individualism, thus supporting the case for individual-
isation in Chinese society in the context of both tradition and modernity. In doing 
this, I introduce a specific analytical framework that is motivated by a recent dis-
cussion in Chinese religious studies about the relevance of the ‘religious market 
model’ (henceforth, RMM).5 In this discussion, David Palmer (2011) criticises 
applications of the RMM in pointing out that many forms of religious activity in 
China do not follow the logic of market exchange, but of gift exchange, thus pri-
marily serving as expressions of identities and community. We can refer this to 
the debate about religious individualisation in general, where we also observe 
the implicit distinction between individualism in terms of choices and individ-
ualism in terms of expressivity. This dualism has been seminally elaborated by 
Charles Taylor (1989) as an important feature of the European process of indi-
vidualisation. I suggest that we can therefore think about individualisation in 
terms of two modes, where market exchange relates with (rational) choice, and 
gift exchange with expressivity. I submit the claim that an adequate picture of 
individualisation needs to take both modes into consideration, and analyse their 
4 My project is related to Szonyi’s (2009) discussion of secularization in comparative terms. In-
deed, individualisation is often seen as concomitant to secularization, partly because seculariza-
tion reduces the grip of religion on society. Interestingly, Szonyi uses the religious market model, 
which I introduce below, also as an analytical device to analyse secularization in Imperial China, 
which is methodologically akin to my approach.
5 The RMM was seminally introduced by Iannacone (1991), building on early ideas of Adam 
Smith. The subsequent literature is aptly reviewed by Höhener and Schaltegger (2012). The jour-
nal Religion published a special issue on religious markets in the Chinese context in its issue 
41(4) in 2011. One of the most influential authors in this area, Rodney Stark, has also co-authored 
a study on Taiwan, see Lu et al. 2008.
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systematic interaction. In other words, I think that individualisation is always 
and everywhere a bimodal phenomenon. This implies that it is dynamic, and that 
there are recurrent oscillations between the poles which may explain much his-
torical and cross-cultural diversity.
In this context, the RMM has never been considered as a point of reference 
in the specialised literature about religious individualisation, to the best of my 
knowledge. I suggest that it can help as an analytical lens to identify specific 
forms of individualisation that occur during processes of the economisation of 
society (Çalışkan, Callon 2009; 2010). After all, this is certainly part and parcel 
of the grand narrative about Western individualisation, and an important aspect 
in discussing individualisation in China today. Authoritarian individualisation 
easily can be interpreted as a form of ‘neoliberal governmentality’, where the 
market appears as a form of social power, thus actually even reducing the scope 
for both individual choice and expressivity (Sigley 2006). Yet, the RMM states pre-
cisely the opposite in arguing that religious markets enable individual choice, 
and therefore create a competitive dynamic of providers of religious services ful-
filling autonomous individual needs.
Therefore, I think that we can use the RMM as an analytical metaphor in 
reflecting on the nature and scope of individualisation, without claiming that it 
also covers the phenomenology of religion in a specific case. In  discovering the 
limits of its applicability, we can also identify the points of transition to the mode 
of expressivity, following the lines of Palmer’s reasoning. Yet, at these points of 
transition, we could indeed realise even the phenomenological value of the RMM 
in noticing the emic references to market exchange in religious life, often trigger-
ing critical reflection and moves towards the  expressive mode.
Another advantage of the RMM is that it implicitly combines the perspectives 
of institutionalisation and individualisation in its analysis of practices. On the 
phenomenological level, the empirical vindication of the RMM would rest upon 
the identification of certain practices, such as competitive behaviour among alter-
native suppliers of religious services. However, ‘markets’, even if conceived as a 
mere metaphor, would include both complex forms of institutionalisation (such 
as religious rights) and individual behavioural stances (such as entrepreneurial 
drive). Accordingly, I think that the RMM is particularly powerful in approaching 
the relationship between institutionalisation and individualisation in the domain 
of practices.
In the following, I begin with a brief exposition of the RMM. In section 3, I 
introduce the second mode of expressivity and gift exchange. Section 4 puts the 
two modes together in a dynamic model of individualisation. Section 5 applies 
the model to China. Section 6 concludes with an outlook on the implications for 
the general issue of individualisation in Chinese society.
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2 Basics of the religious market model (RMM)
I treat the RMM as a methodological litmus test to explore some deeper aspects 
of religious individualisation, without claiming that it is sufficient to explain 
observed phenomena. The RMM is a useful metaphor and heuristic device that 
highlights certain aspects of individualisation which relate to the economic 
dimensions of religion, in two senses:
 – First, religious activities and religious organisations require economic 
resources and economic management, which implies that economic motives 
and concerns always intermingle with religious ones, creating specific moti-
vational and behavioural patterns.
 – Second, religious activity is integrated into the larger evolving structures of 
society, with special relevance of processes of economisation and marketi-
sation, which embed and even drive the individualisation of social agency, 
resulting in specific forms of economic agency that interact with agency in 
other domains, as stipulated in the first point. These processes mainly work 
via certain patterns of institutionalising markets and their embedding social 
contexts.
The RMM as an empirical hypothesis posits that economic agency is also under-
lying religious agency, in terms of the rational choice model. I do not make this 
assumption. The concept of economisation implies that rational choice cannot 
identify a universal form of agency, but is always contextualised in specific social 
and cultural forms, partly enshrined in institutions. Economisation means that 
rational agency is established in social practices, norms, and ideational schemes 
that themselves evolve, interacting with other forms of agency. It is a process 
in which the boundaries between ‘the economic’ and other social domains are 
 continuously negotiated, reproduced and changed.
Originally, the RMM was developed to explain an apparent paradox in the 
theory of modernisation, as applied to the United States, specifically. This is 
that secularization and modernisation have not resulted in a decline of religion 
in terms of religious practices, as indicated by the fact that the United States, 
although being the most advanced economy in the world, still manifests strong 
religious activities, such that, for example, in the World Values Survey, the US 
continues to display ‘traditional’ values, though also scoring high in so-called 
‘self-expression values’.6 The RMM explanation builds on economic theory, espe-
6 See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp (last access March 3, 2018). The WVS 
is designed as a two-dimensional measure of societal modernization, with one dimension defined 
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cially rational choice and market theory, in order to solve this apparent paradox. 
It starts out from recognising a revealed preference for religious services that 
cater to certain religious needs which are taken as a given, as usual in economics. 
Based on this, the RMM applies a market model of supply and demand, in which 
religious organisations are treated as firms. The organisations pursue certain 
goals, which are not necessarily profit-making, but, for example, pursue expan-
sion of the number of followers (‘market share’). The most important analytical 
ingredient is competition. Competition enforces certain strategies on religious 
organisations that are responsive to the demand of believers, but also aim at 
influencing market structure, such as creating monopolies, in the same fashion 
as business firms design strong brands to which customers are loyal.
The RMM suggests that institutional secularization, together with the legal 
guarantees of religious freedom, creates’ the conditions for an emerging religious 
market.7 In a real-world religious market, it is precisely that freedom of expres-
sion and organisational autonomy that leads to the expansion of religion, medi-
ated via enhanced competition, relative to societies where religion remains partly 
tied to the state. Further, the RMM can even explain certain specific aspects of 
religion, such as the emergence of especially strict forms of sectarianism in an 
otherwise secular society, as the outcome of market dynamics and organisa-
tional strategies. Clearly, this specific notion of institutionalisation amounts to 
the standard narrative of growing civic freedoms and individual autonomy in 
Western  modernity.
My interest in the RMM results from the observation that it has been applied 
with some success in the United States, but seems less appropriate for other 
cases.8 Therefore, I consider the possibility that it is performative.9 In a narrow 
sense, performativity of the RMM would mean that applying the RMM itself would 
by the two poles of ‘traditional’ vs. ‘secular-rational’ values, and the second by the two poles of 
‘survival’ vs. ‘self-expression’ values. Over the past twenty years, the US has slowly moved from 
a comparatively strong position in the traditional values to rational-secular values, yet remains 
far below Protestant European countries, but, interestingly, also the ‘Confucian’ countries, in-
cluding China. The comparative literature on the RMM has not resulted in conclusive empirical 
evidence even on the secularization thesis, as summarized by Höhener and Schaltegger (2012).
7 This corresponds to Beck’s (2014) general argument on individualisation as ‘institutionalized 
individualism’.
8 For an explicit critique of applications to China based on institutional differences, especially 
the role of the state as a quasi-religious entity, see Liang 2014.
9 In economics, the notion of performativity has been gaining ground, see Boldyrev, Svetlova 
(2016). The narrow meaning of the term refers to the phenomenon that economic theories do 
not only describe economic facts, but create them, in the same way as performative utterances 
in speech act theory. I follow the broader meaning represented by Callon (2007) who does not 
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contribute to the emergence of the phenomena that it describes. This is evidently 
not the case, given the limited reach of the RMM in religious practice (such as, 
possibly, in guiding management decisions by leaders of religious communities 
in business-like mega-churches). But in a broader sense, both the RMM and its ref-
erents would be conceived as being embedded in certain forms of a market-based 
society, or, capitalism. Then I would surmise that these forms of life and corre-
sponding forms of thinking give rise both to the specific forms of religiosity and 
to the RMM as a way of scientifically understanding it. In other words, religion in 
the US and the RMM would be conjugated cultural forms embedded into a shared 
larger cultural framework that reflects secular processes of economisation and 
marketisation which are specific to the US context. This implies that standard 
forms of applying the RMM are themselves relative to certain cultural frames, and 
hence cannot be taken as universal patterns of explaining religious phenomena. 
However, I think that the RMM as such points towards an important issue in 
the theory of religious individualisation. This is the interaction between certain 
forms of individual behaviour and the institutional environment. Taking the 
market as a theoretical reference implies certain conditions of application that 
are themselves indicators of individualisation. Most importantly, these are spe-
cific individual rights, such as the right of religious self-determination, the right 
of free expression, or the right of establishing religious organisations. So, the 
analytical notion of ‘market’ is highly loaded with assumptions that describe the 
institutional emergence of individualisation in modern societies. This is recog-
nised by the RMM because it takes secularization for granted, which poses the 
challenge that RMM intends to meet. One could argue that all these institutional 
conditions of application are included in the notion of secularization, thus partly 
resolving the alleged puzzle ab ovo. Then, from the perspective of performativity, 
we could say that the applicability of the RMM is a sort of litmus test for indicating 
the existence of its conditions of application.10
Regarding our topic of individualisation, we notice that the RMM implies 
a specific type of individualisation, which is inherent to the general model of 
a market. This model can be described in terms of concepts such as utilitarian 
limit this function to scientific economic theories, but includes all kinds of ideas and concepts 
relating to the economy.
10 However, one additional condition is to take religious needs for granted. That would mean 
that secularization as such would not essentially impact the religious needs. This is a view spe-
cific to economics, which refrains from explaining preferences at all, starting out from subjec-
tivism as a premise. The strength of religion in the US would be simply seen as manifesting the 
underlying preferences. Thus, the theory argues that market dynamism reinforces the expression 
of these needs.
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rationality, autonomy, or analytical separability between individual and society. 
This form of individualisation has been repeatedly highlighted by many sociol-
ogists and philosophers, such as Norbert Elias (1969, xlvi ff.), who coined the 
term ‘homo clausus’ in his theory of Western civilisation, or Charles Taylor (1989, 
195ff., 305ff.), who distinguishes between two different strands of individualism 
in European history: the rationalist, which corresponds to the RMM model, and 
the expressivist. This dualism inspires our next section.
3 Expressivism and gift exchange
David Palmer (2011) has thoroughly criticised the application of the RMM to 
China. Palmer points to different institutional and normative forms of ‘religious 
economy’ and opposes market exchange with gift exchange, following classical 
anthropological theories of gift exchange as stated by Mauss. The central idea 
is that a gift is not a commodity, because it creates and maintains a social rela-
tionship. Whereas in market exchange, payment concludes the social interaction 
between seller and buyer, exchange of gifts never concludes the social relation-
ship, because the action is perceived as being part and parcel of an ongoing recip-
rocal exchange. Religious gift exchange is a variant of reciprocal gift exchange 
because it involves a third party, the transcendental entities. This means that, 
for example, a giver may not expect reciprocity from the human receiver of the 
gift, but from the transcendental domain. However, sacrifice may also be inter-
preted along the lines of dualistic gift exchange, thus establishing a relationship 
between the Gods and the human giver of the sacrifice. Palmer argues that gift 
exchange plays an important role also in Chinese religious activities, and can 
be clearly demarcated from market exchange in empirical terms (for a similar 
view, see Liang 2014). That means that in the Chinese religious economy the two 
modes coexist: For example, there are temples that are indeed involved in eco-
nomic competition over attracting pilgrims and believers, according to the stand-
ards of efficacy (ling 靈) in meeting the needs of the visitors, but there are also 
the communal temples of the villages, which define the relationship between 
believer and temple in terms of social ascription to the village community as a 
ritual collective.
I argue that Palmer’s critique comes very close to Hénaff’s (2002) discussion 
of the relationship between market exchange and gift exchange, but there is an 
important clarification to be made. Hénaff criticises the inclusion of gift exchange 
in the broader notion of economy (which is often done in anthropology), because 
this opens the door for economic analyses of gift exchange that conflate both 
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modes of relationship. Instead, Hénaff emphatically argues that gift exchange is 
radically different from market exchange in serving the goal of expressing identi-
ties in social relationships, in the sense of both individual and shared identities. 
This radical difference implies that the two modes cannot co-exist in one single 
pattern of social interaction, because market exchange necessarily undermines 
the expressive functions of the gift. This is most evident if we consider the role of 
money in mediating social relationships. Since money is the primordial medium 
of market exchange, the use of money in reciprocal relations of gift exchanges 
can undermine their very role in creating and maintaining the underlying shared 
identities. This is important in the context of this paper, because the relationship 
between markets and other social domains is strongly influenced by the respec-
tive roles of money, with money assuming transformative forces.11
Further, I refer Hénaff’s reasoning to Taylor’s distinction between two forms 
of individualisation in European cultural history, the rationalist and the expres-
sivist.12 If we deal with a particular phenomenon of social relationship, this 
can be framed in either of the two modes. Here, the methodological dimension 
comes into play, also in the sense of involving performative phenomena. The two 
frames are simultaneously phenomenological and analytical. In the analytical 
sense, we refer to two fundamentally different frames of thinking in intellectual 
history. The rationalist view is ideal-typically represented in economic theory, 
which, in a broader sense, also encompasses all approaches that rely on analyti-
cal figures such as the social contract. This is exactly the frame that also underlies 
the RMM, and hence also stipulates a specific form of individualisation, namely 
the instrumental and rationalist one, in which individuals pursue their goals 
rationally, and create social institutions based on instrumental rationality, both 
via exchange and agreement. The expressivist analytical stance is represented by 
social theories and philosophies that reject the frame of instrumental rationality 
and instead focus on the role of individual identity and creativity. In this view, 
individualisation means that the scope and range of individual expressions of 
11 This opens perspectives on Simmel’s (1907) philosophy of money, which is significant in the 
current context because Simmel approaches money as a major medium of individualisation, and 
would imply that a market logic expands across all social domains. However, as Zelizer (1997) 
has shown in her classical study of money in social relationships, the uses of money are classi-
fied differently in social practice, especially distinguishing between money used in market ex-
change and in gift exchange. I have analysed the performative functions of money extensively in 
Herrmann-Pillath (2016b).
12 Taylor (1989, 195ff., 305ff.). More specifically, the rationalist tradition is defined in terms of 
‘atomism’ and ‘instrumentalism’. Expressivism is also a constant, but was strongly emerging as a 
counter-current against rationalism, such as in German romanticism; it relates with Republican 
values in political philosophy, as opposed to rationalist social contract theory.
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identity is enhanced, and necessarily requires the cooperative creation of shared 
identities based on emotional and symbolic formations.
These two frames also have a phenomenological status. This implies that 
there is a tension between the analytical and the phenomenological uses, 
because the two analytical frames are mutually exclusive, but in terms of the 
phenomenological interpretation they can co-exist, albeit in tension. This is 
the idea that I wish to explore further in the next section. I argue that the notion 
of individualisation is two-modal, and that the two modes are manifest in dif-
ferent combinations and dynamics across diverse cultural settings, and across 
different historical periods. One essential aspect is the relationship between 
individualisation and economisation: Economisation is deeply shaped by his-
torically specific trajectories of institutional changes, driving the emergence of 
specific forms of economic agency that interplay with changing forms of reli-
gious agency. It is the struggle between those different forms of agency that 
determines the trajectory that individualisation takes. Therefore, we could 
argue that institutionalisation of individualisation leaves a space open for 
multiple trajectories of individualisation in either of the two modes, such that 
there is no unequivocal relationship between institutionalisation and individ-
ualisation, as is often uncritically assumed when reflecting upon the Western 
experience.
4  The two-modal approach to religious 
individualisation
The two-modal approach to individualisation suggests that, even when referring 
to the European origin of the distinction, individualisation in the West must be 
conceived as a multi-faceted phenomenon, manifesting tensions and contradic-
tions. We can use the two modes as an analytical device by which we can identify 
certain conditions and manifestations of individualisation, while at the same time 
avoiding claims that one analytical mode is sufficient for explaining observed 
phenomena, or that entire social and cultural systems are shaped by one form 
of individualisation. This is because in the phenomenological interpretation, we 
always need to realise that the two modes co-exist in a dialectical tension. My 
claim is that in different cultural settings we will find different societal, norma-
tive and institutional arrangements that reflect temporary solutions to this dialec-
tical tension, and that one important aspect of individualisation is the individual 
creativity in discovering these solutions and successfully engaging collectives of 
actors in adopting these solutions.
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Summarising the discussion in sections 2 and 3, we can arrange the issues in 
the following way.
Market exchange Gift exchange
Rationalism/instrumentalism Compatibility Tension
Expressivism Tension Compatibility
Analytically and phenomenologically, rationalism is compatible with market 
exchange, and expressivism with gift exchange. This also implies a performative 
relationship: Adopting a rationalist stance is a necessary condition of maintaining 
market exchange, and vice versa, and gift exchange relies on expressive stances, and 
vice versa. Analytically it is possible to interpret gift exchange in terms of rationalism, 
yet phenomenologically the corresponding stances exist in tension, as  demonstrated 
by Hénaff. In other words, instrumentalist gift exchange is  counter-performative, at 
least in the longer run.13 This is what directly applies to the RMM, as has been shown 
by Palmer for the case of China: If participant actors start to perceive the religious 
domain as a ‘market’, this triggers a backlash and move towards the gift exchange 
mode. Yet, this does not mean that the entire social domain of religion does not 
manifest institutional, normative, and behavioural patterns that can be analysed 
by the RMM. In a nutshell, applying the RMM analytically means to consider the 
process of economisation, and this helps to understand general processes of indi-
vidualisation, and of religious individualisation, specifically.
In some more detail, the notion of individualisation can be related to the 
market exchange model in an abstract way: Individualisation mode 1 relates with 
the market exchange mode of relationships. In analytical terms, this mode allows 
for identifying certain conditions of individualisation, such as certain formal or 
informal rights of pursuing individual goals. Then, the RMM is a proper analyti-
cal tool for understanding religious individualisation, as it allows for recognising 
behaviours and social practices that relate to established and recognised forms of 
pursuing individual religious needs, and understanding the corresponding role 
of instrumental functions in establishing larger organisational phenomena of 
religion, undergirded by certain institutional arrangements. As an abstract ana-
lytical model, the RMM is culturally neutral, but helps in identifying functional 
equivalences across different cultural contexts, thus also in identifying culturally 
specific forms of individualisation in the market exchange mode (such as relating 
the interpretation of evangelical churches in the US as ‘firms’ to the performance 
of Daoist temples in Hong Kong).
13 On the notion of counter-performativity, see McKenzie (2007).
654   Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
However, in the market exchange mode fundamental issues arise regarding 
the question how to establish, maintain, and express the identity of the individ-
ual as a person who is in continuous social interaction with others. Hence, in the 
market exchange mode a crisis of identity and authenticity looms. So, individu-
alisation mode 2 emphasises the stability, the commitment and the authenticity 
of behaviour in expressing and manifesting individual identity as a person; the 
mode of expression is gift exchange. This unfolds in the fundamental tension 
between being an individual person and being in need of realising this person-
hood in a web of social relations. The tension can only be resolved when these 
relationships are themselves rooted in authenticity and commitment.
Now, I claim that the dialectical relationship between the two modes explains 
specific patterns of religious individualisation: I do this, first by adopting the dif-
ferent analytical perspectives of the two modes, and second, by understanding 
the inherent tensions in terms of the phenomenology of religious practices. In 
other words, in terms of empirically identifiable phenomenon, we observe ‘indi-
vidualisation’ as a mix of the two modes, and only analysis can reveal their spe-
cific expressions. Religious individualisation is driven by and enabled by the 
expansion of the religious market, in conjunction with the diffusion of markets 
in society, or, more generally, processes of economisation. This process builds on 
the growth of a religious infrastructure, which is itself increasingly diverse and 
competitive, and goes along with the standardisation of religious practices by 
different suppliers, such as the formalisation of beliefs and rites of specific com-
munities, which enables expansion of services. The concomitant enhancement of 
individual freedom of choice enables religious entrepreneurship and creativity.
These developments correspond to the institutionalisation of individualis-
ation and imply the growth of the religious market also in institutional terms, 
that is, in certain formal or informal rights of religious expression, the diversity 
of organisational forms offering religious services, and specific ways of regulat-
ing the religious market. However, they also create the conditions for a backlash, 
which I approach as the second mode of individualisation. The second mode 
emphasizes individuality in terms of personal experience, uniqueness, and 
authenticity of the religious experience, thus explicitly working against the forces 
of standardisation, but also against all other forms of external enforcement of 
religious beliefs and rituals that constrain the religious market. The more the reli-
gious market moves to ‘commoditisation’, the stronger will the incentives become 
that trigger the transition to individualisation mode 2. This is because, as Hénaff 
shows in much detail, the economisation of the religious domain raises princi-
pled doubts and questions about the very authenticity of the motivations and 
experiences of religious actors. This tension is literally embodied in the universal 
conflicts over the role of money in religious activities and organisation.
Religious individualisation in China: a two-modal approach   655
The gift exchange mode is more complex. This is because there are two 
aspects here, related to the fact that social relations and religious relations are 
superimposed. On the one hand, religious interactions with the transcendental 
can be approached as a gift exchange relationship by which the believer relates 
personally with the object of her belief. At the same time, however, this personal 
relationship is mostly embedded in communities of believers who share this per-
sonal experience in creating shared identities, which is also expressed in gift 
exchange. This makes individualisation 2 complex because personal individual-
isation can be in tension with the embeddedness in a community, which imposes 
constraints on individual freedom, understood in terms of  individualisation 1.
Thus, we see how the two modes contain the seeds for change, and stay in 
continuous interaction with each other, as represented in Fig. 1. Individualis-
ation mode 1 often triggers the emergence of alternative religious movements 
that claim authenticity of the religious experience, thus moving to mode 2: That 
is, the role of the ‘religious entrepreneur’ bridges the two modes, triggering 
such modal transitions.14 There are various more detailed scenarios, in par-
14 The figure of the religious entrepreneur is ambivalent here, but can be related to a similar du-
ality in Schumpeter’s views on market dynamics. There is also the type of entrepreneur (the Wirt) 
who concentrates on enhancing the efficiency of the organization and expanding its resource 
base: This type remains within the scope of individualisation 1. But the type of entrepreneur who 
drives ‘creative destruction’ is not motivated by economic concerns in the first place: This match-
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Fig. 1: The two-modal view on religious individualisation.
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ticular referring to religious markets which are deeply embedded in social and 
political power structures, thus actually constraining individual freedom of 
choice via limiting the supply side. In these cases, broader societal develop-
ments of marketisation and commoditisation can also drive deviant religious 
movements, that are originally cast in terms of individualisation 2, but which 
eventually also foster individualisation 1, such as in claiming also rights of reli-
gious freedom.
On the other hand, individualisation 2 can foster the expansion of reli-
gious communities in the larger context of marketisation. In this case, com-
munities need to build an organizational infrastructure, which requires the 
mobilisation of economic resources, but also triggers processes of standardi-
sation. So, this mode also harbours forces that go along with individualisation 
1, depending on the broader framework of existing institutional constraints 
and endogenous forces limiting freedom of choice. This is especially true if 
communities aim at expansion, which requires raising resources and creates 
the need for standardising religious practices in the transition to more formal 
organisation.
In the end, we can envisage cycles of individualisation, for example, with 
individualisation 1 fostering the emergence of institutionalised freedom of 
choice, but also engendering switches to mode 2, with religious entrepreneurship 
operating as a lever connecting the two. Individualisation 2 also goes along with 
mode shifts to individualisation 1 because of standardisation and economisation 
in the context of community formation. I posit that these dialectical movements 
can only be properly understood if we contextualise them in the larger patterns 
of economisation that take place in different societies. So, the model is both uni-
versal and particular: It is analytically universal, but can only be empirically 
grounded if, phenomenologically, cultural and socio-political embeddedness is 
explicitly considered.
If I call these movements ‘dialectical’, this even applies on a deeper level. 
So far, I have approached the phenomena in the dimension of individualis-
ation, without considering the two poles of this trajectory together. However, 
one could also argue, for example, that individual dissatisfaction with 
standardised forms of religious practices in mode 1 in fact responds to their 
 increasing power of  de-individualisation, as conceived in mode 2. This applies 
vice versa: submission to community ways of life may be felt as encroaching 
on individual liberties, so being another kind of de-individualisation, but as 
perceived in mode 1. Hence, we could argue that the movement between the 
two modes is driven by their inherent de-individualising forces, as measured in 
the opposite mode. For reasons of space, I do not pursue this further theoretical 
development here.
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5 Religious individualisation, ‘Chinese style’
Applying the model of individualisation to the case of China means that we inter-
pret the empirical evidence about Chinese religious phenomena in the light of 
the four elements of the model, that is the two poles of market exchange and gift 
exchange, and the mechanisms that drive the dynamics between the modes. By 
means of this interpretation, I assess the status, the pattern, and degree of reli-
gious individualisation in China.
In doing this, as a starting point it is important to briefly consider the role of 
the state, because the state is the most important medium by which certain forms 
of institutionalisation of individualisation emerge and are being reproduced, 
which are both constraints and enablers of certain practices of individualisation. 
The modern Communist state continues, but also considerably strengthened the 
control of religion that was characteristic also for Late Imperial China (Palmer 
2010). This observation plays a central role in one of the most prominent applica-
tions of the RMM to China, Yang Fenggang’s (2006) distinction between the ‘red’, 
the ‘gray’, and the ‘black’ market of religion. If we look at this phenomenon in the 
light of the individualisation perspective, however, we can interpret the regula-
tory role of the state in various ways. The peculiar relationship between state and 
religion was established in Imperial times to contain religion as a potential source 
of autonomous power vis à vis the state, often manifested in the role of religion 
in large-scale uprisings. This motivation clearly is also prevalent today, such as 
in the case of the suppression of Falungong (法輪功), which did not directly chal-
lenge state authority, but revealed organisational capacities that posed a poten-
tial threat.
However, this containment of religion has another side of the coin, namely 
implicitly safeguarding individual freedom of choice in religion, both by limit-
ing the emergence of religious monopolies and by refraining from establishing 
and enforcing a state religion: This is manifest in the secular growth and rich-
ness of the central phenomenon of Chinese religiosity, i.e., popular religion 
(Clart 2012). The latter assessment might be questioned, however, as the Con-
fucian state cult certainly had a religious dimension (sometimes called a ‘civic 
theology’); beyond that, the Confucian enforcement of certain kinship norms 
and rituals may also be interpreted as imposing state-backed religious beliefs, 
as ancestor worship is one of the constitutive elements in popular religion (Ebrey 
1985; Faure 2007). Similarly, some observers would argue that Maoism was a sub-
stitute state religion, and even contemporary modernist ideologies might have 
an almost religious status (Goossaert, Palmer 2011, Chap. 7; Liang 2014). Yet, I 
think that even if we accept the thesis of religious aspects of the Chinese state, 
this does not imply that a state religion is imposed on society, in the sense of 
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a fully-fledged institutionalisation of religious practices. One important limit to 
this is the rationalism and secularism that shaped both Confucian and contem-
porary modernisers’ thinking about religion, and is visible in the long historical 
tradition of approaching popular religion as mere ‘superstition’ (Lagerwey 2010, 
2ff.). Battling against superstition in the 20th century, of course, also implies that 
certain individual rights of religious choice are infringed, but as we know, both 
Imperial and Communist governments also accommodated popular religion. In 
the past, this happened via the recognition of spontaneously emerging beliefs 
in the official pantheon (Watson 2004); in the present, this works via the sym-
biosis between tourism and ideas about national heritage and popular religion 
(Clart 2012). This ambivalent attitude of the state has been theoretically and pos-
itively described as ‘orthopraxy’ versus Western ‘orthodoxy’, meaning that state-
led institutionalisation only covered certain sensitive forms of social practice, 
but firstly, refraining from imposing also certain standardised interpretations of 
these practices, and secondly, leaving all other practices effectively to the choice 
of individuals and communities.15
Therefore, I conclude that we can diagnose a de facto, though constrained rec-
ognition of the freedom of individual choice of religion.16 For Yang’s RMM model, 
we can conclude that the very applicability of the market paradigm implies that 
the entire domain of religion in China manifests properties of a religious market, 
though under government regulation. By implication, we observe a high degree 
of individualisation on both the supply and demand side, in terms of the market 
exchange mode.
This comes to the fore in an approach to Chinese religion that has been 
developed recently by Adam Chau (2006; 2011). Chau looks at the demand side 
in more detail, but without referring to the complete RMM. Yet, his point is per-
tinent. He argues that Chinese religion is ‘polytropic’, which means that the 
entire religious domain is shaped by the expressions of different ‘modalities of 
doing religion’, such as scriptural, caring for life concerns, or ritualistic. Modal-
ities correspond to different needs that individuals have. Individuals turn to 
different suppliers in the various modalities, according to need and perceived 
efficacy. So, polytropy means that the religious domain is not shaped by a 
hegemonic belief system, but is open, variable, and dynamic. Most importantly, 
15 The term ‘orthopraxy’ was seminally suggested by Watson (1985/2004), Watson and Ebrey 
(1988) and Schmidt-Glintzer (1983). There is still a lively debate about its merits, see Sutton 
(2007) and the contributions to this special issue of ‘Modern China’.
16 Regarding individual rights in general, Bünger (1983) seminally argued that Western-type 
notions of rights might not have emerged in China because the state was not as intrusive as in 
Europe, especially in England after the Norman invasion (on this, see also Foucault 1997).
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it centres on the individual, or, in the Chinese cultural context, the household 
(which points to the variant of ‘family individualism’ as highlighted in Chinese 
studies).
This interpretation is especially relevant when considering the organised reli-
gions. Clearly, Buddhism and Daoism easily match with the analytical standards 
of the RMM because they compete in delivering services to individuals, which 
also implies a cash nexus. Since the collapse of the Imperial order, these religious 
groups started to import organisational models of Christianity to strengthen their 
positions in the Chinese religious domain, introducing hierarchical structures, 
standardisation, and so forth. At the same time, there is the distinction between 
lay people and religious experts, with the latter adopting exclusive ties to the 
respective confessions. However, there is no strict imposition of exclusivity on 
the laypeople. By contrast, Christianity and Islam always caused tensions in the 
Chinese religious domain because of their claims to exclusivity. Yet, we can still 
think of Christianity as competing with other forms of religion in the Chinese reli-
gious domain, while even adopting certain assumptions of the RMM in arguing 
that it is this competition that creates tendencies towards exclusiveness. I shall 
come back to this important point later, because it refers to the transition to the 
second mode of individualisation.
I think we even need to diagnose an extremely rich and diverse form of reli-
gious individualisation in China, both in the rural and the urban settings. For 
example, as has been shown by Fisher (2012) for the case study of a large urban 
Buddhist temple, on the one hand there are the religious experts in Buddhism, 
and on the other hand, in the foreyard of the temple that is his field site, there is 
a crowd of individual lay preachers who offer an astonishing diversity of inter-
pretations and opinions related to Buddhism. This is a veritable market micro-
cosm where the different suppliers of religion compete. Remarkably, we do not 
only observe individualisation on the demand side, but also on the supply side. 
Further, we also recognise a strong cash nexus, especially relating to the formal 
organisation, with donations serving as vehicles of obtaining relief of religious 
needs, without establishing any kind of closer ties of believers to the organisa-
tion, which even remains somewhat aloof from the average believer with less 
financial means.
Fisher’s (2008) work also shows how economic dynamics even drive individ-
ualisation within the organisation. Quite frequently individual monks aspire to 
set up their own temples in some other place in China, where they would assume 
the role of abbot, and thereby also generate income, safeguarding their liveli-
hood now and in old age. This activity clearly is akin to investment, and in fact 
sometimes does not rely only on donations, but also on investments that require 
the generation of returns, produced by future donations to the monastery and 
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temple. In other words, these activities are almost exemplary instances of reli-
gious entrepreneurship in the market exchange mode.17
Often, these activities aim at the urbanising rural areas, where religious 
needs may be strong, and sufficient prosperity is achieved. However, this effort 
meets with the endogenous dynamics of popular religion in the rural areas. Here, 
we observe a similar richness and continuity of forms of individualisation. One 
important difference between the urban and the rural areas certainly is that in 
the rural areas, the family and, more precisely, the household plays a central 
role in forms of individualisation. In that context, Adam Chau (2014) noticed 
another important difference between Western and Chinese forms of religion: In 
Christianity, the community is the basic unit of religious practice, highlighted in 
central rites such as communion, whereas in China the household is the central 
unit. Specifically, in the idea of communion God hosts the believers, whereas in 
China the household hosts the gods.18 This reversal of roles also applies for many 
Chinese temples if they are built autonomously by local communities: Apart from 
established religious entities, a temple would additionally host various gods who 
often represent local histories of religious tradition.
This is not the place to go into details that are well known. What is most 
important is the fact that therefore in Chinese tradition, often still alive in the 
rural areas, religion permeates social life, beginning with the fact that the house-
hold is at the same time a site of religious activities, beyond the religious role 
of the family in ancestor worship.19 This relates with gender differences, with 
women playing an essential role in individualising religious activities related to 
the household, including external activities such as visiting temples (apart from 
ancestral halls). There is a vast continuum of activities in the field between the 
17 In my own fieldwork conducted together with Feng Xingyuan, we met a related example in 
Ninghai, Zhejiang province, which is a failed investment. A monk arrived there, equipped with 
funds that were investments, and asked the villagers for complementary donations. The core 
building of the temple was constructed, with a plaque identifying all donors of the village, but 
eventually funds were insufficient, and the monk left.
18 Foucault (2004, 177ff., 187) highlights the subordination of the individual to the community 
in the Christian image of the ‘shepherd’. In this sense, formal Christian religion in medieval times 
was clearly de-individualising. This confirms Bünger’s previously mentioned point in the sense 
that individualisation in the West can be interpreted as a countermovement which was simply 
not necessary in China, given the high degree of individualisation already present.
19 For a rich elaboration on this, see Yue (2014). This fact had led C. K. Yang (1961) to describe 
Chinese religion as ‘diffuse’. However, this has a somewhat pejorative ring, matching with the 
modernist Chinese stance since the 1920s to regard only organized religions as ‘religion’. In our 
context, the religious meaning of ordinary life is a major aspect of individualisation. On this 
peculiar symbiosis of life and religion, see also Gui (2013; 2014).
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household and public forms of religion: For example, religious feasts might be 
organised on the household level, and sometimes, depending on the charisma 
of the protagonists, might tie up with larger public activities of temple festivals 
(Yue 2014).
My point here is that we meet a wide and rich variety of religious entrepre-
neurship in the rural areas of China, past and present. Again, this is true for 
both the demand and the supply side: across the fluid boundary of the house-
hold and the public domains, these two sides merge, as the household first has 
a religious need, and then might turn into a supplier fulfilling similar needs of 
others. Beyond that, the widespread existence of shamans, spirit mediums, or 
idiosyncratic forms of collective religious activities rooted in local histories, is 
clear evidence of the individualisation of the supply side of religion (Dean 2003; 
DuBois 2005). Here, the central notion of ‘efficacy’ (ling) also points towards to 
a common yardstick of competitive performance, often extending the impact of 
suppliers far beyond their local roots, such as local temples attracting visitors 
from other places.
In this context, we should include the role of local government in both con-
straining, but also supporting this local religious market today. This is a peculiar 
aspect of the Chinese governance of religion that needs systematic recognition 
and seems so far neglected in Chinese religious studies, which mainly focus on 
the regulatory role of the central government. Especially with regard to analysing 
the economy, the fundamental dualism between central and local state has par-
adigmatic analytical status (Pieke 2004; Heberer, Schubert 2008). One intriguing 
observation about religion in modern China, noticed by many researchers, is the 
active role of local governments in the ‘marketisation’ of religion, mostly under 
the umbrella of tourism (e.g. Oakes 1999; Bruckermann 2016). Although this 
might sometimes even provide legitimacy for individual religious practices on 
the part of officials, what counts most in the current discussion is that the appro-
priation of religion for purposes of tourism strengthens the market exchange 
mode also in the religious domain proper. This is typically manifest in competing 
claims on religious sites, beginning with competition over interpretive hegemony, 
to actual conflict about managerial control (for a case study, see Kang 2009). So, 
authentic believers might struggle with local government representatives about 
certain features of the site, or businessmen might try to push original religious 
activists out of the management committee of a temple site. However, there is also 
a long tradition in Chinese popular religion where religion stays in a symbiotic 
relationship with markets, such as in the institution of the temple fair (miaohui 
廟會). Today, founding a temple even for economic motives may not simply be a 
touristic investment, but also, in a deeper sense, an attempt at creating collective 
social capital and reputation for a community; or even with a genuine religious 
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motivation as the first driver, ultimately one may also have the economic prosper-
ity of the community in mind (for a case study, see Chau 2006).
This observation points to the ambivalent role of religious entrepreneur-
ship in China. This is an even more complex and rich field, beyond the forms 
that we mentioned so far, and relates with what Yang calls the ‘gray’ market. 
To a certain extent, this gray market also existed in Imperial China, because 
it is mainly defined in distinction to the black market. The latter was certainly 
covered by the notion of ‘heretical teachings’ (xiejiao 邪教) in Imperial China, 
which reveals many family resemblances with prohibited religious activity 
today. In comparison, the ‘gray’ market covers a broad range of autonomous 
religious activities which also may not fit into the established forms of tradition. 
As such, it is also a distinct form of religious modernity in China, including such 
things as redemptive societies, healing sects, and so forth. Evidently, these need 
to be counted as manifestations of religious individualisation. Yet, what is most 
important here is the tension between the two modes that accompanies many 
religious activities in the gray market. That means, most importantly, that the 
switch to the gift exchange mode would undermine the logic of market exchange 
underlying the RMM.
I think this is a crucial step in the analysis: We approached the domain of 
Chinese religion in terms of the RMM, discovered many forms of individualis-
ation, but now realise that individualisation also means that this religious market 
generates forces that undermine the very logic of market exchange. We can even 
say that it is the market itself that creates these countervailing forces, as is even 
stated by Yang himself (2011): The expansion of the market society, the perceived 
erosion of morals, and the growing feeling of alienation create the need for reli-
gion beyond the use of a service that would just mirror this marketisation process.
This corresponds to Palmer’s (2011) argument against the RMM. In a narrower 
sense, this means that religion would directly oppose the cash nexus, even if mon-
etary flows are involved. This happens, for example, when religious communities 
are established in the shape of charities, and strictly follow the principle that 
donations are channelled to the needy, and that this fulfils the religious needs 
of the lay members of the charity (for a case study, McCarthy 2013). In a broader 
sense, the tension between market exchange and gift exchange has always been 
present in the Chinese religious domain. Palmer rightly points out that there 
were always two types of temples, with one type directly manifesting community 
identities, and therefore explicitly excluding competition with other providers of 
religious services. This constellation is one driving force of temple construction 
in China today, also including ancestor worship where the community is directly 
defined in ascriptive terms of kinship. There is much religious entrepreneurship 
involved, but this is only indirectly related with the market exchange logic, mainly 
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via the creation of social capital for the entrepreneur. First, religious entrepre-
neurs contribute to the strengthening of communities via the construction and 
organisation of religious activities, and only as a derivative effect this also results 
in social capital and reputation, which might support also their business activi-
ties. This argument even applies on the community level: For example, Christian 
businessmen as members of Christian communities might achieve the reputation 
of being trustworthy. Yet, it needs emphasis that we are here facing the creative 
tension between the two modes: This effect can only work if it does not rely on the 
market exchange logic.20
Community formation is the shared feature across an extremely wide range of 
religious activities in China today, reaching from traditional lineages to villages, 
over Buddhist lay organisations and Christian house churches, to ‘new age’ forms 
of religion, ‘Chinese style’. It may be granted that this is also reflected in the RMM, 
as competition is conceived as strengthening strong ties between believers and 
religious organisations. Yet, this argument hides the forces that factually create 
these ties, which cannot themselves follow the market exchange logic. So, I argue 
that the gift exchange mode is omnipresent in China, and again driven by forces 
of individualisation. Probably the most impressive recent example of this transi-
tion was the rise of Falungong out of what initially appeared to be an entrepre-
neurial project in the context of Qigong (氣功) movements present in many forms. 
The rapid transformation into a powerful religious movement was emerging from 
its increasing role in defining individual identities and their expression in close-
knit communities. The spread of Christianity via Protestant ‘House churches’ also 
fits into this pattern of expressivist community formation.
The latter proposition follows from the observation that there is no exter-
nal force that imposes certain ascriptive ties on individuals, apart from kinship. 
Even regarding the latter, we could again argue that the suppression of tradi-
tional kinship by the modern state implicitly implies the protection of individuals 
against such impositions. Yet, we observe a strong revival of ancestral rites in 
many places of China, and most interestingly, this is often tied to the local eco-
nomic strength of kinship groups. This is especially visible in South-East China, 
where kinship groups (lineages) often could maintain control over land rights, 
which have become extremely valuable during the recent urbanisation process. 
20 A fascinating case study is Cao’s (2008; 2009) research on Christian entrepreneurs in Wen-
zhou, which shows in detail the delicate balance between business leadership and religious 
leadership, also cast in modernist terms, such as the ‘quality’ suzhi 素質 of leaders. Chau’s (2006) 
much cited study of a Black Dragon Temple in Shaanxi highlights the role of a businessman who 
even retreated from business to become a temple manager, without necessarily internalizing the 
religious beliefs.
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Based on their economic power, and perceiving the need to counterbalance 
municipal authorities potentially encroaching their rights, there is a resurgence 
of kinship-related rituals that express and cement the solidarity of the lineage 
(Trémon 2015; Herrmann-Pillath, Guo 2017). In this case, we observe the conflu-
ence of the two modes in maintaining what is probably a precarious balance, 
given the forces of social change that eventually will erode the ground on which 
extended kinship is built in China (such as demographic change).
To round up this section, if we look at the rich and expanding landscape of 
religious practices in China today, we can employ the two-modal framework as an 
analytical lens to identify underlying forces of individualisation. There is much 
scope for religious entrepreneurship, and the reach and scope of religious com-
munities is growing. This can be related to a vibrant religious market that grows 
out of a distinct pattern of an aggressively secular communist state which gradu-
ally retreated from suppressing religion to toleration, thus creating the space for 
limited religious freedom by default. However, as I will discuss in the conclusion, 
this observation is different from the thesis of ‘authoritarian individualisation’, 
since the revival of religion in China is not driven by the state.
6 Conclusion
We can resolve the conflicting perspectives on the RMM and gift exchange in 
Chinese religion through arguing that both analytical perspectives grasp the two 
modes of what I conceive as an integral process of individualisation. The dynam-
ics of this process are driven by the dialectics of these two modes, contextualised 
in the specific societal, political, and cultural setting. Based on this, I claim that 
the Chinese religious domain manifests many and strong phenomena of religious 
individualisation. I also think that we can extend this diagnosis into Imperial 
times, which, however, would be the topic of another study.21
This result is of high significance for the general debate about individualis-
ation in China. Yan Yunxiang believes that this differs from the Western pattern 
because it is driven by the state. The case of religious individualisation does not 
confirm this claim. Here, the state contains the religious creativity of people, 
across all social domains, from rural to urban, so that we cannot say that the state 
21 As stated in the beginning, this matches with Szonyi’s (2008) analysis of secularization, 
which covers different historical periods. The paradigmatic debates in historical religious stud-
ies on China, such as the issue of ‘orthopraxy’, can be easily tied up with individualisation in 
historical times.
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pushes people into individualisation, but to the contrary, tries to keep it within 
boundaries defined by the state. On the other hand, we also cannot say that the 
state fosters individualisation beyond religion just because the government sup-
presses religion and, hence, allegedly ‘collectivist’ forms of social organisation 
in China. This follows from our re-evaluation of Chinese religious practices in 
the light of the two-modal framework of religious individualisation. In Chinese 
popular religion, the household and the individual play a central role in shaping 
religious activity. There is a rich dynamic of creating all forms of modern religios-
ity, unless contained by the state. Paradoxically, the other side of containment by 
the state is that there are large spaces of freedom, which are filled by individual 
religious initiative. I have argued that this can be partly covered by the RMM, 
which we can therefore use as an analytical litmus tests for identifying religious 
individualisation in China. Hence, we diagnose a distinct pattern of institutional-
isation, individualisation and practices that is far more complex than the thesis 
of ‘authoritarian individualisation’ suggests.
Therefore, in the religious domain we can find support for autonomous 
forms of individualisation in China: In other words, religious individualisation 
is an important aspect of the individualisation of Chinese society in general. 
That may come as a surprise to many Western observers who, following the 
Western narrative of modernisation, would tend to see religion as a social force 
that works against individualisation. Yet, we can argue, as has been done for the 
case of Taiwan (Weller 2004), that in the specific political and economic context 
of China, religion becomes an important foundation for individualisation and 
hence a defining feature of modernity.
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Individuals in the Eleusinian Mysteries: 
choices and actions
The Eleusinian Mysteries have gripped the imaginations of both ancient can-
didates for initiation and generations of modern scholars. They are among the 
most intriguing of ancient cults, as their study raises a variety of questions 
regarding Athenian politics, religion, philosophy, and soteriology, as well as 
issues surrounding the continuity of the cult from the Bronze age, through the 
classical period, and on into the Christian era. The Mysteries attracted individ-
uals who participated as a matter of personal choice, offering an eschatological 
perspective at a time when the fashion for ‘mystery’ and ‘oriental’ cults had not 
yet reached the height of its popularity. Initiation by choice means that partic-
ipation in this public cult, which is administered by the Athenian state, is not 
purely a matter of tradition, as was the case for other cults attended by citi-
zens or demesmen. At the same time, the Eleusinian Mysteries were open to all 
those who wished to be initiated and they attracted a large and varied audience. 
The decision to participate led the initiand to take a series of preparative ritual 
actions and then on to the various stages of the initiation itself: the preliminary 
initiation, the muêsis, and, ultimately, the epopteia where the initiand becomes 
one who has seen.1
How should we understand the combination of the individual aspect with 
the collective in this cult? While the unique individual is prominent in the Mys-
teries, they are still, obviously, strongly characterised by socially and politically 
predetermined expectations. The collective aspect, on the other hand, applies 
here to various groupings. In what follows, we shall examine the ways in which 
individual and collective combine. This approach will cast light on the extent 
to which individuals act and the extent to which they are acted upon, the roles 
they are expected to play, and the space left for individual initiative. Within the 
framework of polis- or public cults, the Eleusinian Mysteries are indeed an excep-
tion. Not only is participation based on personal choice – itself an oddity, since 
attendance is still regulated by tradition –, but individual initiation promises 
to change one’s fate in the afterlife. This focus on the individual has been seen 
1 For the various stages of initiation, see Clinton 2003, 51, considering the preliminary initiation, 
the mustai as first-time participants, and the epoptai, the viewers, one year later. See also, with 
slight differences, Richardson 1974, 20; Dowden 1980; Simms 1990, 190, rejecting preliminary 
initiation and identifying the muêsis with the Mysteries.
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as challenging the theoretical model of polis religion, which would not address 
the individual as the Mysteries do, by offering an emotionally and intellectually 
satisfying perspective. In this respect, the relation of the Eleusinian Mysteries 
to other mystery cults is multi-faceted and inspiring. However, treating ‘mystery 
cults’ as a single category is liable to restrict our attempts to focus on the par-
ticular religious and social contexts which significantly differentiate cults across 
time and place. For instance, the categorical approach requires focusing on the 
notions of individual salvation and belief rather than on ritual. Both elements, 
moreover, are emphasised in Christianity, marking a definite break with ancient 
religions.2 For this reason, I will concentrate on the Eleusinian Mysteries and will 
limit my enquiry primarily to the context of classical Athens and will draw only 
secondarily on later sources. I will attempt to evaluate the space available for 
individual initiative, interaction with other individuals, and the integration of 
individuals into a new group which conveys a new religious identity that is both 
personal and collective.
To what extent is it possible to consider the individual in this particular 
cultic context? In the course of the festival, collective acts and acts involving the 
individual closely follow each other, as a brief summary of the calendar shows. 
To start with, the setting links Eleusis to the city of Athens both geographically 
and ritually. On 14 Boedromion, the ephebes take the hiera, the sacred things, 
from Eleusis and escort them to the Athenian Eleusinion. On 15 Boedromion, 
the sacred herald announces the festival during the prorrhêsis (proclamation). 
The initiates then respond to a call of the archon basileus, the highest magistrate 
responsible for religious affairs, and proceed to the agurmos (gathering) at the 
Stoa Poikile. At some point, the formula hiereia deuro (here, the animals) calls 
for a sacrifice. On the next day, the initiates respond to the formula halade mustai 
(initiates, to the sea); they march with piglets to Phaleron and bathe in the sea. 
17 Boedromion is reserved for latecomers and Asclepios, honoured by a major 
sacrifice and a pannuchis (all-night celebration). During this time, the rest of the 
candidates interrupt their collective activities and rest at home. On 19 Boedro-
mion the procession forms and leads the ephebes, priests and officials escorting 
the hiera (sacred things) to Eleusis. On the 20th of the month, the crowd of initi-
ates follows Iacchus to Eleusis, likely joined at some point by the ephebes (Graf 
1996, 61–4). The initiation takes place the day after, when all participants have 
2 Rüpke 2011, 192; Rüpke 2013, 5. Bremmer 2014, 142–54, for previous discussions on the pre-
sumed – and denied – influence of mystery cults on Christianity regarding terminology, ritual 
practice, and doctrine. See Pakkanen 1996, 109–21 and 130, for the definition of individualism 
in Hellenistic Athens in terms of possibility of choice, of personal faith entailing a submissive 
attitude towards deity and of individual remaining in society.
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arrived at Eleusis. Scholars have long speculated about what was done and said 
during the initiation ritual. It seems certain that what took place involved single 
individuals in ways that I lay out below and thus indicates a focus on the indi-
vidual already in the sixth century. Various aspects of this coming together in the 
community of initiates point to an early focus on the individual, his disposition 
and his fate.
1 Personal choice and personal fate
In contrast to most other cults, the Eleusinian Mysteries were open to various 
categories of people, including men and women of all ages, foreigners and slaves. 
According to Herodotus (8.65.4), ‘whoever of the Athenians and the other Greeks 
wishes is initiated’. Restriction applied only to those who did not speak Greek, 
those who had blood on their hands, and after the Persian wars, the Persians 
(Isocrates, Orationes 4.157). Despite this apparent inclusivity, time and cost cer-
tainly prevented many from becoming members of this, after all, selective group.
Does free choice point here to a case of ‘initiation rituals of a voluntary, per-
sonal, and secret character that aimed at a change of mind through experience of 
the sacred?’ (Burkert 1987, 11). Most scholars have considered choice to be char-
acteristic of the Mysteries and an important factor in shaping a personal relation 
with the goddesses (Burkert 1985, 285; Sourvinou-Inwood 2003, 26). We know 
with certainty that the experience of the rituals was perceived as changing one’s 
fate in the afterlife. The whole setting of the festival aimed at bringing the partici-
pant to a state of receptivity to this change through alternations of dark and light, 
sorrow and joy. Awe that turns into joy, as Burkert acknowledges, is not about 
rescue or salvation but ‘blessedness’ and, more properly, material happiness.3 
The personal character of the experience was, as we shall see later, less firmly 
grounded and secrecy was a concern to all initiates, as well as to the Athenian 
state.
3 Burkert 1987, 21. Olbos in the Homeric poems is given by the gods: de Heer 1969, 12–3; Lévêque 
1982, 123. It consists in the possession of a house, wealth, family, and power. Foley 1994, 63, 
emphasises material happiness or success, as well as a different relation to the afterlife. We can 
follow Richardson 1974, 310–1 and 314, in considering it most probable that the olbios is prosper-
ous both in his present life and after death. It is only later that the initiates appear to be living 
on the Islands of the Blessed or with the gods; see Graf 1974, 80–1. Olbios means more properly 
happy while ‘blessed’ has clear Christian connotations. Similarly, de Heer 1969, 4, points to the 
‘emotive Christian overtones’ of the term ‘blessed’. I therefore keep the sense of happiness in the 
quoted texts about the olbos of the initiates.
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To start with the Homeric hymn to Demeter, the poem describes the fate of 
individuals in the afterlife. While there is no reason to admit any precise corre-
spondences between the myth reported in the Hymn and the cult practiced at 
Eleusis, the Hymn suggests some general ideas about the cult of the goddess that 
were certainly shared by at least some of the candidates. Happiness in the after-
life appears as the aim of the initiation: ‘happy (olbios) is the mortal on earth 
who has seen these rites, but the uninitiated who has no share in them never 
has the same lot once dead in the dreary darkness’ (480–3, transl. Foley).4 Soon 
after, the Hymn makes clear how this state of happiness begins in actual life: 
‘highly happy (meg’ olbios) is the mortal on earth whom they [the goddesses] 
graciously favour with love. For soon they will send to the hearth of his great 
house Ploutos, the god giving abundance to mortals’ (486–9, transl. Foley). The 
initiand is not only looking for an answer to the question of the afterlife, he is 
also looking for olbos, the wealth combined with fertility that is taken to be one 
of the early aims of the Mysteries.5 Demeter herself expresses the miseries and 
the inevitable fate of mortals when Metaneira interrupts the goddess burying 
the son of the queen in the fire to make him immortal. She reproaches mortals 
for being ‘ignorant and foolish, unable to foresee destiny, the good and the bad 
coming on them’; they ‘cannot escape death and the death spirits (ouk esth’ 
hôs ken thanaton kai kêras aluxai)’ (256–7 and 262, transl. Foley). In the Hymn, 
death is the prime concern of those who see the rites. Sophocles (F 837 Radt; 753 
Nauck) alludes to their being awarded life after death: ‘thrice happy (trisolbioi) 
are those among mortals who have seen these rites before going to Hades; for 
they alone have life there (toisde gar monois ekei zên esti), while others have 
all kind of misery’. In a similar formula in Pindar (F 137 Snell), seeing the rites 
bestows a special kind of knowledge: ‘happy (olbios) is he who having seen 
these things has gone under the earth; he knows the end of life and the Zeus-
given beginning (oide men biou teleutan, oiden de diosdoton archan)’.6 All kinds 
of sources allude to this privileged relation between death and initiation. Aris-
tophanes (Peace 375) shows Trygaeus borrowing money because he needs to be 
initiated before he dies while Isocrates (Or. 4.28) asserts that initiation (teletê) 
gives more agreeable hopes about the end of life and all time (peri te tês tou 
4 For Dickie 2004, 589, this is what the hierophant said to those who had just been initiated. For 
the viewing of the Mysteries, see Petridou 2013.
5 Bremmer 2014, 18–9, points to the fertility aspect of the Mysteries with the return of Perse-
phone, the showing of an ear of wheat (Hippolytus, Refutatio 5.8.39) and agricultural wealth, the 
prominence of Ploutos and Pluto.
6 Richardson 1974, 313, suggests that the language of Pind. F 137 and Soph. F 837 is so close to 
that of the Hymn that imitation is likely.
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biou teleutês kai tou sumpantos aiônos). Heracles articulates these hopes as he 
presents to Dionysus the initiates in the underworld, wandering and dancing, 
jesting and joking in flowery meadows (Aristoph. Ran. 324–36, 342–52, 372–6, 
447–59).7 They form happy choirs of men and women together clapping their 
hands, enjoying their existence in a breath of pipes, shining light, and myrtle 
groves (154–7).
All these passages show happiness and a better fate in the afterlife to be the 
aim of initiation. From the Hymn to Aristophanes, all sources share a common 
view of the afterlife the initiates will enjoy as distinguishing them from the unini-
tiated. This eschatological aspect of the Mysteries seems to have appealed to can-
didates who came to Eleusis to gain some kind of knowledge and to ensure a 
better fate after death.
2 Individual initiation
What happened during the initiation ritual remains cloaked in a shroud of 
secrecy. We can, however, glean some information on practical matters from 
inscriptions and from the blend of allusions to myth and ritual in literary and 
poetic works.
Starting with logistics, an inscription regulating Eleusinian matters, dated 
to 470–460 and found in the City Eleusinion, relates the fees necessary for initia-
tion. Each initiate is to give an obol to an official, probably the dadouchos (torch-
bearer), half an obol to each of the hierophantides who had the duty to reveal 
the hiera along with the hierophant, and an obol at the Lesser Mysteries as well 
as another at the Greater Mysteries to the priestess of Demeter (IEleusis 19 C 5–14 
[Clinton 2005]).8 The Eumolpidai and the Kerykes together receive money from 
each initiate, five obols from men and three from women (20–3). No candidate is 
exempted from the fees, with the exception of the child from the hearth (24–6).9 
Information follows on the way to properly conduct the ritual. The Kerykes as 
well as the Eumolpidai are to initiate each mustês individually (Kerukas de muen 
dicha tos mustas hekaston); if they initiate several at once (ean de kata pleios), 
7 For the relation of the Frogs to the Mysteries, see Bowie 1993, 228–38, arguing for a chorus 
constituted by Eleusinian initiates, olbioi continuing their cult in Hades. For the meadow as a 
standard piece of the Eleusinian underworld, see Graf 1974, 41–2.
8 According to Inscriptiones Graecae I3 6.6–9, the half obol is given to the hieropoios, while 
 according to Cataldi 1981, 79, it is given to the sacred herald.
9 IEleusis 19 C 24–6. For Cataldi 1981, 79 the stress is on the age of the candidates.
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they are fined a thousand drachmas.10 The inscription then returns to financial 
matters.
This muêsis is the first instance within the ritual process in which initiates 
are individually treated. After making a free choice and participating in the 
public part, each of them receives the attention of an initiating official. This 
one-to-one ritual may have been about something the official did, said and/or 
showed. From what we know, some acts and formulas may have been restricted 
on an individual basis. At the same time, other acts addressed the whole group. 
For instance, the drama of the story of the goddesses, if any, was likely shown to 
the group as a whole, as was the marvellous vision in brilliant light.11 At some 
point, the initiate utters or hears other types of formulas, presumably reporting 
his own actions, such as the giving of the obscure password (sunthêma) reported 
by Clement of Alexandria: ‘I fasted, I drank the potion (kukeôn), I took from 
the box (kistê), after working I placed back in the basket (kalathos) and from 
the basket in the box’.12 We do not have the slightest idea how these actions 
were carried out, nor at what moment in time, nor whether they formed a single 
sequence or extended over several days of the festival. Nor do we know if they 
were collective or individual actions.13 Their meaning is elusive beyond the 
sense they give us of participation in a common ritual that led to the happy state 
of the initiate.
10 IEleusis 19 C 26–30. IG I3 6 omits dicha. According to Clinton 2008, 42, pleios in 29 suggests 
an opposite condition should be restored in line 26, for which dicha is appropriate, stressing the 
individual character of the initiation; see also Sokolowski 1959, 4. Simms 1990, 187, considers 
the possibility that lines 26–30 refer to the costs of initiation and not to the number of mustai. 
Consequently, pleios in 29 would refer to obelos instead of mustas, and hekaston in 27 to the fees 
rather than to individual initiation. Another possibility discussed is the restoration Kerukas de 
muen kath’ena and so on, where hekaston has Kerykas as subject, contradicting the prohibition 
of group muêsis. Clinton 2008, 42, sees hekaston modifying Kerykas as rather forced, since this 
would imply that each member of the Kerykes and Eumolpidai performed muêsis. ‘Each’, after 
Clinton, most naturally pertains to the mustai, each of whom takes part in ritual. Clinton remarks 
that the ritual had certainly been conducted for groups for convenience, hence the penalty.
11 IEleusis 637 (215 CE); Plutarch, Mor. 81e; Plut. F 178. This leads Parker 2015, 72, to consider 
the collective character of initiation as increasing the intensity of the experience. For the relation 
between the representation of death and ritual, see Graf 1974, 126–38. The question has fasci-
nated philosophers and later authors who have related a drama of Demeter’s sufferings to the 
representation of the initiates in the afterlife.
12 Clem. Al. Protr. 2.21.2. See also the tokens (sumbola) reported in 2.15.3: ‘I ate from a drum 
(tumpanon), I drank from a cymbal, I carried the kernos, I went into the chamber’.
13 According to Bremmer 2014, 3, these acts would not have been part of the Mysteries because 
there would not have been enough time for some thousands of initiates to perform them. He thus 
relegates them to the Lesser Mysteries or to another time.
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3 Initiates as a group
If the previous acts refer to the initiate primarily as an individual, how do the ini-
tiates participating in the ritual as a group relate to each other? The ritual identity 
of the initiate connects citizens, non-citizens, foreigners, young and old, men and 
women. The bonds forged between them are situational, regardless of civic iden-
tity or territorial claims. Nor do they connect the whole polis population. They are 
a collective for and during the festival. The question is then what happens after 
the festival. Is there any indication of Eleusinian initiates forming a group or a 
community?
The initiates act as a group during the public parts of the festival, and cer-
tainly in the more obscure parts of the festival that took place within the sanctu-
ary as well. When we refer to a group we essentially talk about a large crowd, as 
the Persians’ reaction indicates. Watching the procession from afar just before 
the battle of Salamis in 480, they heard the song of Iacchus and saw dust coming 
from Eleusis as if there were thirty thousand people.14
The procession formed an impressive spectacle. The initiates wore festive 
clothes, were crowned with myrtle, and held a branch called bacchos. The splen-
dour of the procession was important enough to make Alcibiades a favourite 
among the Athenians because he had it restored during the Peloponnesian war. 
He conducted the priests, the mustai and the mustagôgoi in order (en kosmôi) and 
silence (meta siôpês), an awesome (semnon) spectacle for his fellow citizens who 
witnessed his valour and hailed him as hierophant and mystagogue.15
According to the Athenians, this cult promises that ‘the greatest good among 
men is acquaintance with one another and trustworthiness’ (IG II2 1134.20–1, 
117/6, transl. Clinton 1999, 98). There is evidence that those undergoing initiation 
together become brothers (adelphoi).16 We may understand this relationship from 
co-initiation by Dion’s misfortune. This disciple of Plato was initiated and hence 
was attached to two brothers from Athens, Callipus and Philostratus. Their friend-
ship came from companionship and sharing in religion, initiation and epopteia. 
14 Hdt. 8.65.1; Plut. Themistocles 15. Could it be the multitude (plêthos) of the ‘law concerning 
the Mysteries’ IEleusis 138 Bf 6 (367/6–348/7)? For Clinton 1980, 273, and Clinton 2008, 117, the 
increased popularity of the Mysteries motivated this ‘new code’, the ‘most extensive set of regula-
tions we possess from antiquity concerning this cult’. The document’s value as a code is refuted 
by Scafuro 2010, 39.
15 Plut. Alcibiades 34.3–5. Simms 1990, 193, considers this appearance of the mystagogue as an 
anachronism projected back to the fifth century. 
16 Sopatros 8.123.26–8: an daidouchian theasômai kai schêma ti peri tou adelphou gignomenon. 
See Burkert 1987, 45 and n. 77. According to Parker 2005, 361, n. 152, Sopatros’ reading is probably 
wrong.
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Arriving in Sicily, they found out that Dion was charged with plotting a tyranny 
and killed him. This shameful (aischron) and disrespectful (anosion) act from 
brother to brother brought shame on the whole city. According to Plutarch, the 
outrage of the goddess was as great as if her mustês were slain by his mystagogue, 
implying that Callipus had initiated Dion (Plato, Letters 7.333d-334b; Plut. Dion 
56.4. Bremmer 2014, 3).
This episode illustrates an ideal relationship that is disrespected. We may 
doubt, however, that there existed a larger brotherhood comprising all initi-
ates from different social classes and milieus. It is similarly doubtful that the 
Mysteries ritually reinforced group solidarity beyond the context of the ritual 
(Sourvinou-Inwood 1990, 305). The group of the initiates has indeed been 
thought to form a community, based on their collective religious identity and 
experience.17 However, the status of initiate does not entail an exclusive indi-
vidual awareness of belonging nor self-description as a member when the 
ritual is over.18
After the Mysteries are over, there is no more unified group.19 The initi-
ates’ return to their usual mundane environment somehow dissolves the ties 
that bound them together during the festival. They are not required to return 
to Eleusis unless they seek to achieve a higher degree of initiation. From their 
departure from Eleusis onwards, except for the initiates in court who isolate 
themselves from the uninitiated in order to avoid revealing the secrets of the 
ceremony if the case regards the Mysteries,20 we know of no other collective 
activities. Initiates occasionally come together, as in the case of the mimicking 
of the Mysteries by Alcibiades and his friends, but we never hear of a formal 
association of initiates.
17 Burkert 1998, 377, considers a new community. If community there is, it is clearly not one 
formed around one religion or a civic status (see Graf 2003, 9) and it would also count among its 
members mythical initiates, such as Dionysus Mustês (Pausanias 8.54.5) and Heracles (Diodorus 
of Sicily 4.14.3; Plut. Theseus 30.5).
18 Rüpke 2016, 4, defines a group as sharing concepts and a collective religious identity, consid-
ering in all cases these identities to be differentiated and dynamic.
19 As Burkert 1987, 43, remarks, there is no credo after this experience, nor is the group united 
by faith. See Bremmer 2014, 138, on the lack of special groups of Eleusinian initiates in Attica.
20 Andocides, On the Mysteries (I) 12.28–9 and 31. See Sourvinou-Inwood 1997, 145. According to 
Pollux 8.124 and 141, the jurors are chosen in this case from the epoptai and the court is cordoned 
off by a rope. As to the jurors, they are elected by lot from among those over thirty and not in debt 
to the treasury: Aristot. Ath. Pol. 63.1 and 3.
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4  From personal choice to religious 
individualisation
Personal choice seems to be part of the individualisation process. We need to 
keep in mind, however, that the individual is entangled with the collective. While 
personal and free choice is a requisite for initiation, future initiands are drawn in 
some way to the Mysteries by acquaintances who are already initiated.21 Muêsis 
requires a mystagogue, a guide, time devoted to preparatory learning and para-
dosis, transmission of knowledge.22 The mystagogue leads the participant to the 
completion and success of his initiation (Hesychius, s.v. mustagôgos), as the hier-
ophant does later in the process. They both have, at some point, a one-to-one 
relationship with each initiate in order, presumably, to tell or show him what is 
coming.
Regarding the significance of knowledge in the initiation process, Aristotle 
(F 15 Ross; Synesius, Dion 8.48.42–4) states that the initiates should not learn any-
thing but, rather, experience or suffer in order to be put in a certain disposition 
(ou mathein ti dein alla pathein kai diatethênai) and to become suitable in ways 
that are not to be articulated (kai hê epitêdeiotês de alogos).23 Even though Aris-
totle has been largely followed to the letter and learning considered as opposed 
21 Bremmer 2014, 3, n. 3, for the sources. And. Myst. (1) 132, alludes to his having initiated a 
Delphian and another friends of his from outside Attica, and the orator Lysias had promised to 
initiate his mistress Metaneira (Demosthenes, Against Neaira [59] 21). For Simms 1990, 191, this 
would mean merely taking care of the expenses.
22 The mystagogue’s role clearly relates to teaching: Posidonius F 368 (didaskalou kai 
mustagôgou); Plut. Mor. 795e (didaskôn kai mustagôgôn); or simple assistance: Plut. Mor. 765a; 
Sopatros 8.123.22–3; Menander F 714 (Sandbach; Plut. De tranquillitate animi 474 B 6): mustagôgos 
tou biou agathos. Instruction relates, for many later authors, especially to the Lesser Mysteries. 
For Clem. Al. Strom. 5.11.71, the Lesser Mysteries are about teaching and preparation for what is 
coming (didaskalias tina hupothesin echonta kai proparaskeuês tôn mellontôn), and the Great 
Mysteries are about everything, where one does not learn (ou manthanein) but sees and ponders 
nature and things (epopteuein de kai perinoein tên te phusin kai ta pragmata); see Riedweg 1987, 
5–14. For Simms 1990, 191–5, the mystagogues conducted the indoctrination of mustai early in 
the Mysteries and he links them with the Eumolpidai and the Kerykes, recalling IEleusis 138 A 27 
(infra note 35), separating the muêsis and the leading of the mustês to an Eumolpid or a Keryx, and 
equating muêsis and mustagôgia, also noting the relatively late appearance of the term, especially 
after 100 CE.
23 Or as Bernabé 2016, 34, translates: ‘those who become initiated should not learn anything, 
but rather experiment and change their mentalities, this is, achieve due preparation’. He trans-
lates pathein as ‘to experience’, ‘to receive an external stimulus without implying any activity 
from the subject’. For Albinus 2000, 156, n. 6, Aristotle’s statement could have been polemic.
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to experiencing, pathein is closely related to learning through experience.24 
If we accept that knowledge was somehow related to muêsis, it may have been 
transmitted in advance. The experience of the Mysteries is guided and somehow 
instructed by the various officials. Before the muêsis, some kind of interpretation 
(exêgêsis) is provided to the mustai (IEleusis 250.27, second-first century), possi-
bly by the mystagogues.25 An individual pre-initiation was apparently adminis-
tered at some point by a member of the Eumolpidai or the Kerykes. This seems 
to have been a preparation through information provided by a mystagogue or 
the officials. This is clear in the story of two uninitiated Acarnanian youths who 
entered the sanctuary unwittingly and were given away by questions revealing 
their ignorance of Eleusinian matters.26 Part of the preparation may have been 
hearing the logos narrating Demeter’s kindness towards the Athenians, which 
was only allowed to be heard by initiates (Isoc. Or. 4.28). In addition to certain 
types of knowledge gained before the initiation, a different kind of knowledge is 
thought of as resulting from the initiation itself. Pindar (F 137) for instance claims 
that the initiated gained insight (oiden) into the end of life and the Zeus-given 
beginning.
Given the centrality of gaining some kind of knowledge or insight through 
the process, the question is how this knowledge affects individuals. Pre-initiation 
knowledge may indeed prepare the candidates but, at the same time, it marks 
them out from the uninitiated.27 Marking out is not yet individualising. At the 
other end of the process, the final experience is individual, as is the  mysteric 
24 Aeschylus, Agamemnon 177, reports the very wish of Zeus that ‘wisdom comes from suffering’: 
ton pathei mathos. Talking about mysteries in general, Plut. F 178, states that knowledge comes 
to the soul at the moment of death, when it undergoes an experience similar to that of the partic-
ipants in the great initiations (tote de paschei pathos oion oi teletais megalais katorgiazomenoi). 
As Bernabé 2016, 37, remarks, this knowledge comes from experience and not from being told.
25 According to Clinton 2008b, 33, this is a period set aside for the muêsis, a few weeks before 
the Greater and Lesser Mysteries. The quoted passage follows that concerned with what happens 
to the mystagogues if they do not march with the mustai in the procession (l. 26) and could be 
related. IEleusis 138 A 38–40, also mentions the exêgêtai that start their work on the Athenians 
and on foreigners on Metageitnion 1, well before the muêsis. Larson 2016, 273–6, assumes trans-
mission of knowledge about eschatological promises, the basics of Eleusinian theology, cult ter-
minology, hieroi logoi tied to the landscape of the sanctuary, the significance of a password and 
rules of secrecy, assuming that there was a large amount to be learned by each mustês.
26 Livy 31.14.7–8. The youths were eventually put to death. See Parker 2005, 346; Larson 
2016, 274.
27 Parker 2005, 345. Bernabé 2016, 37, points to the use of oiden, the perfect form of the verb ‘to 
see’ expressing the present result of a past action: whoever has seen the mysteries now retains 
these visions. Petridou 2015, 254–6, stresses the relationship between the vision of the rites and 
knowledge.
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sacrifice of piglets offered on behalf of each initiand, contrary to collective rituals 
where the animal was brought on behalf of all (Schol. Aristoph. Ach. 747). Even 
so, the initiate does not achieve anything on his own, guided as he is by acquaint-
ances, a mystagogue, and then by the hierophant. He achieves his initiation only 
through mediators and through the ritual itself. One might then argue that while 
it involves marking out the participant, the experience is not necessarily one of 
strict individualisation. The effect of the initiation, moreover, is the same for all 
candidates.
In the frame of this barely sketched individualisation we can include a 
personal moral disposition which appears to be necessary. Aristophanes (Ran. 
455–9) counts among the happy ones who ‘enjoy the sun and the light’ those 
who have been initiated and who behaved properly (hosoi memuêmeth’ eusebê 
te diêgomen tropon) to foreigners and ordinary people. In the same play (Ran. 
354–7) he uses a formula resembling the prorrhêsis stating that one cannot 
join the choirs of the initiates who ‘is not pure in thought (hostis… gnômên 
mê kathareuei), has neither known nor danced in the rites of the noble Muses 
and has not been initiated into the Bacchic rites of the tongue of Cratinus the 
bull-eater’.28 Purity will be more significant in later periods and in other reli-
gious contexts, more particularly orphism, yet the moral distinction drawn 
between the happy ones, on the one hand, and the uninitiated and those who 
have transgressed rules, on the other, is already present in the classical period 
(Petrovic, Petrovic 2016, 263). The dominant opinion is that the just and pious 
are rewarded (Rudhardt 1992, 119). Transgression and non-initiation are put 
on the same level and entail punishment, inflicted on the uninitiated dead 
through encounters with monsters and laying in mud.29 This relates the after-
life to moral values and the distinction certainly reflects some of the shared 
understandings of the time.30 Morality and purity ascertained by initiation 
28 As Bowie 1993, 239, and Petrovic and Petrovic 2016, 243–4, remark, this echoes the Eleusinian 
prorrhêsis. See also Burkert 1985, 289; Dickie 2004, 588 and Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 369.
29 Soph. F 837 Radt (753 Nauck). Aristoph. Ran. 144–51, describes ten thousand snakes and terri-
ble wild beasts, dung where whoever wronged his guest, or screwed a boy and took back a pay, or 
thrashed his mother, or smacked his father’s jaw, or swore a perjured oath lie. Paus. 10.31.9, de-
scribes the leschê of Polygnotus at Delphi and the fate of two uninitiated women, carrying water 
in broken jugs. In Pl. Grg. 493b, they carry water into a leaky jar with a sieve. For the punishment 
of the uninitiated, see Fabiano 2010.
30 See Graf 1974, 86, on the moral aspect of this assertion, combined with Pl. Phd. 69c, con-
trasting the uninitiated (amuêtos kai atelestos) lying in the mire with the purified and initiated 
(kekatharmenos te kai tetelesmenos) living among the gods; Plut. F 178, presents the initiates 
along with the pious and the pure (sunestin hosiois kai katharois andrasi). See also Dickie 2004, 
585–6; Parker 2005, 361.
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could be used for further purposes. For instance, Demetrius hastily undergoes 
all stages of initiation at once for his own political purposes. This is his way 
of displaying a superior morality in contrast to his political opponents and of 
claiming purity from blood after the murders in the dynasty of Alexander.31 
Philosophers, on the other hand, often use the Mysteries to confirm their the-
oretical positions or to add a religious dimension to their exercises (Burkert 
1987, 85; Waldner 2013). Finally, administrators of the Eleusinian Mysteries 
focus on the aspect of ritual that suffices for the initiation (Larson 2016, 270). 
The moral focus thus shifts or is nearly absent, depending on the perspective 
and the purpose of the sources.
The varying natures and contexts of our sources have sometimes been 
neglected and this has led to the creation of a stereotype of spirituality that tends 
to be contrasted with the usual ritual display of the polis that would prevail over 
belief (Petrovic, Petrovic 2016, 2). Burkert points out some of the problems of 
spirituality and sees the ancient mysteries as a personal but not necessarily a 
spiritual form of religion (Burkert 1987, 87). But even the personal aspect of such 
a form can be questioned, since the personal needs of the candidate for initiation 
are hardly distinguished from the shared religious concerns which render them 
almost communal and even political (Kindt 2015, 39).
We may also wonder what is meant by spiritual.32 If it is a concern for the 
fate of the psuchê, we only have indirect evidence that the Eleusinian Mysteries 
were ‘spiritual’.33 Yet the picture of the initiates in the underworld described in 
the makarismos of the Homeric hymn is closer to the ideal existence of the orphic 
utopia, as Bernabé puts it. It stands in contrast to the depiction of the feeble ghosts 
in the Od. 10.560, when Circe gives Ulysses directions to the house of Hades where 
the dead, the psuchai, end up. There, Ulysses is to invoke the dead and to sacrifice 
to the fleeting heads. These are a famous race, the shadows of the dead.34 Their 
gloomy description in the epic not only contrasts with the happy fate of the olbioi 
in the Homeric hymn but also brings out the coexistence of these two contrasting 
understandings of the afterlife, despite the generally admitted change in attitude 
towards the afterlife in the archaic period (Sourvinou-Inwood 1997, 139–40).
31 Plut. Demetrius 26.2. Kuhn 2006, 269, also stresses the demonstration of Demetrius’ complete 
integration into Greek culture.
32 Regarding Burkert’s assertion, see Albinus 2000, 198.
33 Orphism by contrast was spiritual in stating the immortality of the soul; see Bernabé 2012, 
13–4.
34 Od. 10.521, 536; 527; 530, with their repetition in Od. 11.29–65. For the psuchê in Homer, see 
Bremmer 1983, 15–7; Sourvinou-Inwood 1995, 56–8.
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One last aspect of the Mysteries that connects the individual and the collec-
tive is secrecy. Secrecy is implied in the sources from the Homeric hymn (478–9, 
transl. Foley) onwards: the rites are ‘not to be transgressed, nor pried into, nor 
divulged’ (ta t’ou pôs esti pareximen oute puthesthai, out’ acheein). The Hymn 
(479) stresses the reason for the secrecy, that ‘great reverence of the gods restrains 
utterance’ (mega gar ti theôn sebas ischanei audên). For Strabo (10.3.9) things are 
slightly different: ‘the secrecy with which the sacred rites are concealed induces 
reverence for the divine (semnopoiei to theion), since it imitates the nature of the 
divine, which is to avoid being perceived by our human senses’. A growing stress 
on the secrecy of the cult appears in our sources from the Imperial period, with 
Pausanias refraining from describing the Athenian Eleusinion and the sanctuary 
of Eleusis (Paus. 1.14.3 and 1.38.7), and the name of the hierophant being included 
amongst the secret matters (Clinton 1974, 9).
The initiate is to keep the secret of the Mysteries but this is, at the same time, 
a secret of the whole society (Bremmer 1995, 70; Burkert 1998, 378). When the col-
lective secret was at times divulged, trials took place and the issue was handled 
by the Athenian state. When accused, Aeschylus seemed unaware of what he 
had divulged and claimed to be uninitiated (Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1111a; Clem. Al. 
Strom. 2.14.60; TGrF 3, T 93 Radt). He was eventually acquitted. Diagoras of Melos 
was accused of mimicking the Mysteries (Lysias, Against Andocides 17; Melan-
thios, FGrHist 326 F 4; Aristoph. Av. 1073–4), as was Alcibiades at the time of the 
Sicilian expedition. Both were condemned. In all cases of impiety for divulging 
the cult secrets, the city made the final decision on the offence and punished 
the offenders, cultivating reverence for the two goddesses and their Mysteries 
(Gagné 2009, 220–2).
There emerges a quite intricate picture of the initiation process. Aspects 
that stand out are the acquisition of different types of knowledge, elements of 
moral disposition, and secrecy. In our sources, however, we find that the different 
aspects are variously highlighted. And as a result, individual and group, personal 
choice and collective or civic affairs, merge in a range of ways. The complexity of 
the evidence and how the individual and group merge is also brought out by the 
initiatives of officials.
5 Eleusinian officials and the Athenian city
The place left for the initiatives of Eleusinian officials is suggestive of the sig-
nificance of the cult in the Athenian city. The main officials originated from two 
Eleusinian families, the Eumolpidai and the Kerykes, which were associated with 
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performing initiations.35 The Eumolpidai provided the hierophant, the official 
who showed the sacred things during the culminating point of the ceremony. The 
dadouchos and the sacred herald were provided by the Kerykes. In both cases, 
their authority came partly from the knowledge that was passed down through 
the families for generations.36 However, the supervision of the festival was the 
task of the annually elected Athenian basileus, along with the epimelêtai or cura-
tors elected by the People, two from the Athenians, one from the Eumolpidai 
and another one from the Kerykes, as stated in a ‘law concerning the Mysteries’ 
 (IEleusis 138 A 30–1, 367/6–348/7; Aristot. Ath. Pol. 57.1).
Most officials of the Mysteries acted as a group and appear to have had little 
eminence as individuals. A few exceptional cases involve the attitude and actions 
of officials towards questions of impiety, mostly taken for political reasons. The 
hierophant Eurymedon, for instance, is known for bringing Aristotle to trial, 
accusing him of impiety for having composed a hymn in honour of Hermias.37 
This prosecution, however, had nothing to do with Eurymedon’s position at 
Eleusis; he merely acted as a citizen (Gagné 2009, 222). There are also instances 
in which officials ordered to act as a group denied the authority of the request. 
Thus, in 415, the priestess Theano refused to curse Alcibiades despite a decree 
stating that ‘all priests and priestesses’ were to curse him. The reason she gave 
was that she was a praying and not a cursing priestess (Plut. Alcibiades 22.5). 
When the People eventually decreed the return of Alcibiades in 407, the hiero-
phant Theodoros refused to revoke his curse. He claimed he had invoked no evil 
upon one who did no wrong to the city, so that his curse was void.38 In so saying, 
Theodoros subtly acknowledged the authority of the city while at the same time 
defying it. He tried, and succeeded, to differentiate his own actions from those of 
the priestly board. Later, the dadouchos Pythodoros refused to initiate Demetrius 
Poliorcetes when he asked that the calendar be modified in order to allow him 
to undergo all the stages of initiation at once. Pythodoros’ refusal had no effect, 
35 It is illegal indeed, according to IEleusis 138 A 27–9, for one knowing that he is not a member 
of the Eumolpidai or the Kerykes to perform the muêsis. It is also illegal to introduce a candidate 
to initiation to someone who is not a member of these families.
36 This factor is clearly at play for the dadouchos Themistocles in IEleusis 300.63–5.
37 Diogenes Laertius, Aristotle (5) 5. Before that, Diogenes Laertius reports another story in 
which Aristotle fell in love with a concubine of Hermias and sacrificed to her as the Athenians 
did to Demeter (3–4), but this is not included in his charges. Similarly, the hierophant Eury-
cleides accused the philosopher Theodorus of joking about the Mysteries. He was eventually 
saved by Demetrius of Phaleron or condemned to drink hemlock: Diog. Laert. Aristippus (2) 8.101; 
 Athenaeus 15.696a.
38 Plut. Alcibiades 33.3. As Burkert 1995, 205, remarks, this is logic encroaching on ritual.
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even though he had authority over the ritual.39 Other officials at times opposed 
Eleusinian authority in order to defend their own rights and were successful. An 
anonymous priestess in the fourth century opposed the hierophant Archias over 
her rights and he was convicted of impiety by the Athenian court for having per-
formed a sacrifice contrary to the ancestral tradition (Dem. Or. 59.116–7).
Many dadouchoi were also distinguished and politically active individuals. 
Kallias the second was part of the embassy that negotiated the truce with Artax-
erxes in 449/8 and he also negotiated the truce with Sparta in 446/5.40 Kallias the 
third was general in 391/90 during the Corinthian war. Acting as envoy to Sparta, 
he gave a famous speech reporting the civilising mission of Triptolemos among 
the Peloponnesians and the tradition that he revealed the Mysteries first to Hera-
cles and the Dioscouroi, the founder and the citizens of the Spartans (Xenophon, 
Hell. 6.3.2–6). He was also involved in dubious affairs, such as the accusation of 
Cephisius against Andocides in 400 for placing a suppliant’s bough on the altar 
of the Eleusinion during the Mysteries.41
The honours accorded to Eleusinian officials attest to the prestige of their 
families and their involvement in the political life of the Athenians. The focus 
on their public life contrasts with the anonymous crowds of the initiates, until 
the Roman period when most prominent politicians would travel to Eleusis to 
undergo initiation.42 Cult officials acted, then, as eminent citizens and therefore 
as individuals in a way that is entirely different to that of the initiates. They were 
entitled to oppose each other and, at times, even the decisions of Athenian poli-
ticians. Praised for their dedication to the cult, they were, at the same time, care-
fully pursuing their own agendas.
6 The initiates
From our evidence, it is very hard to identify who participated in the Mysteries. 
The question shifts to whether participants act and appear as individuals or as a 
39 Plut. Demetrius 26.1. Kuhn 2006, 267, illustrates by this case the complexity of the issue of 
ritual authority and of the meaning and power of ritual knowledge in practice.
40 Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 64. On the legendary wealth of Kallias, see Plut. Aristides 5 and 25. For the 
personage and his family, which dominated this office during this period, see Clinton 1974, 47–8.
41 And. Myst. 112–7. Politically active officials are far more common during the Roman period. 
See Clinton 1974, 68, for dadouchoi holding distinguished offices.
42 Clinton 1989b, 1500, dates the interest of Romans in the Mysteries to Cicero’s time; see  Clinton 
1997, 163, on the steady stream of them travelling to Eleusis. For the prosperity of the sanctuary 
between the Hadrianic and Severan periods, see Lippolis 2013.
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group. A special official seen as representing the Athenians is also worth consid-
ering in this context.
Regarding the social context of participation in the Mysteries, the regulation 
from 470–460 addressing all those who wished to use the sanctuary set a truce 
for the protection of the visitors travelling to Eleusis (IEleusis 19 B and later IEle-
usis 138 B 14–7. See Clinton 1994, 162–3). All were welcome although not all came. 
The picture of the chanting crowds heading to Eleusis points to mass initiation 
and, as a norm, Athenians who could afford it would be initiated (Parker 2005, 
343; Bremmer 2014, 4). Much later, at least, being initiated was an assurance 
of a degree of popularity, as is shown by Lucian’s (Demonax 11) account of the 
unpopular character of the Cynic Demonax: alone of all he refused to be initiated. 
This means that most people wished at least to go to Eleusis. Notwithstanding 
the cost of the Mysteries, the social pressure to take part alongside everyone else 
must have been strong. Other groups of initiates are identified as the ephebes 
lifting the oxen for the sacrifice and the slaves who worked in the sanctuary (IG II2 
1028.10–1 [100/99]; IEleusis 159.24).
When we turn to politicians, it appears that involvement in the Mysteries 
increases their popularity and at the same time increases the magnificence of the 
festival for all to see. This is exactly what Alcibiades did by restoring the proces-
sion during the Peloponnesian war. The magnificence contributed in turn to the 
attraction of more initiates and of more prestigious participants. This dynamic 
renders the personal choice of those undergoing the ritual for political reasons 
a tricky notion. Such a choice is socially prescribed by the identity a powerful 
individual adopts, constructed from several civic as well as religious titles.43 For 
some, participation in the Mysteries was part of their public image. For others, 
the choice was made for what we understand as an individualistic goal regarding 
olbos and the afterlife. Their personal development is suggested by the chanted 
fate that awaits them in the underworld.
Among the initiates, we have some evidence – albeit very difficult to inter-
pret – for the so-called child initiated from the hearth. Through this special ini-
tiate, a rather sophisticated way of reconciling the character of the Mysteries as 
a central polis cult with their limited accessibility through individual initiation 
43 This is particularly clear in the case of the Roman emperors, for whom the festival becomes a 
must at a time when Eleusis became a centre for imperial cult; see Clinton 1989b, 1503–9; Clinton 
1997, 163–73. For Hadrian, see Clinton 1989, 56–7, and Clinton 1989b, 1516–9. Also, Clinton 1999, 
94–7, on the evidence for Augustus, Tiberius and Claudius or Nero. In this context, the formalities 
of the initiation through the Lesser Mysteries in Anthesterion, the Great Mysteries in Boedromion 
and epopteia a year later may have been simplified for Roman initiates as they had occasionally 
been for a few politicians wishing to undergo all stages at once.
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has been suggested. The pais aph’hestias muêtheis, selected by lot among the 
Athenians, is often seen as symbolically representing the whole Athenian polis 
(Harpocr. s.v. … ho aph’hestias muoumenos Athênaios ên pantôs).44 If this inter-
pretation is valid, the representative character of this participant may minimise 
the significance of individual choice. Porphyry (Abst. 4.5) compares those who 
sacrifice to the gods on behalf of the polis with the child from the hearth who 
implores the gods in the place of all the initiates (anti pantôn tôn muoumenôn). 
The child therefore had the role of offering prayers and sacrifices on behalf of the 
initiates and, possibly, on behalf of the city as well, according to Kevin  Clinton.45 
The child was, then, certainly important to the city that paid for his/her initi-
ation fees.46 The title has been variously understood as pointing to the city, as 
symbolised by the public hearth, or to the first and primordial initiate (Clinton 
1974, 99). Besides Porphyry, however, there is no clear evidence on this initiate’s 
being in any way representative of the city. The evidence shows these paides to 
be members of well-to-do families and wealth appears to have been a criterion 
for a candidate for the position, as much as tradition or family choice. It becomes 
apparent then that choice can hardly be thought of as individual in this case. Just 
like other officials, the child bestowed fame as much as he received it from his 
family.47 Notwithstanding this realistic description of the perfect candidate, we 
hardly have any evidence on the actual function of the child. Whether the city 
was indeed represented is hard to assess. Porphyry’s comparison indicates that 
the child represented all the initiates rather than the city. In all cases, the inter-
pretation of representativeness does not imply ‘that all members of ancient soci-
eties were in principle equally religious’ (Rüpke 2011, 192; 2013, 3), as the polis 
religion theoretical model suggests. Individual choice draws a line between the 
initiates and the rest of the citizens and there does not seem to be a way to inte-
grate into the first category other than through the ritual of initiation.
44 Sourvinou-Inwood 1997, 151. Albinus 2000, 183–4, n. 44, points to a possible symbolic con-
nection between this initiation ‘from the hearth’ and Demeter’s nursing of Demophon ‘in’ the 
hearth. The child appears thus to be a representative of the people, as was Demophon in the 
myth. For Bremmer 1994, 85, the presence of the child fits with the origins of the cult in the ar-
chaic puberty rites of a genos.
45 Clinton 1974, 99, points to the high respect accorded to them, attested by a great number of 
honorific dedications of the Hellenistic and Roman periods issued by the Areopagus, the Council 
and the People.
46 IEleusis 19 C 24–6, is of highly uncertain meaning, as is IEleusis 138 Bd 5; Anecd. Bekk. 204.
47 Clinton 1974, 100–1 and 108–13, lists between the last quarter of the second century BCE and 
the middle of the third century CE future ephebes, sons and grandsons of priests and daughters 
and granddaughters of priestesses, kanêphoroi and arrêphoroi, exêgêtai of the Eumolpidai and 
members of the Kerykes, archons, and other members of distinguished Athenian families.
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Political and social considerations with regard to initiation do not alter the 
aim of the ritual and the olbos gained through it that is praised in the Homeric 
hymn. Eschatological concerns are already visible in the Hymn. Even so, scholars 
have only admitted eschatology as part of the Mysteries in later periods. According 
to this approach, the Mysteries originated as a civic cult without eschatological 
concerns.48 Notwithstanding the original nature of the cult, which is beyond our 
understanding, it was certainly a civic cult since it was administered by the Athe-
nians. At the same time, the promise of a happy afterlife in the cult of Demeter 
appears as early as the Hymn. This evidence indicates that the premises of a civic 
cult and eschatological concerns could certainly be combined. Moreover, eschato-
logical concerns appear to have been significant in a cult that was largely controlled 
by the Athenian city well before the classical period. Different theoretical models, 
however, raise questions about a potential contradiction, as I discuss below.
7 Theoretical models for the Mysteries
The Mysteries have been seen as ‘a remarkable anomaly in the panorama of civic 
religious practice of archaic Greece’, because they were state-sponsored, on the 
one hand, but ‘secret’ and oriented toward winning a better fate for individual ini-
tiates, on the other hand (Stehle 2007, 165). Various things the initiates did during 
the festival, such as wandering, searching, mourning, or joking, imitated the 
actions of the goddess, bringing the participants into a relationship of  intimacy 
with Demeter.49 On this view, the experience of the Mysteries was one that the 
‘standard sacrificial ritual’ did not provide.
Despite the difficulties involved in defining what ‘standard sacrificial ritual’ 
might be, the Eleusinian Mysteries are part of what Sourvinou-Inwood has called 
the Athenian polis religion, which takes the individual as its basic cultic unit 
48 Bremmer 1995, 72; Parker 2005, 343. Bremmer 2014, 18, claims that the emic explanations of 
the reverence for the divine forbidding the Mysteries to be performed outside their proper ritual 
context contained no esoteric wisdom. Sourvinou-Inwood 1997, 152, argues for a shift from a polis 
cult of agricultural nature to an initiatory soteriological cult. This shift has also been claimed by 
comparative anthropologists. See Richardson 1974, 12–8, for former theories about the origins, 
the development and the significance of the Mysteries, namely the Corn-mother and the Maiden, 
and the shift from the agricultural paradigm to the personal, or eschatological, development 
towards a happy existence after death.
49 Stehle 2007, 176–7. It is, however, going too far considering identification with or presence of 
the goddess in that, eventually, the participants become Demeter in wandering and then are with 
Demeter in the Telesterion, as the author claims.
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(Sourvinou-Inwood 1988, 264). Sourvinou-Inwood claims that individual rituals 
were not abnormal nor different from group rituals and there was, thus, no 
rupture between the usual polis cults and those involving individual initiation 
or choice (Sourvinou-Inwood 1988, 266). Individual initiation was, however, cer-
tainly unique and did not function in the same way as did the collective rituals 
we know of. Significantly, the Mysteries do not appear as an alternative to main-
stream practices but merely as an additional option (Waldner 2013, 218). Yet the 
model of polis religion has much to offer for those seeking to understand the Mys-
teries.50 Taking some of these nuances into account and combining them with 
aspects of the individualisation concept (Otto 2017), we can see that the Mysteries 
stood at the intersection of both models.51 As Walter Burkert stressed some years 
ago, even though the mysteries – without considering those of Eleusis in par-
ticular – were characterised by secrecy and individual implication, they were not 
private and nor were they in opposition to the polis.
It is significant that the polis itself seems to have encompassed and legiti-
mated all the religious activities of its members, including activities related to 
eschatological concerns (Sourvinou-Inwood 1988, 264–6; 1990, 297–300; 1997, 
151). Not only were the Mysteries controlled by the polis but they also contributed, 
just as did other civic cults, to the defining of the polis’ religious identity, with the 
Eleusinian sanctuary serving as a symbol of civic identity and unity (de Polignac 
2009, 430). The Athenians used Eleusis to reinforce their international prestige 
and influence in the Greek world, as well as to provide a source of income.52 The 
contribution of the Mysteries to the religious identity of the city is not restricted, 
however, to the region of Athens or even to its sphere of political influence. The 
kind of religious identity that it created encompassed initiates who came from 
all over the Greek world and beyond. Such a collective identity incorporates 
individual choice in various ways. Initiation can, therefore, be seen as a process 
50 Kindt 2009, 15, considers the relation between polis and religion to be far more complex than 
this model allows. Eidinow 2011, 11, based on more or less the same critique, solves the issue 
of ‘loose ends’ left by this model as marginal by invoking the social networks, or sets of nodes 
 representing individuals or groups linked by ties representing relationships, not all of which 
occur in polis-centred ritual activity.
51 Sourvinou-Inwwod 1995, 38, already believed that the Mysteries and other movements can 
only be thought of as marginal if one ignores the intimate intertwining of the Eleusinian Myster-
ies with Athenian polis religion.
52 Isoc. Or. 4.28. Clinton 1994, 161. For the rhetorical manipulation and political exploitation of 
Demeter’s xenismos in Athens, see Petridou 2015, 305–9. The income is secured by the practice 
of the aparchai known by the decree IG I3 78a 4–8, 24–6 (IEleusis 28, 440–35), urging during the 
Mysteries that all cities should offer aparchai ‘according to the ancestral custom and the oracle 
of Delphi’.
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involving the socialisation of the individual in an intimate and closed commu-
nity that is distinct from the polis (Burkert 1998, 375), even if it is a situational 
and a temporary community. At the same time, the festival is clearly Athenian in 
 character.
What makes the Mysteries unique in this context is the individual choice 
involved (Sourvinou-Inwood 1997, 152). A significant aspect of the relation 
between individual and collective religious identity is what has been described 
as a shift in attitudes towards death that took place in the sixth century. Accord-
ing to this interpretation, there was a movement from the acceptance of the 
notion that death was hateful but not frightening toward a greater concern for 
the survival of one’s memory, which led to a more individualised perception of 
one’s own death. This shift is related to the eschatological promise of a happy 
afterlife, which has been claimed to be integrated into the religion of the polis 
(Sourvinou-Inwood 1995, 298–300; 1997, 153–4). This integration, however, is not 
necessarily thought of as unproblematic by scholars, especially given the various 
influences on the Mysteries. Orphic influences on the Mysteries can be detected 
from the end of the fifth century on.53 Further on, the Hellenistic era is largely 
considered to be a period in which the aims of cult and individual religiosity 
became increasingly soteriological, since it was now easier to choose which cults 
one wished to follow (Pakkanen 1996, 109–21). It should, however, be pointed 
out that the eschatological aspect of the Mysteries is much earlier; there is no 
real contradiction in accepting both an eschatological belief and a promotion of 
the Mysteries by Athens at the same time, that is at the beginning of the sixth 
century (Clinton 1994). Eleusinian eschatology has also generated a soteriologi-
cal discourse in modern times but this is a mere anachronism (Sfameni Gasparro 
2013, 148–9). The general trends mentioned do not prove a parallel, soteriological 
development of the Mysteries.54
53 The Mysteries and orphism were still treated as somehow related to one another as late as 
Paus. 1.37.4, who avoids giving the reason for prohibiting beans in the Mysteries but states that 
it is well known from the Orphica. For Orpheus as founder of the Eleusinian Mysteries, see Graf 
1974, 26–34 and Bremmer 2010, 27–9; for Demeter and the Eleusinian eschatology in the orphic 
epic, Richardson 1974, 77–86; Graf 1974, 139–50; Bremmer 2002, 23, for their common picture of 
the afterlife, and Graf 2011, 61, for details in Plato’s eschatology referring either to Eleusis or to 
Bacchic mysteries. Albinus 2000, 162–4, points to the differences between the Eleusinian and 
orphic genealogies of those playing a part in Demeter’s story. He compares the fate of the olbioi 
in the underworld to the orphic immortality of the soul, drawing the line between orphism and 
the Mysteries. See also Graf 1974, 81–2.
54 As Larson 2016, 252, points out regarding eschatology, even though we can detect a 
 ‘moralisation’ during the Classical period, it is best to avoid notions of chronological development 
from one prevailing form of belief to the next.
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Individualisation through the Mysteries implies obtaining knowledge of a 
commonly shared secret, the keeping of which was everyone’s personal duty. 
This sharing would create coherence among the initiates even though they 
never formed any kind of unified religious association, even in times when 
such associations flourished. While there is no single community of Eleusin-
ian initiates, there would have been several groups spread across the Greek 
speaking world. There would have been as many distinct groups as there were 
places of origin for the participants and each group would be as large as the 
number of mustai coming from that particular single place, presumably trav-
elling together from their homes to Athens during the truce. These groups 
formed a network around initiation and the goddesses’ favours. Mustai did not, 
however, share a life-style comparable to that of the orphics (Pakkanen 1996, 
72). Other than the status of initiate, we have no evidence as to how or whether 
the participants internalised the whole experience.55 The poets and philoso-
phers of the ancient world allude to certain moral values of the initiates while 
rewards and punishments are a recurrent topic of Eleusinian eschatology. The 
purity required by the prorrhêsis, as formulated by the chorus of Aristophanes 
(Ran. 354–7), also shows concern for the soul. This is one further exception to 
the trend of the increasing internalisation of purity as occurring only in later 
antiquity.56 Speculation on ethics or pragmatic matters regarding the happy 
afterlife of the initiates is entirely depending on the sources.57 While personal 
ethics are important – even though not consistently, the collective dimension 
of the festival is still prominent.
Regarding the theoretical frame of individualisation, self-consciousness of 
the divine favour and the knowledge conveyed by the Mysteries is the basis for 
the self-categorisation as mustai. This is a valued status that necessitated an emo-
tional involvement and a sense of interdependence between the initiates, at least 
during the festival.58 Indeed, if not for poetic allusions to the flowery underworld 
and civic occasions such as trials during which only initiates might gather to 
hear cases related to Eleusinian matters, the social ramifications of the initiate’s 
55 Vernant 1989, 220, considers the initiate as gaining an internal modification through his fa-
miliarity with the two goddesses, even though this entails no socially visible change.
56 See Bremmer 2014, 4. As Petrovic and Petrovic 2016, 11, notice, purity includes a moral di-
mension.
57 Graf 1974, 140, for the speculative dimension in the orphic epic and in connection with the 
Eleusinian Mysteries.
58 Rüpke 2015, 10; Rüpke 2016, 5, lists evaluation of membership by individuals, the impor-
tance ascribed to this particular membership, the emotional involvement, and the sense of 
 interdependence as aspects defining a group self-categorisation.
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status are entirely obscure. What remains are the narratives about the values, 
characteristics and history of the group (Rüpke 2016, 5) but these are known 
for the mustai in only a fragmentary and frustrating way. There is, on the one 
hand, a ‘common knowledge’ about what the Mysteries can do for the initiate. 
On the other hand, there is the specialised knowledge acquired by the initiates 
during the ritual, through direct transmission and via the preparation that took 
place over the length of the festival. The broad body of initiates – including poli-
ticians and eminent citizens to ordinary individuals, foreigners, slaves, and cult 
and civic officials – displays a significant diversity regarding their social and 
certainly religious identity. They cannot be considered as a whole wherein the 
identity shaped by the quality of mustês is always predominant or, indeed, even 
religiously motivated in all cases. Individual and/or collective identity is in each 
case foregrounded depending on the participant’s social background and the 
occasion that motivates his/her participation in the ritual. Both as individuals 
and as a group, initiates follow a tradition which is thought of as long established 
by the goddess and guarded by her officials. The initiation process is entirely 
thoroughly regulated and determined by traditional norms, even though single 
individuals, for the most part officials, may have, at times, influenced or changed 
them (Patera 2011). The discourse concerning the Mysteries that was shaped by 
both Eleusinian officials and the Athenian city implies an ideology of the olbioi, 
putting the initiates and their fate at the centre.
These multiple parameters limit individual initiative within the regulated 
ritual frame of the Mysteries. Its norms and practices are meticulously codified by 
institutional bodies, along with the officials chosen from the two official families 
discussed above. As a whole, the city has religious authority over the matters 
concerning the Mysteries. Even in this highly institutionalised frame, the focus 
on the individual experience of the initiates and the eschatological promises do 
not lose their gravity. While the Mysteries address the individual, differing in this 
approach from the polis religion model, there is little beyond personal choice that 
points to religious individualisation. Initiands tend, rather, to follow an individu-
ation process, defined as a ‘gradual full integration into society and the develop-
ment of self-reflection and of a notion of individual identity’ (Rüpke 2013, 7). The 
more prominent initiates mostly seek a type of distinctiveness, which is to say a 
form of competitive individuality. Some among them are honoured for their exem-
plary lives, as was Themistocles of Hagnous in 20/19 (IEleusis 300.31–63; Plut. 
Mor. 843c), but none is clearly representative of a model to follow. There remains 
the fact that the rituals focus on the participants who seek olbos and a happy fate, 
rather than on the gods, as is the case with other civic rituals (Bernabé 2016, 28). 
Seeing the Mysteries gives the individual a new status within the large and some-
what loose community of initiates. This status might prove at times significant in 
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civic life. Beyond specific social occasions, however, the identity of the initiates 
rather fades throughout their lifetime into other social groupings to which each 
initiate belongs. At the same time, sweet hopes might accompany them until such 
a time as they meet their fate in the underworld. Separating the dead initiates 
from the shadows in Hades in the epics, this individual fate resumes their shared 
experience as initiates on earth, only this time they are clearly distinct from all 
the uninitiated.
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Institutionalisation of religious 
individualisation: asceticism in antiquity 
and late antiquity and the rejection of 
slavery and social injustice
1  Methodological Introduction: Religious 
individualisation, asceticism, and justice in 
imperial and late antiquity
Phenomena related to religious individualisation existed, and were important, 
already in classical antiquity and late antiquity.1 A major issue that is closely 
related to religious individualisation in historical perspective2 is the practice of 
personal piety, and specifically of asceticism, in antiquity and late antiquity – 
with a focus on one’s own body, soul, passions, and intellect/nous, with a view 
to a ‘unified nous’ (Evagrius). My focus in this paper will be on imperial and late 
antiquity, the long period over which Jörg Rüpke has identified a change in prac-
tices and assumptions, which he calls ‘individualisation’.3
The definition of asceticism is complex. What emerges from an accurate anal-
ysis is that ancient and late antique philosophical asceticism involved not only 
dietary and sexual restrictions, and not simply a mortification of the body, as 
a kind of new martyrdom or even new sacrifice (on whose varieties in Roman 
times see Schultz 2016), but also voluntary poverty, voluntary service to others, 
refraining from oppressing other people, and the like, all as part and parcel of 
piety towards the divine. This emphasis on poverty, voluntary service to others, 
refraining from oppression, and the like is not common to all strands of ascet-
icism (neither in antiquity, nor today: see Logan 2017), but is stressed both in 
1 See Fuchs, Mulsow, Rüpke 2016, 5. This is an etic category; I refer to its discussion as a seman-
tic matrix in Otto 2017. See also Rüpke 2013, which analyses both the individual and its sociali-
sation – its integration into ever larger social contexts – in ancient Mediterranean religions from 
Hellenism to late antiquity, including Seneca’s philosophical reflections (Aldo Setaioli, ‘Cicero 
and Seneca on the Fate of the Soul: Private Feelings and Philosophical Doctrines’, Chap. 17). 
Concrete examples of individualisation in Roman religion are in Rüpke 2016. On religious indi-
viduality in gnosticism see Markschies 2014.
2 See Fuchs, Rüpke 2015; Fuchs 2015; Rüpke 2015.
3 Rüpke 2011/2017; 2014. See also Rüpke 2013a; Spickermann, Rüpke 2012.
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the Pythagorean tradition that was Christianised through the Sentences of Sextus 
and in patristic philosophy, especially the ‘Origenian’ line, which represents the 
quintessential philosophical asceticism of the ancient Christian tradition.4 As 
Anna Williams (2007, 7) has remarked, ascetic texts ‘do not display their authors’ 
interest in ascesis because ascesis is a worthy or superior substitute for intellec-
tual activity, but because the latter is infeasible without control of the emotions 
and bodily desires’. The concern for justice is paramount both in the harmony 
of the single person’s faculties, including the control of passions (i.e. negative 
emotions) and desires that are so central in, for instance, Evagrius, and in the 
harmony within humanity as a whole, with an equal distribution of goods and 
without the oppression of some by others.
Elements of ascetic practice which were present all together or selectively in 
given groups of ascetics, included sleep and food deprivation, chastity, poverty, 
renunciation of honours and of any form of violence and oppression of other 
people, along with much else. In the various forms that ancient asceticism 
assumed, some aspects were more emphasised than others. Some, for instance, 
placed greater stress on sexual and nutritional control and less on poverty and the 
renunciation of oppression; others, on the contrary, attached more importance 
to the latter than to the former aspects. The ascetics who made the most of the 
renunciation of oppression and injustice were also more likely to renounce both 
slave ownership and wealth, which was perceived as the cause of the poverty of 
other people and, thereby, of social injustice.5
Peter Brown’s highly influential analysis (1988/2008) concentrates on only 
one facet of asceticism, sexual restraint in the first five centuries of Christian-
ity, but there were many other kinds of self-control. Even virginity itself was 
conceived of very broadly by ascetics such as Origen, Methodius, and Gregory 
Nyssen, to the point of embracing the whole of the self-discipline that aimed at 
apatheia, the eradication of passions from one’s soul with a view to purification, 
as the first stage in the ascent to contemplation. In late-antique Christianity, 
monasticism, both anchoritic and cenobitic, was the privileged environment for 
the application of asceticism. William Harmless (2009) rightly insists not only on 
the renunciation of marriage, family, and any sexual activity as marks of asceti-
cism, but also on the renunciation of wealth, property, and career, the taking up 
of manual labour, and the deprivation of food and sleep. Cenobitic asceticism 
was already practiced by Essenes and Therapeutae in the Jewish world, and it is 
precisely such ascetic circles, both Jewish and Christian, that provide the most 
4 See Ramelli 2016. On theological perspectives on slavery see also Priesching, Grieser 2016.
5 On the notion of social justice see Ramelli 2016, introduction and conclusion, and Feldman 2016.
Institutionalisation of religious individualisation   697
remarkable instances of the rejection of slavery as an institution, as well as a 
broader rejection of both social injustice and oppression.
As recent scholarship has emphasised (Griffin-Ramelli 2019), asceticism – 
‘pagan’ philosophical, Jewish, and Christian – in antiquity and late antiquity is not 
hatred of the body, not even in the Platonic tradition. Asceticism was not simply 
about the refinement of the body: in both ‘pagan’ and Christian Platonism, the 
ascent through the hierarchy of bodies reflects a purification and progress of the 
soul. Origen spelt out this soul-body correlation in the best way: each soul must be in 
a corporeal state that is appropriate to its rank or order, by which he means its level 
of moral development (Ramelli 2018). For several ascetics, in particular the philo-
sophical ascetics of Hellenistic Judaism and especially late antique Christianity, the 
progress of the soul involved justice, solidarity with other people, and renouncing 
the oppression of fellow humans that came through the ownership of slaves and the 
impoverishment of others that was a result of possessing excessive wealth.
2  Asceticism and the rejection of oppression:  
human dignity and Gregory of Nyssa’s 
arguments against slavery and socio-economic  
injustice
I shall outline the main strands of the research I have conducted into the role of 
philosophical asceticism as a personal and group religious practice (2016) and its 
echoes in the opposition to social injustice and slavery found across religious tra-
ditions (‘pagan’, Hellenistic Jewish, and Christian) throughout the Mediterranean 
world in imperial and late antiquity. My study points out how private and group 
ascetic practice played a substantial role in the rejection of slavery, oppression, 
and social injustice in this period and seeks to connect asceticism, the rejection 
of the institution of slavery, and the embrace of social justice as they are found 
in ancient philosophy, Jewish Hellenism, and especially Christian antiquity and 
late antiquity. When Christian ascetics chose poverty and low status in service to 
Christ, were they simply withdrawing from social duties, or were they also con-
cerned for those who were socially enslaved or dispossessed? Since at least some 
Christian (and Jewish, and ‘pagan’, as we shall see) philosophical ascetics spoke 
explicitly of justice in this connection, we can surmise that at least some of them 
embraced asceticism also for the sake of justice.
In voluntary poverty and the giving up of slavery, a deeper level of asceticism 
was often at work: the principle of renouncing the oppression of fellow humans 
698   Ilaria L. E. Ramelli
and thereby the commission of injustice against them, either by claiming to own 
other people or by accumulating wealth, which latter automatically meant, in 
the judgement of these ascetics, stealing the necessary from the poor. This is the 
patristic tenet that wealth is tantamount to theft (Ramelli 2016, Chap. 6). Renun-
ciation of oppression and injustice was, at least in the case of the best ascetics, 
the common root of both the rejection of slavery and the rejection of social injus-
tice through the embrace of voluntary poverty. The necessary and deep inter-
relation between the two thus turns out to derive from a common origin rather 
than being a mere juxtaposition. Other options were also available for the second 
point, social injustice, such as – instead of voluntary poverty – almsgiving in a 
variety of degrees. This represented a milder form of the reduction of social injus-
tice and oppression.
In some cases, we can even see the development of a notion of ‘human 
dignity’ and, as we would call them, individual human rights. This is espe-
cially clear in Gregory of Nyssa’s strong theological arguments for the rejection 
of slavery and social injustice on the grounds that they lead to the dire poverty 
of some people, especially his ‘theology of the image’, which bestows a unique 
dignity on every human being qua image of God. Gregory rejected the legitimacy 
of the institution of slavery and his theological arguments against this institution 
parallel his theological arguments against the social injustice which resulted in 
great poverty for many.
Gregory’s main argument against slavery is found in a Homily for the Holy 
Easter (In S. Pascha, 379) and especially in his fourth Homily on Ecclesiastes 
(GNO 5.334–52). Gregory begins by presenting Easter as the feast of liberation. He 
describes the manumissio in ecclesia as ‘good and humane’ because it sets slaves 
free and does so in a dignified way (GNO 9.1.250.15–20). Gregory here assimilates 
slave owners to Pharaoh (GNO 9.1.250.24), who elsewhere in his works symbolises 
evil and the devil. Gregory, unlike many other early Christian thinkers, used argu-
ments concerning spiritual slavery to conclude that legal slavery was illegitimate 
and against God, and therefore had to be abolished.
Gregory urges masters to release their slaves immediately, on that very day. 
He qualifies manumission as ‘good’ (ἀγαθόν, 251.2), as opposed to slavery, which 
is evil. Note that Gregory urges not only ascetics, but all the heads of households 
in his audience to manumit all slaves. He argues that, if prisoners are freed when 
a new member of the royal family is born, or on a military victory, all the more 
must slaves be freed on the day of Christ’s victory over death and his resurrec-
tion. Gregory’s plea extends to all those afflicted, such as the indigent/beggars 
(πτωχοί) and the sick. The association of slaves with the poor is no accident in 
Gregory, who used the same theological arguments to denounce as illegitimate 
both the institution of slavery and the social injustice that led to poverty. Gregory 
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regarded the misfortunes of the poor and the sick as a totally undeserved product 
of the greed of others. Gregory’s appeal to choose ‘virtue’ and reject ‘evil’ in 
the peroration of his Paschal homily implies that he regards owning slaves as 
evil and manumitting them as virtuous. He admits of no exception: all masters 
should free their slaves. These are humans and, thanks to Christ’s Paschal work, 
all humans ‘inherit God’, the supreme Good (GNO 9.1.251.21). Humans inherit God 
fully in the end, at the perfection of all, but already here and now they are heirs 
of God, because Christ’s resurrection contains in nuce, and prefigures, the final 
 resurrection-restoration of all humanity (Ramelli 2013, 372–440).
Slavery is illegitimate and against God because every human is free, in that 
she or he is God’s image. This argument is brought forth especially in Gregory’s 
fourth homily on Ecclesiastes. From the beginning (334), Gregory criticises a 
human who presumes to be the ‘master of fellow humans’. This is an ‘outland-
ish presumption’. Nο one can claim to possess another human being, which 
would be ‘against God’, since all humans belong only to God. Those who claim 
to own other persons are stealing God’s possession (335) and go against God and 
God’s decree, which made all humans free and endowed them with freewill: ‘You 
condemn to slavery the human being, whose nature is free and self-determining, 
and so you make laws that are contrary to that of God’. God made each person 
the master of all creation, and anyone who dares enslave any human being ‘goes, 
and fights, against God’s own ordinance’. Slavery, far from being decreed by God 
after the Fall, as Augustine maintained, is definitely against God’s will. Not God, 
but human arrogance divided humanity into masters and slaves: Gregory repeats 
this statement in his On the Lord’s Prayer: ‘Not nature, but spirit of dominion 
[δυναστεία] divided humanity into slavery and mastery’.
Gregory’s condemnation of the institution of slavery is not limited to a 
Paschal homily and a homily on Ecclesiastes, but emerges constantly throughout 
his works. Gregory’s injunction to all masters to free all of their slaves is rooted in 
his theology, on which his anthropology depends. Founding his position on the-
ological arguments, in Homily 4 on Ecclesiastes Gregory claims that God’s image, 
i.e. a human being, cannot, as a rational creature endowed with logos (and the 
Logos is Christ), be bought at any price. Gregory is founding his rejection of jurid-
ical slavery here upon the ‘theology of the image’. Every human is free, qua image 
of God, who is free and powerful par excellence. God made each human person 
the owner of the whole cosmos; thus, no amount of money can buy a person: ‘“I 
have bought for myself male and female slaves” [Eccl 2:7]. Please tell me: At what 
price? Among the existing beings, which have you found that is worth human 
nature? How many coins have you evaluated the logos? How may obols have you 
put on the scales as the price for God’s image? Who can sell the being who is in 
the likeness of God, rules the whole earth, and has inherited from God power over 
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all creatures on earth?’ Only an insane man, deceived by the devil, could presume 
to be the owner of God’s image: ‘Has the devil tricked you into believing that you 
are the master of God’s image? O what foolishness!’ (Hom. Eccl. 4.337). Gregory’s 
argument echoes 1 Tim 6:10, where the root of all sins is identified as greed for 
money (ibid., 4.339).
Gregory used another theological argument against both slavery and social 
injustice, besides the ‘theology of the image’: that from the ‘social analogy’, which 
argues for equality within the Trinity and within humanity. Freedom and equal-
ity within the Trinity – which Gregory supported in his anti- subordinationism 
(Ramelli 2011) – are reflected in freedom and equality among all humans. This 
argument is found in his treatise against the ‘neo-Arian’ Eunomius and else-
where. For example, Gregory attacks Eunomius on the grounds that humans’ 
admitting of no master (ἀδέσποτον) is a reflection of God’s own absolute admit-
ting of no master. A similar position is also held in On the Lord’s Prayer, GNO 
7.2.70–1, where Gregory states that by nature only irrational creatures are slaves 
of rational ones. God has granted humans to be masters only of animals, not of 
other humans. Gregory reminds the master that his slave has the same worth 
as he himself from the viewpoint of the ‘dignity of human nature’. In Against 
Eunomius (1.1.526, 3.1.15, 3.3.54–5, 3.4.37–8, 3.5.12, 3.8.44, 50, 53, 54–8), Gregory 
argues that, just as the divine nature cannot be divided into slavery and mastery, 
neither can human nature; the whole creation is a slave, but of God alone. Here, 
the analogy of the unity of nature in both divinity and humanity substantiates 
the claim that slavery cannot divide a nature that is one, whether this nature be 
divine or human.
Rachel Moriarty (1993) draws a parallel between some of Nyssen’s statements 
on slavery in Homily 4 on Ecclesiastes and Seneca’ Letter 47. On the basis of rhe-
torical resemblances, she concludes that Gregory’s polemic against slavery is only 
apparent and drawn from rhetorical commonplaces, just as Seneca’s advocacy of 
humane treatment for slaves did not entail a condemnation of slavery as an insti-
tution. But Gregory’s theological arguments against slavery, based on the ‘the-
ology of the image’ and ‘social analogy’, have little to do with Seneca’s: they are 
grounded in the Bible and its philosophical interpretation, mainly in the light of 
Platonism. Gregory also adduces an eschatological argument. The elimination of 
slavery in the eschatological scenario will result from Christ’s freeing of humans 
from slavery by voluntarily and lovingly taking slavery upon himself (C. Eun. 3.8). 
Because slavery cannot abide in the end, since it is against God’s will and utterly 
impious and evil, it must be eradicated already now. This is why Gregory insisted 
that all people, not only ascetics, should free all their slaves.
The theological arguments that buttress Nyssen’s condemnation of legal 
slavery are the same as those which underpin his condemnation of social injus-
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tice and usury, the causes of the dire poverty of many. Gregory joined Origen’s, 
John Chrysostom’s, and Evagrius’ conviction that excessive wealth is tantamount 
to theft (Ramelli 2016, 199, 204–7). From the socio-historical viewpoint, Grego-
ry’s attitudes toward poverty and slavery are grounded in the prevalence of debt 
slavery in Gregory’s own day, and in the practice of Gregory and other members 
of his family, such as Naucratius and Macrina, who rejected both riches and slave 
ownership altogether. This life choice was profoundly admired by Gregory, who, 
in the footsteps of Origen, Pierius, Pamphilus, Eusebius, and other Origenians, 
identified the philosophical life with a life of asceticism and voluntary poverty. 
Thus, in Against Fate 34.3 he remarks that the highest kind of life is a life ‘without 
possessions’.
The ‘theology of the image’ is the main basis for Gregory’s condemnation 
of not only slavery but also social injustice. In On Doing Good (GNO 9.1.93–108) 
Gregory maintains that nobody can be considered to be less worthy than others, 
since all humans are the image of Christ, who is the image of God. Christ has given 
his very countenance to all humans alike, in that he has taken up all human-
ity and has become incarnate in all humans. Gregory expressly refers to Matt 
25:35–45, where Jesus identifies himself precisely with the poor: ‘I was hungry 
and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink […] I was naked and 
you clothed me, I was sick and imprisoned and you visited me […] as you did it to 
one of the least of these brethren, you did it to me’.
God has given the goods of this world to all humanity equally; therefore, 
those who possess more than they need are in fact depriving other people of 
what they need.6 Wealth is tantamount to theft; Gregory thus exhorts his flock 
to refrain from unjust acquisitions and love for riches: ‘stay away from iniqui-
tous gain, starve your idolatrous greed for riches: let nothing be stored up in your 
house that comes from violence and robbery’ (On Doing Good 94). When Gregory 
claims that those who have more than the necessary are thieves who have stolen 
the necessities from the poor, he is following Origen, who insisted that whatever 
one acquires must be acquired with justice. If one acquires a great deal of wealth, 
this is necessarily acquired by means of injustice: ‘They do not consider whether 
they gain in the right way, with justice […] One of the following two alternatives 
must necessarily be the case: either to gain a lot by means of injustice, or only a 
little, but with justice […] abundant riches are tantamount to iniquity’ (Homily 3 
on Psalm 36.6).
6 See also Basil, Homily 6 (cf. 7, 8) and Nazianzen, Oration 14.24–6. The principle that one’s 
possessions should not exceed one’s needs was supported by Epicureanism in antiquity: see 
Morel 2016.
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Ascetic practices, such as fasting and abstinence, are not appreciated by God, 
if one is oppressing one’s brothers. Taking away necessities from the poor means 
‘biting your brother with wickedness’ and ‘drinking their blood out of evilness’. 
Judas also fasted, but his greed for money caused him to sell Jesus: greed for 
money is thus worse than failing to practice fasting and other pious deeds (Benef. 
94–5). Corporeal fasting is useless, ‘if the intellect is not purified. Self-restraint is 
useless, unless it includes all the other aspects of justice [δικαιοσύνην] as insep-
arable and consequent […] Isaiah asks: To what end do you fast, while you strike 
the poor with your fists?’ Like Gregory, John Chrysostom too warned that alms 
deriving from the degrading of other people are not welcome to God, who deems 
such a person a murderer. Therefore, John exhorts his audience ‘to abstain from 
greed first’ and then show mercy through alms (Hom. in 2Cor. 4:13, PG 51.300).
According to Gregory, as well as to Origen and other ascetics, asceticism must 
pair acts of self-restraint with justice. Gregory invites his flock to share their food 
and houses with the poor: the fact that they are poor is itself a grave ἀδικία (Benef. 
96–7). Again, he avails himself of a theological argument: fear of God should elim-
inate social and economic inequalities, by becoming ‘a just balancer who makes 
people equal’ (δίκαιος ἐπανισωτής). The poor and the sick are salvation for the 
rich: ‘Hug the disadvantaged as your own health, as the salvation of your wife 
and your own children’ (Benef. 97–8). This is a threat: if the rich do not share their 
wealth with the poor then their own health and salvation, and those of their fami-
lies, will be in danger. ‘Do not despise the poor who lie down as worthy of nothing. 
Consider who they are, and you will find out their value/dignity [ἀξίωμα]: they 
have put on the very countenance of our Saviour. Ηe, who loves humanity, lent 
them his own face’. This echoes the theology of the image and Matt 25:35–45.
To the argument from the theology of the image – the poor have Christ’s 
countenance – Gregory adds another in On Doing Good 101–13: God made crea-
tion for all humans in equal share. All should limit themselves to the possession 
of what they need, because the rest belongs to the poor, whom God loves: ‘Put 
limits to the needs of your life! […] Let a part of your wealth belong to the poor, 
God’s beloved. For all goods belong to God, the common Father of all […] we are 
all siblings, from the same race. It is better and more just if siblings participate in 
their heritage in equal parts’. Gregory accuses those who refuse to give the poor 
one third or one fifth of their goods (ibid., 104). In On Doing Good 106–8, Gregory 
alludes to the parable of Dives and Lazarus – on which he expands also in De 
anima – and warns the rich who give nothing to the poor that they may die in a 
few days and the abyss awaits them. Elsewhere, too, Gregory condemns injustice 
due to covetousness (ἐπιθυμία τῆς πλεονεξίας; cf. Orat. 284.6–9). This is why he 
is so severe against covetousness, calling it ‘madness incapable of controlling 
itself’, inspired by the devil (Orat. 286.1–9). In On Usury 9.201.25–9, Nyssen warns 
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the usurer, too, that his alms are unwelcome to God, since they come from his 
siblings’ tears, flesh, and blood.
For Nyssen, renouncing the oppression of others through slavery or robbery – 
and wealth is tantamount to robbery –, and thereby pursuing justice, is a matter 
of asceticism. Asceticism cannot possibly do without the renunciation of all forms 
of oppression. This connection was already at work in the Sentences of Sextus, a 
Christianised version of Pythagorean asceticism (see Ramelli 2016, Introduction; 
2016a), but Gregory makes it stronger. No Christian, according to him, can prac-
tice asceticism, even in the mild forms of fasting or almsgiving, and at the same 
time own slaves or keep the riches that imply the impoverishment of other people.
3  Other source texts: from Essenes and 
Therapeutae to late antique and Byzantine 
sources: asceticism and authority
My source texts, besides those by Nyssen, range from the accounts given by Philo 
and Josephus of the rejection of slavery and social injustice by the ascetic Essenes 
and Therapeutae to late antique and early Byzantine sources concerning individ-
uals or couples who emancipated their slaves and gave up their possessions in 
favour of the poor upon embracing the ascetic life, as well as monastic groups 
who liberated all the slaves who joined their communities, and the institutional 
reaction of the Church of the Empire to this destabilising practice. In the case of 
Byzantine monasteries, asceticism could be a way to liberate slaves. Some mon-
asteries, as we shall see, kept fugitive slaves as ascetics, even refusing to return 
them to their owners.
It is correct, on the one hand, that, as Rebecca Krawiec (2008, 5) notes, 
‘asceticism emerges as a means of legitimating authority, rather than simply a set 
of religious practices’. This may have been the case, for instance, with bishops 
or other male authorities claiming control over female ascetics. But asceticism 
could also be subversive vis-à-vis authority, both ecclesiastical and social. This 
is proved by the fact that, as we shall see, the ‘official’ church had to intervene 
repeatedly to curb those ascetics’ revolutionary practice of freeing slaves against 
their masters’ will when they entered the monastic life. That meant subtracting 
slaves from the authority of their owners and from the social system in which 
slavery as an institution was embedded. And those ascetics who continued that 
practice with regard to slaves also went against the ecclesiastical authority that 
ordered the preservation of the social-legal status quo.
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3.1 Essenes and Therapeutae
Centuries earlier, the Jewish groups of Essenes and Therapeutae were already refus-
ing slavery and social iniquity, both de jure and de facto. These groups represent 
an important strand of philosophical asceticism that had its roots already in Greek 
philosophy. Their rejection of slavery went hand in hand with their ascetic life-
style, which, in the case of the former, according to Philo, entailed total disposses-
sion. In Philo’s report, the Essenes voluntarily had neither money nor possessions 
(ἀχρήματοι καὶ ἀκτήμονες, Every Good Person Is Free 1.77). This ideal of voluntary 
poverty, as well as of the rejection of slavery, was to be exalted by Nyssen, with 
specific reference to his family, and became a standard feature in Christian monas-
ticism. The link between asceticism, poverty, and philosophy, which was taken over 
in the tradition of Origen, Pamphilus, Eusebius, Nyssen, and Evagrius, is particu-
larly clear in Philo’s description of the Therapeutae in On Contemplative Life.
According to Sharon Weisser (2010, 308), neither Philo nor Nyssen aimed at 
the establishment of social justice but merely condemned the vanity and arro-
gance of slave ownership. This was indeed the case with Philo, who did not share 
the ideals of the Essenes and the Therapeutae and did not personally reject slave 
ownership. But the Essenes and Therapeutae themselves – at least as represented 
by our sources –, as well as Nyssen, did focus on injustice (ἀδικία) in their dis-
course about the rejection of slavery and social injustice. Jodi Magness, in a per-
sonal conversation at Metochi in summer 2013, endorsed the historicity of the 
Essenes and the Therapeutae and of their rejection of slavery and possessions, 
but suggested that their reasons may have had more to do with ritual purity. If this 
was the case, Philo and Josephus translated these reasons into more Hellenistic 
and philosophical terms. The description of the Essenes, as Joan Taylor (2004) 
notes, resembles that of the Pythagoreans, due to the attribution of philosophical 
asceticism to both. Richard Finn (2015, Chap. 2) also deems the Therapeutae to be 
close to Levites, while Philo depicted them in a more philosophical light.
In pre-Christian antiquity, ascetic Essenes and the Therapeutae are the sole 
groups credited with unequivocally refusing both to keep slaves and to recog-
nise slavery as an institution, on the grounds of the natural equality and kinship 
among all humans and an evaluation of slavery as intrinsically unjust. This pre-
supposes a strong link between equality and justice. Philo of Alexandria, in the 
first half of the first century CE, spoke of the Essenes in Every Good Person Is Free 
79. These ‘Jewish sages’, according to him, were superior in sanctity to all other 
sages with regard to ‘love for God, for virtue, and for humans’ (83). Philo informs 
us that these Essenes numbered over four thousand and their name derived from 
holiness/purity (ὁσιότης), which in itself suggests some form of asceticism. He 
describes them as ‘servants of God’ οn account of their will to make their interior 
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dispositions worthy of the divinity (75). Philo’s definition, therapeutae of God, 
may indicate a connection with the Therapeutae to whom Philo devoted a trea-
tise. They avoid all that which can arouse cupidity (78). They share their posses-
sions, meals, and homes (86) in reciprocal solidarity and renunciation of own-
ership (87). What inspired their ascetic practices was ‘freedom, which escapes 
every slavery’ (88). This is also why they rejected slavery both de jure and de facto.
The characteristics of the ascetic lifestyle of the Essenes are described in 
more detail in a substantial section of Josephus’ Jewish War (2.120–61): ‘holi-
ness/purity’, rejection of pleasure as a vice, and the embrace of ‘temperance 
and control of passions’ and sexual renunciation (120). Some of them married, 
but only for the sake of begetting children (160–1); all ‘despise riches’ and prac-
tice ‘communality of goods’, so that among them ‘one will nowhere see either 
abject poverty or inordinate wealth’ (122), as was also the case in the first Jesuan 
community in Jerusalem. The link between the excessive wealth of some and the 
poverty of many others was later highlighted by patristic thinkers such as Origen, 
Evagrius, and John Chrysostom, as well as Gregory Nyssen. They equated riches 
with theft, in the conviction that the wealth of some was the cause of the poverty 
of others.
The corresponding Slavonic tradition of Josephus’ Bellum expands on this: 
‘They have no kind of property, but among them all things are communal, both 
clothes and food’. When new members enter the community, ‘all the resources 
of the community are put at their disposal, as though they were their own’ (124). 
The adherents change their garments and shoes only when they are worn out and 
‘there is no buying or selling among them, but they give what they have to any in 
need, and receives from them in exchange what is useful to themselves. They are 
also freely permitted to take anything from any of their siblings without making 
any return’ (127).
The Essenes ‘help those deserving, when in need, and supply food to the 
destitute’ (133–5). The vow they made consisted in piety toward the deity, justice 
toward humans, wronging nobody, hating injustice, keeping faith with all people, 
loving truth, and abstaining from stealing, unholy gain, and robbery (139–42). 
Note the insistence on justice and avoiding the oppression of fellow humans.
That the Essenes rejected slave ownership is explicitly attested by Philo, 
who in Prob. 79, reports that these ascetics not only kept no slaves at all, but 
also rejected the very institution of slavery. They ‘denounced slave owners not 
only because of their injustice in violating the law of equality, but also due to their 
impiety in infringing the statute of Nature, who, like a mother, bore and reared all 
humans alike, and created them genuine siblings, not simply in name, but in very 
reality’. The Essenes refused to keep any slave, while most Stoics did not refrain 
from owning some or even many. The same passage by Philo confirms this: ‘It is 
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impossible to find even just one slave among them. On the contrary, all of them are 
free and serve each other.’ This was also the lifestyle of the Therapeutae accord-
ing to our sources. Josephus also reports that the Essenes kept no slaves because 
slavery is tantamount to injustice (ἀδικία, Jewish Antiquities 18.21).
Thus, Philo and Josephus concur in implying that the Essenes did not 
simply reject slave ownership as part and parcel of their vow of lack of property 
(ἀκτημοσύνη) and self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια), but because they realised the 
intrinsic injustice of the institution of slavery. This hypothesis is supported by 
Philo Prob. 79: the Essenes qualified the ‘injustice’ and ‘impiety’ that brought 
about the institution of slavery in terms of ‘arrogance and avarice’. The natural 
kinship and equality of all humans was blurred by ‘the triumph of the vicious 
arrogance and avarice’ of some who began to oppress others.
The project of these ascetics, the Essenes and Therapeutae, was elitist, insofar 
as it only involved isolated ascetic groups, but it was undoubtedly also radical in its 
refusal of slavery both de jure and de facto, at least in the representation provided by 
the Hellenised Jews Philo and Josephus. The same position, that slavery and social 
injustice must be rejected because they entail the oppression of fellow humans, will 
be held by Christian ascetics such as Nyssen, but the latter thought that not only 
ascetics, but all humans should reject slavery and limit social injustice.
In his On Contemplative Life, Philo makes the rejection of slavery a core 
feature of the ascetic Therapeutae, both in a moral sense (18–20) and in a literal 
sense (70–2). In Cont. 18–20 Philo describes these people as ‘no longer slaves of 
anybody’, because they have renounced all their possessions, including slaves, 
and all their relatives. In Cont. 70–2 Philo is not using the Stoic metaphor of moral 
slavery (on which see Ramelli 2016, Chap. 1): he testifies to the Therapeutae’s 
radical rejection of the institution of slavery and relates this to their asceticism:
They receive service, but not by slaves, because they deem the possession of servants alto-
gether against nature. For nature has generated all humans free; it is rather the acts of injus-
tice and arrogance of some people who pursue inequality, the principle of all evils, that, accu-
mulating upon one another, conferred to the stronger power over the weaker. Now, in this 
holy community, as I have said, nobody is a slave, but it is free people who serve other people, 
performing the necessary services not by force, nor waiting for orders, but anticipating the 
requests with zeal and willingness, voluntarily.
These services are not performed by any free person, no matter which, but it is rather the 
young of the group, selected on the basis of their excellence, who do so with every solici-
tude, in the way that becomes noble and distinguished people who strive for the highest 
virtue. These young people, as legitimate children, diligently and happily serve fathers and 
mothers, deeming them their own common parents, closer to themselves than their biological 
parents. For nothing is closer and more familiar to the wise than excellence in virtue. And 
while they perform these services, they wear no belt and let their short frocks hang down 
free, to avoid bringing even just a shade of slavish appearance.
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The motivations for the Therapeutae’s rejection of slavery are similar to those 
of the Essenes.
Both were ascetic groups stemming from Hellenistic Judaism and roughly 
contemporary with one another. The tenet that all humans are free by nature 
fits well with a Stoic framework. However, the Therapeutae did not simply reject 
slavery in principle but actually refused to own slaves. And they did so not merely 
on the grounds of a Cynic requirement for ἀκτημοσύνη, because they renounced 
all possessions, among which slaves were counted, but because they considered 
slavery, as an institution, to be against nature and an example of inequality, 
which is a fruit of injustice and arrogance, resulting in the oppression of others. 
Just as is the case with slavery, so too are the dire poverty of some and the exag-
gerated wealth of others instances of inequality among humans, which here is 
declared the principle of all evils.
Arguments against slavery and against social inequalities – replaced among 
Jewish ascetics by voluntary service and voluntary poverty – are very similar in 
these texts, as they will be again in Nyssen, who was well acquainted with Philo’s 
writings. He approved of the Therapeutae’s rejection of slavery and the freedom 
and promotion that asceticism offered to women, in this case the Therapeutrides, 
who were ‘mostly aged virgins’. They are described by Philo as women who ‘have 
kept their virginity without being forced to do so, unlike some Greek priestesses, 
but full willingly, out of their ardent desire for wisdom’. Voluntary asceticism, 
poverty, and service are identified as the highest freedom. Origen, Gregory, and 
other Christian ascetics agreed.
Junior Therapeutae served the elder, as children do their parents. In Decal. 2 
Philo insists again on the rejection of injustice by the Therapeutae. Cities, from 
which the Therapeutae flee, are full of all sorts of injustice (ἀδικίαι) against fellow 
humans. The Therapeutae counted slavery among these, as did the Essenes. 
Some Christians, such as Eusebius, considered the Therapeutae described by 
Philo to be Christians (Ramelli 2011), thus idealising ascetics who refused slavery 
and embraced voluntary poverty. Indeed, it is from ascetics that the few condem-
nations of slavery in ancient Christianity arose.
3.2  Asceticism of late ancient married couples and the giving 
up of slaves and possessions
At the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth, some married 
couples who embraced asceticism, such as the two Melaniae and Therasia and 
Paulinus of Nola, emancipated all of their slaves and renounced their immense 
wealth. Paulinus was born in Bordeaux from a very affluent family; a disciple 
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of Ausonius, he became the governor of Campania. In 394/95 Paulinus and his 
Spanish wife Therasia decided to pursue a life of prayer and chastity, giving 
their possessions away to the poor and renouncing slave ownership. Ambrose 
delighted in Therasia’s decision to give away all of her property and limit herself 
to Paulinus’ ‘tiny piece of turf’ (Letter 6.27). Paulinus, ordained a priest, retired 
to Nola, close to the tomb of St Felix, became the bishop there, and promoted the 
cult of the saint. He also publicly renounced his senatorial seat, a decision that 
attracted much criticism on the part of his peers, including Ausonius.
After the death of her husband, when she was twenty-two years of age, 
Melania the Elder espoused asceticism in the form of renunciation of wealth 
and slaves. She gave up all her vast possessions and moved from Rome to Egypt, 
where she dwelt with the Origenian monks dubbed ‘Tall Brothers’, whom she 
followed to Palestine in 373. As ascetics, they kept no slaves, so Melania served 
them voluntarily in that capacity. She even wore ‘the dress of a young slave’ and, 
when the consular of Palestine had her thrown into prison, she proudly declared 
herself to be the daughter and wife of prominent noblemen, but also ‘the slave of 
Christ’, like Paul (Palladius, Lausiac History 46). She founded a double monas-
tery in Jerusalem, which she directed and in which Rufinus too lived, supported 
by Melania as his patroness. For thirty-seven years she continued to give hospi-
tality, to support churches and monasteries, strangers, and prisoners, her family, 
her son himself, and her stewards by providing money; finally, ‘she possessed 
not even a span of land’ and died ‘having got rid of her possessions’ (ibid., 54). 
Melania persuaded her own granddaughter, Melania the Younger, her husband, 
and her daughter-in-law Albina, to sell all their goods and become ascetics. She 
read virtually all of the literary production of Origen, Nyssen, and Basil seven or 
eight times (ibid., 55); thus, she absorbed Origen’s ascetic ideals and the views on 
slavery and social justice of Gregory and Basil.
Indeed, Melania the Younger (Hunt 2016), aged twenty after the death of her 
two children, and her husband Pinianus decided to embrace monastic life, with 
the divestment of their massive wealth and the liberation of their slaves:
she freed 8,000 slaves [ἀνδράποδα] who wished freedom. For the rest did not wish it, but 
preferred to be slaves to her brother; and she allowed him to take them all for three pieces 
of money. But having sold her possessions in Spain, Aquitania, Tarragonia and the Gauls, 
she reserved for herself only those in Sicily, Campania, and Africa, and appropriated their 
income for the support of monasteries. Such was her wise conduct with regard to the burden 
of riches. And her asceticism was as follows. She ate every other day – to begin with after a 
five-day interval – and assigned to herself a part in the daily work of her own former slave-
women, whom also she made her fellow-ascetics [συνασκητρίδας]. She had with her also 
her mother Albina, who lived a similar ascetic life and distributed her riches for her part 
privately. Now these ladies are dwelling on their properties […] with fifteen eunuchs and 
sixty virgins, both free and former slaves. (ibid., 61)
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This report concurs with that by Gerontius, who, in his Life of Melania, rep-
resents Melania and Pinianus as renouncing the whole of their wealth as soon as 
they embraced asceticism. They may have kept some financial resources (Dunn 
2014, 113–4) but they did not use them for their own comfort, as they embraced 
an ascetic lifestyle, but for helping the poor and other ascetics.
The example of these ascetics contributes to showing the connection between 
asceticism and the renunciation of slave ownership and wealth. For many patris-
tic thinkers, and especially those of the Origenian-Evagrian line that was Mela-
nia’s own bedrock, reducing one’s wealth was just both in itself and for the sake 
of the poor, since wealth is tantamount to theft against them.
3.3  Various categories of late antique ascetics 
and their relation to slavery and social justice
Hermits or semi-hermits and extreme ascetics such as the stylites or dendrites – 
who lived respectively on pillars and on trees –, as well as the other ascetics of 
Syria described by Theodoret in his Religious History, kept neither slaves nor 
possessions or much money. Simeon the Stylite (c. 390–459), who lived for forty 
years on a pillar, led a life both of extreme poverty, with restraints of all sorts, 
and of renunciation of slave ownership. In Religious History 26, Theodoret por-
trays Simeon’s asceticism as philosophical, calling his ascetic life φιλοσοφία and 
φιλοπονία (love for labour), and the monastery in which he spent ten years a 
‘school of philosophy’. According to the biography in Athanasius, 2–3,  Antony (d. 
356), the father of monasticism, , was inspired by Jesus’ exhortation to sell all pos-
sessions and follow him, by the apostles’ leaving everything to follow Jesus, and 
by Acts’ description of the first Christian community as holding all possessions in 
common for the support of the needy (on this passage and its patristic reception 
see, e.g., Boulnois 2014). Antony renounced all his wealth when he embraced 
the ascetic life, gave the possessions of his forefathers to the villagers, and sold 
everything else that was movable, donating the revenues to the poor. Antony lib-
erated or sold the slaves who, presumably, worked on his parents’ estate, or he 
gave them, too, the land he owned when he distributed it to the villagers. He kept 
neither slaves nor possessions during his ascetic life.
Some monastic communities may have owned slaves not individually but in 
common. But in some monasteries, such as that of Macrina, this was not the case, 
since former slaves were freed before entering the monastery and did not have to 
serve therein. Both the ex-slaves and the free women served. In a work devoted 
to monasticism and attributed to Basil, the author insists that the monk must 
have no possessions whatsoever, having to embrace the ‘life without  possessions’ 
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(ἀκτήμων βίος, First Education in Asceticism PG 31.621.16). The same is maintained 
in another work attributed to Basil: a monk has first of all to enter an ἀκτήμων 
βίος (Ascetic Discipline, PG 31.648.42–3). We do not know whether here slaves 
could still be owned by the monastic community as a whole.
3.4  Gregory of Nyssa’s depiction of ascetics as models, 
his theory of ‘spiritual asceticism’, ‘invisible religion’, 
and individual and universal salvation
Among the most significant texts that are relevant to the present investigation 
are those by Gregory of Nyssa, both his portrayal of model ascetics in the bio- 
hagiography of his sister Macrina and his theological arguments and exhorta-
tions against slavery and social injustice. As we shall see, Gregory seems to offer 
his portraits of Macrina, Naucratius, and other ascetics who embraced poverty 
and voluntary service and rejected slavery as a model for his readers to imitate.
Gregory called for ‘spiritual fasting’ and ‘immaterial self-restraint’ based pri-
marily on the practice of justice, since he, like the Sentences of Sextus discussed 
above, maintained that ascetic practices such as fasting and almsgiving were 
not acceptable to God if one oppressed other people, kept slaves and excessive 
wealth, and did not practice justice. In On Doing Good 94, Gregory calls absti-
nence from oppressing other people ‘spiritual asceticism’:
There exists a spiritual fasting [νηστεία], an immaterial self-restraint [ἐγκράτεια]. Τhis is 
abstinence from sin, which pertains to the soul. Fast now from evil! Control yourself in your 
greed for what belongs to others! Give up dishonest gains! Starve your idolatrous greed 
for money to death! Let nothing be stored up in your house that comes from violence and 
robbery. It is to no avail that you maintain meat far from your mouth if you bite your brother 
out of evilness. It is to no avail that you keep strict frugality by yourself if you rob the poor 
with injustice. What kind of devotion makes you drink mere water, while with your machi-
nations you ignobly deceive someone else and drink their blood?
Ascetic practices are in vain if one does not renounce the oppression of other 
people by means of such things as slavery, usury, and theft, which are described 
as ‘injustice’ and ‘evil’. This position was inherited by the Evagrian Cassian: 
fasting is not only abstinence from material food but also fasting spiritually 
(Inst. 5.21.1): abstaining from greed, amassing wealth, owning slaves, etc. Abba 
Theodore is reported to have deemed it best to possess nothing, not even books 
(Apophthegmata Patrum, alphabetic series, Theodore of Pherme 1, PG 65.188).
Macrina, the sister of Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa, a lady coming 
from a rich and noble family, lived in a house-monastery – led by herself – like, 
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later, the Mediaeval noble ladies Gertrude Rickeldey of Ortenberg and Heilke of 
Staufenberg (see Mulder-Bakker in this section). Gregory’s bio- hagiography of 
Macrina and her fellow nuns (Ramelli 2019) could indeed be seen as an indi-
cator of an intended institutionalisation of individualisation (bearing in mind 
that ‘processes of religious individualisation are closely connected to the for-
mation of institutions and traditions, and the interactions among them must 
be systematically examined’, as remarked by Fuchs et al. 2016a, 11), for Gregory 
wanted all Christians – and not only strict ascetics – to renounce slave own-
ership as well as wealth that exceeds one’s needs. Likewise, the biographers 
of those late antique ascetics who renounced all wealth and all slaves upon 
the embrace of what they represented as philosophical asceticism arguably 
intended to produce models to be followed. Thus, while on the one hand the 
house monastery of Macrina and those late antique ascetics who espoused 
asceticism and rejected wealth and slave ownership provide types of priva-
tisation and ‘invisible religion’ (Rüpke 2015, 347) – to the point that Gregory 
Nazianzen exalted the secrecy and hiddenness of the life of Macrina (Ramelli 
2010) –, on the other hand, the accounts of Gregory and the biographies of the 
other ascetics were intended to provide ideal models of religious and societal 
practices for a wide range of people.
Nyssen’s attitude and intention can be contrasted with that of Philo: the 
latter reported the radical views and behaviour of Essenes and Therapeutae 
against slavery, private property, and social injustice, but he did not aim at 
providing a viable model for many people. For, unlike Gregory, Philo deemed 
slavery indispensable to relieve masters of menial tasks (On special laws 2.82, 
2.123) and did not think that all should follow the example of the Therapeutae 
and embrace voluntary poverty and service, while renouncing slave owner-
ship.
In the main exponents of Christian philosophical asceticism, it is possible 
to detect both an enhanced focus on the ‘self ’ and individual salvation (on 
which see Fuchs 2015, 335; Ramelli 2019a), and, at the same time, a concern 
for, and theorisation of, universal salvation. Indeed, Nyssen, Macrina, and 
Evagrius, like their inspirer Origen, were all universalists in their soteriology 
(Ramelli 2013). But Origen and Gregory also stressed individual freewill. Indeed, 
Origen even made it a core feature of his antivalentinian polemic – and note 
its relevance to philosophical ethics, but also to social sciences and history, as 
highlighted recently by Ramsay MacMullen (2014). Moral responsibility is the 
gist of Origen’s ethics and philosophical theology. In these religious thinkers 
we can see at work a focus on individual, experience-based spirituality in the 
mysticism and mystic apophaticism shared by Nyssen, Origen, and Evagrius 
(as argued by Ramelli 2018a).
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4 Equality in different ascetic groups
It is interesting to examine the different practices of these protomonastic and 
monastic communities or individuals, from Antony to Macrina, Naucratius, 
Melania, Evagrius, etc. A striking discrepancy can be observed regarding the 
retention or rejection of slave ownership and social hierarchy: Macrina liberated 
her slaves and made them her own peers, homotimoi, sharing the same works 
with them. But Paula, the ascetic, wealthy friend of Jerome’s, in her house- 
monastery in Bethlehem, maintained all social distinctions, even emphasising 
them spatially (Jerome, Letter 108). Here, the virgins were not at all ὁμότιμοι but 
were divided into three classes: noble, middle, and lowest. They worked and ate 
separately, only joining together for psalmody and prayer.
Macrina, instead, lived together with her ex-slaves in her monastery, sharing 
her ascetic life with them. She and her siblings encouraged their household slaves 
to enter their proto-monastic community. In his bio-hagiography of his sister (Life 
of Macrina GNO 8.1.377.25–378.5), Gregory himself, full of admiration, recounts 
how Macrina convinced her mother Emmelia to join her ascetic community and 
live together with their own former slaves, now made ‘of equal dignity’ (ὁμότιμοι) 
with their ex-masters. Emmelia made ‘all the slaves and servants she had, her 
sisters and equals’, ὁμοτίμους – not rhetorically, but because she renounced 
being served by her ex-slaves: she ‘gave up the services performed by her slaves’. 
In 381.22–7, the keyword ὁμότιμος in reference to Emmelia and her former slaves 
is repeated, and further details about Emmelia’s equality with her former slaves 
are given: she shared the same table and the same kind of bed with them. Reli-
gious ascetic communities such as this mostly worked in a manner closer to the 
‘gift-exchange mode’ delineated in this section by Herrmann-Pillath than in the 
‘market-exchange mode’.
Gregory emphasises that for Emmelia, Macrina, and their family, embracing 
ascetic life coincided with giving up being slave owners. Thus, Gregory draws a 
close connection between asceticism – the ‘angelic life’ – and rejection of slavery. 
Gregory also extols his brother Naucratius for adopting ‘a life without posses-
sions’ (ἀκτήμονα βίον, ibid., 378.17) when he embraced an ascetic lifestyle, and 
for his ‘renunciation of possessions’ (ἀκτημοσύνη, ibid., 382.12), ‘bringing with 
himself nothing else than himself’. Naucratius accepted that one of his former 
slaves followed him, not to be served by him, but to share ‘the same life choice 
with him’ (ibid., 378.19–21). Far from being served by his ex-slave, Naucratius 
made himself a servant of the poor, old, and ill (379.6–7). Naucratius and Peter, 
the future bishop of Sebaste, in the same biography of Macrina, are exalted as 
ascetics by their brother Gregory far more than is Basil. Naucratius is praised for 
refusing any ecclesiastical position and for privileging asceticism and poverty. 
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Peter is praised for cooperating with Macrina in the angelic life of asceticism and 
for being a faithful disciple of hers, who was his ‘father, professor, pedagogue, 
mother, and counsellor of every good’ (Life of Macrina, 12.11–13, 27–30). Asceti-
cism is again paired with total renunciation of slave ownership, and even volun-
tary self-assimilation to slaves, as well as voluntary poverty.
5  Conflict between ascetic groups  
and the ‘Church of the Empire’:  
ascetic impulse to ‘de-traditionalisation’
This investigation offers valuable avenues for reflection on the institutionalisa-
tion of forms of religious individualisation, especially with respect to the institu-
tionalisation of asceticism in ecclesiastical structures and the attitudes of ascet-
ics and ascetic groups toward social justice and slavery. I think, for instance, of 
Eustathius of Sebaste (in Armenia-Pontus), depicted as a philosophical ascetic 
committed to social justice and the liberation of slaves independently of their 
owners’ consent, the official church reaction at the Synod of Gangra in the 340s 
against the practice, promoted by Eustathius and his followers, of liberating 
slaves even without their owners’ consent, and the resistance of monastic groups 
to this official ecclesiastical reaction. Eustathius was an ascetic who supervised 
a hospice for the poor in the 350s CE. He likely inspired Basil’s plan for his own 
hospice for the needy. Basil himself, in Letter 244, testifies that he had upheld 
Eustathius as a model since his youth. Socrates relates that Eustathius was the 
son of Eulalius, the bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia, the same seat as Basil the 
Great held, but Eulalius deemed his son unfit for the priesthood and the episco-
pal dignity (Church History 2.43).
Eustathius organised almshouses, hospitals, refuges, and the like (Epipha-
nius, Against Heresies 75.1 and Sozomen, Ecclesiastical History 3.14.36). He was 
the teacher of Macrina and Basil, who both emphasised asceticism and the rejec-
tion of slavery and social injustice. But Macrina, Basil, and Nyssen mitigated Eus-
tathius’ radicalism, dropping especially the prohibition of marriage, at least for 
non-ascetics. Socrates relates Eustathius’ teaching and activity, which was full 
of ascetic traits, and attests to Eustathius’ commitment to the liberation of slaves 
independently of their owners’ consent:
He forbade marriage and taught as a dogma that it was necessary to abstain from foods. 
This is why he separated many people who were married from their partners and persuaded 
those who were averse to churches to make communion in private houses. He also snatched 
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slaves from their masters under the pretext of piety. He wore philosophical garb himself, 
and had his followers wear a strange outfit, and women cut their hair. He also taught to 
neglect the prescribed fasting days and rather fast on Sundays, and prohibited praying in 
the houses of married people. He prescribed to decline as a defilement the blessing and 
communion of a presbyter who had a wife, even if he had married her according to the law 
while he was still a layman. (Church History 2.43)
A synod at Gangra, in Paphlagonia, in the 340s, not only prohibited the liberation 
of slaves in monasteries against their owners’ consent, as we shall see in the next 
paragraph, but in Canon 12 also forbade the use of the philosopher’s mantle for the 
sake of asceticism – and Eustathius is presented by Socrates as a philosopher. He 
is said to have worn philosophical attire even when he was a bishop, like Heraclas 
of Alexandria according to Origen. In a letter reported by Eusebius (Church History 
6.19.12–4), Origen defended his interest in philosophy, which he never abandoned. 
He adduces the examples of Pantaenus and Heraclas, both Christian philoso-
phers in Alexandria. Pantaenus had an excellent preparation in philosophy and 
Greek disciplines, and Heraclas, the future bishop of Alexandria, ‘who now sits in 
the πρεσβυτέριον of Alexandria’, not only was a Christian philosopher, but even 
dressed as a philosopher. He was still wearing philosophical garb and studying 
the ‘books of the Greeks’ when Origen wrote his letter. There was a connection 
between Eustathius’ being a philosopher and his asceticism, which surely had an 
impact on his rejection of slavery. Asceticism and philosophy went together in Ori-
gen’s life, too, according to Pamphilus and Eusebius, and in Philo’s life, according 
to Eusebius – who modelled his portrait of Philo on that of Origen (Ramelli 2011a).
Eustathius and his followers were condemned by the above-mentioned 
synod at Gangra for their teachings, including, most prominently, their campaign 
for the liberation of slaves. Sozomen, Church History 3.14.36, reports that Eus-
tathius submitted to this council, but an Antiochian synod condemned him again 
for ‘perjury’ (ibid., 4.24.9). The official teaching of the ‘Church of the Empire’, as 
expressed in the third canon of Gangra, was that slavery had to be retained as 
an institution. The canon condemned to excommunication those who exhorted 
slaves to stop serving their masters, which they should have done, moreover with 
respect and goodwill, as the deutero- and pseudo-Pauline house codes com-
manded (on which see Ramelli 2016, Chap. 2).
A century later, the fourth canon of the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE) again 
forbade monasteries from offering refuge to runaway slaves without the per-
mission of their masters. The reiteration of the prohibition suggests that ascetic 
groups had meanwhile continued to free slaves against their masters’ will. Mon-
asteries were used as asylum for runaway slaves (Rotman 2009, 144–50). This 
confirms that many ascetics within the church rejected slavery, as some Jewish 
and perhaps some ‘pagan’ philosophical ascetics had already done.
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Zeno decreed that slaves, provided that their masters agreed, should be 
allowed to participate in monastic life (484 CE). As long as they continued to be 
monks, their owners had to renounce the exercise of ownership and lordship over 
them. But if those former slaves left the monastic life, they would automatically 
return to the condition of slaves (Codex Iustinianus 1.3.37). This points again to a 
strong connection between ascetic life and the rejection of slavery. The focus in 
this case is not on a slave owner who renounces the keeping of slaves when he or 
she embraces asceticism, but rather on the slave himself or herself, who is freed 
from a condition of enslavement upon adhesion to asceticism.
However, the need for the slave owner’s permission severely limited the 
effects of Zeno’s decree, whereas monks such as those condemned at Gangra and 
at Chalcedon acted independently of the consent of masters. Eustathius and his 
followers were undermining the institution of slavery both in monasteries and 
even in society at large.
The connection between asceticism, monasticism, and the rejection of slavery 
becomes especially clear in the age of Justinian, when monasteries were allowed 
to receive fugitive slaves who intended to become monks, unless they perpetrated 
a crime. However, the legal owner of these slaves could still reclaim their slaves 
within three years of their embracing the monastic life (Rotman 2009, 144–5). 
Another open issue, as I mentioned, is that of the possibility for the monastery as 
a whole to own slaves collectively, as opposed to individual ownership of one or 
more slaves. However, monasteries – the stronghold of asceticism – appear as the 
single space where slaves could actually gain independence from their owners. In 
some cases, poverty was mandatory not only for the individual monks, but also for 
the monastery as a whole. For instance, Cassian, in the early fifth century, exhorted 
monks to give up wealth not only individually, but also collectively: the monastery 
itself had to be poor and to renounce endowments from its members or rich dona-
tions from outside. And in Conferences 18, Cassian observes that the true monks are 
those who reproduce the lifestyle of the first Christian community as depicted in 
Acts – although in Acts the point was not poverty, but the sharing of possessions.
As in the case of the Eleusinian mysteries, not only is participation in 
 ascetic-monastic life based on personal choice, but individual initiation prom-
ises a change of fate in the afterlife (see Patera’s paper in this section). The main 
difference is that the Eleusinian mysteries were run by the polis, while monaster-
ies were, in many cases, not a direct expression of political power and, indeed, 
sometimes came into overt conflict with it, such as when they liberated slaves 
against the will of their masters. This went not only against the Roman institution 
of slavery, but also against the church’s official decree at Gangra.
The present investigation also seems to bear on, and support the notion, of 
de-traditionalisation as described by Jörg Rüpke (2013, 7), in which ‘individual 
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action is less and less determined by traditional norms handed down by family 
and the larger social context’. Indeed, those who rejected slave ownership and 
possessions were going against societal norms and even the institution of slavery 
itself, which was a pillar of ancient society and economy; hence also the harsh 
criticism of ‘pagan’ polemicists against Christian ascetics as destroyers of society 
(Ramelli 2016, 219–20). Already Celsus criticised Jesus’ claim that the rich have no 
access to God, and that people should not be concerned with food, granary attics, 
clothes and wealth (Origen C. Cels. 7.18). The practices of Eustathius and his fol-
lowers, as well as monastic resistance to Gangra, clearly questioned established 
religious and societal norms, concepts, and institutions.
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Lived religion and eucharistic piety  
on the Meuse and the Rhine in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries
1 Introduction
In 1323, when Gertrude Rickeldey of Ortenberg, a lay religious lady in Strasbourg, 
decided to renounce all property, she met with strong resistance from her con-
fessor, a Friar Minor. Deeply frustrated by his censure, she found comfort in her 
friend and life companion Heilke of Staufenberg: ‘Getruwe im [unserm Herren] wol 
und nim din selbes war […] volge dem daz in dir ist’ (‘Trust Him [the Lord] well and 
know yourself […] follow what is inside you’).1 These words spoken by a laywoman 
in the fourteenth century give food for thought to those searching for religious 
individualisation in the Middle Ages. They suggest that the individual as a moral 
category is not simply a discovery of the (Early) Modern world, as is usually held. 
Regarding earlier scholarship, Cary J. Nederman (2010) has already concluded: 
‘Renaissance and Reformation constituted a watershed for the appearance of the 
individual as a moral and political category.’ In contrast, Nederman himself, in his 
own insightful overview of ‘Individual Autonomy’ in the medieval period, shows 
that individualisation started long before, from the twelfth century onwards.
Since Colin Morris published his The Discovery of the Individual (1050–1200) 
in 1972, and Caroline Walker Bynum in 1982 recast his researches in terms of 
‘“Discovery of the Individual” or “Discovery of Self”?’, an increasing number 
of researchers have noted a growing role for free choice and individual liberty 
in private and public affairs in the later Middle Ages. They observe a realm of 
personal discretion in decision-making with which no one may interfere, and a 
freedom to speak critically. According to Nederman (2010, 552), ‘Know thyself 
typifies the individualistic outlook present among many medieval thinkers’. 
Already in the 1120s, Abelard gave his book on ethics the title Scito Teipsum 
1 The Saintly Life 220v. The Middle High German biography, Von dem heiligen Leben der Seligen Fro-
wen genant die Rückeldegen, is kept in Brussels, Royal Library of Belgium, MS 8507–09, fol. 133r-239v. 
Derkits 1990 gives a transcript of this text with an historical introduction. See also Derkits 1991, 
Hillenbrand 2010, Hillenbrand 2011, and Mulder-Bakker 2014. In collaboration with Freimut Löser 
and Michael Hopf, I have prepared an edition of this biography in an English translation provided 
by Gertrud Jaron Lewis and based on the Brussels manuscript: Mulder-Bakker 2017. I quote from this 
edition under the title The Saintly Life. The edition is prefaced by a historical study written by myself.
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(“Know thyself” – Clanchy 1997), and in the 1320s William of Ockham developed 
theories of imprescriptible natural rights and natural liberty conceded by God 
to mankind: rights that endowed each individual with freedom of judgement as 
a ius. The intellectual historian Larry Siedentop, in his Inventing the Individual, 
speaks of the ‘birth pangs of modern liberty’ in this context (Siedentop 2014, 
281–348). Heilke’s advice to Gertrude seems to be in line with Ockham’s theory 
that all individuals have the right to trust their own conscience and follow their 
interior voice. It is no surprise, therefore, that Ockham committed his ideas to 
writing in collaboration with a group of spiritual Franciscans, one of whom was 
Henry of Talheim, a Franciscan Lesemeister (learned friar) from Strasbourg, and 
a longstanding intimus of Gertrude.2 Forms of religious individualisation can thus 
be surmised for the later Middle Ages; but what of institutionalisation?
Whereas Nederman and most scholars with him limit their studies to philoso-
phers and theologians, it is my purpose to extend my search for processes of reli-
gious individualisation to laypeople, and in particular to two pairs of lay religious 
women. On the first of these, Juliana and Eve, I have already published a comprehen-
sive study in my Lives of the Anchoresses (Mulder-Bakker 2005, 78–147, 233–55). The 
second pair is Gertrude and Heilke. During my stay in Erfurt in 2014/15, as a fellow 
of the Max Weber College in the context of the project ‘Religious Individualisation 
in a historical Perspective’, I was able to complete a study and edition of Gertrude’s 
Life (Mulder-Bakker 2017). In the present text I will study these women’s claims to 
individual conscience and choice, and ask whether and how these were addressed 
by church leaders. I will pose the question whether they may have inspired theo-
logians and prominent churchmen of their time, and ‘infiltrated’ the institutional 
Church. It will become clear that, from their anchorhold and their House of Souls, 
they did in fact inspire laypeople in the area of conventions and traditions. In this 
way I meant to contribute to reflections on processes of institutionalisation, which 
hardly existed, and of conventionalisation, which were booming.
2  Juliana of Cornillon, theologian 
and inventor of the Corpus Christi festival, 
and Eve of Saint-Martin
In 1197, two wealthy girls, Juliana and Agnes, orphaned at a young age, were 
entrusted to the convent of Cornillon in order to be raised there. The orphans 
2 See hereafter.
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brought with them a huge dowry, which placed the convent deeply in their debt. 
Cornillon was a civic institution located just outside the city walls of Liège. It 
consisted of a leprosarium, rest homes for rich people of leisure, and a place for 
young children to be educated. It had two departments: a female convent led 
by a prioress, and a male convent led by a prior who acted as head of the entire 
institution. Its board of governors consisted of city dignitaries and episcopal rep-
resentatives. It was not, therefore, an ecclesiastical institution. No vows were 
taken by the brothers and sisters, and no monastic rule was followed (Spiegeler 
1980; 1987).
Juliana, whom we now know as Juliana of Cornillon (1192–1258), proved to 
be a bookish young woman.3 She could usually be found in a quiet corner, devot-
ing herself to study and contemplation. ‘Semper meditativa erat’, her biographer 
tells us: she was always meditating. She received a solid education, and learned 
to read the psalter and the main texts of the Bible. Besides vernacular texts, she 
studied patristic Latin literature and the sermons of Bernard of Clairvaux: she 
knew his sermons on the Song of Songs by heart. The prioress, who was respon-
sible for her upbringing, brought the studious girl into contact with the teachers 
and students of the schools in Liège. Juliana may even, like Beatrice of Nazareth 
and others, have attended one of the excellent chapter schools. She will also have 
received some liturgical training (cf. Steenwegen 1983).
As a child, Juliana lived at the Boverie, in the meadows outside the convent 
buildings, and had her own oratorium where she could find solitude. As an adult, 
acting as the prioress of the female convent, she lived in her own house, separate 
from the other sisters. Having had to flee from Liège in 1247, she became a Beguine 
at Namur, and spent her last years in a reclusorium at Fosses. It should be noted 
that Juliana was not a nun; she did not follow a monastic rule; and at Fosses she 
was not formally enclosed as an anchoress. She was an informal recluse. For us 
studying religious individualisation, it is good to realise that there were many 
more laypeople in the later Middle Ages who were attracted to a full-time religious 
life, but also wanted to keep their independence. They lived a lay spiritual life in 
an urban environment, and are not to be counted as (semi-)monastics.4
3 See the Vita Julianae, written by a younger scholastic from Liège c. 1260, in the edition by 
Delville 1999. This edition is based on the ‘official’ manuscript of Juliana’s Vita, written in Cornil-
lon c. 1280 and now kept in Paris, B.N., MS Arsenal 945. It supersedes the edition in the AASS, 
and the English translation by Barbara Newman (1988) based on the AASS. Newman wrote an 
improved translation and a new introduction in ‘The Life of Juliana of Cornillon’, published 
in Mulder-Bakker (ed.) 2011, 143–302. For an in-depth study of Juliana’s life and thought, see 
Mulder-Bakker 2005, 78–147, 233–55.
4 I entirely disagree with Elm 1998 on this.
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Juliana was often visited by a younger girl, Eve (d. after 1264), probably her 
cousin. After Eve, in adulthood, had herself formally enclosed as an anchoress 
at the collegiate church of Saint Martin in Liège, Juliana often visited her and 
stayed with her in the anchorhold, sometimes for prolonged periods. Eve proved 
to be a very intelligent and energetic person, who acted as Juliana’s sparring 
partner and helped her set up the Corpus Christi festival. Anchoresses too are 
laywomen living religious lives on their own. They were usually held in high 
esteem by the lay faithful and churchmen alike. Because Saint-Martin was a 
meeting place for reform-minded prelates and scholastics, Eve from her anchor-
hold could mediate between Juliana and these learned theologians and leading 
churchmen, among them the Parisian Magister Hugh of St. Cher, provincial of 
the Dominicans at that time, and his friend Jacques Pantaléon, archdeacon of 
Liège, who, as Pope Urban IV (1261–1264), would institute the feast of Corpus 
Christi in 1264.
During the celebration of the Eucharist, at the silent part of the Mass, 
Juliana as a young adult habitually saw a full moon with a small portion 
missing. It is easy to imagine that she saw the priest in the choir upholding the 
incomplete circle formed by the host between his thumb and index finger. For 
her it symbolised an imperfect church, where the faithful hardly understood 
what the celebrant was doing as he muttered formulas in mumbo jumbo during 
the silent canon. She asked Christ what the hidden meaning of her vision was, 
and received the unsettling answer that a new festival had to be introduced in 
the Church, the feast of Corpus Christi, and that she had to prepare for it and 
promote it through the medium of the humiles, the lay faithful: ‘And you cannot 
leave this to the magni clerici, the leading churchmen.’ As later appears from her 
liturgy, Juliana’s overriding concern was the communal experience of the faith-
ful during mass, not just a new ritual performed by the clergy. Small wonder, 
then, that she could not leave it to the clerics to institute the festival, since they 
took little interest in the feelings of common believers, and, especially after the 
Fourth Council of the Lateran in 1215, when the separation between clergy and 
laity had become a fact, were increasingly preoccupied with their own sacerdo-
tium, the priesthood.5
5 An illuminating study of the Eucharist and the spirituality it was embedded in is Macy 1974. 
Angenendt 2013, in his monumental Offertorium, 379, gives no attention to the Corpus Christi 
Office, mentioning only the procession in the streets.
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2.1  Support from prominent theologians and prelates 
of the church
Juliana then commenced work on a eucharistic theology to provide justification 
for the feast of Corpus Christi, and devoted some twenty years to thinking through 
the content and meaning of the Eucharist for the purpose of a liturgical celebra-
tion. She read many church authors and theological tracts, especially from the 
twelfth century, including Alger of Liège and Lotharius of Segni (= Pope Innocent 
III); quotations from their work are discernible in her liturgy.
In the 1230s (when Juliana was in her forties) she submitted her thoughts to 
prominent theologians and prelates, notably Jacques Pantaléon, later to be pope, 
and Hugh of St. Cher, the Dominican scholastic in Paris, as well as to local Domin-
icans and to the former chancellor of the University of Paris, Guiard of Laon; they 
are mentioned by name in the Vita Julianae. They all approved. With the help 
of a skilled cleric, a litteratus who knew how to write Latin hymns and compose 
music, she invented a complete liturgy with texts and music, both for the feast 
day itself and the octave following: the office Animarum Cibus.6 Eve, the anchor-
ess, started to disseminate the festival via her network of female faithful, and col-
lected money for the altar plates. The first Corpus Christi Mass was sung in 1246 
at the deathbed of Bishop Robert of Thourotte. The feast seemed on the way to 
gaining universal acceptance. Unfortunately, the new bishop, Henry of Guelders, 
was fiercely opposed to Juliana and her feast, so that she had to flee from Liège; 
she died in exile in 1258.
But her friend Eve did not give up. She had persuaded Hugh of St. Cher, 
then papal legate, to celebrate the liturgy in person in 1251 in the church of Saint 
Martin, the church where Eve had her anchorhold. After Juliana’s death in 1258, 
she collected all evidence relating to her and to the origins of the festival and 
wrote it down in a booklet in French.7 This anecdotal history was developed into a 
6 The office Animarum Cibus is not preserved, but was reconstructed by Lambot and Fransen 
in 1946. It is studied and re-edited in Walters, Corrigan, Ricketts (eds.) 2006. I consider Juliana 
to be the intellectual author of the office, although her Latin hagiographer writes that the cleric 
‘started with writing and she with praying’. When he had written a section he presented it to her: 
‘And what Christ’s virgin had approved, he kept; and what the virgin found in need of correction, 
she corrected herself or left it to him to correct’ [italics mine]. This is a bold statement about a 
female for a medieval hagiographer, so bold that the Bollandists omitted these words from their 
edition in the AASS.
7 Eve’s narrative in French, qualified as Fragmenta by the Latin hagiographer and mostly con-
sidered to be some loose notes in modern scholarship, was still kept in Cornillon in the seven-
teenth century and then qualified as Vita Gallice scripta by Barthélemy Fisen in his Origo prima 
festi Corporis Christi (1628), a vernacular vita, therefore. See Mulder-Bakker 2005, 120–1 and 
724   Anneke B. Mulder-Bakker
fully-fledged saint’s life in Latin by an unknown scholastic: I surmise it may have 
been Godfrey of Fontaines before he left Liège for Paris.8 He completed the Vita 
shortly after 1260, just in time for it to be used by Jacques Pantaléon, now Pope 
Urban IV, to institute the festival in 1264.
The pope wrote a moving bull to Eve, the now elderly anchoress in Liège: ‘We 
know, o daughter, with what intense longing your soul has desired the institution 
of this solemn festival of the most holy Body of our Lord Jesus Christ in the Church 
[…]. Know then that we have established it as a universal feast and that we have 
celebrated it with all the prelates here in Orvieto’ (Lambot 1969).
He attached to the bull an official copy of the Corpus Christi Office, and 
charged Eve that ‘you respectfully receive this quire and that you freely and liber-
ally provide a copy to all persons who request it’. An exceptional honour for the 
anchoress: but in fact an honour with a hidden caveat. For the quire contained a 
revised version of the Corpus Christi liturgy; it was not Juliana’s office, but a text 
adapted by the leading scholastic of the day, Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas appar-
ently convinced the pope that the office as it stood was not acceptable to him or 
to the Church. This adapted office is known as Sacerdos in aeternum Christus.9
2.2  Juliana’s office Animarum Cibus and Aquinas’ office 
Sacerdos in aeternum: a comparison
What, then, did Juliana write in her office, and what did Aquinas not approve of? 
What do we have today in the Roman Catholic Church, where we still celebrate 
this office as one of the popular spring festivals? Juliana’s office opens with the 
Mulder-Bakker 2011, 27–32. I hypothesise that Eve’s narrative in French must have been similar to 
the anecdotal Middle High German biography on Gertrude Rickeldey of Ortenberg, also written 
by a female biographer; see hereafter.
8 Geoffrey of Fontaines, himself from the Liège area, came to study in Paris around 1270 and be-
came one of the prominent theologians. In circles of religious women’s studies nowadays, he is 
best known as the scholastic who approved of Marguerite Porete’s Miroir des Simples Âmes. In a 
miscellany manuscript, Paris, B.N. lat. 16297, partly written in Geoffrey’s own hand in c. 1270, he 
collected, among other things, a tract containing the latest insights into Eucharistic theology and 
a summary of the reasons why the Feast of Corpus Christi should be introduced. He propagated 
a form of incarnation theology, with the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and even a re-
jection of the daily sacrifice by the priest (fols. 237a-237b), a position that Juliana would certainly 
have affirmed. See Glorieux 1931, and illuminating remarks by Delville in Laffineur-Crépin 1990.
9 Thomas’ office is not preserved either. We cannot even be absolutely sure that he is the author 
of the text Sacerdos in aeternum that we know now, but since Zawilla 1985 there is no longer any 
serious doubt. A new edition is still underway; I use Thomas Aquinas XV, 1864, 233–8.
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antiphon Animarum cibus: ‘Food for souls. The wisdom of God places before us 
a meal of the flesh that He assumed; we are invited to taste his divinity by eating 
the food of his humanity.’10 Juliana envisioned a grand and solemn festival, in 
which the faithful gathered together in church and proclaimed their communion 
with God and one another, thus forging and confirming the bond of peace and 
love. She assigned no place to the priest as a separate actor in the drama. He is 
the officiant included in ‘we, the faithful’. For Juliana, the Eucharist is all about 
the joy of having Christ present in the community on earth. ‘I am with you always, 
even unto the end of the world’ (Mt. 28:20). Christ is right here, she sings, every 
day anew, cotidie, cotidie.
Thomas’s message is quite different. In keeping with his view of the sacer-
dotium, he concentrates on the priest.11 ‘Sacerdos in aeternum Christus’ (‘Christ 
our high priest in eternity’) are his opening words, and the priestly celebrant is 
Christ’s representative. ‘God chose to institute this Sacrifice [of the Mass] in such 
a way that he entrusted the ministerium of it only to priests. To them it is permit-
ted to partake [of the bread and wine] and to then distribute it to the others.’ The 
priest comes first, the community of the faithful follow, and individual believers 
disappear from sight. The messages, and the religious cultures in which they are 
embedded, could hardly be more different.
It is Aquinas’ liturgy that is accepted in the Church and sung today. However, 
as Miri Rubin has shown, the Sacramentsfeest or Fronleichnamsfest, as it is called 
in the Netherlands and in Germany, stole out of the church building and into the 
streets of the city. As the feast of the urban community, it became the symbol of 
their communion (= common union with God and one another). It was mainly 
celebrated in processions and street theatre (Rubin 1991). In short, the festival of 
Corpus Christi became both an official feast of the Church, with Aquinas’ liturgy, 
and a festival of the urban community organised by the city council or the guilds 
and celebrated in the streets, with, for instance, Corpus Christi Plays as in York 
(Beckwith 2001). As one of the Erfurt fellows noticed: ‘the resulting ambivalence 
of the Corpus Christi festival seems still perceptible to me. On the one hand, it is 
10 Lambot and Fransen 1946. See Mulder-Bakker 2005, 102–11, also for the following.
11 Thomas in hymn Ad Matutinas: ‘Sic sacrificium istud instituit,/Cuius officium committi volu-
it/solis presbyteris, quibus sic congruit,/Ut sumant, et dent ceteris.’ In correspondence, Father 
Jean-Pierre Torrel, the eminent Dominican scholar and Aquinas expert, in answer on my ques-
tions to him in 2004, commented: ‘vous touchez un point qui m’a toujours un peu intrigué; il y 
a là une insistance sur le rôle du prêtre qui confine á la polemique; sur ce point, il se  pourrait 
que vous ayez raison et qu’on trouve là un exemple de “dialogue” entre une mystique et un 
 théologien – même si le théologien a cru devoir faire une mise au point et peut-être une rectifi-
cation des idées de Julienne.’
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a very “clerical” feast, the priest with the Eucharist leading the procession, often 
under a canopy, etc. On the other hand, in a lot of parishes it is a feast of enor-
mous communal importance.’
2.3 Tentative conclusions
Two well-educated laywomen, schooled in theology, reflected on religion as lived 
in the urban community, thinking up new theologies and new forms to express 
the religious feelings of the common faithful. They focused on the personal 
and communal piety of believers, sidestepping the mediating role of the clergy. 
Juliana and Eve appropriated religious agency by inventing a new feast and dis-
seminating it via lay believers, the humiles, mainly the network of women and 
men around Eve and Juliana. In Eve’s anchorhold, they met with leading church-
men and scholastics.
These women had no ecclesiastical status. Juliana and Eve were just lay-
women living solitary religious lives, the one in an anchorhold, the other in 
an informal reclusive home. They demonstrated what pursuits well-educated 
and energetic laywomen were able to encompass, at least when they chose a 
life style where they could keep their own power of decision, and receive the 
support of the faithful and of reform-minded clergy. Their manner of religious 
life was a good model for other ambitious laywomen, at least in Northern 
Europe.
At the same time, the women maintained intense intellectual contact with 
leading theologians of the day, for instance the Dominican magister and later 
papal legate Hugh of St. Cher. It is my impression that Juliana’s visions and her 
activities as a ‘prophetic theologian’ influenced Hugh in his own work. I cannot 
go into detail here, but, as I demonstrated in my Lives of the Anchoresses, Hugh’s 
support for Juliana is intertwined with his own intellectual development: his new 
ideas about the Eucharist, and his instigation of the discussion of the nature of 
prophetic knowledge in De Prophetia. Hugh was the scholar who put the question 
of prophetic knowledge on the scholastic agenda in Paris, and set the entire dis-
cussion on a new footing in the years 1235–1236 (Torrel 1997). These are the very 
years when he was involved in assessing Juliana’s visionary and prophetic theol-
ogy. It cannot be by chance that Juliana’s hagiographer in the Vita Julianae has 
a long excursus on prophecy, stressing that Juliana’s thought was a product of 
prophetic knowledge. Hildegard of Bingen (d. 1179), the ‘Sybil of the Rhine’, may 
be regarded as the first medieval prophetess in the tradition of the Old Testament 
prophets, but  it is thanks to Juliana and Hugh that this prophetic ‘ministry’ was 
incorporated in medieval theology.
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Eve’s reputation as a formally enclosed anchoress offered her the freedom to 
ensure that the new festival was celebrated in Liège and instituted by the pope. 
In later years, the priests of Liège started the celebration of the Corpus Christi 
festival by walking in procession to Eve’s anchorhold, thus making her part of the 
ecclesiastical tradition.
Eve certainly made the most of her position as an anchoress. In my Lives of 
the Anchoresses I set out a profile of the ideal anchoress (Mulder-Bakker 2005, 
198–9). It indicates the range of activities pursued by historical anchoresses, 
and what the faithful hoped to receive from them. According to my profile, an 
anchoress has to be a free and independent spirit; strong-willed, but balanced 
and even-tempered. She has to love study and meditation, but at the same time 
possess gifts of communication. An anchoress walks the path of sapientia, 
acquiring en route a knowledge of the Bible and theology that equals or surpasses 
that of professionals. As a prophetess she is charged with proclaiming the word 
of God to the community. When necessary she criticises the local clergy. In her 
anchorhold, the anchoress lives the life of angels. Residing on a piece of holy 
ground, she brings salvation into the here and now, making it visible and tangible 
– graspable, in the full sense of the word – to the faithful. She imparts the grace 
of God to those to whom it is due. She is a living saint.
Eve was venerated as the inventor of the Corpus Christi festival in the later 
Middle Ages, and her relics are still on display in the church of Saint-Martin. 
She was a model of the anchoritic life style, which was, as I showed in my book, 
very popular among pious urban women. Juliana, the prophetess, was forgotten 
until recently.
If we confine our attention to the Church’s own institutional documentation 
of the Corpus Christi liturgy – as most scholars do – we discover only the one-
sided clerical perspective. Because Juliana’s office is not preserved in full (as, 
neither, is that of Aquinas), we have to reconstruct the actual history, basing our-
selves, on the one hand, on the anecdotes taken from Eve’s Fragmenta by her 
Latin hagiographer, and, on the other, on the various parts of the original Corpus 
Christi Office that lie hidden in one manuscript or another. Most antiphons and 
hymns, for instance, are preserved in an Antiphonale in the Royal Library in The 
Hague. And many of the prayers are preserved in the personal prayer book of 
Jacques Pantaléon, Pope Urban IV.
The practice of studying only institutional documentation means that schol-
ars miss all ‘lay’ material, and helps explain why we still know so little about 
religious individualisation among non-institutionalised women and the common 
faithful. What is worse, it helps explain why we still fail to recognise the recipro-
cal influences of leading churchmen and spiritual women in developing lay devo-
tion and lived spirituality in the later Middle Ages. It also helps us realise that 
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searching for ‘institutionalisation’ is only one aspect of our task, which has to 
be complemented by the search for ‘conventionalisation’, that is to say the study 
of constant, formalised, and recognised conventions and practices that regulate 
and stabilise individual initiatives in societal forms, such as living in an anchor-
hold, the ministry of a prophetess, or reaching the age of discretion at forty (cf. 
Mulder-Bakker, Nip 2004).
3  Gertrude Rickeldey of Ortenberg and Heilke 
of Staufenberg
The noble Lady Gertrude (c. 1275–1335) was raised in the 1280s at Ortenberg 
castle, not far from Strasbourg. In her biography we read:
When Gertrude was still a small little daughter, there was a knight’s wife in this castle, a 
good lady, a guote frowe, who liked to speak of God and our Lord’s suffering […]. This lady 
spoke quite plainly and simply of our Lord’s suffering, but the child loved to listen to her, 
and her heart always became inflamed when she heard the lady speak of our Lord’s martyr-
dom […]. This love consumed her throughout her whole life, in desolate poverty and in the 
humble model of life that he had shown her out of love.
Thus we read in The Saintly Life, a spiritual biography written by a female lay 
author shortly after Gertrude’s death in 1335 (Mulder-Bakker (ed.) 2017). We 
also read:
Gertrude was taught the psalter at the age of nine. After she had learned the psalter so that 
she could pray it well, she daily prayed the seven hours […]. She prayed so much every day 
that she completed a psalter every week, and in addition said many other prayers to our 
Lady and other saints.
As an adult, she used to pray the daily hours, and this she did at home, not in the 
church. These prayers framed the day, and the other members of the household 
shared in its sanctification. The house became a hallowed place, and the house-
hold a kind of ‘holy’ family.
The biographer regularly speaks of Gertrude’s eucharistic piety. During her 
marriage with a rich knight, she ‘lived in awe and great love of the Lord’ and 
went to the parish church to hear mass. ‘She would be very devout […] especially 
during the silent canon of the mass where our Lord was elevated. For she was 
convinced that our dear Lord was present then; this was without a doubt certain 
in her faith’: the biographer takes care to stress this explicitly; apparently it could 
not be taken for granted; and we are glad to note that Gertrude did not follow 
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Aquinas.12 Later, the biographer notes: ‘She often stood at mass imagining how, 
through our Lord’s presence, all graces and sweetness overflow her. She was well 
aware that she was granted this through grace and from God […]. Moreover, our 
Lord’s suffering was quite present to her.’ For Gertrude, the celebration of the 
Eucharist was all about envisioning Christ’s presence, experiencing the overflow 
of his sweetness at the communion, just as it had been for Juliana. It strengthened 
her in her personal faith and her self-reliance.
3.1 An ascetic domestic household: a House of Souls
After her husband died, probably in 1301, Gertrude seized the opportunity to take 
her life into her own hands, and moved to the city of Offenburg where she settled 
as an independent woman of faith. She devoted herself to an ascetic way of life in 
her own house. She was soon joined by the young Heilke of Staufenberg, she, too, 
a noble lady and a relative of hers, who saw the chance to escape from marriage 
by joining Gertrude.
Heilke must have had a more thorough education. She could read and write; 
she could check data in her book; which means, I gather, that she had a Latin 
breviary. Together the women ran an aristocratic household, and Heilke guided 
Gertrude as Eve had Juliana: helping her to master bewildering mystic experi-
ences, putting them into words and implementing them in action. In Offenburg, 
‘everyone took her [Gertrude] as a good model, for her whole life was nothing but 
a perfect imitation of the model and life of our Lord Jesus Christ’. After sixteen 
years, in about 1317, when Gertrude was about forty years old, she experienced a 
religious change of life. At this time she rented out her landed estates in Offen-
burg and moved to Strasbourg. The two women bought a Hofstatt together in the 
patrician environs, ran an urban domestic household, lived as women of faith, 
and participated fully in the social, religious, and even political life in the city 
(Mulder-Bakker 2015).
The Franciscans in Offenburg and Strasbourg ‘liked Gertrude’s way of life so 
much that many friars came to her, speaking of our Lord. She felt good in their 
company, for she liked to hear them speak of our Lord’. These visitors included a 
remarkable number of Lesemeister, learned Friars who taught in Strasbourg and 
elsewhere:
12 Juliana’s Corpus Christi Feast was disseminated by Jacques Pantaléon after he too had been 
urged to leave Liège. He became bishop of Verdun and travelled to the east. The feast was first 
celebrated in Cologne in 1264. See Martinet 1998.
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She would also ask learned people when our Lord gave her some special understanding 
that she could not well assess herself. She was not ashamed at what she could not well 
understand. It seemed to her that if she just let these things remain unexplained, it would 
have been terrible toward our Lord.
Her own Psalter readings, her conversations with Heilke and the friars, caused 
Gertrude to have visionary experiences that completely overwhelmed her. She 
then needed Heilke to understand what overcame her and to capture it in words. 
Heilke incorporated into her responses the knowledge and insights she had 
acquired elsewhere. She also regularly ‘re-preached’ at home the sermons they 
had heard. Evidently, the women held services at home in which Heilke fulfilled 
the role of clerica.
The Saintly Life creates the impression that there was a lively community of 
discourse in and around the house, one in which occupants, visitors, and learned 
Franciscans met informally to discuss their faith. Referring to such group- 
building phenomena, Robert I. Moore speaks of ‘communities’ in which partici-
pants develop ‘a sense of belonging together’ and a ‘group identity’ by means of 
shared learning and discussion (Moore 1996, 37). This holds as true for the house-
hold of Gertrude and Heilke as it did for Eve’s anchorhold. Unlike Eve, however, 
the two ladies in Strasbourg did not choose full-time religious life in a recluso-
rium, but stayed in their home. They had the means to set up an ascetic domestic 
household, in what I have termed a House of Souls.
3.2 Striving for Christian perfection
Over the years, Gertrude became more diligent in her struggle for complete 
detachment, and wore Armut, espoused personal poverty. According to the biog-
rapher, twelve years prior to her death, hence in 1323, she was commanded by 
God not only to live a poor and ascetic existence but completely to renounce all 
possessions. She had to give away her money, her house, and the clothes that 
she wore. She was instructed to give up her status and noble identity. The final 
transition to complete detachment was to surrender her family property. Here she 
encountered principled objections from her confessor, but was supported by her 
friend Heilke. How is this to be understood?
It was during this very period 1322/23 that the controversy about the Fran-
ciscan ideal of poverty between Pope John XXII and the Spiritual Franciscans, 
including William of Ockham and Magister Henry of Talheim, reached its peak. 
A war of pamphlets was waged, one to which Henry of Talheim contributed, and 
papal bulls were issued (Gál (ed.) 1996, 67–82; Gonzales 2006). Magister Henry, 
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who had studied in Paris, was Provincial of the Franciscans for upper Aleman-
nia, and set up the General Chapter of his order in Strasbourg in 1325. As we read 
in The Saintly Life, he was intimate friends with Gertrude, der ir denn heimlich 
war. Inspired by the spiritual Franciscans, Gertrude took completely to heart 
what was at issue in the fundamental debate on poverty during these years. Just 
as the Franciscans had to exist without property or security, Gertrude would 
similarly live in woren Armut. By breaking all connections with family, church, 
and city, she was thrown upon her own conscience, trusting her own will and 
her own wisdom. In consequence – and this is vital for her significance –, she 
was no longer an interested party to the many conflicts in the city. She stood 
above the warring factions, and could take action against unglimph, outrage and 
injustice.
When Gertrude heard talk about the great lords who treated the poor with such great vio-
lence and haughtiness or about others who undertook and accomplished such terrible 
things and thus were greatly despised by the people and were lamentably judged for it, she 
was seized with great compassion.
Clearly here was one of the common faithful, in this case a woman, standing up 
for her personal autonomy and the right to make her own moral decisions, such 
as to be a pauper, and to venture to enter the realm of public morality.
3.3 Further contacts with learned mendicants
In the last ten to fifteen years of their lives, Gertrude and Heilke exhibited spiritual 
insights that they shared with Magister Eckhart. In describing Gertrude’s spirit-
uality in The Saintly Life, the lay author uses words and anecdotes of her own, but 
we recognise commonality with Eckhart’s thinking. When Magister Eckhart, the 
Dominican who had also studied and taught in Paris and served as provincial of 
his order in Germany, returned from Paris to South Germany in 1313, and worked 
in such places as Strasbourg, he found himself surrounded by dozens of virtuosae 
(women and men), striving for Christian perfection in the midst of their fellow 
citizens (Mulder-Bakker 2014). His writings and vernacular sermons suggest that 
he then saw that his primary task was to keep these women within the bounds of 
orthodox Christianity. He felt sympathy with their ideals but saw the dangers as 
well; he perceived their intellectual power but also noted their lack of both scho-
lastic training and sense of moderation. He certainly felt inspired by their inner-
worldly perfection. He understood that he should offer them inspiring secular 
models of Christian perfection, and create a path for women’s spiritual and moral 
solidarity within a domestic setting.
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Eckhart summarised his new philosophical and theological thinking in a 
number of vernacular works, most notably in his Buch der göttlichen Tröstung. 
His work is well-known in modern scholarship, and much studied. But women 
too started to record their insights. Their work is hardly studied at all; it has often 
not as yet surfaced, and so is not investigated. But here now is The Saintly Life. 
I show in my book that the laywoman from Strasbourg, in writing this spiritual 
biography in her native tongue, tried, in an innovative way, in graphic exempla 
and brief narratives, to catch the spiritual ideas underlying the lives of Gertrude 
and Heilke. In her proven ability to capture in images the ideal of inner-worldly 
perfection, she also reveals that those ideas frequently coincide with the thinking 
of Magister Eckhart.
4 Conclusions
Gertrude received a basic education at home. As a noble young lady, she was 
taught mainly the Psalter by a guote frowe. Other girls were taught by their mother 
or grandmother. Heilke must have received further schooling in a similar way to 
Juliana and Eve a century earlier. Because women, both laywomen and moniales, 
were barred from schools and academic training, they depended on private edu-
cation. As a consequence, they never penetrated the academic world of learning 
or entered (male) institutions.
Together, Gertrude and Heilke set up an ascetic domestic household, in and 
around which a lively community of discourse arose, and within which the two 
women and their visitors, including learned Franciscans, discussed their faith. 
Heilke regularly ‘re-preached’ sermons she had heard. The women built a reli-
gious culture in which learned Lesemeister and lay religious women inspired each 
other and developed a shared inner-worldly spirituality. As we saw above, Eve the 
anchoress at Saint-Martin and Juliana had also gathered a network of women and 
men around them. At Eve’s anchorhold they met with leading churchmen and 
scholastics.
Gertrude and Heilke’s home was a House of Souls. In the fifteenth century, 
reformist Dominican Johannes Nider gave a description of the model of lay reli-
gious life in a domestic setting, applying to it the term domus animarum (House of 
Souls; see Van Engen 1999). We learn from this that the owners of such a House of 
Souls and their company could lead a religious life without requiring any special 
religious status. Due to their ownership of property, they were citizens within 
the community of citizens. It is significant that Nider locates their houses in the 
proximity of the centres of learning of the mendicants. The women evidently 
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had studious dispositions, and valued their contact with learned brothers. Nider 
defines the women as lay religious. He does not label them semi-religious and 
place them halfway between the laity and the monastic state, as modern schol-
arship often does.
From her House of Souls, Gertrude ventured to enter the public ethical dis-
course in Strasbourg. Inspired by the Franciscans, Gertrude and Heilke stimu-
lated new systems of ethics and morality that benefited the entire community. 
Moreover, The Saintly Life is an ideal embodiment of a religious culture in which 
learned Lesemeister and lay religious women inspired each other and developed 
a shared inner-worldly spirituality.
In sum, two types of autonomous religious life are presented in this chapter, 
types that were to gain more widespread recognition in the later Middle Ages. The 
first is that of the anchorhold, and the second that of the House of Souls; in both 
of these, self-confident and ambitious women could strive for religious perfection 
in secular forms, and in an urban environment. Moreover, in reclusoria as well 
as in Houses of Souls women could give effect to the human right to make their 
own decisions, pursue their own personal aspirations, and – to a certain degree 
– appropriate religious agency in the urban community.
Their communities of discourse yielded a lived faith that was founded on 
incarnation theology, a eucharistic piety that had its source in a direct relation-
ship between the believer and God, and a shared endeavour by learned mendi-
cants and lay religious women to provide guidance to the common faithful.
The two types were never institutionalised in the Church, and gave rise to 
no official, institutional locations where women could give expression to their 
personal aspirations.13 The women grew into exemplary models in the field of 
conventions and traditions, there to inspire women and men over the genera-
tions. The evidence given here testifies to women’s religious individuality, their 
independent intellectual culture, and their collaboration with learned mendi-
cants to develop new communal festivals and a new, inner-worldly spirituality. 
In cases where women wished to penetrate the institutional world of the Church, 
they needed short-cuts, and depended on their personal contacts with leading 
churchmen, for instance to give effect to their insights, as in the celebration of 
the Corpus Christi festival.
As I argued above, the practice of studying only institutional documentation 
means that scholars miss all this ‘lay’ material. The quest for religious individu-
13 Canon Law knows of hermits and recluses only within a monastic (Benedictine) setting, 
where monastics could aspire to leave the community and fight the devil on their own as a kind 
of super-monk or super-nun in a hermitage or anchorhold. The Church also recognised male 
eremitical orders such as the Carthusians and the Hermits of Saint Augustine.
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alisation in the context of ‘institutionalisation’ yields only failed institutionali-
sations; the approach has to be complemented by a search for ‘conventionalisa-
tion’, that is to say constant formalised and recognised conventions, which also 
regulate and stabilise individual initiatives in societal forms.
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Michael Nijhawan
Migrant precarity and religious 
individualisation
1 Introduction
This chapter examines social processes of religious self-making and self-reflection 
in the context of precarious social and cultural encounters associated with global 
migration. More specifically, I examine the everyday life of Sikh asylum seekers 
who have left the Indian border region of Punjab since the political upheavals in 
the 1980s and 90s to seek asylum in Germany. When compared to the situation 
of Ahmadi Muslims discussed in my second contribution to this publication, the 
success rate of Sikhs in asylum hearings was significantly lower. The reasons for 
this were that, on the one hand, the category of ‘religious persecution’ was not 
applied to their situation while, on the other, the state, with striking parallels to 
current discussions about deporting young male refugees, suspected Sikh migrants 
to be supporters of militancy. For the Sikh individuals who I encountered in the 
period between 2003 and 2013, the suspension of rights and the general uncer-
tainty they experienced demanded various adaptation strategies as well as the 
ability to manoeuver through social and legal grey zones for prolonged periods of 
time. My analytic work in this chapter pays close attention to how refugees caught 
in these social and legal grey zones articulate aspects of the religious self. The dia-
logues below advance ideas about how such a self is expressed through individual 
conduct and forms of agency that are not scripted by the standard vocabularies 
of religious norms or ideologically charged faith talk. The ability of these indi-
viduals to act and make sense of the world around them is mediated by the fact 
that their own religiosity is politicised as a consequence of their social isolation 
by highly individualising tendencies. When highlighting aspects of self-making 
and self-reflexivity in this context, I aim to illuminate how socio-legal processes 
of exclusion intersect with emergent ideas of how to be Sikh. In more abstract 
terms, I discuss ontological conditions of ‘diasporic displacement’ (Bakare-Yusuf 
Note: This is a fully amended version of an earlier published chapter titled ‘Religious Subjec-
tivity in Spaces of the Otherwise’ originally appearing in my book The Precarious Diasporas of 
Sikh and Ahmadiyya Generations with Palgrave Macmillan (2016). The German Research  Council 
(SFB  619) as well as the Canadian Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences provided 
 generous support for this project in addition to minor grants by the Faculty of Liberal Arts and 
Professional Studies, York University. I use pseudonyms throughout this chapter to refer to all of 
my research participants.
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2008) that are multifaceted and not reducible to established representations of 
Sikh religious identity or prevalent claims to tradition, even as elements of Sikh 
tradition remain a source for articulating sentiments of togetherness, suffering, 
and resilience.1
The relationship between migrant precarity and religion as discussed below 
is an issue of much wider scope than can possibly be covered by this small quali-
tative case study. What my case study can perhaps accomplish is a charting out of 
the realm of the ordinary (see Das 2007) that, because of its presumed historically 
inconsequential dimension, is often glossed over in political and sociological 
analysis. As this section’s emphasis is on new possibilities of religious expression 
and new options for its realisation, it seems beneficial to trace such possibilities 
in ordinary language and with regard to the experiences of ordinary people at 
the social margins. I gesture here towards emergent life worlds and words that 
oscillate between everydayness and spontaneous articulations. I think about 
those who, feeling wasted, continue to labour and reach out to others even as 
they are abandoned by loved ones and about how they still find themselves in a 
creative process of forging relationships and relatedness to the world. We could 
say that they are forced to do so but they are also committed to something that lies 
elsewhere and that something goes beyond the need for wellbeing in conditions 
of depravity. As soon as we pay attention to people-on-the-move who face the 
material conditions of socio-legal exclusion, social marginality, and the difficult 
process of recovering memories of loss and violence, precarity becomes a concept 
loaded with heavy and often contradictory meanings.
Precarity is a term that circulates widely in public discourses today. It points 
to social vulnerability, the loss of income security as well as the curbing of indi-
vidual rights and forms of human dignity. Whereas Standing (2011) and others 
have understood precarity in terms of a systemic change characterising global 
capitalism and, hence, the (demise of the traditional) working class more gen-
erally speaking, sociologists working on migrant precarity have emphasised 
the ‘hyper-precarization’ (Lewis, Waite 2015) of migrant labour resulting from 
the combined workings of de-regulated, low-wage sectors and the exclusionary 
mechanisms of state institutions that curb free movement. In the light of the 
massive uprooting of people and the emergence of growing refugee  movements 
1 When it comes to the social and political contexts of contemporary diaspora formations, I 
refrain from positing a deterministic corporeal scheme of loss and self-fragmentation, inasmuch 
as I resist celebrating a model of ‘the diasporic’ to capture a purely discursive form of self- 
reflexivity. However, I cannot explore here the complex histories of capitalist labour, migration 
and state violence in which much of the contemporary forms of Punjabi migration are rooted 
(see Nijhawan 2016).
Migrant precarity and religious individualisation   739
globally, sociologists have further challenged common categorizations of ille-
gality and quasi-legality as these, in the words of one prominent author in the 
field, ‘do not adequately capture the grey areas experienced by many migrants’ 
 (Gonzales 2011,  605). The extant literature provides a sound critique of the 
 political economy of migrant precarity and the ways in which those deemed 
‘inadmissible’ and ‘illegal’ face exclusion, if not an outright denial of their social 
identities. But inasmuch as these grey areas affect how migrants struggle in their 
everyday lives, it is within such scenes of fragmentation, and often devastation, 
that people realise potentials to creatively re-imagine their sense of (religious) 
self, person, and agency as a way of surviving, coping, enduring, and showing 
resilience. I thus wonder how we might look at the relationship between precar-
ity, diasporic displacement and religious belonging.
Courtney Bender (2003) suggests that one way of tracing the meaning- 
making processes of such a tenuous relationship is by paying attention to recur-
ring genres and speech patterns that illuminate how in ethnographic encounters 
social actors articulate the generally fluid and often ephemeral concepts of ‘the 
religious’ in their interactions with others in specific social and institutional set-
tings. This is not just about the actual words and how they might register in an 
established religious vocabulary, which might or might not be part of the equa-
tion. More importantly, we need to pay attention to how concepts acquire spe-
cific form, meaning, and affective layers, which in contexts defined by precarity 
occurs in particularly nuanced ways. The strength of the ethnographic encounter 
is to make visible this emerging sense of what we can understand and agree upon 
as the common ground of our relationships. It can contribute to an understanding 
of how we perceive our differences and how those differences are actually con-
stituted, and, finally, of how we make sense of words and things that might seem 
evidently ‘secular’ or ‘religious’ in connotation and yet we cannot just assume to 
be transparent.
I read the voices below in how they lend themselves to such an emerging 
sense of (religious) subjectivity; that is, for how they become embedded in 
unfolding relationships in which claims to belonging are of existential concern. 
This does not amount to idealising the ethnographic encounter. Ethnography, 
understood here as a critical praxis of theorising cultural articulations, trans-
lations and encounters, lends itself to a contextualised understanding of what 
religious individualisation might entail, much in the way Martin Fuchs (2015) has 
delineated it. Ethnography nonetheless bears its own ethical and political chal-
lenges and is thus not offered as a methodological blueprint here. Living under 
precarious conditions entails that the very horizon of interpretation and social 
interactions involves a careful process of negotiating positionality and of assur-
ing mutual trust, commitment, reliability, and sincerity.
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Consider for example the following interaction involving Harjeet Singh, one 
of the interlocutors we meet again later, and my research collaborator Khushwant 
Singh.2 As we were cautious in our initial tape-recorded interviews about how to 
address the everyday struggles and hardships around migrant precarity, we had 
asked Harjeet about his thoughts on participating in (tape-recorded) interviews. 
This is how he responded:
‘I will talk about my personal opinion’, Harjeet said, ‘There is a reason why someone does 
something. Like when I came to Frankfurt from Limburg today, there was a reason for it. 
Each person has a way of thinking. That is a personal thing. And if you want me to talk 
about that, it will be from a personal point of view talking about my conditions only. And it 
is something else if you want me to talk about the field in general, Punjab’s condition, like 
the percentage of Sikhs coming because of all the difficulties, and how many are coming 
because of other reasons. So what do you want me to talk about?’
‘First tell us on a general level, what your insights are about the conditions to migrate’, we 
inquired.
‘Do not mind what I am saying, it is my personal opinion about coming here. For about the 
last three years, the Sikh parties here have approached me about a dozen times, asking 
me to join them. Even the good leaders have asked that I join their parties. But I person-
ally feel that, being a Sikh, this is my own mission, it is my own struggle (larai), which I 
have to fight myself, alone. There are many things that I have kept to myself. My cousins 
probably don’t even know about this, why all of a sudden I left all my work and life there. 
Even my girlfriend asked me what was the main reason for coming here. “What should I 
think about why you have come? Do you really have a problem there?” Sometimes, when I 
don’t feel like speaking about it, I just stay quiet. You might pose a question that to answer 
truthfully would put me in trouble, so in that case I would not answer because I cannot lie. 
And if you have to answer, then answer truthfully because I do not lie. So if a question of 
yours could cause harm (nuksan), I might not be able to answer. With regard to turning the 
tape recorder on or off, I think trust is bigger than anything else. When you trust, and you 
give everything you have, then inevitably there can be damage. But one day you will get 
ten times the reward because there is one thing that is in all human beings, which makes 
the whole world work, what sustains our relationships (nirbah), you can also think of God 
(rab) or if you think differently, you can call it a system. The one who is running the system, 
whoever he is, he always does justice, when the time is right. And you are the second person 
maybe, I told my girl friend the first time, she had asked me the same thing. I had told her 
that until now my answer has always been that, “I cannot talk about this”. And because you 
have come into my personal life, later on you might not like me being quiet, and I do not lie, 
so listen to what I have to say carefully if you want to hear the story. And it is the same with 
you that I can live peacefully even without having to say anything. There is no pressure on 
me. Yet I feel that since you are going to do a good deed, then maybe I can contribute a little 
bit to it. I will find happiness in this.’
2 Interview conducted February 7, 2004 Frankfurt a.M.
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Harjeet employed the term nuksan frequently in this segment, but he used 
it with strikingly different connotations. He clearly recognised the danger of 
damaged social relationships in our research context and contemplated on 
the potential harm of being exposed as a person with insecure status. He also 
switched between different ethical and theological concepts, from using rab 
(a name for the divine that is more common in devotional movements) to terms 
such as nirbah, which evokes key tenets of the Sikh Guru’s hymns, to repeating 
English loan words (‘system’) that invite an immanent frame of deliberating on 
ethical responsibility. Damage is a real threat and yet the encounter was seen as a 
potential to open horizons, as a possibility of togetherness, of making friendship 
even, and of understanding the world better and making sense of the prevail-
ing situation. It had to be clearly articulated that our desire to know entailed a 
responsibility to respond – framed in terms of the damage it could do to rela-
tionships and the reality of a broader ‘system of justice’ that he evoked. We had 
spoken many times before about issues surrounding Sikh institutions and Sikh 
teachings with Harjeet, so he did express here a sense of moral obligation too. 
Such claims were a common thread in conversations that pertained to specific 
aspects of the social worlds of precarity, which often have to remain under the 
radar of public visibility and recognition.
Anthropologist Elisabeth Povinelli (2011) was concerned with this issue, 
asking how we might imagine alternative social projects and ways of life through 
the capacity to endure the structural violence of ‘late liberal modernity’.3 More 
specifically, she tells us something about relationships to place and what 
she  holds to be the more ambivalent question of one’s embodied commitment 
(ibid., 112) in situations in which one is exposed to forms of chronic depravity 
and suffering. She poses these questions in the context of her longstanding eth-
nographic work with indigenous peoples in Australia. Not unlike other settler 
states, Australia’s policy towards indigenous populations has been characterised 
by neoliberal restructuring enacted through massive economic projects, such as 
mining, but also through the legal and bureaucratic technologies of managing 
indigenous affairs and an official policy of recognition. The latter, couched in 
the language of benign intervention, has turned indigenous life into the object 
3 Povinelli’s use of ‘late liberalism’ is directly linked to the neoliberal project of the ‘governance 
of the prior’ (ibid., 34). By that she means the technologies of sovereignty that are built upon a 
scheme of cultural recognition through which settler state violence becomes intelligible and, in 
the eyes of the state, legitimised. Both liberalism and settler colonialism are, for her, diasporic 
objects as well (ibid., 38), which means that rather than there being a singular logic of the ‘gov-
ernance of the prior’ in the context of settler states, there is an uneven dispersal of how these 
principles apply to those affected by land theft, land treaty and genocide.
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of the managerial order and made it subject to the regulative norms set up by the 
settler state. At the same time however, when speaking about potentiality and 
the capacity to endure in contexts of other alternative social and religious move-
ments, she advances the question of where to locate the ability to endure and the 
will to persevere. Her work as ethnographer is placed firmly within this specific 
situation. When thinking about such forms of endurance, she doesn’t slip into the 
resistance narrative of the ‘weapons of the weak’. Instead she points at a recursive 
relationship between corporeality and carnality.4 This relationship is meant as a 
corrective to the current social theoretical trend of seeing all material formations 
in terms of their elasticity or plasticity. Povinelli instead wants to speak to and 
about indigenous ontologies in a way that accounts for social change and alterity, 
particularly for those who have to struggle in their everyday lives with conditions 
of fixation, immobilisation, precarisation, and bodily disintegration.5 Let me 
quote one of her paragraphs to illustrate this:
To what are we committing ourselves if we commit to a freedom that is the undefined and 
undefinable trajectory of a radical otherwise in our world’s scenes of abandonment? This 
otherwise may lie in shattering the life-world in which a person finds herself situated, but 
it also might mean maintaining a life-world under constant threat of being saturated by the 
rhythms and meanings of another. The conditions of excess always sit side by side with con-
ditions of exhaustion and endurance that put into question the neat capture of substance 
by capital and other biopolitical projects and complicates the simple ethical investment 
in the thresholds and transitions of becoming within biopolitics. In these situations, to be 
the same, to be durative, may be as emancipatory as to be transitive. To live the present as 
if it were this future demands that a social world learn how to maneuver illegally. Those 
who must hide out within this environment, appearing to be in a time they are not even 
as they must go on heightened alert because the time they are in is a time no one wants to 
 recognize. (ibid., 130)
In what follows below, I want to explore the durative aspects of spatiotemporal pro-
cesses, emphasising the embodied dimension of social worlds in which one main-
tains an existence. I see the circumstances of my Sikh interlocutors as being defined 
precisely by this durative quality. It is expressed through many everyday references 
and idioms. This process is discursively over-determined by the language of legal 
toleration and the sheer inaccessibility to the public realm of debating cultural 
4 Corporality is understood by Povinelli as ‘the discursive construction of materiality’ or ‘the 
arts of material formation’ (ibid., 108–9), whereas carnality is defined as ‘the unintegrated, er-
rant aspect of materiality’ (ibid., 109) or the spill-over effects that cannot be reintegrated into the 
order of things.
5 Note that Povinelli speaks of the ordinary in ways that distinguish how people are situated in 
late liberalism so that for some the ordinary becomes generalisable whereas for others it does 
not. ‘We can think of the ordinary as the local spacing of eventfulness’ (ibid., 133).
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citizenship. In our conversations, each of my interlocutors articulated their rela-
tionship to the teachings of the Sikh Gurus as an evolving effort and commitment, 
something that is never finished but requires an everyday labour on the self.
Experts in Sikh philosophy have underscored the non-dualistic  configuration 
of the Sikh self (Singh 2003; 2014; Mandair 2009). Commenting on key texts in 
the Guru Granth Sahib such as the Japji (one of Nanak’s key compositions), they 
emphasise how attributes that are associated with the ego-self in its desires 
to draw boundaries between the ego and the other and its preoccupation with 
all kinds of repetition in the form of ‘concepts, rituals, or austerities’ (Mandair 
2009, 370) ultimately work, in the words of the Sikh Gurus, as impediments to 
 realising a state of mind-being referred to as gurmukh. Paradoxically, argues 
Arvind Mandair, while in Sikh thought, ‘the ego might be the problem […] the 
solution to the problem also lies in [how we understand] the constitution of the 
ego’ (ibid.,  370). He goes on to explain the specific facets of this ego-problem 
that have been addressed by the Sikh Gurus. One aspect is that which causes 
the  separation or duality when we project qualities onto another, whereas one’s 
own cherished qualities ‘become the basis for normative reality’ (ibid., 371). With 
Lacan, Mandair explains this as a psychic mechanism that singles out aspects of 
the self that, as estranged and separated parts, are then projected outwards as 
attributes to which we must remain attached. This affective process instils a norm 
of what is good, cherished, desired and, thus, implicitly leads to a self-affirmation 
by repetitively ‘solidifying our experience of the temporal world’ (ibid., 371).
How does one struggle with such inherited concepts of ego-loss and the 
non-dualistic self when at the same time the attachment to material realities and 
the daily encounter of conditions of alienation arrive through a particular set of 
forces and social obligations from which distancing oneself does not appear to be 
a realistic option? I address this question in the subsequent sections on ‘sangat’ 
(congregation), ‘dukkh’ (suffering), and ‘charhdi kala’ (resilient ethos) in which 
we encounter individuals who engage in practices of learned spontaneity that 
defy the biopolitical projects of citizenship and belonging. Whether these take 
the form of re-inhabiting scenes of abandonment and concepts of spirituality 
that must remain under the radar of legal recognition, as Povinelli suggested, 
or emphasise a relationship to community under conditions of social and legal 
precarity, each scenario suggests a durative practice that keeps the self open to 
modes of alterity. A Sikh self engages here that struggles with the social and eco-
nomic realities of the world in pragmatic ways without adhering to ‘narcissistic 
self-love’ (Mandair 2009, 377). This is not about utopian counter models, nor do 
I want to gloss over the differences between notions of sacrificial love (ego-loss) 
engendered in Mandair’s readings of Nanak and Povinelli’s attempt to think love 
within the framework of immanent critique as she distances herself from the 
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 sacrificial norm (with regard to nationalism, a concept that is rejected by Mandair 
too). The key point is that ‘being for another’ in Sikh ethical thought engenders 
the image of a non-dualistic self that requires a durative quality: not in the sense 
of an identity that is upheld, but rather in terms of an aesthetic-meditative-social 
practice of other-relatedness. This construction of the self echoes a different tem-
porality from that produced by the politico-economic order. Hence, I situate inter-
locutors somewhere between the two scenes captured above. As sojourners who 
strive to stay committed to the principles of gurmat and of becoming gurmukh, 
their orientations to place and existence carry something into their narratives on 
contemporary forms of exclusion and the specific diasporic conditions they face 
(that is, the forces that potentially erode the very conditions from which crea-
tive praxis might originate). The commitment to withhold and ‘stay the same’ in 
such scenes is a difficult achievement that requires both an unconscious and con-
scious effort to resist the ‘rhythms and meanings of another’ (Povinelli) so as to 
avoid complete fragmentation or the usurpation by powerful normative regimes. 
Povinelli’s idioms of ‘hiding out’ and ‘manoeuvring illegality’ are closely related 
to my own exploration of ‘precarious diasporas’ (Nijhawan 2016), for those cap-
tured in their commitments to place, space and religion are always engaged in 
specific acts – acts of inaugurating relationships and acts that differentiate and 
subvert the social and political field of belonging.
2  Sangat: discourses on maintaining 
self-integrity
The term sangat carries historical weight and depth for Sikhs and is one of those 
long-established terms for which one finds widely used definitions. A sangat or 
congregation would originally form around the historical figure of a Sikh Guru, 
from Nanak in the late fifteenth century to Gobind Singh in the early eighteenth 
century. This memory is relived in the manner in which activities are organised 
around the Adi Granth (Guru incorporated in the ‘book’), like the sung repetition 
and bringing to life of the Guru’s bani (speech, hymns). Sangats are always eval-
uated in dimensions other than mere face-to-face relationships. Being a member 
of a sangat also entails, for many, being on a spiritual trajectory for which the 
language of the Sikh Gurus offers the concept of the sat-sang, an emergent sense 
of a sangat that is better understood in temporal rather than spatial dimensions 
(Mandair 2009, 31). However, as mentioned above, such terms acquire very spe-
cific meanings when seen in social practice. Let me explore this with Harjeet 
Singh’s voice, as I have spent many hours with him debating issues pertaining 
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to the lived sociality in and around the Sikh gurdwara. His frequent references to 
sangat indicated to me shifts between a more individualist approach and moral 
commentaries on the erosion of collective values.
In our interviews and informal conversations, as indicated above, he often 
rebuked the approaches by different parties at the gurdwara to join their ranks 
and he instead referred to Sikhi as ‘his own mission’.6 In doing so, he did not 
reject being part of a congregation but, rather, reclaimed a notion of sangat 
on the basis of specific participatory engagements that allowed him a sense 
of autonomy in this togetherness. In other words, he did not rule out the net-
worked social group that forms a sangat but rather considered his struggle in 
relation to it. Sangat was certainly seen to be built on a set of shared commit-
ments, values and cultural ideas, but what comes to the fore in his colloquial 
speech is a kind of self-reflexivity that repeatedly juxtaposes socio-spatial 
aspects of how a particular sangat has been formed with his own quest for 
religious becoming.
For example, Harjeet deliberated on the specific conditions facing a sangat 
here and elsewhere. Drawing on such differences became a way of asserting his 
current position, of reassuring himself of the meaningfulness of what he did 
on a day-to-day basis as he then still lived with uncertain status. There were all 
the lingering doubts about having left his mother and siblings behind, as the 
prospect of contributing to livelihood through remittances and other socioeco-
nomic transactions had been curtailed by the conditions of the precariousness 
he endured: work permits were either temporary or not granted for prolonged 
periods and movement was bureaucratically restricted by the visa-issuing office. 
Thinking about and comparing different sangats thus facilitated the ordering 
of memories and moral as well as political judgments. His reflections were trig-
gered by social interactions and transactions in the present, for he clearly felt 
trapped in unhappy circumstances and difficulties. Harjeet said: ‘There are 
some real difficulties here. In Punjab for example, you can go to the gurdwara 
freely […]; here the conversation is always about legal and illegal. Over there 
anyone can come and live with the sangat […] but here you cannot keep too 
many in the gurdwara, because if you do, then you have to figure out who has 
their papers or not.’
The circular movement of people, things and ideas along transnational 
routes becomes an occasion for memories to evolve around personal objects, 
thoughts and policed trajectories. The social and economic debts one has 
6 The interviews with Harjeet Singh I draw upon in this chapter were been conducted in the 
period between January 2004 and August 2005.
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accrued become enmeshed with the processes of forming ethical substance. 
There was the sense of fluctuation and unpredictability when, for instance, 
I saw Harjeet making calls to brokers to secure a day job or to make sure that 
enough people would be present for the morning and evening prayers in the 
gurdwara: ‘It is never the same people who come’, he said, making it also hard 
to establish a pattern of participating sangat members. But the point about 
ethical substance is not merely one of organising routines, of assembling 
bodies for a religious ritual; it is rather about honing one’s own virtues and 
forming embodied relationship to others. This is where a common notion of 
sangat among Sikhs is affirmed and where it opens itself to Harjeet’s personal 
memories. The notion is also concerned with the transposition of experiences of 
sangat to unlikely times and places. For Harjeet, this comprised the daily work 
in the gurdwara kitchen, the informal interactions and transactions in asylum 
homes, the conversations and exchange of information and support that we 
observed occurring daily between those with precarious status. It was through 
all of these scenarios that a sense of sociality and moral obligation to the other 
was maintained and that he became reflexive of his circumstances, projects and 
aspirations to belong.
For Harjeet, the religious routine of nitnem (daily prayers) was at the centre of 
his reflections connecting sangat to the formation of an ethical self. This entailed 
taking a bath, then reciting Japji, Jap and the ten savayyas. At sunset, he said, he 
would always recite Rahiras and Sohila, followed by the Ardas. The turn toward 
such practice was, in his recollections, directly linked to how ethical substance is 
formed. As he maintained in our conversations, his ‘turn’ to stick to a daily routine 
of recitations, that is, to do proper nitnem, involved a feeling of emancipation. 
It was relative to roaming around hungry with no roti (bread/food), as another 
kind of hunger was stilled. But he also expressed a transitive dimension, for he 
contrasted the rural spaces of his upbringing with his current spiritual quest. 
‘Initially,’ he said, ‘I didn’t know anything about Sikh religion or the problems 
our people faced, so at that time my nitnem was just to get up in the morning, 
say satnaam waheguru [repetitive recitation of the ‘name’] for some time, then 
have breakfast, and continue with my daily chores’. Harjeet did at some point join 
Sikh missionary reading circles and was part of a group that drove around in the 
villages to preach. His deliberation on the gurdwara custodian in his village, and 
the manner in which daily life was enacted, was thus inflected by Sikh reformist 
ideas. If one listened closely, however, it became apparent that his narrative con-
veyed sentiments of a political climate of fear and moral resignation in Punjab 
after a decade of violence and suspicion against Sikhs. What resonated in his 
remarks were ideas about corporeality and evaluations of embodied practice that 
were responsive to a particular political climate. He recognised that this climate, 
Migrant precarity and religious individualisation   747
in other words the material conditions putting constraints on peoples’ abilities 
to act, had an eerie resemblance to the material conditions he later faced as an 
asylum seeker. As we talked about the issue of where and how to hold nitnem 
(in solitude or with others) and what to expect from it, Harjeet’s thoughts oscil-
lated constantly between a sense of how to maintain psychic integrity and how to 
perform nitnem with a mind for another:
‘Today, whatever we do, we seem to do it just for ourselves. According to what Guru says, 
your own self comes only after taking care of everyone else’s wellbeing first. So when I do 
nitnem it should only have an indirect effect on the self, and most of the time I try. But some-
times in a state of worry, I do think about my own wellbeing first and pray to be relieved 
of the problem before even thinking about others. But the principle rule is that, everyone, 
not only oneself – that is, the person who lives with you, your neighbour, someone from 
the same village, city, country, or on this earth – we should think about the wellbeing of 
all beings.’
He signalled here a form of precarity of self that translates between forms of 
sociality and ethical orientations (how to maintain other-relatedness as guiding 
principle) that make it difficult to keep a sense of stability and routine. Surely 
routine here should not be read as habitual repetition of the same. Harjeet spoke 
about how keeping up the nitnem was contingent on the place one stayed and 
the social relationships that enabled or disabled such practice, even if it ought 
to be otherwise. In the context of living in asylum homes or changing one’s resi-
dence and status as one moves along in the citizenship regime, it meant that the 
sense of who belongs to one’s sangat constantly changed. Harjeet only recently 
moved to what he calls a ‘decent home’, finding time to stay with his girlfriend 
in  Frankfurt once in a while. He told us about the difficulties of living in larger 
accommodations with people from all over the world gathered together on the 
same floor and sharing the same bathroom. They were not allowed to buy their 
own food initially and received non-vegetarian dishes. What to eat and how 
to keep in physical shape to get up at four in the morning became important 
issues. People on the floor would smoke and drink and those in the adjacent 
room complained about the noise. Upholding nitnem in such circumstances 
became a reflexive practice that was formative of the spatiotemporal conditions 
of  precarity. Spatial arrangements of sociolegal restrictions and classifications, 
state regulations and surveillance of spaces associated with the sangat, and the 
difficult  journeys of transit and entry all represent processes that interfere and 
intersect with social and religious imaginaries in such circumstances.  Moreover, 
it is a practice through which the self-in-migration can evaluate their own 
 pursuits and ways of enduring difficult situations, even to the extent that they 
experience a sense of lost reputation.
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‘When I think about how I was coming here, they would sometimes make us sit in the forest 
for two hours, you know. I would check the time and if it’s morning, I would do nitnem. 
Although there was no way of taking a shower or washing my hands, I had the gurbani 
memorized, so I would just sit on the ground there and do path. This would bring peace to 
my mind and even give us some strength, even the people with me.’
Here he talks about a situation that occurred somewhere on his journey to 
Germany when they had to walk for hours in the forest when trying to make it 
across the border. There were pressures by others to get on moving but Harjeet, 
knowing it was a special day in the Sikh (lunar) calendar (sangrand), was firm to 
keep up with the nitnem and did path:
‘I started doing the Barah Maha shabads [hymns by Guru Arjun Dev recited for this purpose]. 
They got up, one after the other, and started walking, but no one told me to get up. I glanced 
once and saw them leaving but decided not to leave until the recitation was completed. Because 
of the delay, we missed the border patrol by just two minutes, so the danger was averted. The 
others got so happy that, on the way, whenever there was drinking water, they would let me 
have it first. They would always ask me what I was doing. And whenever it was time to go, 
they would wait until I had finished. That way they knew they would be safe. It had become 
such a good thing in their minds. So they liked it that I did this, because whenever I did it, we 
would not get caught and would not get checked. They felt safe this way. And even after coming 
here, in my first year or two, the routine was complete. I would do prayers in the morning and 
evening. Even in the afternoon, during free time, I would do shabad because I am not too fond 
of television. Even back in India, I never watched television. I would do shabad and memorize 
gurbani from the Guru Granth Sahib. Sometimes the guys with me would say that I keep on 
repeating the same thing over and over again and they would insist on me going out with them. 
But this is how my nature is; even if I am sitting alone all day, I do not get bored. Sometimes it 
would be hot in the room, and others would tell me to come out, but I thought the more I pray 
in my spare time, the better it is. Pray or read or memorize more gurbani.’
Whereas this last segment produces a certain aura of piety around him – which 
he expresses as manoeuvring high risks but also being bestowed with a sense 
of knowing how to remain unscathed – within the same conversation, he sud-
denly switched to the fragmentary character of practicing nitnem. Over time ‘the 
system’ seemed ruptured and the recognition he received from others shifted to a 
sense of alienation and isolation.
‘But now the situation is different. If I am ever at the gurdwara, or when I am in the room 
alone, I used to keep a gutka (booklet with the daily prayers) with me before but I don’t 
anymore. I still do nitnem every morning, though I do it a bit late. The 4am thing does not 
happen anymore, but I try to do it at 6am. The system here is like that. It would get late going 
to bed at night. Because I don’t have any regular work, I have not been able to make it a new 
routine. It is very hard to keep something going without a system. Now, I never know where 
I am going, Frankfurt or Hoechst or Offenbach or Giessen. Where to go to sleep and when to 
wake up? The routine is completely broken now. But still I attempt to do it when I wake up 
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in the morning. For example, today I could not complete nitnem. I had to go to the doctor, 
so I did part of it there. Even if I don’t have time to sit and do nitnem, I will do it when I’m on 
the move. Like in the doctor’s office, everybody else was talking but I sat on the chair and 
did my prayers. I would just complete the time that I had left. If there is no one to talk to you, 
you can do it going or coming in the train. But the evening routine has remained, I intend to 
do path before going to sleep. That has been there since the beginning.’
3 Dukkh: on the material effects of deportability
Let us now inspect the imbrication of everyday speech with legal categories. For 
migrants with precarious status, the very process of language acquisition and 
translation is overburdened with the materiality of language. Court orders, doc-
tor’s certificates, police warrants, official notifications, which must appear as 
opaque to the addressee, are simultaneously felt to be bestowed with the state’s 
power to transform everyday life for better or worse. There are the spoken prom-
ises, phone calls to resourceful brokers, references to others in the sangat who 
might have a reputation and be able to ‘do something’. Sometimes, as refugees 
struggle month by month, there is a sense of being given over that comes to the 
fore and manifests in the words that are spoken, and how they are spoken. Ref-
erences to Behörde (office), Krankenhaus (hospital), Dolmetscher (interpreter), or 
waiting for a Schein (certificate or official document) occur as German loanwords 
in the Punjabi vernacular, signalling ironic self-distancing and the untranslata-
bility of bureaucratic terminology. The Kafkaesque character of the situation was 
hard to miss, considering the state bureaucracy’s notorious suspicion, enacted, 
for instance, by only granting short temporary permissions and requiring con-
stant reporting, which signalled to those seeking refuge the sense of an absurd 
transitory existence that Anna Seghers (1951) so nicely portrays in her novel. Yet 
the transitory and transitive here was entangled with somatic conditions that 
were deeply troubling, especially for refugees who suffered from posttraumatic 
stress. One such individual is Gurpreet, known to us through prior contact and, 
at the time of the research, residing near Cologne.7 As a trauma victim his status 
was contingent on medical certificates that the bureaucracy and courts often dis-
missed as favouritism (in German legal jargon: ‘Gefälligkeitsgutachten’). State 
bureaucrats are often suspicious of renewed medical certificates, and consider 
medical professionals cooperating with NGOs as not being impartial enough. 
On the other hand, asylum policy is precisely designed so that the re-issuing 
7 This interview with Gurpreet Singh was conducted on February 19, 2004.
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of medical reports becomes a necessity for the system to work.8 To what extent 
does the regime of health assessments and the re-issuing of short-term residence 
permits itself produce a discourse on the self in pain? Gurpreet’s story below 
might provide us with some insights.
After we joined Gurpreet for one of his medical consultations, he talked to us 
about how his efforts to be granted extensions of his stayed deportation affected 
his sense of self. During our conversation he talked about depression and the 
strong side effects of the psychiatric drugs the doctor prescribed:
‘The medicine should help me sleep because sometimes I think too much and cannot fall 
asleep. But after taking the pills, I fall asleep and do not feel awake for quite some time, 
almost up to twelve or fourteen hours. My body feels numb. It becomes like a dead body 
walking. The other medicine is for the days when I feel too lazy. Taking that the person 
becomes more active. He has given me these two. When I tell him that it causes problems, 
he changes it to a different brand.’
‘That’s why you have grey hair now, whereas you are actually still young?’, Khushwant 
asked him.
‘It happens, if you have to think constantly’, was Gurpreet’s reply.
His stay of deportation was then being renewed on a monthly basis, which meant 
that he had to get new certification from the psychiatrist every other month. It is 
an irony that part of what brought Gurpreet to this kind of impasse was the deci-
sion of the officers not to issue work permits any longer. As soon as these permits 
are issued on a continuous basis, they would give him the legal right of residency. 
At the point of our interviews, he had been stuck in limbo for three years without 
permission to work. For considerable periods of time he lined up daily to receive 
his social assistance payment and get his visa renewed:
‘I do not even have permission to go outside of my Kreis (district). There’s actually a gurd-
wara within this district to which we count Düsseldorf, but in my case they have expressed 
in writing that I cannot leave the city.’
‘It is like you are being treated like a criminal who wants to run somewhere’, we said.
‘I told them’, said Gurpreet, ‘that I want to do some volunteer work for the sangat, but they 
didn’t even give me permission for that.’ [All the letters that were sent through lawyers and 
community representatives were to no avail.]
‘How many years has it been?’, we asked. ‘And even after having faced so many problems, 
you are still able to take care of the family? You doing so much even after having so many 
problems. How do you do this?’
8 There are generally two aspects to consider here: prevailing issues with health from which a 
person currently suffers (Kriterium der inlandsbezogenen Gesundheitsprobleme) and a risk as-
sessment of health-related issues in the country of origin (erhebliche Gesundheitsgefährdung 
amounting to Abschiebungshindernisse according to §§ 51, 53 AuslG [foreign law]). Both assess-
ments are temporarily valid and are required to be renewed.
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‘You know that in our religion, you are not supposed to leave your family behind. I cannot leave 
my family and children because of my own problem. If I have a personal problem, I can face it 
and fight it, but that does not mean I should stop taking care of my family’, Gurpreet answered.
‘And how old are your children?’
‘The oldest daughter is 12 or 13. The other was born last August.’
‘And when did your wife come?’
‘She arrived about four years ago’, he confirmed.
‘And she gets the same visa as you do?’
‘Yes, she and my daughter get the same monthly visas just like me. But my younger son 
[who is born here] gets a visa for four months. They go by their own will. The director is 
up to no good. He does whatever he feels is best. He actually said to me that I am the first 
Indian who he has allowed to stay for this long, otherwise he does not let anyone stay for 
this long.’
‘He really said this to you?’, we wondered.
‘Yes! And when I had seen him initially the first thing he did was to end my work permit. 
And I said to him that in my religion, we are to work as long as we are able to work with both 
of our hands and feet. But he said that you are here on political stay, so you do not need to 
work. We will give you food, and you eat it, that’s all.’
‘But you still work right?’
‘No.’
‘We know you worked for some time, right?’
‘Yes, I did work before.’
‘You did pizza delivery?’
‘Yes.’
‘How many years have you been here for now?’
‘It’s almost ten years.’
‘Ten years and nothing in return’, we remarked. ‘You know the law they made that whoever 
has been here for so many years and who is able to work […].’
‘But yes, that’s exactly why they stopped giving me permission to work. If they kept on 
giving me permission, I would eventually have the right to get my papers. So they killed my 
right. They stopped it.’
With precarious status, minor transgressions suffice to get people in trouble. Gur-
preet was in danger of violating zoning laws of asylum residency when he wanted 
to participate in religious rituals. Similarly, the bureaucrats might take issue with 
having a ‘wrong address’ after he just been relocated from the asylum homes to a 
social housing unit. Sometimes he had to pretend not to know some of his closest 
relatives, as their legal status might affect his own. Constant negotiations and 
endeavours to try to find some way into legality have an impact on wellbeing, 
especially for those already traumatised. While there are legal mechanisms to 
incorporate those who stay in limbo for too long, such regulations can, as we 
have seen, be manipulated. Work permits can be cancelled and deportation slips 
issued, even if their enforcement is likely to be stopped by medical intervention 
or through the intervention of lawyers. Gurpreet told us that he once hurt himself 
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when the police picked him up to bring him to the Indian embassy in Bonn. He 
feared they would confirm his identity and deport him.
‘I have seen how they kill in Punjab and have tolerated things myself. We had the bodies to 
bear it before, but not anymore. I used to play kabbadi (a popular contact sport) there before 
and now I sit around and the body has become soft. When they hit us, it will hurt more than 
before. The way they hit you is not normal. No one even hits animals in such a manner. So 
instead of going through that, it is a lot better to kill oneself.’
There were claims that the police wouldn’t allow him to return home but instead 
abandoned him when he started hurting himself with his kirpan (small cer-
emonial knife typically worn by Khalsa Sikhs) and being admitted to hospital 
after two bystanders found him in distress. After eight stitches, he was later 
released, knowing that he could not bring forward any charges. He feared that 
next time they would arrive with the entire border enforcement team. Meanwhile, 
deportation procedures would include so-called Abschiebebeobachter, who are 
appointed by NGOs and who overlook deportation procedures at the airport.9 Ten 
years is a long time for a stayed deportation. Until recently, asylum seekers were 
only temporarily allowed to work as the permits had to be constantly renewed. 
Children have the right to go to school but adult refugees spend their days won-
dering what their future might bring. The fear of being deported is like a shadow 
that follows these migrants through every single aspect of the chores of everyday 
life. If you go out to buy groceries, the police might arrest you. The psychiatrist 
resorts to antidepressants to make you sleep and feel at ease but these make you 
feel incapacitated. You have a difficult time thinking. It is painful to see things in 
clear perspective.
In Punjabi, the common reference to such embodied states is dukkh, an idiom 
that conveys a prolonged form of pain or suffering and expresses something 
about how negative social transactions result in embodied states of mind. Ref-
erences to dukkh in the Sikh imagination also evoke a state of existence through 
which subjects acknowledge the idea of Guru’s grace.  The issue then becomes 
a question of acceptance and resilience, of seeking explanations in gurbani and 
of seeking answers and responses to political conditions that cause harm, for 
the teachings of the Sikh Gurus are not interpreted by these men as some sort 
9 This became necessary after several dramatic cases of deportees’ deaths received media at-
tention, especially the case of the Sudanese refugee Omar Mohammad Ageeb. See the detailed 
report: “Bericht an den Innenausschuß des Deutschen Bundestages über den Tod des sudane-
sischen Staatsangehörigen Aamir Omer Mohamed Ahmed AGEEB bei dessen Rückführung am 
28. Mai 1999.”
http://www.augenauf.ch/bs/doku/chukwu/ageeb1.htm (last access April 10, 2018).
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of fatalistic acceptance of their current destiny. Considering, for example, Guru 
Nanak’s Malar hymn, dukkh seems multi-layered, capturing the idea of suffering 
as existential condition, separation from Oneness/the divine that results from 
ego desires, and ailments that result from unbalanced mind-body relationships.10 
But comparable with the use of sangat in my participants’ responses, the use of 
vocabularies of pain, suffering and sorrow in Gurpreet’s account are of a political 
register that juxtapose his own somatic state with the injustice of the bureau-
cratic handling of his claim and the ignorance the state displayed in letting him 
linger on in a state of depression and posttraumatic stress.
Hence, when we look at how Harjeet and Gurpreet relate to prevailing ideas 
of ethical conduct in Sikhism, we notice how they invest these ideas with dif-
ferent meanings. Harjeet sees irony in the fact that current circumstances push 
him constantly into situations where he puts his own interest and ego-desires 
first. When for example we asked him more about the personal poems he col-
lected, he said: ‘Whether I talk about my current situation according to what it 
says in the Sikh teachings (gurmat) or in my words will be a completely different 
story,’ adding that, ‘a gurmukh [someone who has overcome ego and follows the 
Sikh Guru’s example] is never in a state of sadness. One should always remain 
in charhdi kala. And these poems I read they reflect how time passes, sometimes 
they express things that make you revolt inside. So I can only read you their key 
message, not the entire thing’. By contrast, when Gurpreet contemplates dimen-
sions of the self, it is striking how he makes a concession to, on the one hand, 
a loss of masculinity (having a soft body) and, on the other, a loss of capacity 
(having nowhere to go), both of which affect his sense of resilience.
4 Charhdi Kala: fragile and resilient selves
I have argued that those struggling with a precarious status and the socio- political 
conditions of expulsion articulate a sense of becoming that does not simply draw 
on standing vocabularies of culture, rights, and religion. This is because the very 
foundations of their relationship to others and the quests for making themselves 
at home are constantly rendered vulnerable. There is a critical mediating element 
here. The notion of being resilient emerges from within the specific encounters 
that I have described. But a ‘resilient ethos’ is often explicitly cited in reference 
to the principle of charhdi kala, as we just heard from Harjeet. In this concluding 
10 For a detailed discussion of the meanings of dukkh in Sikh theological interpretations, see 
Pashaura Singh (1998). My reading in this chapter is not oriented towards issues of theodicy.
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section, I want to briefly address such references to the art (kala) or ethos (in the 
Geertzian sense) of being resilient. As the interactions described in this chapter 
unfold in a predominantly male world, the question is how such references to a 
resilient ethos relate to a dominant discourse on Sikh masculinity and heroism. 
I cannot describe this discourse in detail but it certainly matters in the context 
of post-1984 identity politics and the focus on militancy and martyrdom. There 
is also a link in the liturgical context: in the Ardas prayer, charhdi kala is evoked 
precisely in the context of commemorating all the Sikh martyrs, including those 
who died during the events of 1984. By including here the story of Rajinder, one 
of Gurpreet’s close acquaintances, I demonstrate that even among those who 
had identified with pro-separatist politics in Punjab, there is a significant shift 
in how such an ethos is defined once it is placed in the context of the everyday 
struggles of those with precarious status.11 The story also provides us with an 
opportunity to look at yet another common genre of speech in contexts where 
conversations evolve around filing documents and writing letters to various 
adjudicators. This constitutes an ordinary activity and modality of persever-
ance but, as we shall see, it also triggers particular representations of the self, as 
writing to lawyers, receiving letters from doctors and waiting for letters from the 
courts is part of the very condition that defines the asylum seeker. There is more 
to be said here about the resilient self when we consider the kind of connections 
that are being drawn between registers of legal speech and those that appear as 
magical or transcendent.
We met Rajinder after receiving a call from Gurpreet, who mentioned that his 
friend couldn’t leave the asylum home because he was subject to a deportation 
order. He had just had his temporary stay renewed for another month. Gurpreet 
was quite worried about him, so we agreed to go there. Rajinder was an active 
member of one of the Sikh political youth organisations back in the 1990s and 
he explained that, as a result, his name appears in Indian police records. When 
we met him, he had just trimmed his long hair hoping to appear less suspicious 
upon his return to Delhi. He told us about how a recent ‘gurdwara brawl’ in which 
he was implicated was a trigger for the current deportation slip. I want to briefly 
comment on how he rationalised his interactions with lawyers and judges as a 
form of resilience and his unwavering trust that some miracle would occur to help 
resolve the impasse he found himself in. Rajinder is someone who documented 
his activities in political exile meticulously, from photos taken during protest 
rallies to the various legal communiqués with lawyers and institutions. He even 
11 Interviews with Rajinder Singh were held on February 20 and March 13, 2004.
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wrote letters to the judges who were working on his case. As he sorted through his 
heavy folder, he took out one such letter to share it with us:
‘I just made a request to him [the judge] that said [reads] […] “I met you three years back and 
you had told me you would respond in six months and that I could stay here. I asked you to 
please respond.” I actually wrote him two letters. He then got annoyed […] When I went on 
protocol [in the court hearing] he rejected my case. He asked me only a couple of questions. 
These were not even related to my political status. He asked me really odd questions. For 
example, he asked, “Tell me what type of help you want from us?” I asked him, if he just 
meant myself or if he implied all of us. He then confirmed that he meant the plural. So I said 
that, “we want help from you in the same manner that you helped people from Vietnam 
or Kosovo in the past. We want that kind of help from your country!” And that’s when he 
answered, “You can forget about that for the next one hundred years.” Luckily, there were 
people sitting with me there, who knew German very well, one of them asked the judge to 
give him two minutes to speak. So he gave him the two minutes. My friend asked him that as 
a judge what type of a relationship he has with the government; how it is possible he could 
say such a thing? He then gave in, saying, “This was not really one of the questions, but I 
ended up asking it anyway.” But he continued to ask me a couple of other such questions. 
After a while I got a letter that my case had once again been rejected.’
At each step of the legal process that involved appeal courts and bureaucrats, 
Rajinder receives written notice and in turn writes letters, struggling with the 
material consequences of such legal documents, keeping up a file with all docu-
mentations and using all kinds of tactics to avoid receiving a deportation slip. In 
the process of such interactions and the constant endeavour to manoeuver around 
illegality and deportability, he displayed resourcefulness and an almost stubborn 
belief in the potency of his words and letters. I don’t suggest here that this forms 
a paradigmatic way of understanding the resilient self in the context of precarity. 
It is, however, striking that, whereas Rajinder was the least explicit in claiming 
spiritual dimensions of Sikhi as a way of self-making, his explicit political struggle 
pointed to the transcendent in different ways, assuming notions of miracle and 
magic. I show this with a reference to a well-known activist and petitioner among 
the Sikh refugees who Rajinder looked up to for his unbroken spirit. Buddha Singh 
was someone who, despite a disability, continued in his efforts to document human 
rights violations and in that manner helped Rajinder maintain a sense of hope:
‘Buddha Singh has all of the records. December 20 is human rights day, so he told us to 
distribute a thousand papers each, wherever we live. Even though Buddha Singh has a back 
problem, he still gave out two thousand papers himself that day. We also handed out papers. 
If five or six of us handed out a thousand papers, he alone handed out two thousand […] 
Let me tell you one more thing. There was a program on television some time ago. Buddha 
Singh said that initially he was doubtful about stories such as that of Baba Deep Singh, the 
warrior who fought with his neck cut off. And the same he used to say about the martyrdom 
of the Panj Pyare [the five individuals originally selected by Guru Gobind Singh for their 
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willingness to self-sacrifice to form the nucleus of the Khalsa brotherhood] and how they 
had their heads cut but still managed to appear unharmed. But then he mentioned to have 
watched this program on television. In that program they cut a fish into pieces and put the 
pieces apart. Slowly, as it suffered and suffered, the fish was able attach its parts together. 
Buddha Singh said he called the producers of the show and asked how that could be possi-
ble. They said that it was indeed possible; we did a scientific experiment. So he found that if 
the fish can be restored into one form, then God can also re-attach Baba Deep Singh’s head. 
So he can tell you quite a lot, Buddha Singh.’
5 Conclusion
In each of the three thematic sections above, I have portrayed the ways in which 
individuals relate to their contemporary struggles with social and legal exclusion 
through everyday speech, some of which was inflected by registers and genres 
associated with Sikh gurbani. Although this strategy precluded a more systematic 
analysis of the German Sikh diaspora as a nascent immigrant community, it could 
be shown that Sikh refugees, who form a large segment of that population, artic-
ulate experiences of migrant precarity not by simply employing religious signifi-
ers but by using these as a modality to reflect existential and political concerns. 
Within the broader communicative and political context of refugee adjudication 
that guided the analysis in my two contributions to this publication, this chapter 
shows that moments of self-making under conditions of prolonged uncertainty 
were never simply rooted in a given ‘belief system’ or cultural fabric. On the con-
trary, each individual struggled with some of the inherited vocabularies as they 
tried to re-evaluate their own precarity and vulnerability.
When delineating the key conceptual pillars for a theory of religious individ-
ualisation, Martin Fuchs (2015, 341) argues that such a project needs
to engage with the comparative investigation of self, person, identity and agency and recon-
ceptualise them as contingent processes – processes of self-formation and self- transcendence. 
Only then will research on individualization allow us to shed more light on the distinction 
between articulate and inarticulate, explicit and implicit forms of self and identity, elaborat-
ing on the tensions between individualization and countervailing tendencies.
This quote relates directly to the ambivalent notion of individualisation that 
comes to the fore in this chapter, for not only are processes of self-formation pre-
carious by definition, considering that the human rights context is paramount for 
understanding the predicaments discussed above, but also must we recognise 
the eroding forces within the broader cultural and social fabric that put stark con-
straints on religious agency itself.
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The heuristic use of labels, such as ‘migrating precarity’ above, only partially 
captures this problematic and runs the risk of a potential complicity in portraying 
people affected by the loss of home, family, safety and social citizenship, with cat-
egories that have become instrumental to social and political regulation. I have 
argued elsewhere that the general suspicion against racialised religious bodies such 
as the Sikh body exceeds the specific context of asylum regulation that provided 
the backdrop for this chapter (Nijhawan 2016). Considering the broader context of 
targeting Sikh bodies (see Thobani 2012), it is incumbent to read the voices above 
beyond their idiosyncratic expressions as moments of political critique. Through-
out the text, I have also considered questions of religious agency carefully and 
asked in each instance what to make of ‘creative turns’ once they appear in my eth-
nographic setting as ‘noteworthy’ or maybe, ‘too ordinary’. Certainly, the use of the 
term ‘creative’ should be broadened beyond capturing historical evidence of ‘rein-
venting tradition’ or ‘re-signifying religious meanings’. Following Martin Fuchs, 
I consider creativity as an aspect of interactive and inter-subjective processes of 
encounter and thus have given it a more micro-sociological dimension here with 
the hope of contributing to a comparative discussion of religious self-formation.
References
Bakare-Yusuf, Bibi. 2003. ‘Rethinking Diasporicity: Embodiment, Emotion, and the Displaced 
Origin’, African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal 1 (2). 147–58.
Bender, Courtney. 2003. Heaven’s Kitchen: Living Religion at God’s Love We Deliver. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Das, Veena. 2007. Life and Words: Violence and the Descent Into the Ordinary. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Fuchs, Martin. 2015. ‘Processes of Religious Individualisation: Stocktaking and Issues for the 
Future’, Religion 45 (3). 330–43.
Gonzales, Roberto G. ‘Learning to be Illegal Undocumented Youth and Shifting Legal Contexts 
in the Transition to Adulthood’, American Sociological Review 76 (4). 602–19.
Mandair, Arvind-pal Singh. 2009. Religion and the Specter of the West: Sikhism, India, 
Postcoloniality, and the Politics of Translation. New York: Columbia University Press.
Nijhawan, Michael. 2016. The Precarious Diasporas of Sikh and Ahmadiyya Generations: 
Violence, Memory, and Agency. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Povinelli, Elizabeth A. 2011. Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in 
Late Liberalism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Singh, Pashaura. 1999. ‘Sikh Perspectives on Health and Suffering: A Focus on Sikh Theodicy.’ 
In: Religion, Health and Suffering, eds. J. R. Hinnells, R. Porter, New York: Kegan Paul 
International. 111–38.
Singh, Pashaura. 2003. The Bhagats of the Guru Granth Sahib Sikh Self-Definition and the 
Bhagat Bani. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
758   Michael Nijhawan
Standing, Guy. 2016. The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. New York: Bloomsbury 
Publishing.
Thobani, Sunera. 2012. ‘Racial Violence and the Politics of National Belonging: The Wisconsin 
Shootings, Islamophobia and the War on Terrorized Bodies’, Sikh Formations: Religion, 
Culture, Theory 8 (3). 281–6.
Waite, L. et al. 2015. ‘Precarious Lives: Refugees and Asylum Seekers’ Resistance within Unfree 
Labouring.’ ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 14 (2). 479–91.
 Open Access. © 2019 Bernd-Christian Otto, published by De Gruyter.  This work is licensed 
under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110580853-038
Bernd-Christian Otto
The Illuminates of Thanateros and 
the institutionalisation of religious 
individualisation
From the perspective of recent research on ‘religious individualisation’, modern 
groupings of ‘learned magic’ seem to entail a striking paradox. For large parts of 
Western history, ‘learned magic’ has been a decidedly individualistic enterprise, 
given that: (1) the bulk of the sources provide ritual prescriptions for pursuing 
indiv idual goals or desires, and thus aim at facilitating or improving one’s individ-
ual life (be it in the realm of love, wealth, protection, harm, or healing); and (2) most 
premodern ritual prescriptions assume the ritual soloist.1 Even from the late 19th 
century onwards, when group formation and sophisticated group rituals came to 
the fore, the goals of ‘learned magic’ remained largely individualistic, independ-
ent of whether they shifted towards individual apotheosis and self- deification, or 
continued to focus on inner-worldly and purely instrumental matters (see Otto 
forthcoming). It therefore comes as no surprise that the  textual-ritual tradition of 
‘Western learned magic’2 triggers most, if not all core notions of ‘religious individ-
ualisation’ (see Otto 2017), and thus seems to represent an important individualis-
ing current in Western history from antiquity till this day.
In the light of this basic characterisation, group formation might be a par-
ticularly difficult enterprise in the realm of ‘learned magic’. If its practice is ulti-
mately individualistic, it seems to collide with typical group dynamics, such as 
the need for shared rituals and mythologies, the development of binding teaching 
curricula and organisational structures, the institutionalisation of authoritative 
leadership, and the dogmatisation of ‘learned magic’ by means of selecting or 
discarding specific ritual techniques or by stipulating homogenous concepts of 
ritual efficacy. In other words, group formation, as soon as it became historically 
1 I would like to cite a recent Chaos Magick practitioner in this very first footnote, Ray Sherwin, 
who seems to confirm my claim. See Sherwin 1978, 2: ‘Since magick is an individualist pursuit 
the individual must always be of paramount importance and anyone who denies this is looking 
for profit or power or does not know any better’. In this regard, I shall point out that many written 
works of Chaos Magick authors are today out of print, and can only be accessed either via rare 
and excessively over-priced ebay offers, or through electronic texts on the internet, whereby the 
latter may circulate in many different versions. In the following, I will usually rely on the latter, 
but do my best to precisely indicate the online version used (in the references section), in order 
to avoid confusion.
2 On its conceptualisation see Otto 2016.
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 relevant (that is, mostly from the 19th century onwards), must have undermined 
the overly individualistic impetus that underlay ‘learned magic’ ever since. 
Unsurprisingly, there have been major schisms in major groupings of ‘learned 
magic’ all throughout the 20th century, such as the disruption of the Hermetic 
Order of the Golden Dawn between 1900 and 1903, the secession of the Typho-
nian Order from the Ordo Templi Orientis between 1955 and 1962, and the schism 
between the Church of Satan and the Temple of Set in 1975, to name only three 
prominent examples. Yet, if we subsume all these groupings under the concep-
tual umbrella of ‘new religious movements’ (NRMs) and acknowledge one of the 
most common characterisations of NRMs – namely, that these tend to be gener-
ally short-lived, as schisms, trans- and re-formations, or complete demises are 
the historical rule rather than the exception (see, for instance, Stark 1996; Melton 
2007; Cusack 2010, 1) –, then this is not very surprising. So, is there is a particular 
instability in modern groupings of ‘learned magic’, or were and are these just as 
fragile as many other new religious movements in the 20th and 21st centuries?
Inspired by this question, the present paper investigates a recent case which 
has not yet received much scholarly attention, namely, the so-called ‘Ice Magick 
War’, which led to a substantial schism between different sections of the Illu-
minates of Thanateros (henceforth IOT) in the early 1990s. This ‘Chaos Magick’ 
group is particularly appropriate to discussing the aforementioned individualistic- 
collectivistic-paradox in the realm of ‘learned magic’, and the schisms that may 
have arisen out of it. If one tentatively splits the (Euro-American)3 history of 
‘learned magic’ in the 20th and 21st centuries into a few major currents (‘major’ 
here mainly refers to historical impact; there are countless minor currents which 
will not be part of the following sketch),4 namely: the (1) Golden Dawn (and post-
Golden Dawn) current, which includes various off-springs such as Dion Fortune’s 
Fraternity of Inner Light; the (2) Thelema and Ordo Templi Orientis current, which 
later also includes the pivotal works of Kenneth Grant and his disciples (Typho-
nian OTO); the (3) Wicca current, with its countless splits and branches, including 
further Neopagan adaptations of ‘learned magic’ (e.g., Starhawk); the (4) Satanic 
3 As scholarship has concentrated on the history of modern ‘magick’ in Euro-America or even 
only the Anglosphere, there is not much descent scholarly information available on recent de-
velopments in other parts of the world, such as South America, Northern Africa, or even some 
parts of Europe (consider Portugal, Spain, Italy, Eastern Europe, etc.). Thus, the following sketch 
is necessarily limited and open to future revisions. 
4 Yet the selection reflects, it is hoped, recent practitioner perspectives: compare, for instance, 
the topics discussed in Evans 2007 and Drury 2012. Note that, even though here divided for ana-
lytical purposes, most of these currents are historically related or have influenced one another, 
thus indicating fluid borders.
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current (e.g., Church of Satan, Temple of Set); the (5) Chaos Magick current; the 
(6) Dragon Rouge current (which includes further ‘Draconian’ orders as well as 
the debate on ‘Uthark’ practices); the (7) Martinism current (with roots in France, 
but now almost global scope); the (8) Hoodoo / Voudon current (which includes 
further African-American or Afro-Caribbean adaptations by Western practitioners) 
and (9) modern ‘Seiðr’, ‘Asatru’ and related ‘Neo-Shamanic’5 adaptations, Chaos 
Magick is clearly the most individualistic and has, not least due to its decidedly 
individualistic agenda, also yielded numerous innovative impulses, thus influenc-
ing the overall development of ‘learned magic’, or ‘magick’, as we shall call it in 
this article,6 over the past decades.7
According to Colin Duggan, the importance of individualism in Chaos Magick 
cannot be understated: ‘The emphasis on personal experience, personal experimen-
tation, personalised rituals, personal beliefs, self-development,  self-conditioning, 
individual potential, individual creativity, and individual creation and dissemi-
nation of knowledge is evident in all aspects of Chaos Magick discourse’ (Duggan 
2014, 411). In fact, typical modes of group formation (that is, in the realm of ‘learned 
magic’, the foundation of an elaborate order or fraternity) were neither considered 
inevitable nor necessary in the discourse on Chaos Magick, due ‘its strong rejection 
of the hierarchical structures of other magical orders or groups’ (ibid., 408). In con-
trast, individuals ‘choosing to involve themselves in the practice of Chaos Magick 
more often work alone or in loose networks. The anarchic elements of Chaos Magick 
[…] allow each individual to create or choose their own mode of  participation in 
5 ‘Shamanism’ entails many discursive meanings but is nonetheless embedded in this historical 
sketch as it has often been used as a pivotal concept in modern literature on ‘learned magic’, 
particularly in the discourse on Chaos Magick: see on this observation also Duggan 2014, 100f; 
for Chaos Magick adaptations of ‘Shamanism’ see, for example, Carroll 1978; Sherwin 1978; Hine 
1989/90. Interestingly, the latter relies on Mircea Eliade’s Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of 
 Ecstasy (1951, transl. 1964) in his attempt to construe shamanism as an ‘archaic technique of 
ecstasy’ that would underlie much of modern magick: see Hine 1998 (1989/90), vol. 1: 5.
6 Most modern practitioners, not least those belonging to the Illuminates of Thanateros, fall 
under my criteria of conceptualizing ‘Western learned magic’ as outlined in Otto 2016 (such as 
Western-ness; the self-referential, identificatory use of the term ‘magic’; literacy; striving for 
lengthy, sophisticated rituals; etc.). Yet, in the following, I will, mostly for aesthetic reasons, 
abstain from labelling their ritual art as ‘learned magic’ (which, as an analytical category, makes 
more sense in premodern scenarios), but instead use the term ‘magick’, which is the main spell-
ing found in the practitioner literature; going back to Aleister Crowley, said spelling is mainly 
used by authors and practitioners to acknowledge the reality of ‘magic’ despite living in modern 
secular or post-secular environments. 
7 See also the self-perception of Peter Carroll, one of the founders of Chaos Magick: ‘Its para-
digm has influenced virtually the whole of western magick with a current of eclecticism and a 
rejection of the principles of absolutism, guruship and totalitarianism’: Carroll 1997.
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the discourse’ (ibid., 409). The foundation of the IOT was thus ‘more the excep-
tion than the rule’ (ibid., 409),8 whereas a loose network like ‘Thee Temple Ov 
Psychick Youth’ (TOPY, originally an avant-garde group of artists dedicated to 
Chaos Magick, the most prominent being Genesis P-Orridge) could be considered 
a contemporaneous counter-example, or even the more common form of social 
organisation in the Chaos Magick milieu of the 1970s and 1980s (see Cusack 2011). 
The IOT is thus a good case study for the issues discussed in this publication, as 
it was and still is an unprecedented attempt of institutionalising one of the most 
individualising currents in the history of ‘Western learned magic’.
The article is structured as follows: In the first section, Chaos Magick will be 
analysed from the viewpoint of the overall history of ‘Western learned magic’, 
thereby focusing on its contributions and innovations to the latter, particularly 
with regard to its individualism and its relevance for dynamics of religious indi-
vidualisation. The second section provides a brief sketch of the history, organisa-
tional structure and ritual workings of the Illuminates of Thanateros. Thereafter 
follows a re-narration of the Ice Magick War and the IOT’s major schism in the 
early 1990s, which will be interpreted from different angles. A Conclusion rounds 
up the discussion, highlighting open questions and apparent paradoxes of the 
analysis.
1  Chaos Magick and ‘Western learned magic’
The year of birth of Chaos Magick is usually considered to be 1978, which is the 
publication year of Liber Null (Peter J. Carroll, b. 1953) and The Book of Results 
(Ray Sherwin, b. 1952). Yet, both authors had met and coordinated their literary 
and ritual activities before that date, at least from 1976 onwards, when Sherwin’s 
journal The New Equinox first appeared, to which both regularly contributed (the 
journal’s title was a reminiscence of Aleister Crowley’s The Equinox, founded 
in 1909). In the year 1976–77, Carroll and Sherwin had already announced the 
foundation of a new order dedicated to the practice of Magick, the Illuminates of 
8 See also Versluis 2007, 142: ‘One is struck by the individualism that resonates throughout the 
chaos magical movement to such a degree that one can hardly speak of a chaos magical tradi-
tion even if there is an order of “Magical Pact of the Illuminates of Thanateros”’. Note that there 
are other groups dedicated to Chaos Magick, such as the Autonomatrix or the Covenant of the 
 Ancient Ones (see for a short discussion of these groups Houston 1995, 58; see also Hanegraaff 
2007, 104), but the IOT is clearly the most important one, operative until today.
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Thanateros, in The New Equinox.9 According to Peter J. Carroll, Thanateros ‘takes 
its name from the gods of sex, Eros, and death, Thanatos’ (Carroll 1987, 9).10 The 
birth years of Chaos Magick and of the IOT thus somewhat collide (even though 
the IOT really got started in 1986, see below), but the debate on Chaos Magick was 
much broader and only a small number of Chaos Magick sympathisers or practi-
tioners were ever members of the IOT.
In the following years, apart from Carroll (see also Psychonaut, 1981) and 
Sherwin (see also Theatre of Magick, 1982), numerous further authors, artists and 
sympathisers contributed to the discussion, among them Lionel Snell (see, e.g., 
Thundersqueak, 11978; Words made flesh, 11987), Genesis P-Orridge (co-founder 
of Thee Temple Ov Psychick Youth; for his textual contributions see foremost 
Thee Psychick Bible, 11994), Joel Biroco (editor of the popular magazine Kaos, 
publ. between 1980–1989), Julian Wilde (e.g. Grimoire of Chaos Magick, 11986), 
Phil Hine (e.g., Techniques of Modern Shamanism, 11989/90; Condensed Chaos, 
11992; Prime Chaos, 11993; Oven-ready Chaos, 1997), Stephen Sennitt (editor of 
the magazine Nox, publ. between 1986–1991, and of Infernal Texts: Nox and Liber 
Koth, 11997), or, more recently, Stephen Mace (e.g. Stealing the Fire from Heaven, 
12003).11 If one interprets their written works from the perspective of the overall 
history of ‘Western learned magic’, their main contributions and innovations 
seem to be: (1) the adaptation of scientific chaos theory; (2) ritual individual-
ism, pragmatism, and instrumentality; (3) relativism and constructivism with 
regard to belief systems; (4) sophisticated conceptualisations of the human self; 
(5)   anti-hierarchical  distribution of knowledge; and (6) an ambivalent ‘appeal 
9 The announcement ran as follows: ‘Spiritual heirs to the Zos Kia Cultus, the Illuminates of 
Thanateros are the drinkers of the dual ecstasies of the sex- and death- gnosis. The IOT repre-
sents a fusion of Thelemic Magic, Tantra, the sorceries of Zos and Tao. The non-mysteries of 
symbolic systems have been discarded in favour of mastery of technique. Studies may be accom-
plished in a minimum period of 6 months and consist of a series of techniques to be mastered 
by lone effort. Students will then be tested. Having shown themselves acceptable, initiates will 
be put in contact with other members of the order and more complex instruction will be given. 
Applicants should write c/o Box 333, Morton Press, enclosing a blank £1 postal order for the com-
plete studentship curriculum and instructions’: See The Council of the Magi (= The Book) 2014, 4.
10 See for further explanation ibid.: ‘Apart from being humanity’s two greatest obsessions and 
motivating forces, sex and death represent the positive and negative methods of attaining mag-
ical consciousness’.
11 The literary output of the Chaos Magick scene was and is enormous and can only be taken into 
account rudimentarily in this article, with a particular focus on publications from the 1970s-1990s. 
Apart from the monographs just mentioned, there were also the ‘zines’,  self-produced fan- 
magazines devoted to Chaos Magick, which are today only partly accessible via the internet, as 
well as numerous other never-published texts and thoughts: the most complete online database 
seems to be http://www.chaosmatrix.org/library/chaos_all.php (last access October 17, 2017).
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of tradition’, i.e. innovative ways of positioning themselves within an alleged 
age-old tradition of magick (mainly due to the strategy of ‘iconoclasm’, which has 
been described in detail by Duggan 2013 and will thus be omitted in the following 
brief discussion of each facet).
1.1  Chaos theory
Numerous cultural and intellectual influences underlay the emergence of Chaos 
Magick in the 1970s, among them the written works of Aleister Crowley, Austin 
Osman Spare (foremost his Book of Pleasure, 1913), Kenneth Grant (The Magical 
Revival, 1972), Anton LaVey (The Satanic Bible, 1969; The Satanic Rituals, 1972), 
and Lionell Snell (S.S.O.T.B.M.E. an essay on magic, 1974); the  psychedelic revo-
lution of the 1960s with its ‘search for ever new, more extreme, and  otherworldly 
states of consciousness through marijuana, hashish, psilocybe [sic], mesca-
line, LSD, and other hallucinogens’ (Urban 2006, 234); novels like Robert Anton 
 Wilson’s The Illuminatus! Trilogy (1975); new religious movements such as Wicca, 
Discordianism (see Cusack 2011; Greer 2017), or the Church of all Worlds (Oberon 
 Zell-Ravenheart); contemporaneous debates on constructivism,  poststructuralism 
and postmodernism in the social sciences (see Urban 2006, 222–54); counter- 
cultural artist networks such as Thee Temple ov Psychick Youth and magickal 
study groups such as the ‘Stoke Newington Sorcerers group’ (see on the latter The 
Council of the Magi 2014, 4); and, last but not least, quantum physics and chaos 
theory, which ‘radically altered traditional conceptions of matter, space, and time’ 
(Urban 2006, 234). Of all these influences,12 chaos theory is the most interesting 
one, as it led to innovative modifications of the theory and practice of magick.
What Chaos Magick authors took from chaos theory was foremost the idea of 
‘nonlinear dynamics’, often associated with the so-called ‘butterfly effect’, which 
was derived from the observation that small causes may have very different and 
potentially much larger physical effects, thus calling into question deterministic 
interpretations of reality. The term ‘butterfly effect’ was coined by mathemati-
cian and chaos theorist Edward Lorenz in the year 1972, when he presented some 
‘chaotic’ meteorological findings to the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science and was looking for a good metaphor. It is in fact fascinating to 
note that, inspired by Edward Lorenz’s works, and only shortly before the pub-
lication of Carroll’s and Sherwin’s works (namely, in December 1977), the New 
York Academy of Sciences organised the very first Symposium dedicated to chaos 
12 See also the summary in Mayer 2008, 58–63.
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theory, which led, in the following year, to various ground-breaking articles that 
permitted the application of chaos theory to many different phenomena. In other 
words, Chaos Magick emerged almost simultaneously to its counterpart in the 
natural sciences.
Chaos Magick authors adapted the idea of a ‘chaotic’, or non-deterministic 
and non-predictable, universe mostly by relating it to processes of the human 
brain. Phil Hine, in his Condensed Chaos (later renamed Oven-Ready Chaos), 
writes for instance that ‘the Universe […] is stochastic13 in nature. Magick is a set 
of techniques for rousing a neurological storm in the brain which brings about 
microscopic fluctuations in the Universe, which lead eventually to macroscopic 
changes – in accordance with the magician’s intent’ (Hine 1997 (1992), 21). This 
argument is obviously related to one of the most classic esoteric ideas, namely 
that there is an intrinsic relationship between macrocosm and microcosm (‘As 
above, so below’), which now serves ‘to emphasise the connection between bio-
logical activity in the brain and the universe’ (Duggan 2013, 107). Yet, according 
to Carroll, the result of this reinterpretation is nothing but the emergence of a new 
Aeon, the ‘Chaoist Aeon’14:
‘In the Chaoist aeon, on whose threshold we stand, a new conception of psychic reality is 
forming. […] The leading edge of quantum physics seems to be providing a theoretical basis 
for many of the phenomena rediscovered by the renaissance of interest in parapsychology 
and ancient magical practice. In this new paradigm […] the animating force of the vast uni-
verse can be called Chaos’ (Carroll 1987, 157).15
In contrast to its rather abstract meaning in scientific chaos theory, the notion of 
‘chaos’ is here promoted to a universal life force, and thus described in religious 
rather than scientific prose. Carroll even equalises it with ‘God or Tao’, as it is ‘the 
force which has caused life to evolve itself out of dust’ and claims that it is ‘cur-
rently most concentratedly manifest in the human life force, or Kia, where it is 
the source of consciousness’ (ibid., 28). Magick works because it allows the prac-
titioner to influence, via his or her mind or brain, Kia, which is  connected – via 
13 By ‘stochastic’ Hines apparently means non-deterministic: a system in which its current state 
does not determine its next state.
14 The metaphor of the ‘Aeon’ has been a common topos in ‘learned magic’ discourse ever since 
Aleister Crowley: see Bogdan 2012.
15 See also Hine 1991, who states that if the ‘Quantum revolution dealt a death blow to the dual-
istic perception of the universe, Chaos physics will more or less finish it off. […] We know that the 
Universe is much too complex (and wonderful) to be neatly labelled into opposites. […] Anything 
might be possible, if we allow ourselves new possibilities. The best kind of magick […] is magick 
that liberates us from the chains of oppression’.
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an  intermediate realm called Aether – 16 to the overall life force of the universe, 
namely Chaos. That practitioners can influence reality through their minds is, 
of course, not a novel idea and reminiscent, for instance, of Marsilio Ficino’s 
 re-conceptualisation of the Plotinian ‘world soul’ (anima mundi) or, a bit more 
recently, of Éliphas Lévi’s Mesmerism-driven concept of ‘astral light’ (on the latter 
see Otto 2011, 520f). Yet, chaos theory provided practitioners of the 1970s and 1980s 
with an up-to-date scientific framework that seemed to heighten the plausibility of 
neurological processes affecting outer realities, whereby TOPY practitioners even 
coined the notion of ‘neuromancy’ (word-playing on necromancy: see Greer 2003, 
474).17 Carroll went as far as to suggest that ‘the higher reaches of scientific theory 
and empiricism actually demand that magic exists’ (Carroll undated (b)). Out of 
this novel interpretation arose a particular focus on extraordinary experiences, or 
ecstasy, as an important tool of magickal practice, as we will see below.
1.2  Ritual individualism, pragmatism, and instrumentality
If scientific chaos theory provided Chaos Magick practitioners with a novel theo-
retical framework, Austin Osman Spare’s concept of ‘sigilisation’ fostered a fun-
damental change in their ritual art. Formulated as early as 1913 (Book of Pleasure), 
Spare’s innovative idea that sigils – i.e. those usually predefined ‘sophisticated 
circular or rectangular arrangements of drawings, “voces magicae” and/or “char-
acteres”’ that had pervaded the Grimoire genre for many centuries (Bellingradt, 
Otto 2017, 74 and passim)  – could be tailor-made by writing down wishes and 
re-arranging the letters above one another18 was hardly recognised during his life-
time and popularised only during the 1970s, first by Kenneth Grant (1972, 180f.) 
and thereafter, with somewhat greater impact, by Peter J. Carroll and Ray Sherwin.
16 See also Carroll 1987, 29: ‘Between Chaos and ordinary matter, and between Kia and the 
mind, there exists a realm of half formed substance called Aether. […] It consists of all the pos-
sibilities which Chaos throws out which have not yet become solid realities. It is the “medium” 
by which the “non-existent” chaos translates itself into “real” effects. It forms a sort of backdrop 
out of which real events and real thoughts materialize. Because aetheric events are only partially 
evolved into dualistic existence, they may not have a precise location in space or time. They may 
not have a precise mass or energy either, and so do not necessarily affect the physical plane. It 
is from the bizarre and indeterminate nature of the aetheric plane that Chaos gets its name, for 
Chaos cannot be known directly’.
17 The term ‘neuromancy’ was first adopted from W. Gibson’s novel Neuromancer (1983). Thanks 
to J. Christian Greer for this hint. 
18 See Spare 1913, 29f; for a concise technique see Carroll 1987, 20–2.
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From the viewpoint of the history of ‘Western learned magic’, the ritual tech-
nique of ‘sigilisation’ implied two important innovations. First, it allowed prac-
titioners to produce individualised sigils that were construed according to their 
personal wishes and desires. Compared to the slavish repetition of predetermined 
iconographies beforehand (which usually referred to hierarchies of demons 
and other intermediaries in the Grimoire genre),19 the technique of ‘sigilisation’ 
thus represents a crucial shift towards the psychologisation and individualis-
ation of magick. If the production of sigils was individualised, so, secondly, was 
their ritual implementation: namely, through their casting onto the practition-
er’s subconscious mind by means of ecstatic techniques (based on either sex, 
drugs, meditation, music, dance, or other similar means)20; techniques of ‘sexual 
magick’ were of particular preference here.21 As it is here indeed nothing but ‘the 
mind that works magic’ (Luhrmann 1989, 120), Spare’s technique of ‘sigilisation’ 
pushed the so-called ‘psychologisation of magic’ forward, as it was now sys-
tematically applied to all facets of ritual practice and theory, thus going beyond 
earlier psychologisations of the art.22
A crucial facet of the ritual pragmatism inherent in Chaos Magick was its 
systematic, experimental, and results-oriented approach, which was devoid 
of any obedience to authority.23 From the viewpoint of the history of ‘Western 
learned magic’, the game-changing impact of this impulse is, again,  noteworthy. 
Chaos Magick practitioners apparently burst apart the idea that ritual scripts, 
19 I believe that Spare’s inspiring sources may have been Mather’s edition of The Key of Solomon 
the King (1889) and particularly Crowley’s edition of the The Book of the Goetia of Solomon the 
King (1904), with its list of 72 demons and their respective sigils. 
20 See for instance Carroll 1987, 70, on the use of sexuality: ‘As the body goes into the orgasm 
phase, and in the seconds following, the whole force of the will and perception is focused on the 
desire, or more conveniently, its sigil. In that brief instant when he is no more, the alignment is 
made, the obsession formed, the demon bom, or the sigil charged, his will sent forth’.
21 See for instance Hawkins 1996, 103: ‘Spare often charged sigils with his semen, though many 
of his sigils were simply written on card and held to his forehead while muttering some form of 
incantation, leading to instant results’.
22 See on psychologisation Pasi 2011 and Plaisance 2015.
23 See for instance Wilde 1998 (1986), 26: ‘I find it inconceivable that so many talented occultists 
still cling to a perverted, post-victorian [sic] perspective of reality. The Golden Dawn and other 
movements of that ilk bestowed upon the world great pioneers/warriors (and I here acknowl-
edge my debt and gratitude to them) but one can no longer trudge drearily in their well-worn 
footsteps, hoping that (by some process of sympathetic magic?) some of their accomplishments/
abilities will rub off – if you pursue dinosaur tracks all you are likely to acquire are dinosaur 
droppings and a few bones – small reward for a life-time’s work. A fossil is not a living creature – 
discovering someone else’s reality and making it your own may be convenient and gratificatory 
[sic], but it is also second-rate’.
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only because they have been written down centuries ago or were practiced by 
acclaimed individuals or groups, were to be considered more trustworthy and 
efficacious, thus paving the way for a more systematic, experimental and inno-
vative ritual agenda.24 In fact, practitioners were encouraged to record all their 
ritual experiments and results in ‘magical diaries’,25 thus following Aleister Crow-
ley’s earlier suggestions – yet, compared to Crowley (whose ritual successes and/
or failures we may never be able to verify, due to the hagiographic impetus of 
his entire work), Chaos Magick practitioners might have been more open-ended 
and results-oriented, given that their diaries should record any ‘data pertaining 
to both positive and negative results’ (Duggan 2014, 407–8).26 Accordingly, Chaos 
Magick practitioners ‘see their practice as scientific, results-based, and experi-
mental’ (ibid., 406), or, in the words of Phil Hine, ‘What matters is the results you 
get, not the “authenticity” of the system you use’ (Hine 1997 (1992), 10).27
Next to this drift towards ritual individualism and pragmatism, Chaos 
Magick practitioners tossed away all those moralistic and ideological reserva-
tions that have led many practitioners of the late 19th century onwards to neglect 
24 See also Davis 1995, 59: ‘For today’s Chaos mages, there is no “tradition”. The symbols and 
myths of countless sects, orders, and faiths, are constructs, useful fictions, “games”. That magic 
works has nothing to do with its truth claims and everything to do with the will and experience of 
the magician. Recognizing the distinct possibility that we may be adrift in a meaning less mechan-
ical cosmos within which human will and imagination are vaguely comic flukes. […] the mage 
accepts his groundlessness, embracing the chaotic self-creating void that is himself’. See further 
Duggan 2014, 408: ‘The […] way in which Chaos Magick appeals to tradition is in the form of 
iconoclasm, which is understood figuratively as the strategy of disregarding the established ideas 
of one’s predecessors in favour of one’s own innovations. […] Iconoclasm is the active form of per-
ennialism in Chaos Magick discourse as tearing down existing structures and hierarchies makes 
way for new systems, cultural spaces, and individualism that can be included in the  tradition’.
25 See for instance Carroll 1987, 13: ‘A magical diary is the magician’s most essential and power-
ful tool. It should be large enough to allow a full page for each day. Students should record the 
time, duration and degree of success of any practice undertaken. They should make notes about 
environmental factors conducive (or otherwise) to the work’. The advice is repeated some ten 
times in Liber Null. See also Sherwin 1978, and Hine 1997 (1992), 45f.
26 See also Sherwin 1978, 12: ‘By keeping an accurate record of his workings, when his inaugu-
ral experiments are completed the magician is able to review his methods and observe which of 
them were effective and which of them he might now discard as being of no pertinence. The Book 
of Results should be kept in as scientific a manner as possible. The magician realizes, of course, 
that no experiment can be repeated exactly since there are circumstances which he is unable to 
control (e.g. the motion of the heavenly bodies, the weather etc.) but as far as his own prepara-
tions are concerned (the time of day, the ritual trappings, his own state of mind) he should record 
these as precisely as possible’.
27 See also Urban 2006, 226: the ‘guiding principle here is not “what is the Truth” but rather the 
pragmatic stance of “what works for me”’.
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 instrumental or ego-centred ritual goals and focus instead on apotheosis as 
the ultimate objective of magick (see on this development Otto forthcoming). 
Chaos Magick practitioners were certainly not unique in their countermovement 
towards instrumentality (that is, in their pursuing of short-term, inner-worldly 
ritual goals) in the 1970s and 80s  – think, for instance, of the publications of 
Anton LaVey – but from the viewpoint of religious individualisation it is nonethe-
less worth noting that Chaos Magick practitioners were not ritually wedged into a 
system of spiritual purification or soul ascension (compared to, say, the contem-
poraneous followers of Dion Fortune or the several re-foundations of the Golden 
Dawn), but allowed and encouraged to pursue any ritual goal they desired, even 
odd ones.28 Take one of the oldest desires that ever manifested in the ritual art 
of ‘learned magic’ as a telling example, namely economic advantage – or simply 
money –, about which Carroll writes in his Psybermagick (Carroll 1995, 21): ‘Never 
insult money or blaspheme it […] If you want money, then sacrifice it only on 
opportunities which will make money. Treat money as a major God: for its capri-
cious and awesome power rivals that of even love and war. Money acts as a vast, 
intelligent organism which lives by occupying the brain of nearly everyone on 
this planet. Mammon seems far more awake at this moment than many gods we 
could mention’. Following such advice, Chaos Magick practitioners developed 
countless ritual techniques for money gathering (many, unsurprisingly, focused 
on sexuality).29 Pondering this interesting inclination towards instrumentality, 
one might conclude that apart from the individualisation of ritual theory (through 
psychologisation), and of ritual practice (through sigilisation), Chaos Magick also 
implied a significant individualisation of ritual goals.
1.3  Relativism and constructivism with regard to belief systems
In a manner somewhat similar to this individualised, pragmatic and instrumen-
tal approach towards ritual practice, Chaos Magick practitioners also adopted 
28 See for instance Carroll 1987, 98: ‘At odd moments he [the magickal practitioner] may pick 
various persons around him and make them stand up, sit down, or move around and do par-
ticular things’.
29 See for a few practical examples Urban 2006, 250–3; see for instance LaSara Firefox 2003, 
11: ‘“But how did you get your computer?” you ask. The answer is simple: lots of masturbation 
whilst focusing on a series of lovely little sigils. I started with sigil phrases like “I will own a 
Mac Laptop” and progressed to “I will be gifted with a Mac Laptop.” Sex is energy, so I suggest 
masturbating while chanting, rubbing the piece of paper on your body or maybe drawing it on 
yourself with sensual oil. Let your imagination run wild’.
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 creative and pragmatic attitudes towards the issue of ‘belief’. ‘Do you know, that 
there may be no Ultimate Truth?’ figures prominently on the title page of one of 
the main teaching documents of the Illuminates of Thanateros (see The Council 
of the Magi 2014, title page) – thus mocking the desire of many former and con-
temporaneous practitioners.30 This renunciation of the existence of ‘ultimate 
truth’ had two driving forces. On the one hand, Chaos Magick practitioners gener-
ally ascribed negative effects to belief systems as ‘belief is responsible for all the 
limiting conditions placed on the subjective individual and therefore, in order to 
break free of the conditions, one must break free of belief and learn how to use it 
as a tool for the development of the self’ (Duggan 2014, 409). Carroll thus suggests 
different ‘techniques of liberation’, thereby referring to ‘those which weaken the 
hold of society, convention, and habit over the initiate, and those which lead to a 
more expansive outlook. They are sacrilege, heresy, iconoclasm, bioaestheticism 
[sic], and anathemism’ (Carroll 1987, 45–7). One the other hand, Chaos Magick 
was influenced by contemporaneous debates on relativism and constructivism in 
the social sciences. In his essay ‘The Magic of Chaos’ Carroll argues for instance 
that an ‘implication of the principle of relativity of belief is that all beliefs are 
considered to be arbitrary and contingent. Consequently, all notions of absolute 
truth only exist if we choose to believe them at any time’ (Carroll undated (b)).
Thereof derived another ground-breaking innovation of Chaos Magick, 
namely the idea that instead of being controlled by belief systems, practitioners 
should begin to control belief systems. In other words, beliefs should be consid-
ered as mere tools, adapted to the respective situation, and interchanged when 
necessary (see further Duggan 2014, 409). Carroll devotes an entire chapter in 
Liber Null to diversifying six ‘random beliefs’ (namely paganism, monotheism, 
atheism, nihilism, chaoism, and superstition), which should be adopted and 
adjusted by the practitioner depending on each situation’s necessities: ‘Try each 
or any of them for a week, a month, or a year. This exercise may save one an 
unnecessary incarnation or two’ (Carroll 1987, 73–7). Chaos Magick practitioners 
were quite aware of the innovativity of this theoretical turnaround and engaged in 
interesting comparisons of different historical explanations of magickal  efficacy.31
An interesting consequence of this relativistic and constructivist attitude 
towards belief was that Chaos Magick practitioners became ‘uninterested in 
30 Another prominent slogan is ‘Nothing is true, everything is permitted’, taken from William S. 
Burroughs’ Minutes to go (1960). It can also be seen as a partial inversion of Discordianism’s slo-
gan ‘Everything is true; everything is permissible’: see Malaclypse the younger 1965, 88. Yet, the 
line already appears in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals (1969, 150). Thanks to J. Christian 
Greer for these suggestions. 
31 See, e.g., Hine 1997 (1992), 19–22. See also Tegtmeier 1991.
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whether deities invoked exist, or whether formal rituals are performed’ (Cusack 
2011, 142). On principle, any being could be invoked, any ritual tradition adopted 
and tested for its efficacy, including self-invented or fictional entities or cosmolo-
gies. Thus, the particular interest of Chaos Magick practitioners in the latter, par-
ticularly in Lovecraft ’s Cthulhu myth (on which see Frenschkowski 2011), which 
also served to undermine ‘those culturally-indented categorical distinctions which 
separate the “real” from the “unreal”’ (Hanegraaff 2007, 102).32 Again, from the 
viewpoint of the overall history of ‘Western learned magic’, the  ground-breaking 
impetus of this move is fascinating. Instead of stipulating a coherent cosmology 
or belief system which would explain the workings of magick, Chaos Magick prac-
titioners simply filed away the whole issue of truth, thus liberating and instru-
mentalising individual belief as a mere tool of ritual practice.
1.4  Sophisticated conceptualisations of the human self
Chaos Magick’s instrumentalisation of belief systems is related to another inno-
vative idea, namely that the mind, and particular the conscious self, has to be 
looked upon differently than has been done thus far in the history of ‘Western 
learned magic’. Broadly speaking, according to Chaos Magick practitioners, the 
average, everyday state of mind is incapable of producing any magickal effects 
(see also Duggan 2014, 410). In contrast, Chaos Magick strives for overcoming ‘the 
gods of logic and rationality’ through ritual and other means, for instance through 
an ecstatic ceremony called the ‘latter day black mass’:
‘Drumming, leaping, and whirling in free form movement are accompanied by idiotic incan-
tations. Forced deep breathing is used to provoke hysterical laughter. Mild hallucinogens 
and disinhibitory agents (such as alcohol) are taken together with sporadic gasps of nitrous 
oxide gas. Dice are thrown to determine what unusual behavior and sexual irregularities 
will take place. Discordant music is played and flashing lights splash onto billowing clouds 
of incense smoke. A whole maelstrom of ingredients is used to overcome the senses’ (Carroll 
1987, 44).
Phil Hine considers sexual ecstasy, pain overload, and LSD to be the ‘nukes’ 
that provide ‘a powerful form of gnosis’ necessary for the ‘continual process of 
32 See further ibid., 103: ‘A preference for precisely the kinds of beings described by Lovecraft – 
entities that have come from other-dimensional “spaces between the stars” – fits very well with 
the importance to Chaos Magick of Spare’s concept of “Kia”, described as “the space between the 
worlds”, or the “neither-neither” realm beyond the duality of objectivity and subjectivity (and 
hence beyond the duality of fiction and reality as well)’.
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 Deconditioning’ (Hine 1997 (1992), 43). Hine also suggests performing a ‘Dis-
cordian Opening Ritual’, where the practitioner asks the ‘Blessed Apostle Sri 
 Syadasti,33 patron of psychedelia’ to ‘blow our minds’ (ibid., 26). 
According to the Chaos Magick literature, such practices serve two goals: (1) 
the liberation or ‘deconditioning’ of the mind from oppressive beliefs and thinking 
habits, which may obstruct efficacious ritual practice; and (2), even more impor-
tantly, the achievement of ‘gnosis’ – which is also called ‘magical consciousness’ 
or ‘absolute consciousness’ in the literature –, as ‘Altered states of consciousness 
are the key to magical powers’ (Carroll 1987, 31). For the achievement of ‘gnosis’, 
Carroll distinguishes two different modes or paths, which he calls the inhibitory 
mode (mostly equated with sensory deprivation and meditation techniques) 
and the excitatory mode (where ecstatic and ‘mind-busting’ techniques come 
into play).34 The final goal and aspired state of mind is equated with samadhi, 
or absolute quiescence: ‘Stopping the internal dialogue, passing through the eye 
of the needle, ain or nothing, samadhi, or onepointedness’ (ibid.). Carroll claims 
that it is only ‘during these moments of single-pointed concentration, or gnosis, 
that beliefs can be implanted for magic, and the life force induced to manifest’ 
(ibid.).35
With its focus on altered states of mind and the achievement of ‘gnosis’, 
Chaos Magick was in line with many new religious and New Age movements 
of the 1970s and 80s. Yet, when it comes to ritual practice, Chaos Magick’s urge 
towards ‘shattering […] the boundaries of the self’ (Urban 2006, 253) was none-
theless an innovative – and, again, individualising – move when interpreted from 
a bird’s eye perspective upon the history of ‘Western learned magic’. The mere 
re-enactment of pre-arranged ritual scripts from previous centuries obviously 
ceased to be a plausible enterprise, when it is ultimately ecstasy, or ‘gnosis’, that 
33 This figure is taken from the Principia Discordia: see Malaclypse the younger 1965, e.g. 39, 
89. Sanskrit ‘Syādasti’ means ‘could be’ (Syād) and ‘be’ (asti), hence ‘could-be-and/or-be’, ‘may-
be-ism’, or ‘non-absolutism’ (as everything could be or not be, or both be and not be). Thanks to 
Rahul Parson for this clarification, who points to the related Jain term ‘syādavāda’ in his article 
‘Individualization and Democratization of Knowledge in Banārasīdās’ Samayasāra Nāṭaka’ (in 
this publication). 
34 See Carroll 1987, 31: ‘In the inhibitory mode, the mind is progressively silenced until only a 
single object of concentration remains. In the excitatory mode, the mind is raised to a very high 
pitch of excitement while concentration on the objective is maintained’; see also the table on 
p. 33, where 20 different techniques are assigned to either type.
35 To be fair, I simplify things a bit for the sake of the argument, as ideas ‘of the self in Chaos 
Magick are ambivalent and the singularity of self, the essentialism of the idea that there is one 
self, sometimes in two parts, and that that self corresponds to the physical individual, and to that 
one individual only, has been a source of contention’ (Duggan 2014, 410).
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taps onto ‘Kia’, thus setting magick in motion. Again, the practitioner is thrown 
back onto him- or herself, being responsible for his or her own self-transcendence 
through techniques of ecstasy or deprivation, which, expectably, led to manifold 
individualised ritual variations.
1.5  Anti-hierarchical distribution of knowledge
Last but not least, the debate on Chaos Magick yielded individualised publication 
strategies already in the early 1980s, which went beyond the regular and occult 
book and journal markets. Crucial in this regard was the genre of ‘zines’ which 
could be produced and shared by any individuals interested in Chaos Magick. 
‘Zines’ (an abbreviation of ‘fanzine’ or ‘magazine’) were self-produced texts, 
usually in A4 or A5 format, that were printed privately and circulated in low quan-
tities, thus also reflecting an anarchistic or ‘punk’ element inherent to the emer-
gence of Chaos magick.36 They included home-made texts devoted to theories of 
magick and related topics, accounts of ritual experiments and results, or excerpts 
from magical diaries, and often ‘a networking section and/or a review section of 
other zines along with contact details of their producers and information on how 
to obtain them’ (Duggan 2014, 410). ‘Zines’ were an individualised publication 
tool that foreshadowed the democratisation of knowledge production and dis-
tribution which has become so crucial to the universal success of the world wide 
web. Long before the latter become the most democratic communication medium 
of all times, ‘zines’ led to a striking individualisation as well as interconnected-
ness of grass-root communication about Chaos Magick in that ‘zine consumers 
are zine producers, and the act of distributing zines becomes the act of gaining 
access to other zines’ (ibid.). In other words, in the Chaos Magick discourse basic 
communication strategies, too, were individualised, thus verifying the above 
claim that Chaos Magick indeed represents one of the most individualistic cur-
rents within the textual-ritual tradition of ‘Western learned magic’.
This finding is even more striking when acknowledging that ‘Western learned 
magic’ per se triggers most, if not all, core notions of ‘religious individualisation’ 
(see Otto 2017, 46–50). Yet, it may be reasonable to argue that there are different 
grades and strengths of ‘religious individualisation’ even within single religious 
traditions (in this case, within the textual-ritual tradition of ‘Western learned 
magic’), depending, for instance, on the temporal and spatial focus, or concern-
ing different individuals or groups that belong to the same tradition. As we have 
36 See on this issue Greer forthcoming. 
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seen, Chaos Magick is highly individualistic in various domains, be they ritual 
theory (psychologisation; neuromancy); ritual practice (‘sigilisation’, experimen-
tality, diaries, instrumentality); its interpretation of belief systems (relativity, 
constructivism, utilisation); its sophisticated conceptualisation of the human self 
(‘gnosis’); or its democratic and anti-hierarchical publication strategies (‘zines’). 
Against this backdrop, it is even more fascinating to note that an organised frater-
nity arose out of this movement, the Illuminates of Thanateros, to which we shall 
now turn our attention.
2  The Illuminates of Thanateros
Before we delve into the history and workings of the IOT, a word on methodology 
is necessary. The IOT is a small modern grouping of magick which has hardly 
evoked the attention of the scholarly community, so that there is almost no ‘inde-
pendent’ information available on its history and workings, apart from texts and 
accounts produced by the group itself or occultist historians. It is hence impos-
sible to verify or falsify any of the order’s historical claims, and the fact that IOT 
members are not allowed to communicate freely on internal matters, does not 
rectify the situation. There are indeed order historians (also called ‘archivists’: 
see The Council of the Magi 2014, 9) who may have produced accounts of crucial 
events such as the Ice Magick War,37 but these texts are usually not accessible by 
outsiders (such as scholars). We therefore have to work with what we have, but as 
we will see there is enough material to scrutinise for the time being.
A basic outline of the order’s history is provided in a document entitled ‘The 
Secrets of the Illuminates of Thanateros’, also called ‘The Book’, which is availa-
ble on the internet in two different versions (2002 and 2014). According to the 2002 
version, which, by the way, ‘is accepted by all Sections and all Pact members as 
valid’ (Illuminates of Thanateros 2002, 14), the IOT was, in the first years after its 
announcement in 1976/77, ‘rarely more than a loose correspondence network and 
a few people meeting for rituals in East Morton’ (ibid., 6). Until the mid-1980s, the 
IOT never advanced to a fully operating order with regular ritual (group) practice 
but remained instable, with occasional meetings at different places and short-
term group formations and dissolutions. Peter Carroll (also known as ‘Frater 
Stokastikos’ in the IOT) equipped a temple in Bristol in 1982, the ‘The Bristol 
C.H.A.O.S. Temple’ or ‘Cabal Heraclitus’ (ibid.), which remained operative until 
Carroll’s resignation (on which see further below). Apart from another small (8–14 
37 An example may be DeWitt 2000. 
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members) short-lived group (The ‘Circle of Chaos’, 1984–87), the IOT as we know 
it today only got started when Peter Carroll, together with German practitioner 
Ralph Tegtmeier (b. 1952, also known as ‘Frater U∴D∴’),38 ran a public seminar in 
Bonn-Ramersdorf ‘in a former cloister in the Rhineland over four days in October 
1986’ (ibid., 7). During this seminar, ‘certain tests’ were made with the practition-
ers and those passing were invited to a ‘Mass of Chaos’, whereby the decision was 
made to form ‘a new magical order of some kind’. This event was also called ‘The 
Founding of the Pact’, and the IOT also synonymised as ‘The Pact’ thereafter. In 
the official IOT calendar, 1986 is thus the year ‘0’ (ibid.). The re-formation of the 
now re-named ‘Magical Pact of the Illuminates of  Thanateros’ was announced 
in another manifesto called ‘The Pact/Liber  Pactionis’, which was published in 
August 1987 in the journal Chaos International (#3). The same event led to the 
formation of a UK section, whereby a ‘UK Pact Temple’ was equipped in London, 
and to the formation of a German-speaking section (comprising, at that time, 
Germany, Austria and Switzerland). The first ‘World Pact Meeting’ was held at 
Raabs (Austria) in August 1987, and 25 new members were initiated (ibid.). These 
meetings have been held ever since, with the 28th AGM meeting held in Germany 
in 2014 (see The Council of the Magi 2014, 22). In the years after 1986, various 
independent national sections or ‘satrapies’, as they are called (Illuminates 
of Thanateros 2002, 3), were founded, such as Australasia (1988), USA (1989), 
 Bulgaria (1995), Brazil, Denmark, and Holland (1997).
This (hi)story is at least partly confirmed by an interview with Ralph Tegt-
meier conducted by German psychologist Gerhard Mayer on June 21, 2004, when 
the latter did research for his monograph Arkane Welten: Biografien, Erfahrungen 
und Praktiken zeitgenössischer Magier (2008).39 Tegtmeier maintained an occult 
bookshop called Horus in Bonn between 1979 and 1981 and founded several book 
labels (Verlag Ralph Tegtmeier; Edition Magus), wherein he published a German 
translation of Carroll’s Liber Null in 1982 under the title Liber Null: Praktische 
Magie (with reprints and revisions in 21984 and 32003). In the aftermath of this 
translation, Carroll and Tegtmeier eventually met and decided to offer ritual 
workshops together. The aforementioned seminar in Bonn (October 1986) was 
the first of these joint seminars and it led, as indicated above, to a re-foundation 
of the IOT, or ‘The Pact’, as it was now called. Technically, thus, Tegtmeier is a 
38 On Tegtmeier’s biography see Mayer 2008, 72–8.
39 I would like to thank Gerhard Mayer, who has been so kind as to provide the interview tran-
script. Additionally, I would like to thank Ralph Tegtmeier for the opportunity to conduct an 
interview on the matters discussed here (on May 21, 2019). 
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founding member of ‘The Pact’,40 which is a crucial piece of information as in the 
early 1990s a severe dispute between Carroll and Tegtmeier was one of the under-
lying motifs of the Ice Magick War.
From the viewpoint of the institutionalisation of religious individualis-
ation, it is interesting to note that the order attempted to be decidedly: (1) anti- 
hierarchical; (2) anti-dogmatic; and (3) anti-secret. Concerning the first issue, 
The Book states:
‘In traditional secular as well as in mystical organisations we find the form of the pyramid, at 
the top of which there is a leader or Guru or similar person. The position of the Guru is above 
all other members and above all criticism. The Guru teaches, commands and criticises those 
who hold a lower degree. […] No one, regardless of degree or post, may command another 
member of the Pact. Criticism in the Pact flows from the bottom to the top. Those in higher 
degrees must refrain from critical remarks towards members with lower degrees […]. Every 
Magister Templi, Section Head, Adept and Magus is assigned an Insubordinate as personal 
assistant. This assistance consists of providing feedback to the recipient of the insubordi-
nation on their actions. The office of the Insubordinate ensures that criticism flows from the 
bottom to the top. The Insubordinate acts independently from the Pact hierarchy’ (Illumi-
nates of Thanateros 2002, 12 = The Council of the Magi 2014, 3).
As we see, the IOT attempted to overcome or even reverse – through the position 
of the ‘Insubordinate’ – power imbalances which the founders have observed in 
other magickal (or ‘mystical’) organisations.41 The IOT distinguishes four stand-
ard degrees  – Neophyte (4°), Initiate (3°), Adept (2°), and Magus (1°)  – and a 
range of offices which shall not interest us here (see Illuminates of Thanateros 
2002, 13–4; the 2014 version differs slightly: The Council of the Magi 2014, 6). 
Interestingly, it is claimed that ‘rising within the hierarchy and mastery is based 
on actual magical and organisational achievements’ (Illuminates of Thanateros 
2002, 13; in the 2014 version, ‘hierarchy’ is replaced with ‘antiarchy’: The Council 
of the Magi 2014, 8). The anonymous authors of the English Wikipedia article on 
the IOT thus speak of a ‘magical meritocracy’,42 whereby it is to be noted that a 
40 See the unpublished interview transcript with Gerhard Mayer (June 21, 2014): ‘das führte 
auch dazu, dass wir den I.O.T., den es offiziell zwar gab, aber der eigentlich nie formal gegründet 
worden war, […] in den USA, in Großbritannien, dass wir den also dann tatsächlich formal auch 
noch gegründet haben in Deutschland und äh .. insofern bin ich, wenn man so will, was den 
formalen Aspekt angeht, ein Gründungsmitglied des I.O.T. gewesen’.
41 See also Urban 2007, 236: ‘The organization of this order was, from its origins, intentionally 
“chaotic,” that is, antihierarchical and fluid, with “less emphasis on discipline than on enthu-
siasm and creativity,” in the hope of “calling the bluff” of the “great almighty gurus” who run 
most modern magical groups’.
42 See, e.g., Anonymous 2017: the IOT ‘was based on a hierarchy of magical ability rather than 
invitation, a magical meritocracy’.
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‘degree raising may occur either at the request of a candidate or at the proposal of 
the bearers of the according degree and higher degrees. For carrying out a degree 
raising the presence of at least one bearer of a higher degree is necessary’ (The 
Council of the Magi 2014, 8).43
Apart from this anti-hierarchical approach, the IOT also attempted to be 
anti-dogmatic in the sense that local temples, sections or so-called ‘satrapies’ 
were self-governed, particularly with regard to their ritual practice(s): ‘Each 
section is autonomous. The autonomy of each section ends where the unimpeach-
able autonomy of the Pact is affected/concerned’ (Illuminates of Thanateros 
2002, 14).44 Carroll indeed stressed the need for innovation and creativity in each 
section, as ‘dogmatic ideas, rigid hierarchies and fixed teachings and beliefs will 
kill its creative spirit rapidly’ and thus encouraged sections to ‘experiment with 
whatever techniques, rituals and ideas they please’ (Carroll undated (a)). Finally, 
at least in the 2014 version, the IOT claims to be anti-secret: ‘The structure of the 
Pact and the responsibilities of its degrees and posts are laid open in this book. 
There are no secret oaths and no secret inner circles’ (The Council of the Magi, 3).
Even though each IOT section or group was encouraged to operate freely, 
independently, and creatively – thus mirroring the individualist agenda of Chaos 
Magick as outlined above –, there were, of course, standardised scripts for indi-
vidual as well as group rituals. Particularly for the first degree, the Neophyte (4°), 
a summary of basic techniques is provided in a document called Liber MMM, 
which was already included in Carroll’s Liber Null (see Carroll 1987, 12–25), but 
now also circulates independently on the internet.45 It includes instructions 
on mind control, visualisation techniques, sigilisation, and dream control or 
43 See also the overview in Woodman forthcoming: ‘Whilst adherents emphasise the individu-
alistic, anti-dogmatic and anti-structural nature of Chaos magic, the IOT replicates aspects of the 
initiatory and hierarchical grade structures common to Western esoteric sodalities.  Nominally 
under the authority of “The Council of Magi”, the IOT is comprised of quasi-autonomous 
 “Temples” and its formal degree structure is subverted by inclusion of the ritual office of “the 
Insubordinate” (whose role is to contest abuses of power within Temple hierarchies). Temples 
do, however, perform institutionally-shared rituals, including “The Mass of Chaos B”, an invo-
cation of Baphomet, who is seen as the mystical figurehead of the organisation, embodying the 
“current” of Chaos magic’.
44 Again, the 2014 version slightly differs: ‘The rules and procedures described in this Book are 
valid on a global level throughout all Sections. All Sections are otherwise autonomous. Every 
Section may add rules and procedures as it is considered necessary by the Section’ (The Council 
of the Magi 2014, 2).
45 See, for instance, http://www.chaosmatrix.org/library/chaos/texts/libermmm.pdf (last  access 
November 14, 2017).
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divination.46 Concerning group rituals, various scripts are outlined in Carroll’s 
 Psychonaut, such as the five ‘Rites of Chaos’ of which the ‘Mass of Chaos’ seems 
to be the most important one. This group ritual is performed to raise ‘a particular 
manifestation of energy for inspiration, divination, or communion with particu-
lar domains of consciousness’, but also to ‘modify physical reality’ (ibid., 130), 
and consists of six steps, which revolve around group invocations of Chaos (here 
understood as an entity)47 and Baphomet (understood as ‘the representation of 
the terrestrial life-current’: ibid., 131). Against the backdrop of the individualist 
agenda of Chaos Magick, it is interesting to read here that the
‘purpose of structuring group activity with ritual is to generate more power than individual 
efforts might achieve. Synergistic effects will come into play in a properly synchronised 
working, and the collective power will exceed the sum of individual powers participating. 
Group working also makes possible many experiments requiring more than one operator 
and allows for a division of labor when some participants can contribute abilities which 
others lack’ (ibid., 117).
Yet at the same time, Carroll stresses that any group ritual should be experimen-
tal and research-like, as it would otherwise be ‘unnecessary to do it’ (ibid.). In 
other words, there are tendencies of ritual standardisation within the IOT, but the 
experimental, creative and individualist agenda prevails even here.48
As we will see shortly, it is precisely the anti-hierarchical, anti-dogmatic, 
individualist and experimental agenda of the IOT which may have fostered devel-
opments that led to its schism in the early 1990s. This may not be utterly surpris-
ing: ‘After all, an organised movement of Chaos Magic is inherently contradictory 
and could only logically end by dismantling itself in its own act of total liberation’ 
(Urban 2007, 243).49 In fact, already around 1986 Ray Sherwin resigned from the 
order, that is, he ‘excommunicated himself because he felt that the Order was 
slipping into the power structure that he had intended to avoid with this group’ 
(Hawkins undated; see also Woodman forthcoming). In a similar vein, Peter 
46 Another document called The Book of the Novice outlines 11 basic ritual techniques for begin-
ners, which are a bit more precise and also includes a chapter ‘magical weapons’ and banishing 
rituals as well as the suggestion to find a mentor: see The Council of the Magi 2014, appendix 
(16–8). 
47 See ibid., 130: ‘I Reign Over You Saith | The Dragon Eagle of the Primal Chaos | I Am the First 
the Highest That Live In the First Aether’ etc.
48 See for some interesting descriptions of group rituals DeWitt 2000.
49 See also Anonymous undated (a): ‘Das Vorhandensein einer Hierarchie im IOT hat viel Streit 
über ihn in der chaosmagischen Szene verursacht. Gegner denken, dass das Konzept  un-chaotisch 
sei und einzelne Mitglieder einschränke, während Befürworter glauben, der geringere Chaoismus 
mache wesentlich effektivere Gruppenarbeit vor allem in internationalem Maßstab möglich’.
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Carroll backed out from the IOT shortly after the Ice Magick War, though it was 
only in 2016 that he ‘publicly announced withdrawal of support for the organisa-
tion’ (Woodman forthcoming).
Apart from these resignations by (both) founding figures of the group, it is 
particularly the Ice Magick War which may have revealed the weak spot, or Achil-
les’ heel, of the IOT. It is thus time to discuss the IOT’s major schism and the 
events that preceded and followed in the early 1990s.
3  The Ice Magick War
In all wars, there are at least two sides to the story, and this is equally true in the 
case of the Ice Magick War. There are several sources for the conflict authored 
by protagonists (such as Carroll and Tegtmeier), and these, as we might expect, 
differ in their respective narrations and interpretations. But before delving into 
the story and its interpretations, we should first understand how modern practi-
tioners of magick actually engage in war, that is, how they do battle. After all, we 
may suspect that they have more nuanced weapons at their disposal than fists, 
knives or firearms. A brief detour into modern ‘battle magick’ may also help to 
understand what actually happened during the Ice Magick War.50
Let us start with two texts on ‘battle magick’, authored by Peter Carroll and 
Ralph Tegtmeier, respectively. In the chapter on ‘magical combat’ in Carroll’s Psy-
chonaut, he states that ‘Magical attack takes two forms. At long range, telepathic 
information is sent which makes the target destroy itself. To make a man fall 
under a vehicle is not impossible; to make a vehicle fall on top of a man is some-
thing else entirely. At short range, it is possible to injure or drain an adversary’s 
energy field using one’s own. This demands close proximity, usually contact. 
Magical close combat of this type is not effected by mere will or visualisation, but 
by projecting a force that can actually be felt, usually through the hands’ (Carroll 
1987, 125). The theoretical approach is again mostly psychological, even though 
he also refers to the invocation of entities for attacking – ‘A skilled sorcerer may 
succeed in projecting a purely aetheric entity across space to harass his oppo-
nent’ (ibid., 126) – and for defensive purposes: ‘The most effective defenses are 
provided by sentient or semi-sentient entities’ (ibid., 127). When it comes to the 
use of ritual artefacts, we find an interesting list of quite stereotypical elements – 
‘The image of the target wounded in the required manner is used to send the 
50 I have adopted the term ‘battle magick’ from the practitioner literature, even though, of 
course, much of what it covers had previously been labelled ‘black magic’. 
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attack. Wax images, photographs, hair, or nail pairings help to form a connection 
between the visualised image and the target’ (ibid., 126). Here, again, the attack 
is mostly a matter of the projection of ‘psychic energy’: ‘the attack is launched 
from a state of deepest concentration or from a pinnacle of ecstatic excitement. 
Hate and anger aroused during a full ritual destruction of the image may serve’ 
(ibid.). Carroll does mention the dangers involved in malevolent magick (‘It is 
the height of unwisdom to enter into situations where conflict is the only option 
left. Magical attack is the direct opposite of occult healing, though it uses similar 
forces. As with all things, constructive activities are a far greater challenge to our 
skills than destructive ones’: ibid., 127), but his approach is quite pragmatic and 
far from being moralistic.
Ralph Tegtmeier, in a chapter on ‘Kampfmagie’ in his Die Hohe Kunst der 
Magie (2011 II: 564–79), claims accordingly that a fully-fledged battle between 
practising magicians is the rare exception, as it spins out high amounts of energy; 
yet, there are also unconscious threats and attacks derived from emotions such as 
hate, envy or jealousy which call for sufficient knowledge of protective measures 
(Tegtmeier 22011, 565). Tegtmeier calls into question the ‘myth’, widely spread in 
modern esoteric and ‘white magic’ discourses, that the negative energy of malev-
olent magick ultimately falls back onto its arouser, claiming that this would be 
nothing but a misleading Judaeo-Christian imprint.51 He provides a disturbing 
list of some 17 effects of successful magickal attacks, based on those instances 
in which he was able to verify that magick was indeed responsible (ibid., 574). 
There are some further reflections on defence, the deployment of psycho-terror, 
and ‘micro-magic’ (the use of figurines or magickal weapons), but Tegtmeier does 
not provide any detailed ritual prescriptions, apart from basic partner exercises 
that aim at sharpening one’s senses (ibid., 577–9). Tegtmeier provides a few more 
specific instructions in his brief articles on ‘Kampfmagie’ published in 1986–7 in 
51 Ibid., 569: ‘Fataler ist allerdings die Sicherheit, in die der Esoteriker damit gewiegt werden 
soll: Denn nichts wäre falscher als die Annahme, daß man vor kampfmagischen Aktionen an-
derer allein schon deshalb geschützt sei, weil irgendein göttliches Vergeltungsprinzip die Bösen 
schon bestrafen werde. Abgesehen davon, daß es selbst in einem solchen Fall alles andere als 
wünschenswert wäre, erst zum Opfer zu werden, um sich dann  – möglicherweise auch noch 
posthum! – an der Bestrafung der Bösewichter zu erfreuen, verkennt diese Spießeridylle leider 
die Grundmechanismen, nach denen die Kampfmagie funktioniert. Tatsächlich läßt sich zwar 
recht häufig beobachten, daß Magier, die einen Angriff gegen andere starten, mit plötzlichen 
Rückstößen (im Fachjargon: “Reperkussionen”) zu kämpfen haben, doch beweisen andererseits 
die vielen erfolgreichen Schadensmagier, daß dies wohl kaum an irgendeinem die Schwachen 
schützenden “Naturgesetz” liegen kann’. See also Tegtmeier 1986, 36. 
The Illuminates of Thanateros and the institutionalisation of religious   781
Anubis (issues 3–5), which were partly inspired by Peter Carroll’s previous writ-
ings on the matter.52
Before delving into the Ice Magick War itself, another brief detour on ‘Eis-
magie’ is necessary, given that it is the name-giver of the events discussed in the 
following. Eismagie is the title of a short booklet published by Tegtmeier in 1996, 
i.e., years after the schism of the IOT. Eismagie is a highly sophisticated discus-
sion of human reality that is sometimes hard to digest, not least due to its narra-
tive style (the text uses plenty of unusual German terminology, partly invented 
for the purposes of the argument). It is mostly an essay on what it might actually 
mean to be a ‘magician’ if ‘magic’ were to imply really doing the impossible.53 
Apart from one practical ‘arrangement’ (‘anordnung’), to be performed once in 
a lifetime, which consists of lying on the ground – as motionless as possible – 
for eight hours and marking down one’s experiences thereafter (Tegtmeier 1996, 
37–39), and an uncommented list of bodily and linguistic exercises for the first 
degree or ‘Laborstufe’ (ibid., 78–84), there are no ritual scripts provided in the 
84-page book. ‘Ice Magic’, at least as Tegtmeier conceptualises it here, rather 
seems to be a philosophical or even phenomenological attempt to fundamentally 
52 See for instance Tegtmeier 1986, 38. Anton La Vey, in his Satanic Bible, is also quite transpar-
ent regarding the precise performance of malevolent rituals: see LaVey 1976 (1969), 63f.
53 See Tegtmeier 1996, 5. For the German reader, and for the purpose of understanding the dif-
ficulty of the text, I shall quote the entire first paragraph of chapter 1, despite feeling incapable 
of offering any sensible translation (note that Tegtmeier uses small letters throughout the entire 
book): ‘reduziert auf ihre kernaussage – und “reduziert” meint hier: unter außerachtlassung der 
kulturüblichen verbrämungen, folkloristischen schnörkel, verkennungen und mehr oder weni-
ger wohlformulierten ausflüchte – besagen alle gängigen definitionen, wenn auch nur ahnung-
sweise, daß “magie” bedeutet, unmögliches zu tun. wir wollen das hier ganz wörtlich nehmen: 
“unmögliches” heißt also nicht, “(vorläufig) für unmöglich gehaltenes”, denn damit erschöpfte 
sich jede begehung in den zirkelschlüssen bloßer mutmaßung. (hier, wie so oft – das werden wir 
noch sehen –, bietet die sprache einen nutzbaren fingerzeig: eine mutmaßung ist ein akt, durch 
den der eigene mut – genauer, das fehlen oder die beschränktheit desselben – zum maß der 
dinge gemacht wird. sicherlich Iäßt sich beispielsweise die position vertreten, daß man es für 
durchaus wünschenswert hielte, wenn es keine unmöglichkeiten gäbe; es aber a priori anzuneh-
men, daß dem so sei, kündet lediglich von mangelnder streitbereitschaft gegenüber der eigenen 
ohnmacht). zwar ist der reflex, der unzuverlässigkeit aller aussagen den vorzug zu geben (“wie 
kann man behaupten, daß etwas unmöglich sei, da solche anmutungen in der vergangenheit 
doch immer wieder von der wirklichkeit überholt wurden?”), prinzipiell instinktsicher. doch 
werden wir an späterer stelle in einiger gründlichkeit ausführen, daß es im sinne dessen, was 
hier als “eismagie” noch zu definieren und entwickeln ist, zugriffsbefestigendere herangehens-
weisen an die problematik gibt als die der resignativen, achselzuckenden anpassung an die un-
haltbarkeit schematischer konturierungsstrategien’. For some English reflections on the matter, 
see Tegtmeier, Rietti 2006.
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change the practitioner’s perception of reality,54 particularly against the back-
drop of Tegtmeier’s claim that ‘Ohnmacht’ (powerlessness) is necessarily and 
inevitably the basic state of affairs in human life.55 To be fair, the book only pro-
vides a basic outline of ‘Eismagie’ and rarely dips into the practical side of the 
art, the encounter of which seems to be reserved for workshop-participants and 
personal disciples.56 It is worth mentioning, however, that there is certainly no 
right-wing, fascist or ‘völkisch’ ideology present in the work. Tegtmeier does his 
best to emphasise that ‘ice’ implies neither geographical nor ideological connota-
tions or preferences but is used as a mere metaphor for something ‘that actually 
does not exist’.57 He even engages, presumably from a perspective of hindsight on 
the Ice Magick War, in a lengthy apology on the matter.58 
54 See also the summary in Mayer 2008, 61–3.
55 See for instance Tegtmeier 1996, 16: ‘”wirklichkeit” ist in ihrer urbedeutung “das, was 
wirkung ausübt”. was aber wirkt, ist dadurch mächtiger als der empfänger oder erleider dieser 
wirkung. im allgemeinen hat der mensch sich evolution gegenüber anderen lebensformen als 
überlegener anpassungskünstler erwiesen. In unserem zusammenhang aber bedeutet das nur, 
daß er sich mit seiner ohnmacht arrangiert, also abgefunden hat. nicht so der zauberer: will er 
unmögliches tun, kann er sich weder mit der wirklichkeit begnügen noch sich mit ihr arrang-
ieren. tatsächlich ist die magie im hier entwickelten sinne ein “totalangriff auf die wirklichkeit” 
(genau genommen sogar der einzige)’.
56 Tegtmeier provides a concise outline of ‘Eismagie’ in his translation of John Michael Greer’s 
The New Encyclopedia of the Occult (Engl. 2003; Tegtmeier added a range of self-penned arti-
cles to his translation of the German Enzyklopädie der Geheimlehren [2005], such as that re-
ferred to here), in which he points to further definitions of ‘Eismagie’: ‘Magie ist die Kunst, die 
eigenen Interessen ohne Bedingungen, Hilfsmittel und Ausschmückungen durchzusetzen’; ‘Es 
geht darum, die Reichweite vorbehaltlos auszuschöpfen  – nicht versuchen, mehr zu tun, als 
man kann,  sondern sich darum bemühen, nicht weniger zu tun, als in der eigenen Reichweite 
liegt’; ‘Magie ist die Erschließung zielentlassener, hochdifferenziert nutzbarer Flachpotenziale’: 
 Tegtmeier 2005.
57 See, for example, ibid., 22: ‘halten wir noch einmal fest, daß es sich beim “eis” im hier 
verwendeten sinn also um etwas handelt, das es grundsätzlich nicht gibt, folglich um etwas 
 allenfalls herzustellendes oder, genauer, durchzusetzendes’. See also Tegtmeier, Rietti 2006. 
58 Tegtmeier 1996, 75: ‘gerade dieser letzte Punkt wurde in der Vergangenheit von einschlägig 
interessierten kreisen in absichtlichem mißverständnis und als manipulative taktik dazu be-
nutzt, abstruserweise ausgerechnet der eismagie “rechtsradikale” oder “neofaschistische” an-
liegen nachzusagen. freilich gehört es zu den faderen treppenwitzen westlicher magiegeschichte 
der jüngeren Zeit  – sofern man derlei belanglose miszellen überhaupt in den rang historisch 
relevanter ereignisse erheben und ihnen somit eine folgenschwere zusprechen möchte, die in 
keinem vertretbaren verhältnis zu ihrer durchsichtigen einfältigkeit steht  –, daß ein teil dies-
er kreise ausgerechnet selbst erklärtermaßen aus dem neonazistischen lager stammte und sich 
diesem bis heute zugehörig und verpflichtet fühlt. daran wird aber immerhin offenbar, welche 
denunziatorischen spasmen die vertreter magischer orthodoxie aufzubieten imstande sind, so-
bald sie ihre mehr oder weniger mühsam erwirtschafteten sozialen pfründe gefährdet wähnen’.
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The exercises on ‘Körperführung’ in the final part on the ‘Laborstufen’ point, 
in particular, towards Tegtmeier’s main inspiration, namely the martial arts 
concept (called ‘Tan Tien Tschüan’) of his part-time mentor Helmuth Barthel.59 
According to Gerhard Mayer’s interview with Tegtmeier (2004), Barthel contacted 
Tegtmeier after the latter had published his articles on ‘Kampfmagie’ in Anubis 
(1986–87).60 Barthel suggested a meeting, with the result that he became Tegt-
meier’s teacher for several years.61 Tegtmeier claims that Barthel could perform 
incredible deeds with his martial arts technique, deeds that were usually called 
‘magic’ by laymen (an example may be ‘kontaktloser Stoß’).62 It was from Barthel’s 
abilities that Tegtmeier derived the above definition of ‘magic’ as doing the 
impossible.63 Tegtmeier even lived with Barthel for roughly a year, before break-
ing off the contact for unspecified personal reasons. Nevertheless, ‘Eismagie’ is 
derived from Tegtmeier’s experiences with Barthel,64 although it is to be noted 
59 There is still an operative website dedicated to the art, where texts and images of Helmut Barthel 
can be found: http://www.tantientschuean.de/tan/boxen.html (last access November 16, 2017).
60 See also Tegtmeier, Rietti 2006, 8.
61 See the unpublished interview transcript (Mayer 2004): ‘Das hat dessen Aufmerksamkeit er-
regt und er hat mich dann zu einem Interview eingeladen, in Norddeutschland. .....mhm [zündet 
sich eine Zigarette an] und besagter Herr wurde dann .. zu meinem eigenen, nicht geringen Er-
staunen, dann eigentlich auch zu meinem Lehrer. Ich hab ne Menge Lehrer gehabt, wenn auch 
nicht im Bereich der Magie, also Lehrer beispielsweise: Yoga, Tantra, .. in dieser Art ja? Da habe 
ich auch bei ... teilweise bei ganz bekannten Leuten dann auch gesessen und [lacht] mich be-
lehren lassen. In der Magie eigentlich nich. […]’.
62 See ibid.: ‘Da war es in sofern ein bisschen anders, weil der, dieser Mann, ... m...äh .. Kamp-
fkunstexperte war, aber in seiner Kampfkunst auch .. also .. rekurrierte, beziehungsweise, 
 wiederherstellte, wenn man so will, .. ähm ... ne ganze Menge von dem, was man sonst eigentlich 
in der Kampfku// in der asiatischen Kampfkunst nur in den Legenden .. ke// oder aus Legenden 
kennt. [unklar: Also das sind auch// – 0:24:28] angefangen bei kontaktlosem Pushen .. bis zu 
den äh wirklich.. äh abstrusesten.. sagen wir mal .. für den .. Laien-Beobachter eigentlich nur 
als magische Phänomene zu bezeichnenden.. […] ..äh Effekten .. und äh der hat mir so manchen 
Zahn gezogen auch, was meine ... mhm.. bis dato natürlich nicht so def// von mir nicht defini-
erte, aber.. dann äh .. versucht zu definierende, wenn man so will, auch Kritik .. unkritische 
Haltung, was, was die konventionelle Magie anbelangte’; see also Tegtmeier, Rietti 2006, 8. In 
my own interview, Tegtmeier described further ‘miraculous’ capabilities of Barthel. 
63 Ibid.: ‘Also mit anderen Worten: Von ihm stammt eine Formulierung äh: “Magie heißt un-
mögliche Dinge zu tun!”’.
64 Ibid.: ‘Es gab, ich bin ja auch äh .. mit ner Gruppe von Leuten dann dort gewesen, hab dort 
praktisch gelebt .. für‘n Jahr so. Ich hatte da noch meine ... meine Hauptwohnung in .. damals 
in U. Aber es kam dann [sogar?] aus persönlichen Gründen auch zu nem Bruch, und äh seit 
dem haben wir auch keinen Kontakt mehr. Aber ich habe da im Zuge dessen, und das war dur-
chaus zumindest am Anfang mit seinem Einverständnis ... dann das entwickelt, was ich dann die 
 “Eismagie” genannt habe’.
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that  Tegtmeier claims full responsibility for the invention of the term and for the 
contents of his later book on the matter.65
So, what happened during the Ice Magick War? In order to facilitate the anal-
ysis, I shall mostly rely on an internet document composed by an anonymous 
member of the IOT at some point after the year 2000, which neatly combines 
several versions of the story (Anonymous undated (b)). The document includes 
Peter Carroll’s essay ‘The Ice War’, which he had published in the journal Chaos 
International (#23) in 1997; a comment by practitioner Ryans Run on an interview 
quote from Carroll published in Chaos International 17 (1993); an email state-
ment on ‘Ice Magic’ by Frater U∴D∴ (Tegtmeier) from the year 2000; and a critical 
comment by an anonymous German practitioner of the IOT. Finally, I shall use 
another insider account of the events produced by eyewitness Michael (now Zoe) 
DeWitt (2000), and the transcript of my own interview with Tegtmeier (conducted 
on May 21, 2019). As we will see, this ensemble of perspectives reveals quite some 
food for thought with respect to the issues discussed in this publication.
According to Peter Carroll’s account of the story, the conflict began during the 
third ‘AGM’ (International Pact Meeting) in 1989, when Tegtmeier told his then-
friend Carroll about the incredible deeds of Barthel, thereby evoking  Carroll’s 
criticism.66 In the year between the third and fourth AGM, more and more 
members of the German section began to sympathise with the Barthel-Tegtmeier 
approach causing Carroll to believe that Tegtmeier had actively ‘attempted to 
lead sections of the pact into it’ (Anonymous undated (b)). Carroll thus decided 
to publicly accuse ‘Fra. U.D. of abusing his position and of membership of an 
ultra right wing [sic] mind control cult with a seriously nasty agenda. All hell 
broke loose [...] The ice magick philosophy appeared to be a grim and paranoid 
thulean  atavism which might have had ghastly consequences if Fra. U.D. had 
spread  it through the fabric of western esoterics’ (ibid.). In sum, there seem to 
have been five reasons for  Carroll’s concerns: Tegtmeier’s alleged adoption of an 
‘ultra-right-wing’ agenda; his shift towards non-transparency and secrecy; his 
65 See Tegtmeier 1996, 7; Tegtmeier, Rietti 2006, 8.
66 See Carroll 1997: ‘The Chancellor or “Kohl”, as I shall call him for reasons of girth, first spoke 
to me about the Ice Lord on the eve of our best ever combined seminar and Order meeting at 
 Castle R?s. According to Kohl, the Ice Lord’s theories and methods lay aeons ahead of anything 
our magical order got up to. As a reputed master of internal martial arts, the Ice Lord could appar-
ently deliver lightning bolts with his fingertips and paralyse adversaries at a distance […] Kohl, 
who favoured a decidedly old-aeon authoritarian master-acolyte approach to magick, could 
hardly contain his excitement at the prospect of such power. I found all this highly alarming, as 
Kohl seemed likely to lose interest in what we had created together, in favour of what the Ice Lord 
apparently had to offer’. During my own interview (Tegtmeier, Otto 2019), Tegtmeier confirmed 
that Carroll reacted very negatively when Tegtmeier told him about Barthel’s capabilities. 
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shift towards hierarchical, dictatorial forms of leadership; his (and Barthel’s) 
abuse of power (allegedly including threats to and punishments of members), 
which seemed to undermine the magickal freedom and individualism for which 
the IOT stood; and, finally, Tegtmeier’s alleged attempt to take over the entire IOT, 
thus disempowering Carroll. Carroll concludes:
‘Reports spoke of Aryan supremacism, survivalist paranoia, and cultic levels of obedience. 
My heart sank: the usual aeons old crap with a charismatic figure, this time with a few 
good tricks up his sleeve, pandering to cultural fears and desires, with probably enough 
intelligence to make it all end in tears bigtime if he got hold of a suitable communications 
infrastructure, i.e., my Order! […] If things had gone badly, Kohl [Tegtmeier] and the Ice Lord 
[Barthel] would have ended up at the head of the cream of the western world’s magicians 
with the Order’s communications infrastructure in their hands.’ (Carroll 1997)67
Notably the conflict was not, thus, about eventual incompatibilities between 
Chaos Magick and the techniques promoted by Barthel and Tegtmeier.68 However, 
‘ice magick’ nonetheless seemed to contradict or undermine basic pillars of the 
IOT as outlined above, particularly its anti-hierarchical, anti-secret, anti-dogmatic 
agenda – at least from the viewpoint of Peter Carroll.
Before the fourth AGM, which took place in August 1990 at the same Aus-
trian castle as the third AGM (Burg Plankenstein), Carroll sent memos to all 
section heads mentioning his serious concerns,69 in response to which Tegtmeier 
67 For a German summary of further rumours, see DeWitt 2000, 28–9. However, DeWitt’s report 
is problematic as he was excommunicated from the IOT – due to ‘harmful behaviour directed 
against pact’ (‘wegen paktschädigenden Verhaltens’) – at the beginning of the very pact meeting 
he describes in his report (Tegtmeier, Otto 2019). See from DeWitt’s perspective DeWitt 2000, 
33–38. 
68 See also Ryans Run in Anonymous undated (b): ‘The IOT was not opposed to innovative mag-
ical creations. Nor was the IOT interested at all in dictating to Frater VD concerning his magical 
goals etc. For sure, there was substantial interest in Helmets abilities. He could after all raise his 
Chi to a high level of circulation; and hence had developed extraordinary sexual [the claim that 
Barthel practiced sexual magick is incorrect, according to Tegtmeier] and magical powers. His 
training program was based upon a strict program of activity often spanning many hours or at 
least as some opine, days without sleep. Magical exercises combined with a rigorous training 
period created an accelerated experience, however stressful. The Ice Mage was not actually the 
problem, it was the underpinnings of dictatorial control which created a fiasco for the IOT’.
69 See DeWitt 2000, 30: ‘In dem Rundschreiben, das Carroll für der Tempel CHAOS beisteuerte, 
forderte er unter der Überschrift “Grade A Priority Request” alle Mitglieder des Pakts zur zahlre-
ichen Teilnahme am kommenden Pakttreffen auf, da es bei dieser Gelegenheit eine Diskussion 
darüber geben würde, ob die “innerhalb des Pakt im Geheimen entwickelte Eismagie” wie folgt 
einzustufen sei: “A) pararoid und apokalyptisch – der selbe alte Trick, B) neofaschistisch, au-
toritär, elitär und rassistisch, C) gegründet auf Charisma, Hypnose und Bullshit, D) eine Kult 
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authored a critical reply and declared a state of ‘pact emergency’ (Paktnotstand).70 
Tegtmeier, who was responsible for the organisation of the event (which was, inci-
dentally, masked as a Mythologenkongress towards the owners of the castle),71 first 
attempted to prevent Carroll from coming to the castle, but later re-invited him 
(Tegtmeier, Otto 2019); Carroll, for his part, claims to have arrived at the event 
with a bag full of magickal weapons.72 According to the latter over the following 
days both he and Tegtmeier (note that Barthel was not there)73 tried to convince 
participants to join their respective sides, whereby ‘Conspiracies, factions, and 
private briefings sprung up everywhere amongst the forty plus magicians present’ 
(Carroll 1997).74 Apparently, there were almost no physical encounters involved, 
even though Carroll and Tegtmeier exchanged ‘Grim accusations of treachery, 
deceit, and megalomania […] for several hours with no ground given […] Perhaps 
only the presence of the aristocratic Section Head prevented the massively-built 
Kohl and my athletic self from seeking a resolution on the physical plane’ (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, Carroll, Tegtmeier, and all other participants held a regular pact 
meeting at some point, which, according to Carroll, ‘became mired down at 
many points with debates about procedures and precedents and rules, and with 
what seemed to many, attempts by Kohl to introduce authoritarian and central-
ist measures’ (ibid.). The most important magickal ‘battle’ involved in the entire 
event75 seems to have happened on the last night when, according to Carroll, 
von Machtfanatikern, die Menschen in die unausweichliche Katastrophe zu führen versuchen, 
E) dem Geist der Chaosmagie entgegengesetzt, F) dazu geeignet, den Pakt zu zerstören”’.
70 Ibid. 
71 See ibid., 37.
72 See Carroll 1997: ‘He then cancelled my appearance at the impending event. He could do 
this as he had made the Seminar and accommodation arrangements. However, the member-
ship forced him to recant, and I eventually got on a plane with a rucksack full of heavy duty 
magical weaponry, including a huge oversize dagger acquired from a leading American occult 
swordsmith with a thirteen-inch drop-forged carbon steel blade, ironwood grip, phosphorbronze 
fittings which had had no expense spared, was bought without haggling, was aether-fixed and 
consecrated to Baphomet knows what’.
73 See ibid.: ‘I never met the Ice Lord, nor ever saw his image, during the whole conflict, and he 
declined a challenge to meet me in person at the siege of Castle L??..s, during one of the major 
battles of the campaign’.
74 See in much greater detail DeWitt 2000, 34–7. Note that DeWitt speaks of ‘circa 35 partici-
pants’ (37). According to Tegtmeier (Tegtmeier, Otto 2019), ca. 60 members participated in the 
event. 
75 On another magickal encounter, see DeWitt 2000, 39: ‘Während ich mich selbst noch in der 
Taverne befand, fand draußen – mit dem Einbruch der Dunkelheit – jene schicksalshafte Kon-
frontation zwischen Alhia und Neonfaust statt, in deren Verlauf als Höhepunkt des äußeren 
Geschehens eine verzögerte Ohrfeige und ein laut ausgesprochener Fluch standen, über deren 
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 Tegtmeier and a few supporters were sitting in a local taverna. Carroll acquired 
two  supporters,
‘charged down to the taverna and announced to Kohl’s table that I would be the “last to 
leave”. […] Kohl prided himself on his ability to have the last word in any session lasting into 
the small hours. […] At my insistence the three of us sat at a table with hands joined in a tri-
angle whilst I shouted bizarre occasional comments at Kohl and his entourage. […] Madman 
strategy works, however, as I have discovered. If you appear prepared to do ANYTHING to 
beat the other bastard, you probably will. […] Eventually, at about three in the morning, 
Kohl led his followers out first. Soror Crazy and Frater Hardman seemed at the end of their 
respective tethers; I thank them for their fortitude, I was hallucinating’. (Ibid.)76
Whatever happened during this encounter, magickal or otherwise, we know only 
the basic rule that whoever left the taverna first would lose. On this basis, Carroll 
won, at least according to his own narrative (for Tegtmeier the described event 
never actually happened), yet the schism remained. In the aftermath of said 
AGM, ‘Kohl [Tegtmeier] led a number of German members plus the UK Section 
Head [Ian Read] and his other half to the Ice Bunker. […] As I had suspected, 
Kohl had done a deal with the Ice Lord [Barthel] to bring him more people in 
return for sharing some of the absolute authority over them and for receiving a 
priority line to Ice Magick teachings’ (ibid.).77 Carroll apparently engaged in prac-
tices of hostile long-distance magick for some time,78 and attempted to acquire 
and convince sympathisers, eventually persuading the Austrian section leader 
weitere Einzelheiten ich jedoch – auch wenn ich darüber Bescheid weiß – nicht Auskunft geben 
kann, da ich zum einen nicht selbst Zeuge der Vorfälle war, und zum anderen ein rein äußere 
Beschreibung des Geschehens im Sinne dessen, was die am Hof befindlichen Zeugen davon mit-
bekommen hatten, der eigentlichen, zutiefst magischen Interaktion nicht im Mindesten gerecht 
werden würde, da diese vorwiegend auf telepathischer Ebene, im Bewußtsein der beteiligten 
Personen, stattfand und somit in erster Linie allein deren Angelegenheit ist’. Tegtmeier does not 
recall this event, but mentions an encounter with Carroll in the castle courtyard who, apparently 
drunk, threatened Tegtmeier with his magickal dagger; Tegtmeier responded by applying the 
Chaos magick technique of ‘laughter’ (Tegtmeier, Otto 2019). 
76 Tegtmeier does not recall this event (Tegtmeier, Otto 2019). Even though he concedes that the 
participants often spent time in said taverna he asserts that he never shared a table with Carroll. 
77 Tegtmeier confirms that he, together with eleven of his own disciples, lived at Barthel’s 
 commune for some time before and after the fourth pact meeting in August 1990 (Tegtmeier, 
Otto 2019). 
78 Carroll 1997: ‘Protecting myself with semi-sentient combat servitors against attacks Kohl had 
reputedly launched, I struck with dissaffinity wedge enchantments between Kohl, the Ice, and 
the UK Section Head [Ian Read, according to Tegtmeier]. One can never tell what effects such 
conjurations have, except perhaps statistically but, fairly soon after, the UK No.1 and his other 
half made an escape from the bunker and returned to the UK with grim tales confirming all suspi-
cions about Ice Magick in detail, much of which I published in memos to all Sections’. Tegtmeier 
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to prevent Tegtmeier’s participation in the forthcoming fifth AGM. In reaction 
to several Tegtmeier sympathisers who ‘proclaimed themselves in charge of the 
Order, almost certainly on Kohl’s command’ (ibid.), Carroll formed an agreement 
with ‘the remaining loyal Section Heads for an excommunication of Kohl. I also 
excommunicated the gang of four who now claimed to lead the Order’ (ibid.).79 
During the fifth AGM in Austria, Tegtmeier did not appear,80 and ‘no hardcore Ice 
magicians attended, although a few Germans with ambiguous feelings and loy-
alties came to argue for a while’. According to Carroll, this is basically when the 
‘war’ ended, with casualties of some ‘30 % of its membership […], including most 
of the Swiss and Germans’ (ibid.).
Compared to Carroll’s account, Tegtmeier’s version is, as we might expect, 
quite different. In an interview with Gerhard Mayer (2004) and another one con-
ducted by myself (Tegtmeier, Otto 2019), Tegtmeier concedes that there was a 
major dispute with Carroll but claims that he never intended to take over the IOT, 
nor to abolish its grade structures, nor to establish authoritarian or secretive prin-
ciples of leadership.81 On the contrary, Tegtmeier had announced to step down as 
head of the German section already before the fourth pact meeting in 1990, which 
he in fact did at the beginning of said meeting (a decision that was confirmed 
by the ‘council of the magi’, i.e. the holders of the first degree of the IOT: Tegt-
meier, Otto 2019). What is more, the Swiss and Austrian satrapies, whose leader 
Tegtmeier had previously been, became independent sections with new section 
heads during the fourth pact meeting (this re-grouping was likewise confirmed 
by the ‘council of the magi’). Tegtmeier thus technically gave up his position 
as leader of the German section  – which had previously included Austria and 
Switzerland – at the very meeting during which Carroll accused him of craving 
claims to never have performed long-distance magick against Carroll (Tegtmeier, Otto 2019); see 
also Tegtmeier, Rietti 2006 and below.  
79 According to IOT rules, an ‘Excommunication is the expulsion of a Pact member. An excom-
munication can only be executed by a temple or Section with the full knowledge and approval of 
the Section Head and their Insubordinate’ (The Council of the Magi 2014, 8). Interestingly, this 
rule does not allow for the excommunication of section heads (i.e., holders of the first degree), 
which may explain why Carroll needed the support of other section heads to excommunicate 
Tegtmeier.
80 From Tegtmeier’s perspective, it would have made no sense to participate in meetings of the 
‘old’ pact after the foundation of the ‘revolutionary IOT’ – on which see below –, thus he never 
actually intended to come to the fifth pact meeting: Tegtmeier, Otto 2019. 
81 See also his email statement from 2000: ‘never was there any intention to split let alone gain 
control over the IOT. I actually resigned from my post as head of the All-German section as an-
nounced a year before, splitting it up into a German, a Swiss and an Austrian section with someone 
else taking over’ (Anonymous undated (a)).
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power within the order. Tegtmeier claims that he never felt comfortable as the 
leader or spearhead of a magickal grouping, a disposition which also led him to 
reject various offers to become grandmaster of the Fraternitas Saturni (in which 
he is still involved today). In fact, frustrated by the events surrounding the fourth 
pact meeting and particularly Carroll’s ‘excommunications’, Tegtmeier founded, 
together with some 75 German members of the German section,82 a schismatic 
spin-off named ‘Revolutionary IOT’  –83 but Tegtmeier did not seize leadership 
of said spin-off either, that is, he merely became a regular member. Tegtmeier 
furthermore stresses (Tegtmeier, Otto 2019) that neither himself, nor Barthel, nor 
any members of the German section were entrenched in political right-wing ide-
ologies; in stark contrast, both Tegtmeier and Barthel had rather been committed 
to socialist ideas in their past, while the majority of the members of the German 
section were either politically disinterested or belonged to the Green and/or 
 leftish-liberal side of the political spectrum.  
For Tegtmeier, the core of the matter were misunderstandings, anti-German 
prejudices, and paranoia, aside from a more theoretical underlying dispute: ‘We 
got into an argument not least because I simply posed the question, and this was 
actually a very old question: “Well? Does it work?”’.84 This question, as well as 
‘ice magick’s’ seemingly radical approach (in that it calls into question the effi-
cacy of most ‘conventional’ forms of ritual magick and strives for nothing less 
than a ‘total attack onto reality’85), tended to fuel fear and aggression, as attested 
by the emotional reactions and statements of Peter Carroll.  Carroll, in fact, never 
even attempted to engage in an open-ended discussion with Tegtmeier on the 
matter (Tegtmeier, Otto 2019), a discussion that might have called into question 
the validity of his apprehensions. To be fair, Tegtmeier’s teacher Barthel indeed 
82 According to Tegtmeier, most German members of the pact were shocked by Carroll’s seem-
ingly totalitarian and paranoid behaviour. 
83 See also Anonymous undated (a): ‘In den frühen Neunziger Jahren litt dieser chaosmagische 
Orden unter dem sogenannten Eiskrieg und mehrere Streitigkeiten zwischen den Hochgraden 
zerbrachen die Gruppe in Fraktionen wie den Reformierten IOT (RIOT) in Deutschland und The 
AutonomatriX in Kalifornien. Kurz danach trennte sich Carroll selbst von der Gruppe und zog 
sich von der aktiven Mitarbeit zurück, wobei er ausdrücklich betonte, dass das nicht in Unzu-
friedenheit mit dem Zustand des Paktes begründet läge, sondern eine Angelegenheit seiner 
persönlichen Entwicklung sei’. The agenda of The AutonomatriX can be studied online: http://
www.arcane-archive.org/occultism/magic/chaos/autonomatrix-1.php (last access November 17, 
2017). See also DeWitt 2000, 40.
84 See Mayer 2004: ‘Krach gab‘s nicht zuletzt deshalb und Irritation, weil ich einfach mal die 
Frage gestellt habe, und die war eigentlich nun ganz alt: “.. Und? Klappt’s?”’; my translation. 
85 Tegtmeier 1996, 16. Tegtmeier, Otto 2019: ‘In der Eismagie können wir uns nicht mit 99 % 
zufrieden geben’. 
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pursued an authoritarian type of leadership and frequently made his disciples 
witness his superior powers (in martial arts and beyond), and this may also be 
one of the reasons why, a few months later, Tegtmeier split up with Barthel for 
personal reasons (‘aus persönlichen Gründen’: ibid.). 
According to Tegtmeier, the IOT lost 80% of its members in the schism (as 
opposed to 30% in Carroll’s version).86 His email statement from the year 2000 
(see Anonymous undated (b)) is, however, more polemical. Tegtmeier argues 
here that Carroll had a severe ‘personal crisis’ and points to alleged ‘symptoms of 
maniacal depression and of schizoid paranoia’: ‘The only “magical war” he ever 
waged with “this organisation” was the psychotic blitz in his own head’ (ibid.). 
Tegtmeier strongly rejects Carroll’s idea ‘that we were some sort of neo-fascist 
white supremacist oddball outfit working towards world domination’ (ibid.), and 
calls into question the legitimacy of Carroll’s excommunications (‘he was neither 
in any authority to excommunicate anyone […], nor did he even have any majority 
within the council of the Pact’s Magi for this preposterous act’). Ultimately, Tegt-
meier ridicules the idea that there has been any kind of war at all, thus mocking 
Carroll’s ‘imagined victories’. A similar interpretation is provided in an interview 
between Tegtmeier and David Rietti, published in the journal Oracle in 2006 
(Tegtmeier, Rietti 2006); Tegtmeier stresses that he never engaged in any malevo-
lent magick towards Carroll, given that ‘it wouldn’t have been necessary anymore 
because all these irrational forays were so obviously over the top, they were inevi-
tably bound to become wholly self-defeating anyway. […] No point in wasting any 
resources of your own on ultimately inessential exertions’ (ibid., 12). 
To sum up, from Tegtmeier’s perspective, it was Carroll who undermined the 
liberal agenda of the IOT, due to his attempt to suppress a novel and promis-
ing theoretical-practical approach towards magick (‘Eismagie’), his incapabil-
ity to accept other people’s opinions, his illegitimate excommunication of pact 
members – including Tegtmeier himself –, and his attempt to re-gain control over 
86 See Mayer 2004: ‘Und äh ... gut, das führte aber auch dazu, dass ich dann äh einen Riesen-
krach kriegte im I.O.T. und vor allem auch mit Pete Carroll, weil der da irgendwie .. so im Grund 
sich so in den Kopf gesetzt hatte äh, ich wollte den Orden übernehmen, was nun wirklich, nichts 
lag mir ferner.. ich hätte sogar schon, das hatte damit noch gar nicht zu tun: Ich war Leiter der 
der der Sektion Deutschland und der wie es damals hieß ein Satrapin [?], Schweiz und Österreich 
und ich hatte gesagt, ich will in einem Jahr von diesen Ämtern zurücktreten, was ich dann auch 
pünktlich gemacht habe und nichts lag mir ferner, als mir da so ne Organisation an ans Bein zu 
binden [lacht] ... aber gut, da gab´s ne Menge äh .. an Missverständnisse auch an Paranoia und 
so weiter, wie dem auch sei, jedenfalls gab´s da, kam´s dann zu nem Bruch .. der I.O.T. hat dann 
darauf hin ungefähr achtzig Prozent seiner Mitglieder verloren’; compare also Tegtmeier, Rietti 
2006, 12. According to Tegtmeier (Tegtmeier, Otto 2019), the German section had, at that time, 
around 80 registered members, whereas the global IOT had some 115 members. 
The Illuminates of Thanateros and the institutionalisation of religious   791
the IOT by ‘bringing into line’ members against a fantasised right-wing infiltra-
tion of the order.87 
It is noteworthy that, after the events described here, both Carroll and Tegt-
meier secluded themselves more or less simultaneously from the IOT.88 As Carroll 
writes in his Psybermagic (1996, 124), the reason was that he had ‘captained the 
Magical Pact of the Illuminates of Thanateros for a decade and derived immense 
satisfaction from the progress made in the theory and practise of magic(k) during 
this period, but grew to despise the slavish imitation and treachery with which 
many mortals seek to advance themselves’.89 It was also in the aftermath of the 
Ice Magick War that Tegtmeier broke with Barthel, and also more or less disap-
peared from the magickal scene (Mayer 2008, 75).90 The breakaway group of ca. 75 
87 An anonymous German IOT member claims to have internal documents on the matter, re-
ceived from his own mentor  – who was a direct witness of the events  – which would falsify 
Tegtmeier’s attempts at downplaying the issue. According to these documents, Tegtmeier tried to 
take over the IOT and thereby abolish its grade system in favour of ‘hidden authority’. See anon-
ymous undated (a): ‘[…] never was there any intention to split let alone gain control over the IOT. 
| Ausser, dass er den Paktnotstand ausgerufen hat, weil einige Fratres wegen Beschäftigung mit 
Eismagie exkommuniziert wurden (fragwürdig damals, indeed). Ausser, dass er das gradsystem 
abschaffen wollte, damit auch noch die IOT Anarchos auf Linie brachte. Natürlich war der Zweck 
einers [sic] gradlosen paktes die hidden authority – er wollte alle Schlüsselstellungen (section 
heads, etc.) mit seinen lemmingen besetzen. Ich habe einen ganzen Arsch voll Dokumente zu 
dem Thema, die ich von meiner mentorin geerbt habe. Besagte Frau lernte damals (80er) ber [sic] 
Tegtmeyer, und war am Anfang der Eismagie Zeit dabei – blieb dann aber beim IOT und machte 
sich für VDs Exko stark – go figure!’. He explains Tegtmeier’s version as a mere attempt to ‘kill 
Carroll’s reputation’ and in fact blames Tegtmeier as being ‘responsible for the biggest schism of 
the chaos current, and Pete naturally feels like a father of it […] In 1993 the IOT Germany was a 
big pile of rubble and one can be glad that the people who restored it aren’t cultists. Todays [sic] 
German pact is extremely liberal’ (Anonymous undated (a)). Tegtmeier (in an email from May 15, 
2019) strongly rejects the existence of these documents: ‘das ist reine Fiktion. Wer das Gegenteil 
beweisen kann, soll es auch tun. Würde mich durchaus interessieren. (Wie man im Englischen 
so schön sagt: Not holding my breath, though.) Geschieht dies nicht, bleibt es nichts anderes als 
ehrenrühriges Hörensagen vulgo Gerücht’.
88 Technically, Tegtmeier never actually ‘resigned’ from the order; however, after having found 
the ‘revolutionary IOT’, he had lost interest in the – from his perspective – ‘old’ pact. 
89 For another argument, see Carroll’s internal letter in DeWitt 2000, 41: ‘Letzten Endes hing die 
Mitgliedschaft im Pakt davon ab, ob man den Leuten zum Gesicht stand und ob man gewillt war, 
sich nach den ungeschriebenen Gesetzen des Paktspiels zu richten, ähnlich wie in den sozialen 
Strukturen anderer kleiner Vereine und Banden’.
90 See DeWitt 2000, 40: ‘Nachdem Neonfausts [Tegtmeier] Versuch, eine Gegenveranstaltung 
auf die Beine zu stellen und gemeinsam mit einigen deutschen Fratres einen reformierten I.O.T. 
(R.I.O.T.) [‘Revolutionary IOT’] ins Leben zu rufen, gescheitert war, es weiters zum Bruch zwischen 
Neonfaust und dessen Lehrer, dem Eismagier H. [Barthel] gekommen war, und die kleine Gruppe 
von Eismagiern, die der Magus um sich geschart hatte, zerfallen war, zog sich Neonfaust alias 
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German members of the newly founded ‘Revolutionary IOT’ continued its work-
ings for roughly one year, and gradually fell apart thereafter (Tegtmeier, Otto 
2019). 
4  Conclusions
If I am correct in my observation that the ‘textual-ritual tradition of “Western 
learned magic” triggers a wide range of notions ascribed to “religious individual-
isation” and might therefore be interpreted as a particularly noticeable example 
case of such dynamics’ (Otto 2017, 29), and if I am further correct with my claim 
(above) that ‘Chaos Magick represents one of the most individualistic currents 
within “Western learned magic”’, then the IOT was indeed a striking attempt at 
institutionalising religious individualisation. Even though the IOT created grade 
structures, stipulated pre-arranged teaching documents and ritual scripts, and 
engaged in group events and rituals, the founders were well aware of the implica-
tions – or dangers – of group formation and did their best to construe the IOT as an 
embodiment of what Chaos Magick stood for: ‘a current of eclecticism and a rejec-
tion of the principles of absolutism, guruship and totalitarianism’ (Carroll 1997).
The irony of the story is that the IOT’s theoretical and ritual liberality and its 
encouragement of individual sections to ‘experiment with whatever techniques, 
rituals and ideas they please’ (Carroll undated (a)) may have led to the very events 
described here. In other words, the IOT, through its liberality, suddenly found 
itself sharing a bed with its ideological enemy: ‘Ice Magic’s’ alleged dogmatism, 
sectarianism, authoritarianism, and abuse of power – at least as they appeared 
from the perspective of Peter Carroll. The latter’s attempt to suppress these per-
ceived tendencies might be understandable (if his accusations had been true), 
but also points to an undesired flipside, nicely formulated by the anonymous 
German insider of the IOT: ‘Many good people left the scene back then – many 
because they themselves thought Pete’s fight against fascism was fascistic (and 
there is something to that)’ (Anonymous undated (a)). In fact, from Tegtmeier’s 
perspective it was rather Carroll who undermined the ‘spirit of liberty’91 for which 
Frater V∴D∴, dessen Karriere als Magieautor an die zehn Jahre davor so vielversprechend begon-
nen hatte, vollständig aus der Öffentlichkeit zurück, beendete bis auf unbedeutende  Ausnahmen 
seine einstmals so rege Publikationstätigkeit und soll Gerüchten zufolge neben der Geburt eines 
Sohnes [Tegtmeier does not have a son: Tegtmeier, Otto 2019] auch einen gefährlichen Herzanfall 
[according to Tegtmeier, this is likewise incorrect] erlitten haben’.
91 Ibid., 30: ‘Als Antwort auf die obigen Fragen von Autonemesis veröffentlichte Neonfaust 
[Tegtmeier] am 21.6.1990 das von ihm verfasste Positionspapier 309 “Contra Inquisitionem”, 
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the IOT stood for, and Carroll’s excommunication of pact members appeared to 
him as nothing more than a ‘drumhead trial of Chaos’.92 
Where does this leave us concerning the idea of institutionalising religious 
individualisation? To be sure, any attempt at generalising from the case presented 
here would be too far-reaching. The Ice Magick War and the schism that arose 
from it was, in all likelihood, not an inevitable consequence of the IOT’s foun-
dation and its attempt to institutionalise a particular strand or type of religious 
individualisation that materialised in modern magick (namely, Chaos Magick). 
There may well be general tendencies in human behaviour that particularly apply 
in matters of group formation and group dynamics, not least in the realm of 
magick.93 Yet history necessarily remains contingent in the sense that everything 
might still have happened differently. In other words, ‘ice magick’ did not enter 
the stage of history to demonstrate that the IOT’s liberalist agenda was deter-
mined to fail. What the IOT’s schism rather seems to attest is that both factions 
attempted to preserve and protect the liberal agenda of the grouping, albeit from 
very different perspectives, with different means, and different outcomes. This 
might suggest that attempts at institutionalising religious individualisation are 
by no means predestined to fail and that they may even yield powerful dynam-
ics of resilience and self-defence. Nonetheless, the case presented here remains 
highly ambivalent, thus highlighting the tension, or contradiction, inherent in 
the idea of ‘institutionalising religious individualisation’.
in dem er für den Fall einer versuchten oder ausgeübten Inquisition (die abwertenden Fragen 
Carolls stellten für ihn eine klare Verletzung seiner persönlichen Glaubensfreiheit dar) die Aus-
rufung des Paktnotstands durch einen Defensor fidei und die Einberufung eines Tribunals des 
Chaos vorschlug, das die streitenden Parteien anhören und schließlich einen Richtspruch fallen 
sollte, durch den der Geist der Freiheit innerhalb des Pakts wieder hergestellt werden könnte’.
92 See DeWitt 2000, 39: ‘In seiner verbitterten Stellungnehme […] betonte [Tegtmeier], dass ein 
solcher Schritt nicht im Mindesten den Regeln des Liber Pactionis entspreche, und bezeichnete 
dieses Vorgehen, bei dem ihm nicht einmal die Gelegenheit zu einer Stellungnahme gegeben 
wurde, schlichtweg als “Standgericht des Chaos”. Gleichzeitig forderte er sämtliche Paktmit-
glieder auf, ihre Stimme gegen ein solches Unrecht zu erheben und fragte, wo denn jene Queru-
lanten [subordinates] seien, die einst als lautstarke Verteidiger der Freiheit die Kritik der Basis in 
die oberen Ränge tragen wollten’.
93 See, for instance, Mayer 2008, 237–45, who discusses various failed attempts to unite magick-
al individuals and groupings under German umbrella organizations in the early 2000s.
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Afterword: practices
How can practices generate, accelerate, or undermine the institutionalisation – or 
conventionalisation (see the Introduction to Part 2 of this publication) – of reli-
gious individualisation? This question, which we initially posed to our authors and 
which also underlies the first sub-section of this part of the publication, has three 
conceptual components – ‘practices’, ‘institutionalisation’, and ‘religious individ-
ualisation’ –, each of which are as ambiguous as they are multi-layered. It should 
therefore come as no surprise that the six papers assembled in this section will 
not present a conclusive answer. However, the insights gathered here, derived from 
different case studies and historical scenarios, are also far from arbitrary or trivial. 
They go to the core of the matter: how can processes of religious individualisation 
in all their ambivalence and intricacy (Otto 2017) acquire stability over time and 
become relevant not just for some select few but for a significant number of people? 
Are there cultural structures and strategies that help preserve for future generations 
those ideas, texts, practices, or sets of experiences that foster processes of religious 
individualisation, whether these processes are related to the enhancement of reli-
gious self-determination, the pluralisation of religious options, the development 
of elaborated notions of the self, the facilitation of deviance, or the realisation of 
intense ‘experiences deemed religious’ (Taves 2009), to name only a few potential 
facets? These questions have seldom been asked in a systematic manner, especially 
in relation to premodern contexts, as they seem to undermine the persistent stereo-
type of religious individualisation as an essentially modern Western phenomenon, 
a stereotype that often goes hand in hand with a sweeping ascription of a ‘public 
and collective character to premodern and non-Western religion’ (Rüpke 2016, 707). 
Pondering ‘religious individualisation in historical perspective’ thus forces us to 
re-read and re-think historical sources and the master narratives on cultural history 
alike and, ultimately, to change one’s thinking habits and perspectives. 
In contrast to the authors of the second section of this part of the publication, 
who, in the realm of texts and narratives, rather think of ‘individualisation and insti-
tutionalisation as intertwined’ or even as ‘mutual, reciprocal and coeval’ processes, 
the focus on practices in the present section yields much more ambivalent results. 
Apparently, the notion of ‘practices’ opens a wide field of potential congruities, but 
also of discrepancies, between the notions of institutionalisation – or convention-
alisation – and religious individualisation. We can think, for instance, of practices 
of social control or ‘power-knowledge’ (Foucault 1980) performed by religious elites 
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or even lay people in order to discipline or sanction dissenters, thus blighting their 
individualising tendencies (which may not even have been self-conscious). The 
more institutionalised such normative practices become, the more we might think of 
‘conventions’ as basic cultural frameworks that foster de- or non- individualisation. 
On the other hand, we can also think of practices, such as ritual, that provide or 
enhance religious agency for individuals and groups alike. Such practices may also 
evoke intense, off-book ‘experiences deemed religious’, thus opening the floor for 
unusual and innovative interpretations of religious doctrines or ideas. Such novel 
interpretations may lead to the questioning of established religious traditions or 
institutions (on such dynamics, see also part 4 of this publication), and thus to 
individual or collective ‘contentions’, which may or may not result in religious 
reforms or even schisms. If there is a pre-theoretical ‘logic of practices’ or ‘habitus’ 
(Bourdieu 1990) that is not purely rational, instrumental, or purpose-oriented, 
then human practice also entails a chaotic element which may lead to undesired 
outcomes. In fact, much of the ambivalence that arises when pondering the seem-
ingly counterintuitive composite ‘institutionalisation of religious individualisation’ 
results from the apparent un-controllability of the effects of (certain) practices: they 
may initially arise as attempts to heighten religious self-determination and agency 
but once they become ritualised and standardised they have the potential to under-
mine their initial impetus. The history of the Christian reformation, with its numer-
ous schisms and sub-schisms, appears to be a splendid research field for studying 
such dynamics. The goal of this section is, therefore, to find those subtle in-between 
cases in which dynamics of religious individualisation become relevant for larger 
groups (i.e., not only for some outstanding individuals) and gather some stability 
over time, but in which dynamics of homogenisation, dogmatisation, and suppres-
sion have not (yet) led to backlashes into de- or non-individualisation. 
Perhaps due to the complexity of such dynamics and the difficulty in observ-
ing them, none of the papers assembled here will present a clear-cut case of how 
it was historically – or could theoretically be – possible to institutionalise reli-
gious individualisation straight-forwardly by means of specific practices. The 
contributions rather highlight ambivalent cases, as they attest both the difficulty 
of (1) stabilising and conventionalising processes of religious individualisation in 
historical realities, as well as (2) detecting and analysing such processes from a 
scholarly viewpoint. Ioanna Patera, for instance, calls into question the recurrent 
claim that the Eleusinian Mysteries were one of the most individualistic facets of 
Ancient Greek religion. Apart from the individual decision to become an initiate 
(which was partly compulsory), we do not know whether there was even only 
one ‘individual’ element in the initiation procedure that was not shared by all 
other initiates – including the promised happiness in the afterlife, which may 
have been the same happiness for all practitioners. We do not know whether the 
Afterword: practices   799
Mysteries arose as an attempt to provide individuals with enhanced control over 
their destinies. However, once the rites were established as an integral part of the 
cultic repertoire of ancient Athens (we might use the label ‘institution’ here), it 
seems difficult to detect even basic notions of religious individualisation in the 
surviving sources. 
We encounter the same ambivalence in Ilaria Ramelli’s study of late ancient 
ascetics and discourses on slavery. To be sure, we can observe various facets 
of religious individualisation in her material, such as de-traditionalisation, an 
enhanced focus on the self and individual salvation, preliminary ideas of basic 
human rights and ‘dignity’, or the individual striving for intense ‘experiences 
deemed religious’ as a result of the ascetic’s focus on his or her own body, soul, 
passions, and intellect or ‘unified nous’ (Evagrius). Hence, the institutionalisa-
tion of monasticism in late antiquity might be considered an important landmark 
in the history of religious individualisation, and many later Christian figures 
and ‘mystics’ that have been said to embody high degrees of religious individu-
alisation (such as Meister Eckhardt: see, exemplarily, Loser/Mieth 2014) indeed 
arose from monastic milieus. Yet, Ramelli also points to various de- or counter- 
individualising dynamics: consider, for instance, the stipulation of binding 
monastic rules, ritual standardisation, or the recurrent desire for tradition(alisa-
tion) in ascetic milieus. Does the monk or nun not strive for the striping off of his 
or her individuality, becoming nothing other than similar with his or her humane 
brothers and sisters and, ultimately, God? This even pertains to slaves, for whom 
monasteries were among the few ancient refuges where they could be liberated 
from their owners without further ado. But did this liberation also liberate their 
religious selves? It seems that casting off the identity of a slave by becoming one 
of many ‘sisters and equals’ (to quote one of Ramelli’s sources) in a late ancient 
monastery is a rather de-individualising move, as one restrictive and compulsive 
cultural-religious framework is replaced by the other. 
If we read Anneke Mulder-Bakker’s contribution with the same analytical 
lens, we again encounter social spaces – the reclusorium or anchorhold in the case 
of Juliana of Cornillon and Eve of Saint Martin, and the House of Souls in the case 
of Gertrude Rickeldey of Ortenberg and Heilke of Staufenberg – which facilitated 
certain degrees of religious individualisation for lay religious women in late medi-
eval Europe. They could live an unusually private piety, mostly detached from 
the routines of contemporaneous church rites, develop an individual and partly 
innovative stance on theological matters, regularly engage in intense ‘experiences 
deemed religious’ without ecclesiastic (that is, male) supervision and restric-
tions, and even influence important (again, male) theologians of the time. We 
might interpret their monetary and educational background, their  handing-down 
of spiritual insights over generations, their functioning as ‘exempla’ in later bio- 
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or hagiographies, and particularly the social place of the anchorhold / House of 
Souls as indicators of a – yet, limited – form of institutionalisation of individu-
alised female religiosity in the late Middle Ages. However, again, ambivalence 
prevails: it was Aquinas’ clergy-centred version of the Corpus Christ liturgy, and 
not Juliana’s  individual-centred version, that was institutionalised already during 
her own lifetime and became the standard ritual script down to this day. In other 
words, Juliana’s attempt to promote a ritual procedure that might have had a 
strong individualising impulse for lay Christian practitioners clearly failed. In a 
similar vein, Gertrude and Heilke did influence Meister Eckhardt and other impor-
tant theologians of the time, not least due to their extraordinary spiritual expe-
riences. Despite this, they remain barely known, their work hardly studied even 
today, in stark contrast to the lives and works of some of the male theologians that 
they influenced. In fact, by becoming ‘exemplary’ (exempla), and thus normative, 
figures in later hagiographies, they were themselves standardised, and we can be 
fairly sure that eventual theological deviations from orthodox positions were erad-
icated over the course of this literary process. Mulder-Bakker thus suggests a dif-
ferentiation between ‘institutionalisation’ and ‘conventionalisation’ when analys-
ing female religiosity in the European Middle Ages (on this differentiation, see also 
the notes in the introduction to part 3 of this publication): whereas the first, in her 
eyes, ‘hardly exists’ in medieval times, the latter – understood as the formation of 
‘stable, formalized and recognized conventions and practices, which regulate and 
stabilize individual initiatives in societal forms’ – was ‘booming’. 
With Carsten Hermann-Pillath’s contribution, we move from ‘Western’ 
cases to the ‘East’, namely to modern China. So far, the notion of ‘practices’ has 
mostly been aligned with ritual practices but Hermann-Pillath’s contribution 
places economic practices centre stage. Note, however, that much of what our 
author subsumes under ‘gift exchange’ was and is realised through ritualised 
behaviour, which thus forms one of the underlying motifs of this entire section. 
 Hermann-Pillath’s strategy to develop a concise theory of religious individualis-
ation based on the religious market model (RMM) is perhaps the strongest attempt 
to substantiate the notion of ‘institutionalising religious individualisation’ in 
this section. In fact, while reading his analysis, both the theoretical and the his-
torical parts (the latter being focused on modern China), we get the impression 
that religious individualisation is nothing but an inevitable side-product of any 
economisation of society, and that it is hard to avoid processes of religious indi-
vidualisation in societal frameworks within which religious rights are granted 
to everyone and different religious traditions compete with one another. Even 
though the historical prototype of this scenario may again be modern Europe 
and North America (or even only parts of these regions), Hermann-Pillath claims 
that similar dynamics have been in play in modern China for quite some time, 
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 tentatively extending the timeframe back to Imperial China. While his idea of two 
modes of exchange is fascinating, including regular back-and-forth movements 
between market exchange (individualisation 1: here, individualisation refers to 
the granting of religious rights, freedom, and choice between competing religious 
options) and gift exchange (individualisation 2: here, individualisation is primar-
ily embodied in practices that have an expressive function, also in the sense of 
reaffirming the individual of her/his self and the social groups he belongs to), one 
wonders about relapses into de- or non-individualisation in the model presented 
here. Do certain dynamics of market exchange not undermine religious individ-
ualisation, for instance through the setting up of organisational infrastructures 
with all their powers of standardisation and dogmatisation? Hermann-Pillath 
provides a few observations on the matter but remains focused on processes of 
religious individualisation rather than de-or non-individualisation. Yet his model 
is a most welcome attempt to put some (in this case, economic) theory behind the 
idea of ‘institutionalising religious individualisation’ – a theory that may indeed 
be relevant to other scenarios, both premodern as well as modern. 
Michael Nijhawan’s piece on Sikhs seeking asylum in post-1984 Germany 
shifts our attention to legal – or bureaucratic – practices, namely those geared 
towards controlling the residence, activities, and eventual deportation of asylum 
seekers in a modern nation state, in this case Germany. Nijhawan’s qualitative 
interviews with some of these seekers show in great detail how Kafkaesque 
bureaucratic necessities and procedures – such as the asylee’s frequent depend-
ence on court orders, doctor’s certificates, police warrants, official notifications, 
work permits, or monthly visa-renewals – lead to a variety of changes in their 
religious practices and self-perceptions that correlate to processes of religious 
individualisation. In fact, the ‘precarious diaspora’ of these asylum-seekers, 
and particularly their constant fear of being deported, affects all aspects of their 
everyday life and routines, thereby leading to individualised perspectives on 
their participation in local Sikh communities (sangat), their performance of tra-
ditional rites (such as nitnem, the daily prayer), or on core Sikh doctrines (such 
as Dukkh, an embodied state of suffering and pain, or Charhdi Kala, the aspi-
ration to maintain a mental state of eternal optimism and joy). In other words, 
even though Sikhism remains an important resource to Nijhawan’s informants 
in their daily struggles to endure the hardships of diaspora and asylum-seeking, 
it is precisely these hardships that foster certain forms of de-traditionalisation, 
creative re-interpretations of Sikh terminologies, or enhanced reflections on their 
religious self or selfhood. The latter finding, in particular, reveals a fascinating 
ambivalence, namely the asylee’s inevitably enhanced inclination towards ego-
centrism and self-centeredness – obviously a psychological reaction to their per-
ceived loss of social, political, and religious agency –, even though Sikh doctrines 
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traditionally focus on egoless states, the achievement of a non-dualistic self, as 
well as ‘being for another’. In the light of this finding, Nijhawan rightly points 
to general ambivalences in his case with regard to religious individualisation: 
even though there is a powerful institutional framework, namely German asylum 
law, that fosters certain individualising dynamics, the very same framework puts 
‘stark constraints on religious agency itself’ (to quote the author). Yet, having a 
sufficient degree of religious agency at one’s command is, so we might suppose, 
a precondition for processes of religious individualisation. Nijhawan’s article also 
shows that dynamics of ‘institutionalising’ religious individualisation may origi-
nate in very different – and often non-religious – social spheres, such as, in this 
case, citizenship law. 
Finally, Bernd-Christian Otto’s piece analyses the schism of a contemporary 
grouping of ‘learned magic’ (or ‘magick’, as it is usually called in modern practi-
tioner literature), the so-called Illuminates of Thanateros. This schism took place 
in the early 1990s and is usually referred to as the ‘Ice Magick War’. Otto considers 
the foundation of the Illuminates of Thanateros in 1976/7 (and its re-foundation 
in 1986) to be a fascinating attempt at ‘institutionalising religious individualis-
ation’, as the theories and practices of its main doctrine – Chaos Magick – are 
individualist to the core, thus yielding major tensions and ambivalences when 
implemented in the context of an organised magickal fraternity. Yet, the question 
of whether the Ice Magick War was an inevitable consequence of these ambiva-
lences is not easy to answer, as history remains contingent and things may have 
evolved differently or deteriorated due to purely coincidental reasons. Neverthe-
less, the Ice Magick War illustrates the tension between a strikingly individual-
ist, anti-hierarchical, anti-dogmatic agenda, on the one hand, and competing 
(group) dynamics of dogmatisation, authoritarianism, secrecy, and power abuse 
on the other – all this within a relatively small new religious movement which 
comprised, in the early 1990s, less than 120 members. 
In sum, assessing and analysing processes of institutionalising (or conven-
tionalising) religious individualisation with a focus on practices – particularly 
ritual but also economic or bureaucratic – is a difficult task that calls for nuanced 
assessments and a cautious eye on historical ambivalences and discrepancies. 
In fact, adopting such a nuanced perspective is inevitable in the light of the mul-
tifactorial complexities of historical realities, which rarely adapt to those neatly 
contrived theoretical models that modern scholars and historians tend to apply in 
order to make sense of their own worlds, as well those of the past. In this regard, 
the notion of ‘institutionalising religious individualisation’ may be considered 
an interesting, thought-provoking ideal type (an ideal type, according to Weber, 
is a mental construct [Gedankenbild] that, ‘in its conceptual purity […] cannot 
be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia’; Weber 1949, 90), which, 
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however, turns out to be difficult to detect and analyse on a broader scale due to 
the ambivalences outlined above. However, it should be noted that this section 
only comprises a limited number of case studies and there are chapters in other 
parts of this publication – such as Martin Fuchs’ piece on ‘The Social Embed-
ment of Individualisation in Bhakti’ (in section 1.2) or Jörg Rüpke’s article ‘Ritual 
objects and religious communication in lived ancient religion’ (in section 4.2) –, 
which seem to reveal dynamics of institutionalising religious individualisation in 
a more straight-forward manner. Yet it is, perhaps, best to embrace the placement 
of these chapters in different analytical sections in order to do justice to the multi-
layered nature of this publication. 
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Ian H. Henderson
‘… quod nolo, illud facio’ (Romans 7:20): 
institutionalising the unstable self
No reading process has been more influential as a perceived warrant and cata-
lyst of, at least, early modern (Elliott 2008; Holder 2008; Chester 2017) individ-
ualisation than the reception of Chapter 7 of Paul’s letter to the Romans. The 
reception-history of this tormented text dramatises the paradox, not only that 
individualisation and counter-individualisation may ebb and flow through the 
same channels, but also that texts themselves may institutionalise permanently 
ambiguous, dynamic whirlpools and eddies.
1  Early Christian individualisation and incipient 
institutionalisation
1.1 The Jewish-Stoic person in Paul (Troels Engberg-Pedersen)
Much of the following essay will lean upon the work of Troels Engberg- Pedersen. 
Engberg-Pedersen is closely associated with reasserting the relevance of Stoic 
notions of the cosmos and the self to understanding Pauline texts. Engberg- 
Pedersen is, however, not only the most recognisable proponent of foreground-
ing dialogue between Paul and Stoic thinkers, even beyond the ‘normal’ field of 
ethics; Engberg-Pedersen can also be perceived more suspiciously as an episte-
mologically overconfident historian of ideas across worldviews (Martyn 2002; 
Rowe 2016, 188–91; Engberg-Pedersen 2010, 8–10). That perception should be of 
concern to any project considering religious individualisation across historical 
cases. But I will start here from one 2006 essay in which Engberg-Pedersen evalu-
ates Paul’s ‘concept of the person and self’ and his ‘actual use of various elements 
from his mixed cultural context’, with special reference to the ‘I’-passage in Phi-
lippians 3, and through the social-theoretical framework of Pierrre Bourdieu. This 
study is especially suggestive of the possibility of considering Pauline selfhood as 
verging on social-symbolic typification and habituation – steps towards institu-
tionalisation – within a complex social and cultural context.
Engberg-Pedersen doesn’t directly address the specific institutionalisation 
which would or did support social projection of a Pauline self, but the question 
is just below the surface (Engberg-Pedersen 2006, 71–4). The article appears in 
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a volume entitled ‘Beyond “Reception”’, so Engberg-Pedersen notes that catego-
ries of ‘reception’ and ‘influence’ are too retrospective to be ideal for describing 
the ‘Pauline project’ expressed in Paul’s core letters, to Jesus-devotees in Galatia, 
Philippi and Rome. Engberg-Pedersen argues that ‘the actual production of ideas 
takes place in an altogether different manner from “receiving” them and being 
“influenced” by them’ (ibid., 69). Paul’s letters project his highly self-conscious, 
sectarian Jewish identity, asymmetrically hybridised with a somewhat ambiv-
alent Roman Greekness, all further subordinated to Paul’s gospel of Christ. 
 Engberg-Pedersen is also keenly aware that ‘Paul’s own perception of his project’ 
was (and, I would add, textually remains) ironically different from the cultur-
ally more ambivalent historical explanation of Paul’s project to which Engberg- 
Pedersen might aspire. ‘Paul himself saw the Christ faith very distinctly as a form 
of Judaism, indeed, in the best sectarian manner as the proper form of that religion 
or way of life’ (ibid., 70). In this context Paul articulated a nascent ‘philosophy of 
the self’ without feeling the need to acknowledge affinities with ‘a similar set of 
ideas in the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis’ (ibid., 80). Engberg-Pedersen carefully recog-
nises that Paul’s ‘personal relationship with the Greco-Roman side of his overall 
context was distinctly more distanced than that with the Jewish side’ (ibid., 81).
Following on Engberg-Pedersen, then, I understand Paul as processing his Jew-
ishness and Roman-Greekness not just rhetorically, but prophetically for a social 
future which Paul himself can just barely imagine. Moreover, receptions of Paul’s 
own texts and discourse will tend to reproduce their designed effects of destabilis-
ing and reorienting individuals toward modified and intensified social imaginaries. 
This essay is meant as a thought-experiment in describing Paul’s rhetoric in Romans 
7 (with related passages, Philippians 3; I Corinthians 9), as re-institutionalising in a 
temporarily stable medium an intrinsically, programmatically unstable individual-
ity, like a dangerous explosive suspended for handling in a malleable form.
1.2 The discovery of the self and the ‘new perspective’ on Paul
What follows here will therefore be a rhetorical-critical argument that in his 
letter-writing, especially in the monumental letter to the Romans, and in the 
conspicuous difficulty of Romans 7, Paul was rhetorically institutionalising in 
Jesus-devotion a dramatically ambiguous relationship between a transformed 
and intensified ‘I’ and a profoundly recontextualised Torah from God. I will claim 
that the authorial voice in Romans, especially in Romans 7, is a communicative 
instrument designed, to some degree consciously, to institutionalise in what we 
now call Christianity an awareness of personhood, structured – ironically both 
stabilised and de-stabilised – by the permanent tension between Jesus and Torah.
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The last generation of New Testament studies reopened, and as a topic of his-
torical rather than just theological enquiry, the question where we ‘should place 
Paul in an account of the discovery of the self’ (Engberg-Pedersen 2006, 70). 
Paul and, in particular, readings of the ‘I’ of Romans 7 have been made to occupy 
conflicting places in the history of selfhood. The movement toward the ‘new per-
spective’ on Paul in the last forty years may be said to have begun, with specific 
reference to Romans 7, with Krister Stendahl’s famous 1963 article, ‘The Apostle 
Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West’. Stendahl’s argument was that, 
whatever Paul was doing in Romans 7, he was not proposing justification of the 
individual by personal faith as the remedy for anguished selfhood, tormented with 
intensely individual awareness of sin. Stendahl’s point is that attributing to the his-
toric or implied author (and intended readers) of Romans a prototypically modern, 
Lutheran self-understanding, treats as central a misunderstanding of a relatively 
secondary feature and obscures Paul’s deeper concern. Paul’s essential concern in 
the classic ‘I’-passages of Romans 7 is to defend the holiness and goodness of the 
God-given Torah even in the transformed context of Christ-faith. Such a defense 
was necessitated by Paul’s insistence that Christian existence is conditioned by 
grace, not Torah (Romans 3:20, 4:15, 5:20, 6:14). In Stendahl’s words: ‘Paul here is 
involved in an argument about the Law; he is not primarily concerned about man’s 
or his own cloven ego or predicament’ (Stendahl 1963, 211). Or again,
What was a digression is elevated to the main factor. It should not be denied that Paul is 
deeply aware of the precarious situation of man in this world, where even the holy Law of 
God does not help – it actually leads to death. Hence his outburst. But there is no indication 
that this awareness is related to a subjective conscience struggle. (ibid., 213)
Stendahl focuses on denying that Paul was interested in ‘the dilemma of the 
introspective conscience’ (ibid., 203) attributed to him in Augustinian, Western, 
especially Lutheran and post-Lutheran reception. A perceived consequence was 
that ‘Paul’s theology cannot be centred on the individual’ (Sanders 1977, 438); 
Paul’s gospel was not about individualisation. Stendahl was perceived as allied 
to a protest against excessive individualism of existentialist hermeneutics (ibid., 
434–8). It was not Stendahl’s task to deny or affirm that the author of Romans 
7 may nonetheless be interested in activating for his argument some unusually 
intense perception of individuality. Precisely because Romans 7 had become the 
locus classicus for reformational, modern individualisation and conflicted self-
hood, a re-reading of Romans 7 was the fulcrum for leveraging a less individualis-
tic, more covenantal and nomistic understanding of early Christianity. Inevitably, 
the resulting, rather fluid ‘new perspective’ on Paul has attracted some defensive 
nostalgia in those for whom the self-divided, faith-justified Lutheran persona – or, 
in my case, a Calvinist, evangelical variant – remains a powerful identity marker.
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Among proponents of the ‘new perspective’, James Dunn has insisted most 
emphatically that displacing Law-free justification from the centre of Paul’s the-
ology historically reconstructed does not necessarily falsify reformation soteri-
ology and anthropology. But Dunn would not need to reassure, if no one had 
felt threatened (Schröter 2013, 195–7, esp. 196 n. 8; Dunn 2008). Certainly the 
‘new perspective’ was intended to falsify historic misrepresentation of the func-
tion of Torah in Judaism and, therefore in Paul’s Christ-devotion. Adolf Harnack 
famously distilled at least the Liberal Protestant verdict on early receptions of 
Paul: ‘Marcion was the only Gentile Christian who understood Paul, and even he 
misunderstood him’ (Harnack 1897, 89). The ‘new perspective’ has shown that 
reformational and liberal understandings of Paul have also been creative misun-
derstandings.
Here, however, I hope to illustrate the possibility that, after all, a certain 
deliberately de-stabilising individualisation was indeed part of Paul’s argu-
mentative strategy and therefore consequently at least latent in any Pauline- 
influenced Christianity. Although readings of Romans 7 are only quite ironically 
sources for reformational, enlightenment and romantic notions of the self, Paul 
the  Greco-Roman, Jewish Christ-apostle and epistolographer may nevertheless 
still have imagined a mode of covenantal individualisation which could make 
intuitive sense to at least some proto-Christian readers. Although modernity 
constructed its types of individualisation on anachronistically decontextualised 
re-readings of Paul, we may still ask how far key Pauline texts were designed 
to institutionalise a historically possible kind of individualisation within at least 
one segment of an emerging Christian ‘social imaginary’ (Taylor 2002).
1.3 Modes of institutionalisation
In addition to reconsidering Pauline individualisation fifty years after the begin-
nings of the new perspective, I also want to attend to this publication’s theme, 
to think particularly about textual modes of institutionalisation of a particular 
religiously imagined/constructed selfhood. Imagining early Christian institution-
alisation in a historically disciplined way remains a problem: on the one hand, 
 Jesus-devotion was relatively marked by ambitious institution building. On the 
other hand, our sources, including Paul’s letters, allow a rich description of 
the varied social imaginary of some proto-Christians, but do not document the 
social mechanics of Christ-groups nearly so well. Standing as we are in socie-
ties which are not only hyper-individualised, but also hyper-institutionalised and 
 hyper-organised, we are hermeneutically challenged not to misunderstand the 
impact of what look to us as rudimentary, almost subliminal institutions.
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This is no place to sketch in any detail the initial institutional life of Christ 
communities, or to trace the institutional development of the Pauline groups. I 
want to emphasise, however, the strikingly unobtrusive, yet effective local and 
translocal institutional patterns that sufficed for the first generations of the 
Christ ekklēsia, as a basis for discussing the somewhat distinctive institutionali-
sation implicit in Pauline textuality itself. Thirty years ago Margaret MacDonald 
published her ‘Socio-historical Study of Institutionalisation in the Pauline and 
 Deutero-Pauline Writings’ which views the Pauline texts as documents of the 
changing institutionalisation of Christ-groups as their focus shifted: from initial 
community-building, through stabilisation, toward protection from internal and 
external threats and competition (MacDonald 1988; compare Back, Koskenniemi 
2016). MacDonald studied the extra-textual social institutions attested by the 
texts. In the case of Paul’s baffling language in Romans 7, I think it is the text itself 
or, somewhere between the text and social groups, Pauline epistolography as a 
quite specific social institutional field within Pauline proto-Christianity, which 
is activated within ‘a special type of institutions’ (Engberg-Pedersen 2006, 71) of 
reading, writing, transmitting, and interpreting. MacDonald adopted her defini-
tion of ‘institutionalisation’ from the seminal work of Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckman for whom,
[i]nstitutionalization occurs whenever there is reciprocal typification of habitualized 
actions by types of actors. Put differently, any such typification is an institution. What must 
be stressed is the reciprocity of institutional typifications and the typicality of not only the 
actions but also the actors in institutions.  
 (MacDonald 1988, 11 n. 21 citing, Berger, Luckman 1967, 54)
The whole social-rhetorical process of generating and using early Christian, 
especially Pauline epistolary literature participates in Greco-Roman cultural 
types and institutions. Epistolography was an important institution in Greco- 
Roman culture, despite the absence of a modern postal system. But early Chris-
tian epistolography was also a distinctively Pauline and para-Pauline (eventually 
post-Pauline) institution, designed to support particular imaginaries of Christ’s 
ekklēsia in the world.
In recent German and Canadian scholarship, the actual organisation of early 
Christ-groups has been understood largely along the very wide spectrum of spe-
cific membership associations (literature: Last 2012, 175 n. 8; Ascough 2016, 87–9). 
Broadly speaking, it would have been hard in antiquity to produce a better gener-
alisation about basic early Christian organisation than Pliny’s famous dismissal of 
Christ-groups as hetaeriae, which might, even in their own adherents’ eyes, come 
under prohibition more because of the frequency of their meetings than because 
of the content of their rather homespun mysteries and interestingly differentiated 
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leadership patterns. Paul assumes for his addressees in Corinth that an unini-
tiated person might conceivably enter where ‘the whole ekklēsia’ is gathered in 
the same place (I Corinthians 14:23–5). Paul expects that the intruder or visitor 
so imagined would remark on intense charismatic arousal, would experience the 
revelation of their own heart’s secrets and would be conscious of divine pres-
ence. Paul does not suggest that the outsider would experience any great shock 
of  religious-institutional novelty. The Corinthian Christ cult-group as imagined by 
Paul seems institutionally less marked than, say, a synagogue of Judaeans might 
have been.
One aspect of early Christian institutionalisation that seems relatively 
marked over a fairly long time span is the habit of translocal and transregional 
networking. Paul was an important agent of this process and his surviving letters 
are its most important documentation. Moreover, the Pauline evidence indicates 
plenty of (often rival) non-Pauline activity. It is thus impossible to make a bal-
anced assessment of which habits were Pauline distinctives or innovations. Even 
before the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in 70 AD, and even with the acces-
sion of many non-Jews, Jesus groups seem not only to have participated in Judean 
geographical dispersion. They also mimicked the institutions of communication 
between diaspora communities and the Temple, sending and receiving apostoloi 
and transmitting sacred money to Jerusalem. This is the long-distance habit of rit-
ualised communication within which the Pauline habits of writing, exchanging, 
sharing and preserving letters became an important institution, with ramifica-
tions for imagining individuals’ roles within community.
1.4 Pre-Canonical textual institutionalisation
Some years ago I argued that earliest Christianity was more an ‘agglomeration 
of rituals’ (Ando 2003, 143) than an incipient ‘religion of the book’ (Henderson 
2006). My point then was that it is interesting that early Jesus-adepts, including 
Paul, but not just dependent on his genius, institutionalised a certain distinctive 
bookishness, but with a noticeably lighter style of institutionalisation than in the 
bookishness of a more normal philosophical school or of more normal Jewish 
haireseis. Eventually, Patristic Christianity would institutionalise Scripture over 
against Rabbinic Judaism (Stroumsa 2015, 30–4, 53f.). The epistolary habit of Paul 
and his correspondents; the preservation and collection of some of his letters; 
the collections’ pseudepigraphic extension; accretion of letters by other figures; 
fairly remote, generic imitation by Ignatius; perhaps even Marcion’s project, all 
evidence a process of literary institutionalisation which is generically modest yet 
ideologically ambitious (Pervo 2010). My primary point here, which I will want to 
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turn back into discussion of individualisation, is that the Christian institutions of 
Scripture-reading and epistolography are well-attested analogues for thinking of 
other aspects of the Christian social imaginary as, paradoxically, very lightly, yet 
very powerfully institutionalised.
My earlier discussion was not intended to understate either the influence 
of prior Jewish scriptural institutions or the important marking of local Christ-
groups and of the larger Christian network as, in Guy Stroumsa’s words, ‘“reading 
communities”, whose cultural and religious capital was, to a great extent, repre-
sented by its books’ (Stroumsa 2012, 186). My concern was more to think about 
the paradox that early Christ-groups could be to a significant degree ‘a “textual 
community”’ (Gamble 2004, 29), ‘“reading communities”’ (Stroumsa 2012, 186) 
or even a ‘re-reading community’ constituted by reading Jewish books in delib-
erately un-Jewish ways, while only very gradually institutionalising a distinctive 
Christian sense of apostolic and evangelic literature. In his analysis of ‘exagger-
ated exclusionary mechanisms’ in elite reading communities, William Johnson 
notes that, ‘there clearly were those in the high empire who were able to use their 
intellectual gifts to find a way around the exclusionary circles that the elite drew 
around themselves’ (Johnson 2010, 205).
Motivated by the communicative necessities of the gospel, Paul became the 
model of such a possibility (Henderson 2011, 29–31). Brian Stock and others have 
described the institutionalisation of ‘scriptural communities’ in later Christianity 
in ways that go beyond questions of canonicity and definition of Scripture (Stock 
1996; Grafton, Williams 2008; Klingshirn, Safran 2007; Clark 1999; Stroumsa 2015; 
Haines-Eitzen 2012; Krueger 2004). For the earliest generations of Jesus-devotees, 
both with regard to the rituals of textuality and with regard to the non-textual 
mysteries of baptism, commensality, exorcism, a very little institutionalisation 
went a very long way toward establishing and stabilising Christian identity.
Thus I continue to accept Harry Gamble’s judgement that early Christian lit-
eracy and attitudes to textuality were continuous with those of Greek-language 
society generally – much more different from at least some Jewish attitudes 
towards sacred texts. I therefore still find exaggerated Stroumsa’s emphasis on 
the ‘revolutionary form of literacy’ (Stroumsa 2003, 168) and ‘characteristic status’ 
of books (Stroumsa 2012, 186) in early Christianity, although, as Larry Hurtado 
reminds us, early adoption of the codex and scribal features such as nomina sacra 
do suggest some specifically Christian consciousness of textual institutionality 
(Hurtado 2006; 2012). I admire Stroumsa’s earlier formulation, that ‘Christianity 
was from the beginning, rather than a religion of the book, one of the “paper-
back” (if one is allowed an anachronic metaphor)’ (Stroumsa 2003, 173). The early 
Christian institutionalisation of textuality seems physically marked by an almost 
shabby pragmatism. In Gamble’s words,
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when Christians began using the codex not merely for notes but as a vehicle of texts, they 
did so not because those books had a special status as aesthetic or cult objects, but because 
they meant them to be practical books for everyday use, the handbooks, as it were, of Chris-
tian communities.  (Gamble 2004, 34)
The paradox in the institutionalisation of Christian textuality is, for the earliest 
period, even more marked and much better attested in the especially, though 
not exclusively, Pauline habit of letter-writing, than it is in the emergent habit 
of codex-use. The earliest specifically Christian literature was in the letter genre, 
indeed, not only in the epistolary genre, but actually within the social institu-
tions of  letter-writing, sending, receiving and preservation. Proto-Christian insti-
tutional use of texts is usually assumed to be continuous with Jewish synagogic 
Torah- reading, about which we also really know remarkably little. Dan Nässelqvist 
argues well that continuity with synagogue practice does not account for the little 
we know of initial Christian collective reading practices (Nässelqvist 2016, 96–118). 
Notably, the earliest Christian admonition toward collective, institutionalised 
reading is the repeated command to read out apostolic (or pseudo- apostolic) 
letters (I Thessalonians 5:27; Colossians 4:16; I Timothy 4:13; Acts 15:22–35) or pro-
phetic oracles including angelic letters (Revelation 1:3). Paul’s letters often cite 
the Septuagint (Gamble 2004, 29 n. 1), especially when he needs to display his 
expertise, but he does not presuppose systematically that his addressees are con-
stituted as communities by institutionalised liturgical Bible-reading. Famously, II 
Peter 3:16 implies a rather advanced institutionalisation of reading Paul’s letters, 
as authoritative along with other, unspecified scriptures, precisely despite the 
interpretative difficulties and attendant dangers of misinterpreting Paul.
As far as I know, Melito of Sardis is the first attested Christ-preacher to assume 
explicitly that a pre-Christian Scripture (Exodus) has actually been read as part 
of a Christ-centred (paschal) liturgy (Peri Pascha 1), but the liturgical situation 
is not presented as typical. The earliest description of collective reading within 
Christian weekly worship is strikingly vague (Rouwhorst 2002, 326), surely delib-
erately minimalist and synthetic: by mid-second century, Justin Martyr can claim 
that weekly Eucharistic assemblies might typically include readings of flexible 
length from ‘the memoirs (apomnemoneumata) of the apostles’, which Justin 
earlier says were ‘called euaggelia’, ‘or [sic] the writings (suggrammata) of the 
prophets’ (Justin, First Apology 67). Justin claims that reading is a marked part 
of regular Christ-ritual; he does not really inform his audience about the rather 
discretionary selection of texts to be read.
Harry Gamble expresses clearly the position I seek to qualify and the 
under-warranted assumption on which it is based: ‘We must assume [sic] that 
originally and continuously Jewish scriptures were read in Christian assemblies, 
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but it is clear that from a very early time Christian writings began to be read along-
side them […]’ (Gamble 2004, 33; compare Gamble 1995, 211–8).
An interesting alternative imagination, based on identical evidence, is 
expressed equally dogmatically by Valeriy Alikin:
The reading of authoritative writings took place in the social session connected with the 
supper. That was the context in which apostolic and other important letters, Prophets and 
Gospels were read aloud to the community gathered for its weekly supper and conviviality. 
There is a close analogy between the reading of texts during non-Christian banquets and 
that during the Christians’ gatherings connected with their weekly supper.  
 (Alikin 2010, 157f., cited in Nässelqvist 2016, 101)
My intuitions are closer here to Alikin’s, but clearly Christ-groups very early 
began the habit of producing, exchanging, and re-reading texts, which supported 
their ecclesial identity and incipient institutionalisation. This textual habit began 
with letters, mostly Paul’s letters, informed by general consciousness of a special 
Christian way of re-reading Jewish texts.
2 Romans 7
2.1  Romans 7:1 ‘I am speaking to people who are aware 
of Torah’
Paul’s great letter to Christ-groups in Rome exhibits most of the institutionalising 
paradoxes of early Christian textuality. In terms of length and elaboration, Paul’s 
treatise-letter to Jesus devotees in Rome explodes norms for epistolary genre, 
yet it was, socially speaking, a real letter, engaged not only in developing Paul’s 
apostolic philosophy, but also in the pragmatics of travel arrangements and inter-
group diplomacy. Notably Paul displays his erudition and ingenuity in scriptural 
argumentation, but rarely in ways that presuppose or require much actual textual 
knowledge from his correspondents. Nonetheless auditors of Paul’s letter to the 
Romans cannot ignore that he is engaged in a monumental struggle to make 
sense of himself between the Gospel and the Torah.
Some of the interplay between the emerging institutionality of a particular 
attitude to texts and the projection of a strong habit of individuality appears 
already in the first words of Romans 7. These mark with a rhetorical question a 
quite strong transition from the topic of Sin to the topic of Torah-Law. Romans 
6 begins with the formula, ‘What shall we say then?’ followed by an absurd 
 question, ‘Shall we continue in Sin, that Grace might abound? Mē genoito!’ 
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 followed in verse 3 by the further formulaic question, ‘Or are you unaware that 
[…]?’ Chapter 7 reverses and extends the pattern. So Chapter 7 begins with the 
formula, ‘Or are you unaware […] that […]’ (7:1), followed a paragraph later by 
the formula, ‘What shall we say then?’ followed by its absurd question, ‘Is the 
Law Sin? Mē genoito!’ (7:7). The reader/hearer of Chapter 6 on Sin recognises that 
Chapter 7 is a new section and that it will be about Law. Because Romans 7:1 
introduces the chapter as a whole it is clear that Paul has, as is usual, the Torah in 
mind when he speaks about Law/Nomos (sixteen times in Romans 7). Paul does 
not operate with a generic sense of ‘law’ of which ‘Mosaic Law’ is even a very 
special case; Paul works with the God-Revealed Torah, which when represented 
by the word nomos might acquire some ironic connections with merely human 
legal institutions (Hellholm 1997).
Romans 7:1 beautifully crystallises Paul’s first-person self-projection and his 
interest in institutionalising his hearers’ relationship with the Torah in Christ – 
in the sense of epistolary and discursive institutionalisation that I am trying to 
capture. Almost everything that I want to say about Romans 7 as a whole can 
be said about Romans 7:1; at any rate I agree with David Hellholm’s observa-
tion that Paul’s assertive language here is ‘sehr viel beachtenswerter als oftmals 
erkannt’ (Hellholm 1997, 401). Paul begins this new section, ‘Or are you unaware, 
kindred, – for I am speaking to people who  recognise Torah/Law (ginōskousin gar 
nomon lalō) – that the Law rules a person only as long as s/he lives?’
The aside, ‘for I am talking to people who recognise Torah’, is especially 
important, though almost casually passed over by commentators, precisely 
because it so directly invokes the epistolary communicative situation, both in 
its institutional character and in its intensely typified personal character. This 
is the first time since the vividly personal comments in Romans 3:5–7 that the 
putative authorial voice has appeared in the first person singular; the strong 
presence of the first person that is so strongly marked later in Romans 7 by the 
repeated egō begins in 7:1 already with lalō, ‘I’m talking’. In a complex ‘jeu des 
pronoms’ (Gignac 2014, 241 and passim), Paul is deliberately (re-)activating 
the epistolary convention of fictional orality and personal presence here, after 
several chapters, and especially chapter 6, in which the ‘I’ has been absorbed 
into ‘we’.
Now the ‘I’ which is here invoked is not the introspective self of modernity, 
nor is it some objectively real Paul: it is emphatically the rhetorical self, perhaps 
the prophetic self, consciously institutionalised as authoritative speaker address-
ing fictive kin. All through Romans there is a character ‘Paul’ who habitually 
addresses some people in Rome whom the real Paul has never met. In Romans 
7, however, even in the opening words ‘Paul’ typifies himself – using the institu-
tional frames of epistolary rhetoric – as a certain kind of self, able to speak to a 
‘… quod nolo, illud facio’ (Romans 7:20): institutionalising the unstable self   817
certain kind of audience about the Torah, which is a little different than the way 
the same ‘Paul’ has just spoken to essentially the same audience about Sin. In any 
letter and all through Romans, the authorial voice and the auditors are typified 
rhetorically: that is a key part of the institution of epistolography. In Romans 7, 
however, Paul typifies himself and his auditors differently by slipping so noticea-
bly into the first personal address, eventually emphasised as we shall see by the 
repeated egō of 7:7–25.
It is no coincidence, then, that Paul also here suddenly resumes addressing 
his auditors typically as fictive ‘kindred’, adelphoi, for the first time since Romans 
1:13 where it also complements the first person singular and the wish to overcome 
possible lack of awareness: ‘I do not wish you to be unaware, kindred, that I have 
often intended to come to you and have so far been prevented.’ We may regard 
‘kindred’, adelphoi, as simply the typical reciprocal Christian address within 
the institution of the ekklēsia, but this typification of Paul’s epistolary audience 
is not randomly distributed in Romans. In Romans 1:13 and in Romans 7:1 Paul 
invokes several of the same epistolary conventions/institutions. In Romans 1 the 
epistolary ‘Paul’ works hard to establish himself with listeners who do not know 
the real Paul; in Romans 7 Paul reinitialises or reinstitutes both his epistolary/
prophetic self and his relationship with his audience as their senior cognate in 
order to speak to them about the Law. After Romans 7:1, Paul will address his 
audience as ‘kindred’ seventeen more times, distributed throughout the remain-
der of the letter. Thus Romans 7:1 is a marked turning point in the long letter. For 
our purposes, however, what matters is that the turning point turns not only on 
Paul’s use of prevenient rhetorical-epistolary possibilities, but also specifically 
on Paul’s typification of an epistolary self in relation to epistolary as well as cultic 
kindred. At this particular moment in Romans we are witnessing a sudden stress 
on rhetorical typification of actors and individualisation of an epistolary self in 
close kinship with the imagined auditors.
The ‘I’ of Romans 7:1 is, however, not only reminding his auditors that they 
are his next of kin: he also suddenly refers to them as ‘people who are aware 
of Torah’, ginōskousin gar nomon lalō. Unless it becomes impossible, we should 
understand Paul’s nomos to refer to God-given Torah. In 7:1 and in the illustration 
from marriage-law in 7:2–4 I doubt that Paul, as Dierk Starnitzke puts it, ‘meint 
einfach die allgemeine menschliche Kenntnis bestehender Ehegesetze’. A page 
later Starnitzke does a little better to suppose that nomos ‘hier nicht nur die jüdis-
che Tora meint, sondern allgemeiner die bestehenden Ehegesetzte’ (Starnitzke 
2004, 232f.). I think Paul would find the phrase ‘jüdische Tora’ reductive and mis-
leading: Paul knows that Torah does or should define Jewishness (Gal 1:13f.), but 
I do not see that he could think that Torah is Jewish in anything like the ways that 
Roman law is ‘Roman’. The Torah defines Jewishness, but for Paul Torah certainly 
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has ‘application to non-Israelite humanity’ (pace Esler 2003, 236). In Romans 7, ‘it 
is not only Jews who are concerned with the Law’ (Gaventa 2013, 88).
Thus Romans 7:2–4, like I Corinthians 7:10f., 39, apparently regards all married 
women, at least Christ-devotees, Jewish or not, as bound by a version of marriage 
law which is restrictive and idealised, even by the standards of Second Temple 
Judaism. As we shall see again, in Romans 7:7, Paul does not randomly select an 
aspect of Torah to illustrate his argument: Paul assumes that both Jewish and 
non-Jewish Christ-devotees can marry and that their relationships are structured 
by Torah – and therefore also in a certain sense by death.
At the same time I do not think that with ginōskousin gar nomon lalō Paul 
means to flatter his correspondents for their knowledgeability, still less actually 
to suggest that they were anything like his equals in Torah expertise or author-
ity, or that they have Numbers 5:11–29 (LXX) actively in mind, as I guess Paul 
himself does (Witherington 2004, 175). I think Paul understands his audience 
throughout Romans to be a mixture of Jewish and non-Jewish Jesus- devotees 
with no uniform level of biblical or ritual knowledge; it seems incredible 
within the pragmatics of a letter actually sent to be read outside the sender’s 
total control, that Paul is signaling with 7:1 a change from a mixed, but largely 
non-Jewish audience to an essentially Jewish or Torah-observant audience (still 
less is Paul focusing on an exclusively Gentile audience sunken in extreme, 
entrenched immorality).1
Paul does not expect his correspondents to know much about the content 
of Torah as a legal system, but he does expect them to be aware of two, for Paul 
basic, principles: that Torah is binding during the life of the covenant subject 
and that a woman once married (hypandros [compare Numbers 5:20, 29 LXX]) 
may not marry again while her first husband lives. Paul constructs – typifies – 
his hearers as junior siblings who as such are supposed to have at least some 
minimal awareness and interest in how Torah works when its centre has been 
displaced, or replaced toward Christ. This re-institutionalisation of self and of 
the auditors as kindred is for the author of Romans significantly more urgent in 
relation to the topic of Torah/Law than it was to the topic of Sin, because it will 
be necessary to institutionalise some on-going positive role for Torah within the 
Christ-covenant.
1 Contra Wischmeyer 2005, 101 n. 50, ‘Kap. 7 passt nur auf Juden’; Esler 2003, 222, 225, Romans 
7:1 is ‘an aural cue’ that Paul is now focusing more on Judaeans than on non-Judaeans among 
his recipients; Wasserman 2008, 148, Romans 1–8 is ‘addressing a particularly Gentile plight’, 
compare 6f., 114f., 125f.
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2.2 Romans 7:7–25
2.2.1 Egodocument
We turn at last to consider the heart of Romans 7. My concern here is only to argue 
that this chapter of Romans did rhetorically institutionalise within Pauline Chris-
tianity a kind of Pauline self – not inevitably a modern, introspective self, not 
inevitably simul justus et peccator, but still remarkably individualised in relation 
to Sin, Death, God’s Law, and, eventually life in the Spirit of Christ. Here I want 
to return to Engberg-Pedersen’s description of Pauline individualisation as the 
 emotional-cognitive individuality of an acratic self, radicalised in the painful 
awareness of moral and cognitive self-contradiction (akrasia) by encounter with 
divine Law. I agree with Engberg-Pedersen that ‘there are plenty of reasons for 
finding a full-blown concept of a “person” in Rom 7:14–25’ (Engberg-Pedersen 
2011, 103), but I want to take a further step and note that Paul specifically in 
Romans 7 institutes an intensified and at least temporarily divided self as part of 
his correspondents’ new Christian social imaginary. This section will describe the 
exegetically controversial individualisation I am finding in Romans 7. In a con-
cluding section I will then reflect on the kind of institutionalisation I am attribut-
ing to Paul’s action in including Romans 7 in his monumental letter.
From the moment Paul composed it, Romans 7 has been seen to be simul-
taneously one of the most important and one of the most difficult passages in 
Early Christian discourse (Schröter 2013, 198). Throughout its reception history 
it has been both unavoidable and problematic. Even apart from such high 
reception-historical and theological stakes, there is therefore not the slightest 
chance of ‘solving’ the passage’s many exegetical puzzles. Nor is it conceivable 
that any exegetical ‘solutions’ I might endorse would become a consensus. I 
propose to claim this impasse as an opportunity to confine myself to sketching 
an answer to the questions whether/how the passage individualises and insti-
tutionalises a ‘self ’. The bibliography cited will only serve to document my 
own process, though Jens Schröter gives a good general orientation (Schröter 
2013, 195–207).
From a rhetorical-critical point of view, it is inescapable that the historic 
composer of Romans consciously and successfully intended Romans 7 to be 
especially impressive and dramatic, at some expense to argumentative and prop-
ositional clarity. By Chapter 7, the author to the Romans has shown himself to 
be communicatively highly competent, so the oddity of Romans 7 must be taken 
as purposeful. That communicative decision is the basis for all the exegetical 
problems and all the hermeneutical attention the text has generated. Because 
Romans announces itself as a strongly representative text, that is, as a text 
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introducing ‘Paul’ the slave and apostle of Jesus Christ (Romans 1:1), it is par-
ticularly  important to recognise that, throughout, the implied author ‘Paul’ and, 
more subtly and variably, the authorial voice in the text, are constructs, never 
simply related to the historic person to which they refer (Starnitzke 2004, 239f.). 
In some sense the whole of Romans is about the initial institutional representa-
tion of one particular ‘self’ as the authoritative representative of another, Jesus, 
who is much less personally realised. Within that constructive project, however, 
and to some extent interrupting it, is the construction of the deeply conflicted 
‘I’ of Romans 7. What is going on in Romans 7 with regard to selfhood is not 
straightforwardly related to what is going on with ‘Paul’ in the rest of the text. 
Although all Paul’s authentic letters are ‘egodocuments’, ‘[D]ocuments in which 
an ego deliberately or accidentally discloses or hides itself’ (J. Presser cited and 
translated in Mascuch, Dekker, Baggerman 2016, 11), they contain relatively little 
autodiegetic, autobiographical narrative. Paul writes enough about himself, 
however, for Romans 7 to stand out as an argument about egō and Torah, not a 
memoir (Wischmeyer 2005, 101f.).
2.2.2 Torah and akrasia
The most original aspect of Romans 7 is the fact that it is the encounter with the 
Torah which radicalises the tension of akrasia into an inescapable crisis, however 
we analyse that crisis in relation to the ‘self’. Niko Huttenen has shown just how 
far in content and diatribic style Paul resembles Epictetus on law; for Huttenen, 
however, ‘Paul identifies Torah with more general moral principles’ (Huttenen 
2009, 117f.). The intensity of Romans 7 only makes sense, however, in Paul’s 
 apocalyptic discovery that general moral principles are implications of divine 
Torah, locked in implacable struggle with Sin and Death.
Paul could have imagined an acratic crisis emerging retrospectively, and 
therefore with much less emotional force, triggered by the experience of radical 
transformation and resolution in Christ. Thus in Galatians 2:15–21 in a moment 
of autobiographical candour Paul refers to himself and Peter/Cephas as ‘we Jews 
by nature, not Gentile sinners’, but then asks rhetorically, ‘if we, in the process 
of seeking to be rightwised in Christ, were found ourselves to be sinners, is Christ 
then a servant of sin? Certainly not’. Paul to the Galatians can imagine himself 
and Peter as a non-acratic, Jewish Torah-observant ‘we’, retroactively discover-
ing themselves to have been sinners all along, scarcely better than Gentiles. In 
Galatians 2, the discovery comes not because of the Torah, but because of the 
experience of a new righteousness in Christ. By contrast, the Paul of Romans 7 
chooses to give Torah the role of inducing or intensifying an akrasia which will 
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only be relieved in the next chapter, Romans 8, by the new life in the Spirit of 
Christ. As Stefan Krauter puts it, in Romans 7, ‘either the “I” wants to say “sin 
used the law to deceive me and therefore I have become akratic,” or the sense of 
the passage is “since I am akratic sin was able to use the law to deceive me and 
make my situation even worse.” […] the former is far more plausible’ (Krauter 
2011, 115).
We noted above Paul’s deliberate choice of marriage-law in 7:1–3 to intro-
duce his discussion of the ambiguous, but indispensable role of the Torah. In 
Romans 7:7 there is an equally non-random choice of ouk epithumēseis, ‘You 
shall not desire’, as Torah’s only direct speech in the passage. The point is not 
that Paul is quoting from Exodus 20:17 or Deuteronomy 5:21, where ouk epi-
thumēseis has direct objects in personal law. Instead the prohibition of epithu-
mia understood absolutely, apart from a particular prohibited object, univer-
salises Torah beyond exclusively Jewish concerns (see Schröter 2013, 212 n. 97 
for Jewish texts citing epithumia as paradigmatic, attitudinal sin). Understand-
ing epithumia as ‘desire’ not ‘coveting’ internalises and clarifies the possibility 
of Sin using Torah in individuals, ‘to lead humans into the miserable state of 
akrasia’ (Krauter 2011, 122). Epitomising Torah by the prohibition of epithumia 
institutionalises and internalises Torah as the universal possibility of individ-
ual moral failure.
Among the things that make Romans 7 text-linguistically so distinctive 
within Romans and the wider Pauline corpus, it is salient that ‘this relatively brief 
passage is marked by eight verbs of perception/recognition’ (Martyn 2002, 93), 
in addition to many verbs of intention and action; there is both a tension inter-
nal to cognition and a tension between cognition and action. Even very differ-
ent readings of this passage as about the experience of acute akrasia share the 
virtue of identifying the drama of the passage as a cognitive process imaginable 
essentially within human personalities (compare Wasserman 2008; Krauter 2011; 
Engberg-Pedersen 2011).
We have also already noted the sudden, dense reintroduction of the first 
person singular, twenty-seven times in 7:7–25. This is heightened by association 
with ‘the emphatic pronoun ἐγώ, which has previously appeared in the letter 
only at 3:7’ (Gaventa 2013, 78). One of the eight occurrences of egō in Romans 
7:7–25 is textually insecure; moreover, it has long been conjectured, without 
manuscript support, that Romans 7:25b with its even more emphatic autos egō 
may be a very early, intrusive gloss (possibly misplaced after v. 25a rather than 
with v. 24: Schröter 2013, 207f.). I distrust such conjectures, but if I knew that 
7:25b with its autos egō was indeed such an early gloss, it would be astonish-
ingly early evidence that Romans was understood as positing an emphatically 
self-divided self, incorporating a Torah divided by the self who internalises it. If 
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Romans 7:25b did not originate as an intrusive gloss, it is a remarkable rephras-
ing of the argument of the section in language which recalls that the character 
‘Paul’ in Romans first introduced himself as ‘slave of Christ Jesus’ (Romans 1:1). 
So Engberg- Pedersen notes, ‘it is not at all surprising that Paul should end up 
summarising his description in 7:25b as follows: “Consequently, I myself (αὐτὸς 
ἐγώ = autos egô) am enslaved to God’s law with my mind (νοῦϛ), and to the law of 
sin within my flesh.”’ (Engberg-Pedersen 2011, 103).
Despite contrasting overall approaches, Engberg-Pedersen and, in a famous 
article to which I shall return, Paul Meyer agree that the dichotomy of the Law which 
appears not only in 7:25b, but also in vv. 21–23, ‘the Law of God related to my inner 
person’ and the ‘other counterattacking Law in my members’ refers throughout to 
the one Torah, differentially experienced by the divided, paralysed self. Whatever 
else the Torah does, it radicalises or even causes the situation of a divided self, 
who fully intends to do what is good and then actually and knowingly does what 
is wrong.
‘[W]hat [Paul] does in Rom. 7.7–25 is precisely to develop, spell out and almost “celebrate” 
that crux for thought in its most emphatic and impressive form: in the recognition of a schiz-
ophrenic split in the mind of a person who basically sees the Mosaic Law as God’s own 
law, a split that has such proportions that it even generates a kind of split in the Law itself’ 
(Engberg-Pedersen 2002b, 54).
‘[…] the “two” laws are whatever they are – as seen by, or from the perspective of, those 
other two anthropological parts of the I-person. […] Paul Meyer is right on target when he 
concludes that “not only the ‘law of God’ (v. 22) but also this ‘different law’ (v. 23) is the 
Mosaic law!” […] The point is precisely that these two things – Law and self – go together’ 
(Engberg-Pedersen 2002b, 50 and n. 24 quoting Meyer 1990, 79).
2.2.3 ‘Apocalyptic’ and ‘acratic’ readings
In a 1995 article published in a volume edited by Engberg-Pedersen, Stanley 
Stowers argued that Romans 7:7–25 is an exercise in ‘speech-in-character’ 
(prosōpopoiia); that is, at the very least, the Ego-voice in 7:7–25 is not supposed 
to be heard as representing the implied authorial voice of ‘Paul’. Certainly it 
is valuable to see that the heavy marking of the Ego-voice is likely rhetorically 
to differentiate it and generalise or universalise it over against the usual dis-
cursive voice of the letter (compare Schröter 2013, 210). In fact, Stowers goes 
further, approvingly quoting Origen as saying ‘that the discourse has different 
characterisations (προσωποποιίαι) and the sections conform to various qualities 
of characters (πρόσωπα)’ (Stowers 1995, 194). That is, the passage is not only not 
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to be heard as in the voice of the main speaker of Romans as a whole; it should 
be internally distributed among a plurality of characters in fierce dramatic dia-
logue (Dodson 2008). Origen also understood the passage as broadly about 
akrasia, but apparently across a range of moral types (Stowers 1995, 196f.). 
Readings of Romans 7 through a plurality of voices, none easily identified with 
the authorial voice of the letter as a whole, cohere well with readings which 
emphasise the agency of the superhuman powers of Death, Law, and, especially 
Sin – perhaps especially where the ‘I’ character is identified with some sort of 
transpersonal ‘Adam’ (Schröter 2013, 209–11) or ‘Eve’ (Krauter 2011, 116–9). As 
Beverly Gaventa summarises Paul Meyer’s influential reading, ‘Sin continues to 
be the major “character” in the argument. […] the primary concern in Romans 
7 is neither the Law nor the “I” but the way in which Sin’s power can reach into 
and use even the holy and right and good Law of God’ (Gaventa 2013, 77 refer-
ring to Meyer 1990).
From the standpoint of such broadly ‘apocalyptic’ readings of Romans 7, 
Susan Eastman accuses Engberg-Pedersen of omitting ‘any serious reckoning 
with the role of sin as an agent acting on and through persons’ (Eastman 2013, 
104 n. 23). J. Louis Martyn went further, contrasting Engberg-Pedersen’s ‘de- 
apocalypticising’ reading of Romans 7 with Meyer’s reading to emphasise the 
dramatic struggle between Sin and God:
‘What the self comes to know is rather a drama marked – as in apocalyptic dramas gen-
erally – by the presence and doings of actors other than human beings. Far from being a 
merely anthropological “element of sin in oneself”, hamartia is an actor who, being the 
subject of verbs, plays an essential part in the drama as nothing less than the opponent of 
God’ (Martyn 2002, 94; compare Rowe 2016, 98).
Engberg-Pedersen has tried to incorporate the strengths of ‘apocalyptic’, mytho-
poetic readings of Romans 7 into a reading which also sees Paul as arguing for a 
strongly individualised ‘person (cognitive and bodily)’ defined pathologically – 
murdered (7:11) – by the encounter with Sin and Torah – to be redefined in Romans 
8 by the encounter with the Spirit (pneuma) also understood quite concretely 
(compare Engberg-Pedersen 2002a with Engberg-Pedersen 2011, quoting 111 n. 
56; on the materiality of pneuma, 106 and n. 50). With regard to ‘“ apocalyptic” 
powers’ Engberg-Pedersen argues,
‘for seeing them [in Paul] as physical entities that are present both in the world at large and 
also within human beings. They are also to be seen (from a Pauline perspective) as per-
sonal powers. Finally – and most importantly […] – they are to be understood as cognitive 
powers. […] This point is of huge importance. It is precisely by accepting the “apocalyptic” 
reading of Paul that one may also come to see the importance of the “philosophical” one’ 
( Engberg-Pedersen 2011, 94 and n. 25).
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3  Paul’s ‘I’ as ‘spectral institution’ within 
a Christ-centred social imaginary
We return now, belatedly, to the issue of institutionalisation. The reception- history 
of Paul and Romans 7 has been characterised by productive misunderstanding, 
from Marcion (Schmid 1995, 333) to Harnack, to the ‘new perspective’, and the 
debate in English-language exegesis between ‘apocalyptic’ and ‘acratic’ read-
ings. Even if the (here preferred) acratic reading is not fully embraced, it justifies 
the strong presumption, that Romans was composed and transmitted – includ-
ing Romans 7 – with an expectation of predictable communicative effectiveness. 
The letter credibly claims to represent the voice of ‘Paul’ on a monumental scale 
and with a rhetorical intensity transcending normal epistolography, to a network 
of Jesus devotees in Rome who on the whole do not independently know Paul. 
Romans both used and exceeded existing social institutions of letter exchange. 
On any account, Romans 7 was from its conception unusually difficult to ignore 
or to understand. No doubt Romans became easier to misunderstand as it became 
distanced from its originally designed occasion and setting, but it seems exeget-
ically inescapable that at least Romans 7 was designed to have a generalisable 
literary function within which it was worthwhile to be conceptually provocative 
as well as impressively dramatic.
Romans presented itself as a monumental, representative letter transmit-
ted within a pioneering religious network, from a controversial authority figure, 
to unfamiliar recipients prior to a possible visit. As such Romans should have 
reflected and contributed to ‘community-building institutionalisation’, in terms 
of MacDonald’s typology of community-building, stabilising, and defending 
institutionalisation. Few would deny that ‘Paul’ goes well beyond what was likely 
useful or even prudent for those kinds of social function. Few indeed would now 
claim that the Ego-voice in Romans 7 is in any sense autobiographical for the 
extra-textual Paul. Still, the text-internal figure, ‘Paul’, clearly has work in hand 
to stabilise the heavily-qualified institutionality of the Torah within the emerg-
ing new institutions of the euaggelion and ekklēsia. I cannot tell how influen-
tial Torah-reading and Torah-observance were among Christ-devotees in Rome. 
I doubt that Paul knew. But the Torah is still massively important as well as 
problematic within the social imaginary which Paul is trying to institutionalise 
between himself and his correspondents.
At some later stabilising and defensive stages in the institutionalisation of 
Christianity a reading of Romans 7 like Peter Meyer’s may have become stronger, 
in which Romans 7 became more about the tyranny of Sin than about the power 
of God-given Torah. In the institutional moment within which Romans was 
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imagined, however, Torah is still a live voice in the epistolary network, saying, 
ouk epithumēseis (Romans 7:7), more clearly and with greater authority than 
any other possible voice. Paul therefore resorted to prosopopoeia in order to 
imagine an intensely individualising human voice not immediately identifiable 
with ‘Paul’ or ‘Adam’ or ‘Eve’, but available to attract the provisional imagina-
tive identification of auditors from different backgrounds in a still fluid sectarian 
network. The apocalyptic drama of Sin, Torah and the ‘I’ is essentially narrated 
by the murdered ‘I’ (7:11); it is the same somehow ghostly ‘I’ who reflects on the 
acratic situation which is radicalised when the same divine Torah is internalised 
as simultaneously revelatory and fatal. Engberg-Pedersen’s work has been deci-
sive for me in helping me to imagine historically an actual Paul who might more-
or-less consciously have elaborated such a confrontation of Sin, Torah, and an 
internalising Self.
The author to the Romans believed that the proto-Christian self was and 
should somehow remain normatively unstable specifically in relation to God’s 
Torah. Paul therefore needed to invent an internalising, surprisingly alienated ‘I’ 
in order to teach his auditors how to engage Torah as the normative preparation 
for transferring into ‘the Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus’ (Romans 8:2). In 
this way ‘Paul’ in Romans 7 retained Torah and invented an ‘I’ to be permanent 
ghostly presences within the Christ-centred social imaginary he was elaborat-
ing. As a parting intuition, then, I would suggest that both the Torah and the 
acratic ‘I’ of Romans 7 are designed to work within the Pauline social imaginary 
as instances of something like Derrida’s notion of ‘spectral institution’ (Derrida 




This rough translation is only intended to bring out the general character of the text. 
‘I*’ glosses egō.
I
1 Or are you unaware, kindred – for I am talking to people who recognise Torah 
(nomos) – that the Torah governs a person only as long as s/he lives? 2 For a married 
woman is bound by Torah to her husband while he lives, but if the husband dies 
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she is released from the Torah concerning her husband. 3 Accordingly, she will be 
deemed an adulteress if she belongs to another man while her husband is alive. 
But if her husband dies, she is free from the Torah, so that if she marries another 
man she is not an adulteress.
4  Likewise, my kindred,  you also have died  to the Torah  through the body of 
Christ, so that you may belong to another, to the one who has been raised from 
the dead, in order that we may bear fruit for God. 5 For while we were in the flesh, 
the passions of our sins, aroused by the Torah, were at work in our members to 
bear fruit for Death. 6 But now we are released from the Torah, having died to that 
which held us captive, so that we slave in newness of Spirit and not in antiquity 
of text.
II
7 What then shall we say? That the Torah is Sin? By no means! Yet if it had not 
been for the Torah,  I would not have been aware of Sin. For I would not have 
known what desire is, if the Torah were not saying, ‘You shall not desire’. 8 But 
Sin,  seizing an opportunity through the commandment, produced in me all 
kinds of desire. For apart from the Torah, Sin is dead. 9 I* was once alive apart 
from the Torah, but when the commandment came, Sin came to life 10 but I* died 
and the very commandment that promised life is found to be death for me. 11 For 
Sin, seizing an opportunity through the commandment, deceived me and through 
it killed me. 12 So the Torah is holy, and the commandment is holy and righteous 
and good.
13 Did that which is good, then, cause death for me? By no means! Rather it was 
Sin, in order that it might be shown to be Sin, which was enacting death in me 
through what is good, in order that Sin through the commandment might become 
utterly wicked.
III
14 For we know that the Torah is spiritual, but I* am fleshly, sold under Sin. 15 For 
I do not recognise my own action. For I do what I do not want, but I do the very 
thing I hate. 16 Now if I do what I do not want, I am agreeing with the Torah, that 
it is good. 17 So now it is no longer I* who act, but Sin dwelling in me. 18 For I know 
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that nothing dwells in me, that is, in my flesh, that is good. For the will is present 
in me to do what is right, but not the ability to enact it. 19 For I do not do the good I 
want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. 20 Now if I do what [I*] do not want, it 
is no longer I* who enact it, but Sin dwelling in me.
IV
21 So I find with regard to the Torah, that when I want to do right, evil is present 
for me.  22  For  I delight in God’s Torah,  in my inward person,  23  but I see in my 
members another Torah subverting the Torah of my mind and taking me prisoner in 
the Torah of Sin in my members. 24 Wretch that I* am! Who will deliver me from the 
body of this death? 25 Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, I* 
myself serve God’s Torah with my mind, but with my flesh I slave to the Torah of Sin.
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and institutionalisation among the early 
Mahānubhāvs
The Old Marathi literature of the Mahānubhāvs provides a classic example of 
individualisation and its mitigation. Beginning in the second half of the 13th 
century, the Mahānubhāvs are a bhakti group (sampradāy) that places a high 
value on asceticism and recognises five principal incarnations of one supreme 
God, called Parameśvar. This chapter will examine the characterisation of two 
of the divine incarnations, Cakradhar and Guṇḍam Rāüḷ, in their Mahānubhāv 
hagiographies, and the account of the early years the incarnations’ disciples 
spent without the benefit of the incarnations’ presence. The three principal texts 
I will discuss are:
1) the Līḷācaritra, the biography of Cakradhar (composed after 1274 and before 
1287 CE);1
2) The Deeds of God in Ṛddhipur (Ṛddhipurcaritra), the biography of Cakradhar’s 
guru, Guṇḍam Rāüḷ (composed 1287 CE);2 and
3) In the Absence of God (Smṛtisthaḷ), the account of the early Mahānubhāv dis-
ciples in the period after Cakradhar’s departure and Guṇḍam Rāüḷ’s death 
(composed 14th-15th century CE?).3
The Līḷācaritra is the text I began translating under the auspices of the ‘Reli-
gious Individualisation in Historical Perspective’ project at the Max-Weber- 
Kolleg in Erfurt. I have already published translations of the other two texts 
(Feldhaus 1984 and Feldhaus, Tulpule 1992, respectively), under the English 
titles given above.
1 The most thorough edition of this text is Kolte 1982. I primarily follow the text of Nene 1936–
1950, but the numbering I use follows that in my own edition and translation of this text forth-
coming in the Murty Classical Library of India series. In Nene’s edition and my own, the text has 
three sections: ‘Ekāṅka’, ‘Pūrvārdha’, and ‘Uttarārdha’. In references in this chapter, these are 
abbreviated as E, P, and U (or LC, E; LC, P; and LC, U), respectively.
2 Kolte 1972. Translated in Feldhaus 1984. Abbreviated here as DGR.
3 Deśpāṇḍe 1968. Translated in Feldhaus, Tulpule 1992. Abbreviated here as SS.
832   Anne Feldhaus
1 Violations of social norms
Extraordinary in their behaviour and powers, the divine incarnations can be 
seen as individual humans who are relatively free from the constraints of societal 
norms.
Guṇḍam Rāüḷ in particular is portrayed as having been weird and erratic 
in his behaviour; townspeople in Ṛddhipur are often quoted (favorably) saying 
things like, ‘The Rāüḷ is mad; the Rāüḷ is possessed!’ He is demanding and pet-
ulant, particularly about food, and his disciples work hard to indulge his every 
whim. His biographer delights in recounting the kinds of crazy, eccentric things 
that Guṇḍam Rāüḷ used to do. Here are two typical chapters of The Deeds of God 
in Ṛddhipur (Feldhaus 1984, 150, 81):
DGR 288. He plays with his reflection.
The Gosāvī used to go up to a small well. He would stand at the edge and look at his holy 
face in the well. He would talk to himself. He would say things to himself. He would comb 
his beard with his fingernails. He would laugh. He would put his holy hand into the well. 
Sometimes he would sit at the edge of the well, dangling his holy feet.
He would play this way, and then he would leave.
DGR 101. He abuses his buttocks when he farts.
The Gosāvī went out by the eastern gate. When he was near the Paraśurāma temple, to the 
northeast of it, he farted.
And the Gosāvī said, “Die, buttocks! Die! Why are you shouting?” and he slapped his 
buttocks and laughed.
Then he left.
The Līḷācaritra also has several descriptions of Guṇḍam Rāüḷ’s appearance and 
behaviour (E7, E21, P46–52, P72, P274, P440, and P444). In the following passage, 
for instance, a disciple who has just returned from Ṛddhipur describes Guṇḍam 
Rāüḷ’s ‘play’ to Cakradhar (LC, P444):
Lord, Lord, the Gosāvī would get up early in the morning. He would walk back and forth. 
Then he would go to [the village of] Āpvihīr. Along the way he would play with a boundary 
stone. He would play at the Five Pipal Trees. Then he would go into the town. He would go 
into house after house. He would take down the stack of storage pots with his holy hand. He 
would taste the vegetables. He would stack up the pile again. He would look this way, and 
then he would say, “Hey, now this is the way I like it.”
The Gosāvī would be going along the road. And he would burst out laughing.
Compared to Guṇḍam Rāüḷ’s portrayal in The Deeds of God in Ṛddhipur, 
Cakradhar’s biography depicts him as relatively sane. It does nonetheless show 
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him to have been to a great extent free from the bonds of normal social expecta-
tions. The first part of the Līḷācaritra, ‘Ekāṅka’ (‘The Solitary Period’), describes 
Cakradhar in his earlier years as leaving behind home and family to become a 
wandering, homeless, emotionally detached ascetic – the archetype of the ‘indi-
vidual’ in classical India, according to Louis Dumont (1960). One of the principal 
clusters of characteristics that ‘Ekāṅka’ emphasises in its portrayal of Cakradhar 
(whom it calls ‘the Gosāvī’) is his dispassion and asceticism. Asceticism is a high 
ideal for Mahānubhāvs, and a life of constant, solitary wandering, renunciation, 
and detachment (the way of the sannyāsī, a wandering ascetic or renouncer) is 
the central ethical teaching of the Sūtrapāṭh, the Mahānubhāvs’ anthology of 
Cakradhar’s teachings (Feldhaus 1983). In his early period as a wandering ascetic, 
Cakradhar certainly illustrates this ideal:
LC, E8. He accepts a state of extreme detachment.
The Gosāvī accepted a state of dispassion. He was not inclined to walk along the road. His 
matted hair got caught in thorns. The wind would blow it loose, or someone would come 
along and unravel it, and then the Gosāvī would move on. Thorns would pierce his body 
and scratch it. Drops of blood would appear. They would naturally look beautiful, like 
rubies on pure gold.
Repeatedly in the text, the Gosāvī remains silent when addressed by other people. 
He just stands or sits where he is, on these occasions as impassive toward other 
people as this līḷa portrays him being with respect to thorn bushes. Another point 
the text wants to make is that the Gosāvī does not care about money. Although he 
plays at gambling and even boasts about his winnings, he gives away all but the 
amount he really needs:
LC, E13. He gambles,
He told this episode in connection with Āplo:4 “My woman, I used to play dice. I would win, 
but I would never lose.”
In a certain village, he went to a gambling den. He said to the gamblers, “Is there room 
for a winner?”
“Come on in, Sir,” they said, and moved aside. They made room for him. Then the 
Gosāvī began to play. He won many cowrie shells. He spent the small, brown cowries. He 
gave them away to people.
He separated out some cowries, took them in his holy hand, and held them against his 
stomach. He went to the food market. There he said, “Can I get a meal for a cowrie shell?” 
One man invited him in [to his stall], saying, “Come on in, Sir.”
4 Āplo is a man who appears later in the Līḷācaritra, first in P325 and then in a few early chapters 
of ‘Uttarārdha’.
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He gave the man the cowries. The man gave him a massage. He gave him a hot-water 
bath. He offered him his clothes. He gave him a meal that was appropriate for his greatness. 
Then, as the Gosāvī ate the meal, he praised the food. That made the man happy. Then the 
man set up a cot with a mattress, and [the Gosāvī] accepted sleep.
Early the next morning he was [still] there. Then he left the man’s clothes behind and 
went to the gambling den. When the people in the market saw the Gosāvī, they dropped 
what they were doing and looked at him. [At the gambling den,] bards and singers were 
waiting for him: “The generous man from yesterday hasn’t come yet,” [they said.] Then he 
arrived.
That day too he won. He kept enough for his meal and gave away the rest. That day he 
went to a different house. The restauranteurs from the day before got double the normal 
profit. They were waiting for the Gosāvī.
In this way, he was there for some days. Then he left.
Just as he is about money and his body’s welfare, the Gosāvī as portrayed in the 
‘Ekāṅka’ section of the Līḷācaritra is also dispassionate about food. He will accept 
a lavish meal when it is offered, but most often he begs ‘with his bare hands’ (that 
is, not even using a begging bowl or bag) and eats off a flat surface, such as a 
smooth rock in a riverbed. Nor is the Gosāvī interested in sex, though he receives 
a number of propositions and get himself involved in some tricky situations – 
including a marriage or two. In the following episode, for example, Cakradhar 
marries a merchant’s daughter:
LC, E16. He accepts marriage.
He was sitting under a tree in a certain village. Horse traders had stopped there. They 
approached the Gosāvī. They saw the Gosāvī as a prince. Then they asked about the types of 
horses. The Gosāvī explained the types of horses. […]
Then the horse traders spoke. They invited him. They brought him to their tent. Then 
he had a massage. He had a hot-water bath. They offered the Gosāvī clothes. They gave him 
a horse. They began to act as if the Gosāvī was the principal one, the leader, and all the 
others were his servants.
Then he went to Oraṅgaḷ. Hearing that the horse traders had come, all the people came 
up to them. As they sold horses, he described them: “This horse is of such-and-such a type. 
It has such-and-such good qualities, such-and-such characteristics. This horse should get 
such-and-such an amount.” The horse traders said, “Because of the Gosāvī, this horse 
fetched a high price.” The people [buying the horses] said, “Because of the Gosāvī we got 
this horse for cheap.”
A merchant came there. He saw [this]. He said, “Sir, I have a jewel of a daughter. 
Nowhere is there a husband who is suitable for her beauty. If the Gosāvī makes her his 
maidservant, I will be gratified. What I have done will have borne fruit.”
The Omniscient one said, “I have no caste or lineage, no wife or family.”5
5 Literally, no stake and tether. In other words, there is nothing to tie me down.
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The man said, “The Gosāvī himself is caste and lineage. The Gosāvī himself is wife and 
family.”
The Omniscient one said, “I don’t have the means to do it.”
The man said, “Sir, I already have everything that is needed.”
The horse traders said, “This all does not belong to the Gosāvī alone.”
Then the merchant took the Gosāvī to show him to his extended family. A wedding 
took place, with a Gondhaḷ.6 The marriage ceremony went on for four days. Then the horse 
traders asked leave to go. The horse traders set out.
Then he lived there for some days. One day they were playing parcheesi upstairs […] 
when a wandering ascetic entered the town to beg for alms. The man had turned his back 
on worldly life. [The Gosāvī] saw this. Seeing the man, he said, “I will do the same thing.” At 
that, the woman fell down in a dead faint. The Gosāvī lifted her up by her arms. He wiped 
her eyes with his holy hand. He put water on her eyes. He brought her to consciousness. 
Then he said, “I was teasing you, I was playing with you.”
At that, Mahadāïseṃ asked, “Lord, the Gosāvī left. What happened to her?”
“She was looking at me. She went into a trance. Then I left.”
Extremely passive in his acceptance of this marriage, Cakradhar leaves it with 
apparent ease. It is only a later woman disciple, Mahadāïseṃ, who thinks to ask 
what became of Cakradhar’s abandoned bride.
Besides his ascetic detachment, another way in which ‘Ekāṅka’ portrays 
Cakradhar as violating social norms is his apparent indifference to purity rules, 
including the kinds of avoidance normally required between people of different 
castes.7 Not only does Cakradhar move around freely among Untouchables, Adi-
vasis, and other people of low or uncertain position in the caste hierarchy, he 
sometimes puts low-caste people into a trance state in which they cause what 
others see as pollution. A good example of this is found early in the text, in the 
story of Cakradhar’s encounter with an Untouchable Leatherworker:
LC, E12. He meets a Leatherworker.
As he was going to a certain village, there was a drinking-water stand along the road. 
The Gosāvī sat down at the water stand. A Leatherworker and his wife had gone to the 
market. They came there. The Leatherworker prostrated himself. He touched the holy 
feet. Seeing the Gosāvī’s beauty, he began to stare at him. And he opened his partitioned 
pouch. He offered him pieces of betel nut. He made betel rolls and gave them to him. 
With that, the Leatherworker’s wife came up from behind. “Get up, you! Let’s go home 
to our village.”
“Wait a minute. Wait a minute.”
6 A Gondhaḷ is a performance in honor of goddesses that involves story-telling and singing. 
Gondhaḷs are frequently performed in connection with weddings.
7 The Līḷācaritra also provides evidence of Cakradhar’s violations of the rules about separation 
between the genders. For the most part, I will avoid that topic here, saving it for a separate study.
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Again she said that. Three times he gave the same reply.
“All right. You are not coming. If you aren’t coming, give up your rights over me.”
“I give them up.”
“Who is the witness?”
He gestured toward the Gosāvī. “This God.” The Gosāvī agreed to it. Then she set out. 
Then he received a trance state from the Gosāvī. Because of it, he lost all consciousness of 
his body, all sense of who he was. He became a Gosāvī and moved around in the world as 
one.
In the course of his wanderings, he came to Kholnāyak’s Āmbā. There, thinking him a 
god-man, they took him from house to house to feed him meals. One man took him to his 
home. He did pūjā.8 He served him a meal.
A Leatherworker from that man’s village had come there to the market. He said, “Hey! 
Isn’t he a Leatherworker from our village? Here he has become a god. He has polluted the 
village.” One after another, people asked this. Everyone heard it. Then Jagaḷdev and Vīñjh-
dev, the officials, summoned Brāhmaṇs knowledgeable in traditional law. They had them 
take out law books. Those men said, “He should be seated in lime. Then water should be 
poured over him from leather water bags.”
That is exactly what they did to the man. Seeing the crowd, a man arriving at the scene 
asked someone what was going on. He replied, “We have done such-and-such to that man.”
Then the first man said, “What can you do to him? He is over there in the market, 
playing, with a garland around his neck and pan in his mouth. The garland around his neck 
hasn’t wilted a bit.”
In the later, longer sections of the Līḷācaritra, ‘Pūrvārdha’ (‘The First Half’) and 
‘Uttarārdha’ (‘The Second Half’), Cakradhar gathers a shifting but more-or-less 
permanent group of disciples around him. In these parts of the text, he becomes 
something like a typical guru, extraordinarily perceptive about his disciples’ 
actions and intentions and strict in his demands for loyalty and obedience. On 
many occasions, what he teaches his disciples involves ignoring or minimis-
ing of caste distinctions and purity norms. For example, on several occasions 
Cakradhar opposes men’s wearing the ‘sacred thread’, the topknot,9 and the 
forehead mark that indicate their Brāhmaṇ status. In P89 he tells his disciple 
Nāthobā, ‘Go and bury your forehead mark and your sacred thread’, and in U53 
he commands another disciple, Indrabhaṭ, ‘Indra, you must give up the topknot 
and thread’. In U161 Cakradhar tells Dādos, a rival guru several of whose follow-
ers transfer their loyalty to Cakradhar, ‘O Māhātmā, get rid of your topknot and 
sacred thread. Follow me’. And in U202, he praises yet another disciple, one who 
‘gave up everything Brāhmaṇical and got rid of his topknot and sacred thread’.
Shaving one’s head entirely, giving up the topknot, and removing one’s 
sacred thread are part of the ritual requirements for leaving the householder state 
8 Pūjā is ritual worship, involving offerings and gestures of hospitality.
9 A tuft of hair left on the crown of the head when the rest of the head is shaved.
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and becoming an ascetic renouncer. Hence, in these passages Cakradhar is urging 
his high-caste male disciples to renounce the householder life and become ascet-
ics, rather than wholeheartedly condemning Brāhmaṇism or caste hierarchy. In 
the case of Indrabhaṭ (U53), his father-in-law pleads with Cakradhar, ‘Shave my 
head, Lord, instead of his. But don’t shave his, Lord’. When Cakradhar asks why, 
the father-in-law replies that Indrabhaṭ’s wife (the father-in-law’s daughter) ‘is 
young’ and should not be deprived of her husband’s presence so early in her life.
While Cakradhar’s disparagement of the marks of Brāhmaṇical status may 
thus be better seen as a preference for ascetic withdrawal from the world, there 
are many other episodes that indicate his disregard for the rules of purity and pol-
lution. Cakradhar is especially lax about the rules about ingesting food or drink 
that Brāhmaṇs would normally considered polluting, whether because of being 
served by someone in a permanent or temporary state of pollution or because 
of having been touched by someone’s saliva. In P332, Cakradhar makes fun of 
Lukhdevobā for undergoing an elaborate purification ritual after having drunk 
water that was served to him by an Untouchable. When Dādos’ father has died, 
Cakradhar accepts food from Dādos, even though Dādos points out that he is 
affected by death pollution. ‘I don’t observe anything like that’, Cakradhar says 
(LC, E61), and he eats the curds and rice that Dādos brings him. In P222, Cakradhar 
eats jujubes that one of his disciples has tasted, and in P223 he eats chickpeas 
that the same disciple has tasted.10 On many occasions reported in the Līḷācaritra, 
Cakradhar gives people food that he has tasted or pan that he has chewed (P11, 
P245, P256, P260, P433, etc.). In U61, his spittle cures a Gardener-caste woman’s 
tongue disease, and in E36 pan that he has chewed heals an eye that has been put 
out. In P94 and P99 disciples intentionally drink water that he has spat out, and 
in many more episodes, devotees drink water that has washed his feet.
Guṇḍam Rāüḷ too is frequently portrayed in his Mahānubhāv biography as 
violating not just the norms of sanity and politeness but also those of purity. For 
example, he drinks water from a large water storage jar reserved for Untoucha-
bles’ use, then washes his feet directly in the jar (DGR 23). He plays with meat 
in the butchers’ shops, then washes his hands in the water storage jar at a Brāh-
maṇ’s house (DGR 49). He takes a cloth that the Brāhmaṇ’s daughter sits on while 
menstruating (DGR 16), and puts it into her family’s water storage jar. The fol-
lowing episode from The Deeds of God in Ṛddhipur illustrates the problems he 
10 Even more shockingly, in P221, when the same disciple (who appears to have been physi-
cally if not also mentally disabled) needs someone to accompany him when he goes to urinate, 
Cakradhar is the one to take on this task. The urine splashes onto the Gosāvī’s feet. Afterwards a 
female disciple washes them.
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causes for the authorities in Ṛddhipur, by passing freely between the homes of 
Untouchables and Brāhmaṇs:
DGR 47. The village headmen make an ordinance.
The village headmen said, “The Rāüḷ goes around among the houses of Māṅgs and Mahārs, 
and right afterwards he goes into the houses of consecrated Brāhmaṇs. In this way, the Rāüḷ 
has caused general pollution. Put their houses outside the village. Then the Rāüḷ won’t go 
to them.”
Thus they had houses built outside the town. The original Mahār quarter was razed. 
But the Gosāvī would go to the new one too, [saying], “Oh, I shouldn’t go, I say […] I should 
go, I say […] No, I must not go, I tell you.” In this way, he would amuse himself, going from 
house to house.
Thus, both Guṇḍam Rāüḷ and Cakradhar violate purity rules, and both transgress 
on occasion the boundaries of caste. Moreover, each of them is quoted in his biog-
raphy as having spoken a verse that expresses his transcendence of the principal 
categories of classical Hindu social theory, the varṇas (‘castes’ or ‘classes’) and 
āśramas (‘stages of life’ for an upper-caste man), as well as the even broader dis-
tinction between human and divine beings (Sūtrapāṭh, ‘Vicār Mālikā’ a61 [Feld-
haus 1983, 199, with changes]; DGR 281; LC, P328): 
I am not a man, nor a god or Yakṣa,
Nor a Brāhmaṇ, a Kṣatriya, a Vaiśya, or a Śūdra.
I am not a celibate student; I am not a householder or a forest hermit.
Neither am I a mendicant, I who am innate knowledge.
Cakradhar says something similar to this twice during his ‘Ekāṅka’ period. We 
have already seen him, in E16, say to his future father-in-law, ‘I have no caste 
or lineage, no wife or family’. And in E48, when Cakradhar attends a wedding 
without being invited by either the bride’s side or the groom’s, he says: ‘I am not 
yours. I am not theirs. I do not belong to anyone.’
2 De-individualisation
However, despite such bold pronouncements, and despite the biographies’ por-
trayal of Cakradhar and Guṇḍam Rāüḷ as not conforming to the rules, there are 
some ways in which the two divine incarnations seem not to be understood as 
individuals.
Most fundamentally, as incarnations of the same divine being, generally 
referred to as Parameśvar (the ‘supreme Lord’), they are not two separate individ-
uals but essentially identical with each other and with at least three other such 
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incarnations. A couple of episodes in the Līḷācaritra point out Cakradhar’s iden-
tity with Cāṅgdev Rāüḷ, another incarnation of Parameśvar, who abandoned his 
body and took on the body of the young man who became Cakradhar (E4; cf. 
P330). There are many more episodes that express or refer to Cakradhar’s iden-
tity with the god Kṛṣṇa (Śrīkṛṣṇa Cakravartī): for example, P63, P88, P246, P376, 
P380, P437, P392, U88, U275. In one of the most striking such passages, fish in the 
Godāvarī river swim to the surface to look at the Gosāvī, just as fish swam to the 
surface of the Yamunā river to look at Kṛṣṇa in the distant past:
LC, P376. Śrīkṛṣṇa on the [river]bank.
Then the Gosāvī sent all the devotees straight along the path. Placing his holy hand on 
Upādhye’s shoulder, the Gosāvī went along the bank of the river. […] The shadow of the 
Gosāvī’s holy body fell on the water. That made all the fish from the bottom come up. All 
the fish were looking at the Gosāvī’s holy form. Then the Gosāvī said to Upādhye, “Śrīkṛṣṇa 
Cakravarti was going along the bank of the Yamunā. The fish who had gone to the under-
world had gone to the bottom [of the river]. They came up to look at the holy form. […] That 
is what an attractive teacher he was.”
“Yes, Lord.”
Finally, Līḷācaritra passages that express the identity of Cakradhar and Guṇḍam 
Rāüḷ include the following episode in which Guṇḍam Rāüḷ (Śrīprabhu) reveals 
that Cakradhar too is divine. Cakradhar is staying in the Bhairav temple in Ṛddhi-
pur when Guṇḍam Rāüḷ comes along:
LC, P51. Śrīprabhu plays in the Bhairav temple.
One day Śrīprabhu came playing from the step-well11 to the Bhairav temple. As he played 
with Keśav’s image, he would place his finger on its nose, he would place it on the ear, he 
would place it on the eyes. At the same time he would say, “This is an ear. This is the nose. 
This is an eye. This is the forehead.” And he would say, “Are you a god? Drop dead! You 
aren’t. This is not a god.” As he went along doing this, he reached the Bhairav temple.
Bhairav was in the back. The Omniscient one said, “Go away for a moment, my woman. 
Śrīprabhu is coming.” Bāïseṃ went outside. She covered her eyes and kept silent, in order 
not to break his play.
Śrīprabhu entered [the temple]. He played with Bhairav in the same way. Then he 
approached the Gosāvī. The Gosāvī was sitting still. “This is an ear. This is the nose. This is 
an eye. This is the forehead.” Saying this, he put his finger on [the Gosāvī’s] forehead. “Yes. 
You are a god.” (Hīrāïsā version: “Oh, you are a god, I say. You aren’t, I say. This is a god, I 
tell you.”12)
In this way, God revealed God.
11 A well with stairs leading down to the level of the water.
12 This is a normal way of speaking for Śrīprabhu.
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As two of the five principal incarnations of Parameśvar, then, Cakradhar and 
Guṇḍam Rāüḷ are fundamentally identical with one another and with the other 
divine incarnations. They are thus, in this sense, not portrayed as individuals.
Besides this fundamentally theological identity, there are several more ways 
in which the Mahānubhāv biographies portray these two divine incarnations as 
not being completely individualistic, but in fact conforming to a great extent to 
the rules that governed the society of their times. As human beings, both Cāṅgdev 
Rāüḷ and Cakradhar are Brāhmaṇs,13 and both of them are men. Besides the occa-
sions on which each of them breaks the rules for proper Brāhmaṇ behaviour, or 
on which they or their disciples violate the norms for gender roles, there are other 
times when they conform to those rules and norms, often without even question-
ing them. The most prominent of these occasions have to do with food and eating.
To begin with, Brāhmaṇs are not supposed to eat food prepared by a member 
of a lower caste. Cakradhar and his mendicant followers, most of whom were 
originally Brāhmaṇs, often adhere to this most basic caste rule. When they are 
in a village where there is no Brāhmaṇ home that can provide them with cooked 
food, the Līḷācaritra portrays them accepting only uncooked food as alms (U184, 
U216, U241–2). At one point in the text (P284–5), Cakradhar stays for more than 
a week in the home of a certain Sāïdev, whose shield, sword, and horse mark 
him as most probably a member of a warrior caste. During this visit, the food 
that Cakradhar and his disciples eat comes not from Sāïdev’s kitchen but from 
a neighboring Brāhmaṇ home. On another occasion, when one of Cakradhar’s 
female disciples, Sādheṃ, finds that it has gotten too late, and she too hungry, 
to beg for her food, she asks for and eats a plate of food at an unfamiliar house 
that she takes to be the home of Brāhmaṇs.14 The way Cakradhar teases her upon 
her return reflects at least her assumption, if not also Cakradhar’s and the text’s 
authors’, that it would be horrifying for her to eat food cooked by anyone but a 
Brāhmaṇ. The passage also illustrates the kind of clues that people in the late 
thirteenth century, as now, used to guess a person’s caste (LC, U124):
13 Guṇḍam Rāüḷ’s Mahānubhāv biography states directly and at the beginning that he was born 
into a Kāṇva Brāhmaṇ family (DGR 1), that is, a family belonging to the Kāṇva branch of the Yajur 
Veda. The Līḷācaritra is much more cagey about Cakradhar’s caste identity. In U122, however, one 
of Cakradhar’s female disciples refers to his caste as ‘Lāḍ’, a Brāhmaṇ group from Gujarat (Novetz-
ke 2016, 109). In Kolte’s version of LC, E16 (numbered P32 in Kolte’s edition), Cakradhar calls 
himself a ‘Lāḍ Sāmak’ – that is, a person belonging to the Lāḍ jāti (‘sub-caste’) and the Sāma Veda.
14 On another occasion (U235), Sādheṃ goes to a Brāhmaṇ house to drink water when she be-
comes thirsty.
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“[…] By then I got hungry, Lord. It was early afternoon. So I asked a Brāhmaṇ for a plate 
of food. [His wife] had made a leaf vegetable cooked in buttermilk. So I ate my meal there, 
Lord. I brought back the rest of the food. […] I placed it over there.”
The Omniscient one said, “O Sādheṃ, that house was a Grocer’s.”
“No, Lord. There is a Tuḷsi Vṛndāvan at their house.”15
The Omniscient one said, “There are Tuḷsī Vṛndāvans at Grocers’ houses. […] Isn’t that 
so, Vānareya?”
“That’s right, Lord,” [replied Vānareya]. “Those are the Grocers at the Capital. Let’s go 
to the Capital, and then we can get some groceries there.”16
“No, Lord, his bull’s ears are this big.”
The Omniscient one said, “Grocers’ bulls’ ears are big like that too.”
“No, Lord. His womenfolk are light-skinned. His children are light-skinned.”
The Omniscient one said, “Grocers’ womenfolk are light-skinned too. Grocers’ children 
are light-skinned. Isn’t that so, Vānareyā?”
“That’s right, Lord.”
And Sādheṃ remained silent.
Then the Omniscient one said, “O Sādheṃ, if it turns out that even so that house was 
a Grocer’s, what will you do?”
“Then I will drink water that has washed the Gosāvī’s feet. Then I will purify my 
stomach.”
The Omnsicent one said, “Oh, Sādheṃ, that house is not a Grocer’s. That house was a 
Brāhmaṇ’s. I was teasing you.”
“Is that so, Lord?”
Was the Gosāvī teasing Sādheṃ because he thought that she was silly to worry 
about whose food she ate, or because he agreed with the premise of her horror 
and was simply being playful? The text leaves the answer deliciously ambiguous.
Except for some episodes recounted in ‘Ekāṅka’, Cakradhar and Guṇḍam 
Rāüḷ rarely eat food obtained by begging. Rather, disciples cook for them, and the 
disciples who do the cooking are almost invariably women, not men. This is but 
the most striking way in which the divine incarnations and their disciples adhere, 
apparently unquestioningly, to the gender roles of their times. Having women 
cook, however, raises questions about purity and pollution. In this respect too, 
Cakradhar, though gentle, nonetheless conformed to the conventions. Here is the 
most explicit treatment I’ve found in the Līḷācaritra of his policy with respect to 
menstrual pollution:
15 A Tuḷsī Vṛndāvan is a flower pot, often decorated, that is generally set in a central location 
in front of the doorway to a house, in which a holy basil (tuḷsī) bush is planted, to be worshiped 
every morning by a woman of the household.
16 It appears that Vānareya (another name for Bhaṭobās or Nāgdev) is playing along with 
Cakradhar’s joke.
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326. He accepts Umāï’s snack.
Umāïseṃ was preparing to fast for a month. The Omniscient one said, “When one com-
mences a month-long fast, one should serve a meal to Brāhmaṇs.”
So Umāïseṃ invited the Gosāvī for some food. On the evening of the tenth day of the 
fortnight, she became polluted. Early the next morning she came for darśan of the Gosāvī. 
She prostrated herself to the Gosāvī without touching him. She began to express her sadness 
to Ābāïseṃ.
The Gosāvī called for Ābāïseṃ. “My woman, what is the woman who is fasting for a 
month saying?”
Then Umāïseṃ began to say to the Gosāvī, “Lord, Lord, I do not have the good fortune 
of preparing food for you myself, Lord, and then doing pūjā to the Gosāvī.” Having said this, 
she began to cry.
The Omniscient one said, “O woman who is fasting for a month! Is it good to be far away 
[in the kitchen], not to know where I am, to fill your eyes with smoke? […] Vṛdhābāïseṃ will 
prepare the refreshments. Nāgdev will do the pūjā on your behalf at the door of the house. 
Do not cry.”
“All right, Lord.”
The Gosāvī is sympathetic to Umāïseṃ, but he does not encourage her to violate 
the prevalent pollution rules. Rather, he attempts to reconcile her to them. Here, 
as in other cases, the divine incarnations, along with those who composed and 
preserved the texts describing their lives, appear to have been untroubled by – 
indeed, unconscious of – the caste-based and gendered structures within which 
they lived as humans. In these respects, the biographies’ subjects were far from 
becoming, and the texts’ authors were far from portraying them as, revolutionary 
individuals.
3 Institutionalisation
Besides allowing us to question the degree of individualisation that Cakradhar 
and Guṇḍam Rāüḷ may have achieved, early Mahānubhāv literature provides a 
good deal of evidence about the process of institutionalisation experienced by 
their followers. As the ‘founder’ of the Mahānubhāvs, Cakradhar is remembered 
to have taught a large number of doctrines and rules of behaviour. The con-
straints that these teachings and instructions place on the thoughts and actions 
of his followers provide further examples of ‘de-individualisation’ that can be 
traced in the early Mahānubhāv literature. To take just one example, many of 
the rules that Cakradhar taught have to do with asceticism. Asceticism as a way 
of life involves cutting oneself off not only from luxury and comforts, but also 
from social bonds. The institutionalisation of the life of a wandering ascetic is 
one of the principal developments of the Mahānubhāvs’ early years. The text that 
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reports in the most detail on that institutionalisation is Smṛtisthaḷ, the account of 
the developments among Cakradhar’s disciples in the years after his departure in 
early 1283 CE and, approximately fourteen years later, the death of Guṇḍam Rāüḷ 
(in 1286 or 1287 CE), up until the death of Nāgdev or Bhaṭobās, who led the group 
during this period. For example, Smṛtisthaḷ contains some poignant episodes 
about disciples, both male and female, being tested in their renunciation of 
home, family, and sex.17 One particularly dramatic episode tells of the efforts by 
the family of Kesobās, who would later compile Cakradhar’s remembered sayings 
in the Sūtrapāṭh, to get Kesobās to abandon the ascetic live (Smṛtisthaḷ 12–3):
It is not known what village Kesobās was from. […] He was a learned preacher. One day he 
came to Bhaṭobās and was initiated as an ascetic by him. Bhaṭobās loved him very much. 
He stayed in Bhaṭobās’s presence. […]
Then one day Kesobās’s relatives heard about [his initiation as an ascetic] and came to 
take him away. His brother, Gopāḷdev, and his father-in-law came to take him away because 
they were opposed to what he had done.
They took Kesobās away. They tried to make him give up his initiation; but no matter 
what they did, he would not give it up.
Then they summoned all the learned men and had them argue with him. But he 
silenced them in argument. And the learned men washed their hands of him. They said, 
“We cannot win him over. If he is to be won over now, it is his wife who will do it. Now lock 
up the two of them in the same room.”
So they locked them in. If she lay on the cot, he would sleep on the ground. If she lay 
on the ground, he would sleep on the cot. In this way, the night would pass.
During the daytime, he would go to the river. They would put someone there to watch 
him. Kesobās would stay alone at the river. […] Then they would bring him into the village.
Several days passed this way. Then his wife said, “Let him go now. He has become a 
yogī now. It is a sin for me to interfere.”
So they all gave Kesobās permission to leave. He left. He met Bhaṭobās. He told him 
what had happened. Bhaṭobās listened, and then praised him lavishly. […]
Besides showing us the heroic efforts of the first two generations of Cakradhar’s 
disciples to live the way of life he taught, early Mahānubhāv literature also 
allows us to trace the development of the Mahānubhāvs from a single individ-
ual to a loosely knit group to a highly structured institution. In the Līḷācaritra, 
the description of Cakradhar as a solitary wandering ascetic in the first part of 
the text (‘Ekāṅka’) is followed, in the second and third parts (‘Pūrvārdha’ and 
‘Uttarārdha’), by almost a thousand episodes in which he is accompanied in his 
wanderings by one or a few disciples. Toward the end of ‘Pūrvārdha’ (P444), 
Cakradhar meets Bhaṭobās, and Bhaṭobās comes to realise that Cakradhar is 
17 See Smṛtisthaḷ  13, 53, 54, 56, 58, 75, 83, 97, 105-6, 134, and 206, and the discussion in Feldhaus 
1994.
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God; at the beginning of the third and final part of the Līḷācaritra (‘Uttarārdha’), 
Bhaṭobās becomes a full-fledged follower of Cakradhar (U1), renouncing home 
and family, as well as his previous guru.18 Gradually, in the course of the 500-or-
so episodes of ‘Uttarārdha’, Bhaṭobās becomes Cakradhar’s most important dis-
ciple. At the end of ‘Uttarārdha’ (U489, U495, and U496),19 Cakradhar entrusts 
him with the leadership of the community of disciples. Fourteen years later, 
Guṇḍam Rāüḷ confirms the appointment, when he is on his deathbed. At the 
end of the The Deeds of God in Ṛddhipur (DGR 322), Bhaṭobās asks him, ‘Lord, Śrī 
Cakradhar Rāyā20 entrusted us to you. Now you’re leaving, Gosāvī. So to whom 
do you entrust us?’ Guṇḍam Rāüḷ replies, in his typical speech pattern, ‘Oh, 
drop dead! I entrust all these others to you, and I entrust you to Śrī Dattātreya 
Prabhu’.21
Finally, Smṛtisthaḷ portrays Bhaṭobās and the other disciples working out, 
under his leadership, the rules and structures of a full-blown sampradāy (‘sect’). 
We learn of the categories of discipleship that come to be utilised, of the body of 
literature that begins to be composed, of the traditions of pilgrimage and relic 
veneration that develop, of the theology that grows ever more elaborate, and of 
the rules and regulations that become ever more precise.22 For example, Bhaṭobās 
modifies Cakradhar’s command that his followers should practice constant, sol-
itary, aimless wandering (nityāṭan) by directing the disciples to wear distinctive 
clothing when they wander (SS 30), by instituting the suspension of wandering 
during the rainy season (SS 29), and by introducing the innovation that male 
mendicants should wander in pairs and the women in groups of four. Bhaṭobās 
institutes the last of these modifications in response to an incident narrated in 
Smṛtisthaḷ 105–6:
18 In LC, U29–31, Bhaṭobās’s wife, Gāṅgāïseṃ, comes and curses him (‘Burn up! Burn up! Such a 
man’s [life] was saved. Why is that man still alive? The man whose wife has no food, no clothes  – 
that man has no shame’). Cakradhar convinces Gāṅgāïseṃ that she is better off with Bhaṭobās 
alive, then he sends Bhaṭobās and Gāṅgāïseṃ to spend the night together in the nearest village. 
When they fail to reconcile, Cakradhar finally sends Bhaṭobās home to make arrangements for 
Gāṅgāïseṃ’s support.
19 These chapter numbers follow Nene’s edition. The corresponding numbers in my forthcom-
ing edition are U494, U500, and U501. For similar chapters in Kolte’s edition, see his LC, U606, 
U620, U623, and U625. See also Sūtrapāṭh, ‘Vicār’ 153, 155, 156, 158–62, and 240, and ‘Ācār’ 137.
20 Rāyā means ‘King’.
21 Dattātreya Prabhu is another of the five principal divine incarnations recognised by the 
Mahānubhāvs.
22 For a detailed discussion of these and other aspects of the institutionalisation of the 
Mahānubhāvs, see the introduction to Feldhaus, Tulpule 1992, especially pages 3–53.
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Once when Kesobās had gone out alone to wander, rain fell out of season. He went to a 
village to beg. At one house a moneylender’s daughter saw him. Kesobās was handsome. 
He was strong. She felt attracted to him. She gave him alms herself, and asked, “Where do 
you live?”
He just shook his head and moved on indifferently.
She watched for him until evening. That evening it rained. He went to spend the night 
in a liṅga temple23 near the village gate. He had a small piece of shawl with him. He placed 
it in front of him and sat in a corner.
At night the temple priest went home. He had seen [Kesobās], but left without saying 
anything.
After a while, the woman wrapped herself in a thick blanket and came to the temple. 
She looked around and saw Kesobās. And she sat down on his lap.
Kesobās said, “Get up. I’ll do whatever you say,” and he made her sit on the ground.
And he said to the woman, “I’m going out to urinate. You sit right here.” And he left 
behind the shawl and some belongings that he had. She believed him.
In this way, he got out of the temple, and immediately he left, saying, “Śrī Cakradhar!”
The woman waited for a while. When she realised that he was not going to return, she 
got frightened. She went home.
That night Kesobās slept out in the open, and the very next day he set out to meet 
Bhaṭobās. […]
Then Bhaṭobās said to Kesobās, “Now you go back there.”
Kesobās agreed. Kesobās said to himself, “My body is the cause of this.” So he returned 
to his wandering. His body became emaciated. He practiced stringent fasting. Then he went 
to that same village and went to beg at that woman’s house. Just then, she was standing 
there. She saw Kesobās and spat contemptuously, naturally taking him to be a wretched 
beggar. And she went into the house.
With that, Kesobās patted himself on the arms.24 “Am I not Śrī Cakradhar’s Keśavdyā?” 
he said. […]
So [Bhaṭobās] arranged that the men should [go wandering] in pairs and the women 
in groups of four.
Thus, even in Smṛtisthaḷ, we are presented with a very organic, non-bureaucratic 
process. We observe Bhaṭobās and others of the first generation of Cakradhar’s 
disciples as they figure out how to practice, over the long term and as a growing 
group, the highly ascetic, individualistic way of life taught by a man they under-
stood to have been God. Through Smṛtisthaḷ, we are thus able to capture the very 
beginnings of the institutionalisation of a way of life based on the teachings of a 
highly individual religious leader and his extremely unconventional guru.
23 A temple of the god Śiva in his aniconic/phallic form.
24 This is a gesture of self-congratulation in Old Marathi.
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Ishita Banerjee-Dube
Religious individualisation and collective 
bhakti: Sarala Dasa and Bhima Bhoi
‘The author remains a mettlesome subject in late modernism’, writes Chris-
tian Novetzke, ‘confounding a simple definition of what it is to be an author’ 
(Novetzke 2003, 214).1 Novetzke skilfully unravels the distinct layers of author-
ship that went into the conferral of ‘authority’ on one particular figure, Namdev, 
in traditions ‘not born of modernity yet fully present in the modern world’. In 
doing so, he argues against the modern notion of the author as a solitary, creative 
figure. In this chapter, I seek to extend his insights about ‘corporate authorship’ to 
an examination of the interface and mutual imbrication of individuality, individ-
ualisation, and institutionalisation of authors and texts in Odisha, eastern India 
in ‘medieval’ and ‘modern’ times.
The confounding and conflation of the individual and the collective, and the 
medieval and the modern, also underlies bhakti (devotion). Bhakti or the spirit of 
bhakti, widely accepted as the hallmark of medieval India, particularly the north, 
is simultaneously personal and communitarian. Often represented as a female 
being and usually translated as devotion, bhakti is ‘heart religion’; it emanates 
from divine encounter of individuals with the divine, an encounter that engulfs 
them with love, passion and joy, and inspires them to break out in poems and 
songs. Their exhilaration infects others with effervescent enthusiasm, resulting 
in a ‘glorious disease of the collective heart’ (Hawley 2015, 2). Bhakti’s efferves-
cence makes the individual and the collective, and autonomy and heteronomy, 
mingle in intriguing ways. Bhakti is intensely personal but hinges on sharing and 
communion. It is also liberating – from societal hierarchies, sectarian rivalries, 
and Sanskritic supremacy.
How then should we classify bhakti? As medieval or as modern? Is it medi-
eval because the sensibility is entirely religious, inflected by the miraculous? 
Or is it modern because it is individual, autonomous, and emancipatory? What 
is the sense of the ‘individual’ and the ‘person’ we assume when we call bhakti 
individual and personal? Does bhakti encompass and supersede the modern? Or 
do we need to find different ways to think about the ancient, the medieval, the 
early modern, and the modern? Is it possible to think of the inextricable blends 
1 My sincere thanks to Anne Feldhaus for referring me to this essay. And also to all the other mem-
bers of our discussion group – Rahul Parson, Ian Henderson, Max Deeg and Saurabh Dube – for 
suggestive observations.
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in which the individual and the collective, the personal and the social, the author 
and the reader merge and mutually constitute each other? And if we do, how 
would we think of individualisation and institutionalisation? These questions 
will become pertinent as I address, and try to gain entry to, the world of a 15th 
century sudra (lowercaste/varna) Odia poet who composed a vernacular Mahab-
harata upon the command/blessing of the goddess Sarala.2
Needless to say, the miraculous is not unique to India or bhakti or the medie-
val. It is current in several other traditions, starting from the ancient Greek. Homer, 
I was reminded during my talk at the Max Weber Kolleg in June 2017, was tradi-
tionally said to be blind and his compositions the result of a miracle. Even though 
scholars have tried to discard such beliefs as legends or fables, the debates on 
when, how, and under what circumstances the Iliad and the Odyssey were com-
posed, and whether one or several authors composed them, are far from settled.
Bhima Bhoi, a mid-19th century poet-philosopher of Mahima Dharma, a 
radical religious faith of Odisha, is also believed to have been born blind and 
bestowed with the ‘eyesight’ of knowledge by his preceptor Mahima Swami, the 
founder of the Dharma. Mahima Swami in turn, is taken to be an incarnation of 
the Absolute whose mahima (radiance/glory) he preached. Although the author-
ship of Bhima Bhoi’s compositions has not been questioned by scholars, the fact 
of his blindness has been interrogated. In addition, texts composed decades after 
his death have been ascribed to him, a fact that testifies to Bhima Bhoi’s appeal to 
the popular imagination, as well as to the enduring legacy of his ‘authorial agency 
in a way similar to the tradition of Namdev’ (Novetzke 2003, 215). In my earlier 
work, I have explored the notion of corporate authorship by paying attention to 
the process of composition and transmission of texts and have argued in favour 
of shared composition through collective reading and recitation. My purpose has 
been to interrogate the binaries of orality and writing, literacy and illiteracy, and 
text and performance, in order to raise important issues with regard to the author 
and authorial voice (Banerjee-Dube 2003, 1–17; 2007).
In this essay, I will examine the Mahabharata in Odia ascribed to Sarala 
Dasa, an adi or early poet of vernacular Odia, and will briefly touch upon Bhima 
Bhoi’s own compositions and those other texts that have been attributed to him 
in order to trace the constitution and mobility of texts and authors in the very 
process of their actualisation in interpretive reading. This will, perhaps, enable a 
different understanding of institutionalisation and individualisation. I will draw 
upon and extend Michel de Certeau’s suggestive idea of reading as ‘poaching’, an 
 interpretive exercise that questions ‘the assimilation of reading to passivity’ and 
2 Odia is used now both to refer to the people of Odisha (earlier Orissa) and the language they speak.
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asserts that ‘every reading modifies the object’ – the text – (De Certeau 1984, 169). 
At the same time, I will not follow de Certeau’s formulation of the written text and 
the reader as two separate and well-defined entities. I will further track the impli-
cations of Roger Chartier’s arguments about how written texts get their meanings 
through the forms in which they are received, understood, and appropriated by 
readers/listeners, resulting in their ‘actualization’ by means of ‘concrete practices 
and interpretive procedures’ (Chartier 1992, 50). By asserting that in medieval 
Europe and in later times, written texts were routinely recited in collective gather-
ings of readers/listeners who were not ‘literate’, and that such collective reading 
conferred differential meanings on the texts on account of the diverse expecta-
tions of readers, Chartier forcefully brings home the ‘instability’ of meaning in 
apparently fixed, written texts (see Chartier 1992; 1989, for instance).
Such insights acquire a distinct significance in India, where reading and rec-
itation have had an equal, if not greater, importance and texts have been com-
posed (and actualised) through their performance and circulation. With this in 
mind, we will look into the elaboration of Sarala Dasa’s rendering of the epic in 
the vernacular as the Mahabharata in Odisha and of Sarala Dasa as the adi kabi 
(early poet) of Odia. This supreme importance of the Mahabharata moreover, can 
be attributed to the fact that it is an imaginative re-telling, or ‘reconceptualiza-
tion’, rather than a translation of the ‘original’ version (Satpathi, Nayak forthcom-
ing; Patnaik 2012, viii).
1 Sarala’s Dasa?
Sarala Dasa, like so many other (ancient and) medieval saints, bhaktas, and 
composers, comes to us through a series of mediations. First, his Mahabharata, 
composed in the 15th century, spread and circulated through recitations and col-
lective readings and that were copied and re-copied on palm-leaf manuscripts 
(believed to have an average life of 35–40 years) for over three centuries before 
it was printed in the late 19th century. The first ‘definitive’ version of the Odia 
epic, collected, compiled, and edited by Artaballav Mohanty and his large team 
of scholars, was published by the Department of Culture of the Government of 
Odisha in 1966. Until the late 19th century, innumerable copies of palm-leaf 
manuscripts of the Sarala Mahabharata could be found in ordinary and royal 
households as well as in the village bhagabata ghara (a shed/hut where the Odia 
Bhagabata and other devotional texts were read out). It is redundant to point out 
that the ‘original’ Mahabharata also underwent a similar process of circulation 
before being written down.
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The legends about Sarala Dasa’s life comprise the second mediation. Argu-
ably, such legends are an offshoot of his great composition. At the same time, 
the inextricable blend of a goddess, her will, command, and blessing, with the 
poet’s devotion to her make it difficult to state with certainty whether the legends 
spread after the composition, or the legends and the composition together went 
into the making of Sarala Dasa, the servant/servitor of goddess Sarala as the com-
poser of the Odia Mahabharata. We can turn to two such legends, taken from an 
early scholarly exposition on Sarala Dasa, to sample a taste of the genre.
An ordinary peasant is ploughing his field. In order to get rid of tiredness and 
boredom and to energise himself and his bullocks, he starts singing chautishas, 
short verses of 34 letters, taken to be the earliest literary expression in vernacu-
lar Odia. But fatigue overcomes him and he keeps forgetting the words. A little 
forlorn, he starts praying to istadev (personal god). A woman figure appears and 
demands to know why he has stopped singing. She says that she greatly enjoys 
hearing him sing and commands him to compose the Mahabharata in Odia. After 
the figure disappears, an amazed and bewildered peasant, Sarala Dasa, starts 
singing again, successfully this time. These chautishas do not exist any longer. 
But the Mahabharata, composed through the icchhashakti, the force of will, wish, 
or desire of the woman/goddess, has endured, together with three other compo-
sitions by the same peasant.
  Consider a second scenario. While Sarala Dasa is ploughing his field 
one day, messengers from the royal palace come in search of a suitable match 
for the king’s daughter. They talk to Sarala Dasa, are thoroughly impressed by 
his intelligence, and take him to the palace as a possible partner for the prin-
cess. A simple, unlettered peasant, Sarala Dasa is alarmed and overwhelmed 
when the princess comes to him with her offerings on a plate to welcome him as 
her life partner. Awe-struck, he hides under a cot. Irked, the princess expresses 
disdain for a stupid, ignorant farmer, throws away the plate and offerings, and 
leaves the place. Chastised and humiliated, Sarala Dasa decides to dedicate 
himself to the acquisition of knowledge. He reaches the temple of Sarala Devi 
(goddess Sarala), only to find her missing. He closes the temple door and sits in 
meditation. The goddess is pleased and commands him to compose the Mahab-
harata in order to please her. A perplexed Sarala Dasa responds in despair 
that it was impossible for him to undertake such a difficult task. The goddess 
asks him not to panic and instructs him to pick up the quill from the road the 
next day and go sit under the Kalpabat (wish fulfilling tree). The scenes of the 
Mahabharata will, she tells him, become visible to him there. All he needs to do 
is write them down.
It is significant that the Mahabharata, or the version in print at least, men-
tions a lekhana, something to write with. The typical image of bhakti poetry 
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involves spontaneity, with the blessed one, touched and engulfed by the divine, 
instinctively breaking out into songs that affect and overwhelm other hearts 
to create a storm or a wave that makes selves move and flow into one another. 
At other places in the text, the poet recounts how he only needed to recite the 
Mahabharata the Devi was to speak in his ears.
Through legends and stories, Sarala Dasa, the son and servant of the goddess 
Sarala, appears at once as a symbolic subject and an embodied person who prob-
ably does not carry the meanings and significance attached to the concept of the 
modern individual as a bounded intentional subject. And yet there are nuances 
and ambiguities that we need to address. Who is Sarala Dasa? A person who con-
sciously calls himself the servant (dasa) and putra (son) of the goddess Sarala, 
or a symbolic name ascribed to the ‘author’ of a composition that is constituted 
in the very act of its corporate recitation, reading, and narration? In other words, 
what I am trying to get at are not the real facts about a person who assumes 
‘Sarala Dasa’ as a title to emphasise the miraculous powers bestowed on him by 
the goddess but, rather, the possibility of a constitutive instability of the author 
and his text(s).
Scholars have not, it might be argued, yet questioned the existence of 
Sarala Dasa as a person. On the contrary, his compositions have been combed 
through to find historical facts about his life, his place of residence, and of 
happenings in Odra rashtra or Odra desha, as current Odisha, with its dif-
ferent and changing frontiers, was referred to at the time (Panigrahi 1976). 
Indeed, there was a debate in the 1950s between a well-known historian and 
an acclaimed writer over the location of Sarala Dasa’s village and the time of 
the composition of the Mahabharata, with each claiming to have meticulously 
studied the details provided by the poet himself and the language used in his 
composition to come to very different conclusions (Panigrahi 1956; Mohanty 
1956). Subsequent authors have sustained or questioned the arguments 
advanced by either the historian or the writer without probing whether such a 
Sarala Dasa existed.
This ready acceptance of Sarala Dasa as the author of the Odia Mahabharata 
has been due to the inscription of an authorial voice in the text. At the beginning 
or end of each canto, Sarala Dasa comes in as the narrator: ‘so says Sarala Dasa 
kabi’ or ‘Sudra muni’ Sarala Dasa. The question is whether, given the several 
mediations I have indicated above, we can simply assume the existence of Sarala 
Dasa on the basis of these pronouncements or whether we need to consider the 
possibility of an unstable author and a collective authorship through which a 
‘narrational self’ is constructed in the transmission and circulation of the text? If 
we follow this latter course, how should we understand the individual, the self, 
the collective, the personal, the social, and their interface?
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2 Sarala’s Mahabharata
In the edition compiled by Mohanty that I have consulted, Sarala Dasa begins 
with an invocation of Sarala Devi (goddess Sarala), the mangalacharan, and then 
moves on to describe in detail the location of the village in which the great goddess 
Saralachandi resides. This is followed by a declaration of the identity of the 
author/composer. Significantly, Sarala Dasa calls himself Sarala Dasa kabi (poet 
Sarala Dasa), the son of Saralachandi, upon whose command he is composing the 
Mahabharata. There is an interesting twist here. Goddess Sarala, a manifestation of 
goddess Chandi, sometimes linked to the tantric devi Bimala who is still the adhist-
hatrti devi (presiding deity) of the Jagannath temple in Puri, is addressed as pan-
kajbasini and parama-vaishnavi in the Mahabharata. Pankajbasini means one who 
dwells on the lotus and the term is normally associated with Lakshmi, the spouse 
of Vishnu and goddess of bounty and wellbeing.  Supreme vaishnavi, in turn, might 
represent Lakshmi or a supreme worshipper of Vishnu. Some, however, have iden-
tified the goddess Sarala with Saraswati, the goddess of learning who also had 
links to tantra. We will not be able to parse this intriguing mix-up here. Suffice it to 
say that there are clear indications of a degree of turmoil within the divine hierar-
chy, beginning in the 13th century, with Shiva and Shakti being gradually displaced 
by the rise and increasing prominence of Vishnu worship and the conferral of the 
status of state deity to Jagannath by the Ganga kings, a theme I have examined 
elsewhere and which Heinrich von Stietencron discussed decades ago.
Let us return to the Mahabharata. Immediately after the invocation of the 
goddess and the declaration that Sarala Dasa is composing the Mahabharata to 
carry out the devi’s command, the poet implores wise men not to find faults with 
his work. He is ignorant from birth and is not a pandit, a learned man. Again, in 
the second chapter of adi parva (the first book), he declares that he is sudra by jati 
(caste/calling) and ignorant, that he lives by the manual work of cultivation along 
with his three brothers. He has had no ‘education’ but is a great devotee of Sarala 
Devi, who he hopes will forgive him for embarking upon this daring venture. A 
few couplets later, Sarala Dasa mentions his journey to the abode of Govinda 
(Vishnu), where he came into the company of saints and wise men and gained 
knowledge. He also refers to himself as ‘sudra muni’, a sudra saint or a saint 
among the sudras, probably to emphasise the knowledge he acquired through 
Sarala devi’s blessings and by coming into contact with saints and wise men.
Hence, even if we accept the person/individual Sarala Dasa as the author, his 
words tell us that his self is simultaneously individual (personal) and collective, 
and that his prodigious composition is the result of a collectivised self, a self that 
is constituted both by an unlearned person who is moved by the command/wish/
blessing of a goddess and by the knowledge acquired from wise and learned men.
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On the other hand, according to Jatin Nayak, a retired professor of English 
literature at Utkal University currently engaged in translating the Sarala Mahab-
harata into English, the Sarala Mahabharata is a very ‘self-reflexive’ text. ‘The 
Mangalacharana and invocation in his Mahabharata’, he comments, ‘leave the 
reader in no doubt as to the ambivalence of the author and the text, even when 
he was defending the enterprise by taking recourse to divine intervention and 
inspiration’ (Satpathi, Nayak forthcoming).
Is Sarala Dasa consciously taking ‘recourse’ to divine intervention as a ‘trope’ 
or is he moved by the ‘divine command’ which is, for him, intuitively real? We 
cannot be certain. From his own statements and their subsequent readings it 
appears that Sarala Dasa’s individual selfhood, marked by low-birth and igno-
rance, is elevated through its intimate relationship with the divine. There seems 
to be an assertive affirmation, upheld by the use of the first-person-singular in 
the text: Sarala Dasa, an ignorant sudra is blessed with the power to compose 
an exceptionally elaborate and unique text. A text that is mediated by his own 
vision/hearing/apprehension of the Mahabharata narrative and is constituted, 
in turn, through continual actualisation and interpretation in collective readings 
poised on a common stock of knowledge and the expectations of communities 
of readers/listeners (Chartier 1989, for instance). The enmeshment of hearing, 
seeing, and composing and/or writing is found in the text itself: while at one 
place the poet states that he was to sit under the Kalpabat with a quill to write the 
Mahabharata, at others he alludes to seeing the scenes of the epic or hearing it 
through the voice of Sarala Devi.
The Odia Mahabharata can, therefore, be seen both as a collective compo-
sition of the goddess and her command/blessing, the poet, and the knowledge 
acquired from wise and learned men on the one hand, and, on the other, as a 
composite construct of the ‘author’ and the readers/listeners. Its authorship is 
inspired by the wish-command-vision-blessing of the divine, articulated through 
the vision-hearing-imagination of the poet, and moulded by the perceptions and 
aspirations of the readers.
Let us dwell a little longer on the singularity of the Odia Mahabharata. Apart 
from a facile correspondence with the Sanskrit epic in the number of parvas 
(books), 18 to be precise, and in the main protagonists, the Odia version differs in 
the sequence and extension of the parvas, in the storyline, and in the portrayal of 
the main characters. It introduces new events and characters, including a signifi-
cant story about the indestructability of Krishna and his transformation into Nil-
amadhaba and later Vishnu/Jagannatha, the central deity of Hinduism in Odisha. 
It also leaves out very important episodes, such as the Vishawarup darshan, i.e. 
the Bhagavat Gita part of the Sanskrit epic. Indeed, a recent scholar has argued 
that Sarala’s story is ‘purer’, since it excises ‘deliberations of a  philosophical 
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nature’ and proffers a picture of Krishna’s intervention in human affairs based 
on a different understanding of the nature of divine intervention (Patnaik 2012, 
viii). An intertwined relation between the human and the divine, and an absence 
of ‘philosophical deliberations’, accounts for a ‘pure’ version of an epic that is 
closer to the heart of the simple folk of Odisha. Sarala Dasa, we need to remem-
ber, calls his text the Mahabharata, leaving it unclear whether he is composing 
a new one or rendering a vernacular version of the Sanskrit epic. This contrasts 
with Tulsidas’s Ramacaritmanas, for instance, an extremely popular 16th century 
vernacular rendering of the Ramayana, where the reference to an original is con-
tinually present.3
To cite Jatin Nayak again, an ‘illusion of sameness and an illusion of dif-
ference are being created at the same time’ (Satpathi, Nayak forthcoming). 
The poet follows certain textual strategies to conserve the idea of the Sanskrit 
Mahabharata but never refers to it directly. And even though the main protag-
onists remain, their names are rendered in colloquial, ‘rustic’ Odia – Yujhesthi 
for Judhisthir and Mahodar (one with a huge belly) for Bhima – with their depic-
tions differing widely from those in the Sanskrit version of the story. Sakuni, 
the violent villain, is given a very empathetic portrayal, even when his violence 
is emphasised and exaggerated. The Pandavas, by contrast, receive a some-
what dismissive treatment. Gandhari and Kunti are made ‘hilariously realistic’ 
through the ‘natural and petty jealousies which are inseparable from feminine 
nature’, and (river/mother) Ganga is portrayed as ‘an impetuous, imperious and 
tyrannical shrew’. Draupadi, the forceful heroine of the Sanskrit epic, is made 
to ‘sigh deeply over her fate’ when she is married to five brothers (Mansinha 
1962, 52–7).
Significantly, the entire drama of the epic, it is stated recurrently by my col-
leagues and acquaintances in Odisha, is set in the milieu and topography of 
what was then Odra desha or Odra rashtra (current Odisha), a fact that made 
the text intimate and accessible. Moreover, its claim to be a ‘history’ from crea-
tion onwards, with realistic references to contemporary place names, rivers, and 
mountains, brought it even closer to the hearts of its readers/listeners, as they 
could easily identify and relate to the text.
It is perhaps in order here to invoke Roger Chartier’s argument once again 
and pose the question of whether this ‘materiality’ of the text, the concrete 
topographic references, for instance, were inherent in the text or whether 
they resulted from the intervention and interpretation of readers who con-
3 I draw upon Luis Gamaliel Quiñones Martínez’s unpublished MA dissertation, ‘Vernacular-
ización e identidad en el reino de Varanasi’, CEAA, El Colegio de México 2017.
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stantly participated in the composition and evolution of the text. Readers, 
Chartier affirms, ‘never confront abstract, idealized texts detached from any 
materiality’ (Chartier 1992, 50); the form of the text governs the modalities 
through which it is read or heard and that modality produces meaning. In 
other words, in a scenario in which the Mahabharata is being recited or per-
formed by one or many, the content of the text is shaped by the dispositions of 
the community of readers: their active perception, expectation, and interpre-
tation. In such a context, it is eminently possible that the names of places and 
personalities, as well as the events of the Mahabharata, were moulded by the 
dispositions and perceptions of the readers/audience. Instead of the readers 
easily identifying with a text that is accessible on account of its concrete ref-
erences, the text may have taken shape and been transformed through tradi-
tions of reading and the expectations of interactive readers and audiences. 
This accounts for the numerous versions Artaballav Mohanty and his team 
of scholars collected, compared, selected from, and edited, beginning yet 
another process of ‘corporate composition’, albeit one that we will not be able 
to discuss in detail here.
All accounts indicate that Sarala’s Mahabharata found an immediate and 
overwhelmingly popular response. In a world of collective reading and per-
formance, and at a time when vernaculars as languages of literary expression 
were becoming increasingly important, characters, figures, episodes, and narra-
tions of the Odia Mahabharata acquired real and symbolic significance. Certain 
phrases became metaphoric and almost axiomatic, while certain characters 
became representative of real lives and figures. Even today, these phrases and 
characters are common knowledge in Odisha, as I have been told repeatedly by 
my friends and colleagues in Bhubaneswar. Hence, for people with very little 
knowledge of the Sanskrit text, Sarala’s Mahabharata could and did become the 
Mahabharata.
What would be the ‘original’ or the ‘putative’ original in this context and for 
whom? And how do we understand the relation between the putative original 
and its vernacular rendering? Sarala Dasa’s Mahabharata, it has been empha-
sised by the several scholars and students I have spoken to in Bhubaneswar, is 
not a ‘translation’; it is a re-telling of the Sanskrit narrative with its own anec-
dotes, emphases, and interpretations, which are sufficiently extensive that they 
come together to form a new telling. It is a telling, re- or new, in which the events 
of the Mahabharata are concurrent with important events of Odra desha and in 
which they occur in regions and places within Odisha. Is it history? What kind of 
history is it? Imaginative, intuitive, or interpretive? Can it be called history at all? 
Leaving readers to ponder these issues, I turn to the later, modern apprehensions 
of Sarala Dasa and his compositions.
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3 Kabi and canonisation
‘The emergence of Sarala Dasa in the mid-15th century was phenomenal. The track-record of 
Oriya literature before him was not such that it could have thrown up a writer as substantial 
as he was […] His is the first case where an individual talent not only changes a tradition, but 
sets up a new one for subsequent generations to follow’ (Mohanty 2006, xxi).
In this recent History of Oriya Literature, Sarala Dasa is not only an individual but 
also an exceptional one: a genius who breaks with an earlier tradition and starts a 
new one. And yet the break with an earlier tradition and the beginning of a new one 
does not constitute a ‘modern’ rupture, since the tradition begun by Sarala Dasa is 
suffused with bhakti, devotion, and pertains to both the ‘ancient and the medieval’. 
According to Mohanty, modern Odia literature began roughly in the mid-19th century 
and supplemented the spirit of devotion and love with that of nationalism and a 
concern with the ‘human predicament’ in a hostile world. Clearly, there is an under-
standing of the ‘modern’ here as being rooted in the ‘human’, as distinct from the reli-
gious and the divine, and in the real conditions of the social world. But it accords to 
Sarala Dasa the status of an extraordinary individual in the modern sense of the term.
It is worth stressing that it was precisely in the second half of the 19th 
century, i.e. with the beginning of the ‘modern’ period in Odia literature, that 
Sarala Dasa and his compositions drew increased scholarly attention and his 
status as adi kabi, the early poet of vernacular Odia, acquired greater signifi-
cance. The renewed interest in the language and culture of Odisha was tied both 
to the growth of incipient nationalism against colonial rule and to a fight for the 
survival of Odia against the encroachment of Bangla (Bengali) in the coastal dis-
tricts. This struggle inspired a new sense of pride in Odianess and instilled with 
urgency the search for a genealogy of Odia that precedes, and is distinct from, 
Bangla. Towards the end of the century, this struggle was taken up with greater 
vigour by Odia speakers of the western region against the encroachment of Hindi. 
This sustained bhasha andolan (language movement) eventually led to the cre-
ation of current Odisha as a unified, separate province of Odia speakers in 1934 
(Banerjee-Dube 2015, Chap. 5 for a brief overview).
The search for a linear history of Odia language and literature was stimulated 
further by an important project launched by the University of Calcutta in the first 
decades of the 20th century, aiming to compile histories of vernacular literature. 
This, together with the need to uphold and emphasise the uniqueness of Odia 
against more dominant languages, resulted in the ‘discovery’ and retrieval of the 
early poets of the language who were credited with laying the foundation of the 
‘national literature of Orissa’ (Mazumdar 1921: xiv).
Interestingly, this process of compiling a linear history of vernacular Odia was 
fraught with ambivalence and ambiguity, reflected in the diverse assessments of 
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Sarala Dasa and his Mahabharata over the late 19th and early 20th century. Even 
while the pronounced hesitation of the late 19th century in openly acclaiming the 
achievement of a ‘rustic’ poet narrating an epic becomes less in the early 20th, it 
does not disappear completely. If there is pride in the fact that the Odia Mahab-
harata was composed prior to many other vernacular renderings, there is also 
discomfort, not just with its wide variations and deviations from the ‘original’ 
story but also with its uncultured, even ‘vulgar’, language, its incorporation of 
many folk tales, and its lack of metrical sophistication. Sarala Dasa’s categori-
sation as adi poet often comes very close to the characterisation of his works as 
aadim (primitive) or ancient, in a slightly pejorative sense of the term.
Both Mrutyunjaya Ratha’s ‘Saralacharit’, published in 1911 and subsequently 
included in his collected works published in 1971, and B. C. Mazumdar’s Typical 
Selections from Oriya Literature volume 1, published in 1921, assert that the varia-
tion in the number of letters in the 14-letter metre of dandibruta can be accounted 
for by the fact that the text was meant for recitation. What appears to be an imper-
fection was corrected when the Mahabharata was read aloud. Ratha adds that 
this dandibruta of the Mahabharata sounded more like prose than poetry and was 
easier for non-literate people to understand (Ratha 1971, 197). His forceful affir-
mation that Sarala Dasa was born in the early 15th century and was the adi kabi 
of Odia, goes hand in hand with the statement that this Mahabharata is aadim, 
primitive, and contains all the features of primitive literature: an ungrammatical 
language full of prakrut words, descriptions expressive of superstition, un-truth 
and the vulgarity of rural, rustic folk (ibid., 198).
Early appraisals of Sarala Dasa emphasise his low birth and his lack of formal 
education and knowledge in order to explain his simplicity and rustic style and 
metre.  These features also serve to establish a distance between the world of 
the cultured, ‘modern’ subject and that of a rustic medieval peasant who never-
theless composed an epic that caught the popular imagination for centuries. A 
simultaneous acceptance and distancing is carried out in the double move of val-
orising Sarala Dasa as the adi kabi and placing him squarely among the simple, 
the rural, the unlettered folk of Odisha, diffusing thereby his significant influence 
in the configuration of Odia cultural identity.
Indeed, the numerous ‘deviations’ in the Sarala Mahabharata, and the 
several liberties he took in retelling the story, prompted Fakirmohan Senapati, 
regarded as the father of Odia prose literature – and now also called ‘Vyasakabi’ 
a kabi who like Vyasa, produced the Mahabharata – to translate the original San-
skrit Mahabharata into Odia. He took eight years, from 1898 to 1905, to translate 4 
of the 18 parvas. This partial Odia translation, however, did not gain the favoura-
ble reception that Fakirmohan was hoping for, even among the cultured circle of 
the Odia literati of Bhubaneswar and the coastal region. In his autobiography he 
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mentions how the Sarala Mahabharata and other devotional texts still continued 
to be read out in important households (Senapati 1977).
The spread of print culture and the printing of the Odia Mahabharata went 
hand in hand with attempts to standardise and homogenise the several versions 
of Sarala’s Mahabharata and to edit its uncomfortable anecdotes. Some printed 
versions even sought to correct the ‘irregularities’ in the famous dandibruta.
Such attempts to bring the Sarala Mahabharata into line with elite expec-
tations of what the epic should be gradually changed over the 20th century as 
Sarala Dasa’s low birth and status came to acquire prominence and began to be 
touted as a sign of Odia ‘genius’. The period of his emergence and the flowering of 
Odia literature became tied to the founding by Kapilendra Deva of a local Hindu 
Odia dynasty, the Suryavamsa (the solar dynasty). It is interesting that Kapilen-
dra is recorded as an usurper in historical accounts while also being praised for 
his patronage of the local language. There is no direct indication of any court 
patronage of Sarala Dasa by Kapilendra, a point that goes against Sheldon Pol-
lock’s observation that the ‘break with the Sanskrit tradition’ and the flowering 
of vernaculars as languages of literary practice happened under the patronage of 
local courts and rulers (Pollock 2006). However, Kapilendra and the short-lived 
solar dynasty are still coupled with the adi kabis of Odia in scholarly representa-
tions of a time during which Odia literature attained its ‘highest glory’ (Mazum-
dar 1921: xviii).
Sarala Dasa’s gradual elevation in status is reflected in the History of Oriya 
Literature, written by the poet and scholar Mayadhar Mansinha:
‘Sarala Dasa, the poet of the Oriya Mahabharata, flourished in the reign of the founder and 
the greatest ruler of the Solar dynasty, Sri Kapilendra Deva […]. This commoner-king carried 
the Oriya arms down to the banks of the Kaveri down to Warrangal and beyond, into the 
very heart of the South Indian Moslem powers of those days. […] Sarala Dasa was born in 
such political conditions and such propitious times. True national poet that he is, we find 
all these happy contemporary conditions, clearly reflected in the vigorous narrative of his 
great Mahabharata’ (Mansinha 1962, 51).
Another important history of Oriya literature, written in Odia and first pub-
lished in 1963, placed Sarala Dasa’s compositions confidently in the adi parva 
(first stage) of Odia literature, which began with the Buddhist caryapadas. This 
History, however, did not show any unease with the lack of sophistication in 
Sarala Dasa’s compositions. The compositions of Sarala Dasa are, according to 
this work, replete with the ‘cultural characteristics’ of this first stage, in which 
sagas of heroes predominated, sagas that underscored bravery and courage as 
well as sacrifice and spirituality, rather than the desire and pleasure that would 
mark out the second stage of Odia literature (Mohanty 1977, pp. 1–2).
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By the 1960s therefore, Sarala Dasa had been both individualised and insti-
tutionalised: two processes that complemented and sustained each other. At the 
same time, Mansinha’s essay also bears witness to the uncertainty that besets an 
intellectual in his attempt to valorise a poet and a composition that lack ‘sophis-
tication’. At one point in the essay, Mansinha admits that despite many ‘unique 
and excellent qualities’, Sarala Dasa’s epic, ‘owing to his lack of any formal edu-
cation and systematic training and comprehensive erudition’, has the appear-
ance of ‘a wild growth’ (Mansinha 1962, 64). We are tempted to compare this with 
Mrutyunjaya Ratha’s description of the Mahabharata as ‘primitive literature’. The 
Sarala Mahabharata, Mansinha hastens to add, is popular with the people for the 
very reasons that make it a ‘wild growth’.
Such reservations notwithstanding, an increasing association with religious 
devotion, simplicity, and earthiness as the hallmarks of Odia language and litera-
ture that articulate the voice of the people of the soil, has substituted ambivalence 
with pride in the poor, unlettered poets as true representatives of the ‘genius’ of 
Odisha. With linear histories of Odia literature establishing Sarala Dasa as both 
an adi kabi and a ‘national poet’, the instability of both Sarala Dasa as an individ-
ual author and also his collective and itinerant compositions have become insti-
tutionalised through a new set of mediations and appropriations. The collection 
and compilation of the several palm-leaf manuscripts of the Mahabharata that 
accepted Sarala Dasa as the individual author, the attempts to edit and standard-
ise the language and metre, and the careful selection of the ‘correct’ version from 
among numerous variations of the Odia epic, have simultaneously established 
Sarala Dasa as an individual and also institutionalised him as the sole author of 
the Mahabharata.
It is time now to look at another rural poet of late 19th century Odisha who 
belongs to a radical faith before tying together the strands of poets and their com-
positions, individual and collective authorship, and individualisation and insti-
tutionalisation.
4 Bhima Bhoi and bhakti
Bhima Bhoi, the poet-philosopher of Mahima Dharma, a radical religious faith 
preached in the 1860s in Odisha by an itinerant ascetic named Mahima Swami, 
was initiated into Mahima Dharma by the preceptor. The Swami also endowed 
the blind, poor Khond (adivasi) Bhima Bhoi with the ‘eyesight of knowledge’ and 
the gift of poetry to spread the message of the faith. Like Sarala Dasa, Bhima Bhoi 
grew up with no formal education. However, prior to Mahima Swami’s bestowal of 
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knowledge and the gift of poetry, Bhima Bhoi is believed to have heard and assim-
ilated the message of popular devotional texts and epics collectively read out in 
village gatherings. He combined such knowledge with the precepts of Mahima 
Swami to elaborate a philosophy/theosophy of Mahima Dharma. His rich compo-
sitions reflect the varied trends of religious thought current in Odisha and under-
score Bhima Bhoi’s ingenuity in imbuing prevalent ideas with new meanings.
Bhima Bhoi emerged as a preacher after his Guru’s death, then took up the life 
of a householder, severing ties with the ascetics of the faith, and set up his own 
ashram in Khaliapali in western Odisha in the last decades of the 19th century, where 
he slowly replaced the Guru as the founder of the faith. His colourful life and rich 
compositions generated a host of legends while his emotive chants of devotion and 
spoken/written compositions produced a surfeit of meanings at collective readings/
recitations in gatherings of non-literate followers. In western Odisha, Bhima Bhoi 
merged with and/or displaced Mahima Swami as the founder of Mahima Dharma.
At a different level, Bhima Bhoi’s invocation of the evil Kali Yuga, the last 
and worst of the four classical yugas (epochs) in Hindu time reckoning, and his 
appeal to all to take shelter in the true preceptor without further delay, took on 
a particular resonance amongst his followers at times of crisis in their lives and 
within the faith. The collective compositions that conferred great credibility and 
significance on Bhima Bhoi also meant that apocryphal texts were ascribed to 
him after his death.
The deification of the poet by lay disciples was complemented by a process 
of canonisation begun by intellectuals in the early twentieth century. Once again, 
the ambivalence about an unlettered poet of low birth, which characterised the 
late nineteenth-century reports of officials of the princely and colonial states, 
changed into admiration at the turn of the century. An essay on ‘Bhima Bhoi’s 
acquisition of knowledge’ appeared in the literary magazine Mukur in 1908; 
this was soon followed by two influential texts of N. N. Vasu, a scholar-official – 
Modern Buddhism and its Followers in Orissa (1911) and The Archeological Survey 
of Mayurbhanja (1912). In these texts, Vasu categorically identified Bhima Bhoi as 
the leader of the sect and paid him glowing tributes:
‘Ere long the fame of Bhima Bhoi spread far and wide. Hearing his immortal instruction 
helping in the attainment of real knowledge and illumining the head and the heart, the 
mighty pillars of the caste system stooped at his feet, though the blood of the low kanda ran 
in his veins. They considered him a spark from the Eternal Flame of truth and knowledge. 
Before several years had elapsed the Mahima Dharma could count its followers by thou-
sands’ (Vasu 1911, 164).
Vasu’s adulation of Bhima Bhoi’s low birth, which was seen to only heighten 
his achievements, was felt by others as well. B. C. Mazumdar, an official of the 
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Sonepur court and the editor of Typical Selections, credited Bhima Bhoi with ‘a 
charming and commanding personality’ that enabled him to lead an attack on 
the temple of Jagannatha in Puri in 1881 (Mazumdar 1911, 126). Colonial records 
confirm that Bhima Bhoi did not lead the attack. At the same time, it is highly 
probable that Bhima Bhoi’s compositions, which mentioned that Lord Jaganna-
tha had left Puri to become Mahima Swami’s first disciple, inspired the group of 
very ordinary men and women who marched to Puri from western Odisha to take 
out and burn the lifeless image of Lord Jagannatha (Banerjee-Dube 2007, 110).
Mayadhar Mansinha, whom we have cited above, also wrote in glowing terms 
about Bhima Bhoi, who called himself a ‘kandha’ (khond) in his compositions. 
Bhima Bhoi was described as ‘the greatest adivasi poet’ and a ‘revolutionary’, 
a symbol of the genius of adivasi (aborigine) Odisha. (Mansinha 1976, 206). In 
histories of Odia literature written in the vernacular, Bhima Bhoi was raised to 
the status of a ‘national poet’, alongside Sarala Dasa and other early poets, and 
given the credit for occasioning an awakening of the Odia people (Misra 1928, 
278). Interestingly, the fact that Bhima Bhoi used ‘impure’ words in his composi-
tions, ‘words used very commonly by the illiterate’, was commended as proof of 
his experiments with language and literature and upheld as poetry close to the 
heart of the common people.
In other words, simplicity, lack of formal education, earthiness, and the 
rustic style of the early poets, as well as that of Bhima Bhoi, came to be increas-
ingly valorised as ‘devotional poetry’ underwent the process of being constructed 
as the hallmark of Odia literature, a true expression of the voice of the people. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Sarala Das’ sudra status, his spirited personality, the 
striking changes he made to the ‘original’, the new episodes he introduced, and 
the deviant interpretations of the epic he provided, have been seized upon as the 
conscious innovations of a creative genius that resulted in a break with an earlier 
tradition and the creation of a new one. An early poet with a ‘medieval’ sensibility 
inaugurates the ‘early modern’ in Odia literature by reconceptualising a Sanskrit 
epic through devotion and the blessing of a goddess and by providing a lower 
caste interpretation of a ‘Brahminical’ text.
Bhima Bhoi, for his part, is hailed simultaneously as a social revolutionary 
and an outstanding composer whose works bear a close resemblance to those 
of the early poets (and medieval mystics) in terms of language, thought, and 
content. He is a late 19th century devotional poet who pertains to the medieval 
in the thrust of his compositions. He is also modern because he caused a social 
revolution by speaking out against the caste system and boldly using ‘impure’ 
words in his creations.
Bhima Bhoi’s commanding personality, radicalism, and affinity with the 
medieval mystics that caught the imagination of his followers, found  expression 
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in the circulation of malikas, apocryphal texts ascribed to him in the early decades 
of the twentieth century. Such malikas rolled Gandhi and Mahima Swami together 
into the figure of Kalki, the tenth incarnation of Vishnu, whose appearance was to 
bring the evil Kali Yuga to an end and re-establish satya dharma (true faith). The 
avatar, human incarnation of the divine, proclaimed by such texts had appeared 
once – in the figure of Mahima Swami. But the devotees had failed to recognise 
him. He was to appear again and this time the true devotees were not to falter. They 
were to take shelter at his feet and also fight along with him against the evil forces 
of Kali Yuga (represented by the British among others) to wipe away evil and clear 
the path for a bright future. Bhima Bhoi’s distress at the evils of Kali Yuga and his 
call to all to take refuge in the Absolute to cope with these evils became pertinent 
in the disturbed times of colonial rule and during the grassroots surge in nation-
alist agitation under the leadership of Gandhi in 1920–21. Bhima Bhoi’s emotive 
bhajans, which acquired new meaning and content in the collective singing of 
devotees during his lifetime, became a source of solace at a later stage through the 
creation and circulation of texts ascribed to him. If in the process of canonisation 
by the literati and of diverse apprehensions by the adherents of Mahima Dharma, 
Bhima Bhoi became individualised and institutionalised, the inherent fluidity of 
his compositions enabled the production of new ones in his name, reinforcing the 
mobility and lack of fixity of Bhima Bhoi and his compositions.
5 By way of a conclusion
In order to sum up a very preliminary foray into this subject matter, let me raise 
a few questions that do not have ready answers. How do we gain access to a text 
and its composer? How do we understand both through the multi-layered medi-
ations and mutations they have undergone? What do Sarala Dasa and Bhima 
Bhoi, and their texts, tell us? That both authorship and texts/compositions are 
corporate and collective? That even if texts are taken to be the creation of an indi-
vidual author, they speak different languages, are understood in diverse ways 
and acquire lives of their own? In such a scenario, it is perhaps fruitful to track 
the journey(s) of the text and the author to gain a better understanding of texts 
without closure and of authors who are simultaneously individual and compos-
ite. Such a reading could make the author a less ‘mettlesome subject’ and enable 
us to reflect on authorship and subjectivity in new ways.
Sarala Dasa and Bhima Bhoi, as well as their compositions, offer instances of 
collective authorship and of personal and communal selves. While Sarala Dasa’s 
relationship with Sarala Devi and that of Bhima Bhoi with his preceptor is acutely 
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intimate, both exemplify social and composite selves that enmesh the divine, 
the human, and the community of readers and listeners in distinct ways. Such 
entwined articulations account for the mobility of their compositions, as they 
were circulated and reconstructed in a process of evolutions that spanned cen-
turies. If this mobility made the Odia Mahabharata’s relation with the putative 
Sanskrit ‘original’ almost negligible and conferred on Sarala Dasa an authority 
of great proportions, Bhima Bhoi’s authorship and authority was reinforced in 
the composition of newer texts that were ascribed to him after his death. In both 
cases, the authors, corporate to start with, became individualised and institution-
alised through the work of a collective.
The mutual imbrication of a subjective self and a social subject, and fused 
practices of creation and reading, author and audience, enable us to move beyond 
modern understandings of the author as a creative individual and his creation – 
the ‘text’ – as two separate well-defined entities. Further, it allows entry into a 
world in which the author and audience, reading and composition, get rolled 
together into one, displacing the well-defined boundaries of the self and the indi-
vidual, the personal and the collective. It is time to start looking afresh at notions 
of the individual and individualisation, keeping in mind these fascinating combi-
nations of the ancient and the medieval, and the early-modern and the modern, 
the religious and the rational, and the individual and its ‘other’.  Keeping these in 
view, we can begin to rethink the notion of institutionalisation.
References
Banerjee-Dube, I. 2003. ‘Reading time: texts and pasts in eastern India’, Studies in History,  
19:1. 1–17. An abridged version reproduced in Historical Anthropology. Oxford in India 
Readings in Sociology and Social Anthropology, ed. S. Dube, New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2007. 149–64.
Banerjee-Dube, I. 2007. Religion, Law, and Power: Tales of time in eastern India, 1860–2000. 
London: Anthem Press.
Banerjee-Dube, I. 2015. A History of Modern India. Cambridge/Delhi/New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
Chartier, R. 1989. ‘Leisure and sociability: reading aloud in early-modern Europe.’ In Urban 
Life in the Renaissance, eds. S. Zimmermann, R. S. E. Weissman, Newark: University of 
Delaware Press & London, Associated Press. 103–20.
Chartier, R. 1992. ‘Laborers and voyagers: from the text to the reader’, Diacritics 29, 2. 49–61.
de Certeau, Michel. 1984. The Practice of Everday Life. Trans. Steven F. Rendall. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Hawley, J. S. 2015. A Storm of Songs: India and The Idea of Bhakti Movement. Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Mansinha, M. 1962. History of Oriya Literature. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.
864   Ishita Banerjee-Dube
Mazumdar, B.C. 1921. Typical Selections from Oriya Literature, vol.1. Calcutta: University of 
Calcutta (published by the Baptist Mission Press).
Misra, B. 1928. Oriya Sahityara Itihasa. Cuttack: Utkal Sahitya Press.
Mohanty, G. 1956. ‘Sudramuni Sarola Dasanka abirbhaba samaya’, Jhankara 8, 4. 388–401.
Mohanty, J. N. 2006. History of Oriya Literature. Bhubaneswar: Vidya.
Novetzke, C. L. 2003. ‘Divining an author: the idea of authorship in an Indian religious 
tradition’, History of Religions 42, 3. 213–42.
Panigrahi, K. C. 1956. ‘Sarala Dasanka ghara keunthi?’, Jhankara 8, 5. 457–71.
Panigrahi, K. C. 1976. Sarala Sahityara Oitihasika Chitra (Historical Depictions in Sarala 
Literature). Bhubaneswar: Prajatantra Prachar Samiti.
Patnaik, B. N. 2012. Introducing Saaralaa Mahaabhaarata. Manasagangotri, Mysore: Central 
Institute of Indian Languages.
Pollock, S. 2006. The Language of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, culture, and power in 
premodern India. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.
Ratha, M. 1971 (1911). ‘Sarala Charita’, reproduced in Mrityunjaya Granthabali, vol. 1, Cuttack: 
Students Store, 1971. 200–01.
Satpathi, Sumanyu; Nayak, Jatindra K. unpublished. ‘Introduction’, to the English translation of 
Sarala Mahabharata. 
Senapati, F. 1977. Atmacarita. Trans. Maitree Shukla. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.
Vasu, N. N. 1911. The Modern Buddhism and its Followers in Orissa. Calcutta: U. N. 
Bhattacharya.
Vasu, N. N. 1912. Archeological Survey of Mayurbhanja. Calcutta: U. N. Bhattacharya.
 Open Access. © 2019 Rahul Bjørn Parson, published by De Gruyter.  This work is licensed 
under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110580853-043
Rahul Bjørn Parson
Individualisation and democratisation 
of knowledge in Banārasīdās’ Samayasāra 
Nāṭaka
The ways in which religious pluralism produces and regulates processes of indi-
vidualisation (Malinar 2016, 150) is one of the most productive questions to ask 
about religion in South Asia, and one that comes to the heart of how Jains, a 
numerically small community, explained and reconciled religious difference, 
thus creating an imaginary that affords and accommodates diversity of belief, but 
also necessarily diversity of personality and identity. The Jain adhyātma group 
championed neutrality and equanimity with regard to otherness and difference, 
rejecting hostility and partisanship. For these poets, partisanship meant the 
betrayal of the Self and a lost chance to know the Self, because taking any side 
is necessarily taking sides against yourself (joining someone else). Early modern 
Jain spiritual/mystical poets re-calibrated Jain philosophical concepts to the 
requirements of the laity, and particularly, the individual seeker.
One of the most interesting individuals in 17th-century North India, of whom 
we have a good record, is the Jain poet Banārasīdās (1586–1643). Perhaps the 
most telling and fascinating aspect of his writing that speaks to a process of indi-
vidualisation is Banārasīdās’ fascination with himself, as evidenced in his cele-
brated autobiography, Ardhakathanaka. Banārasīdās is so interesting precisely 
because he intentionally left this ego-document containing a detailed account of 
his own life, which was the first of its kind in South Asian literature. In the case 
of Banārasīdās, writing may have helped develop notions of individuality (Rüpke 
2013, 8). His desires, anxieties, intense sorrow and exuberance feature promi-
nently in most of his work, wrought with a subtle poetic genius. The micro-social 
aspects and anecdotal moments in Banārasīdās’ writing allows modern readers 
to view the tender friendships that shape his life and embolden him to take pio-
neering risks in 17th-century India. He was a pioneer in at least two ways: first, 
his ego-document was unprecedented and introduced a new genre in Indian lit-
erature, and second, he had the audacity, as a layperson, to produce a modern, 
 vernacular version of a religio-philosophical text from the Jain tradition, the Sama-
yasāra Nāṭaka. Banārasīdās’ legacy resulted in a type of conventionalisation of 
individualisation via other poets and members of the laity. These concepts can be 
traced through the work of several Jain poets, starting with Banārasīdās. Poets of 
the adhyātma (spiritual) school placed a high premium on anubhava  (experience 
of the self through yogic insight), samatā (equanimity), and  anti-dogmatism 
866   Rahul Bjørn Parson
(Bangha 2013).1 In order to trace the implications of Banārasīdās’ work, I will 
also briefly discuss Cidānanda (early 19th cent.), and Rājacandra (1867–1901), to 
demonstrate that two centuries later we still find vibrant strands of this line of 
Jain thinking and poetics.
Banārasīdās’ major works are the following: Banārasī Nāmamāla  (lexogra-
phy, 1613), Samayasāra Nāṭaka (religio-philosophical treatise, 1636), Ardhakath-
anaka (autobiography, 1641), Banārasīvilāsa (a posthumously-compiled poetry 
collection, 1644). The Samayasāra Nāṭaka, while not as famous, studied, or cel-
ebrated as the Ardhakathanaka, is the text in which we see Banārasīdās devel-
oping a strong literary personality. Running through the work is a determination 
and agenda geared toward a bold religious individualisation based on the plural-
istic, multifaceted ontology and epistemology of the Jains.
This study will concentrate mostly on Banārasīdās’ Samayasāra Nāṭaka, since 
the Ardhakathanaka has been thoroughly discussed elsewhere (Banarasidasa and 
Premi 1943, Lath 2005, Vanina 1995). While the Urtext of the Samayasāra Nāṭaka 
was by Kundakunda and commentaries by Amritcandra, on which Banārasīdās 
based his work, were indeed focused on the Self and Jain soteriology, they had less 
to contribute to a concept of individualisation. Rather it is what Banārasīdās draws 
out of the Urtext and commentaries that suggests a new way of being in the world 
that shifts emphasis to the unconditioned-individual’s access to salvation. What 
is so amazing about Banārasīdās is that he and his small group of laymen appro-
priated a tradition of learning that was hitherto overwhelmingly dominated by the 
monastic tradition. Banārasīdās and his group of friends reject ideas long held dear 
by ascetics, specifically that salvation is only available from the status of monk-
hood and that the laity would need to be reborn and aspire to that higher station.2
1 Banārasīdās the merchant-poet 
Banārasīdās3 was born in Jaunpur (65 km northwest of Banaras) in 1586 into 
a Śwetambar Jain4 merchant family. His life spanned the reigns of three great 
1 For an excellent discussion of these aspects of Jain poetry and thought, see John Cort’s ‘For-
word’ in Imre Bangha, It’s a City-showman’s Show!: Transcendental Songs of Anandghan, New 
York: Penguin, 2013.
2 I am grateful to Monika Horstmann for discussing this text with me, sharing her insights, and 
confirming the novelty of what Banārasīdās and his group of friends were doing.
3 This biographical information comes from an article by (Tomar 1985).
4 Jainism is one of the oldest religions in the world and yet it has often been mistakenly 
ascribed to offshoots of Vedic religion or Buddhism; it is neither. It is based on the teachings 
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Mughal emperors: Akbar, Jahangir, and Shahjahan. Banārasīdās is known as 
a central figure in the reform movement of Jain spirituality called Adhyātma.5 
This is indeed one of the most significant reasons for interest in Banārasīdās 
since he influenced serious changes in the fabric of Jain socio-religious life, 
and yet he was not a monk or renunciant, rather he was a merchant. We can 
see from his work that he struggled against the expectations and strictures of 
his community. He lived in an epoch in which the pressure of social approval 
demanded a high degree of conformity and militated against divergence 
from age-old traditions. Yet despite himself, Banārasīdās remained divergent 
throughout his life within this social hegemony. The stakes were incredibly 
high for merchants since their clans enforced stern internal regulation of their 
members in order to maintain communal integrity, commercial solidarity, and 
credibility (sākh). Going it alone, without alliances and partners, was not an 
option for merchants, and therefore religious deviance or heterodoxy necessi-
tated subtlety and accomplices.
Banārasīdās critically engages with the religious institutions of his commu-
nity. The scope of his intervention, as a member of the laity, must have been nearly 
unprecedented. Banārasīdās’ ego-document traces his lifelong reflection on his 
experiences and the trial-and-error approach to spiritual seeking. He shows his 
reader the details of a journey that has brought him to a new religious direction, 
almost like a mathematical proof. His insights and interventions were not par-
ticularly welcomed by many religious authorities. Yet, Banārasīdās, as he says 
in his work, could overcome discouragement with the support of his friends and 
trust in his intuitions.
of 24 great teachers who attained omniscience and nirvana. They are known as the tīrthan-
karas, or ford-makers, since they can help humanity ford the ocean of transmigration and 
rebirth. The 24th tīrthankara, Mahavīra, was a slightly older contemporary of the Buddha. 
The two main branches of Jainism are Śwetāmbar and Digambar, in the former the monks 
are clad in white (śweta) cloth and in the latter, they are naked, literally wearing only the 
sky (dig). While the two traditions share the central Jain principles of ahimsa (non-violence), 
anekāntavāda (non-absolutism) and aparigraha (non-possessiveness, greedlessness), they 
differ on many doctrinal aspects of the religion and maintain separate literary and scriptural 
canons. Banarasi’s spiritual movement, Adhyātma, was unique in that it had members of 
both major sects.
5 Adhyātma means belonging to self or person; concerning an individual, concerning self. It is 
supreme spirit (manifested as the individual self) or the relation between the supreme and the 
individual soul. Adhyātma is usually associated with the spiritual.
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2  The historical context of Jain Hindi literature 
and bhakti 
The two centuries immediately prior to the 17th century saw the emergence of 
several divisions within the Jain sangha (community) and therefore many reform 
movements emerged. This was also in response to a perceived laxity in the behav-
iour of Jain monks. As a result, this period was followed by a great emergence 
of writers, scholars, monks, and reformers all trying to assert some influence 
on Jainism. Much of this new energy in the community is credited (in the Hindi 
language literature) to Emperor Akbar’s syncretism, during the ‘pax Mughalica’.6 
The growing disillusionment with religious authority in the 15th and 16th century 
provoked, in part, a self-reliance imperative. In his texts, Banārasīdās champions 
the empowering concept of anubhava (≈ experience of the Self), as the guiding 
knowledge that leads to liberation, thereby rendering prevailing religious author-
ities somewhat redundant. Yet, as mentioned above, he was emboldened by the 
support of his small group of well-wishers, who were already beginning to organ-
ise a type of spiritual and literary community with stabilising conventions.
In his introduction to Hindī jaina sāhitya kā br̥hada itihāsa volume II (of 7!), Śiti-
kaṇth Miśra insists that it is not possible to adequately categorise or indeed encap-
sulate even with seven volumes the variety of trends, flavours, and ideologies of 
early modern Jain literature! (Miśra 1994, 6–7). With varying degrees of subtlety, this 
literature deals with numerous entanglements, such as the blending of Jain themes 
(nonviolence, nonpossession, correct life-style, charity, austerity, liberation, all in 
the Jain mode) with the themes emerging from trends in bhakti literature, which 
had a substantial influence on Jain literature of the period.7 Many Jain poets and 
thinkers display an inward turn in this period, one that privileges the personal and 
insists on a self-reliance based on a special type of (inner) experience (anubhava). 
In this article, I attempt to locate this experience in the poetry and find some of the 
6 I borrow this expression from Jack Hawley, via Martin Fuchs. See Hawley 2015. The idea is that 
Mughal era allowed for a high degree of plurality and co-existence. 
7 The famous, and pioneering, Hindi literary critic, Ramchandra Shukla, characterised 
 Hindi-language Jain literature, as well as Nath Panth and Siddha literature, as exclusively sectar-
ian instructional (sāmpradāyika śikṣā mātra). It was not given a place in ‘pure’ or real literature. 
Usha Jain says that this has to do with his puritan perspective, but she generously also suggests 
that many texts were not yet available, and therefore Shukla did not have a fair chance to amend 
his assessment. Both Rahul Sankrityayana and Hazari Prasad Dwivedi have written about Jain 
literature, but few others have shown interest until recently. Hazari Prasad Dvivedi wrote that if 
we expunge literature with religious sentiments from the category of real literature, than we can 
wash our hands of more than half of the Indian tradition (Jain 2006). 
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implications of this shift, particularly socio-historically. Anubhava has a special, 
and occasionally, competitive relationship with bhakti.8 Bhakti was a prominent 
feature in early-modern, North Indian popular culture with which Jain poets had 
to engage. Banārasīdās shares or possibly borrows numerous tropes and conceits 
from his Bhakti colleagues, ranging from Kabir to Tulsidas, to name just two. Yet 
Banārasīdās, naturally, employs Jain concepts and values at these moments.
Jain poets, like their Bhakti, Sufi, and Sant contemporaries, found accommo-
dation for strands of religious individualisation within the cultural confluence that 
was Mughal North India. It was a dynamic time in Indian history in which many 
cultures and art forms were able to mix relatively freely. This developed into some-
thing Hindi scholars have called sājhī sanskr̥ti, or shareholder/partner culture. Jain 
poets began to apprehend an introspective, personal religious turn and calibrate 
it with their canonical, philosophical tenets, e.g. anekāntavāda and syādvāda 
(non-absolutism and may-be-ism). Befitting the historical moment, this new lit-
erature appeared in a vernacular poetic idiom, thereby democratising access to 
spiritual knowledge and emboldening further spiritual and literary innovation. 
This may account for why we see in Jain discourse an increasing use of the concept 
of manifold perspectives, known as anekāntavāda. Furthermore, in the privileg-
ing of anubhava and adhyātma, Jainism is managing and mitigating the cultural 
purchase of bhakti. In this way, hegemonic Jainism adapts and produces its own 
counter-culture, but one that puritanically returns to itself, the hegemonic. What 
seems at first like a radical departure, a rebelliousness, and even meets with reac-
tionary opposition, is perhaps the unconscious efforts of mainstream Jainism to 
modify itself in the bhakti milieu. Here Raymond Williams may help elucidate 
this phenomenon: ‘It can be persuasively argued that all or nearly all initiatives 
and contributions, even when they take on manifestly alternative or oppositional 
forms, are in practice tied to the hegemonic: that the dominant culture, so to say, 
at once produces and limits its own forms of counter-culture’ (Williams 1977, 114).
Following Williams, the Samayasāra is addressing itself to more than one 
cultural force. Banārasīdās’ appropriation and subordination of bhakti is the 
neutralisation of its potential challenge to the Jain path, and the re-assertion 
that knowledge is the path to liberation is also a Jain gesture. The modification 
is in advancing personal experience as the wellspring of liberating knowledge, 
thereby profoundly individualising the resource. While the poetry and characters 
8 Jain devotion or bhakti appeared in many forms, as did objects of devotion. Some popular ex-
amples would be guru-bhakti, thīrtankara-bhakti, śalākā-purush (great man) bhakti, frequently 
executed with elegance and refinement. Bhakti did not exist in the oldest texts, as Paul Dundas 
has indicated, but from the earliest period bhakti was ‘a necessary part of the Jain path and was 
credited with the ability to destroy karma’ (Dundas 2002, 171).
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who emerge from the adhyātma movement are highly individualised, as a larger 
historical process it also appears to be a way in which Jainism avoids becoming 
irrelevant. Below I will discuss the passages in which Banārasīdās discusses and 
subordinates Bhakti in favour of knowledge through experience. For a thorough 
engagement with Bhakti and its implications regarding religious individualis-
ation, see Martin Fuchs’ contribution in this publication, The Social Embedment 
of Individualisation in Bhakti (in Section 1.2).
3 Implications for individualisation
In some ways, Jain soteriology as a whole contains within its very logic an extreme 
form of individual isolation: that is the radical separation of each and every ātmā 
or jīva from everything else and every other ātmā or jīva. Indeed, the summum 
bonum of Jain life is to attain omniscience and then liberation, culminating in 
blissful, absolute isolation, known as kevala-jñāna. Although this sounds stark 
it should be thought of as independent perfection. The liberated soul is called a 
kevalin, it obtains mokṣa (liberation) and rises to the siddha-loka and ‘remains 
there in a disembodied state (siddha), experiencing its own inherent nature of 
infinite consciousness and bliss’ (Wiley 2009, 123). I have emphasised the word 
choice ‘experience’ from Wiley’s handbook on Jainism because experience is 
central to the Adhyātmīs. Experience of the self through yogic insight, anubhava, 
is also how we can trace the power of this idea outward from Banārasīdās’ text, 
across space and time, into the voices of other Jain poets and philosophers.
Banārasīdās belonged to and led a school of Jain spiritualism based in 
Agra called adhyātma, mystical exploration of the inner self. It was similar to 
other reformist sects in terms of social ideas. It has been suggested that before 
Banārasīdās, adhyātma was an intellectual movement, but with him it became a 
confident religious reform program. The adhyātmīs harkened back to older teach-
ings in order to bypass what they saw as accretions onto to their religion over time. 
The adhyātma reformists eschewed ritual and image worship, which had become 
orthopraxy in many Jain sects, preferring spiritual (adhyātma) self- exploration 
as the path to liberation (mokṣa-nīrvaṇa). Banārasīdās was able to bring some 
of the loftier concepts down to earth and simultaneously provide something 
that a movement of a lay community sorely lacked – scriptural authority. This 
allowed the group to proceed without the blessing of the professionals, monks, 
and priests, which is a crucial aspect of religious individualisation. Moreover, he 
wrote in the popular poetic idiom, Braj, and this gave Jains some relevance in the 
marketplace of religio-literary production.
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By democratising forms of knowledge and making available vocabularies of 
liberation to a wider Jain public, Banārasīdās believed that he side-lined a declin-
ing religious authority and made audible the ‘voice of the Jina’.9 Additionally, he 
confronts and gains from bhakti as well as Sufi romances, entanglements that 
provide him with a new sensibility and approach to both his own religion and 
his concept of self (Bangha 2015). In this sense, he was instrumental, as were 
the other adhyātmik poets, in adapting popular Jainism to new cultural forms.10 
These adaptations, in turn, made room for highly individualised poetic compo-
sition, which can be traced to numerous poets. At the conclusion of this article 
I will trace these poetic conventions to 19th-century Jain poets Cidananda and 
Rajacandra to demonstrate the spatial and temporal reach of these ideas. The 
very act of writing also seemed to contribute, over time, to Banārasīdās’ sense 
of himself and his place in historical time, culminating ultimately in a proper 
ego-document, the Ardhakathanaka. Banārasīdās seems to share Ricoeur’s view 
that ‘life cannot be understood other than through stories we tell about it, [and 
so] we are led to say that a life examined, in the sense borrowed from Socrates, is 
a life narrated’ (Ricoeur 1991, 435).
Jain adhyātmik literature promotes what one might call Indic idioms of 
religious individualisation: oneself as the premier spiritual resource, broader 
acceptance of difference, explanations for variation, increased opportunity for 
guru-ship (less strict criteria), anti-sectarianism, anti-intolerance, anti-bigotry, 
non-absolutism, equanimity, and finally, increased interest in personhood (evi-
denced by ego-documents and personal anecdotes). Additionally, Jain philo-
sophical concepts suggest avenues for individualisation, such as anekāntavāda, 
manypointedness, which allows for a diversity of perspectives since it maintains 
that each view makes a proper but partial contribution to a higher truth. In Jain 
philosophy, anekāntavāda acknowledges the internal logic and intelligence of 
competing philosophical systems (Cort 2000). Scholars have referred to this as 
a type of relativism of knowledge (syādvāda) and a dialogical search for truth. 
Anekāntavāda is a willingness to benefit from truthful insights of other philo-
sophical traditions, for to deny another (person or tradition) at least a partial 
claim to truth is to harbour pretensions towards omniscience. This is the logic 
by which bigotry and partisanship become chief heresies (Qvarnström 1999, 
Chapple, Haribhadrasūri, and Casey 2003). While Jain thinkers drew from a 
9 A Jina, meaning conquerer, is a liberated and perfected teacher or tīrthankara, whence the 
word Jaina is also derived as a follower of the Jinas.
10 As the Bhagavadgita endeavored to define Hinduism in interaction with Buddhism, Jainism, 
and Ajivikas, Banārasīdās attempts a similar task with the Samayasāra Nāṭaka for a destabilized 
Jain Dharma in the face of bhakti and other attractive alternatives.
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shared and common religio-philosophical Indic pool of concepts, they imple-
mented many familiar ideas in accordance with their own ontology, metaphysics, 
epistemology, and ethics (Soni 2000, 367). This is one reason that simply survey-
ing what anubhava has meant elsewhere will not suffice regarding what these 
poets were mobilising.
In his introduction to Open Boundaries, John Cort wrote of a concept of self 
that is key to our understanding of individualisation: ‘a sense of self-identity, 
whether in terms of the individual person or a social group, is never constructed 
in isolation, but rather is always a contextualised process in which the sense of 
“self” is in dialogue, opposition, or dialectical relationship to a sense of what is 
“not-self” or “other”’ (Cort 1998, 1–2).11 This approach is inspired by Saussure’s 
structural linguistics, which posits that the meaning of any word depends on its 
difference from other words or signs, and thence this enters into critical and cul-
tural studies (Saussure et al. 2011). Thus the ‘self’ conceived in this manner, can 
only be understood when juxtaposed to an ‘other’ (Cort 1998, 14). However, this 
is not the only way to understand what Jain thinkers themselves are saying about 
the Self. Jain adhyātmik poets were fiercely committed to the idea of the individ-
ual identity in a state of neutrality, unconditioned by external forces. I suggest 
supplementing the structuralist approach mentioned above with the concept of 
the Neutral, a close analogue of the problem on which these Jain poets medi-
tate – the radically Neutral as a polemic against all dogmatism, against all ideo-
logical appropriations, and against meaning created by oppositional binaries or 
appositional relations among signs. The adhyātmik poets consistently reject bina-
ries, oppositions, and conflict to determine meaning, opting instead for samatā 
(Neutral, amongst other synonyms). In a way, they explicitly reject the Self that 
is formulated in a contextualised process, against an other, and rather prefer a 
pre-contextualised Self, the one not determined by opposition but by equanimity. 
Roland Barthes writes of the Neutral as ‘everything that baffles the paradigm […] 
The paradigm [is] the opposition of two virtual terms from which, in speaking, I 
actualise one to produce meaning […] meaning rests on conflict (the choice of one 
term against another), and all conflict is generative of meaning: to choose one 
and refuse the other is always a sacrifice made to meaning […]’ (Barthes 2005, 
6–7). The poems discussed below corroborate that the poets undertake the very 
difficult task of understanding the Self without the assistance of meaning creat-
ing oppositions, binaries, and others against whom to define oneself. Another 
critical insight from Barthes is that the Neutral doesn’t refer to ‘impressions’ of 
greyness, of ‘neutrality,’ of indifference. Rather, the concept is both active and 
11 See Part 2 of this publication, particularly Linkenbach.
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personal: ‘The Neutral […] can refer to intense, strong, unprecedented states. To 
outplay the paradigm is an ardent, burning activity’ (Barthes 2005, 7). It should 
be noted that Jain thought and post-structuralism have significantly different pro-
jects. For one thing, much of Jain thought is soteriological, but that does not mean 
that it is not also epistemological. There is an affinity between the Neutral and the 
Jain samatā, which refers to an ardent resistance to meaning-determining enclo-
sures or binaries, as the poetry below will corroborate. The idea of the Neutral, in 
Barthes’ terms, offers at the very least a useful reference point or analogue to the 
‘non-conditionment’ implied by adhyātmik samatā. It is also important to recall 
that this is in conversation with the structuralist approach mentioned above.
The concepts of ‘self’ and ‘other,’ or ‘non-self’ is profoundly important in Jain 
ontology. Jain worship and ritual also have a significant effect on the worship-
per’s sense of self. Whereas the many two-way interactions of religions of which 
Jains would have been aware, such as those involving Kṛṣṇa or Śiva, the object 
of worship and bhakti in Jainism is completely isolated and non-transactional 
(Babb 1998, 150). Whereas Kṛṣṇa is a profoundly transactional being, as in the 
Puṣṭimārg, Jain worship is transactionally null (Babb 1998, 152). Cort sums up 
this idea as ‘pure reflectivity, a mirror that absorbs and transforms nothing but 
rather shows the worshiper the truth of who he or she is’ (Cort 1998, 10). This is 
another way to think about the dissolving of the binary of bhakti for Jain pur-
poses. Josephine Reynell writes that, ‘doctrinally it is the āyā (ātman) which is 
the carrier of passions, cognitions and intentions initiating actions. These pas-
sions and actions in turn shape specific personalities, thereby constituting the 
self within each human being and making each human being a unique individual 
in the Jain view […] providing a clear counter-example to the views of Dumont 
and Marriot […]’ (Reynell 2006, 212–213) see Linkenbach in this publication, 
Section 2.1). Reynell makes two important conclusions regarding Jain individu-
alisation: first, the embodied soul is perceived to lie at the heart of the self and 
second, karma attached to the soul is believed to be responsible for the particular 
constitution and individuality of each person (Reynell 2006, 213).
While most Jain teachers have followed the tri-ratnam, the three jewels of 
right faith (samyak darśana), right knowledge (samyak jñāna) and right conduct 
(samyak cāritra), Kundakunda (c. 750 CE) expressed a minority position that 
deemphasised behaviour/conduct (cāritra) and privileged knowledge (jñāna). 
The emphasis is on knowledge of the difference between what is self and what is 
other (Sanskrit anya). Kundakunda explains in the Niyamasāra (141–50), that the 
autonomous self is the true self, while the dependent self is the external one, the 
social persona. Therefore, as John Cort eloquently puts it, the duality between self 
and other is not only a matter of external relations, it is even internalised in terms 
of correct and incorrect self-understandings, what we might call ‘true and false 
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consciousness’ of the self (Cort 1998, 10–11). This otherness can extend to the 
apparatus of the body and mind (manas), which shapes (or distorts) the nature of 
the experience that the soul has. The attachment to this experience that is shaped 
by exterior otherness, anya, is a singular perspective ekānta, and therefore leads 
to a condition of matārthi, often translated as bigotry. While this duality looks like 
a meaning-producing binary, I suggest that meaning of the self is not in every case 
generated relationally to the other, but often in spite of the other, in neutrality.
4  Experience (present)/neutrality/
the anti-dogmatic
These three categories and tropes, which recur across centuries of Jain poetry (17th 
– 19th cent.) and philosophical writings, are connected intimately with individual-
isation through an uncompromising and sustained effort to resist de- individualising 
trends such as partisanship, dogmatism, and ideological conflict.12 These terms 
become a convention and poetic conceit for forms of individualisation. While this 
is not a standard institutionalisation such as laws or a church, it is rather a poetic 
conventionalisation of a set of individualising resources. These concepts are dynam-
ically and causally connected, they enable one another. That is, they are not com-
pletely autonomous and tend to invoke ancillary associations. For example, one way 
to think about them is that anubhava (experience) is the resource, which enables 
samatā (neutrality/equanimity) as a view, and matārthi-virodha (anti-dogmatism) 
is the outcome or the (in)action. One could also say by way of samatā as a view, 
stemming from matārthi-virodha openness, one may access anubhava. The poets 
play endlessly with this constellation, but it is critical that matārthi-virodha remain 
an element, since it is the portion that resists ideological appropriation.
Anubhava (experience, yogic insight) came to be of supreme importance as 
an individualised resource without need of temple, religious professional, or sect. 
The focus on anubhava is the central conventionalisation, approaching institu-
tionalisation, in the Adhyātma line of poetry and thinking. Adhyātma (Jain spirit-
ualism) proliferated and emboldened numerous poets and their audiences; they 
gained confidence in their own ātmas as the sole requirement to attain mokśa (lib-
eration). This confidence coincided with non-religious spheres such as increased 
12 Jains are by no means a homogenous community with a unity of purpose and perspective, 
this would immediately contradict the doctrine of manifold perspectives. That notwithstanding, 
several scholars, such as Babb and Cort, have indicated that there is something like a Jain ‘style’ 
when it comes to matters of epistemology, of ontology, and I would suggest, of poetics.
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mobility, sociality, and entrepreneurship, sharing family resemblances to non- 
Indian strands of individualisation. Adhyātmīs found authorisation for their ideas 
from critical Jain philosophical concepts and attempted to emplot anubhava in 
Jain intellectual lineages. Yet adhyātmik ideas were challenged then and now.13
There are many critiques of the concepts of religious experience, and though 
it is well beyond my ability to consider all of them, I will take the one that seems 
to come straight to the problem in my material. Robert Sharf’s analysis nicely 
encapsulates one critique of religious experience, which is: appeals to experience 
remain authoritative because they reference empty signifiers that refer to the inef-
fable. He writes: ‘The category of experience is, in essence, a mere place-holder 
that entails a substantive if indeterminate terminus for the relentless deferral of 
meaning. And this is precisely what makes the term experience so amenable to 
ideological appropriation’ (Sharf 1998, 113). Jain thinkers were keenly aware of 
this problem and therefore almost always couple any discussion of anubhava with 
polemics against ideological appropriation (matārthi) and meaning delimiting 
binaries or dogmatism. Sharf insists that any insight achieved from experience is 
‘gained at the expense of any possible discursive meaning or signification’ (Sharf 
2012, 150). Jain poets might agree, adding that the meaning created by experience 
is indeed aloof of discourse and relational signification, rather this meaning of 
experience is created in the autonomous neutrality of the Self.
Raymond Williams’ discussion of experience is useful here: ‘a particular kind 
of consciousness, which can in some contexts be distinguished from “reason” or 
“knowledge”’. He continues, ‘Experience […] is then the fullest, most open, most 
active kind of consciousness, and it includes feeling as well as thought. This sense 
has been very active in aesthetic discussion, following an earlier religious sense 
[…]’ (1988). Williams makes an important distinction between experience past and 
experience present, the former acting as knowledge gained from past events, and 
the latter a type of full and active awareness. ‘The strength of this appeal to whole-
ness, against forms of thought which would exclude certain kinds of conscious-
ness, as merely “personal”, “subjective”, or “emotional”, is evident’ (Williams 
1988, 127). Experience present is a type of subjective witness, ‘offered to be shared 
[…] as the most authentic truth […] an unquestionable authenticity and  immediacy 
13 My research traces the career of these individualising strands up to contemporary Jainism by 
way of interviews with Jain monks, field observations, and the Samaṇasuttam. The latter is an 
unprecedented compendium based on a 1974 Delhi-based conference of Jain monks (all 4 sects) 
convened to concord the central Jain principles and texts. However, it omits many early modern 
developments; neither anubhava, nor any cognate or equivalent term, appear at any point in the 
Samaṇasuttam. Therefore, we see a decline – or intentional exclusion – of anubhava at the hands 
of religious authorities. This decline was not the case in popular poetic traditions.
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[…]’ (Williams 1977, 128). The ‘evident appeal’, to which Williams refers, offers 
some insight into the practicality and versatility of such a term as anubhava.
As each innate ātmā already possesses omniscience, and the anubhava of 
each separate ātmā is the guiding wisdom for liberation, then one’s own anub-
hava is at once radically individualised and yet qualitatively equal, since each 
anubhava derives from an omniscient ātmā. One absolute knowledge should 
not differ from another absolute knowledge. Therefore, anubhava is individually 
determined and accessed, and yet not merely ‘personal’, ‘subjective’, or ‘emo-
tional’, it is an anti-authoritarian, decentralised resource, which resists marginal-
isation since even as it is atomised, it maintains a radical solidarity (and equality) 
with the anubhava of every other jīva. The Samayasāra Nāṭaka marks a transition 
of worldviews, institutional relationships, ideology, and history. The Samayasāra 
Nāṭaka is simultaneously a rupture and continuity in a complex set of discursive 
and institutional relationships within and without the Jain Sangha.
Towards the end of the Ardhakathanaka, after studying Kundakunda et al, 
Banārasīdās explains that from the guṇasthāna (gradualist system) he has learned 
that there are numerous appropriate ways of being and behaving in the world, 
according to the spiritual stage one has reached. This is a reconciliation for varia-
tion and divergence amongst individuals. He even applies this gradualist system 
to his own literary endeavours at different stages of his life, which allows him to 
see his early erotic poetry and his later philosophical and spiritual writings as 
equivalent.
Once again, Banārasī took up his poetic activities, now in a deeply spiritual vein. His early 
work and his current work were alike, there was no contradiction/opposition there (636). 
He had had a stain in his heart, and there was a coldness within, which was removed 
and replaced with equanimity (samatā), there remained neither high nor low (Ardhakath-
anaka 637).  (Banārasīdāsa 1981)14
The significant difference of Banārasīdās’ approach is how personally he applies 
Jain concepts to himself, rather than just discussing these concepts abstractly. 
Through such values as samatā (equanimity), and the logic of the guṇasthāna, he 
finds a way of reconciling his many worldly selves over the span of a lifetime. His 
relationship to Jain philosophy takes a highly personal character, quite different 
from the theoretical abstractions of philosophers Haribhadra and Yaśovijaya. It 
is important to note that his language challenges judgmental binaries,  equalising 
14 Taba phiri aura kabīsurī, karī adhyātamamāhiṃ ǀ yaha vaha kathanī ekasī, kahuṃ virodha 
kichu nāhiṃ ǁ636ǁ Hṛdaimāhiṃ kachu kālimā, hutī saradahana bīca ǀ soū miṭi samatā bhaī, rahī 
na ūṃca na nīca ǁ637ǁ
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the ‘then’ and ‘now’ of his poetry: ‘There was no opposition […] samatā […] neither 
high nor low.’ These terms also carry social signification, which subsequent poets 
will make much more explicit. The importance of samatā shows a resonance with 
sant poet ideas as they exist in Jain discourse. Charlotte Vaudeville, writing about 
Kabir, explains samatā in the following terms:
[…] the state in which all differences or opposites such as good and bad, praise and blame, 
pleasure and pain etc., are abolished, as all appears “equal” (sama) to the true Yogī; samatā 
pertains to the Hindu, especially the Yogic ideal of saintliness […] this transcendent state of 
absolute “non-conditionment” or bliss is also experienced as samatā or samarasa, oneness 
of “enjoyment” or of “emotion”, which implies the constant realisation of the oneness of 
the whole visible world in spite of its apparent diversity and of the falseness of all duality; 
on the psychological plane, it implies that the perfect Yogī looks on all things as “equal” 
(sama) and that he has transcended all possible forms of opposition or contrasts, such as 
male and female, hot and cold, good and bad, pleasant and unpleasant etc. 
(Kabir and Vaudeville 1974, 253 n.5, 125)
So while these ideas are not uniquely Jain, the force of the concepts take their 
own form and have relevance in this strand of the Jain world, as they would have 
in any non-dogmatic enterprise.
5  The Samayasāra and the genealogy 
of discriminative knowledge (bhed-jñān)
In the Ardhakathanaka, Banārasīdās reports that his spiritual progress was deeply 
impacted by two texts. He became acquainted first with the Samayasāra-pāhuda 
and, twelve years later, Gommaṭasāra. With the first text, Banārasīdās finds 
himself disillusioned regarding the usefulness of ritual and idol-worship, and 
becomes effectively unhinged and left in a spiritual desert. However, the Gom-
maṭasāra makes Banārasīdās a staunch Jain again, and moreover, an adhyātmī. 
He tells us that it was the Gommaṭasāra that facilitated his understanding of the 
Samayasāra-pāhuda. He was then, he tells us, in a position to joyfully undertake 
the trans-composition of the Samayasāra Nāṭaka from Sanskrit to vernacular 
(Banarasidasa and Premi 1943).15
15 He fails to mention that he simply appended his version of the Gommaṭasāra to the end his 
Samayasāra Nāṭaka, thereby significantly changing the text according to his own requirements. 
He felt that Samayasāra was not intelligible without a section on the gunasthānas, or stages of 
a soul’s ascendance.
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Scholars believe Kundakunda is a name that stands for the collective author-
ship of a Prakrit textual tradition between the third and the fifth centuries of the 
common era, and yet more recently some scholars locate Kundakunda after 750 
CE (Dundas, 107). His Samayasāra-pāhuda (The Essence of the Self) elaborates on 
the nature of the innate pure soul (ātman) and one’s mystical experience of it. In 
the Samayasāra-pāhuda, Banārasīdās found answers to many of his tormenting 
spiritual questions. The Samayasāra text has a special career and destiny16. It 
fell into the hands of Banārasīdās, his free adaptation of the text enjoyed great 
popularity in the 17th century and was probably read during meetings of the 
adhyātmik groups. The Samayasāra Nāṭaka was widely distributed across Rajast-
han and can be found in nearly every collection of manuscripts (Jain 2006, iii). 
As the text’s most recent translator/re-writer, Banārasīdās is in many ways an 
embodiment of religious individualisation as he recreates a classic text somewhat 
to accommodate his own worldview. Although the Samayasāra Nāṭaka is not an 
ego-document in the strictest sense, its author shares many personal anecdotes 
and insights regarding the text and its uses. He textually performs individualising 
gestures as he appropriates resources and emplots himself in lineages.
Kundakunda characterises reality as having two levels of truth: the absolute 
perspective (niścaya naya) and the conventional, practical perspective (vyav-
ahāra naya). The text focuses on discernment (bhed-jñān) between the pure soul/
Self and everything else, between niścaya and vyavahāra, absolute and practical 
knowledge. As Paul Dundas writes,
Kundakunda taught the centrality of inward experience and the reorientation of all reli-
gious practice to focus on the Self […] The soul is the only true and ultimate category which 
provides a “certain” (nishcaya) standpoint […] with reference to which all other entities, 
beliefs and practices can be judged […] Everything else in the universe has a purely trans-
actional and provisional value and is to be viewed from the perspective of a worldly (vyava-
hara) standpoint.  (Dundas 2002, 91)
Banārasīdās makes use of these two-levels truth to help him reconcile the many 
paradoxes of the individual, namely the possibility of simultaneous difference 
and equivalence.
16 Kundakunda ( 2nd – 3rd cent., 750 CE) Samayasāra-pāhuda (Saurseni Prakrit)
↓
 Amritcandra (8th – 9th cent.) adds Ātmakhāti (commentaries in Sanskrit)
↓
 Rājamalajī Pande (16th cent.) Bālabodhinī (commentaries in old Hindi)
↓
 Banārasīdās (1586–1643) Samayasāra Nāṭaka & Ardhakathanaka inter alia
↓
 The Adhyātmik Poets of the 17th – 19th centuries (e.g. Cidananda and Rajacandra)
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The Samayasāra Nāṭaka of Banārasīdās was completed, he tells us, Vikram 
1672 (1616 CE), Ashwini 13th, on a Saturday. It is noteworthy that in the precise 
dating of the text, he only refers to his historical time, as if calendric dating has 
a new urgency in his moment. He does not date or place the other contributors, 
such as Kundakunda et al. Rather they exist in the mists of time, somewhere in 
India, presumably. We see this trend to give precise dates of composition amongst 
many of Banārasīdās’ contemporaries and recent predecessors (Jain 1964). 
In another telling historical signpost, he also refers to the text as his bādshāh 
(Persian, Mughal emperor) of knowledge-manifest, to whom he offers his taslīm 
(Arabic salutation) (Banārasīdās 1997, 407). Banārasīdās historicises the text and 
salutes it in a Mughal idiom, which is one of many moments where the text moves 
between religious and socio-historical discourses.
The Samayasāra Nāṭaka is largely based on the Sanskrit commentaries of 
Amritchandra from the 9th century and Rajmal Pande’s 16th century Bālabo-
dhinī. It is a great deal more than a translation. For one, it greatly exceeds the 
other versions in size. In a charming moment of immodesty, Banārasīdās tells his 
reader, in the Samayasāra Nāṭaka itself, how long the text is: ‘If calculated using 
32-syllable śloka as the metric, my Samayasāra Nāṭaka is 1707 verses in number!’ 
(Samayasāra Nāṭaka 422). Yet Banārasīdās is not just boasting, but laying claim 
to have expanded the work, insisting that he is not a mere translator, but one of 
the authors of the great text. Or perhaps he is influenced by a merchant’s train-
ing to always take stock and account. In any case, he is asserting his personality 
and pride of achievement. The available cultural forms, while perhaps not fully 
adequate, were increasingly capable of representing individual accomplishment, 
consciousness, and experience, thereby promoting the socio-literary imaginaries 
that facilitate representations of, and interests in, interiorities and subjectivities. 
Here Banārasīdās explains his discovery of the Samayasāra Nāṭaka:
Now I shall discuss how the vernacular Samayasāra Nāṭaka came to be. The original text was 
Muni (monk) Kundakunda’s, and Amritchandra was the author of the commentary (Verse 21). 
The Samayasāra Nāṭaka is a giver of joy, and the Sanskrit commentaries are understood and 
bestow special knowledge on the learned (pandits). But the simple-minded (common) folks 
don’t get the meaning (Verse 22). Pandit Rajmall is a good Jain and well-versed in the Samayas-
āra Nāṭaka. He produced a simple commentary on the text (Verse 23). In this way, in time, in 
the spiritual mode (adhyātmik śailī) in the vernacular (bhāṣā) spread, and the voice of the Jina 
manifested in the world, and from home to home the drama (nāṭaka) was discussed (Verse 24). 
Now in the famous town of Agra there were special meetings of the great thinkers, five men 
stand out as especially capable, who night and day would discuss the essence of knowledge  
 (Verse 25).’17
17 aba yaha bāta kahūm̐ hai jaise ǀ nāṭaka bhāṣā bhayau su aise ǁ kundakunda muni mūla ud-
haratā ǀ amṛtacandra ṭīkā ke karatā ǁ21ǁ samayasāra nāṭaka sukhadānī ǀ ṭīkā sahita saṃskṛta 
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The narrative strategy here is telling. He brings the voice down to earth  (jagamāhī) 
and facilitates discussion from home to home, democratising access to knowl-
edge (bodha-vacanikā). Banārasīdās is keenly aware he is a threatening, non- 
conformist. He establishes an august lineage of Kundakunda, Amritchandra, and 
Rajmall. He then explains that the joy-giving and liberating truth of the text has 
been available only to the learned pandits. Banārasīdās considers the domesti-
cation of the voice of the Jina an important function of the poet and one that 
he continues in other works, particularly the Nāmamāla (1726–1727), in which 
he provides a sort of lexicon of key words from Sanskrit, Prakrit, and vernacu-
lar languages (Jain 1964, 182–183). Banārasīdās continues to give the names of 
his five friends with whom he ‘constantly discussed the highest truth’. These five 
friends are historical figures and poets in their own rights: Rūpcand, Caturbhuj, 
Bhagavatīdās, Kuṃarpāl, Dharmadās. He brings the text, narratologically, out of 
oblivion, from the mists of time, to datable, public time, and with cartographic 
precision, in Agra. This is already somewhat a literary novelty, the introduction of 
an everyday merchant milieu and new chronotopes (Bakhtin 1998).
The inclusion of stories about his friends and his town has another striking 
literary feature: the anecdote. For Stephen Greenblatt, the anecdote is ‘in com-
pressed form the ways in which elements of lived experience enter into literature, 
the ways in which everyday institutions and bodies get recorded’ (Gallagher and 
Greenblatt 2000, 30). As Greenblatt has pointed out, the anecdote,
satisfied the desire for something outside the literary, something that would challenge the 
boundaries of the literary […] the sphere of practice that even in its more awkward and inept 
articulations makes a claim on the truth that is denied to the most eloquent of literary texts. 
Or rather, the anecdote was a way into the “contact zone”, the charmed space where the 
genius literarius could be conjured into existence.  (Gallagher, Greenblatt 2000, 49)
Banārasīdās is elevating not only his own personality, but also his friend circle, to 
the level of literary emplotment. This is an important example of social discourse 
flowing into literary discourse and thereby presenting an increased interest in 
personality. The following stanzas are similarly thematically diverse. He dis-
cusses the presence of divinity in each sentient being while lashing out at those 
who would be doctrinal. He then returns to an anecdote of his five friends who 
whimsically persuade him to write the Samayasāra.
vānī ǁ paṃḍita paḍai su diḍmati ǀ alapamati aratha na sūjhai ǁ22ǁ pāṃḍe rājamalla jinadharmī ǀ 
samaisāra nāṭakake marmī ǁ tīna garaṃthakī ṭīkā kīnī ǀ bālabodha sugama kara dīnī ǁ23ǁ ihi vidhi 
bodha-vacanikā phailī ǀ samai pāya adhyātama sailī ǁ pragaṭī jagamāhī jinavānī ǀ ghara ghara 
nāṭaka kathā bakhānī ǁ24ǁ nagara āgare māṃhi vikhyātā ǀ kārana pāi bhae bahu jñātā ǁ paṃca 
puruṣa ati nipuna pravīne ǀ nisidina jñāna-kathā rasa-bhīne ǁ25ǁ
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Now to what extent shall I praise the glory of my friends, it is better to come to the point. In 
the famous town of Agra lives the meagre-minded Banārasī (Verse 32), in whom the ingen-
ious skill of poetry resides. Those five brothers show him great kindness, and laughing 
gently, forthrightly say to (Banārasī) the simple-minded (Verse 33): The Nāṭaka Samayasāra 
is the benediction of all jīvas (souls), and (while) Rājmall has provided a simple commen-
tary, If a poetic composition in the popular language and metre should be written (bhāṣā 
grantha), then everyone may read it (Verse 34). Banārasī in his heart reflected, if I do write 
this popular poetry then the voice of the Jina will manifest (pragaṭai jinavānī). Having taken 
the blessing/permission of his five friends, he produced his poetic creation (Verse 35).18
Many things are happening in this short passage. For one, we see the poet deliber-
ating about the task and ultimately deciding that it is in the service of the dharma, 
since the voice of the Jina will manifest. This deliberation constructs the narrator 
Banārasīdās as a pensive and apprehensive figure, who eventually takes action. 
Paul Ricœur makes a distinction between identity as spatiotemporal selfsame-
ness (idem – sameness) and the capacity of an agent to initiate an imputable 
action (ipse – selfhood). This dynamic thinking/acting character develops this 
way in the story, for ‘narrative identity is not based on the permanently subsisting 
substance (idem) but on a living tissue of narrated stories that permits the recog-
nition of the self (ipse)’ (Ricœur 1990, 246). As Banārasīdās shows us, he is an 
evolving identity, a narrative self, and it is perhaps this realisation that prompts 
the subsequent writing of his autobiography.
The anecdotes that Banārasīdās provides function precisely as the ‘contact 
zone’ Greenblatt describes above. Furthermore, we see ‘the ways in which 
everyday institutions and bodies get recorded’ (Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000, 
30). Banārasīdās describes the birth of an informal institution, and one that is 
explicitly contrived to support and encourage individualised gestures that will 
 disseminate individualising religious values, thus creating something of an indi-
vidualising feedback-loop. It is a matter of some irony and pragmatism that such 
efforts are necessarily group efforts.
Banārasīdās positions himself as someone who will be ridiculed and labelled 
mad. This suggests that he sees his endeavour as (appearing) quixotic or trans-
gressive. He anticipates his detractors and even flatters them by calling them wise 
or worthy. This is a strategy that he repeats in his autobiography several years 
18 ghaṭa ghaṭa aṃtara jina basai, ghaṭa ghaṭa aṃtara jaina ǀ mati-madirāke pānasauṃ, mata-
vālā samujhai na ǁ31ǁ bahuta baḍāī kahāṃlauṃ kījai ǀ kārija rūpa bāta kahi lījai ǁ nagara āgare 
māṃhi vikhyātā ǀ bānārasī nāma laghu jñātā ǁ32ǁ tāmaiṃ kavitakalā caturāī ǀ kṛpā karaiṃ ye 
pām̐cauṃ bhāī ǁ paṃca prapaṃca rahita hiya kholai ǀ te banārasīsauṃ ham̐si bolai ǁ33ǁ nāṭaka 
samaisāra hita jīkā ǀ sugama rūpa rājamalī ṭīkā ǁ kavitabaddha racanā jo hoī ǀ bhāṣā grantha 
paḍai saba koī ǁ34ǁ taba banārasī manamahiṃ ānī ǀ kījai to pragaṭai jinavānī ǁ paṃca puruṣakī 
ājñā līnī ǀ kavitabaddhakī racanā kīnī ǁ35ǁ
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later, but it was developed here because his very right to comment on such lofty 
 religio-philosophical matters would have been suspect. This reference to figures 
who will laugh at him indicates the presence of forces outside the texts whom he 
presumes to be hostile to his audacity. Whether because of his status as a humble 
and hapless merchant, a layperson, and/or his transgression into clearly demar-
cated Digambara terrain (he was a Śwetāmbar), Banārasīdās is asserting and 
risking himself. The proof of this will appear in a volley of attacks from the towering 
figures of Jain thought at the time (Lath 2005). Yet he is emboldened by his little 
community of well-wishers, his Agra-five, whom he credits even with the idea of 
producing a popular verse rendition of a classical religio-philosophical text. What is 
striking is his insistence on his simplicity and small-mindedness. He gives these five 
friends credit for the democratisation of this spiritual knowledge, while he ascribes 
to himself little more than poetic virtuosity. He develops a literary image of himself 
as having something of a ‘poetic savant syndrome’, that is demonstrating prodi-
gious literary capabilities far in excess of his limited mental faculties. This staged 
humility may indicate, counter-intuitively, a profound confidence and practical-
ity, or even a conventionality aligned with great contemporaries such as Tulsidas 
(e.g. Kavitavali). Nevertheless, he draws attention to individual roles and strengths 
that compel him to compose the work. By including his friends, he has added the 
benefit of implicating them in his endeavour, making them de facto signatories, and 
thereby forging a solidarity of co-conspirators. In early modern India, one’s clan 
and  community were the most tangible social realities for the common person. An 
individual’s security and livelihood depended directly on good standing within a 
community, and this is especially true for merchants (Vanina 1995). Perhaps certain 
strands of individualisation require group efforts and support to proceed. The 
Hindī Sāhitya Kośa (Hindi Literature Compendium) states that volumes were written 
against and in support of Banārasīdās and the adhyātmīs, but whatever came their 
way, they were fearless and completely independent thinkers (Tomar 1985). How 
fearless and independent they may have been is hard to determine, yet Banārasīdās 
gives us the impression that his work was nearly heroic, but also tilting at windmills.
Below Banārasīdās admirably anticipates ridicule for wading so far out of his 
depths, by making his endeavour into a metaphor of courage and wonder.
Just as a fool tries to swim across the mighty ocean […] or just as a child might grasp at a 
reflection of the moon in the water, so have I with my limited intellect begun to write the 
Nāṭaka Samayasāra. The wise will surely laugh at me and say, what a crackpot! (Verse 1.12)19
19 jaisaiṃ koū mūrakha mahā samudra tirivekauṃ ǀ […] jaisaiṃ jalakuṇḍamaiṃ nirakhi sasi- 
pratibimba, tāke gahibekauṃ kara nīcau karai ṭābarau ǀ taisai maiṃ alapabuddhi nāṭaka āramb-
ha kīnau, gunī mohi hasaiṃge kahaiṃge koū bābarau ǁ1.12ǁ
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Banārasīdās elaborates the herculean, perhaps quixotic, task he has set before 
himself. He concludes by ironically acknowledging that ‘the learned and virtu-
ous’ (gunī) will laugh at him and call him a crackpot (bābarau); he compares 
himself to a fool (mūrakh), a child (ṭābarau), and a simpleton (alapabuddhi), sug-
gesting that it may only be precisely those who are free or innocent of opinion 
that strive for liberation. This should not be mistaken for modesty, since he also 
just credited himself with bringing the voice of the Jina to the people, but he 
treads lightly by pre-empting censure through self-effacement. Yet he is really 
(disguised with irony) targeting the theologically narrow-minded, or in the Jain 
context, one-sided or partial. Banārasīdās’ couplet below, from his trans-creation 
of Kundakunda’s work, comes to the heart of the issue of partiality and endorses 
the individualised resource of adhyātmik (spiritually Self-centred) truth.
In every heart lives a Jina,20 and so does the Jain dharma. Those who drink of intoxicating 
doctrinal partiality, will be too drunk on bias to understand.  (Verse 31)21
Echoing Kabir, Banārasīdās emboldens lay people to take charge of their own 
spiritual lives and not look externally to religious authorities, since the Jina 
resides within each of us (ghaṭa ghaṭa antara jina basai). Then also in the vein 
of Kabir, he condemns the dogmatic ones for being too intoxicated from bias 
to see clearly. The operating poetic conceit appears as several wonderful puns 
on the word mat/mad/matavālā. Mata can be: 1) belief, opinion, doctrine (from 
mana), as well as 2) an intoxicant (Sanskrit mādhu, Proto-Indo-European médhu, 
German Met) (Callewaert and Sharma 2009, 1631–1633). Thus, the line, mati-
madira kē pānasauṁ, having drunk the doctrine/drink, the dogmatic/drunkards 
(matavālā) are too deluded to understand (samujhai na). This conceit of ‘doctrine 
as intoxication’ becomes the convention in all of this poetry. It is the doctrine/
drink (mata) that prevents both samatā (equanimity) and consequently access to 
anubhava (experience).
Banārasīdās acknowledges bhakti, but then privileges anubhava as a form of 
knowledge that is the true requirement for liberation. In the Samayasāra Nāṭaka, 
the 14th stanza of the introduction, for example, has an explicit reference to 
bhakti: hradayai hamārai bhagavantakī bhagati (bhakti) hai (‘We have bhakti for 
20 The couplet bears a striking resemblance to a very famous doha from the Sant-poet, Kabir: 
kastūrī kuṃḍala base, mṛga ḍhūm̐ḍhata bana māhi ǀ jyo ghaṭa ghaṭa rāma hai, duniyā dekhe nāhī 
ǀ (‘The musk resides in the deer itself, who searches in vain for the scent in the forest. Similarly, 
Ram dwells in each heart and yet he is not seen in the world’).
21 ghaṭa ghaṭa aṃtara jina basai, ghaṭa ghaṭa aṃtara jaina ǀ mati-madirāke pānasauṃ, mata-
vālā samujhai na ǁ31ǁ
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the blessed One in our hearts’; (Banārasīdās 1997, 0.14). Banārasīdās uses the 
term bhakti with the intention of immediately subordinating it by then promot-
ing the idea of the experience of the soul as the means to liberation. Banārasīdās 
writes in his ‘description of experience’:
We have bhakti for the blessed One in our hearts (Verse 0.14) […] [here] I speak of certain/
absolute knowledge, transactional knowledge, the path of liberation, and the authority of 
experience (anubhava) (Verse 0.16). That thing upon which one meditates, from which the 
spirit finds peace, and from which a sense of the essence of the soul manifests, that is what 
is called experience (Verse 0.17). Experience destroys karma, and at the highest level joins 
Love, No religion (dharma) can equal experience (Verse 0.19).22
In rapid succession (first 20 stanzas of the text) the supremacy of experience is 
established, which is intentionally conflated/aligned/entangled with bhakti. 
Thus, Experience joins Love (bhakti), at the highest level, and no religion 
(dharma) can equal experience (anubhava). This is the closest thing we have to 
a definition of what is meant by anubhava, and how one gains access to it. It is 
the object of meditation and also the medium by which one gains a glimpse of 
the Self, and the fount of knowledge. The Jain philosophical concepts play a role 
here, as it is critical to remain non-absolutist in meditation. Below Banārasīdās 
explains how syādvāda (may-be-ism) is mobilised in meditation to facilitate the 
necessary neutrality for knowledge:
In the heart in which syādvāda-meditation is done, the pure anubhava of the ātma is revealed,
In whom the glory of knowledge radiates day by day, s/he will indeed cross the ocean of 
existence (Verse 42).23
Banārasīdās gives one of many clues as to how the experience of the soul is 
achieved, namely through a meditation or deep focus on core Jain philosophi-
cal principles, in this case, the perspectivist and multi-layered nature of reality 
(syādvāda and anekāntavāda). The verb syāt in Sanskrit is the optative form of the 
verb ‘to be’, thus expressing a critical uncertainty which according to Jain epis-
temology should accompany every truth statement. In other words, every state-
ment should have the mood of ‘could be’ or ‘may be’, rather than ‘is’. Cidānanda, 
22 hiradai hamārai bhagavaṃtakī bhagati hai ǁ14ǁ […] kahauṃ sudha nihacaikathā, kahauṃ sudha 
vivahāra ǀ mukatipaṃtha kārana kahauṃ, anubhava adhikāra ǁ16ǁ vāstu vicārata dhyāvataiṃ, 
mana pāvai viśrāma ǀ rasa svādata sukha ūpajai, anubhau yākau nāma ǁ17ǁ anubhava ciṃtāma-
ni ratana, anubhava hai rasakūpa ǀ anubhava māraga mokhakau, anubhava mokha svarūpa ǁ18ǁ 
anubhau karama torai paramasauṃ prīti jorai ǀ anubhau samāna na dharama koū aura hai ǁ19ǁ
23 jāke hiradaimaiṃ syādvāda sādhanā karata, suddha ātamakau anubhau pragaṭa bhayau hai 
ǀ […] tākau gyāna mahimā udota dina dina prati, sohī bhavasāgara ulaṃghi pāra gayau hai ǁ42ǁ
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to whom I soon turn, continues these impulses. The reliance on bhakti is rejected 
because it is oriented outward from the Self:
Without restraint, you cannot reach the absolute level of knowledge, without love you 
cannot know the essence of love’s refinement, without meditation you cannot still your 
mind, without knowledge you cannot reach the auspicious path (Shiv Path!) (Verse 7.24).24
This seems to want to take the wind out of the sails of bhakti, since Love teaches 
you about refinement, but Knowledge is the only and final recourse regarding 
the auspicious path (Shiva Path)25 to liberation. Banārasīdās tells us repeatedly 
that this knowledge is the discernment of the experience of the pure soul from 
everything else.
To conclude this Banārasīdās section, it is worthwhile to recall several ele-
ments of his writing that may endorse individualisation. He begins by emplotting 
his narrative self into the august lineage of the Samayasāra Nāṭaka legacy. He 
follows this by painting a picture of his life and friends in Agra, in his historical 
moment, lending importance to an otherwise obscure and humble merchant. The 
fact that he finds his story worth telling, indeed edifying, elevates his personal-
ity to unprecedented heights for his station. Lastly, he repeatedly implores his 
reader to rely on his/her experience of the Self as the premier source for liberating 
knowledge, rather than any external (even transactional bhakti) resource. Taken 
together, these elements have emboldened generations of poets and members of 
the laity. I now turn to a brief discussion of two more poets.
6 Banārasīdās’ legacy
Aside from the conventions of humility possibly learned from Tulsidas and other 
Bhakti poets, Banarasidas’ ironic and self-effacing stance anticipates trajecto-
ries of discursivity emanating from his disruption. Some of the Jain orthodoxy 
tended to view and write about Banarasidas’ innovations and transcreations as 
an intolerable heresy and as neo-Digambar. On the other hand, the Terapanth 
sect thoroughly institutionalised his ideas and venerate him as their Adiguru 
(prime Guru) (Lath 2005, 9). And still beyond the confines of the Terapanth sect, 
24 nema vinā na lahai nihacai pada, prema vinā rasa rīti na bujhai ǀ dhyāna vinā na thaṃbhai 
manakī gati, jñāna vinā siva paṃtha na sujhāī ǁ7.24ǁ
25 Banārsīdās, perhaps intending multiple meanings, likes to use the word śiva, which also 
means auspicious. He confesses elsewhere to having experimented with Shaivism, but abandons 
it rather quickly.
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the  reverberations of Banarasidas’ insistence on self-reliance occurs in the sub-
sequent works of adhyātmik Jain poetry, thereby conventionalising and institu-
tionalising Banarasidas’ audacity. Below I will briefly demonstrate the reach of 
these poetic conceits and philosophical conventions with examples from two 
poets who are exemplars of adhyātmik thought. While numerous poets would 
serve as good examples here, I have chosen Cidānanda and Rājacandra because 
they demonstrate the temporal and spatial reach of these ideas; they are both 
19th-century figures and they were based approximately a thousand kilometres 
to the East and West, respectively, of Banārasīdās’ base in Agra.
Cidānanda,26 who lived approximately two centuries after Banārasīdās, is a 
somewhat obscure figure in whom we see many of the themes cherished and prop-
agated by Banārasīdās. The one source that discusses Cidānanda, the Cidānanda 
Granthāvalī, admits that it is difficult to determine his precise dates, but cites 
an elegy for his passing from around 1861 (Dhūpiyā 1976, 13–16). Therefore, he 
presumably lived in the first half of the 19th century. He was said to have spent 
decades wandering around sacred Jain places, mostly Sametaśikharjī (Pārasnāth 
Hill, Jharkhand), where he was known to practice yoga in caves and where he 
eventually died. The following poem expresses a description of samatā closely 
aligned with Banārasīdās’. Along with this quality of equanimity he inserts a 
strong critique of bias or partisanship:
“Rare is the Neutral, the feeling of Equanimity”
Hey Seeker (or yogi)! In the world I’ve seen there are scarce few sadhus who are free of par-
tiality/bias. [However,] the one who merges cognition with a spirit of equanimity, becomes 
neither established nor non-established (i.e. takes no certain position), and he will come to 
know the essence of indestructible peace (1). He knows no distinction between wealth and 
poverty, he records gold and stone as equal. He doesn’t view woman as she-serpent (i.e. 
temptress), but sees an auspicious temple (2). Upon hearing rebuke or praise, neither joy 
nor sorrow come to him, as a master yogi in this world, he constantly ascends the gunas-
thānas (3). Who shines like the moon, and is as serious (deep) as the ocean, always ram-
bling with a bird-like spirit, fully aware (not-intoxicated), pure patience equal to a moun-
tain (4). A lotus (pankaj) is so called because it emerges from mud, but the lotus remains 
detached/distinct. Cidānanda says thus are the great ones, so is the dear lord (5). 
  (Dhūpiyā 1976, 85–7)27
26 I learned about Cidānanda, the second of these three poets, from the Jain monk Kīrti Mahārāj, 
who claims the poet to be his favorite. To my knowledge, there has not been any scholarship in 
Hindi or English on this poet (but my search to find some continues). 
27 ‘nirapekṣa viralā-samarasabhāva’
avadhu nirapakṣa viralā koī, dikhyā jaga sahu joī ǁ ṭera ǁ samarasa bhāva bhalācita jāke, 
thāpa athāpa na hoī ǀ avināśī ke ghara kī bātāṃ, jāneṃge nara soī ǁ1ǁ rāya raṃka meṃ bheda 
na jāne, kanaka upala sama lekhe ǀ nārī nāginī ko nahīṃ paricaya, to śiva maṃdira dekheṃ ǁ2ǁ 
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In his exposition on samatā, Cidānanda gives some fairly common oppositions 
to be rejected: rich and poor, stone and gold, but what is far more striking is 
that he refuses to see women as dangerous or as temptresses. Rather, he recog-
nises the figure of woman as an auspicious temple within which there is also 
a jīva that seeks liberation. While anubhava is not mentioned, he means pre-
cisely this experience when he refers to ‘knowing the essence of indestructi-
ble peace’. He uses a series of beautiful metaphors to describe the qualities of 
the equanimous: lunar brilliance, oceanic depth, roaming free as a bird, the 
patience of a mountain. Based on the force of these metaphors, even if they 
are rather standard, he is not taking samatā as indifference or greyness. It is 
rather a profound accomplishment to break free of all doctrine and opinion; 
it requires, simultaneously, immense patience, seriousness, and yet bird-like 
lightness of spirit.
The following three excerpts deal with opinion, mata, as something that 
always contains bias and conflict. Cidānanda insists that it is better not to even 
entertain a position, since all opinions are self-serving of another self. Rather, he 
implores his audience to always seek the unique experience of themselves, which 
is always an unprecedented utterance. No one else can provide this voice, since 
it remains unspoken until it is listened to, or experienced via anubhava. It is pre-
cisely here that we see the celebration of the individual:
“The ineffable (unsaid) story […]” (pada 55)
Who knows the ineffable story of your genius, only one lovingly acquainted with your wit 
(yourself),
The rest, partisan and sectarian types, they only establish deceit and conflict.28
“The all-inclusive way of the Jina” (pada 48)
No one can tell you of the true path.
Whomever you ask, they will sing the glories of their own path, 
The doctrinal drunkards, discourse-bearers, shamelessly adorn their own dogmas, 
Without the benefit of syādvāda and anubhava, their stories look to me rather pallid.29
niṃdā stuti śravaṇa sunī ne, harṣa śoka nahīṃ āṇe ǀ te jaga meṃ yogīśvara pūrā, nitya caǀte 
guṇaṭhāṇe ǁ3ǁ candra sāmāna sobhyatā jākī, sāyara jema gambhīrā ǀ apramatta bhāraṃḍa pare 
nitya, suragirī sama śuci dhīrā ǁ4ǁ paṃkaja nāma dharāya paṃkaja se, rahata kamala jima nyārā 
ǀ ‘cidānanda’ isyā jana utama, so sāheba kā pyārā ǁ5ǁ
28 ‘akatha kathā’ (pada 55)
akatha kathā kuṇa jāne ho terī catura sanehī ǁ nayavādī nayapakṣa grahī ne, jhūṭhā jhagaǀā 
ṭhāṇe ǀ
29 ‘jinamārga kī sarvāṃgitā’ (pada 48)
māraga sācā kou na batāve ǀ jāku jāya pūchie te to, apanī apanī gave ǁ matavārā matavāda vā-
dadhara, apata nija mata nīkā ǀ syādvāda anubhava bina tākā, kathana lagata mohe phīkā ǁ1ǁ
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“The Pure Nature of the Path” (pada 46)
The clever ones thus have this idea, that opinions are by nature numerous,
Like things they come and go, don’t bother indulging in discourse and counter-discourse.30
The doctrinal-drunkard, discourse-bearers, is the conceit to which I referred in 
the Banārasīdās section. The paradox is that by having (and holding) an idea you 
won’t have a clue. Through the lens of syādvāda (may-be-ism) and anubhava, the 
poet tells us all positions look rather pallid to him, without the flavour of truth. 
The motif of the ‘unsaid story’, which we will see again, is that only the individual 
can articulate his or her mind, to take any other or external position as one’s own 
would distract or cloud the sense of the Self. Thus, in the second poem, ‘No one 
can tell you the true path’. One may only find it via syādvāda and anubhava, crit-
ical non-absolutism and personal yogic insight. In the torrent of discourses and 
currents of thought, it is better not to get involved.
The last poet I will discuss, Śrīmad Rājacandra (1867–1901), was an anti- 
sectarian, Jain poet-saint from Gujarat. He models, very succinctly in his poetry 
and teachings, the way in which anubhava was mobilised to confound religious 
authority. He was aware of Cidānanda and wrote about him as a great yogi with pro-
found self-awareness (Dhūpiyā 1976). Rājacandra represents something of a culmi-
nation of the ideas which were given a significant push by Banārasīdās in the 17th 
century. He was not a mendicant, he never took dīkṣa (monastic initiation), and like 
Banārasīdās he was a merchant, poet, and religious leader all at once. And simi-
larly, his following was nearly entirely laypeople. He emphasises self- realisation 
and guru bhakti (veneration of the guru). His most celebrated text, the Ātma 
Siddhi, was composed in 1896. Śrīmad Rājacandra, as Emma Salter has indicated, 
echoes the teachings of Kundakunda. She writes, ‘[He] defines self- realisation as 
an internal or spiritual state; specifically as the experience of one’s own soul as 
a phenomenon independent from one’s physical body or empirical senses’ (Salter 
2006, 247). She does not mention that perhaps the most important vernacular lan-
guage interpreter of Kundakunda was Banārasīdās, and it was perhaps the latter 
who framed Kundakunda’s ideas in a way that would assist in reshaping religious 
authority under Rājacandra. Salter notes that Rājacandra’s recognition of self- 
realisation as the premier source of spiritual authority has had a two-fold effect on 
Rājacandra’s community: It allows lay gurus religious authority and it has evoked 
a staunch anti-sectarian ethic (Salter 2006, 249). These elements are reminiscent of 
Banārasīdās and Cidānanda, since they also promote experience and eschew any 
30 ‘śuddha-svarūpa prāptimārga’ (pada 46)
matimaṃta ema vicāro re, mata matiyana kā bhava ǁ ṭera ǁ vastu gate vastu laho re, bāda 
vibāda na koya ǀ
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sort of dogma, yet Rājacandra institutionalises these principles. Salter also rightly 
extrapolates the anti-sectarian ethic of Rājacandra and his followers as a scepticism 
about mendicants since they were seen as representatives of sectarian Jainism. The 
high premium on self-realisation and experience of the self has allowed the layper-
son to sincerely participate in the central soteriological objective of Jainism, which 
had hitherto been the reserve of mendicants.31 Rājacandra’s ‘burning passion for 
self-realisation’, can be seen in the following pad.
Knowledge of Self, equanimity, gained/emerging in wandering experiment, unprecedented 
speech, (i.e. speech full of theories never heard before), great knowledge of scriptures, these 
are the qualities worthy of a true guru (AS 10).   (Maheta and Chandrika 2006)32
Taking this pad as an example of Rājacandra’s message immediately privileges 
elements of individualisation: the focus on the self, to begin with, is ubiquitous in 
his work. Equanimity, as I have discussed, has real social implications, namely an 
openness to a variety of ways of being, this type of non-judgement propels social 
imaginaries of increased choice and possibility. The gained in wandering experi-
ment can be read a few ways, but it reminds one immediately of Cidānanda and 
Banārasīdās, since they also speak of an untethered itinerancy as a metaphor for 
a similar process of mind, but also as literally moving about in the world. Unprec-
edented speech, stands out, again, as an openness to the unique and personally 
creative, a privileging of what has never been heard before, rather than received 
wisdom and doctrines. We saw this above in the poem akatha kathā (unsaid story). 
The poet honours the uniqueness, sincerity, and personality of the individual cum 
guru. Lastly, knowledge of the true scriptures makes the list, but these are not 
specified here and maintain manoeuvrability. Below are two couplets addressing 
the problem of partisanship/bigotry and the phenomenon of plurality.
To wit, there are many doctrinal views (mata-darśana) and ways stating many paths to liber-
ation. Which among them is true? Such discrimination cannot be made.  (Couplet 93)33
In which caste is there liberation? In which external guise is there liberation? This cannot be 
decided because of the many profound differences and proclivities.  (Couplet 94)34
31 The most famous recipient of spiritual counsel from Rājacandra was, of course, Gandhi. A 
series of letters written between the two shows that Gandhi sought spiritual guidance and ‘ref-
uge’ several times from Rājacandra and received elaborate responses in Gujarati. Gandhi wrote 
in his autobiography that ‘no one else has ever made on me the impression that Raychandbhai 
[Rājacandra] did’ (Weber 2004, 34–37).
32 ātmā jñāna samadarśitā vicare udaya prayoga ǀ apūrva vāṇī paramaśruta sadaguru lakṣaṇa 
yogya ǁ10ǁ
33 athavā mata darśana ghaṇāṃ kahe upāya aneka ǀ temāṃ mata sāco kyo bane na eha viveka ǁ93ǁ
34 kayī jātimāṃ mokṣa che kayā veṣamāṃ mokṣa ǀ eno niścaya nā bane ghanā bheda e doṣa ǁ94ǁ
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The couplets focus attention again on the impossibility of taking any stand-
point. The proliferation of views makes it pointless to insist on a correct one, as 
Cidānanda also advises. He then extends this idea to social variation in the form 
of caste and outward guise (clothes, appearance, and physical identity), reject-
ing the idea that people who look a certain way or are in a certain caste have an 
exclusive claim to liberation. This is also, no doubt, meant to recall the Digam-
bar/Śvetāmbar schism. Therefore, by refusing to hierarchise or attach value and 
meaning to these social differences, Rājacandra at once brings the ethic of samatā 
into the social realm and also mobilises social plurality as a tangible metaphor 
for anekāntavāda or multiple truths.
In this last pad, the poet uses the second person to address his audience, 
striking a familiar and empowering tone. After beseeching his audience to reject 
all opinion, he asks them to turn to themselves as they are already everything.
As there is liberation in dharma; you are liberation itself; you are infinite views and knowl-
edge (darśana, jñāna); you are un-disturb-able bliss itself (Couplet 116). 
  (Rajchandra and Jaini 1964)35
The last pad speaks of an immense personal resource that becomes available only 
after the critical non-absolutism of non-alliance and non-aversion of samatā is 
realised. Here samatā resonates with the Neutral: ‘first: suspension of orders, 
laws, summons, arrogances […] Then, by way of deepening, refusal of pure dis-
course of opposition’ (Barthes 2005, 12). Samatā follows a pattern that first rejects 
bigotry/certainty/partisanship and then rejects oppositions, binaries, i.e. recog-
nising no distinctions. Once these paradigms are stripped away, the individual is 
afforded the calm to experience his or her own Self. This is the moment nuance 
can be felt and the sensitivity this affords offers a guide on to how to live: ‘nuance 
is one of the linguistic tools of nonarrogance, of nonintolerance […]’ (Barthes 
2005, 130). As it happens, these poems have non-intolerance in the content as 
well. This Jain adhyātmik literature itself is a nuanced reading of the central Jain 
tenets as it extrapolates even more from the Jain principles than conditional 
inclusivism of Haribhadra or Yaśovijaya. The poems of Cidānanda and Rājaca-
ndra promote an interpretive practice challenging ‘conditionment’ and privileg-
ing a liberating self-reliance and a non-comital attitude towards doctrine. In this 
sense, they continue what Banārasīdās had initiated, and they carry his work 
further as they focus more precisely on anubhava (experience present), samatā 
(Neutral) and the anti-dogmatic.
35 eja dharmathī mokṣa che tuṃ cho mokṣasvarūpa ǀ ananta darśana jñāna tuṃ avyābādha 
svarūpa ǁ116ǁ
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7 Conclusion
In the Jīvadvāra section of the Samayasāra Nāṭaka, Banārasīdās elaborates the 
counter-intuitive complexity and contradiction of individual beings. He uses a 
metaphor of fire and fuel to explain how jīvas are essentially the same, but man-
ifest uniquely:
Grass, wood, bamboo and various fuels of the forest, when put to fire, can be said to appear 
multiform. But if one considers only their incendiary nature, then all fire is one. Likewise, 
comprised of the nine elements, all jīvas (beings) appear multiform, some pure, mixed, and 
impure. However, giving mind to their power of sentience, they are grasped as formless and 
undifferentiated.  (Banārasīdās 1997, 31)36
Thus Banārasīdās attempts to reconcile the enigma of difference and equal-
ity, suggesting a perspectivist approach to the problem that allows individuals 
and fires to have simultaneously identical and differing properties. This both 
explains individuality (and plurality) and allows for it, and then asserts that 
from another perspective, all beings are undifferentiated. James Laidlaw has 
written eloquently about the complexity and would-be paradoxes of the image 
of Jainism that we frequently encounter, ‘[…] values and ideals can exist in 
counterpoint: a relation that is not logical or semantic, but aesthetic. Incom-
patible ideals can remain compelling […]’ (Laidlaw 1995, 389). If we think 
about Jainism as austere and mirthless, just orientated towards stark, absolute 
isolation, we miss the whimsical poetic part that remains defiantly nimble, 
that offers encouragement to the individual seeker to rely on him/herself. 
Banārasīdās places the activities and experiences of individuals at the centre of 
his work and his successors push this ethic even further by rejecting anything 
external to the self. And yet, along with this individualistic impetus, they form 
a supportive community for those who wish to be themselves. Banārasīdās is 
even able to make dancing a metaphor for the bliss of stark, absolute isolation 
in nirvana (kevala): ṭhānai nṛtya pāi ekanta (‘finding himself in solitude, he 
breaks into dance’; Lath 2005, verse 655).
36 jaise tṛṇa kāṭha bāṃsa ārane ityādi aura, īṃdhana aneka vidhi pāvakameṃ dahiye ǀ ākṛti 
vilokita kahāvai āga nānārūpa, dīsai eka dāhaka subhāva jaba gahiye ǁ taisaiṃ nava tat-
tvameṃ bhayau hai bahu bheṣī jīva, suddharūpa miśrita asuddha rūpa kahiye ǀ jāhī china 
cetanā sakatikau vicāra kījai, tāhī china alakha abhedarūpa lahiye ǁ (Samayasāra Nāṭaka, 
Jīvadvāra, 8)
892   Rahul Bjørn Parson
References
Babb, Lawrence. 1998. “Ritual Culture and Distinctiveness of Jainism.” In Open boundaries: 
Jain communities and culture in Indian history, edited by John E. Cort. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press.
Bakhtin, M. M. 1998. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. 11th paperback printing ed, 
University of Texas Press Slavic series. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Banarasidasa, and Nathurama Premi. 1943. Ardha kathanaka lagabhaga tina sau varsha 
pahale likhi gai eka padyabaddha atmakatha. Bambai: Hindi-Grantha-Ratnakara 
Karyalaya.
Bangha, Imre. 2013. It’s a City-showman’s Show!: Transcendental Songs of Anandghan. 
New York: Penguin.
Bangha, Imre. 2015. New Aesthetics in Eighteenth-century Brajbhasha: Emerging Individualism 
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Saurabh Dube
Subjects of conversion in colonial central India
This chapter raises key questions concerning religion, individualisation, 
and religious individualisation/institutionalisation. It does so by exploring 
the interplay of conversion, translation, and life-stories. Such interplay was 
embedded within processes of evangelical entanglements between Euro- 
American missionaries and central-Indian peoples in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. Specifically, I focus on autobiographies and biographies of 
converts to Christianity in the Chhattisgarh region of central India, especially 
accounts written in the first half of the twentieth century. Here, the ordinary 
nature and the very details of these texts – mediated by procedures of vernac-
ular translation – not only reveal the writings as key registers of evangelical 
entanglements. They further foreground critical queries that turn on religion 
and politics, individual and subject, individualisation and personhood, insti-
tutionalisation and akrasia.1
To anticipate the arguments that follow, the writings of convert subjects in 
colonial India put a question mark over the notion that individualisation and 
institutionalisation are opposed ideas. In such accounts, conversion and person-
hood, subject and author appear within emergent practices and performances 
of translation. Here, distinctive entailments of myth, legend, and narrative can 
break upon a missionary’s description of a convert’s life. At the same time, a 
son’s story of his father’s conversion uneasily reveals individuality and religious 
individualisation but only after drawing on classical figurations of the epic pro-
tagonist. Finally, a distinct autobiographical narrative of an Indian evangelical 
worker appears to be shored up by recalcitrance toward paternal authority and 
refusal of paternalist power – in a manner that the acute contrariness of the 
tale puts its particular twist to irony and akrasia (for instance, Henderson, this 
publication).
1 For some years now, I have been working on Christianity, conversion, and colonialism, con-
joining central Indian ethnographic histories and North American cultural pasts. The present 
paper builds on such prior and ongoing work, based on a familiarity with wider archival, em-
pirical, and theoretical questions. It is in this manner that I seize upon particular texts, broad 
questions, and their enactments in everyday arenas in order to address issues of the research 
group of which we are a part.
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1 Overture
In 1868, the Reverend Oscar Lohr of the German Evangelical Mission Society ini-
tiated evangelical work in Chhatisgarh. Over the next eight decades, six mission-
ary organisations – including, the American Mennonites, the General Conference 
Mennonites, the Disciples of Christ, the American Evangelical Mission, and the 
Methodists – conducted their evangelical enterprise there. Aided by paternalist 
institutions such as Christian villages, hospitals, and orphanages, conversions 
to Christianity grew haltingly, primarily through ties of family and kinship and 
principally among lower-caste and adivasi (or indigenous) groups. On the one 
hand, the converts continued to understand missionary injunctions and to inter-
pret evangelical truths through the grids of quotidian cultures. Drawing in the 
energies of their Western benefactors as witting accomplice and hapless victim, 
these peoples participated in the making of a colonial and a vernacular Christi-
anity. On the other hand, the mission project itself unravelled through contradic-
tory connections with colonial cultures. Furthermore, such processes in central 
India were intimately tied to those of congregations and Churches in Midwestern 
America. The missionaries had to leave India after its independence. In 1947, there 
were only around fifteen thousand Protestant Christians in a population of seven 
million in Chhattisgarh. At the same time, in independent India, as under impe-
rial rule, the social and political significance of Indian Christians has exceeded 
their numerical unimportance (Dube 2004).
2 Uncanny witness
All of this now registered, I begin with the words of a catechist recounting his 
witness, his work of spreading the Word in a remote village in Chhattisgarh very 
early in the twentieth century. The catechist writes in a hesitant English while 
reporting on his labour to an American missionary, his employer. My purpose in 
rehearsing this example is to highlight the fact that, against the grain of stable 
figures of the individual and author, common sense forms of religion and history, 
and taken-for-granted apprehensions of (religious) individualisation and insti-
tutionalisation, it was the uncanny, the uncommon, and the unstable that often 
defined such subjects within evangelical entanglements. This will allow me 
to ask key questions and articulate critical categories turning on issues of the 
individual and institution, of religion and power, of religious individualisation/
institutionalisation, which presages my discussion of the writings of subjects of 
conversion in this essay.
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24 Monday [January 1908, the village of] Khaira. [Met] Kondu Gond. At the time of preach-
ing, I saw a kid which was intended for sacrifice. I explained to him [Kondu] the object of 
sacrifice in ancient times and that he was right to offer a kid to appease his god for his sins 
but it was a symbol of Jesus Christ who would become incarnate and shed his blood for all 
mankind […] 6 [people were] present. 
(Entry for 24 January 1908 from the day-book of a catechist 
[Anonymous], Manuscript, 83–5)
This brief passage bears an enormous burden. Early in his vocation of disseminat-
ing the Word in central India, the catechist encounters Kondu Gond, an adivasi 
who is about to sacrifice a kid, a baby goat. Yet the native evangelist does not 
disabuse Kondu of the ‘superstitious’ nature and the ‘heathen’ character of this 
action. Rather, the catechist is transported back to the density of descriptions of 
sacrifice in the Book, particularly the Old Testament, concerning, for example, 
the Mosaic sacrifice and the Lamb of God, the sacrifice of Abraham and the Lamb 
of Pascal. The catechist explains to Kondu the ‘object of sacrifice in ancient times’, 
linking this to the sacrifice of Christ.
Here it can be argued that the catechist is doing little more than elaborating 
a key tenet of Christianity, contrasting the variety and inefficacy of the Mosaic 
bloody sacrifices with the uniqueness and efficacy of the sacrifice of Christ for 
the forgiveness of sins. This idea poignantly appears, for instance, in the Epistle 
to the Hebrews:
Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the 
holy place, having obtained redemption for us. For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the 
ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh; How much 
more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot 
to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God? 
 (Hebrews 9: 11–3. The Holy Bible, King James Version 1950, 226).
Yet this is not quite the catechist’s intention, nor is it his representation. Rather, 
drawing a parallel between the sacrifices preceding Christ ‘in ancient times’ and 
Kondu’s sacrifice of the kid in early twentieth century Chhattisgarh, he finds in 
both actions a prefiguring of the sacrifice of Christ. ‘I explained to him [Kondu] the 
object of sacrifice in ancient times and that he was right to offer a kid to appease 
his god for his sins but it was a symbol of Jesus Christ […]’. This is remarkable. As 
we know, Christianity recognises but one sacrifice, the sacrifice once offered by 
Christ in a bloody manner on the tree of the Cross. Yet, mixing together figures of 
the past and forms of the present, the Catechist is claiming that Kondu is correct 
in appeasing his god through the sacrifice of the kid, so long as there is clear rec-
ognition of what the goat and the sacrifice symbolise.
Of course, it is important to remember that the Redeemer Himself instituted 
the sacrifice of the Holy Mass so that the bloody sacrifice of Calvary could be 
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 continued and represented in an un-bloody manner. It was in this fashion that 
the merits of redemption won by the sacrifice of the Cross were to apply – once 
and forever – to individuals in sacrificial form, through constant sacrifice. At 
the same time, as a Protestant, the catechist did not argue from such grounds of 
Eucharistic sacrifice and its relation to the sacrifice on the Cross. Far from it: ‘I 
explained to him the object of sacrifice in ancient times and that he was right to 
offer a kid to appease his god for his sins but it was a symbol of Jesus Christ who 
would become incarnate and shed his blood for all mankind’.
Through an ambivalence of verb tense and an uncertainty of subject (kid 
or Christ?), conjoining the past of the ancients and the present of evangelism, 
the catechist uniquely proposed that there was to be another incarnation and 
another sacrifice for the redemption of humankind. Of the kid or of the Christ, 
we cannot be sure. Of the stipulations of the King and the Cross (in the labour 
of sacrifice and the work of redemption), we do not know. Through excess of 
application to the Book, out of surplus of application of the Word, the catechist 
produced a supplementary narrative on the subjects of kid and Christ, sacrifice 
and redemption. The very literalism of his procedures – bringing to mind Walter 
Benjamin’s advocacy of literalism in the task of translation – were definitional of 
practices of vernacular translation, about which more later.
3 Critical categories
My point now concerns staying with the questions raised by this passage and its 
implications for our deliberations. What does the encounter with, the entangle-
ments of, this work of witness tell us about individualisation and institutionali-
sation? In what ways can the processes being described here be captured by the 
optics of religious individualisation/institutionalisation? What sort of a creature 
is the catechist – what kind of an individual, what manner of an agent, what 
variety of a subject, revealing which trajectories of individualisation and what 
processes of institutionalisation, religious or otherwise? 
Questions of religious individualisation and institutionalisation – alongside 
those of ‘de- individualisation’ and the ‘dividual’ – have been discussed for long years 
now. Allow me to outline my orientations toward certain categories that might be crit-
ical for our deliberations. The exercise has much to do with approaching theory not 
as a prior overarching structure that frames an enquiry. Instead, theory and method 
are understood as ways of asking questions. It is in this way that theory-method are 
thought down to the ground, the demanding terms of everyday worlds, so that theory 
equally emerges as bound to narrative, each crisscrossing one another.
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In thinking through religious individualisation and institutionalisation, it 
might be useful to begin with religion, and then relatedly turn to power/politics. I 
approach religion as straddling the personal and the collective, the mundane and 
the sacred, the everyday and the institutional, epiphany and oracle, the ineffable 
and the obvious. Now, far from being antinomies, such elements (and copulas) often 
actually beget each other. This is because, for me, religion is immanent, turning on 
historical-cultural practices, meanings, and rituals of spatiotemporal subjects. Here 
are to be found rituals, meanings, and practices whose renderings and reconfigura-
tions of worlds and divinities are closely tied to processes of authority and alterity, 
power and value, the appearance of the sublime and the making of the grotesque.
This is where politics, rendered as power, kicks in. For, I understand politics 
and power as extending further and deeper than merely routine institutionalised 
attributes of authority and governance centring on the state and its subjects. 
Rather, power and politics are articulated as equally embodying diffuse domains 
and the intimate configuration of authority and desire, including their seductions 
and subversions, turning on race and sexuality, gender and age, class and caste. 
All this has implications for how, as parts of such force-fields, we unravel the link-
ages of religion not only with power but with state, nation, and government, criti-
cally querying common sense presumptions of the secular and secularisation, all 
issues I have discussed elsewhere, including in several of the references cited in 
the bibliography to this essay.2 The question now is: where am I going with these 
musings? The response is simple. For me, issues of individualisation are, ulti-
mately, better understood as involving formations of subjects, processes of sub-
jectification, and performances of personhood, all of which turn upon meaning 
and power: power and meaning, authority and alterity that course through reli-
gions, politics, worlds, and the subject-agents who populate these procedures, 
including those of the productions, effects, and affects of institutionalisation.
Let me elaborate. Before projections of individualisation lie presumptions 
of the individual, before imaginings of institutionalisation lie images of the 
institutional.3 And so, it is our exact assumptions about the individual and the 
2 State, nation, and government, their policy and program, now emerge as bearing twinned 
dimensions: entailing formidably embodied disciplinary techniques toward forming and trans-
forming subjects-citizens, such protocols, and their reworking by citizens-subjects, register the 
shaping of authority by anxiety, uncertainty, and alterity, of the structuring of command by de-
ferral, difference, and displacement.
3 I am speaking of epistemic precedence rather than a chronological precedence here, for the 
latter would simply return to what came first, the egg or the hen? Although if we believed in 
god-the-creator, the answer to the conundrum/riddle might depend on which divine, what faith, 
we practice.
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institutional that need to be examined and queried, critically and carefully. 
Is the individual being taken to exist across space and time, through history 
and across cultures? Is the individual, then, an innate staple of the world and 
therefore, thereby an a priori unit of analysis? In terms of ontological assump-
tion and epistemic precedence, is the individual presumed to be pre-social, 
in the sense that it begets the social and the institutional, which are further 
apprehended as taken for granted entities-concepts? That is, is the individual 
Nietzsche’s ‘promise-making animal’, who enters into binding relations of obli-
gation and responsibility with other individuals to create society, institutions, 
institutional structures, institutionalised processes? Further, as an entity- 
category that is already always present, is the individual simultaneously in 
front of the institutional?
Here, then, is the key query: In its exact essence, is the individual ‘autono-
mous’ from structure and the collective, institution and the institutional? (This 
is a query I draw not from the ether but actually from the result-statements and 
deliberations of the religious individualisation research group.) It is important to 
stay with, face up to, think through all this.
Now, I appreciate the interrogation within the religious individualisation 
project of the Eurocentric propensities that confine the ‘individual’ only to 
modern European and Euro-American worlds. At the same time, my question 
is different: does such an ‘autonomous individual’ exist anywhere? Or, is this 
figure the effect and an affect of particular processes of history, meaning, 
and power, a form that has subsequently been universalised, made to stand 
in as common currency across the world, over space, through time? This is 
to ask: is this projection of the autonomous individual shored up by perva-
sive presumptions of the bounded, intentional subject? Are we in the face of 
the autonomous individual as the sovereign subject who is seen as the privi-
leged locus of action and reason? As the privileged locus of action and reason 
that is ever constrained by power and the collective, which this autonomous 
individual is seen as always militating against even as it begets the institu-
tional, as a latter, external object? Is this the individual, autonomous, sover-
eign subject who articulates an adjudicatory, meaning-legislative rationality? 
Does not this rationality frame the objects it considers in the image of the 
 commentator-analysts’ singular, self-same reason rather than as subjects of 
other reasons? Are these images and mirrors not the means for the envision-
ing of the institutional and institutionalisation, which are already, always 
apart from the individual?
Let us retrace our steps. The key issue turns on meaningful human actors or 
agents in history and society. Now, mine is the not the silly suggestion that such 
meaningful human actors or agents in history and society simply do not exist. 
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The question is different: Should such actors-agents be cast as ‘individuals’, 
especially autonomous ones or even otherwise? Or, are such agents better ren-
dered as subjects? This is not terminological nit-picking. Far from it. Indeed, I am 
looking beyond the principally a priori singular individual to consider instead 
necessarily heterogeneous subjects. These innately heterogeneous subjects 
are ever formed and transformed within shifting processes and relationships 
of meaning and power, within diffuse and structured nodes, networks, institu-
tions, which they create and are contained by, hardly ever under the circum-
stances of their choosing. (I have in mind relationships and processes, networks 
and nodes, institutions and structures – and of course subjects – that turn on 
divisions and solidarities. Here are to be found, for instance, solidarities and 
divisions of gender, sexuality, and hierarchy, which were outlined above. The 
processes equally entail wide-ranging articulations, over the past few centuries, 
of empire and nation, colony and modernity, as bound to the Renaissance and 
Romanticism, the Enlightenment and Anti-modernism, the Reformation and the 
Inquisition, to take a few examples.) The point is that in speaking of social actors 
as historical subjects my reference is precisely to their active participation in 
these broad relational processes of history and society. Such participation turns 
on two meanings of the term subject. That is, my reference is to social-spatial 
actors who have been both subject to (shaped by) these processes and relation-
ships but also subjects of (themselves shaping) these relationships and pro-
cesses (Dube 2017).
It follows that the place-play of power in the shaping of subjects is of enor-
mous import here. For power and authority are no longer approached in terms of 
their exclusively repressive functions, whether as curbing autonomous individu-
als or as controlling recalcitrant collectivities. That is, I have in mind Foucault’s 
famous undoing of the ‘no-saying’ propensity of power, which is to say power’s 
‘thou shall not’ stricture to its subjects. Rather, power is unravelled in terms of its 
productivity, fecundity, and promiscuousness but also its anxiety, ambivalence, 
and uncertainty (ibid.).
In terms of the dynamic between power and subject, at stake here are pro-
cesses of subjectification: the ways in which formations of power and their 
seductions invite and entice human beings to make them subject to and subject 
of authority, including institutionalised disciplines of state and religion, offer-
ing and inciting action and imagination. Turning to the figure of the ‘modern 
individual’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘individuality’ have not been the end results of a 
developmental (or civilising) process. Rather, the claims upon and performances 
of ‘individuality’ and ‘autonomy’ are the (at once emergent and institutional) 
effects, affects, and consequences of the processes of subjectification. Indeed, 
since power is not simply an external force but an intimate commandment, here 
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might be found variously the will to improve and progress, the desire to obey and 
respect, and the impulse to resist and challenge.
Now, if subjects and their formations are necessarily heterogeneous, ever 
enacted within wider processes of meaning and power, such subjects bear differ-
ent personhoods – their senses of selves and others, cognates and affines, friends 
and enemies, images and colours, smells and sounds, and words and worlds. 
Understood in this fashion, the individual’s is only one among distinct person-
hoods. Effectively, the individual is a particular sort of subject or agent or actor, 
who imagines and emotes, stages and rehearses, performs and practices, lives 
and loses her/his personhood, including autonomy and individuality, the insti-
tutional and the institutionalised, their fissures and fractures. As forms of per-
sonhood, such practices of becoming and being individuals can themselves vary 
enormously, as imagination and institutionalisation.
I acknowledge of course that the term individual can be used as implying 
simply meaningful human actors or agents in history and society. At the same 
time, the problem with any invocation of the ‘individual’ is that it readily and rou-
tinely takes us back to a singular abstraction, an a priori presence, that primary 
locus of agency. The haunting of knowledge and the world by this figure of the 
individual cannot be wished away. And so too what come to be overlooked are the 
different dimensions of the subject, their performance of personhood, including 
of the individual.4
Of course, no term is perfect. Actually, I am attracted to the very contrariness 
of subjects, the contrariness of the category-entity of the subject, including the 
mutual begetting of individualisation and institutionalisation under modernity. 
Indeed, it is in this spirit I distinguish between historically located ‘subjects of 
modernity’, bearing heterogeneous reasons/understandings, on the one hand, 
and routine representations of the ‘modern subject’, as insinuating a singular 
rationality, on the other (ibid; also Dube 2004). Rendered in practice, this dis-
tinction queries a meaning-legislative, adjudicatory reason; it grounds theory in 
the world; and it traces the active interchanges between subjects of modernity, 
modern subjects, and individual personhoods, that are all necessarily not-one. 
Here is heterogeneity that is not merely empirical but acutely critical. It is some of 
these concerns that I elaborate in the pages ahead.
4 Within the religious individualisation project, these issues have been imaginatively addressed 
by articulating the notion of the dividual and processes of de-individualisation. At the same 
time, I wonder if after all dividual and de-individualisation are not premised upon the grounds of 
individual and individualisation, which they seek to refute. Instead, I seize upon the idea-entity 
of the subject.
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4 Questions of conversion
I have shown elsewhere that dominant conceptions of conversion – as an ‘indi-
vidual’ event or a ‘collective’ endeavour – are bedevilled by two overlapping dif-
ficulties (Dube 2010; 2003). First, they remain rooted in common sense European 
connotations of the category. Second, they turn conversion into a self-contained 
analytical apparatus, a self-generative descriptive domain. It is in this way that 
the event of conversion is widely understood as intimating a singular life and 
indicating an exclusive history for the convert, ‘individually’ and ‘collectively’. 
At stake in thinking through such conceptions are wide-ranging questions that 
undergird issues of religious individualisation.
The autobiographical and biographical materials – as well as accounts 
of witness – explored in my paper narrate the words and worlds of subjects of 
conversion in colonial India. On the one hand, all too often, and particularly in 
social science literature, Christian conversion in non-western contexts appears 
as an essentially collective endeavour, opposing it to the image of the solitary 
Saul who sees the light in understandings of conversion in western arenas. Here 
modular understandings construe conversion as a search for meaning in front 
of the onslaught of modernisation/modernity in remote non-western theatres. 
A particular problem with such schemes lies in their tendency to bracket the 
 distinct experiences of conversion, especially converts’ notations of lives and his-
tories and their performances of personhood. On the other hand, Pauline prop-
ositions and psychological prototypes regarding conversion tend to present it as 
an exclusively personal act, also intimating a solitary trajectory. Here the lone 
seeker transfers to a new, primary religious affiliation through a judicious choice 
among distinct and competing faiths, and then acts upon this choice through 
sincere personal belief and committed membership of community in Christ. Such 
understandings are based upon meta-historical and meta-cultural assumptions 
regarding action and understanding, the personal and the collective, conversion 
and Christianity. Unsurprisingly, these two opposed orientations can incline 
toward discounting what is salient and specific about lives and histories in the 
wake of conversion, the acute performances and practices of becoming and being 
Christian as attributes of distinct personhoods – the substance and spirit (or the 
stuff) of subjects of conversion.
We noted that most conversions to Christianity in colonial Chhattisgarh came 
about through networks of extended kinship, further entailing bonds of caste and 
sect, and the prospects of a better life under the paternalist economies of mission 
stations. Yet people also converted in other ways, variously negotiating kith and 
kin, caste and sect. Indeed, even those Christians whose conversion was effected 
through conduits of kinship were not simply figures of a singular, collective logic. 
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In each case, conversion provided a resource for distinct plotting(s) of selves, 
different telling(s) of selfhood, discrete performance(s) of personhood, diverse 
enactments of individuality, disparate measures of subject-hood – being sub-
jects, subjects of and subjects to. This is revealed by the writings discussed ahead.
These narratives were at once shaped by colonial verities and marked by ver-
nacular attributes, both aspects of an evangelical modernity. Although apparently 
formulaic in nature, they engage and exceed the telos of dominant narratives of 
conversion to Christianity, further raising questions for proposals of religious 
individualisation. The accounts imbue such exclusive story lines with their own 
notations. Here conversion and personhood appear as processes, practices, and 
performances of translation, involving the entangled work yet the unequal labour 
of the convert and the missionary. They reveal that at the core of colonial histories 
and evangelical entanglements lie the complex making and unmaking of histori-
cal forms, social identities, ritual practices, mythic meanings, and narrative forms. 
If we are to find religious individualisation at all, it is within such matrices that we 
are obliged to do so, modalities of religious individualisation as beleaguered (not 
brave) protocols, turning on formations of subjects, processes of subjectification, 
and performances of personhood – all of this shored up by vernacular translation.
5 Terms of translation
Beginning with the issue of the impossibility of translation, which I have discussed 
elsewhere, the subject of translation is a vexed one (Dube 2008a). My point here is 
merely that, as George Steiner’s (1975, 250) ‘abundant, vulgar fact’, translation is 
possible because it happens, and happens all the time in social worlds. Indeed, it 
is precisely the routine performance and the quotidian practice of translation that 
have been subject to critical considerations in recent times (especially Barnstone 
1995). To begin with, in debates on cultural translation there has been keen recogni-
tion of what Talal Asad (1993, 171–99) has described as the ‘inequality of languages’. 
Such inequality also implies inequity, the two together inscribing and re-inserting 
asymmetries of languages and idioms, knowledge and power in the name of a 
neutral science and in the guise of an authoritative translation. All of this has led 
to distinctive bids toward a critical-creative practice of translation in history and 
anthropology (for instance, Chakrabarty 2000, 7–18; Sakai 1997). It has also encour-
aged critical scholarship to emphasise that processes of translation were central to 
the elaboration of colonial cultures, instituting distinct forms of colonising power 
and eliciting diverse practices of colonised subjects (for example, Rafael 1988; 
Larson 1997; Peterson 1999; Fabian 1986; Mignolo 1995). Indeed, in the articulation 
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of Christianity and colonialism, as Vicente Rafael (1988, 21) has argued, by ‘setting 
languages in motion, translation tended to cast intentions adrift, now laying, now 
subverting the ideological grounds of colonial hegemony’. Here was dialogue and 
distinction that secured and subverted colonial power and missionary authority by 
construing these through familiar referents and unfamiliar premises.
At this point, it is important to clarify my use of the category vernacular transla-
tion. The notion at once builds upon and departs from Vicente Rafael’s imaginative 
discussion of Spanish colonial and Christian translation among the Tagalog. Now, 
for Rafael (ibid., xi, 21, and passim), translation refers to certified practices involv-
ing clerical-colonial renderings of the Word and its attendant tools and texts into 
the vernacular. He describes the Tagalog ‘response’ to such processes as ‘vernacu-
larisation’. In contrast, my own focus concerns non-certified procedures of trans-
lation set in motion among Indian Christians in the wake of evangelisation and 
translation initiated by the Euro-American missionary. It is such procedures that I 
call vernacular translation. Put differently, vernacular translation does not simply 
indicate the linguistic rendering of texts and works from the English language 
into vernacular idioms. Rather, it equally refers to procedures of the transmuta-
tion of distinct categories and discrete concepts. These procedures lay between the 
interplay (and inequality) of languages, between the exchange (and inequity) of 
idioms, ever on the cusp of the English and the vernaculars, incessantly straddling 
and scrambling the boundaries and horizons of the original and the translation.
Understood in this fashion, the practices of vernacular translation that under-
lie the narratives in front inhabited the interstices brought into existence by the 
‘separation between the original message of Christianity […] and its rhetorical for-
mulation in the vernacular’ (ibid., 20–1) by missionaries in colonial India. Indeed, 
as we shall soon see, the missionaries themselves could not escape the force and 
reach of vernacular translation. And so, procedures of vernacular translation often 
constrained the universalising assumptions of a colonial Christianity in British 
India. Yet, they did this not so much by turning away from its ‘totalising impulses’ 
as by imbuing these with an excess of meaning, a surplus of faith. In other words, 
vernacular translation illuminates Indian renderings of Christianity and empire 
but not simply as a ‘response’ to – which is to say, never ever split apart from – the 
Euro-American evangelist and colonial power.5 All this should become clear in 
the accounts ahead, which underscore that the terms of religious conversion are a 
critical resource to think through the concept of religious individualisation.
5 I elaborate these considerations of vernacular translation by reading the catechist’s chroni-




I turn to two biographical accounts of the Reverend Ramnath Simon Bajpai, who 
was an evangelist of the German Evangelical Mission. One of these accounts 
was drafted by the missionary Theodore C. Seybold, who served in central India 
between 1913 and 1958; the other was written in 1958 by Ramnath Bajpai’s son, 
David Bajpai. The two typescripts show particular overlaps but they also reveal 
critical differences.6
Specifically, the missionary Seybold’s (Typescript undated) was a most sin-
gular rendering of the conversion of the Brahman Ramnath, which followed a 
given blueprint, a prior pattern. Yet, even in this account, to plot the life of a 
primordial upper-caste convert, a connection had to be made between an ancient 
prophecy, a pioneer missionary, and the lone seeker Ramnath Bajpai – uncanny 
tales at the core of evangelical encounters (Dube 1998). Where am I going with 
all this? On the one hand, in the testimony of Theodore Seybold, the conversion 
of Ramnath was exclusive in nature, based on the likeness of the solitary Saul 
who saw the light, intimating a novel trajectory of faith and life. What order of 
individuality and autonomy do we discover in the density of such descriptions 
that envision the life of an Indian convert in the image of the Apostles? If indeed 
we are to find religious individualisation and institutionalisation here, is this of a 
regular or an irregular kind? On the other hand, simultaneously in this account, 
the very terms of an immaculate conversion were acutely forged through the force 
of rumour and the strength of prophecy. This is to say that distinctive entailments 
of myth, legend, and narrative broke upon the missionary’s description of Ram-
nath’s life, placing a question mark on the exact terms of religious individualis-
ation and institutionalisation. Thus, an exclusive rendering of conversion was yet 
enacted through wide-ranging formations of meanings, constitutively turning on 
processes of vernacular translation. Did this not acutely reveal both the convert 
Ramnath and the missionary Seybold as concrete and contrary subjects of evan-
gelical entanglements? What does this tell us not just about the multiple map-
pings but the fraught registers of religious individualisation/institutionalisation?
This brings me to Ramnath’s life-history that was written by his son, David 
Bajpai (Typescript 1945, 1–2). The account follows a different direction from the 
6 Theodore Seybold served as a missionary in Chhattisgarh between 1913 and 1958. For nine 
years, he frequently met Ramnath Bajpai; Seybold lived for a long time in the home of the Mis-
sionary Jacob Gass; Ramnath was the head catechist working under Gass, and was often pres-
ent in the missionary’s home. Few biographical details are forthcoming about David Bajpai. I 
have earlier authored a wider and deeper discussion of the life-histories explored in this chapter 
(Dube 2008b, 259–90).
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missionary’s narrative. It is based on a rather particular blueprint, that of the 
biography of an exemplary character, itself inflected by the lore of the learned 
Brahman. This story is based upon Ramnath’s already distinguished ancestry, at 
once Brahmanical and martial, as well as his intellectual prowess as a student. 
This portrayal is rooted in the widespread lore of the learned Brahman conquer-
ing all with his liturgical abilities and scholarly propensities, so that he finds high 
office in a royal court. This tale is founded on Ramnath’s own spiritual experience 
as envisioned in the mirror of Hindu darshan (vision/envisioning of divinity). 
Indeed, it is only after he is thus primed and presented that Ramnath Bajpai can 
sally forth to consummate his manifest, Christian destiny.
Ramnath is not just a mimic man or an acute double, simply envisioned in the 
evangelical mirror, in the likeness of the missionary or the image of the Apostles. 
In David Bajpai’s account, Ramnath’s sincere character and self-commitment to 
the Bible put him on a par with the missionaries, while distinguishing his persona 
from their personalities. It follows that distinct from the missionary Seybold’s 
more straightforward account of Ramanth’s change of faith, David Bajpai’s nar-
rative of his father’s conversion traverses a jagged trajectory. In the missionary’s 
tale, a single string binds Ramnath’s conversion with his baptism – his formative 
change of spiritual orientation with his formal entry into the Christian church – 
where each step is marked by a breach with the past.
The son’s story exceeds the life of the convert as a reflection of the history 
of the mission. On the one hand, Ramnath’s upright character and his self- 
commitment to the Word – on par with the missionary, yet innately different – 
seemingly surmount all obstacles in his path to conversion. They lead Ramnath 
inexorably toward his entry into the community of Christ through baptism. On the 
other hand, bonds of caste and kin constitute more than hurdles that are deftly 
overcome by the enquirer-into-convert. Rather, they also bear a distinct gravity, 
a discrete force. It is Ramnath’s realisation of the rupture with these ties and the 
fear this engenders that lead him to seek refuge among Christians, unto his con-
version through baptism – as a last step, a final resort. Indeed, we are at last, pos-
sibly in the face of an account that uncertainly betokens autonomy, individuality, 
and religious individualisation, which are yet grounded in the classical, figura-
tions of the ancient, not unlike the entanglements of the concept of the modern, 
as Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht (1992) reminds us.
At the same time, David’s was a lone text. Few autobiographical accounts 
embedded in the evangelical encounter could take for granted the distinctiveness 
of their own lives. Here the uncommon and the unremarkable had to be conjured 
and construed; the distinctive and the routine had to be reckoned with and sorted 
out. Such is the case with most of the writings of native evangelical workers, elic-
ited by missionaries in the 1920s and 1930s, possibly for publication, as well as 
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the life stories of Indian Christians, which I collected in the 1990s for the purpose 
of research. Mired in the common and the quotidian, in various ways these nar-
ratives dramatised the ordinary as the remarkable and pursued the uncommon 
in the everyday. In the case of all these narratives, it would be much too facile 
to present the lives they narrated as ‘all-of-a-piece’, whether seen through the 
optics of individualisation or sieved through filters of conversion. To do so will be 
to ignore the ‘inner tensions – the fluctuations and hesitancies between oppos-
ing ideas or moods’ that run through such accounts, as Arthur O. Lovejoy (cited 
in Kern 1983, 10) reminded us many, many decades ago. The attempt of these 
narratives was to revealingly dramatise the very commonness of the lives of their 
protagonists. Such dramatisations were themselves propelled and circumscribed 
by the constitutive tensions of the accounts. Here, an acute contrariness can run 
through several of these accounts – ‘inner tensions’ escape and exceed the exclu-
sive life of the convert insinuated by dominant conceptions of conversion and put 
a distinct spin on notions of religious individualisation.
As an illustration of what I have been arguing, let me briefly turn to the ‘Life 
Story of Johann Purti’, a typescript of three and a half pages, which was first 
drafted by J. Purti (Typescript 1934) and then typed by a missionary in April 1934. 
At the beginning, through an emphasis upon geographical detail and historical 
chronology, Johann Purti establishes his ancestry and the fact that he was born a 
Christian. Here there is no rhetorical rhapsody or tortured tale of religious trans-
formation.7 A simple sentence suffices: ‘After Sepoy Mutiny in 1857 he [Purti’s 
grandfather] became a Christian and was named Samuel Purti in baptism’ (ibid.). 
Next, the account quickly covers Johann’s initial lack of interest in attending 
school, his appreciation of learning upon moving to a boarding house, and his 
return home in the last year of high school after discovering that his father was 
borrowing money for his education. None of this is remarkable, hardly preparing 
us for the change of tone that now follows.
After leaving school my father asked me to join the Theological Seminary but I refused, 
telling him that one who wanted to be a padre should join because I looked down on the 
padres. Then my father asked me to learn the work of petition writer in the court but I said 
to him that one who would tell a lie and would rob the poor, should go to the court. Then my 
7 Indeed, conversion does not appear as a dramatic or miraculous event in any of the life histo-
ries written or narrated by Christians in Central India that I consulted for this essay. This is true 
of various autobiographical accounts of women and men in Chhattisgarh today. It also holds for 
narratives written in the colonial period. If contrary tendencies characterise David Bajpai’s story 
of his father’s conversion and Johann Purti narrates the event of his grandfather’s becoming 
Christian as an un-dramatic fact, even those accounts in which conversion was accorded central-
ity told the tale in rather low-key ways.
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father asked me to get a position in the railway or in the Forest Department. I answered him 
that one who wanted to be a vagabond should join these two lines. Then my father asked 
me what should I do. I told him I would be a farmer. Outwardly he assented but inwardly 
he wanted that I should change my mind. So he began giving me very hard works. I was 
working with servants as servants. I was working so hard that it changed my mind. I went to 
a relative who was a doctor with the intention to learn the work of a compounder but I was 
not satisfied and wanted to go to a great hospital for which I asked a recommendation from 
the Principal of my school (ibid., 1–2).
This unusual passage introduces us to the critical devices shaping Johann Purti’s 
autobiographical account, which together constitute a curious amalgam. First, 
the narrative is entirely cast as that of a life seeking an occupation, an existence 
stalking a vocation. Second, recalcitrance toward paternal authority, refusal of 
paternalist power, runs through the text. Third, a perpetual note of dissatisfac-
tion afflicts the protagonist of this story, which is also the basis of his recalci-
trance. Fourth, the sources of this discontent often lie in the nature of the occupa-
tion ahead of Johann Purti and in the hardships such work entails, which teach 
him a lesson. Yet, the roots of this discontent equally constitute an existential 
condition. Fifth, abrupt changes of mind as much as God’s guidance lead our 
protagonist in his choices of career. Sixth and finally, such tropic designs – espe-
cially, the salience of occupation, the place of recalcitrance, and the presence of 
dissatisfaction – pattern the entire narrative, driving it toward its resolution. Here 
the critical forms are the vocation of a padre and the work of a compounder. Yet 
like the narrative itself, the resolution too is unstable.
Let me explain. After miraculous encounters with passages from the Book 
of Timothy in the Bible, Johann accepts the vocation of a padre in 1927, declaring 
that he was ‘now a compounder of the greatest physician Jesus’ (ibid., 4). How 
might we read the end of Johann’s story? It is not only that the transformation that 
follows Johann’s encounter with passages of the Book loses some of its motive 
force because obedience to God’s command had also characterised his earlier 
life. It is also that the resolution itself – Johann’s becoming a compounder of the 
greatest physician Jesus – is not simply joyous. Instead, it is equally accompa-
nied by an acute note of discontent.8 The point is that the acute contrariness that 
runs through this account also echoes the contrariness of the subject that was 
discussed earlier. It bids us to ask: In what ways does such contrariness of the 
8 Elsewhere, I have discussed a critical conflict that consumed Purti’s life and vocation (Dube 
1995, 171–201). It is worth noting here that the precise terms of its dramatisation and the exact 
form of its contrariness distinguish Johann’s tale from other life histories within the evangelical 
encounter. While the contrast with the writings of Theodore Seybold and David Bajpai should be 
abundantly clear, it equally extends to other accounts, written and oral (Dube 2008b).
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subject square up with the terms of religious individualisation? Or, is the contra-
riness of this subject better articulated in terms of historical irony and the embod-
ied akrasia of evangelical entanglements?
7 Coda
And so we return to the catechist with whose account I began. Had the catechist 
read the Word in English, in the original? Had he read the Book in Hindi, in trans-
lation (itself carried out by missionaries)? Had he read the Bible in both, in orig-
inal and in translation?9 The catechist had rendered God’s Word in Hindi and 
reported on his labour in English, enacting procedures of reading, translation, 
and life that yielded difference rather than equivalence, subject rather than the 
individual. Might this have something to say to, some stuff to ask of, projections 
of religious individualisation/institutionalisation?
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Many biographies – multiple individualities: 
the identities of the Chinese Buddhist 
monk Xuanzang
1  Introduction
What is usually called the school of Buddhist Illusionism or Idealism (or, as 
others prefer to call it, Phenomenology),1 Yogācāra (Chin. Yujia-xing 瑜伽行) or 
Vijñānavāda (Weishi-zong 唯識宗), argues that all phenomena experienced as 
real are just projections of the mind (Skt. citta, Chin. xin 心) or consciousness 
(Skt. vijñāna, Chin. shi 識) and have no ultimate and intrinsic reality (Skt. asvab-
hāva, Chin. wu(zi)xing 無(自)性).2 In this chapter, I will extend and apply this very 
simplified description of Yogācāra to the question of (religious) individuality and 
individualisation. The argument I will offer is that processes of individualisation, 
those ascribed to individuals and groups as well as those described by others in 
biographical (or auto-biographical) narratives, are always (and only) imagined 
(Skt. prajñaptimātra, Chin. weijiashe 唯仮設) and are not, thus, historically and/
or ontologically real or ‘true’. I assume that the individual under discussion, the 
Chinese monk and East Asian Yogācāra master par excellence Xuanzang 玄奘 
(600/602–664), would fully agree with such a statement.
In this paper I focus on two things: first, on the ways in which individualis-
ation is projected – or, according to my chosen terminology, ‘functionalised’ – 
in the historical sources in the form of narratives about one specific individual; 
and second, on how this form of individualisation is dependent on specific social 
and cultural contexts, preconditions, and the (individual) intentionalities of the 
agents involved. I am aware of the fact that this ‘narrative individualisation’, to 
give it a preliminarily name, is different from certain other expressions of indi-
vidualisation, such as discourses concerning ‘conceptions of an immortal indi-
vidual soul’ (‘Vorstellungen von einer unsterblichen Einzelseele’) and other 
religious experiences and ‘expressive actions’ (‘expressives Handeln’).3 To me, 
however, a critical discussion of the genre of ‘narrative individualisation’, the use 
1 E.g. Lusthaus 2002.
2 Among the many publications on Yogācāra, see, for example, Schmithausen 2014, and Lust-
haus 2002.
3 See KFOR 1013/2 Fortsetzungsantrag Rüpke/Mulsow: Individualisierung: 6f.
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of  autobiography and biographies as sources for tracing processes of individual-
isation, is crucial for the wider discussion of such processes.4
Critical reflection on biography, from a common sense standpoint the most 
natural (written or oral) expression of individuality, raises the question of whether 
or not everything subsumed under the label of ‘individualisation’ is, in some way, 
projected and/or imagined in the sense of Yogācāra philosophy. If such a stance 
is accepted, and be it only provisionally, the concept of ‘individuality’ becomes 
quite fuzzy. The agency and autonomous authority of the subject or individual 
over his or her individual biographical identity and, thus, the assumed epistemo-
logical hierarchy between autobiography and biography, becomes blurred. This 
is particularly the case if the contingency of autobiographical memory and its 
fixation (German: Festschreibung)5 is taken into account to the same degree as 
the selective power (and, at the same time, weakness) of the biographer. In the 
end, all these narrative expressions relating to an individual – and I include here 
also non-written media, such as pictorial, performative, or cinematic expres-
sions – are entangled and embedded in their specific  socio-historical contexts 
the analysis of which will not necessarily bring us closer to ‘the individual’. Nev-
ertheless, an analysis will at least enable us to understand how a specific ‘indi-
viduality’ is construed and (thus) understood in a specific context.  This sort of 
analysis will, then, contribute to a more general understanding of the processes 
of  individualisation.
With reference to Xuanzang, my own chosen example (German: Fall-
beispiel), I agree with the basic assumption of the KFG that processes or dis-
courses of individualisation (and their analyses) are complex and result from 
‘contingent constellations […] in which individuals become central parameters 
of determination of processes of socialisation […]’.6 As might be expected, I am 
very much interested in the ‘become’ here: how and under what circumstances 
4 By this I do not mean to ask for a ‘biographical turn’ (Chamberlain, Bornat, Wengraf 2000) in 
the overall context of studies on individualisation.
5 There have been some recent analytical publications on this aspect of autobiography, ranging 
from the radical statement of the ‘impossibility of auto/biography’ (Evans 1999) to a more nu-
anced discussion of the literary genre (Olney 2014). In fact, quite often modern autobiography 
is not so naïve as to be unaware of its constructiveness, as e.g. expressed in the title of the auto-
biography of the native American writer Gerald Vizenor, ‘Interior Landscapes – Autobiograph-
ical Myths and Metaphors’ (Vizenor 2009). The ‘closest’ example in classical German literature 
is Goethe’s autobiographical ‘Dichtung und Wahrheit’. In the context of East Asian Buddhist 
biography, this dismissal of the fundamental distinction of authority between biography and 
autobiography is indirectly made by Kieschnick 1997, 3.
6 KFOR 1013/2, 5: ‘[…] aus kontingenten Konstellationen resultierende Prozesse, in denen Indi-
viduen zu zentralen Bestimmungsgrößen der Vergesellschaftung […] werden’.
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is an individual first made ‘parametrical’ in narrative terms and then becomes 
determinative in some way or another (institutionalisation?)? The answer seems 
to lie in the ‘constructedness’ of religious biography and in its tendency towards 
function: the religious figure represents a specific aspect – or function, as I will 
call it for the sake of broader applicability and concreteness – of the religious 
ideals of a certain time and social group: the ascetic, the scholar, the martyr, the 
self-immolator, etc.7
My individual ‘object’ of choice, the Chinese Buddhist monk Xuanzang, 
seems to offer a useful case study for playing through some of these basic ideas 
because of the impact he had in different periods (early medieval, medieval, 
early modern, and modern), different regions (Asian and Western) and different 
ideological contexts, religious as well as secular. This impact is reflected, first 
of all, in the fact that Xuanzang’s biography has been received, projected and 
remodelled constantly, all the way up to the present day.8 Several biographies 
are extant (see below), with the earliest being nearly contemporary with the life-
time of the monk. These biographies were themselves the starting point(s) for 
a further re-imagination, emphasising certain aspects (functions) of Xuanzang 
that were represented by particular features in the earlier biographies. I would 
thus claim that the creation of Xuanzang’s different biographies reflects a rare 
historical process during which many identities9 are constructed and multiple 
individualities are implied.
7 In the context of Muslim biographical literature, Cooperson 2000 identifies the legitimacy of 
the followership of Muhammad as a leading motif. This could also be claimed for certain strands 
of Buddhist biographical sources which are concerned with (correct) succession of heirs (patri-
archs, Chin. zu 祖) of the dharma of the Buddha, as are so prominent in the biographical snippets 
that form the ‘transmission of the lamp’ (chuandeng 傳燈) literary genre of Chan 禪.
8 The latest example of such a biographical construction is the cinematic re-enactment of Xuan-
zang’s life, Datang-Xuanzang 大唐玄奘 (2016), an Indo-Chinese co-production which was agreed 
upon at the highest political level during the visit of India’s president Narendra Modi to China 
on the 14th to the 16th of May 2015. The movie was shot over an extremely short period at original 
historical sites in China, Central Asia, and India and had its debut in Chinese cinemas in April 
2016, less than a year after production was set in motion.
9 I am not going to discuss here the relation between the terms – and underlying concepts 
of   – ‘individual’, ‘individualisation’, and ‘identity’, but would like to point out the possible 
applicability of ‘identity’ for a discussion of processes of individualisation in the sense that 
the concept seems to be anchored somewhere on the spectrum between individualisation and 
 de-individualisation/socialisation. For a recent sociological study of the formation of religious 
identity in auto-biographical reflections, in which, surprisingly, the questions of ‘individuality’ 
and ‘individualisation’ are not really taken into account, see Lorenz 2016.
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2 Buddhism and individualisation
We can start with some preliminary general observations concerning individual-
isation in the context of Buddhism, if only to cut through and problematise some 
popular preconceptions about this religion. According to a wide-spread modern 
conceptualisation, Buddhism appears to be a perfect example of religious self- 
reflective individualisation, with this notion being crystallised in the practice of 
meditation. This is reflected by and in the standard narrative (biography) of the 
founder himself,10 the individual Śākyamuni Siddhārtha Gautama, called the 
Buddha11 after finding his ‘true’ identity through a long period of contemplation 
on the experience of enlightenment or awakening (bodhi). Despite their genre, it 
is possible to read the stories of the Buddha’s previous lives (jātaka) in the light of 
individualisation: from individual existence to existence (rebirth), the bodhisat-
tva (an aspirant for Buddhahood) develops and cultivates the characteristics nec-
essary for the final goal, the attainment of ultimate awakening (samyaksaṃbodhi) 
which results in transcending individuality (anātman, ‘without self’) (Reynolds 
1997; Appleton 2010). One could even argue that such individualisation in the 
previous existences and in the first part of the Buddha’s biography, prior to his 
awakening, finds its materialised expression in the localisation of some of these 
stories. A number of the stories occur in concrete places in South Asia and beyond: 
one can, therefore, go to the locations and ‘witness’ or ‘experience’ the reality of 
such individuations of the Buddha in his previous lives.12 This is underlined by 
the opposite tendency towards a kind of de-individualisation in the Buddha’s life 
post-enlightenment, which is ‘boringly’ stereotype and in which only two specific 
places are identified: the place of his first sermon (the ‘Deer Garden’, mṛgadāva, 
in Sārnāth near Vārāṇasī) and the place of his death or parinirvāṇa (Kuśinagara). 
On the doctrinal side, the teaching of retribution for individually committed acts 
and their consequences (karma) drives forward this connectedness and entangle-
ment of individual lives (and deaths) (see Appleton 2014).
However, if we look deeper into the doctrinal tenets of Buddhism and their 
narrative ‘translation’, the individuality of the Buddha becomes blurred again: 
on the one hand, the basic doctrine of ‘selflessness’ (anātman, Chin. wuwo 無我) 
and the (historically later) teaching that all phenomena are without substance, 
10 Discussions about the role and function of religious founder figures are collected in Gray 
2016. However, the question of the function of biography in and outside the tradition is strangely 
absent and overwritten by a focus on ‘religious invention’.
11 On the historical development of the Buddha biographies, see Deeg 2010.
12 These localisations are mainly traceable in the records of Chinese Buddhist travellers. For 
concrete examples, see Deeg 2005.
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‘empty’ (śūṇya, Chin. kong 空), indicate a rather uncompromising approach to 
individuality, denying even the possibility of its substantial existence. Further-
more, from a very early period there existed the concept of multiple Buddhas of 
the past (Kāśyapa, Konakamuni, Krakucchanda, etc.).13 These were then ascribed 
biographies that have the same basic pattern14 as that of the Buddha himself, 
who explains the common scheme by reference to the example of the Buddha 
Vipaśyin. This, then, would be a clear example of de-individualisation of and 
by the one who is conceived in Western scholarship as the historical Buddha 
Gautama Siddhārtha Śākyamuni.15 One could even argue whether an intentional 
individualisation of the Buddha existed at all in pre-modern Buddhist traditions, 
or whether it is not, at least partially, a construct of historicist-positivist Western 
interpretation starting in the nineteenth century.16
Both aspects point towards a tension between individuality and the normative 
uniformity asked for by the exemplary nature of the great individual. In the case of 
the Buddha, one could argue that the multiple episodes in the different versions of 
his life story17 refer to constant and continuous attempts at  re-individualising the 
de-individualised biographical scheme.18 The expression of this tension between 
individuality and the (more or less de-individualised) model role or the (almost) 
13 This idea can be traced back at least as far as the 3rd century BCE, when the Mauryan em-
peror Aśoka referred in one of his pillar inscriptions to the Buddha of the past Kanakamuni (and 
also to another Buddha Krakucchanda), for whom he had enlarged a stūpa in the vicinity of the 
historical Buddha Śākyamuni’s hometown, Kapilavastu: see Deeg 2004.
14 Textually, this is exemplified in the (Skt.) Mahāvadānasūtra – P. Mahāpadānasutta in the 
‘Longer Collection’ (Dīghanikāya) of the Pāli Suttapiṭaka, with its parallel in the Dīrghāgama/
Chang-ahan-jing 長阿含經 of the Chinese canon. See Waldschmidt 1953 & 1956; Fukita 2003.
15 The tension between this historicisation and the historical inaccessibility of the Buddha rais-
es questions about the validity, or at least demonstrability, of the Axial Age theory in relation to 
individualisation. In the light of what is stated here about the biographical process, in the sense 
of the gradual emergence of biographies as narrative individualisations, the same questions 
would also arise for other eastern ‘religious’ ‘founder figures’, such as Confucius (Kongzi), Laozi, 
Zhuangzi, Zarathushtra, etc., who are so central to Jaspers’ argument: see the first paragraph in 
his subchapter ‘A. Characterisation of the Axial Period’ (Jaspers 1953, 2).
16 Ironically, there is a link between this historicisation of the Buddhist biographical texts, 
through processes of harmonisation, selection and interpretation, in the 19th century, and Xuan-
zang’s approach in his ‘Records of the Western World’, with its textual and archaeological explo-
ration and reconstruction of an early form of Buddhism in India. I touch on this very briefly below.
17 Reynolds 1976 rightly speaks of the processual and re-interpretative character of the Buddha 
biography, of the ‘many lives of the Buddha’.
18 This seems to be reflected in what Jonathan Silk (2003) has called the paradox of the Bud-
dha’s biography, in which constant negotiation of the Buddha’s human-ness (individualisation) 
and his transcendent super-human-ness (de-individualisation) is at play.
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unreachable religious and soteriological status of the founder19 is mostly found in 
the genre of Buddhist biography or hagiography; autobiographies in the stricter 
sense of the genre are absent in the early period. It is in this genre of hagiography 
that I would like to situate my analysis of the various attempts to narratively indi-
vidualise one particular individual, the Chinese Buddhist monk Xuanzang.
3 Biography in South Asia and China
Before I introduce my sources, it will be worth outlining some fundamental dif-
ferences between South Asian and East Asian biographical literature20 should 
be outlined. Ancient and early medieval South Asia (c. 500BCE-1000 CE) has no 
clear biographical (or autobiographical) genre. What we find in, for instance, 
Vedic and late Vedic literature are episodes about the deeds or conversations 
of exceptional individuals, mostly brāhmaṇas and kings. The religious ‘revolu-
tion’ – Jaspers’ postulated shift in the Axial Age – of the śramaṇa movements in 
the sixth/fifth century BCE Gangetic plain area resulted in the establishment of 
institutionalised religious ‘orders’, among which  Buddhism and Jainism were the 
most successful. The desire to memorialise the founding figures of these orders, 
Siddhārtha Gautama Buddha and Mahāvīra Jina, nurtured the need for biogra-
phies of exceptional individuals.
In South Asian (Indian) Buddhism, biographies were for a long time only 
partial and were normally integrated into a wider anthological context of other 
literary genres and giving biographical bits and pieces rather than constituting 
independent biographies. There are rare texts that can be understood as autobi-
ographical statements, such as the ‘Songs of the Elder Monks’ (Theragāthā) and 
‘Songs of the Elder Nuns’ (Therīgāthā) in the Pāli canon, but these are an excep-
tional Theravāda tradition and stand out as unique in the South Asian Buddhist 
literary production. As complex texts and parts of the Theravāda canon, these 
originally anonymous verses were ascribed to specific monks or nuns, partly in 
19 Here it is important to make a distinction between the soteriological final goal of ‘becoming 
a Buddha’ and an ‘imitiatio Buddhae’ which is hardly found expressed in Buddhist biographical 
literature. The biographies of the Buddha are never a direct exhortation to follow his example, 
as the gospels are, at least to a certain extent, for the concept of the ‘imitatio Christi’ (see e.g. 
Capes 2003).
20 A lot of ink has been spilled on Asian religious biography – see e.g. Granoff, Shinohara 
1988 – but so far there has been no comparative-critical approach to what ‘biographies’ in the 
different Asia contexts have in common or to what makes them different in terms of structure, 
function and meaning.
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order to localise and contextualise them in the Buddha’s lifetime and his direct 
biographical environment.21
The biographies of the Buddha and certain of his disciples are, at least in 
their extant form, of a relatively late date, although evidence for the formation of 
a biography in the form of standardised episodes from the Buddha’s life can be 
dated back to the 3rd century BC on the basis of (aniconic)22 art-historical evidence 
(stūpas of Sāñcī or Bharhūt). These scenes mainly depict episodes or moments in 
the Buddha’s life that are religiously important and linked to places of pilgrimage 
and worship, e.g. the four major events of birth (janman, in Lumbinī), enlight-
enment (bodhi, in Bodhgayā), first sermon (dharmacakrapravartana, in Sārnāth 
near Vārāṇasī), and the final extinction (parinirvāṇa, in Kuśinagara).23
Fully-fledged biographies only emerged gradually24 and consisted of com-
plete (and over times still growing and expanding) lives of the Buddha,25 his dis-
ciples (Ray 1999, 105–212) or Buddhist patriarchs (e.g. the patriarch Upagupta: 
see Strong 1992), and other eminent individuals.26 They reflect a clear tendency 
towards narrative individualisation insofar as they try to cover the full life-time 
of the protagonist. They include not only specific episodes that are important 
for doctrinal or soteriological reasons but also ‘minor episodes’ like the young 
Siddhārtha’s education at school, his marriage, the birth of his first son, and so 
21 Von Hinüber 1996, 51ff.; Ray 1999, 79–104. Shaw 2010, 39ff., does away, too simply in my 
opinion, with the complex textual transmission process in order to categorise these texts and 
others from the Pāli canon under the rubric of ‘autobiography’. One might talk, as with the early 
Chinese cases mentioned below, of a pervasive trend towards individualisation of anonymous 
texts or text corpora over time.
22 I.e. the Buddha is not physically visible but only represented through symbols, such as a seat 
on which he is supposed to sit or an umbrella underneath which he should stand or walk. On 
the aniconic period of the earliest Buddhist art, see Karlsson 1999, and more generally on the 
development of narrative Buddhist art, Dehejia 1997.
23 On the development of the Buddha biography, see Deeg 2010.
24 This development is reflected in some biographical texts which only cover a certain period 
of the Buddha’s life, such as the Catuṣpariṣatsūtra (from the night of enlightenment to the first 
conversions) and the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (the last months in the life of the Buddha).
25 Mostly anonymous, like the Lalitavistara, the Mahāvastu, or the later Nidānakathā (Pāli). 
One of the oldest extant biographical texts, the poem Buddhacarita, is attributed to the poet 
Aśvaghoṣa (second century CE). Other early biographies are only preserved in Chinese transla-
tions; some of these only deal with a part of the Buddha’s life.
26 Like the legendary life of the king Aśoka, the Aśokāvadāna: Strong 1983. Aśoka provides a 
good example of individualisation in ‘ego-documents’ (‘Ego-Dokumente’; Aśoka’s own inscrip-
tions) and narrative individualisation in the form of a hagio-biography (Aśokāvadāna): see Deeg 
2009b. The different biographies discussed in Schober 1997 range heterogeneously from Buddha 
biographies to modern Buddhist individuals and are restricted to South and South East Asia.
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on.27 The emergence of this biographical literature, starting around the beginning 
of the Christian era, is complemented by the narrative (iconic) Buddhist art of 
Gandhāra.  This flourished in the Northwest of the Indian subcontinent between 
the late first and the fourth centuries of the Common Era and is often called Indo-
Greek because of the obvious Greek stylistic influences.
In China, on the other hand, biographical writing – again, autobiography is a 
relative newcomer in Chinese literature (see Levering 2002; on later Neo-Confucian 
autobiography, see Taylor 1978) – about individuals has been part of Chinese offi-
cial (i.e. imperial) and semi-official28 (Buddhist or Daoist) historiography from the 
1st century BC onwards (see Nienhauser 2011).  The first biographies appear as part 
of the earliest comprehensive historiographical endeavour, which resulted in the 
Shiji 史記 (‘Records of the Historian’) of the Chinese ‘arch-’historiographer Sima 
Qian 司馬遷 (c. 145–86 BC). Starting with this model, almost all subsequent Chinese 
historiographical writings include biographies (zhuan 傳) of not only emperors but 
also other eminent individuals, such as ministers, religious figures, and outstand-
ing intellectuals.  The appearance of such biographies in one specific and rather 
comprehensive section became a mandatory feature in historical writing.29 It might 
even be argued that the traces of Chinese historical writing which survive Chinese 
antiquity – the ‘Classic of Document’ (Shujing 書經) and some poems in the ‘Classic 
of Songs (or Poems)’ (Shijing 詩經) – show rudimentary features of biographical 
individualisation in their presentation of the mythical past in terms of the action 
and deeds of individual cultural heroes like Yu 禹 or Yao 堯 (other examples are the 
pseudo-historical founders of the Western Zhou dynasty (trad. 1046–771 BC), Duke 
Wen (Wen-gong 文公) and his son, King Wu (Wu-wang 武王)).
It is generally assumed that Buddhism was introduced into China in the first 
century CE. By the fifth century, Buddhism had become a consolidated, though not 
undisputed, part of Chinese cultural and religious discourse (see Zürcher 2007). 
Beside the translations of Indian (or Central Asian) Buddhist texts, autochthonous 
Chinese texts, such as commentaries and catalogues of scriptures, were also being 
27 There is a clear tendency to concentrate on the pre-enlightenment period of the Buddha’s life, 
which may point to a structural ‘division of labour’ between a part of the biography that lends 
itself more easily to narrative individualisation (pre-enlightenment) and a part that reflects the 
‘institutionalised’ and de-individualised role of the Buddha as an omniscient religious teacher 
and transcendent being (post-enlightenment).
28 ‘Semi-official’ insofar as most of the religious literature had to be acknowledged, at least in 
principle, by the respective court bureaus.
29 For an overview of the entanglement of biography and historiography during Chinese history 
and its change in the late nineteenth century, see Moloughney 1992. On the development of Chi-
nese biographical writing in the twentieth century, see Moloughney 1994.
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produced. In the early fifth century, the Chinese ‘push’ for biographies30 began to 
impact Buddhist writers and the first collections of biographies of eminent monks 
((Liang-)Gaoseng-zhuan (梁)高僧傳, ‘Biographies of Eminent Monks (of the Liang 
[dynasty])’, 519, T.2059) were collated by Huijiao 慧皎 (497–554).31 Such biographi-
cal anthologies were then produced on a fairly regular basis throughout the dynastic 
history of China, loosely following the pattern of other historiographical writings 
in collating the biographies of an earlier period (or dynasty): Xu(or: Tang 唐)- 
Gaoseng-zhuan 續高僧傳 (‘Continued Biographies of Eminent Monks (of the Tang 
[dynasty])’, 665, T.2060), by Daoxuan 道宣 (596–667); Song-Gaoseng-zhuan 宋
高僧傳 (‘Biographies of Eminent Monks of the Song [dynasty]’, 988, T.2061) by 
Zanning 贊寧, Daming-Gaoseng-zhuan 大明高僧傳 (‘Biographies of Eminent 
Monks of the Great Ming [dynasty]’, 1600, T.2062) by Ruxing 如惺.
These biographical ‘anthologies’ are organised and structured in a way 
which already reflects what could be called the typical hagiographic tendency of 
de- individualisation: the collections are divided into ‘types’ of expertise, with the 
divisions based on the functional roles of the protagonists. Huijiao provides the 
model for this approach by dividing the biographies into the following categories, 
followed more or less by his successors: 1. translators (yijing 譯經); 2. exegetes 
(yijie 義解); 3. wonder-workers (shenyi 神異); 4. practitioners of meditation (xichan 
習禪); 5. specialists in explaining monastic rules (minglü 明律); 6. self- immolators 
(wangshen 亡身); 7. specialists in reciting Buddhist texts (songjing 誦經); 8. 
collectors of (special) religious merit (xingfu 興福); 9. hymnodists (jingshi 經師); 
and 10. proselytisers (changdao 唱導). The singling out of translators as the first 
group is justified by the role they played in the transmission and spread of Bud-
dhism throughout China (Kieschnick 1997, 8f.).
30 As for Buddhist biographies modelled along the lines of the established biographical model – 
minus the hagiographical features and themes – of the secular historiographies, Kieschnick 1997, 
5, states aptly that they are ‘in style and structure squarely in the tradition of secular biography 
established […] in the Shiji and Hanshu’. As part of the classical Chinese division of scriptures 
and categorised under ‘historical texts’, biographies could even escape the destruction of lit-
erature in periods of anti-Buddhist persecution and survive the prohibition of publication and 
dissemination: Storch 2014, 14ff.
31 See Kieschnick 1997; 2011. Huijiao’s compilation was, in a way, a reaction to a slightly earli-
er work by the monk Baochang 寶唱 (464-post 514), the Mingseng-zhuan 名僧傳 (‘Biographies 
of Famous Monks’), of which only fragments have survived: see Wright 1954. Baochaong also 
compiled a collection of ‘Biographies of Nuns’ (Biqiuni-zhuan 比丘尼傳), dated 516; see Tsai 
1995. The biographical ‘push’ was so strong that biographies of translators of the type of the 
Gaoseng-zhuan were already incorporated in one of the earliest Chinese Buddhist catalogues, 
the ‘Collection of the Records of the Compilation of the Three Baskets (tripiṭaka, i.e. the Buddhist 
canon)’ (Chu-sanzang-jiji 出三藏記集, 510–518) by the monk Sengyou 僧祐 (445–518).
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Some hagiographical (de-individualising) topoi are at play in the individual 
biographies: already in their early years the protagonists demonstrate a high 
degree of intelligence or clairvoyance, a fondness for traditional Chinese and/
or Buddhist learning and/or devotion, and their death is very often accompanied 
by miraculous events. It cannot be overlooked, however, that some individual 
monks are granted more space and individual biographical features, although 
this reflects their specific importance for the spread or development of the Bud-
dhist teaching or the Buddhist institution(s) rather than referring to a more accu-
rate historical reality.32 The biographies are mostly hagiographies in the sense of 
‘representations of the image of the monk, of what monks were supposed to be’ in 
‘monastic imagination’ (Kieschnick 1997, 1).
Motivation and intentionality influenced by and drawn from the wider Chinese 
cultural context had an impact on the de-invidualising aspects of Chinese Bud-
dhist (and Daoist) biographical writing,33 as reflected in, for instance, the need to 
show Buddhism’s (and Buddhists’) positive relationship with the imperial state.34
4 Biographies of Xuanzang
While in the cases of most Buddhist monks of whom biographies were written in 
Chinese there exists, as a rule, only one biography, much more material of differ-
ent genres and types is preserved on Xuanzang.35 Those works that can be called 
32 Among the earlier monks, I only want to point out the biographies of Shi Daoan 釋道安 
(312–385) and Kumārajīva/Jiumoluoshi 鳩摩羅什 (343–413) in the Gaoseng-zhuan, the first being 
the earliest polymath and synthesiser of Chinese Buddhism and the latter (projected as) the most 
eminent translator of the period (on Shi Daoan, see Zürcher 2007, 184ff.; Kumārajīva’s biography 
was translated into English by Johannes Nobel 1927).
33 The Confucian and Daoist precedents of these ‘extrapolated’ and religiously specialised bi-
ographical collections were the Liexian-zhuan 列仙傳 (‘Collected Biographies of Immortals’) 
by Liu Xiang 劉向 (fl. 77–76 BC) and the Shenxian-zhuan 神仙傳 (‘Biographies of Divine Tran-
scendents’) Ge Hong 葛洪; see Campany 2002, particularly 98–117.
34 Timothy Barrett speaks of an ambivalence towards religious biographies in China that ‘has 
much to do with the emergence of a new form of biography of a more religious sort into a culture 
that had hitherto been dominated by vitae structured either by bureaucratic values, […], or by 
their inversion […]’ (Barrett 2002, 2).
35 When speaking of different biographies I do not mean the parallel biographies in the earlier 
collections, such as the Chu-sanzang-jiji, the Mingseng-zhuan and the Gaoseng-zhuan, which 
mostly copied material from one to the other and showed relatively little difference in their pro-
jection of biographical individualities. These parallel biographies may, however, reflect the dif-
ferent approaches of their authors to one and the same individual, as Yang has shown in a study 
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biographies in the strict sense were written partly during his lifetime or after his 
death.36 However, the fact that several slightly different biographies exist does 
not help us to get closer to the ‘real Xuanzang’37 through a process of ‘historical 
distillation’. Rather, the varying accounts reflect different layers of interpretation 
of the individual Xuanzang and his life. Before introducing these biographies it 
will be worth considering the text which most triggered the imagination of his 
contemporary audience and later recipients, the voluminous ‘description’ of 
Central Asia and India based on his sixteen-year-long journey to India.
This work is the famous ‘Records of the Western Regions of the Great Tang 
[Dynasty]’ (Datang-xiyu-ji 大唐西域記, T.2087; here abbreviated as ‘Records’) 
in twelve chapters, commissioned by the second Tang emperor Taizong 太宗 
(r. 626–649) and written in less than one year after Xuanzang’s return to China 
in 645. The ‘Records’ are not, as usually assumed,38 a personal record of the 
monk’s journey and nor can they stricto sensu be called descriptive documen-
tary.39 Rather, they combine the fulfilment of the task given by the emperor, to 
give information about the different kingdoms of the Western Regions40 (a very 
on Kumārajīva’s biographies (Lu 2004), which anticipate to a certain extent the situation in the 
case of Xuanzang’s biographies.
36 An overview and discussion of these biographies is given by Mayer 1992, 34ff.
37 This refers, of course, to the well-known British Sinologist Arthur Waley’s booklet ‘The 
Real Tripiṭaka’ (1961), which is dedicated to the ‘historical’ Xuanzang in comparison with the 
literarily- transformed figure of the famous Ming-period novel Xiyou-ji (‘Records of the Journey 
to the West’) (see below). Waley had paraphrased this latter text in English as ‘Monkey’ (1942) 
almost two decades earlier and with such success that the famous scholar and translator deemed 
it necessary to put things right and do justice to the historical figure at the root of the novel.
38 This assumption is fuelled by the fact that the Western translations of the ‘Records’ (Stanislas 
Julien, Samuel Beal, Li Rongxi) insert a personal pronoun (‘I’) where there is none in the Chinese 
text and thus imply inner-textual agency where, again, there is none. This has serious herme-
neutical consequences when, to give only one example, Malcolm Eckel (1994) uses the text as 
an eye-witness (‘to see the Buddha’) as the basis for a ‘revisioning’ of the role of the Buddha in 
Buddhist religion and philosophy.
39 Mayer 2000, 156, correctly speaks of ‘die Abwesenheit […] eines auktoriellen Subjektes und 
eines implizierten Betrachters’, although I do not share his view that this is due to a Buddhist 
negation of the substantiality of the individual person (p.161). Rather, I would argue that he had 
to write in the non-auctorial genre of ‘Records’ (ji 記, zhuan 傳, zhi 志) about the Western regions 
that had already been compiled during the Sui dynasty in the wake of the western expansion of 
the Chinese empire.
40 A clear indication that the text was written for this purpose is the fact that it starts not in 
Chang’an, the Tang capital and departure point, but in Central Asian Kuča and ends in Khotan 
on the southwestern corner of the Tarim basin (Chinese Turkestan or the modern Autonomous 
Region of Xinjiang), i.e. exactly at the border of Chinese-controlled territory in 629 when Xuan-
zang travelled West and in 645 when he returned to China.
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stretched concept in the Tang period, comprising the traditional Central Asian 
regions but also including Iran/Persia and India), with Xuanzang’s own aim of 
describing Buddhist sacred places and educating the emperor and other high-
ranked readers at the Tang court (Deeg 2009a; 2012).
A reader comes looking for autobiographical statements in the ‘Records’ will 
walk away quite disappointed. The text does, however, contain a few self-references 
in the report of the monk’s meeting with the North Indian emperor Harṣavardhana 
Śīlāditya (Harṣa) of Kanauj (Kanyākubja) (c. 590–647).41 These may best be taken 
as biographical snippets through which Xuanzang presents himself as a kind of 
ambassador of Chinese culture and informant for Harṣa about the situation in 
China, clearly aimed towards the Tang ruler Taizong as a captatio benevolentiae 
self-recommendation. Yet, the passage is interesting in that it reflects individual 
agency in an autographically-projected form and is thus worth quoting in full:
At that time Śīlāditya was inspecting the kingdom of Khajuṅghira and issued an order to 
King Kumāra (of Kāmarūpa/Assam) [saying]: “It is appropriate that the visiting śramaṇa 
from afar in Nālanda should immediately come and attend our meeting”. Thereupon King 
Kumāra went to see [Xuanzang]. Śīlāditya, after having taken the trouble, said: “From which 
kingdom did you come and what is your wish?” [Xuanzang] answered: “I have come from 
the kingdom of the Great Tang in search of the law of the Buddha”. The king said: “In which 
direction is the kingdom of the Great Tang situated?” [Xuanzang] answered: “It is several 
ten thousand li to the North-East. It is the kingdom which in India is called Mahācīna”. The 
king said: “I have already heard that there is the heaven’s son, the King of Qin in Mahācīna. 
When he was small he had a high spirit, when he had grown up he was a gifted warrior. 
Before, when the former dynasty was collapsing in disorder and parts of the land were 
divided, fighting had arisen and the people were tormented, the King of Qin early had con-
ceived a strategy and sensed great compassion, rescued the sentient beings, pacified the 
region between the oceans, cultivation was far spread, the [imperial] kindness was harmo-
niously [established] in far [regions], distant regions and foreign countries took refuge and 
submitted to him, all the people carry along his well-balanced instruction, all perform the 
‘Music of the King of Qin’s breaking the battle-lines’,42 his eulogy has been heard here since 
long – isn’t there really praise of his virtues? Isn’t the Great Tang like this?” [Xuanzang] 
answered: “What is called Zhina 至那 is the former name of the kingdom, Datang 大唐 is the 
name of the kingdom of our ruler. Before he had ascended to the throne he was called King 
of Qin. Now that he has already ascended to the throne he is called Son of Heaven. When 
the fortune of the former dynasty came to an end the living beings had no ruler, fighting and 
turmoil arose and people were cruelly injured. The King of Qin, [endowed with] heaven’s 
grace, opened his mind with compassion and, stimulated by his dignity, the calamities of 
the people were wiped out. The eight directions were pacified and ten thousand kingdoms 
41 An analysis of Xuanzang’s description of Harṣavardhana and his rule is given in Deeg 2016.
42 This (Shengong-)Qinwang-pochen-yue (神功)秦王破陣樂 was a dancing performance on the 
occasion of Li Shimin’s 李世民 – the later emperor Taizong – suppression of the rebellion of Liu 
Wuzhou 劉武周 in the year 619, when he was still king (or prince) of Qin.
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paid tribute to him. He loves and cultivates the four kinds of living beings and venerates 
the three jewels. He levied taxes and issued amnesty on capital punishment. The national 
expenditure achieved a surplus; the etiquette of the people is flawless [and] their behaviour 
has undergone a great change [to an extent] that it is difficult to describe it in detail”. Śīlād-
itya said: “How magnificent! The people of this land are blessed [and should] be grateful to 
their sacred ruler”.  (T.2087.894c.20ff.-895a.18)
The actual dialogue between the two certainly did not occur in this form43 but the 
written version reflects a self-understanding or self-projection of Xuanzang as a 
mediator between the two great empires of China and India and as an educator 
for both the Indian king, by informing him about China and her ruler, and the 
Chinese emperor Taizong, by showing him, in the passages before and after this 
dialogue, the ideal behaviour of an Indian Buddhist king. This self-assumed role 
is taken up in all the biographies and even pushed further when the Indian king 
pays the highest honour to the Chinese monk because of his status as an eminent 
Buddhist scholar and monastic and even urges him not to return to China.
Xuanzang’s biography in the Xu-Gaoseng-zhuan (‘Continued Biographies of 
Eminent Monks’; T.2060.446c.8–458c.13), written by his short-term collaborator, 
the Buddhist polymath Daoxuan, is one of the earliest biographical sketches. 
According to the colophon of the compilation, the first draft of the text was made 
in 645, the year of Xuanzang’s return to China. There is broad agreement that, if 
this date is correct, Daoxuan made many changes and additions to the compila-
tion over the years before his death in 667 (Wagner 1995, 78–81).
A relatively brief individual biography, i.e. not part of a biographical anthol-
ogy, is the Datang-gu-sanzang-Xuanzang-fashi-xingzhuang 大唐故三藏玄奘法
師行狀 (‘Brief [Postumous] Biography of the Deceased Tripiṭaka Dharma Master 
Xuanzang of the Great Tang’, one fascicle, T.2052) by Mingxiang 冥詳 (dates 
unknown). While Daoxuan’s biography and the long individual ‘Biography’ (see 
below) share elements and descriptive patterns – sometimes repeating each other 
word for word – this biographical sketch goes in a different direction. It treats the 
journey to India in a very unsystematic and eclectic manner, focusing on Xuan-
zang as a translator and exemplary monastic figure.
A biographical sketch which draws mainly on the previous biographies is pre-
served in the older official historiography of the Tang (Jiu-Tangshu 舊唐書 191),44 
43 One inner-textual indication of this is that some word-by-word passages of this dialogue 
are repeated in the description of a meeting between Xuanzang and King Kumāra, the ruler of 
Kāmarūpa/Assam: T.2087.927b.14–927c.14.
44 Compiled by Liu Xu 劉昫 and Zhang Zhaoyuan 張昭遠 around the middle of the tenth centu-
ry. The biography is omitted in the ‘corrected’ new historiography of the Tang, the Xin-Tangshu 
新唐書, compiled by Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 between 1044 and 1060.
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a genre which normally does not include biographies of Buddhist individuals. On 
the one hand, this demonstrates the status that the monk had attained in Chinese 
cultural memory towards the end of the first millennium. On the other hand, it rel-
ativises Xuanzang’s status and position as an extraordinary personality by listing 
him under the category of ‘[Individuals endowed with] magical and specific techni-
cal [skills]’ (fangzhi 方伎) as one among a group of less celebrated monks (seng 僧). 
This biographical sketch focuses mainly on his translation activities and his role 
as an exegete of Buddhist scriptures who was supported and protected by the 
emperors Taizong and Gaozong 高宗 (r. 649–683). It is his connection with the 
court that is important to the biographer, a fact demonstrated also by the focus 
on Xuanzang’s funeral, an important indicator of social status in the early Tang 
Empire. Getting wrong both the year of death (661 instead of 664) and his age at 
the time of death (56 instead of either 6445 or 62), the text emphasises that the 
funeral was attended by many members of the social elite (shinü 士女): ‘In the 
sixth year [or the era Xianqing 顯慶, i.e. 661] [Xuanzang] died, at that time 56 years 
old; [his] funeral was on the White Deer plain, and the funeral was attended by 
several ten thousands of ladies and gentlemen’.46
The most extensive biography, however, was written by Xuanzang’s disciple 
Huili 慧立 (fl. 629–665) and redacted and extended by the monk Yancong 彥悰 
(fl. 650–688), the ‘Biography of the Tripiṭaka dharma master from the Great Cien- 
monastery of the Great Tang’ (Datang-Daciensi-sanzang-fashi-zhuan 大唐大慈恩
寺三藏法師傳, T.2053; here abbreviated as ‘Biography’). The chronology and com-
positional process of this biography is not entirely clear. Most likely the first five 
chapters, which include Xuanzang’s youth and his travel to and stay in India, were 
written by Huili first and then complemented by another five chapters, covering the 
period from Xuanzang’s return to China to his death, written by Yancong, who also 
expanded on and revised Huili’s chapters.47 It is also not entirely clear what the 
relation is between this biography and that of Daoxuan’s biography, the first draft 
of which is said to have been written quite some time before Huili’s first version. 
While some questions remain open, it is nevertheless clear that this  biography had 
the strongest impact on the shaping of the different identities of Xuanzang, not 
45 This could be a scribal mistake for 65 – 五十六 instead of六十五 – which would suit 600 as 
the year of birth and 664 as the year of death, keeping in mind that according to Chinese tradition 
a person is already one year old when he or she is born.
46 六年卒，時年五十六，歸葬于白鹿原，士女送葬者數萬人。
47 This can be concluded from the style and content of the two halves, e.g. no dates are given 
in the first five chapters while in the second half, following good Chinese historiographical tra-
dition, dates are given for all episodes which have mainly to do with Xuanzang’s dealing – his 
correspondence in writing – with the emperor and the court.
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only in historical East Asia but also in the contemporary world, a point to which I 
will return in the chapter about functional identities or individualities.
5 Commonalities and differences
The fact that there exist three biographies of Xuanzang is remarkable, but it does 
not answer the question of why Xuanzang was and is special – was he indeed 
an extraordinary individual, or was he individualised by his biographers? – to 
the extent that he not only attracted the attention of his fellow-believers and 
fellow-countrymen but also led all kinds of after-lives and re-incarnations. To 
answer this question it will be necessary to look at the ways in which the early 
biographies, which served as the basis of all later representations of the monk, 
depict Xuanzang. Is there anything different from the way that other eminent 
monks were portrayed when they were singled out and memorialised in a biogra-
phy? To answer this question I would like to look at the way in which an ‘eminent’ 
monk is defined in the Chinese hagiographical discourse. Huijiao, the compiler 
of the first Buddhist biographical collection, defines an eminent monk (gaoseng 
高僧) as follows: ‘If men of real achievement conceal their brilliance, then they 
are eminent but not famous; when men of slight virtue happen to be in accord 
with their times, then they are famous but not eminent’.48
A famous monk (mingseng 名僧) is an ordained Buddhist who represents the 
moral and religious (from a Buddhist perspective) tenets and standards of his 
time – he is exemplary and can and should be a model to his fellow-monastics. 
But such a monk is not outstanding (or eminent). In contrast to a merely famous 
monk, an eminent monk is exceptional – he is brilliant (guang 光) – but does not 
propagate himself publicly (qian 潛), a job which is then done by the biographer 
anyway. Biographical individuality is, as it were, gained by standing out from the 
crowd in virtue of extraordinary skills, talents and actions.
In the case of Xuanzang’s biographies, the extraordinary and exceptional goes 
beyond the ‘normal’ hagiographical standard. Xuanzang is represented in the biog-
raphies as the most eminent (or at least one of the most eminent) monks of his time.
48 T.2059.319a.24f. 若實行潛光，則高而不名。寡德適時，則名而不高。 (all translations from 
Chinese are my own); for a discussion of this passage see Kieschnick 1997, 4. This is a clearly 
derogative distinction of Huijiao’s own work from that of his predecessor Baochang’s Mingseng-
zhuan (‘Biographies of Famous Monks’). In practice there is a significant overlap between the 
biographies in the compilations of Baochang and Huijiao.
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In Daoxuan’s Xu-gaoseng-zhuan, although in this compilation Xuanzang 
is in a way in a de-individualizing competition with other hagio-biographies of 
other monks in the collection displaying similar features as his own (extraordi-
nary degree of learning, adviser of high officials and the emperor, etc.); this is 
expressed by the sheer length of the Xuanzang’s biography: it comprises almost 
the complete fourth chapter (or fascicle: juan 卷) of the compilation. Daoxuan 
categorises him under the heading of ‘translator’ (yijing), thus giving him the 
same prominent position Huijiao had already assigned to this expertise or skill.
In the ‘Biography’, Xuanzang is described in a number of places as carrying 
out actions or behaving in a way that fundamentally sets him apart from other 
monks. However, the text also emphasises that he did not see himself as an 
exceptional person but as someone following in the tradition of earlier eminent 
monks who had visited the sacred lands of the Buddha in India: ‘[Xuanzang] 
further said: “Formerly Faxian and Zhiyan and learned men of their time all were 
able to search for the dharma and bring benefit to the living beings. How can it be 
allowed that [nobody] follows [their] eminent traces and [their] distinct tradition 
is cut off? A man of status should be able to follow them!”’49
Xuanzang’s ‘Biography’ demonstrates a freedom of choice, to use one often 
stressed aspect of individualisation, on his behalf which is lacking in others. It is 
in this characteristic, I suggest, that we can locate a grade of narrative individu-
alisation which differs from the hagiographical patterns and norms of behaviour 
in other comparable biographies of the time. This can be seen in the example of 
the narrative concerning Xuanzang’s departure from China, which reflects the 
monk’s willingness to act ‘against all odds’. According to the ‘Biography’, Xuan-
zang is forbidden by imperial order from leaving China:
Thereupon [Xuanzang] came together with [his] companions, [and they] submitted a peti-
tion to the court. [But] it was ordered that [the journey] would not be allowed. Everyone 
[from the group] gave up the plan, and only the dharma master did not yield. [He] then 
sincerely prepared [his] lonely journey, keeping in mind the dangers of the road to the West. 
He therefore tested his mind and [in his imagination] inflicted on himself all kinds of pains 
human beings [could experience in order to be able] to endure [them] and not falter.50
The right time for the departure, in the eighth month (October) of the year 629, 
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overcome all obstacles before him.51 And, indeed, there were several unsuccess-
ful attempts by officials to hinder the monk as he tried to leave the country.52 In 
narrative terms, the motif of the dramatic illegal departure53 is taken up again 
in the fifth chapter of the ‘Biography’, when Xuanzang is residing at the border 
of  the Chinese empire in Khotan after his return from India and before return-
ing to the capital. He writes a long apologetic letter or petition (biao 表) to the 
emperor, justifying his departure from China sixteen years earlier and indirectly 
asking to be pardoned for his former disobedience and allowed to return.54 Xuan-
zang’s request is, of course, granted happily by the emperor, who even sends an 
escort to bring the monk and his extensive luggage of Buddhist texts and artefacts 
to Chang’an.
This disobeying of an imperial decree or order is, as far as I know, unique and 
unheard of anywhere else not only in the Buddhist biographical literature but 
also in other Chinese texts. It would normally have resulted in the death penalty 
for the offender, a fact of which the biographer was certainly aware. The illegal 
departure, which frames the whole of the journey to India, thus clearly serves the 
purpose of demonstrating and flagging up the extraordinary and superior per-
sonality of Xuanzang.
51 In his dream, Xuanzang wants to cross the sea and to climb the cosmological Mount Sumeru, 
and is enabled to do so by stone lotus flowers growing underneath his feet and a wind lifting him 
to the peak (222c.15–23). This dream is preceded by a dream his mother had when Xuanzang was 
born: she saw her son clad in white and going westward, and when she asked him what he was 
up to do he answered that he was searching for the dharma (222c.13–15).
52 223a.6–10. 時國政尚新，疆場未遠，禁約百姓不許出蕃。時李大亮為涼州都督，既奉嚴勅， 
防禁特切。有人報亮云：“有僧從長安來，欲向西國，不知何意。”亮懼，追法師問來由。 
法師報云：“欲西求法。”亮聞之，逼還京。 (‘At that time the imperial rule [of the Tang] was 
still new and the borders not very far yet, and there was a prohibition for common people not 
allowing them to go to the western barbarians. At that time the governor of Liangzhou, Li Da-
liang, imposed the prohibition very consequently since he had received strict imperial orders. 
Someone informed [Li Da]liang: “There is a monk who has come from Chang’an and wants to go 
to the western kingdoms, and it is not known for what purpose”. [Li Da]liang became afraid and 
sent for the dharma master to ask [him] why he came. The dharma master informed [him]: “[I] 
want to go to the West to search for the dharma”. [When Li Da]liang heard this, [he] sent [him] 
back to the capital.’)
53 Historically the story is rather unlikely for several reasons, one of them being that there is no 
legal regulation found in the extensive Tang administrative documents which interdicts those 
leaving the empire, and another one being the internal contradiction of the text, speaking of 
an individual petition (biao 表) but of a general imperial prohibition (jinyue 禁約, yanle 嚴勅).
54 251c.12–252a.3.; see especially 251c.18f. 遂以貞觀三年四月，冒越憲章，私往天竺。 (‘Then 
in the fourth month of the third year of [the era] Zhenguan (629) [I] took the risk to transgress the 
regulations and privately went to India.’)
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6 Functional identities or individualities
Xuanzang has more than one identity in the three original biographies: he is the 
pious and striving young monk; the outstanding scholar and intellectual; the 
adventurous and brave traveller; the advisor and teacher of foreign rulers; and, 
finally, mapping the preceding function to the second half in his life, the trusted 
kalyāṇamitra, ‘spiritual friend’, of emperor Taizong and advisor of his son and 
successor Gaozong. These different identities, or rather functions, of the same 
individual in one biography is structurally more evident in the biographies of 
Huili and Yancong than in the two others. The ten chapters are equally divided 
into two halves. The first five are principally concerned with the journey to and 
the sojourn in India, and depict the monk as a religious-intellectual hero. The 
second half is very much devoid of action and focuses instead on Xuanzang’s 
interchange with the emperor and the court, mostly in lengthy letter exchanges 
between the protagonist and the highest elite of the state. It thereby portrays 
Xuanzang as a clever monk-politician who is capable of securing imperial 
support for the Buddhist saṅgha, represented by himself and his entourage of 
scholar and translator monks. So, already in the earliest biographical layer, 
we grasp at least two ‘Xuanzangs’ with each representing a specific identity or 
function.
Here I can only briefly introduce some other, later examples of what I consider 
to be functional identities (or individualities?) of Xuanzang that were constructed 
in different sources under different conditions and with different intentionalities 
or for different purposes. I favour the term function (and its derivative vocabulary: 
functional, functionality, etc.) over others because I think that it best conveys 
the link between the producer/creator and the consumer/recipient aspects of the 
biography. My understanding of function here is derived from a practical context 
(let us say: a screwdriver) but certainly can also be applied to ideas and concepts: 
something (e.g. a tool or a text/biography) is produced/created by someone with 
the intention of serving a specific purpose,55 of fulfilling a specific task, and it is 
only the higher degree of functionality (plausibility) in practice56 (being used or 
accepted by the user/audience) that proves and guarantees not only the practical 
applicability (it works!) but also the continuity of use or the appeal to potential 
users.57 Applied to the example of Xuanzang, such a concept of function allows 
55 To us the practical example of the screwdriver: screwing screws into an object.
56 The screwdriver being more effective than, e.g., a coin to fulfil the task. 
57 Continuous use of the screwdriver and no need to develop another tool.
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for an explanation of processes of re-interpretation (appropriation) which do not, 
however, lead to a fully-fledged and stable institutionalisation.58
Over the centuries and across a variety of contexts, Xuanzang has been (re-)
presented in different functions: as a founder of a Buddhist school, as a traveller, 
teacher, advisor, philosopher, spiritual adventurer, eye-witness, archaeological 
guide, etc.59 This (re)presentation also found its expression in different media, 
such as text, relics and in pictorial, theatrical, and cinematic form. Xuanzang 
was, after a peak of narrative individualisation in the biographical tradition 
during his lifetime and the decades immediately following his death, function-
alised in different ways.
Institutionalisation: while the group of translators and exegetes of Yogācāra 
philosophy that formed around Xuanzang was very short-lived in China, Xuan-
zang (Jap. Genjō) became institutionalised, in the common sense of the term, in 
early medieval Japan in one of the five so-called Nara schools, the Hossō-shū 
法相宗, ‘School of the characteristics of the dharmas’.60 This school had its own 
monastic centres, such as the Kōfukuji 興福寺 and Yakushiji 薬師寺 in Nara and 
considered Xuanzang to be its main Chinese patriarch.
Aestheticisation: after his death, Xuanzang very quickly became the object of 
pictorial representation. A clear iconography developed (Mair 1984; Wong 2002) 
which even appears in the latest cinematic presentation of the spiritual adven-
turer. The very fact that Xuanzang had become institutionalised as a patriarch in 
Japan led to the artistic representation of his life in the popular medieval genre of 
the emaki-mono 絵巻物 (‘pictorial scrolls’ of sequences of episodes) on the basis 
of the ‘Biography’, the Genjō-sanzō-e 玄奘三藏繪 (‘Pictures of the Tripiṭaka[-mas-
ter] Genjō’) (Minamoto 1962; Wong 2002, 53ff).
Literarisation: the popularity and omnipresence of Xuanzang as the par-
adigmatic eminent monk has transformed him into a literary figure known by 
every Chinese person, even if he or she is not aware of the underlying historical 
persona. The version of Xuanzang who appears as the ‘Tripiṭaka dharma-master’ 
(sanzang-fashi) of the Ming novel Xiyou-ji 西遊記 (‘Journey to the West’) by Wu 
Cheng’en 吳承恩 (16th cent.)61 is, in a sense, anonymised. The monk’s journey is 
58 I am using this in a rather common-sense understanding of ‘institution’ as a form of the con-
cretisation or materialisation of an idea or – again – function. I thereby differ slightly from the 
more open concept of institutionalisation used by the KFG.
59 See Deeg 2012, esp. 91–100.
60 For an overview, see Matsunaga, Matsunaga 1974; Kleine 2011, 67–85; on Xuanzang/Genjō as 
a patriarch see Wong 2002, 53–59.
61 Complete translations into English are provided by Yu 1977 and Jenner 1984. On the literary 
interpretation and contextualisation, see several articles by Yu in Yu 2009.
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completely de-historicised and mythologised in this popular work. Other mighty 
but comical heroes, such as the monkey Sun Wukong 孫悟空 or the pig Zhu Bajie 
豬八戒, are introduced and these reduce Xuanzang to the role of an almost deco-
rative figure. The historical process through which this functionalisation of Xuan-
zang as (or his transformation into) the protagonist of a secular novel happened 
is fascinating (Dudbridge 1970) and helps to reveal the different levels of func-
tionalisation that can occur in biographical material.
‘Scientification’62: in the first half of the 19th century, Xuanzang was ‘discov-
ered’ by western scholarship. The focus here was on Xuanzang as an eye witness, 
a traveller, ethnographer, and geographer, a proto-scholar, as it were, who could 
help to reconstruct Indian history or the history of Indian Buddhism or help iden-
tify archaeological sites in colonial India (Leoshko 2003). In a way, this led to the 
Indianisation of Xuanzang and the texts affiliated with him.
Politicisation: in recent times it has been possible to observe a politicisation 
of Xuanzang in a range of contexts. He is invocated by the Indian and Chinese 
government and cultural and intellectual circles as an early witness of Sino- 
Indian exchange and friendship. This connection reached its first peak with the 
donation of Xuanzang relics by the Dalai Lama on behalf of the Chinese govern-
ment to India, represented by Jawarhal Nehru, on the occasion of the celebrations 
of the 2500th birthday of the Buddha in 1956, and has culminated more recently 
in the Xi Jinping-Modi move to establish a new phase of Sino-Indian friendship.63 
Xuanzang became the main figure for symbolising the Sino-Indian friendship, 
the ups and downs of which are mapped by the changing fates of the Xuanzang 
Memorial Hall near the archaeological site of the old Nālandā monastery, started 
already in 1957 but only completed in 2007.64 In the context of the new economic 
and cultural master-project of the Chinese government, the ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
(yidai yilu 一帶一路) initiative, with its strong rhetoric of reviving the Silk Road, 
Xuanzang is frequently flagged up as a historical paradigmatic antecedent of 
China’s outreach to the wider world.
62 I use ‘scientification’ in the absence of a better term.
63 See e.g. https://cpianalysis.org/2014/11/21/searching-for-inner-peace-in-sino- indian-
relations-xi-and-modis-buddhist-diplomacy/ (accessed 29-05-2017). One of the continuous pro-
moters of Xuanzang as the beacon of Sino-Indian friendship and cultural ties was Tan Yun-Shan 
(Tan Yunshan) 譚雲山 (1898–1983), a Chinese who had lived and taught at Santiniketan and is 
often dubbed as a modern Xuanzang: see Tan 1999.
64 See https://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/beta/exhibit/-gLy1Bey76EHJA (accessed 
14-05-2017).
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7 Conclusion
Religious biographies construct lives between individuality and religious func-
tionality or purpose. How much individuality is given to a protagonist is depend-
ent on the intentional parameters within which the biography is constructed. The 
construction of religious individuality is, thus, entrenched and restricted in given 
patterns of religious ideals and concepts, to such an extent that the protagonist is 
paradoxically de-individualised in the process of biography-making.
In the case of Xuanzang, this is evident in the earliest biographical depiction 
of the monk as, on the one hand, a religious ‘adventurer-hero’ and, on the other, 
a scholar-monk and advisor of the Chinese emperor in two different phases of 
his life. His biographers Huili and Yancong portray him as an exceptional and 
extraordinary individual whose unique life is beyond comparison to others. Indi-
viduality is reached by going beyond the usual hagiographic ideals and patterns, 
and this is achieved by combining identities or functions which are rarely found 
individually in other monastic biographies and even less encountered together in 
one individual.65
It would be interesting to explore whether the concept of multiple layers of 
identity or constructed individuality is also traceable in other cultural contexts 
of religious autobiography and biography (e.g. Mani, Shōtoku Taishō 聖徳太子, 
Augustine, Martin Luther, etc.), and how such biographies contributed to and 
influenced the shaping of ideas of religious individuality. But this is beyond the 
scope of the present paper and must remain a project for future work.
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Sabine Sander
Jewish emancipation, religious 
individualisation, and metropolitan 
integration: a case study on Moses 
Mendelssohn and Moritz Lazarus
Beginning as a representation of the cosmos, a means of bringing heaven down to earth, the 
city became a symbol of the possible.  (Mumford 1961, 31)
Space, places and the topic of Bodenlosigkeit (homelessness, also bottomlessness) 
were always privileged topics in the reflections of Jewish scholars and artists – 
unsurprisingly, given the precarious ‘diasporic existence’ of the Jews, bonded 
by shared history and a shared destiny. The cities in Western Europe which had 
grown, prospered and served as vessels for economic, social and cultural crystal-
lisation since the middle of the eighteenth century held out a particular promise 
for immigrant Jews. They offered them hope that they would be able to escape 
the physically cramped conditions and the intellectual narrowness of their shtetls 
and emancipate themselves step by step from the strictures of religion and tradi-
tion, taking on a double identity as Jews and as Germans in the process. The path 
taken ‘out of the Ghetto’ (Katz 1973) by European Jews between 1750 and 1850 is 
closely interlinked with the emergence and development of the modern metropo-
lis and with the processes of religious individualisation. The metropolis as a real 
and as a symbolic place creates an urban community made up of people from 
different social classes, professions, and geographical regions.
In the light of the fact that metropolises were grasped as symbolic proxies 
of Utopia from an early stage onwards, it is startling that so little attention has 
been paid to the relationship between religious individualisation, Jewish eman-
cipation, and metropolitan integration since the Haskalah. To remedy this imbal-
ance, this paper will give evidence of the integrative tendencies of the Haskalah 
and their interrelationship with the emergence and development of metropolitan 
areas.
This development will be investigated by taking up a case study on the 
parallel biographies as well as on the religious and linguistic writings of two 
German-Jewish scholars, Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) and Moritz Lazarus 
(1824–1903). The paper shows how a variety of different processes of religious 
individualisation are entwined with other social and political developments. The 
focus is in particular on forms of sociality, sociability, community and collectivity, 
on the questioning of traditional forms of belonging within the Reform Judaism, 
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and on the question of how these factors provided social spaces for enabling the 
development of the personal options or paths for Jews.
The paper takes up this material for both, as a case study on the intellec-
tual biography of these Jewish scholars, and as an approach to explore through 
the lens of individual cases a more general, universalistic pattern of an existing 
entanglement between Jewish scholarly writings, on the one hand, and processes 
of religious individualisation, metropolitan growth, and social as well as political 
emancipation, on the other. The paper will show how their writings, as well as 
their life stories, initiated, catalysed, and later even institutionalised these pro-
cesses of individualisation, but are yet also the subsequent expression of these 
developments within the Jewish religion.
1 The role of language in Judaism
In his essay ‘Meta-Rabbis,’ George Steiner (b. 1929) describes Jewish scholars as 
commentators who stand outside the Jewish Law but continue to advance the 
interpretative legacy of the Jewish tradition, which he relates to Jewish thinking 
on language and creativity (Steiner 1976, 64–76). He credits the Jews with a certain 
obsession with the written word and ‘a kind of Talmudic trust in the supreme 
dignity of text and exegesis’ (Steiner 1976, 64). In this view, the traditional prac-
tice of learned study and hermeneutic interpretation ultimately led Jewish poets, 
philosophers, artists, and academics to revolutionise language, enrich linguis-
tics, initiate movements founded on revolutionary theories and establish new dis-
ciplines such as sociology, which constituted itself as a distinct discipline around 
the turn of the last century. This subtle observation raises the question as to the 
extent to which Judaism or Jewish experiences were sources – perhaps hidden 
ones – for this theoretical work. It seems pertinent to subject the relationship 
between theory development and the self-image of the Jewish-German authors of 
these theories to further study and to examine how questions that were originally 
Jewish were transformed into more general, systematic theoretical questions.
The investigation of the question of how the Jewish heritage has shaped our 
present-day culture has largely focussed on exploring the theological context of 
Jewish thinking on language. The process of secularisation undergone by Hebrew 
from the eighteenth century onwards has been recognised and investigated, and 
it has been seen how the Maskilim acquired a historical perspective on the holy 
language of the Torah (Schatz 2009). The social and theoretical consequences of 
such changes in language use and in reflection on language are readily apparent: 
reflection on language precipitates social, historical, political,  anthropological, 
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aesthetic and cultural assumptions (Trabant 2006). Entering the space of a 
foreign culture is always bound up with linguistic or cultural barriers, and this 
also applied to Jewish life in the diaspora and to the migration of Eastern Jews 
to Western cities. The interest in the German language shown by Jews since the 
Haskalah has often accompanied the appropriation of new cultural or social 
forms. Against this background, it becomes easier to understand what Hermann 
Cohen (1842–1918) was driving at when he celebrated the significance of Mendels-
sohn’s translation of the Pentateuch and the Psalms for the Jews in the following 
words: ‘Language was to become the medicine with the power to free them from 
the Ghetto, and he selected the German language as the medicine for Judaism’ 
(my own translation. The German original in Cohen 1915, 24 reads as: ‘Die Sprache 
sollte das Heilmittel werden zu ihrer Befreiung aus dem Ghetto. Und die deutsche 
Sprache hat er als Heilmittel des Judentums erwählt’).
Lazarus also affirmed the value of Mendelssohn’s work, highlighting in 
 particular the role of language in Jewish emancipation through education and 
interpreting Mendelssohn’s translation as an integrative contribution to under-
standing between peoples:
‘Again, showing profound insight, he identified and reached out for the right book, perhaps 
the only book that could form a bridge which would lead broad swathes of people into 
German intellectual territory. No other, no foreign, but their own spiritual content, the 
books of the Law of Moses and the Psalms were what he offered people, expressed in pure 
German: in their own soul they were to receive the link that connects Jews and Germans 
[…] For the power of language over the soul was something he recognized from an early 
stage’ (Lazarus 1887, 181–223, here 202). (My own translation. In the German original it 
reads as: ‘Wiederum mit wunderbar tiefem Blick und Griff wählt er das rechte, vielleicht das 
einzige Buch, das für breitere Schichten die Brücke bilden konnte, um sie darauf in deutsches 
Geistesland zu führen. Keinen anderen, keinen fremden, sondern seinen eigenen geistigen 
Inhalt, die Bücher des mosaischen Gesetzes und der Psalmen bietet er dem Volke in reiner 
deutscher Sprache; in ihrer eigenen Seele sollen sie das Band empfangen, das den Juden und 
den Deutschen verbindet; […] Denn welche Macht die Sprache für die Seele hat, hat er früh 
erkannt und oft dargestellt’).
There are various reasons for the keen interest of Jewish-German scholars in lan-
guage, and for the diverse variety of language concepts that originated within 
this group. The language of the sacred scriptures in religious contexts and the 
language of Yiddish in day-to-day communication were and are what links Jews 
around the world. Heinrich Heine put his finger on the symbolic significance of 
scripture for the Jewish diaspora when he called the Torah a ‘portable fatherland.’ 
The formative experiences of living in the diaspora, in outer and inner exile, often 
walking a tightrope between inclusion and exclusion over real and metaphys-
ical bottomless chasms, was bound to raise questions about the cultural and 
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social significance of language, about multilingualism and about human social-
ity through language, especially in combination with the experience of living in 
multilingual and multicultural contexts.
Many Jewish-German scholars, writers, and artists came up with theories 
about language or reflected on the conditions, possibilities, and limits of language 
and language loss in their writings on religious, philosophical, political, anthropo-
logical and aesthetic themes. These scholars had often been raised multilingual. 
They cultivated the traditional Jewish relationship to textual scholarship and often 
possessed an acute sensitivity to the expressive powers of language – something 
which was also reflected in a tendency to take up genres such as the philosophical 
essay, in a predilection to speak in riddles and metaphors, in the ready wit of much 
Jewish humour, and in a high output of literature and poetry. In this latter context, 
one only needs to think of the many Jewish-German poets from Czernowitz, Prague 
and Vienna – among them such prominent names as Theodor Lupul (1838–1858), 
Rudolf Kommer (1887–1943), Rose Ausländer (1901–1988), Itzig Manger (1901–1969), 
Paul Celan (1920–1970) and Selma Meerbaum-Eisinger (1924–1942).
Language as identity and the loss of this identity as the loss of a homeland 
was a topic tackled by Jewish scholars on numerous occasions. Not only were 
many Jews socialised in multilingual environments; scripture and its interpreta-
tion played a prominent role in the education of Jewish children, who received 
instruction in Talmud studies from their fathers or from local rabbis well into the 
nineteenth century. It is also worth recalling the particular position occupied by 
Germany in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe: Other nation states had 
long since emerged, but Germany was still fragmented into separate territories 
and existed only as what intellectuals such as Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–
1803) and Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) defined as a Kulturnation. As such, 
Germany appeared to represent a positive utopia in which people of different 
nations and confessions could co-exist peacefully. Humboldt understood the Kul-
turnation as a community whose members had developed a feeling of belonging 
through their shared participation in art, literature, language, and customs. By 
this logic, belonging to the nation did not result from one’s biological, national or 
religious origins but was the product of becoming conscious of a sense of cultural 
communion.
All of those contributing to the entirety of objective culture should, in this 
view, belong to the nation. The conceptualisation of Germany as a Kulturnation 
probably also contributed to the fact that many Jews living in Germany (and, after 
the foundation of the German Reich in 1871, holding the same legal status as other 
Germans) hoped that they would be accepted without reservation as belong-
ing to the community of all Germans. Many of them held the German  language 
and culture in high affection and cultivated both assiduously. In the nineteenth 
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century, this conception of language and culture going back to Humboldt was 
propagated almost exclusively by Jewish-German scholars; the enthusiasm Jewish 
Germans showed for Humboldt may not have been entirely unrelated to the fact 
that the latter had attempted to legislate for the legal emancipation of the Jews 
(von Humboldt 1903–1936, 97–115; see also Hubmann 2001, 125–52, here 141ff.). 
He did so as early as in 1809, in his role as Prussian Minister of Culture – around 
seventy years before the so-called ‘Jewish Question’ was furiously debated in the 
Berlin Anti-Semitism Dispute of 1879 (Boehlich 1965; for a more recent account of 
the Berlin Anti-Semitism Dispute in English cf. Stoetzler 2008).
Apart from this interest in language originating in biographies, history, and 
cultural politics, reasons for the heightened sensitivity of Jewish-German scholars 
towards language can also be found in intellectual history and in the sociology of 
knowledge: language stands between nature and culture. The fact that the ability 
to produce language is part of human nature, but that language as it is spoken 
is culturally determined and continually evolving, may go some way towards 
explaining why language theories formed such contested territory in the periodic 
skirmishes which broke out between the natural sciences and the humanities 
from the late eighteenth century onwards and escalated further in the nineteenth 
century. Heymann Steinthal (1824–1899), for example, expressed scepticism in his 
annotated edition of the linguistic works of Wilhelm von Humboldt about nativist 
language theories emanating from circles surrounding the noted Indogerman-
ist August Schleicher (1821–1861) (Schleicher 1863; cf. also Sander 2017, 105–145, 
Hartung 2003 and Lang 1989). Nor should the social and political dimensions of 
language be forgotten: language is a medium of communication and interaction 
and therefore a medium of sociality; it touches on questions of human culture 
and the constitution of social orders. From that point of view, it makes sense 
to examine the opportunities presented by human language and the workings 
of language when processes involving the formation of communities, inclusion 
or exclusion are to be described. But Jewish scholars were not only particularly 
drawn to language-related questions; they were also more attuned than most 
other scholars to questions involving places or placelessness or bottomlessness.
2 Location and dislocation in Jewish thought
People who live in one place lastingly and unquestionably have no particular 
reason to concern themselves intensively with this place – it is characteristic 
for Heimat (homeland or native place) that it grants identity in a manner which 
demands no explanations and need not be questioned. But those with no fixed 
944   Sabine Sander
place of residence have every reason to seek to understand and come to terms with 
their current location. Given the Jews’ experiences of loss, exile, and life in the 
diaspora, it is unsurprising that the themes of place, placelessness and bottom-
lessness play a prominent role in Jewish thinking: a vast body of literary, cultural 
and religious evidence bears testament to experiences of rootlessness, mobility, 
migration, homelessness, and otherness (Schlör 1995). The experience of the fra-
gility of an existence linked to one place is not singularly a Jewish one, of course, 
but rather an eminently modern one, linked closely to the emergence of large 
cities. However, this experience was often particularly dramatic in Jewish biog-
raphies, not least because many Jews underwent this experience multiple times. 
Even when they did not, it still formed an integral element in Jewish cultural 
memory and Jewish identity, as it had since the exile of the Jews to Babylon. It was 
also often the case that even successful Jewish immigrants found their legal and 
social status in their new elective homes to be precarious.
The exceptional level of symbolic significance accorded to places is reflected 
in Jewish vocabulary. The Yiddish concept doikeyt can be translated as ‘being 
here’ ‘presence’ or ‘belonging’ and ‘covers an entire network of experiences, atti-
tudes, habits, and traditions which are connected to a particular place and to the 
relations among the Jews living in that place’ (Schlör 1995, 359). The Hebrew word 
makom has a similarly diverse range of meanings: it can refer to topographical and 
to imaginary places, as well as to a spiritual home. Attempts to understand Jewish 
emancipation and Jewish integration following the Haskalah can only profit from 
taking a closer look at the significance Jewish scholars ascribed to the metropolis. 
The path ‘out of the ghetto’ was also the route from the village communities of the 
shtetl to big cities. Most Jewish scholars took this historical and symbolic path, as 
Mendelssohn and Lazarus did, or reflected on it and were thus able to perpetu-
ate an aspect of Jewish memory culture which was transformed into more general 
questions and still occupies theorists in cultural studies and sociology today.
3  Representatives of emancipation through 
education
Although Lazarus was born around a hundred years after Mendelssohn, the par-
allels in their biographies are remarkable: both grew up in devout Jewish families 
and were instructed in the Talmud as children; both were intellectually precocious, 
exceptionally interested in education and thirsty for knowledge, which one acquired 
largely auto-didactically and the other at Berlin University. Both were drawn from 
a rural or small-town setting to the metropolis Berlin, both rapidly established 
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 themselves in learned intellectual circles, both worked towards the renewal of Jewish 
traditions, and both profited from Berlin’s urban environment, although their legal 
and social status there was precarious at times. Finally, both were publicly chal-
lenged over their Jewish faith: Mendelssohn in 1770 in a controversy with Johann 
Caspar Lavater (1741–1801) and Lazarus around a hundred years later (1879) in the 
Berlin Anti- Semitism Dispute, by his antipode Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896).
Moses Mendelssohn, born in Dessau in 1729, was instructed in the Talmud 
from his childhood onwards, first by his father, and later in the local Talmudic 
school, as well as by the chief rabbi in the Duchy of Anhalt, David Hirschel 
Fränkel (1707–1767). He reached the city of Berlin when he was thirteen years old, 
as a protected Jew and in the charge of his beloved teacher Fränkel (Knobloch 
1987). Legend has it that the young Moses, still called Moses Dessau at this point, 
walked for five days to reach the Prussian capital. At the time, Jews needed to 
gain permission to enter the city of Berlin. When Mendelssohn, standing before 
the city walls, was asked what he wanted to do in Berlin, his terse answer was: to 
learn. Whatever the legend, the young Moses took his studies seriously, acquir-
ing second-hand copies of the books of John Locke (1632–1704) and Shaftesbury 
(1671–1703) and teaching himself English, French and Latin. He earned his living 
as a private tutor in the house of silk merchant Isaak Bernhard. The importance 
of such tutoring for the Haskalah should not be underestimated; many Maskilim 
worked as private tutors in the households of wealthy Jewish families and conse-
quently had a direct influence on the socialisation and education of their pupils. 
In this way, they were able to gradually implant reformist ideas in the minds of 
coming generations, so that no major upheaval took place, but rather an inner 
fermentation and reinterpretation of religious ideas and inherited traditions.
The role of the metropolis as an intellectual and cultural centre also enabled 
Mendelssohn to become active as a literary critic, contributing both to the peri-
odical ‘Briefe, die neueste deutsche Literatur betreffend’, which was edited by 
 Friedrich Nicolai (1733–1811) and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781), and to 
the ‘Teutsche Merkur’ produced by Christoph Martin Wieland (1733–1813). Men-
delssohn finally became well-known beyond the borders of the city in the ‘Lavater 
controversy.’ The Swiss philosopher and pastor Johann Caspar Lavater, mainly 
known today for founding the study of physiognomy, had sent Mendelssohn a 
copy of his translation of Charles Bonnet’s (1720–1793) ‘Inquiry into the Evidence 
for Christianity.’ He publicly challenged Mendelssohn to disprove the theses of 
the noted theologian or to convert to Christianity (Lavater 1770).
It cannot have been easy for the modest and mild-mannered Mendelssohn to 
take up this challenge, but he reacted with equanimity and replied that Bonnet’s 
proofs could be used to defend any religion, but that he was, and would remain 
Jewish, out of a sense of deep conviction (Knobloch 1987, 167). In his 1770 letter to 
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Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel (1735–1806), Mendels-
sohn finally wrote, in the spirit of the Enlightenment postulate of tolerance: ‘As all 
people are destined by their creator for eternal bliss, a religion which excludes those 
who do not adhere to it from this cannot be a true one’ (Mendelssohn 1968, 556: ‘Da 
die Menschen alle von ihrem Schöpfer zur ewigen Glückseligkeit bestimmt sind, so 
kann eine ausschließende Religion nicht die wahre sein.’ For an English account of 
the debate between Mendelssohn and Lavater, see Meyer 1967, 29–56). He addressed 
Bonnet with the lines: ‘What a happy world we would live in if all men accepted 
and practiced the truths that the best Christians and the best Jews have in common’ 
(Mendelssohn 1968, 532. English translation from Meyer 1967, 33: ‘In welcher glück-
seligen Welt würden wir leben, wenn alle Menschen die Wahrheiten annähmen und 
ausübten, die die besten Christen und die besten Juden gemeinsam haben’).
The figure of Nathan in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s drama Nathan the Wise, 
which was published in 1779, had its premiere four years later in Berlin, and it 
contained an implicit plea for inter-religious dialogue, was based on Mendels-
sohn. The debate rumbled on for several years and was followed widely, with 
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and other 
noted theologians and philosophers criticizing Lavater’s provocation. Even 
Charles Bonnet himself, the author whose work had given rise to the contro-
versy in the first place, excused himself publicly for Lavater’s affront. Lavater 
persisted in his attempts to fish for Jewish souls despite his lack of success in 
the case of Mendelssohn, and eventually elicited a mocking satire from Georg 
Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799), which the latter published in 1773, using the 
pseudonym Conrad Photorin, with the amusing title ‘Timorus: or, Defence of 
Two Israelites Who Were Moved to Convert to the True Faith on the Strength of 
Lavater’s Arguments and Göttingen Sausages’ (Knobloch 1987, 171). In the origi-
nal German Lessing’s piece was entitled Timorus, das ist die Verteidigung zweier 
Israeliten, die durch die Kräftigkeit der Lavater’schen Beweisgründe und der Göt-
tingischen Mettwürste bewogen, den wahren Glauben angenommen haben; for a 
detailed account of the controversy in English, see Real 2005, 110 f.).
After Lavater had been forced to put up with his missionary efforts being 
compared to the seemingly irresistible taste of smoked pork, the search of this 
man of God for Jews he could convert faded from public view. As in so many other 
cases, humour offered a tried and tested defence against provocations and hos-
tilities – it is no coincidence that jokes have a long, rich and distinct tradition of 
their own in Judaism as well as in other cultures.
About a century after Mendelssohn had reached Berlin from the small world 
of Dessau, Lazarus followed his intellectual preceptor to Berlin from Filene 
(now Wieleń), a small, polyglot German-Polish town in the Prussian Province 
of Posen. Lazarus had grown up speaking Yiddish, and in his autobiography, he 
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describes his efforts to learn to speak High German without an accent (Lazarus 
1913). Much in the spirit of his role model Mendelssohn, he viewed the German 
language as the key that would open up the entire culture of the Wilhelmine 
Empire to him (cf. also Sander 2017, 145–182 and Sander 2009). Lazarus lived 
in the Second German Empire, in which Jews had been granted full legal rights 
but were continually confronted with anti-Semitic challenges that culminated 
in the Anti-Semitism Dispute. Like most other Jewish-German academics, he 
was never appointed to a full professorship in Germany. He was appointed to a 
professorship in Berne, Switzerland in 1860, and remained in that position for 
six years, before he found himself drawn back to Berlin, where he ran a literary 
salon together with his first wife, Sarah Lazarus née Lebenheim (1819–1894), and 
after her death with his second wife, the writer and actor Nahida Ruth Lazarus 
née Sturmhöfel (1849–1928), who had converted to Judaism.
The salon was vividly frequented by academics, politicians, writers, and 
artists, among them popular personalities such as Georg Simmel (1858–1918), 
Theodor Fontane (1819–1898), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), Berthold Auerbach 
(1812–1882) or the painter Adolf Menzel (1815–1905). In the spirit of the Enlighten-
ment ideals of eighteenth century salon culture, Lazarus was an enthusiastic pro-
ponent of the idea of emancipation through self-improvement and sociability. In 
the era of Enlightenment, and subsequently in the German Empire, the opportu-
nities for upward mobility and advancement through education offered by salons 
were taken advantage of by Jews, but also by women: it is probably no coincidence 
that the best-known women of the eighteenth and nineteenth century were fre-
quently the hosts of such salons. Some of the most famous salonnières included 
Mendelssohn’s daughter Dorothea Schlegel (1764–1839), Henriette Herz (1764–
1847), Arthur Schopenhauer’s mother Johanna Schopenhauer (1766–1838), Rahel 
Varnhagen (1771–1883), Bettina von Arnim (1785–1859), Henriette Solmar (1794–
1888), Fanny Lewald (1811–1889), Clara Mundt-Mühlbach (1814–1873), Hedwig 
Dohm (1831–1919) and Misia Sert (1872–1950), among others (Wilhelmy 1989).
4  The language theories as matrices 
for understanding alterity or otherness
The ability to read and write multiple languages belonged to the achievements and 
ideals of Jewish scholars from an early stage. The Jewish scribe and priest Ezra, 
author of the Old Testament book of the same name, acknowledged the necessity 
of translating sacred texts as far back as 400 BCE, when there were already Jews 
living in the diaspora, surrounded by foreign languages and  cultures (Bechthold 
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2005). The act of translation as opening up new horizons of meaning, or as a 
transfer from one field of meaning to another, was a central topic pursued by 
Jewish intellectuals from the Haskalah onwards. During the epoch of the Jewish 
Enlightenment, Mendelssohn initiated this trend with his Hebrew-German trans-
lations of the Pentateuch and the Psalms – a project which he worked on from the 
middle of the seventeen-seventies onwards in collaboration with other Maskilim, 
among them Salomo Dubno (1738–1813), Herz Homberg (1749–1841) and Naphtali 
Herz Wessely (1725–1805). Mendelssohn had initially intended his work to be used 
for the instruction of his children in language and religion but shortly afterward 
he saw the opportunities the translation offered to make the ideas of the Haska-
lah accessible to all German-speaking Jews. He had the translation printed as a 
bilingual edition, with the Hebrew text next to his German translation, which was 
also printed in the Hebrew alphabet. The translation was manifestly intended for 
Mendelssohn’s Jewish contemporaries. In the tradition of rabbinical interpreta-
tion of scripture, Mendelssohn accompanied the translation with a Bi’ur or com-
mentary and termed the entire work Sefer netivot ha-Shalom, which means ‘Book 
of the Paths of Peace.’
Different interpretations of Mendelssohn’s primary motive for carrying out 
the project exist. The translation is frequently seen as providing a possibility for 
opening up in the direction of German culture and language – often, revealingly 
enough, by Jewish scholars themselves. Others have asserted that Mendelssohn’s 
main motivation was to bring Holy Writ closer to German Jews who would now 
be able to read Hebrew and to start the rediscovery of buried Jewish traditions 
(Römer 1994, 49–58). Mendelssohn’s own testimony allows both interpretations 
but stresses the practical aspects of the project. The Bible translation was to 
enable a resourceful paterfamilias to educate his children in the spirit of Judaism. 
But this finding should not distract from the fact that Mendelssohn, like Lazarus a 
hundred years later, was interested in improving the situation of Jews in Germany 
by familiarising them with the German language and culture. This can be seen 
as a form of acculturation. In a letter to his friend August von Henning (1748–
1826), Mendelssohn described the ‘better translation and explanation of the Holy 
Books’ as a ‘first step to culture, something from which my nation, sadly, is kept at 
such remove that one might almost despair of the possibility of an improvement’ 
 (Mendelssohn 1976, 148f. The English translation is cited from Meyer 1967, 43).
When modern Jewish schools were being set up under the Habsburg 
monarchy as a result of the tolerance patents issued by Joseph II (1741–1790) 
from 1782 onwards, Mendelssohn sent the theologian tasked with reforming 
the school system in Bohemia, Ferdinand Kindermann Ritter von Schulstein 
(1740–1801), finished sections of his as-yet incomplete translation. He added 
by way of explanation that the translation had occupied him for a long time 
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as a way of  delivering a German translation into the hands of the youth of his 
own nation that would conform to their religious principles (Mendelssohn 
1977, 97f.). In the light of Mendelssohn’s insistence on the inviolate nature of 
the text of the Torah and his preference for literal rather than interpretative 
commentary, it is surprising to see how severely his text was criticised soon 
after its publication. Ezekiel Landau (1713–1793), chief rabbi in Prague and 
Bohemia from 1754 onwards, criticised Mendelssohn’s project in the strongest 
terms, maintaining that it reduced the Torah to the role of a maidservant to the 
German tongue (Brenner, Lowenstein, Meyer 1996, 291). Critical voices such as 
these speak volumes about the level of upheaval in traditional Judaism sparked 
by Mendelssohn and other Maskilim. But scolding was not enough to prevent 
the success of the book: even the first edition of 750 copies found purchasers 
in such far-flung locations as Holland, Poland and Russia, and in the century 
between 1783 and 1888 seventeen new editions of the work appeared. With this, 
the innovations of the Maskilim had entered the mainstream and the liberal 
Reform Judaism, which Lazarus, among others, would come to represent, had 
been established.
As was also the case for many other Jewish-German scholars in the Wilhelm-
ine Empire, Lazarus found himself standing between the enlightened world of 
Western culture on the one hand and the Jewish traditions he sought to reform on 
the other. Lazarus presided over the first and second Israelite Synods in Leipzig 
(1869) and Augsburg (1871). Extensive reforms of Jewish religious ceremonies, pre-
scriptions on clothing and food, as well as legal matters, were discussed on both 
occasions. At the Leipzig synod, for example, songs and psalms in the German 
language and organ music were introduced into the synagogues. At the Augsburg 
synod, various legal reforms were passed, including the involvement of the bride 
and the mutual exchange of rings in marriage rites, the admittance of testimony 
given by women in courts, the abolition of the chaliza and the legitimisation of 
driving on the Sabbath for charitable or religious reasons.
Without exploring these reforms in further detail, it can be noted that the 
effect of this modernisation was to bring Jews closer to Western culture. Lazarus 
understood the synods above all as attempts to establish a balance between 
Jewish religiosity and the ability to lead a social existence bounded by the same 
legal norms that applied to others (Lazarus 1869; Philipson 1907, 307ff.; Malamat 
1976, 836ff.; Brenner, Lowenstein, Meyer 1997, 116ff., 137ff.). In his late work The 
Ethics of Judaism, he explored the role of the stranger and love for strangers from 
the perspective of Jewish religiosity. He cited the Talmud and Talmud commentar-
ies as sources for Jewish moral teachings and explained the high esteem accorded 
to strangers in Jewish religiosity in terms of the Jews’ own experience of exile in 
Babylon (Lazarus 1898, 87. See also Sander 2017, 341–382).
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What is particularly remarkable is the fact that Lazarus saw Jewish moral 
teachings as a form of social ethics – for, according to him, ‘true recognition of 
man’s destiny in this world can be reached only on the basis of a social philos-
ophy’ (the English citation is taken from Lazarus 1900, 187; in the German orig-
inal in Lazarus 1898, 142 it reads as: ‘[…] in der Sittlichkeit aber spielt gerade die 
Gesammtheit die Hauptrolle; alle Ethik ist (wie schon angedeutet wurde und wei-
terhin noch genauer dargelegt werden soll) wenn nicht ganz und gar, dann doch 
vorzugsweise S o c i a l e t h i k. – Das Dogma des Jenseits gründet sich lediglich 
auf eine Philosophie des Ich; alle wahre Erkenntnis aber von der Bestimmung des 
Menschen, zunächst im Diesseits, wird nur auf dem Grund einer Philosophie des 
W i r gewonnen werden’).
The task of the new discipline he initiated, Völkerpsychologie or ethno- 
psychology,1 was to be the examination of the cultural and social dynamics, 
which arise as a result of people interacting with each other. Lazarus stressed that 
social ethics was not a national principle but a universal one: ‘We shall see how, 
from the unity of mankind, the equality of all nations was deduced, and further-
more, within the ranks of each nation, the equality of all its members. One law for 
all – no hereditary privileges for the one or the other estate or family’ (the English 
translation is taken from Lazarus 1900, 195; in the German original in Lazarus 
1898, 148f. it reads as: ‘Wir werden sehen, wie aus der Einheit die Gleichheit aller 
Nationen abgeleitet ist, aber auch innerhalb der Nation die Gleichheit aller Glieder; 
einerlei Recht und einerlei Gesetz für Alle, also daß alle erblichen Vorzüge einzelner 
Stände und Geschlechter verschwinden’).
Lazarus rejected evolutionist schemes of history and with them biological or 
racial definitions of human dignity, stressing that the Talmud contained multiple 
allusions to the necessity of according respect to strangers. In a lecture he gave to 
the general assembly of the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums (Higher 
Institute of Jewish Studies) in 1879 he took a stand against the nation-state theories 
recently expounded by Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896) at Berlin’s university, 
and against Treitschke’s anti-Semitic rhetoric. In his lecture, Lazarus argued that 
1 Völkerpsychologie is not a concept easily rendered in English. Urs Fuhrer considers ‘folk psy-
chology’ to be merely an ‘absurd mistranslation’ and observes that ‘cultural psychology’ and 
‘Ethnopsychology’ are both closer but still open to various objections. See Fuhrer 2004, 41. Ivan 
Kalmar notes that Lazarus and Steinthal called their new discipline a branch of psychology, 
shying away from terms such as ethnology and anthropology because both terms were strongly 
focused on issues of biology and race at the time. The irony that the two scholars, who more than 
anyone foresaw the direction that anthropology was to take, were forced to reject anthropology 
as a term is not lost on Kalmar, who points out that both scholars would surely be better known 
among anthropologists today if they had opted to use the word. See Kalmar 1987, 671–90, here 
673. For a more detailed account on the concept of Völkerpsychologie, see Sander 2017, 145–82.
Jewish emancipation, religious individualisation, and metropolitan integration   951
communities were not constituted by such objective traits as race, origin, blood rela-
tionships, religion or character (Lazarus 1880; an English translation of Lazarus’s 
lecture is available in Stoetzler 2008, 317–59). He made no reference to external 
determinisms in explaining the emergence of history, opting rather to accentuate 
the impact of the imagination, emotions, subjective will and sense of selfhood of 
the actors involved as necessary and adequate factors for the development of a com-
munity: ‘That which makes a nation a nation lies […] in the subjective views of the 
members of the nation, all of whom regard themselves as its members. The concept 
of a nation rests on the subjective view of the members of the nation of themselves’ 
(my own translation from the original German, from Lazarus 2003, 88; in the origi-
nal it reads as: ‘Das, was ein Volk zu eben diesem macht, liegt […] in der subjektiven 
Ansicht der Glieder des Volkes, welche sich alle als ein Volk ansehen. Der Begriff Volk 
beruht auf den subjectiven Ansichten der Glieder des Volks selbst von sich selbst’).
Such a description applied to the inclusion of the Jews in the German 
Empire – although they were not of Aryan origin, they belonged to the German 
nation through a common language and through education and participation in 
cultural and political life. Culture, as Lazarus concluded emphatically, was the 
product of diversity. While Lazarus opposed the biological understanding of a 
nation held by Heinrich von Treitschke, his views also differed from those of 
Theodor Mommsen (1817–1903). Mommsen was in favour of complete assimila-
tion of the Jews but Lazarus pleaded for an alternative model of acceptance of 
what is foreign to ourselves. With this approach, the Jewish-German theorist had 
anticipated the concept of the construction of nations and identities, a model 
which asserts that belonging to a community is a process negotiated through 
active involvement in the life of that community.
Seen from this point of view, nations do not appear as pre-existing entities or 
realities but as specific historic and cultural projections. In this context, it is note-
worthy that Lazarus’ lecture manuscript ‘What does national mean?’ was passed 
on to Ernest Renan (1823–1892), who made reference to it in correspondence and 
seems to have incorporated much of Lazarus’ thinking into his seminal essay ‘Qu’ 
est-ce qu’une nation?.’ While no mention of Lazarus is made in Renan’s essay, 
Lazarus was justified in assuming that his work had influenced Renan (Smith 
2008, 111–3 as well as Jansen and Borggräfe 2007, 138). As such projected or 
‘imagined’ communities are not bound by territorial borders, they can function 
as the connection which links people in a diaspora, in as much as members feel a 
sense of belonging towards the imagined community, wherever in the world they 
may find themselves (Anderson 1983).
In Völkerpsychologie, or the ethno-psychology developed by Lazarus, lan-
guage has a double function. Both aspects are reflected in the concepts of 
 ‘condensing of thinking’ and ‘appropriation’ which lie at the core of his theory 
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of the ‘objective spirit’: language is an expression of the spirit of the whole group 
because it stores knowledge which has crystallised during centuries of human 
history. It is also the medium through which such knowledge is acquired: lan-
guage makes it possible for individuals to participate in shared, collective beliefs 
and ideas, in the objective spirit of a community. Lazarus accorded particular sig-
nificance to Volksschriften, or folk literature, extolling the significance of Homer 
for the Greeks and the importance of fairy-tales or the Bible for his own era. In 
these texts, collective interpretations of the world, shared values, desires, hopes, 
and fears, in short, the sum total of human imagination is condensed. Folk litera-
ture has a relevance which transcends epochs and social class: ‘Good folk litera-
ture evens out intellectual injustices, and the Bible is a spiritual sun which casts 
its rays into huts and palaces alike and warms and illuminates both’ (my own 
translation from the original German in Lazarus 2003, 72; in the original it reads 
as: ‘Gute Volksschriften ebnen die geistigen Ungleichheiten aus, und die Bibel ist 
eine geistige Sonne, welche in die Hütte wie in den Palast ihre Strahlen wirft und 
hier wie dort erleuchtet und erwärmt’). The study of various languages and their 
canonical texts gives information on the imaginative capacity of society and on 
the ideas about the world shared by the collective. From that point of view, lan-
guage – both academic research on language and the practical acquisition and 
use of language – is the key to culture. Through language, the close links which 
bind individuals to their respective communities are established.
Apart from his general interest in linguistics, Lazarus also devoted attention 
to the everyday conversation long before an interest in the workings and effects 
of everyday conversations became a fashionable topic in linguistics and commu-
nication studies circles (Lazarus 1986). Dialogue with others, even ‘small talk,’ 
preserves what we are familiar with and ensures orientation on values, norms, 
and experiences. Over and above these factors, language allows us to appropriate 
new thoughts, to share the experiences and thoughts of others, and to under-
stand their views of the world. Lazarus argued that dialogue is the basis for 
building communities but also saw that interactions through the medium of lan-
guage paved the way for a cultural and social change. For the act of speech – as 
Humboldt had already acknowledged when he categorised language as energeia 
rather than as ergon – changes as it is executed; it is a continual process which 
in turn impacts on culture and creates invisible bonds between people: ‘But con-
versations do not simply reinforce themselves; they have a purifying and uplift-
ing effect on public opinion. They transform many smaller and larger minds into 
one great, public spirit’ (my own translation from the original German in Lazarus 
1986, 41; in the original German it reads as: ‘Aber die Gespräche befestigen nicht 
bloß, sie läutern und heben die öffentliche Meinung; sie machen aus den vielen 
kleinen und mittelmäßigen Geistern einen großen, öffentlichen Geist’).
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A shared language and everyday conversations create an inter-subjective 
reality, an objective culture within which the individual manoeuvres. At the same 
time, speech is the privileged medium for the appropriation of the material objec-
tification of cultural forms, such as architecture, art, technology or utilitarian 
objects, but also for appropriating its immaterial manifestations, from tact and 
morals to customs and habits. When children learn their native language, they 
acquire – in the process – the sum total of their own objective culture. Seen from 
this point of view, according to Lazarus, linguistic research offers insights into the 
imagination and attitudes of collectives. At the same time, language is the intel-
lectual tool which assists in understanding what is foreign to us and integrating 
it into our own experiences.
The perceptions of language and culture of Jewish-German scholars allow 
us highly revealing insights into the historical and political changes that took 
place in the two hundred years between the Jewish Enlightenment and the eve 
of National Socialism and in the different environments of the Prussian state, 
the German Empire, and the Weimar Republic. Mendelssohn had understood his 
translation as the first step towards that culture which his nation had previously 
been so far removed from as to despair of the possibility of improvement – and 
thus begun a process of crossing over from German Jewishness to Jewish Ger-
manness, setting an important precedent in the process. It is revealing that the 
practice of translating scripture by Jewish-German scholars reached its zenith in 
the Second Empire, when pressure to assimilate was running at a particularly 
high level. From the middle of the nineteenth century right up to the Second 
World War, not a single decade passed without at least one Jewish Bible trans-
lation being published in German (Bechthold 2005). For the children and grand-
children of the Maskilim and the Reformed Jews, however, the Hebrew language 
and Jewish religiosity often appeared to be merely empty shells. Among other 
sources, Franz Kafka’s ‘Letter to his father’ – a letter which was never sent – bears 
witness to this. Kafka maintains that his father’s Judaism was devoid of real faith, 
‘a mere nothing, a joke’. He rejects his father as a role model with an accusatory 
flourish: ‘Had your Judaism been stronger, your example would have been more 
compelling too’ and he describes how the residue of Jewish culture his parents 
still possessed was lost: ‘Even in this there was still Judaism enough, but it was 
too little to be handed on to the child; it all dribbled away while you were passing 
it on’ (Kafka 1975; English translation cited from Kafka 1966).
The environment described here – awareness of the loss of Jewish traditions 
and attempts to return to the roots of Jewish religiosity and culture – finally 
formed the historical background to what has been the last major Jewish-German 
Bible translation to date: right on the eve of the rise of Nazism to power, Martin 
Buber (1878–1965) and Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) began their Verdeutschung 
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der Schrift, a ‘Germanification’ of the Hebrew Bible (Buber, Rosenzweig 1956–
1968). Their translation stood exactly on the margin between two languages and 
cultures, in that the Hebrew text was translated into German but the cadences of 
the original Hebrew were retained, so that a new and unusual language emerged. 
Buber and Rosenzweig aimed to create a new work which would run against the 
grain of readers’ expectations and in this way bear testament to the irreducibility 
of the experience of the ineffable. In their synthesis of Old Hebrew and German, 
Jewish faith in revelation and a creative reworking of the German language were 
to be moulded into something new, a third element that would extend the range 
of what could be thought and perceived, a language and culture in which German 
and Jewish elements would condense to form a new whole (Rosenzweig 1926). 
Buber and Rosenzweig created a Hebraic German to give their contemporaries, 
most of whom were rooted fast in the German language and had no knowledge of 
Hebrew, a sense of the holy language of their ancestors. With that, they strove to 
initiate a ‘Renaissance’ of lost Jewish traditions as an answer to the acculturation 
of German Jews which had gone before and only shortly prior to the unleashing 
of National Socialism’s horrific and vast destructive potential.
5  The metropolis as the pre-condition 
for emancipation and individualisation
Against the background of prototypical Jewish metropolitan biographies, such as 
those of Mendelssohn and Lazarus, and the resultant body of theoretical work, 
numerous scholars from diverse academic disciplines, many of them Jewish, 
have devoted considerable attention to studying the consequences of these met-
ropolitan developments. They have focussed on the spatial and social order of 
the metropolis, its population structure and the cultural, social, psychological 
and imaginary dispositions and mentalities which developed through the co- 
existence of diverse social classes, nationalities, and cultures. In order to get to 
the heart of the distinct qualities of life in the metropolis, representatives of the 
emerging discipline of social theory postulated the existence of typical figures, 
such as the ‘marginal man’ and the ‘stranger.’
Reflections of this nature can aid us in gaining a perspective on the huge 
revolutionary significance of the lives of Mendelssohn and Lazarus. Robert E. 
Park’s social type of the ‘marginal man’ fits both Jewish-German scholars per-
fectly (Park 1928, 881–93). Park conceived of the ‘marginal man’ as existing in an 
urban setting on the fringes of more than one world, occupying a marginal, bor-
derline position. But Park’s main point is not that the ‘marginal man’ is  separated 
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from the  homogeneous mainstream community by a border. Rather, it is that the 
‘marginal man’ finds himself on this border between several antagonistic cul-
tures. The ‘marginal man’ is a product of migration and acculturation; Park saw 
assimilated and emancipated European Jews as prototypical representatives of 
the concept. What is described in spatial metaphors as a borderline existence 
results in subjective feelings of ambivalence. Both models, adaptation to a new 
cultural system of reference and self-assertion within a group one does not quite 
belong to, require a homogeneous frame of reference which must be negotiated 
and created through forms of exclusion, distancing oneself, and attributive pro-
cesses. As a result of this intermediate position, the ‘marginal man’ advances 
social change and cultural developments: finding otherness within himself and 
something of himself in others, he joins both to form a third entity. Mendels-
sohn and Lazarus straddled the margin between Jewish traditions and Western 
Enlightenment humanism and can thus be considered  representative cases for 
this model.
Park’s concept of the ‘marginal man’ also bears witness to the fact that he 
spent a semester studying in Berlin under Georg Simmel, who was both one of 
the founders of sociology in Germany and a student of Moritz Lazarus. Simmel’s 
highly detailed observations and descriptions of the dynamics of the develop-
ment of the metropolis and its cultural and social forms were ground-breaking 
when first published early in the twentieth century, and they are still highly rel-
evant today (Simmel 1900; Simmel 1903, 185–206). Simmel observed that the 
metropolis is an environment that allows the individual a great degree of ano-
nymity but also promotes the ‘intersection of social circles’ in a manner which 
he saw as a prerequisite for the emergence of individuality. Individuality arises, 
according to Simmel, when people belong to various social circles or groups at 
the same time and is found in the unique area of intersection between these dif-
ferent circles (Simmel 1908, 305–44). Above and beyond his seminal work on 
the metropolis, Simmel was also preoccupied with the figure of the stranger as 
a person ‘who comes today and stays tomorrow’ (Simmel 1908, 508–12, here 
509). Strangers are characterised primarily by the interaction of proximity to and 
distance from a given community – they are not ‘inhabitants of Sirius’ (Simmel 
1908, 509), so far away as to be imperceptible, but those who find themselves 
amid a homogeneous group from which they are separated not in spatial terms 
but through a cultural or social border. Simmel maintained that this ambivalent 
position between proximity to and distance from a (closed) group gave strangers 
the ability to regard existing structures and social orders objectively and to 
anticipate change particularly sensitively. Simmel himself, and before him Men-
delssohn and Lazarus, were certainly all particularly well-attuned to the socio- 
cultural environment around them.
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It should be clear from the overview given of the biographical stations and 
theoretical concepts of Mendelssohn and Lazarus that metropolitan Berlin had 
enormous significance for the Jewish emancipation movement and for Reform 
Judaism. The Enlightenment in Europe and its tender offshoot, the Haskalah, 
began in big cities because these places, with their schools, universities, publish-
ing houses, printers, associations, literary salons, and coffee-houses, provided 
the locations and the points of intersection where education, the exchange of 
ideas and networks could be initiated and deepened. Drawing on Simmel, Louis 
Wirth (1897–1952) came to define urbanity as a specific way of life, a ‘complex of 
traits which makes up the characteristic mode of life in cities’ (Wirth 1938, 8). In 
Wirth’s views, the typical features of this urban way of life are segmented role 
relationships, memberships to different groups, the loss of family ties, and forms 
of contact with others which are anonymous but tolerant of social and cultural 
differences. A highly concentrated population creates the critical mass required 
for specialist demands to emerge and so makes the formation of cohesive net-
works and subcultural institutions and movements easier (Fischer 1995, 543–77).
Cities were always places where different lifestyles and subcultures inter-
sected and interacted. Competition between multiple parallel strands of think-
ing makes social dynamism, innovation, and progress possible. The pulsating 
atmosphere and vibrant social life in eighteenth and nineteenth century Berlin, 
with its coffee houses, salons and learned circles, created the fruitful ground 
for Jewish-German emancipation. This occurred not least because cities such as 
Berlin had a large number of journals, publishers, and printers; this allowed for 
the quick dissemination of new experiences and different cultures of knowledge 
that could enter into cultural memory. Encapsulated in books and other publi-
cations, this knowledge and this culture took on a portable quality, which ulti-
mately meant that the Jews who emigrated were able to take it with them.
6 Conclusion and prospects
This paper draws on early social theory texts and biographical sketches to review 
the impact of the metropolis on intellectual life and the impact of the ‘marginal 
man’ on the emergence of an integrative metropolitan culture. To this end, the 
effects of Jewish migration on the ‘grammar’ of urban co-existence and the role of 
urban structures as a catalyst for Jewish emancipation have been explored. Berlin 
provided opportune conditions for the Haskalah movement, resulting from its 
rapid population expansion and its increasingly important position as the capital 
of the Prussian kingdom; but also the fact that the metropolis, as a location of 
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 cultural and social crystallisation, always accommodated alterity as well as 
homogeneity, goes a long way in explaining the fruitful role of the big cities for 
the movement of the Haskalah and for processes of religious individualisation. 
The biographic paths of Mendelssohn and Lazarus are paradigmatic for 
a process of emancipation through education which was largely successful, 
although it must be emphasised that the striking degree of optimism in the 
ideas voiced by Mendelssohn, Lazarus, and other Jewish-German intellectuals 
(see Sander 2017) was at stark variance with the actual political realities of their 
respective eras: both Mendelssohn and Lazarus were confronted with modern 
anti-Semitism in various forms. Their conceptions of language, culture, and 
national identity can be interpreted as intellectual ‘parallel worlds’ which they 
set against the ambivalent social and political realities they encountered in – 
respectively – the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The study of intellectual biographies is an excellent medium within which to 
identify and to better understand the manifold overlaps of personhood, individu-
alisation, and institutionalisation, for there is no ‘lonely genius’ outside of society 
and it’s agencies of socialisation and education, on the one hand, but there would 
be no scientific or historical progress, on the other, if it was not for those outstand-
ing individuals who moved beyond their cultural and religious ties’ or who trans-
formed their social ‘package’ into a universalistic viewpoint. The investigation of 
intellectual biographies gives evidence of the intertwined relationship between 
tradition and deviance, norm and creativity, or structure and agency. Intellectual 
biographies also testify to the fact that there is an undeniable link between the 
historical experiences of a generation and its actions or cultural works. The history 
of ideas matters, for it is ‘social imaginaries’ (Taylor 2003), worldviews, ideas, and 
particularities that drive the history of mankind and foster social change and cul-
tural dynamics, such as processes of religious individualisation.
This case study of the intellectual biographies of two German-Jewish schol-
ars who were representatives of the Haskalah and the Reform Judaism testifies to 
multiple processes of religious individualisation:
1) Both scholars walked a tightrope between traditional bondage and deviant 
behaviour, and this tightrope translated in their meandering between norm 
and creativity, or between collectivity and individual self-assertion in their 
lives and writings; for the Reform Judaism allowed the expansion of the 
scope of action for the individual (Jew) without converting the Jewish people 
into renegades.
2) Both scholars had a great capacity to ‘translate’ their (metropolitan) cosmo-
politanism, as well as their multiple cultural identities and affiliations, their 
status’ as ‘marginal men’ (Robert E. Park), in a particularly fruitful way into 
their scientific writings and the stations of their intellectual life and career.
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3) In the writings of both scholars, deep religious piety on the one hand, and 
modern scientific scholarship on the other, were interwoven. It allowed for 
the representation of a unique social, cultural, religious, and historical con-
stellation.
4) According to the thesis expounded here, the historical process of emancipa-
tion through education left significant traces in the writings of both scholars, 
in both cases weaving a type of ‘cultural matrix for understanding alterity’ 
into their work on language and culture. 
It would behoove today’s cultural studies practitioners and sociologists to redis-
cover this intellectual legacy and develop it further. Finally, the survey of the 
complex relationship between urban development and Jewish emancipation pre-
sented here confirms the accuracy of Lewis Mumford’s description of The City in 
History in his opus magnum of the same name, first published in 1961:
The city first took form as the home of a god: a place where eternal values were represented, 
and divine possibilities revealed. Though the symbols have changed the realities behind 
them remain. We know now, as never before, that the undisclosed potentialities of life reach 
far beyond the proud algebraics of contemporary science; and their promises for the further 
transformations of man are as enchanting as they are inexhaustible. Without the religious 
perspectives fostered by the city, it is doubtful if more than a small part of man’s capacities 
for living and learning could have developed.  (Mumford 1961, 575)
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Afterword: texts and narratives
The ‘texts’ portion of this part of the publication has explored narratives of reli-
gious individualisation that have set in motion discourses which, to varying 
degrees, empower and promote religious individualisation. The authors of these 
narratives are, in a sense, the founders of discursivity, from whom currents of 
thought seem to flow which have informed modes of religious individualisation. 
It is, however, often the ‘modes of circulation, valorisation, attribution, and 
appropriation’ (Foucault, Faubion 1998, 220) that provide insights into the cul-
tures and social relations of a process of individualisation. It is the production 
and modifications of the ‘author function’ that indicate the emergence of insti-
tutions that propel and valorise the ‘individual’ author. In this section, we have 
discussed how the author does not necessarily connote a specific individual; 
several narrators, selves, and subjects confuse and complicate the link between 
author and individual (historical or imaginary). The author may function as a 
mere ‘scriptor’, the composer of a text, but its ultimate use, meaning, and destiny 
are in the hands of the recipients of that text (Barthes, Heath 1977, 145). Some of 
the contributions here have engaged with the idea that the author/scriptor plays 
a smaller role in the emergence of conventions than the community that rallies 
around their texts. For it is this community that valorises the author as an exem-
plar to be emulated. Yet other contributors have examined the intentionality of 
an author’s narrative strategies to initiate discursivity and to provide a model for 
posterity. We have discovered, in contrast to the ‘Practices’ section of this part of 
the publication, that texts intuitively tend toward collective efforts of stabilisa-
tion and conventionalisation, sometimes tangential or even at variance with the 
pronouncements of the author.
Processes of text composition, reception, and itinerancy, and the many ironic 
and quirky stances that authors, characters, and audiences take with regard to 
texts, suggest that previous assumptions about sequential and/or dialectical 
dynamics of religious institutionalisation and individualisation need to be recon-
sidered. Is it possible to think of individualisation and institutionalisation as 
intertwined processes rather than opposing or contrasting and sequential pro-
cesses? In other words, can we think of a process in which the narrative creates 
the author? And one in which the individual author is produced when he or she 
is institutionalised or stabilised through the work? In such a scenario, individu-
alisation and institutionalisation, rather than being ambiguous and ambivalent 
processes, can become mutual, reciprocal, and coeval, and the congealing of 
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plural, multiple identities into a single one of the ‘author,’ subject, or individ-
ual can simultaneously set into motion his/her institutionalisation, or as we have 
preferred, their conventionalisation. The genres of biography and autobiography 
offer one prominent path for individualising a figure/person but there are also 
a number of other possible pathways. The contributions here accept the mutual 
imbrication and complementarity of individualisation and conventionalisation, 
which has allowed us to examine how an ‘individual’ or a text gains the ‘author-
ity’ to become institutionalised. We have posed the question, if we accept the 
presence of the author and his/her text as ‘real’, what would the interface of indi-
vidualisation and institutionalisation tell us?
Facets of the institutionalisation of individualisation occur both along with 
the composition and authorisation of a text and as a longer process over gen-
erations, indeed sometimes centuries. Ishita Banerjee-Dube explores an Indian, 
15th-century Oriya telling of the Mahabharata. In this case, practices of collective 
‘reading’ and recitation of the text, as well as its continual transcription, result 
in the many makings of the figure of the ‘author’ as well as of his composition. 
Endeavours to ‘standardise’ the text and its author from the second half of the 
19th century resulted in the institutionalisation of its ‘author’, Sarala Dasa, as an 
‘individual’ and an exemplary figure. It is of particular importance that he iden-
tifies himself as a Sudra-Muni, a lower-caste, ignorant person who is bestowed 
with the power to produce the Mahabharata by the goddess Sarala Devi. The 
audacious act of a Sudra rendering a vernacular telling of a Sanskrit epic was 
valorised and enhanced over subsequent receptions of the text that anachronisti-
cally celebrated, individualised and institutionalised him. Here we have seen an 
example of how the text and author are constructed by the community in order 
to develop an exemplar of individualisation, rather than the text holding sway 
over the recipients. In the case of Bhima Bhoi, a mid-nineteenth century poet- 
philosopher of Mahima Dharma of Odisha, India, the enduring presence of the 
kandha (khond) poet among the followers of a radical yet marginal religious faith 
is reflected in the composition of texts ascribed to him decades after his death, 
once again illustrating the intersection of individualisation and institutionalisa-
tion. In Max Deeg’s contribution, a similar promotion and reification occurs to the 
Chinese monk Xuanzang (600/602–664). In this case, we see how multiple biog-
raphies of one figure can reveal the institutional functionalisation of a historical 
figure, repeatedly and simultaneously authorising the monk and drawing author-
ity from him. Some examples of his functionalisation were literarisation, politi-
cisation, aestheticisation, iconography, scientification, etc., with every instance 
performing this two-way authorisation. Therefore, the increasing exceptionality 
and individualisation of Xuanzang have a direct relationship to authority drawn 
from him by the authors and their institutions; the repetition of his story itself 
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becomes a convention. In both cases we have observed a simultaneity of authori-
sation, rather than a sequential authorisation that we may have assumed because 
of the chronologies of the author, individualised exemplar, text, and community.
What seems consistent in our texts, an aspect that counter-intuitively estab-
lishes trustworthiness, is that the central figures simultaneously transmit tradi-
tion and norms yet at the same time are made extraordinary by a deviation from 
them. The frequent acknowledgement of knowing the ‘rules’ and then exceeding 
them is an aspect of the texts that consistently gives them force, since it main-
tains a tension which refuses to be resolved. Anne Feldhaus’ contribution dis-
cusses the Mahanubhav writings from 13th-century India, texts which preserve 
in minute detail, the doings and wanderings of avatars of the same divine being. 
Since Chakradar disappears in 1274, the successors must preserve the teachings 
over time in order to preserve the presence of Chakradar. The teachings insist 
that the presence of the god gives one liberation and so this presence is produced 
imaginatively and textually. One of the quirky avatars asks questions such as, 
‘do I have to know everything’? This both transmits the assumption and the self- 
evident truth that the divine is omniscient; yet the figure himself won’t allow 
this to be stable. This tension, which we might even call irony, finds its way into 
several of the works. In Rahul Parson’s study of early modern North India, we see 
that Banarasidas, the 17th-century Jain merchant, repeatedly calls himself a fool, 
like a child grasping at the moon in a reflection, and yet because of the acknowl-
edgement of his inability to comprehend dense philosophical positions, he would 
have us trust his rendering of an immense treaty on the Self and the voice of the 
omniscient precisely because of his apparent innocence. Aside from the conven-
tions of humility borrowed from Tulsidas and other Bhakti poets, Banarasidas’ 
ironic and self-effacing stance anticipates trajectories of discursivity emanating 
from his work, propelled by both his detractors and his well-wishers. Depending 
on whom one asks, Banarasidas’ innovations and transcreations either amount to 
intolerable heresy, or they are the basis of a proper institutionalisation witnessed 
in the rise of the Terapanth sect, who venerate him as their Adiguru (initial Guru) 
(Lath 2005, 9). The reverberation of Banarasidas’ insistence on self-reliance is felt 
more widely than just this sect. We also find it in the subsequent works of this 
particular strand of Jain poetry, thereby conventionalising and institutionalising 
Banarasidas’ audacity.
A yet more productive and complicated use of irony appears in Chapter VII 
of Paul’s letter to the Romans, as we have seen in Ian Henderson’s contribution. 
Paul, the historic Paul, writing this ‘I’ or ‘Ego’, functions as an ironic staging of a 
fictional, imaginary Paul, or ‘I’ ‘Ego’, which becomes canonical and also norma-
tive, framing how a Christian should feel (i.e., self-tortured). This imaginary Paul 
stages akrasia, the ethical problem of someone who knows what the right thing to 
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do is but still does the wrong thing. Paul performs this, the Ego knows the good, 
affirms the good, and does something else. In other words, this ‘I’ consents to the 
Torah, knows that it is doing the wrong thing but has consented to the revela-
tion this ‘I’ has received from God. Chapter VII of Paul’s letter to the Romans was 
designed to be institutional by representing personhood in some exaggerated 
way. The irony here functions as a positive ambiguity, with multiple meanings 
that are all sincerely intended, even if irreconcilable. Imagined institutionalisa-
tion is a potent mode of individualisation – and imagined individualisation is 
a potent mode of institutionalisation – in a text written by a real person named 
Paul who dictated a text to be performed elsewhere. The performed-elsewhere 
Paul evokes the Paul needed for the institutionalisation, one who is constructed 
simultaneously by Paul’s words and the community’s performing/hearing them.
Movement, mobility, itinerancy, and plurality are recurring motifs that shore 
up tales of and about the authors and narrators, contributing to a different sort of 
institutionalisation. At times the physical text itself gains audience and authen-
ticity by way of travel. The mobility and legitimacy over space is part of this insti-
tutionalisation. The itinerancy of figures in the text produces a legitimisation 
through worldliness, the reach of its acceptability, and the dynamics of social 
diversity one encounters in the chronotope of the road and the urban (Bakhtin 
1998). As Sabine Sander has demonstrated in her contribution, the path taken ‘out 
of the Ghetto’ (Katz 1973) by European Jews between 1750 and 1850 is closely inter-
linked with the emergence and development of the modern metropolis and with 
the processes of religious individualisation. The metropolis as a real and symbolic 
place (of encounter) creates an urban community made up of people from dif-
ferent social classes, professions, and geographical regions – as once described 
by Georg Simmel in his Sociology with his famous formula of the ‘intersection of 
social circles’ as a pre-condition for individualisation. This was the institution-
alisation of a trajectory that headed towards the emergence of the enlightened 
and emancipated Jew, as an acknowledged citizen of the state. Sander’s case 
study on the parallel biographies and the religious and linguistic writings of two 
 German-Jewish scholars, Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) and Moritz Lazarus 
(1824–1903), reveals how a variety of different processes of religious individual-
isation are entwined with other social and political developments. The question-
ing of traditional forms of belonging, coupled with particular forms of sociality, 
sociability, community, and collectivity, provided social and imaginative spaces 
which enabled the Jews of that time to choose from a variety of personal options, 
developments, and paths.
Finally, Saurabh Dube has shown that the autobiographical and biograph-
ical materials of convert subjects in colonial central India  query persistent 
projections of individualisation and institutionalisation as opposed ideas and 
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processes, presumptions that lie at the core of dominant conceptions of conver-
sion. These narratives were simultaneously shaped by colonial verities and form-
atively marked by vernacular attributes, both aspects of an evangelical modernity. 
Although apparently formulaic in nature, they engage and exceed the  telos  of 
commonplace apprehensions of conversion to Christianity, inscribing such 
exclusive story lines with their own notations. In such accounts,  subject and 
author, conversion and personhood, appear within emergent practices and per-
formances of translation involving the entangled work of the irregular labour 
of convert and missionary, individualisation and institutionalisation. Here, 
the very terms of an immaculate conversion could be acutely forged through 
the force of rumour and the strength of prophecy, such that distinctive entail-
ments of myth, legend, and narrative broke upon a missionary’s description of 
a convert’s life. A distinct autobiographical narrative of a lowly Indian evangel-
ical operative appears as a life seeking an occupation, an existence stalking a 
vocation – shored up by recalcitrance toward paternal authority and refusal of 
paternalist power – in a manner that the acute contrariness of the tale puts its 
particular twist to irony and akrasia.
Across the texts considered here, we find the conventionalisation of certain 
modes or patterns of communication. Irony and akrasia seem to occur most con-
sistently and appear to have a much greater institutionalising potential than con-
sistency or straight didacticism. Recall the ‘dim-witted’ master poet-philosopher 
Banārasīdās; or the Sudra-Muni author of the great epic, Mahabharata; or Chakra-
dar of the Mahanubhavs who questions his own omniscience, or the necessity of 
it; or the many Pauls and their akrasia; the elite German-Jews who knew where 
they had belonged and aspired to exceed that by belonging somewhere new; and 
Xuanzang, who disobeyed the emperor and yet had his anecdote repeated and 
celebrated as heroic from within a frame of political power that would not have 
it emulated. The contributions here specifically disrupt the traditional authority 
ascribed to an author or text by showing that the discourses, rhizomatic narra-
tives, and currents of thought in each case study contain a collage of voices, sug-
gesting that the religious individualisations, and conventionalisations thereof, 
are dynamic and co-constitutive.
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Introduction: authorities in religious 
individualisation
Concluding a publication on religious individualisation with three sections on 
different aspects of the notion of ‘authorities’ requires an explanation. The sec-
tions of this fourth part lead back to our starting point: the study of individual-
isation as a social phenomenon, as a phenomenon involving complex processes 
with different agents and time-lines in varying social contexts.
If new religious practices are an expression, as much as a trigger, of religious 
individualisation, it is processes of grouping (see Lichterman et al. 2017) and, 
hence, institutionalisation that stabilise this individualisation. ‘Associations’ 
(collegia, thaisoi) were present in ancient Mediterranean cities from quite early 
on in their development but it was during the imperial period, in particular, that 
they started to become ever more important as organisational forms of religious 
grouping. Collegia were private organisations that could acquire a legal status 
(and, from the second century AD onwards, own property) by being ‘registered’ 
(for the following see Rüpke 2007, 205–14). The gamut of different types of colle-
gia is very wide: the slaves owned by a large household (familia) might unite to 
form a collegium; independent craftsmen formed large professional organisations 
partly for convivial purposes but also to protect their rights and status, as did 
the mediaeval guilds in a period of European history. The name of the associa-
tion and the location of the meeting place suggest that religious identities were 
ascribed to these groups by members and observers. A membership of between 
fifteen and one or two hundred members was common.
Internal forms of organisation were highly variable. By the middle of the 
second century, nearly four hundred members of a Dionysian club set up an 
inscription to honour the daughter of the founder, Pompeia Agrippinilla. This 
inscription from suburban Torrenova takes the form of a membership list iden-
tifying a wealth of different functions for about fifty members of the association. 
Hierarchically ordered, it lists dadouchos – sacerdotes – theophoroi – hypourgos 
kai seilenokosmos (minister)  – cistaphoroi – archiboukoloi – boukoloi hieroi – 
archibassaroi – amphithaleis – liknaphoroi – phallophoroi – pyrphoroi – hiero-
mnemon – archineaniskoi – archibassarai – and finally custodians, antrophylakes, 
listed only after the mass of female bakchai and male and female seigetaí who, as 
newcomers, had ‘to remain silent’ (see Rüpke 2006). Obviously, at least a mini-
mally corresponding complexity of rituals and ritual space has to be imagined for 
this religious group made up from an extended family.
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The temporal structure of the group’s interaction was, likewise, open to defini-
tion. From the mid-second century AD, the rules of the collegium of Aesculapius and 
Hygieia gave a schedule of dates that might give some indication of the usual practice.
On 4th January: New Year gifts are to be distributed as on 19th September.
On 22nd February, the day of the Caristia (family feast): a distribution of bread and wine to 
be made at the schola near the temple of Mars, in the same amount as on 4th November.
On 14th March, at the same place, a dinner is to be held, which Ofilius Hermes, the presi-
dent, has promised to provide each year for everyone present; alternatively a money distri-
bution in the usual amount.
On 22nd March, Violets day: in the schola, gifts of money, bread and wine to those present, 
in the amount stated above.
On 11th May, Roses day: in the schola, gifts of money, bread and wine to those present, in 
the amount stated above, on the condition, agreed at the full assembly, that the monetary 
gifts, bread and wine allocated to those who do not attend shall be put up for sale and given 
to those who do attend, except in the cases of those who happen to be abroad or who are 
indisposed through illness. 
(From Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum 6.10234 = Année Epigraphique 1937, 
161, trsl. Richard Gordon in ibid., 209.)
The whole association had been financed and (re-)organised by a certain Salvia 
Marcellina, wife of a libertine named Capito, in commemoration of her husband 
and his superior (Flavius Apollonius, a procurator Augusti in charge of the impe-
rial painting galleries), to whom Capito was assistant. Thus, the association had 
received a roofed structure as a meeting place and funds to hold banquets. In 
order to make the bequest meet the costs, the donor had limited the maximum 
number of members to sixty. The most important dates were related to the cult of 
consecrated emperors and further meetings were scheduled for days commonly 
used for the commemoration of the dead. Surely, such a practice was a conse-
quence of the Roman laws controlling associations, which limited official meet-
ings to one per month and allowed monthly contributions only up to a certain 
sum. Tertullian, at the turn of the third century AD, claimed that Christian associ-
ations – in fact churches, with their Sunday services and alms-giving − conformed 
to these rules (apol. 39.5). Such a claim might be the lie of an ‘apologetic’ to cover 
the illegal behaviour of more frequent meetings and giving, but given the spaces 
available for meetings and working conditions for many potential participants 
beyond members of the household, we cannot be sure that frequent meetings 
could have been efficiently institutionalised. But the very presence of the source, 
a lasting inscription inscribed in stone, regulating details and ordering meetings 
so as to assure the memory of a founding figure, demonstrates the dialectics of 
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individualisation secured by institutionalisation, even if the idea that such asso-
ciations could exercise influence over the members’ life-style, disciplina, devel-
oped only slowly. Already in Hellenistic and earlier times, such a connection was 
known and accepted for groups qualified as philosophical ‘schools’. Such rules 
could include regular attendance, abstaining from meat, even sexual regulations 
(Sen. epist. 108.17–22; Diog. Laert. 8.19).
The notion of ‘Authorities’, as thematised in this last and fourth part of our 
publication, points to the impact of power relations, to the relationship of the 
ruling few and the many subjects, of majorities and minorities, of centres and 
margins in terms of political power, cultural or religious authority, economic 
dominance – and the collaboration between the two sides. Again, this demands a 
nuanced concept of individualisation in accordance with our previous treatments.
Contrary to the still dominant view of individualisation as a uni-linear and 
coherent process, the perspective from the history of religion reveals diverse, tem-
porary, and discontinuous processes. The claim of uniqueness, unity, and the irre-
versibility of individualisation (above all as a process of Western modernity) is not 
the result of empirical findings, but is in itself part and parcel of a self- description 
that finds a scientific expression in modernisation theory. For historical analysis, it 
is useful to differentiate between the concepts of ‘individual’ and of ‘individuality’, 
of ‘individuation’ (the biographical process of acquiring a full member’s role in a 
society, see Musschenga 2001, 5 for these terms) and ‘individualisation’ (the social 
structural process of institutional or discursive changes allotting more space for 
individuality). Elsewhere I have proposed to differentiate between types of individ-
uality, in order to enable a closer look at the phenomena and their contexts (these 
will be introduced and developed further below, see Rüpke 2013 for the following).
But what kind of phenomena does such a concept of individualisation 
embrace? What kind of family resemblance does it produce? First and foremost, it 
includes the notion of de-traditionalisation as thematised in the first section of Part 
4. Individual action is less and less determined by traditional norms handed down 
by family and the wider social context. Options open up, choices can be, and need 
to be, made. On the part of the individual, this development is reflected in changes 
in ‘individuation’ – the process of a gradual full integration into society and the 
development of self-reflection and of a notion of individual identity. Socialisation 
is the parallel biographical process of being integrated into ever larger social con-
texts. The individual’s appropriation of social roles and traditions and, more spe-
cifically, religious roles and traditions, goes hand in hand with the development of 
individual identity. I know how to act in society and I act strategically, being self-
aware but not necessarily selfish. Religious individuation, for instance, does not 
imply the individual’s wish to be different. On the contrary, in many historical cir-
cumstances being different was not a value that informed individuation. Dignity 
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and honour were such values, notions of competition, being better than others in 
certain respects, or even being perfect. Religious practices may have been treated 
as fields of competition, for instance in sponsorship and charity, in displays of a 
cultured taste, or in intensive relationships with a deity.
Such changes entail institutional developments: options are declared legiti-
mate; voluntary associations help to realise certain options; writing, as is sug-
gested by bhakti or Sufi poetry, helps to develop notions of individuality; inscrip-
tions on stone, wood or internet pages might help to express it on a larger social 
scale. The rights of the individual are legally protected against society’s demands, 
culminating in the formulation of individual human rights. As we have seen for the 
American white middle classes (Madsen 2009, see the general introduction), indi-
viduality takes on a normative character: you have to be an individual. This relates 
only to a segment of society. Individualisation as well as socialisation are processes 
within complex and multi-layered societies, processes that are informed by basic 
social factors and contingent local and temporal circumstances. They are also 
informed by potentially globalised discourses, pluralised (as the second section is 
to emphasise) not only within fields like religion but also with regard to the impor-
tance attributed to different fields of the economy, culture, politics or religion – and 
the ‘exchange rates’ between the different forms of capital acquired in such fields.
Talking about plurality thus goes beyond (and even questions) the simple 
acknowledgment of the co-existence of different ‘religions’. Religions are usually 
understood as traditions of religious practices, conceptions, and institutions, in 
some contexts even fully developed organisations. According to an important 
strain of sociological thought going back to Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), we are 
dealing here with social products (Durkheim 1947; also Pickering 2008; Rosati 
2009), with groups of people normally living together within a territory, who 
withhold the central core, the shared orientation of their life together, from the 
necessity of daily discussion by investing it in forms of religious symbolism. There 
emerges a system of signs whose immanence is preserved by the performance of 
rituals and which seeks to explain the world in images, narratives, written texts, 
or refined dogma and to determine behaviour by the use of ethical imperatives, 
often by recourse to an effective apparatus of sanctions (for instance, through the 
power of the state), but sometimes even without that implied threat.
Such a conception of religion already meets its limits when it seeks to explain 
religious pluralism, the enduring coexistence of different, mutually contradictory 
conceptions and practices. It is even more limited with regard to the quite distinct 
relationship of individuals to religion, the aspect with which research into reli-
gious individualisation is concerned. This conception of religion has already been 
attacked for being too closely oriented towards ‘western’ and, above all, Chris-
tian religious and conceptual history and has been criticised for its unquestioned 
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and unquestioning ‘colonial’ transference to other cultures (Asad 1993; McCutch-
eon 1997; Masuzawa 2000; 2005). The approach has similar problematic ramifi-
cations when we seek to apply it to Euro-Mediterranean antiquity (see Nongbri 
2013; Barton, Boyarin 2016; Rüpke 2018b, 1–22). The reason for this also lies in 
the present. The dissolution of traditional allegiances, a common feature of our 
time, is seen as religious individualism, the disappearance of religion, or even the 
displacement of collective religion by individual spirituality (Luckmann 1991; also 
Dobbelaere 2011, 198; Rüpke 2016). This perspective then becomes associated with 
the complementary assumption that early societies and their religions must have 
been characterised by a high level of collectivism. Thus, a problematic assump-
tion in respect of the present day creates a highly distorted picture of the past.
But it is not the notion of religion that needs to be set aside. What is needed 
instead is a concept of religion that enables us to describe the aforementioned 
changes regarding the social location and individual significance of religion. This 
can successfully be achieved by conceiving of religion from the point of view of 
the individual and his or her social involvement. Here, the notion of ‘lived religion’ 
is helpful (for the following Rüpke 2012; 2018a). The concept of lived religion was 
developed in the late 1990s. Instead of analysing expert theologies, dogma, or the 
institutional setting and history of organised ‘religion’, the lived religion approach 
focuses on what people actually do. More precisely, it is not interested in inquiring 
into how individuals reproduce the set of religious practices and intellectual tenets 
of a ‘faith’. Taking into account the inter-subjective and relational character of the 
individual (Fuchs, Rüpke 2015; Fuchs 2015), the approach focuses instead on the 
individual’s ‘usage’ of religion. Religion is, however, not to be seen as existing inde-
pendently of individual practice. We are not asking how, over the course of their 
lives, individuals replicate a set of religious practices and beliefs preconfigured by 
an institutionalised official religion or, conversely, how they opt out of adherence 
to a tradition. Instead, ‘lived religion’ focuses on the actual everyday experience, on 
practices, expressions, and interactions that are related to and constitute ‘religion’. 
Such ‘religion’ is understood as a spectrum of experiences, actions, and beliefs 
and communications hinging on human communication with super-human or 
even transcendent agent(s), whether conceptualised as gods, demons, ancestors, 
or powers. Material symbols, elaborate forms of representation, and ritualisation 
are called upon for the success of communication with these addressees (Bell 
1992; Rüpke 2010b). Of course, such a communication at the same time implies 
the forging or, at times, the rejection of human alliances. Thus, the existence and 
importance of culturally stabilised forms of rituals, and of the concepts and people 
who are invested in developing and defending them, cannot be denied.
In contemporary usage, ‘lived religion’ is in the danger of focusing on what is 
also addressed by concepts such as ‘everyday religion’ or ‘popular religion’. Orsi 
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(1999; 2010) and McGuire (2008) focus, respectively, on religious practices on 
the streets of an Italian neighbourhood in New York and on religion in American 
living rooms. Focusing on meaning, however, David D. Hall urges ‘breaking with 
the distinction of high and low’ (Hall 1997; cf. Orsi 1997).
As has been stressed above, individual practices are not entirely subjective. 
There are religious norms, there are exemplary official practices, and there are 
control mechanisms. It is precisely such institutions and norms that tend to pre-
dominate in the surviving evidence from historical religion. In this biased trans-
mission, what historians of religion are used to read as a norm fully in force is 
not the result of the validity of the norm but, rather, a communicative strategy 
on the part of agents in positions of power or in possession of larger means. If 
we observe religion in the making – as is stressed here –, institutions or beliefs 
are not simply culturally given, but are themselves aggregates of individual prac-
tices – as well as the constraints of these practices.
The concept of ‘appropriation’, as initially developed by Michel de Certeau 
(2007), is useful to capture the relationship between the individual agent and 
the cultural and material environment. The specific forms of religion-as-lived 
are barely comprehens ible in the absence of specific modes of individual appro-
priation of motives and models offered by traditions, up to the extreme of the 
radical rejection of dominant ways of life, as is the case with asceticism or martyr-
dom, that is, of walking the edges or even dying on them. For the concrete forms 
and, above all, for their material survival (and thus being available as ‘evidence’ 
today), cultural techniques such as the reading, writing, and the interpretation of 
mythical or philosophical texts, rituals, pilgrimages and prayer, and the various 
media of representation of deities in and out of sanctuaries, are decisive.
The notion of agency implicit in the idea of appropriation is important. 
Agency is not concerned with the lonely individual but with the interaction of 
individuals with structures. And these structures are, again, the result of individ-
ual action. In view of the normative tagging of teachings, traditions, narratives, 
etc. in the field of religion, that is to say in view of the normative claims raised 
by some of the agents, the question of how ideas are taken up and modified by 
others (or in other words: the specification of processes of reception) is of par-
ticular importance. Talking of lived religion offers a frame for a description of 
the formative influence of professional providers of law and other legal norms, 
of philosophical thinking and intellectual reflections in literary or reconstructed 
oral form, of social networks and socialisation, of lavish performances in public 
spaces (or performances run by associations) with recourse to individual conduct 
in rituals and religious context. This valuation and methodological primacy of 
the individual is more than a radicalisation of modern research strategies that 
are interested in differentiating the practices of ever smaller defined groups and 
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communities. Again, institutions are not regarded as ontologically antecedent. 
Individuals’ agency and structure constitute each other (Emirbayer, Mische 1998; 
Dépelteau 2008; Wang 2008; Campbell 2009; Rüpke 2015). Taking religion as 
lived religion brings the precarious state of institutions and traditions to the fore 
and does so without denying the power of such authorities. But above all, these 
are as much the means of expression and creativity of their inventors and patrons 
as spaces and material of experience and innovation for their users and clients. 
Statistically speaking, only in rare instances does such lived religion coalesce 
into networks and organised systems to resemble what we normally categorise as 
religions, expressed in written texts that may then develop an enduring autono-
mous existence of enormous proportions. And yet, they were and are important, 
or have importance ascribed to them, as several chapters of the fourth part of our 
publication underline. Without the support of individual choices by institution-
alised practices or beliefs, or even by full-grown organisations, explicit religion 
might become implicit religion, visible religion invisible religion, and vice versa. 
Processes of individualisation in their different forms are reversible processes, 
potentially following or being followed by processes of de-individualisation.
There are, however, even more complications involved in these relationships. 
Periods and regions that could be regarded as characterised by a variety of pro-
cesses of individualisation can also be seen as seedbeds of religious traditions, 
even organisations. In short, they can be seen as equivalents to what we are used 
to call ‘religions’. Mediterranean Late Antiquity is the birthplace of what has been 
called the first autobiography, Augustine of Hippo’s ‘Confessions’ at the end of 
the fourth century, and of monastic and ascetic virtuosi in the preceding century. 
And yet, Augustine was the powerful head of the Catholic ‘church’ of Carthage, 
fighting the widespread Donatist movements. Many ascetics and hermits grouped 
together as cenobites in monasteries where their ‘fathers’, the abbots, started 
to write monastic rules. Similarly, the idea of the loving relationship to a god, 
called bhakti, elaborated from the Puranic period, roughly the third century AD 
onwards, quickly led to the formation of sampradayas, of sects, which focused 
the religious practices on specific deities. The Central European Reformation of 
the early 16th century propagated the ideas of individual belief and a personal 
salvation that is dependent on God’s grace in the place of ritual services provided 
by the Christian Church, but different theologies and alliances still organised 
themselves into ever closer structures that were also political in nature. The ‘new 
religious movements’ in the era of New Age spirituality attest to a broad differen-
tiation of world views and religious practices but they are not only indicators of 
individual options and choices made. At the same time, they also attest to loose 
and tight networks, practices of bonding or even the sanctioning of disloyalty. 
De-traditionalisation and neo-traditionalisation might go hand in hand.
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These observations can be generalised. Individual behaviour that might be 
judged deviant, or at least non-conformist, from the point of view of the majority 
or the religious mainstream, is precarious and threatened. As a consequence, it is 
safeguarded and institutionalised in the form of (at least in the beginning) minor-
ity groups. From here, the paradox takes its point of departure. A bundle of factors 
and motifs lead to the encaging of those who group together to defend their reli-
gious individuality. In order to define their boundaries, groups dogmatise their 
norms and denounce outsiders, as well as exclude internally deviant members. 
Systematisation of belief and the attempt to gain political support produce rigid-
ity or compromises that turn away other members. Professional leaders judge the 
power of their institution by its influence on the behaviour of the people who 
judge themselves members or are ascribed membership. The conviction or prac-
tice safeguarded by the institution might be rigidly enforced among its members. 
By the fourth century AD, Christian bishops had achieved juridical power, 
granted to them by the Roman emperor; ‘heretics’, ‘followers’ of (just another) 
sect had been banned earlier but could now be sanctioned with public support. 
Manicheans and heretics had to fear for their careers and even their lives. Even 
if the question of whether Muhammad’s Islam was just a new heresy or an inde-
pendent ‘religion’ of its own was discussed by Christian observers far into the 
Middle Ages, in hindsight we can classify this culmination of individualisation 
processes as a period of ‘religionification’, of the rise of religions (Rüpke 2010a). 
In Europe, a comparable process can be observed in the early modern period. 
Down to the 18th century, the processes of confessionalisation, the development 
of different ‘confessions’ (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed), sharply defined 
group limits, formalised standards of belief and behaviour, and assured the inter-
nalisation of specific denominational norms leading to lasting habits, social and 
economic behaviour, and intellectual orientation. Only for a few contemporaries, 
who were able to leave the habitual social and intellectual context, such confes-
sions offered practically eligible options. Despite the existence of religious plu-
ralism from the bird’s eye view, for any historical individual the exercise of choice 
was very restricted. In many instances, this stimulated internal differentiation 
rather than the costly switching of allegiances.
The fourth part of this publication engages with these questions from the three 
different perspectives already indicated. In all of them, the differences in power, 
the sometimes dramatic degrees of dependency and hegemony, are taken into 
account. The first group of articles focuses on processes of de-traditionalisation – 
identified as a major indicator of processes of individualisation above – as well 
as re-traditionalisation or, rather, neo-traditionalisation, thus taking the perspec-
tives of those in power. The section opened with Richard Gordon’s chapter on reli-
gious specialists of low social status in the ancient world and their development of 
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competence and knowledge in the realm of roots, herbs, and basic ritual practices 
in the face of anti-magic legislation and the necessity to perform in a market. Jan 
Bremmer tackles the question of the possibility of limiting de- traditionalisation 
head on by authorities and legal systems by looking into juridical cases in ancient 
Athens. This is followed by Avner Ben-Zaken’s chapter on the trans-local and 
trans-cultural establishment of traditions which cross the boundaries of religion 
and science in the geographical space of Europe, the Mediterranean, and western 
Asia. Kumkum Sagari focuses likewise on individuals, now Annie Besant and M. 
K. Gandhi in 20th century India, and their appropriation and reformulation of 
traditions. For the same period, the tension between individualised and institu-
tionalised religion is discussed with regard to Catholicism in Germany by Veron-
ika Hoffmann. Michael Nijhawan concludes the section by turning again to a legal 
system, this time in contemporary Germany, and its construction of membership 
in a religious tradition for immigrants.
In the second section, processes of pluralisation, another key phenomenon 
of individualisation, are brought centre-stage. Depending on the character of 
political or juridical regimes or constellations in which religion is not sharply 
differentiated against ‘non-religion’ or ‘society’, different degrees of group for-
mation (see Eliasoph, Lichterman 2003; Lichterman 2012; Lichterman et al. 2017) 
and stabilisation of such groupings lead to a pluralisation that might even offer 
possibilities to ‘opt in’. Angelika Malinar focuses on textual strategies of religious 
pluralisation in ancient India, whereas comparable strategies in the form of ritual 
practices and objects in ancient Mediterranean religion are thematised by Jörg 
Rüpke. Marion Frenkel directly engages with processes of institutionalisation that, 
at first glance, seem to attest singularisation rather than its opposite, but points 
to neglected practices of individualisation in late ancient circum- Mediterranean 
Christianity. It is texts that again take centre-stage in Asaph Ben-Tov’s chapter on 
an early modern learned man who employed the confrontation with a different 
lingustic tradition, the Arabic Quran, as a means to add new perspectives to con-
temporary Protestantism. In the fifth chapter, Amit Dey takes the topic of Islam to 
India and investigates Islamic pluralisation there.
Finally, the focus shifts even more to the individual agents. Emphasis is given 
to marginal positions and how individuals in such positions were facing societal 
pressure. Cristiana Facchini’s protagonists were ‘walking the edges’ in their inter-
pretation and transformation of prophets in early modern Europe. Going back to 
the Middle Ages, Katharina Mersch inquires into the processes sanctioned and 
furthered by formal exclusion from the Roman-Catholic church, while Britta 
Müller-Schauenburg looks into the case of a pope who reflected on his own devi-
ance, which was constituted externally by the fact that he was driven out of this 
very office. The last two chapters, by Cornelia Haas and Vera Höke, turn to 19th 
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and 20th century India and attempt to consolidate religious individualisation in 
teachings and organisation.
Collectively, these essays deny that the available sources, even if normative, 
judgemental, or straight-forwardly condemnatory texts, provide access only to the 
exclusive and excluding polemic of those in power. Following Michel de Certeau 
(1988), one might claim that such texts also provide a view of the highly varied, 
distorted, hyperbolic, and ‘devious’ ways in which such norms were appropriated 
by individuals. The norms themselves can be regarded as attempts to represent a 
complex reality that resisted subjection to such formulations (Rüpke 2016). Thus, 
the chapters do not solely inquire on constructivist lines into processes such as 
labelling, exclusion and the creation of otherness, or regulation and the construc-
tion of deviance (Perrin 2001; Thio, Calhoun, Conyers 2008, 3). Rather, they allow 
us to obtain some idea of the breadth of individual religious activity and the posi-
tions espoused by minorities, or marginalised by the dominance of the politically 
dominant groups or elite literary tradition. In short they give us a sense of the 
scope of the views held by those ‘walking the edges’.
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Subordinated religious specialism and 
individuation in the Graeco-Roman world
At any rate on a naive view, the roles of subordinated religious specialists seem 
an obvious candidate for consideration in an account of the relation between reli-
gion and individuation, perhaps even of individualisation, in the Graeco- Roman 
world.1 The claim to special ability to control communication with the divine 
world, the performance of wonders, the notorious moral ambiguity, or rather 
moral indifference, of the subordinated specialist ‒ the diviner, the thaumaturge, 
the pharmakeus/~tris, the ‘herb-cutter’ – ‘petits entrepreneurs indépendants’ 
(Bourdieu 1971, 326) ‒ and the claim to special or extraordinary powers typical 
of such practice ‒ all these mark such small-time specialists as paradigmatic 
individualists in the religious sphere (cf. Dickie 2001; Piñero 2001; Wendt 2016, 
40–73). In this contribution, I focus mainly on the role of different kinds of reli-
gious capital in the process of individuation. 
I start from Bradford Verter’s refinement of Bourdieu’s concept of religious 
capital, which distinguishes between embodied, objectified, and institution-
alised religious capital (Verter 2003, 159f.).2 Institutionalised or dominant reli-
gious capital of different degrees was available in the Graeco-Roman world to a 
wide range of officiants in the religious sphere, whether or not they held priestly 
offices (Várhelyi 2010, 2–19; Rüpke 2013b, 214–23), not excluding heads of fami-
lies, responsible for the conduct of lived religion in private households and neigh-
bourhoods (Bodel 2008; van Andringa 2009, 217–69; Rüpke 2016b, 218–69; Flower 
2017). But the existence of many different types of petty religious entrepreneurs 
1 I use the word ‘individuality’ as a cover-term for analytically distinguishable types of devel-
opment that contribute to differential processes of individuation, i.e. the notion of individual 
performative identity, in complex historical societies (Rüpke 2013a, 7; see also Rüpke 2012 and 
2016a, and two other edited volumes on individuation and individualisation in antiquity, mainly 
in the Roman imperial period: Rüpke and Spickermann 2012; Rüpke and Woolf 2013). On the 
difficulty of maintaining distinctions here, and on the diversity of meanings that have been plau-
sibly attached to the notions of ‘religious individuation’ and ‘ ~ individualisation’, see recently 
Otto 2017, 31-7.
2 These are all types of cultural capital in Bourdieu’s scheme. Verter himself prefers the expres-
sion ‘spiritual capital’. Although I accept his objections to Bourdieu’s tendency to view religious 
capital as exclusively institutional, I prefer to retain the term ‘religious capital’ in this context, 
since ‘spiritual’ seems to me to have misleading connotations in the context of non-Christian 
religious practice; cf. Grusendorf 2016, 4-7. 
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claiming their own kind of religious competence (i.e. competence not socially 
recognised as meaningful religious capital) resulted in a major tension within 
the religious field, perceptible already in the Classical Greek period (e.g. Stratton 
2015, 90–7; Eidinow 2017, 256–60; Pisano 2017) but especially marked in the multi- 
dimensional field that emerged in the world of increasingly large and diversified 
ancient agrarian empires of the Mediterranean basin. Sociologically, however, it 
is useful to view the knowledge-practices of these petty entrepreneurs as forming 
claims to a limited, unstable yet exploitable form of religious capital we can term 
‘embodied’. The insistent depreciation by the possessors of, or spokesmen for, 
institutionalised or dominant religious capital, especially in its public forms, jus-
tifies use of the term ‘subordinated’ for these practitioners.3
As claimants to embodied religious capital trading under the name of ‘com-
petence’, such subordinate specialists were routinely decried as ‘bad individual-
ists’, justifiably subject to obloquy, ridicule and even criminalisation (Stout 2001, 
302f.). If we do allow a degree of individuation to such practitioners, within the 
context of the more general processes in antiquity leading to increased social dif-
ferentiation, greater specialisation of roles (including religious-entrepreneurial 
roles), and increased monetarisation and market-orientation, how are we to clas-
sify it? What were the modalities of this embodied, provisional, contested reli-
gious capital? Can we trace efforts to stabilise it, to lay claim to a more substantial 
type of religious capital, namely ‘objectified’? And if such roles were so open to 
obloquy and even criminalisation, why was the risk worth running? 
In the light of a recent demand for a more thorough-going historicisation of 
the term ‘magic’ as applied to the Graeco-Roman world (Otto 2013), a demand 
that is, however, difficult to satisfy given the extremely partial character of the 
sources, I concentrate on ‘subordinated religious specialists’, ignoring the images 
of ‘magicians’ and ‘witches’ conjured up in ancient literature (cf. Stratton 2007, 
39–105; Gordon 2009; Spaeth 2014), which usually monopolise the discussion. 
The category of ‘magicians’ and ‘witches’ is best understood as just one, albeit 
extremely negative, expression of the enduring competition between institution-
alised, i.e. public and formal, religious capital and the embodied form typical 
of subordinated practitioners (Gordon 1999, 210–43; Frankfurter 2002). Most 
general discussions of ‘ancient magic’ are of no sociological value, since they 
tend to take such literary images as in some sense representations of social reality, 
throwing together a whole variety of distinguishable practices as though they had 
3 Bourdieu generally uses the expression ‘spécialiste dominé’ (e.g. 1971, 326). Verter (2003, 155) 
translates this as ‘subordinated’, which I find more suitable for my purpose. In particular it em-
phasises the role of social judgement in the articulation of such attributions.
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a common essence we can agree to call ‘magic’, or, trapped in the ‘religion vs. 
magic’ paradigm, focusing solely upon the stereotyped discourse of exclusion. 
My focus is on practitioners of a wide range of ritual specialisms (here, for space 
reasons, excluding astrologers, in some ways the most interesting group), not on 
clients or the socio-political discourse about ‘magic’ in antiquity, though both 
of these inevitably surface. The notional time-scale is the later Hellenistic and 
Roman periods up to the early fourth century CE, with very occasional reference 
to the Greek Classical period. 
In what follows, I piece together some remarks on the role of knowledge 
declared legitimate in justifying depreciation of subordinated religious special-
ists in Graeco-Roman antiquity (see § 1). I then go on to discuss the claims by such 
specialists to (contested) religious capital and its modalities, and give an abbre-
viated account of attempts to construct an ‘objectified’ form of religious capital 
by establishing a claim to higher-status knowledge (see § 2 and § 3). In the final 
section I try briefly to identify some of the social factors that played into such 
apparently risky professional choices, returning at the end to consider the issue 
of individuation versus religious capital as methodological yard-sticks (see § 4).
1  Legitimate versus prescriptively illegitimate 
religious knowledge
Every social formation, we might say, develops the religious Others it can best 
instrumentalise (for Greece, see esp. Parry 1992). The more complex and geo-
graphically extensive the social order, above all in the case of culturally-plural 
large agrarian empires, such as the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman Empire 
(which, at its largest extent in the early second, and then early third century CE, 
controlled 5 Megametres2  =  5010 km2, cf. Taagepera 1978, 118; 125 table 2), the 
more ends the images of ‘disorderly’ religious power will serve. In the Graeco- 
Roman world, for example, we can find subordinated religious specialism, under 
the rubric of ‘magic’, represented as the social other, as the political other, as 
affront to the natural order, as absurdity, as fraud, folly or vanity, as prestidigita-
tion, as the power inherent in nature, as the promise of unlimited command, as 
true religion; as heresy, the demonic, the nightmare. But if we stand back from 
these imagined personae and try to grasp the agents and their claimed skills and 
services, to say nothing of their possible individuation, we need some account of 
the construction of the category of subordinated religious specialism itself. 
The justifications alleged by the possessors of institutionalised religious 
capital for their depreciation of marginal religious specialists mainly focused 
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on the claims of the latter to possess authority based on effective religious 
knowledge  ‒ that is, in Weberian terms, their religious competence. Religious 
 knowledge is here understood in Bourdieusian spirit as a positional good in a 
competitive symbolic economy. It goes without saying that the Graeco-Roman 
gods were not simply ‘there’ (though every medial means was employed to make 
it appear as though they were natural givens): they, and the means of relating 
to them, were objects of knowledge, knowledge that was distributed within 
society in a highly differential manner (Rüpke 2014; 2016b, 182–92). It is not just 
that claims to possess more than trivial knowledge of the Other World and of its 
effective ritual management had to be negotiated if they were to become ‘objec-
tive’, that is, achieve the status of shared and legitimate knowledge. At a deeper 
level, the objectivity of legitimate religious knowledge was underpinned by the 
schemes of perceptions and thoughts which not merely generated appropriate 
insights and relevant questions but also excluded the kinds of questions that 
could not be asked and the answers that could not be given (cf. Bourdieu 1971, 
310f.; 2003, 139–47). Such schemes are naturally vulnerable to the impact of real-
world changes, intended or unintended, upon individuals and groups. 
Legitimate religious knowledge in antiquity can be roughly defined in terms 
of its politico-social location and its ‘investment-index’. We can lay this out as 
a notional continuum, between the positive, and of course dominant, pole on 
the one hand, and representations of fully illegitimate, and ipso facto subaltern 
or dominated, religious knowledge on the other (Bourdieu 2003, 148–53). The 
precise form of the continuum shifted very considerably over the longue durée of 
1200 years between the early Archaic period in Greece and the complex ‘inherited 
conglomerate’ of the late-antique Empire. Prior to the advent of Christianities and 
the invention of ‘heresies’ (Marjanen and Luomanen 2005), representations of 
fully illegitimate religious knowledge took two quite different forms: denial of 
the very possibility of religious knowledge itself, that is ‘atheism’, which is neatly 
defined by Plutarch as ‘imperviousness to the divine’ (De superst. 6, 167e7f.) (cf. 
Whitmarsh 2016, 193–241; also Jan Bremmer’s contribution to this publication), 
and the (quite imaginary) total inversion of the norms encapsulated in legitimate 
knowledge, i.e. the spectres of malign sorcery and witchcraft. By definition such 
knowledge had negative prestige – it was deemed not only to be ‘purely’ indi-
vidual but also entirely maleficient. A less extreme form of negativity was pro-
vided by the studiously baggy category of ‘superstition’ (Gordon 2008; Sfameni 
Gasparro 2009; Rüpke 2011), which might well be collective but was always 
notionally defective, if not quite ‘empty’. The dominant forms of religious knowl-
edge, on the other hand, were conceptually ‘full’ and ‘effective’, and were the 
object of a massive effort of resource-investment, being encoded or inscribed in 
an enormous variety of forms and media. 
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The pivot of dominant religious knowledge however was sacrifice, above all 
blood-sacrifice, whose ‘communicative contract’ stood for all the (shifting) sets 
of norms governing perceptions and judgements of civilised versus savage life, 
social order and disorder, membership and exclusion (Detienne and Vernant 
1979; Knust and Várhelyi 2011).4 The purest model of sacrifice was that performed 
by magistrates and public priests (in Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman 
Empire, by the king or the emperor) on grand state occasions. ‘The “great” are 
those who can least afford to take liberties with the official norms’ (Bourdieu 1977, 
193). This was the ideal form reproduced in necessarily imperfect form by every 
individual act of sacrifice performed elsewhere in that social formation, linking 
households to larger social units.5 This reproduction had both a temporal and a 
topographical significance: the grand state occasions were fixtures in the calen-
dar of public and private festivals (themselves the meeting-point of formal laws 
or rules of organisation and of aetiological narratives), but also were celebrated 
at symbolically-charged points in the imagined map of the sacred topography (i.e. 
the innumerable sacred sites scattered about individual cities, their dependent 
villages, outlying caves, water-courses, and ‘numinous places’ in mountainous or 
hilly areas). In all this, philosophical claims to religious knowledge, which gener-
ally dismissed sacrifice and sustained a thoroughly moralised representation of 
divinity, were invariably bracketed as quite irrelevant.
From the Hellenistic period, the notion of political community came to be 
inflected increasingly by considerations of status and wealth and by command 
of literacy. The ideal locus of legitimate religious knowledge thus tended to shift 
away from a community politically defined to one defined in terms of a status- 
inflected centre-periphery model. This model had two facets. On the one hand, 
the city came to be contrasted with the country as the unique locus of civilised 
life. On the other, literacy became a key emblem of full cultural membership or 
inclusion, its absence correspondingly a token of cultural marginality (Johnson 
2000; 2009). On this reading, the social location of subordinated practice shifted 
to the notional periphery, and could be stylised as current solely among an illit-
erate country-population ‒ and of these, women and children are particularly 
credulous: belief in magical powers and effects is more or less confined to such 
people, and their political analogues, the barbarians. Appealing to subordinated 
religious practice thus became either a psychologically interesting matter, as in 
Theocritus’ Second Idyll (say 270s BCE), in which the speaker, a woman who has 
4 Although of course many sacrificial offerings were vegetal, they were conceptually of much 
less importance than blood-sacrifice.
5 On imperfect reproductions of social institutions, in this case marriage, see Bourdieu 1977, 
34-5; 52-8.
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allowed herself to be seduced by a dashing Lothario, attempts to compel him to 
return to her by means of ‘incantation and substances’ (ἐπῳδαὶ καὶ φάρμακα, 
the standard Greek expression for our term ‘magic’); or, as often in Latin erotic 
poetry, a foil for the power of true passion, which is stereotypically stronger than 
any erotic magic (Gordon 2009, 226).
Subordinated practice could thus be represented as so completely dispersed 
that it had no effective significance as a threat to dominant meanings, and could 
thus be dismissed. An alternative spatial model, which emerged already in the late 
Archaic and early Classical periods, before and after the Persian Wars (490–479 
BCE), represented the magician as a literal Outsider, as analogous to the priestly 
caste of the Persian Empire, the magoi (Carastro 2006). Greek claimants to the 
exercise of symbolic power unrecognised by, or subversive of, dominant or vocal 
groups were literally foreigners. The legitimacy of the transfer was guaranteed 
by the Persian priests’ interpretation of dreams and portents, mastery of water 
and the winds (Otto 2011, 149–56). But whereas the Persian magi represented the 
dominant symbolic power of the Achaemenid Empire, their Greek analogues kept 
more doubtful company (Graf 1996, 29–36; Dickie 2001, 27–43; Otto 2011, 156–78). 
Yet, foreign and ‘empty’ as it might be, this ‘Persian’ magic could, like a virus, 
worm its way into the Graeco-Roman world, as Pliny the Elder’s potted history of 
magic claims (Historia naturalis 30.1–18), by taking on the outward appearance 
of legitimate knowledge-practices, namely religion, medicine, and divination. 
The image of a surreptitious, insidiously intrusive, invader perfectly represents 
the problem of contested religious capital – shadowy, disturbing, threatening, 
absurd, ‘empty’ – but…? However, the most common Greek term for practitioners 
of such ambivalent ritual knowledge – vain indeed but still somehow threaten-
ing ‒ was not μάγος (magos) but γόης (goês), a much older term, never taken over 
into Latin, which could be used in a wide range of contexts to express anxious 
contempt for such claims. The late-antique distinction made by the Byzantine 
lexicon known as the Suda (s.v. μαγεία) between μαγεία (mageia), the invocation 
of beneficent spirits for healing, and γοητεία (goêteia), the conjuration of evil 
spirits at tombs, is quite foreign to the Roman period. 
Rather than deal with this threat, whereby subordinated claims to ritual 
knowledge might turn out to be effective indeed, it was far easier to fall back 
onto a polarised cosmology, whose negative dynamic took the form of a fantas-
tic image of deviant ritual mastery, familiar in African ethnography as the ‘night 
witch’, and known to us in the Graeco-Roman world mainly through literary 
re-presentation:
[Dipsas] knows magic arts and Colchian incantations, and by her art causes rivers to reverse 
their flow; she knows precisely (scit bene) what a herb can do, or the humming iunx, the 
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power of the slime from a lubricious mare. When she wills, dense clouds cover the sky, 
when she wills, the sun shines bright. Believe it or no, I have beheld the stars dripping 
blood – the Moon’s orb was red with blood. I believe she flies at night as an owl, her decrepit 
body covered in feathers – I believe it, and so rumour has it (suspicor et fama est). “Double 
pupils” flash from her eyes – a light is emitted from her twofold iris […]  
 Ovid, Amores 1.8.5–16 (late first century BCE)
We can read such a text in several ways. Here I just want to use it ‘ethnographi-
cally’ to suggest the type of anxieties provoked by the image of the night-witch: 
she disposes of an ‘art’, i.e. a knowledge-practice, that aims to undermine or 
undercut the (implicitly beneficent) order of nature, which is also that of the 
self-representation of the dominant social order. And this in three areas: by 
maliciously or at whim controlling natural phenomena (water flows uphill; 
freak weather conditions); by falsifying the divine sign-system that ‘accurately’ 
informs humans of symbolic danger (the moon turns blood-red); and by interfer-
ing with the ‘(arbitrary) cultural necessity’ of sexual relations (erotic magic). The 
witch, emblematised by her nightly transformation into a were-owl (Gk.: βρύας, 
bryas; Latin: strix), is thus the agent of a ‘sacrilegious violence’ that threatens the 
naturalised norms of agrarian production (‘beneficent nature’), divine-human 
communication, and stable social life. As such, she is a structurally necessary 
element, sustained by the circulation of rumour (et fama est…), gossip and accu-
sation (Stewart and Strathern 2004), of a folk-cosmology that viewed the world 
as unsteadily poised between opposed orders, the one beneficent, the other neg-
ative and destructive. As such, the figure could never be quite done away with, 
but remained available to be adapted to new fault-lines revealed by periods of 
marked historical change, notably in the civil wars of the late Republic, the estab-
lishment of autocracy in the early Principate, the crises of imperial authority after 
235 CE, and the long, slow imposition of Christianity as the public religion of the 
Empire (Grodzynski 1974; Fögen 1993; Clerc 1995; Lotz 2005). 
2  Establishing competence/embodied religious 
capital 
One of the main difficulties in providing a general account of this process is the 
sheer range of different levels of skill and knowledge, relative professionalism 
and self-consciousness within the class of subordinated practitioners. Given the 
sources at our disposal and the impossibility of finding a personal informant, 
we must make do with the heuristic device of distinguishing between four ideal 
types: the village wise woman, the full-time or semi-professional usually male 
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rhizotomist (‘root-cutter’), typically urban ritual specialists ‒ ‘prophets’, ‘divin-
ers’, ‘purifiers’, ‘healers’, ‘thaumaturges’ ‒ and, finally, literate advocates of the 
power of the marvellous, who viewed themselves, or at any rate claimed to view 
themselves, as working in ancient traditions derived from the Near-Eastern high 
cultures. 
What is certain, however, is that such a scheme is a radical simplification, for 
the range of roles and styles was in fact extremely large, varying from individual 
to individual in relation both to levels of competence and to consciousness of 
working within a tradition. ‘Beggar priests’ (Gk.: ἀγύρται, agyrtai), who in some 
ways fit perfectly into the general category of subordinated religious specialists, 
can hardly be classed as a ‘group’, since they included people who disposed of 
different kinds of knowledge and exercised many different kinds of skills, and are 
united solely by the claim that they were itinerant, moving from place to place; 
since this claim was intended pejoratively and almost invariably linked to the 
idea of demanding payment for services rendered, we have no idea whether in 
any given case it was true (Eidinow 2017). Moreover, topoi such as ‘(wise) women 
know about magical herbs’ could be used as narrative material in all kinds of 
contexts: for example, the mythic history of the early years of the city of Erythrai, 
on the west coast of Asia Minor (modern Turkey), told of a Thessalian priestess of 
Hekate named Chrysamê, who was an expert in herbal lore and by a ruse doped 
the entire Erythraean army, thus enabling the Ionian Knôpos to seize power and 
become king (Polyaenus, Strat. 8.43). In the early second century CE, the historian 
Arrian of Bithynia reported a similar story about a famous Thracian ‘witch’, Kro-
kodikê, who ‘knew all about incantations and herbs, and how to cure illnesses 
and to bring them about’ (ap. Jacoby 1926, 864 frgs. 61a-c). In novels, figures such 
as the ‘trusted old attendant’ provided endlessly productive narrative material: in 
Heliodorus’ Ethiopian Story, for example, the unscrupulous Kybelê, who knows 
about (love-)potions, tries to poison the heroine, Charikleia, but drinks the stuff 
herself by mistake, leading to Charikleia’s being accused of murder, and con-
demned to the stake, from which she is miraculously saved by […] (Heliodorus, 
Aith. 8.6–10). Much the same applies to female diviners: for a discussion of the 
ideal ruler, Dio of Prusa (40/50–110/120 CE) created a frame-narrative whereby he 
happened to lose his way on a walk near Olympia and came across a rather tall 
old lady near a tumble-down shrine of Herakles, who told him the Mother of the 
Gods had given her the power of prophecy – and instead of whirling about and 
rolling her eyes, gave him a mythographic lecture about Herakles as a good king 
(Dio Or. 1.52–6). 
Here there is no space to do more than offer thumbnail sketches of each 
of these groups, which I have arranged roughly in order of their assumed 
self- consciousness, the value of the claim to restricted knowledge, and the 
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topographical and social range of their active interventions. To repeat: in each 
case, in the absence of ethnographic evidence, we have to do with ideal-types, 
that is, my own selective modelling of the ancient evidence for such activities, 
partly on the basis of comparative evidence (e.g. Lieban 1967; Tambiah 1970; 
Peek 1991; Kirkland 1992; Kapferer 1997; Ankarloo and Clark 1999–2002; Wilson 
2000, 333–71, 395–420; Skemer 2006; Petropoulos 2008; Harari 2017) and partly 
by simply ignoring the insistent negative stereotyping that is so characteristic of 
the ancient representations (e.g. Pliny, Hist. nat. 18.4). 
 – Wise women. The type of the wise woman is the mythical Agamêdê (also 
Perimêdê) of Elis, grand-daughter of Helios, the Sun, who is mentioned by 
Homer as ‘knowing all the herbs that the wide earth sustains’ (Iliad 11.740f.). 
Her name, sometimes coupled with that of Medea or Circe, continued to 
evoke the ambivalence of this type of knowledge, of herbal lore, which could 
be used for healing, and for the making of ‘potions’ (the association between 
female gender and poisoning is immemorial), well into the Roman period 
(e.g. in the passage of Arrian just cited) and the Byzantine scholarly tradition. 
We should also remember that some knowledge of this kind, as well as of 
simple divinatory methods, such as knuckle-bones, was widespread among 
ordinary folk (e.g. Dasen and Schädler 2017). 
The most neutral word in Greek for such women, about whose claims and 
abilities we only possess literary evidence, inevitably tendentious, is μήτηρ, 
‘mother’ – a respectful form of address to an older woman of some authority, 
but which makes no specific reference to such skills (e.g. Heliodorus, Aith. 
7.10, in the familiar diminutive μητέριον, mêterion); more specific is φαρμακίς, 
‘a woman who knows about pharmaka, herbs’, which however is often found 
in a negative sense, ‘witch’. Although a stock of charms (Gk.: ἐπῳδή, epôdê; 
Lat.: cantamen, cantio, cantus, carmen, incantamentum, incantatio) and skill 
in their performance (murmur, susurramen) was indispensable to their prac-
tice, there was no common Greek name for wise women that emphasised 
this aspect of their knowledge, whereas in Latin we find at least cantatrix 
(Apuleius, Met. 2.20, late second century CE) and incantatrix (Scholiast on 
Horace, Carm. 1.27.21). Mater is also found in Latin (e.g. Nemesianus, Eclog. 
4.62, late third century CE), but the most neutral Latin word for a wise woman 
is the rare (mulier) pluscia, precisely ‘wise (woman)’ (Petron. Satyr. 63); more 
negatively, saga and nocturna (‘active by night’). The word saga (from sagax, 
‘sharp-witted’) might be glossed as meaning an ‘old woman who claims to 
know many things’ (Cicero, De div. 1.65). 
Such women were consulted on all manner of issues: illness (diagnosis 
and cure), male impotence, infertility in women, interpersonal relations, 
especially erotic (e.g. Horace, carm. 1.27.21f.; Lucian, Dial. meretr. 1.2), protec-
994   Richard Gordon
tion against attack by witchcraft (e.g. Ovid, Fasti 6.105–68), provision of pro-
tective amulets e.g. against the evil eye, forecasting future events, warding 
off storms, hail and frosts (Pliny, HN 28.29), protection against malicious 
gossip (Ovid, Fasti 571–84), identifying thieves, and many other problems 
of ordinary village life, including attacking clients’ enemies by witchcraft or 
by knowing the right ritual to cause them to be generally hated. Thanks to 
the inherent moral ambiguity of at least some of these undertakings, and the 
anxiety attending any consultation of a person who claims such powers, a 
version of this role served as the basis for the ‘night witch’ figure in antiquity, 
of which the ghastly Erictho is the literary paradigm, who blights the harvest 
with her tread, plucks out the eyeballs of the dead in their sarcophagi, tears 
the flesh from criminals exposed on the gibbet, and kisses corpses so she can 
bite off the tongue (Lucan, Bell. civ. 6.507–68, mid-first century CE). In the 
night-witch fantasy the theme of restricted knowledge is intensified exclu-
sively in the direction of world-reversal.
 – Full-time or semi-professional, usually male, rhizotomists (‘root-cutters’). 
Although women are the stereotypical folk-practitioners in literary texts, 
spreading out from the village-context into urban households, it seems likely 
that most professional or semi-professional herbalists/folk healers were 
actually male (though we do know the names of one or two female special-
ists in gynaecology and obstetrics, one of whom even wrote a manual). At 
any rate, the coinage of masculine agentives such as ῥιζοτόμος (rhizotomos, 
root-cutter) in Greek and herbarius and medicamentarius in Latin suggests as 
much, as do the numerous references to such practitioners in Theophrastus’ 
Historia plantarum 9 (late fourth century BCE) and throughout the sixteen 
books of Pliny’s Historia naturalis devoted to the properties of plants of all 
kinds, animal-parts and minerals (17–32), both for direct application and for 
the manufacture of amulets. Theophrastus (Hist. pl. 9.8.5) links root- cutters 
to φαρμακοπώλαι (pharmakopôlai, herb-mongers); ‘marketing’ implies 
movement of such items from the point of collection to village, urban or 
temple-markets or shops of one kind or another, and no doubt sometimes 
a network of suppliers, as in the modern developing-world. Moreover a few 
such experts were literate and wrote books about their materials, some-
times with illustrations (rhizotomika: Pfister 1938); Pliny derives most of his 
information from such compilations. Some at least specialised in doctoring 
farm- and work-animals, others operated in towns and cities. Since in the 
ancient world many adults, especially in rural areas, where anyway the great 
majority of the population lived, knew a variety of herbal remedies, we must 
assume that the reputation of professional or semi-professional root-cutters 
lay in their possession of more extensive knowledge of such matters, as well 
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as in their ritual expertise. Pliny states as a fact that if root-cutters considered 
their work had not been adequately remunerated, they would replant part of 
the herb in question at the very place where they had collected it, so undoing 
the healing process (HN 21.144, 25.174, 26.24). 
Once again, we must imagine a wide range of claims to authority, all the 
way from those typical of wise-folk (e.g. incantatores) to individuals who 
defined themselves exclusively as medici, ‘doctors’, just as their remedies 
were taken up both by temple-medicine, e.g. on the island of Kos, and by 
school medicine. The implied readership of Pliny’s Naturalis historia must 
have been assumed to be prepared to use at least some of the information 
ultimately derived from the knowledge of such men – but only insofar as it 
had been purged of its ‘magical trappings’ and rendered legitimate by being 
admitted into literate compilations: Pliny misses few opportunities of dismiss-
ing ‘root-cutters’ as a group. On the other hand, school doctors such as Galen 
were prepared to allow that amulets, especially those made of semi-precious 
stones – items by no means cheap ‒ might be of medical value. Nothing what-
ever is known about analogous practices outside Greece and Italy (except 
for Egypt); but already Theophrastus knew a wide variety of plants from 
the eastern Mediterranean, and some manuscript traditions of Dioscorides’ 
medicinal herbal (originally first century CE) contain lists of plant-names in 
a variety of languages, including ‘Marsian’, ‘Celtic’, ‘Hispanic’, ‘Germanic’, 
‘Dacian’, ‘Syrian’, ‘Egyptian’, and ‘African’, which perhaps derive from the 
voluminous late first-century CE work On herbs by Pamphilos of Alexandria 
and might be based (ultimately) upon reports by local root-cutters. 
Many, if not most, rhizotomists and wise-folk practised divination of one 
kind or other ‒ the standard handbooks list nearly one hundred named types 
of ‘inductive’ divination (i.e. based on the principle of combining a matrix of 
given meanings with a device for generating chance) known from antiquity, 
quite apart from many others that had no common name (Gordon 2011; 2017, 
123–31). One of the very rare literary accounts of such low-level divination 
by a saga using a lot-oracle deftly evokes a series of questions posed by the 
enquirer, each of which can be answered positively or negatively. ‘Will he 
die by poison?’, ‘No’; ‘Will he die by violence?’, ‘No’; ‘Will he die of inter-
nal pains?’, ‘No’ […]; and so on (Horace, Sat. 1.9.29–32). Here the engagement 
of the client in the process of finding a solution under the guidance of the 
specialist ‒ precisely one of ‘problems’ elite commentators had with such 
methods, as insufficiently ‘divine’ ‒ is neatly intimated in a mere four lines 
of verse. 
 – Typically urban ritual specialists. Divination however was a central element 
in the practice of many of our third category, ritual specialists who mainly 
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practised in urban contexts and operated under market conditions. The 
heavily-adulterated Greek thesaurus of Iulius Pollux (late second century CE) 
lists over 20 words for such practitioners, covering ‘begging priests’, ‘proph-
ets’, ‘diviners’, ‘interpreters of dreams’, ‘purifiers’, ‘sacrificers’, ‘healers’, 
‘initiators’, ‘thaumaturges’ (Onom. 7.188f.). Such terms, while hardly indi-
cating ‘professions’,6 are the socially-admitted correlates of innumerable 
individually-constructed roles that aimed at personal ritual mastery in 
urban contexts. These were partly inspired by copying others (teachers or 
models), partly by repeated ritualised practice that gives rise to ‘the knowing 
body’, and partly by the resonance of patients and clients, which insensibly 
guided and improved the effectivity of performances. Although a few such 
individuals, such as the Lycian Aristander and the Spartan Kleomantis, the 
diviners of Alexander the Great (Plutarch, Vit. Alex. 50), attained a certain 
prominence, it is precisely this dynamic relation between subordinated spe-
cialist and client, based on intuition, sympathy and ritual competence, that 
evoked the resentment and hostility of the representatives of other, more 
heavily institutionalised, ‘mainstream’ providers of services we can broadly 
term religious. These in turn fuelled the almost univocal denigration and 
depreciation of these specialists ‒ ‘money-grubbing’, ‘vain’, ‘worthless’, 
‘mountebanks’, ‘charlatans’ ‒ that we find in our sources, caricatures that 
sophisticated authors such Lucian readily embellish, and which served as 
ammunition for the proponents of the so-called ‘Great Church’ in denigrat-
ing their opponents (Sfameni Gasparro 2002; Denzey Lewis 2017). Some 
such specialists in the provinces, such as druids (or ‘druids’) and prophet-
esses in the north-west provinces, were even considered enemies of state. 
Although exorcism was unknown in the (narrowly-defined) Graeco-Roman 
world until the establishment of Christianity, the rivalry staged in early 
Christian (and Rabbinic) sources between ‘our’ miraculous cures and ‘their’ 
magic reproduces the same conflict in a different idiom (Piñero 2001; Fren-
schkowski 2016, 223–73).
 – Literate advocates of the power of the marvellous. Rather than continue the 
enumeration of different groups of specialists here, it makes more sense to 
discuss the fourth group, practitioners who used high-status techniques, 
above all textuality, under the separate heading of objectified religious 
capital.
6 ‘The mau song only diagnoses; in that role he does not cure, either through medicine or super-
natural action. His role is conceptually distinct. […] When [he] performs other roles he is called 
by the appropriate name’ (Tambiah 1970, 272). 
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3  Striving for objectified religious capital
We can distinguish three major means whereby subordinated practitioners 
attempted to raise the status of their religious capital from embodied to objecti-
fied.7 These are ‘thaumatisation’ (i.e. appeal to the marvellous), literate discursi-
fication, and Verfremdung (strategic alienation). Since there are in fact no pure 
examples of any of these, inasmuch as such strategies are invariably used in com-
bination, I offer here a few instructive examples.
In themselves marvellous events are of little significance in this context, 
since this was a world in which marvels were a major means of sustaining the 
religious field tout court. It is rather narratives, rumours and reports of marvels 
performed by specific individuals, whether in the village, in the city, in the 
palace, that generated the requisite distinction, generated by the demonstration 
of one’s ability successfully to appropriate the power inherent in nature, special 
objects, rarified texts. Those who claimed special powers for themselves relied 
upon such narratives in establishing their claim: the practitioner’s rôle was as 
much a function of shared marvellous narratives as of secret, sometimes family, 
tradition. It is precisely this complicity that makes a sharp distinction between 
practitioners’ views and outsiders’ views unconvincing. On the one hand, in any 
given situation the practitioner profits from the uncertainty, the indeterminacy 
of the limits of the here-and-now possible produced by knowledge of marvel-
lous narratives. On the other, the local stock of such narratives models the image 
of the transformation of the real that practitioners aimed to realise, within the 
horizon of expectations set by their own self-image and the micro-tradition they 
exemplified. Lucian’s comic dialogue Lover of lies (late second century CE) seeks 
to ridicule precisely this type of claim, for example by introducing a famous 
Egyptian magician Pancrates (‘Mr. Allcan’), who, by a magical utterance or two, 
would turn door-bars and broom-sticks into magical servants to run errands for 
him (Pseud. 35). 
In the literate tradition, however, the ability to achieve marvellous effects 
tends to be represented as a property of ritual texts ‒ the mastery lies in posses-
sion of or access to the relevant knowledge. Thus the Graeco-Egyptian ‘magical 
papyri’ (Preisendanz 1928–41), which can be taken to exemplify the quantities 
of receptaries (grimoires) that circulated, albeit in very restricted fashion, via 
personal communication, in the Roman Empire under the Principate, above 
7 I use ‘objectified’ here to denote recourse to special objects and texts as well as claims to 
 special powers, mostly derived from non-Greek and Roman sources of knowledge.
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all in Egypt, constantly asseverate the extraordinary power of their contents: 
‘a marvellous “driver”’; ‘a really marvellous philtre’; ‘Hermes’ marvellous 
“crusher”’; ‘you will be amazed’; ‘has a marvellous power to induce prophetic 
dreams’; ‘everyone present will marvel’ (e.g. Gordon 2012, 151f.). This is the 
typical language of ‘high ritual realism’, a key claim in the establishment of 
objectified (and institutionalised) religious capital. Moreover, as we would 
expect of the drive towards the objectification of such symbolic capital, mar-
vellous power might also be claimed as inherent in natural objects, not simply 
plants or animal parts but above all precious and semi-precious stones. Already 
in the Classical period, but more especially in the later Hellenistic period, 
there developed a tradition of marvellous stones, now referred to generically 
as Lithika (‘Stone-books’). Some such lore, while referring to practitioners, say, 
in Egypt or India, was ascribed to ‘Orpheus’. Other material was appropriated 
from Babylonian lore translated into Greek in the Hellenistic period (cf. Hopfner 
1926). Pseudepigraphic texts of limited circulation purporting to have been 
written by Zoroaster or Ostanes, which Pliny refers to generically as ‘the Magi’, 
acclaimed the powers of certain stones, such as the chelonia (‘tortoise-stone’), 
which when placed in the mouth at specific times of the day enabled the prac-
titioner to foretell the future. Another type, chelonis, which is actually made 
from tortoise-eyes, enabled him to abate storms by means of incantation; and 
yet another, with golden speckles, raised storms if one dropped it into hot water 
together with a scarab (Pliny, HN 37.155). The problem with textualisation, 
however, is that its circulation cannot be controlled: the distinction-value of 
esoteric goods declines in direct proportion to their availability. Once such texts 
fell into the hands of someone like Pliny, who was prepared to record all kinds 
of beliefs and claims quite neutrally, but loses no opportunity to decry what 
‘the Magi’ say, efforts to establish objective ritual capital could easily be made 
to appear merely vainglorious.
The technique of Verfremdung is a familiar device whereby cultures assign 
the ‘most effective’ magical knowledge to neighbouring peoples – a Roman 
example is the representation of two Italic peoples, the Marsi and the Sabelli, 
who were supposed to be able to cause snakes to split by means of incanta-
tions, as ‘typical’ magicians. Ideologically, the strategy makes it possible both to 
concede the potentially disruptive power of subordinated knowledge-practices 
while at the same time trivialising their consumption within the population at 
large. In antiquity, many of the literary representatives of my first three groups 
are said to be foreigners: in the Classical Greek world, this meant Thessaly, or 
Colchis, a mythical land on the east coast of the Black Sea; in the Hellenistic 
and Roman imperial worlds, Lydia in Asia Minor, say, the homeland of a man 
who ‘knew about magic and drugs that could bring about paralysis and death’ 
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(Polemon, De physiog. 1, page 13014–16 [ed. Förster]), or Africa (‘Libya’), or Syria ‒ 
the historian Tacitus twice mentions a Syrian woman named Martina, ‘notorious 
as a potion-mixer’, who was alleged to have been involved in the mysterious 
death in 19 CE of Germanicus, the emperor Tiberius’ nephew and designated 
successor (Ann. 2.74.2; 3.7.2). Arabia too was a likely home of such knowledge ‒ 
Pheroras, the younger brother of Herod the Great, was said to have been poi-
soned in 5 BCE by means of a drug supplied by an Arabian woman, ‘Arabian 
women being the witchiest of women (φαρμακιστόταται)’ (Josephus, Ant. Jud. 
17.4.1, 62f.); in Lucian’s The Lover of Lies, it is an Arab who gives the Greek host 
an iron amulet and teaches him a complicated incantation to protect him from 
ghosts and revenants (Pseud. 17), while another participant in the dialogue tells 
of a Babylonian with an old book who not only heals a slave who has been bitten 
by a poisonous snake but by means of a spell drives all the dangerous pests, 
from horned vipers to toads, into one spot and burns them to cinders – ‘quite 
amazing’ (ibid. 11f.). 
The Graeco-Egyptian ‘magical papyri’, which in their extant form are mainly 
late-antique although the very earliest examples date from the late Hellenistic 
period, are ritual texts, mostly in Greek, some in Demotic Egyptian, a few in Old 
Coptic or Coptic, claiming to enable the practitioner to achieve a wide variety 
of desirable ends. These range from low-grade divination to direct visions 
of godhead (Suárez de la Torre 2002; García Molinos 2017), from assembling 
amulets to restraining the wrath of the great and powerful, from removing fish-
bones stuck in the throat to forcing compliance from objects of erotic desire, 
from inducing insomnia to obtaining a divine factotum (Gordon 2013; Fraser 
2015, 116–23; Pachoumi 2017, 11–33). While the most famous are lengthy compila-
tions of prescriptions (‘formularies’) for many different procedures, which were 
found by Egyptian tomb-robbers before 1828, acquired by a Macedonian Greek 
merchant/dealer named Ioannis Anastasiou (c.1765/70–1860) (Chrysikopoulos 
2015, 2148f.), and sold on to European museums in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the majority are loose-leaf items written (or copied) by individual practitioners 
working in a tradition loosely associated with the declining fortunes of Egyp-
tian temples. Although the great majority of formulary recipes are anonymous, 
just like the endorsements that asseverate their efficacy, some are ascribed to 
pseudo-historical figures such as Pibechis, Pitys, Pnouthis, Astrampsychus, 
Dardanus, Moses, Pythagoras or Nephôtês, or are stated to have been used by 
such figures (Suárez de la Torre 2012). More rarely, they might be named after 
the divinity addressed, such as Egyptian Bes, Serapis, or Selene (the moon), 
or be claimed to have been copied from stêlai (‘inscribed slab’) in Egyptian 
temples ‒ indeed the word stêlê usually in the formularies means ‘an effec-
tive praxis in this tradition’ and has no reference to an actual object made of 
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stone. The formularies betray no coherent conception of this ritual practice: 
while a few of the recipes are derived from Greek symposium jokes (‘Democri-
tus’ tricks’), others are extremely elaborate, display dizzying familiarity with 
Egyptian theological constructs, myths, and cosmological schemes, incorpo-
rate sequences in verse, conventionally called ‘hymns’, probably taken from 
Greek sources and edited for their new context (Bortolani 2016), and exhibit 
a very wide range of phonic and paragraphic devices, as well as drawings and 
images (Sfameni 2009; Crippa 2010), quite unknown in ‘indigenenous’ Greek or 
Roman ritual contexts, which hardly go beyond citations of Homeric verses and 
simple charms (Heim 1892; Önnerfors 1991, 13–33; 54–61). They also incorporate 
an enormous variety of exotic divine names, mainly Egyptian but also Judaic 
and even Babylonian. Further evidence of the drive to objectification are the 
five thousand surviving amuletic intaglios, mainly ring-stones, with ‘esoteric’ 
imagery linked to Egyptian ritual lore, mostly deriving from the eastern Med-
iterranean area but now in western European or US museums (Michel 2004; 
Faraone 2018).
As will already be clear, the use of written texts was a major strategy in the 
attempt to develop objective religious capital, especially in the area of divina-
tion. Literacy made possible quite new forms of routinisation on the basis of 
written matrices, such as Homer-oracles or the far more sophisticated ‘esoteric’ 
divinatory system ascribed to Astrampsychos (Naether 2010). Use of astrologi-
cal knowledge, itself unthinkable in the absence of literacy, made it possible to 
extend and elaborate many other methods of forecasting by specifying stellar or 
planetary conditions (Gundel 1968). Many divinatory procedures that enjoyed 
little or no status as mere practices could obtain respectability once reduced to 
order under separate headings and given specific textual or diagrammatic form. 
We need only to think of numerous books on oneiromancy (the interpretation 
of dreams) (del Corno 1969), the dialogue by Hermagoras the Stoic on divina-
tion from eggs (Suda s.v. Ἔκχυτον), or books on physiognomics, chiromancy, and 
divination by body-scanning (Bonnard et al. 2015; cf. Dasen 2015). The ‘magical 
papyri’ contain several schemes, ascribed to ‘Democritus’ and others, for foretell-
ing a patient’s death. Meta-levels of different kinds are represented by books that 
collected examples of specific kinds of signs, such as that of ‘Aristander’ on por-
tents connected with trees (Pliny, HN 17.241–43), or Hylas’ work on signs derived 
from the behaviour of birds not found in Italy (Pliny, HN 10.38), and philosophical 
or erudite speculation on how ‘magic’ might work (Graf 2002). In thus eliding 
distinctions between ‘low’ and ‘honourable’ practices, the nexus in the Roman 
empire between book-culture, intellectual activity and aspiration to social status 
(Johnson 2000; 2010, 22–31, 200–5) helped affirm practitioners’ claims to objec-
tified religious capital.
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4  Choosing subordinated religious roles
In social formations in which status and life-chances are very largely ascribed, 
the field of religion provides, for the suitably talented, a major means of escap-
ing such constraints and achieving at least a modicum of self-determination. 
Whatever the predisposing factors, such as family-tradition, emotional or mental 
instability (Crapanzano 1980), social marginality, blindness, or physical deforma-
tion, the notions of ‘talent’ and ‘calling’ are crucial. On the one hand, the massive 
investment by the politico-social élites, central and provincial, of the Hellenistic 
period and the Roman Empire in the maintenance of religious infrastructure and 
the calendar of festivals, guaranteed the meaningfulness of specialisation in the 
religious field. On the other, increasing physical mobility and access to new infor-
mation formed the conditions necessary to the multiplication of small-time spe-
cialist roles. The crucial factors however must have been the movement of village 
practitioners, primarily male ‘wise-folk’, into urban contexts, and the increased 
competition to which they were exposed. 
The place of the wise woman in a community, though ambivalent, was rela-
tively secure. She, and those who dealt with her, had access to a range of motifs 
which could if necessary be brought into play: the heritability of special powers, 
the natural origin of plant and animal remedies, more remotely, figures of local 
myths and narratives; compensation was voluntary and in kind. One worked 
on developing an appropriate degree of individuation, balancing experiential 
knowledge, intuition, and inspiration with a hint of strangeness or ‘deviance’. 
The embodied religious capital that could thus be acquired was correspondingly 
limited. In Bourdieusian terms, this was a thin sub-field, where there was a high 
degree of uniformity of evaluation (Gorski 2013, 346). Much the same applies to 
(male) root-cutters or ‘wise-men’. In the absence of widespread disaster, there was 
little stimulus in the mainly agrarian context to innovate, either as regards claims 
or practices. Such innovation, which we may call ‘de-traditionalisation’, was only 
possible in the presence of a client-driven market for the management of contin-
gency, and therefore of competition between those who offered such services – 
that is, in towns, and especially in ‘open’ towns with relatively rapid social change, 
such as ports, transit- and tourist-towns. Only under these conditions could the 
habitus of practical mastery be challenged. This pattern is clear in the case of 
root-cutters who acquired some wealth and social standing, became literate, and 
actually wrote compendia. Competition brought the subordinated practitioner, 
along with a sharper social profile, increased opportunities for money, influ-
ence and even fame, thus attracting gossip, envy and occasionally fear. Except 
in extreme situations, however, such as the wave of arrests and executions that 
followed the trial at Rome of M. Scribonius Libo Drusus in 16 CE, when 45 men and 
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85 women were put to death (Tacitus, Ann. 27; 29–31; Chron. 354 Ann. CCCLIV = 
Mommsen 1892, 14526–28 ), envy and fear were outweighed by the utility of such 
specialists for different social groups in the face of perceived contingencies.
All these factors, the requirement to sell services in a market, the increase 
in usable information, creative experimentation with new techniques, and the 
ambivalence of the wider community towards such services, encouraged a degree 
of innovation. Competition brought varying fortunes, pushing some into the 
direction of professionalism, others into diversification, yet others into margin-
ality. Increased professionalisation and diversification motivated the processes 
of turning regularities in procedures into systems and then into theories, such 
as ‘sympathy’ and ‘antipathy’, belief in distinguishable ‘powers’ in the natural 
world, or astrologically-warranted ‘moments’, which in turn affected practice. 
These in turn refined the network of ‘secondary elaborations’, subordinate beliefs 
that protect primary beliefs or claims. Professional practitioners drew upon the 
performances of competitors but also needed to define themselves against them, 
either by decrying their methods, by claiming to have improved them, or by 
denouncing them as fraudulent. All these moves induced individuals to break 
with prior models of action (i.e. their habitus) and develop their own standards, 
aims and techniques.
Both the scope of the transformation of prior strategies and the degree of 
self-referentiality increased, perhaps considerably, with the gradual emergence 
of professionalism in subordinated practice, that is, the extent to which such 
specialists could live off their practice by moving away from payment in natu-
ralia towards monetary reward: the pace of such changes greatly increased in 
the Hellenistic and Roman periods. I would argue that such professionalism, and 
the opportunities for shifting away from embodied to objectified religious capital 
at the preferred level of practice/engagement, despite being contested elsewhere 
in the religious system, is the key to the intensification of individuation experi-
enced by urban practitioners, or at any rate the most talented and entrepreneur-
ial among them. 
If we feel it necessary to specify, I would class this type of individuality as 
primarily competitive, based on the sense of self-determination and competence 
acquired through, and reinforced by, the accumulation of intensified embodied, 
and, in some cases, objectified religious capital. In general, however, it seems 
to me preferable to view the struggle of subordinated religious specialists not 
so much in terms of individuation as of competition for acknowledged religious 
capital. The subordination of these specialists did not simply result in victimisa-
tion: under advantageous circumstances it might offer the stimulus to explore 
new techniques and claims that could be cashed in as symbolic capital, thus 
forming the basis for the development of religious individuation.
Subordinated religious specialism   1003
References
Ankarloo, Bengt and Stuart Clark (eds.). 1999–2002. The Athlone History of Witchcraft 
and Magic in Europe. 6 vols. London/Philadelphia: Athlone Press [now Bloomsbury]/ 
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Bodel, John. 2008. ‘Cicero’s Minerva, Penates and the Mother of the Lares: An outline of Roman 
domestic religion’. In Household and Family Religion in Antiquity, eds. idem and Saul 
M. Olyan, Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 248–75.
Bonnard, Jean-Baptiste et al. 2015. ‘Les technai du corps: la médecine, la physiognomie,  
et la magie’. In L’histoire du corps dans l’Antiquité: bilan historiographique. Journée  
du printemps de la SOPHAU du 25 Mai 2013, ed. Florence Gherchanoc, Dialogues 
d’Histoire Ancienne Suppl. 14, Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté. 
169–90.
Bortolani, Ljuba M. 2016. Magical Hymns from Roman Egypt: A study of Greek and Egyptian 
traditions of divinity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1971. ‘Genèse et structure du champ religieux’, Revue française de Sociologie 
12. 295–334.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice (tr. Richard Nice). Cambridge Studies in 
Social Anthropology 16. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 [This version differs considerably from the original version in French (1972).] 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 20032. Méditations pascaliennes. Paris: du Seuil. 
Carastro, Marcello. 2006. La cité des mages. Penser la magie en Grèce ancienne. Grenoble: 
Millon.
Chrysikopoulos, Vassilios I. 2015. ‘À l’aube de l’Égyptologie hellénique et de la constitution 
des collections égyptiennes: nouvelles découvertes sur Giovanni d’Anastasi et Tassos 
Néroutsos’. In Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Egyptologists, University 
of the Aegean, Rhodes, 22–29 May 2008. 2, eds. Panagiōtes Kusulēs and Nikolaos 
Lazaridis. 2 vols. Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 241, 1–2, Leuven: Peeters. 2147–62. 
Clerc, Jean-Benoît. 1995. Homines magici: Étude sur la sorcellerie et la magie dans la société 
romaine impériale. Bern: Peter Lang.
Collins, Derek J. (ed.). 2015. The Cambridge History of Magic and Witchcraft in the West, from 
Antiquity to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crapanzano, Vincent. 1980. Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Crippa, Sabina. 2010. ‘Images et écritures dans les rituels magiques’. In Atti della Giornata di 
Studio La Fattura Scritta / pubblicati dal Dipartimento di Studi Storico-Religiosi, Sapienza 
Universita di Roma, eds. Giulia Piccaluga and Alessandro Saggioro. Studie e materiali di 
Storia delle religioni 76.1, Brescia: Morcelliana. 117–37.
Dasen, Véronique. 2015. ‘Body marks – birth marks. Body divination in ancient literature and 
iconography’. In Bodies in Transition: Dissolving the boundaries of embodied knowledge, 
eds. Dietrich Bosching et al. Morphomata 23, Paderborn : Fink. 153–75.
Dasen, Véronique and Ulrich Schädler. 2017. ‘Jeu et divination. Un nouveau témoignage de 
l’époque romaine’, Archeologia 553. 60–5. 
Del Corno, Darius. 1969. Graecorum de re onirocritica scriptorum reliquiae. Milan: Cisalpino.
Denzey Lewis, Nicola. 2017. ‘Lived religion among second-century “Gnostic hieratic 
specialists”’. In Gordon et al. (eds.). 79–102.
Detienne, Marcel and Jean-Pierre Vernant (eds.). 1979. La cuisine du sacrifice en pays grec. 
Paris: Gallimard.
1004   Richard Gordon
Dickie, Matthew W. 2001. Magic and Magicians in the Greco-Roman World. London: Routledge.
Eidinow, Esther. 2017. ‘In search of the “beggar priest”’. In Gordon et al. (eds.). 255–75.
Faraone, Christopher A. 2018. The Transformation of Greek Amulets in Roman Imperial Times. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Flower, Harriet I. 2017. The Dancing Lares and the Serpent in the Garden: Religion at the Roman 
street corner. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Fögen, Marie Theres. 1993. Die Enteignung der Wahrsager: Studien zum kaiserlichen 
Wissensmonopol in der Spätantike. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Frankfurter, David A. 2002. ‘Dynamics of ritual expertise in Antiquity and beyond: Towards a 
new taxonomy of “magicians”᾿. In Paul Mirecki and Marvin Meyer (eds.). 159–78.
Fraser, Kyle A. 2015. ‘Roman antiquity: The imperial period’. In Derek J. Collins (ed.). 115–47.
Frenschkowski, Marco. 2016. Magie im alten Christentum: Eine Studie zur Alten Kirche und 
ihrem Umfeld. Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann.
García Molinos, Alejandro. 2017. La adivinación en los papiros mágicos griegas. Monografías 
de Filología Griega 27. Zaragoza: Zaragoza University Press.
Gordon, Richard L. 1999. ‘Imagining Greek and Roman magic’. In The Athlone History of 
Witchcraft and Magic in Europe 2: Ancient Greece and Rome, eds. Bengt Ankarloo and 
Stuart Clark, London: Athlone Press. 159–275. 
Gordon, Richard L. 2008. ‘Superstitio: Superstition and religious repression in the late Roman 
Republic and Principate (100 BC – AD 300)’. In The Religion of Fools: ‘Superstition’ in 
Historical and Comparative Perspective. Proceedings of the Past and Present Conference 
held at the University of Essex 20–22 May 2005, eds. Steve A. Smith and Alan Knight. Past 
& Present Supplement 3, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 72–94.
Gordon, Richard L. 2009. ‘Magic as a topos in Augustan poetry: Discourse, reality and 
distance’, Archiv für Religionsgeschichte 11. 209–28.
Gordon, Richard L. 2011. ‘The rules of the game: Constructing power in rhizotomic practice’, 
Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debreceniensis 47. 45–68.
Gordon, Richard L. 2012. ‘Memory and authority in the Magical Papyri’. In Historical and 
Religious Memory in the Ancient World, eds. Beate Dignas and Roland R. R. Smith, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 145–80.
Gordon, Richard L. 2013. ‘The religious anthropology of late-antique “high” magical practice’. 
In Jörg Rüpke (ed.). 163–86.
Gordon, Richard L. 2017. ‘“Straightening the paths”: Inductive divination, materiality and 
imagination in the Graeco-Roman period’. In Ritual Matters: Material Remains and Ancient 
Religion, eds. Claudia Moser and Jennifer Knust. Memoirs of the American Academy in 
Rome Supplement 13, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 119–43.
Gordon, Richard L. et al. (eds.). 2017. Beyond Priesthood: Religious entrepreneurs and 
innovators in the Roman Empire. Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 66. 
Berlin: de Gruyter. 
Gorski, Philip S. 2013. ‘Bourdeusian theory and historical analysis: Maps, mechanisms and 
models’, In Bourdieu and Historical Analysis, ed. Philip S. Gorski, Durham NC: Duke 
University Press. 327–65. 
Graf, Fritz. 1996. Gottesnähe und Schadenzauber. Die Magie in der griechisch-römischen 
Antike. Munich: Beck. [Orig. French: idem. 1994. La magie dans l’antiquité gréco-romaine: 
idéologie et pratique. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.] 
Graf, Fritz. 2002. ‘Theories of magic in Antiquity’. In Paul Mirecki and Marvin Meyer (eds.). 
92–104.
Subordinated religious specialism   1005
Grodzynski, Denise. 1975. ‘Superstition’, Revue des Études Anciennes 76. 36–60.
Grusendorf, Stephen. 2016. ‘Bourdieu’s field, capital, and habitus in religion,’ Journal for the 
Sociological Integration of Religion and Society [= Journal of Sociology and Christianity] 
6.1. 1–13.
Gundel, Hans-Georg. 1968. Weltbild und Astrologie in den griechischen Zauberpapyri. Munich: 
Beck. 
Harari, Yuval. 2017. Jewish Magic before the rise of the Kabbalah. Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press.
Heim, Richard. 1892. ‘Incantamenta magica graeca latina᾿, Jahrbuch für classische Philologie, 
Supplementband 19. 465–575. [Also as separatum (Leipzig: Teubner, 1892)]. 
Hopfner, Theodor. 1926. s.v. Λιθικά. In Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen 
Altertumswissenschaft 13.1. 747–69.
Jacoby, Felix. 1926. Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker 2: Zeitgeschichte, B: 
Spezialgeschichten, Autobiographien und Memoiren. Leiden: Brill.
Johnson, William A. 2000. ‘Towards a sociology of reading in Classical Antiquity’, American 
Journal of Philology 121. 593–627.
Johnson, William A. 2010. Readers and Reading Culture in the High Roman Empire. A study of 
elite communities. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kapferer, Bruce. 1997. The Feast of the Sorcerer: Practices of consciousness and power. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kieckhefer, Richard. 1989. Magic in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kirkland, James et al. (eds.). 1992. Herbal and Magical Medicine: Traditional healing today. 
Durham NC: Duke University Press.
Knust, Jennifer W. and Zsuszanna Várhelyi (eds.). 2011. Ancient Mediterranean Sacrifice. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Lieban, Richard W. 1967. Cebuano Sorcery: Malign magic in the Philippines. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Lotz, Almuth. 2005. Der Magiekonflikt in der Spätantike. Bonn: Rudolf Habelt.
Marjanen, Antti and Petri Luomanen (eds.) 2005. A Companion to Second-century ‘Heretics’. 
Leiden: Brill.
Michel, Simone. 2004. Die magischen Gemmen. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Mirecki, Paul and Marvin Meyer (eds.). 2002. Magic and Ritual in the Ancient World. Religions 
in the Graeco-Roman World 141. Leiden: Brill.
Mommsen, Theodor (ed.). 1892. ‘Chronographus anni CCCLIIII’. In Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica, Auctores antiquissimi, 9: Chronica minora saec. IV-VII, 1, Berlin: Weidmann. 13–148.
Monaca, Mariangela (ed.). 2009. Problemi di storia religioso del mondo tardo-antico: Tra 
mantica e magia. Hierá: Collana di studi storico-religiosi 14. Cosenza: Lionello Giordano.
Naether, Franziska. 2010. Die Sortes Astrampsychi: Problemlösungsstratrgien durch Orakel im 
römischen Ägypten. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Önnerfors, Alf. 1991. Antike Zaubersprüche. Stuttgart: Reclam.
Otto, Bernd-Christian. 2011. Magie: Rezeptions- und diskursgeschichtliche Analysen von der 
Antike bis zur Neuzeit. Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 57. Berlin: de 
Gruyter.
Otto, Bernd-Christian. 2013. ‘Towards historicising “magic” in Antiquity’, Numen 60. 308–47.
Otto, Bernd-Christian. 2017. ‘Magic and religious individualisation. On the construction and 
deconstruction of analytical categories in the Study of Religion’, Historia Religionum 9. 
29–52. 
1006   Richard Gordon
Pachoumi, Eleni. 2017. The Concepts of the Divine in the Greek Magical Papyri. Studien und 
Texte zu Antike und Christentum 102. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Parry, Hugh. 1992. Thelxis: Magic and imagination in Greek myth and poetry. Lanham, MD /
London: University Press of America.
Peek, Philip M. (ed.). 1991. African Divination Systems. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Petropoulos, J.C.B. (ed.). 2008. Greek Magic: Ancient, medieval and modern. London: 
Routledge.
Pfister, Friedrich. 1938. s.v. Pflanzenaberglaube. In Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen 
Altertumswissenschaft 19.2. 1446–56.
Piñero, Antonio (ed.). 2001. En la frontera de lo imposible. Magos, médicos y taumaturgos 
en el Mediterráneo antiguo en tiempos del Nuevo Testamento. En los Orígines del 
Cristianismo 13. Cordoba/Madrid: Ediciones el Almendro/Universidad Complutense. 
Pisano, Carmine. 2015. ‘Il mántis all’ascolo degli dèi’. In Ascoltare gli Dèi/Divos audire: 
costruzione e percezione della dimensione sonora nelle religioni del Mediterraneo 
Antico 2: L’Antichità Classica e Cristiana, ed. Igor Baglioni, Rome: Edizioni Quasar. 63–9. 
Pisano, Carmine. 2017. ‘Intolleranze religiose nel mondo greco? Divinità straniere e pratiche 
magiche nell’Atene di età classica’. In La Storia delle religioni e la sfida dei pluralismi, 
eds. Sergio Botta et al. Quaderni di Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni 18,  
Rome: La Sapienza, Dipartimento di Storia, Culture, Religioni/Brescia: Morcelliana. 
92–105.
Preisendanz, Karl et al. (eds.). 1928–41. Papyri Graecae Magicae. Leipzig: Teubner. [Nowadays 
cited from second edition by Albert Henrichs. 1973–74. Stuttgart: Teubner, which does not 
contain the indices.]
Rüpke, Jörg. 2011. Aberglauben oder Individualität? Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Rüpke, Jörg. 2012. ‘Religiöse Individualität in der Antike’. In Der ganze Mensch: Zur 
Anthropologie der Antike und ihrer europäischen Nachgeschichte, ed. Bernd Janowski, 
Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 199–219.
Rüpke, Jörg. 2013a. ‘Individualisation and individuation as concepts for historical research’. In 
Jörg Rüpke (ed.). 3–38. 
Rüpke, Jörg. 2013b. ‘Was ist ein Heiligtum?’ In Alternative Voices: A plurality approach to 
Religious Studies: Essays for Ulrich Berner, eds. Afe Adogame et al. Critical Studies in 
Religion/Religionswissenschaft 4, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. 211–25.
Rüpke, Jörg. 2014. ‘Historicising Religion: Varro’s Antiquitates and History of Religion in the 
Late Roman Republic’, History of Religions 53.3. 246–68. 
Rüpke, Jörg. 2016a. ‘Individualisation and privatisation’. In The Oxford Handbook of the Study 
of Religion, eds. Michael Stausberg and Steven Engler, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
702–17. 
Rüpke, Jörg. 2016b. Pantheon: Geschichte der antiken Religion. Munich: Beck.
Rüpke, Jörg. (ed.). 2013. The Individual in the Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Rüpke, Jörg and Wolfgang Spickermann (eds.). 2012. Reflections on Religious Individuality: 
Greco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian texts and practices. Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche 
und Vorarbeiten 62. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Rüpke, Jörg and Greg Woolf (eds.). 2013. Religious Dimensions of the Self in the Second century 
CE. Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 76. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Sfameni, Carla. 2009. ‘Per un’archeologia del magico: gli instrumenti del mago nella tarda 
antichità’. In Mariangela Monaca (ed.). 109–46.
Subordinated religious specialism   1007
Sfameni Gasparro, Giulia. 2002. ‘Magie et magiciens. Le débat entre chrétiens et païens 
aux premiers siècles d.n.è.’. In Charmes et sortilèges, magie et magiciens, ed. Rika 
Gyselen. Res Orientales 14, Bures-sur-Yvette: Groupe pour l’Étude de la Civilisation du 
Moyen-Orient. 239–66. 
Sfameni Gasparro, Giulia. 2009. ‘Tra δεισιδαιμονία e ἀθεότης: i percorsi della religione 
filosofica di Plutarco.’ In her Problemi di religione greca ed ellenistica. Dèi, dèmoni, 
uomini: tra antiche e nuove identità. Hierá: Collana di studi storico-religiosi 12, Cosenza: 
Lionello Giordano. 
Skemer, Don C. 2006. Binding Words. Textual amulets in the Middle Ages. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Spaeth, Barbette S. 2014. ‘From goddess to hag: The Greek and Roman witch.’ In Daughters 
of Hecate: Women and magic in the Ancient World, eds. Kimberly Stratton and Dayna 
S. Kalleres, New York: Oxford University Press. 41–70.
Stewart, Peter and Andrew Strathern. 2004. Witchcraft, Sorcery, Rumors, and Gossip. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stout, Jeffrey. 20012. Ethics after Babel: The Languages of Morals and their Discontents. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stratton, Kimberly B. 2007. Naming the Witch. Magic, Ideology, and Stereotype in the Ancient 
World. New York: Columbia University Press.
Stratton, Kimberly B. 2015. ‘Early Greco-Roman antiquity’. In Derek J. Collins (ed.). 83–112.
Suárez de la Torre, Emilio. 2009. ‘La divinazione nei Papiri Magici Greci.’ In M. Monaca (ed.). 
13–44.
Suárez de la Torre, Emilio. 2012. ‘The library of the magician’. In Contesti magici/Contextos 
mágicos. Atti del Convegno internazionale Contesti magici/Contextos mágicos, Roma, 
Palazzo Massimo, 4–6 nov. 2009, eds. Marina Piranomonte and Francisco Marco Simón, 
Rome: Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Culturali – Ministero Español de Ciencia e 
Innovación. 299–306.
Taagepera, Rein. 1978. ‘Size and duration of empires: Growth-decline curves, 600 BC to 
600 AD’, Social Science History 3.3/4. 115–38.
Tambiah, Stanley J. 1970. Buddhism and the Spirit-Cults in north-east Thailand. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Van Andringa, William. 2009. Quotidien des dieux et des hommes: La vie religieuse dans les 
cités du Vésuve à l’époque romaine. Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de 
Rome 337. Rome: École française de Rome.
Várhelyi, Zsuszanna. 2010. The Religion of Senators in the Roman Empire: Power and the 
beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Verter, Bradford. 2003. ‘Spiritual capital: Theorising religion with Bourdieu against Bourdieu’, 
Sociological Theory 21.2. 150–74.
Wendt, Heidi. 2016. At the Temple Gates: The Religion of Freelance Experts in the Roman 
Empire. New York: Oxford University Press.
Whitmarsh, Tim. 2016. Battling the Gods: Atheism in the ancient world. London: Faber and 
Faber.
Wilson, Stephen. 2000. The Magical Universe: Everyday ritual and magic in pre-modern 
Europe. London: Hambledon and London.

 Open Access. © 2019 Jan N. Bremmer, published by De Gruyter.  This work is licensed 
under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110580853-050
Jan N. Bremmer
Religion and the limits of individualisation 
in ancient Athens: Andocides, Socrates,  
and the fair-breasted Phryne
In a recent path-breaking study of the individual in the religions of the Ancient 
Mediterranean, classical Greece was almost entirely absent, except for a single 
contribution on the mystery cults (Waldner 2013). Does this mean that these cults 
were the only possible areas for the expression of individual ideas and practices 
in Greek religion? Does the stress on agency and communication in ancient reli-
gion help us to discover or recover the process of individualisation or individual-
ity in ancient religion (Rüpke 2015, 2016)? Or should we, rather, pursue a  different 
approach and a different term, such as ‘personal religion’ (Kindt 2015)? Ancient 
Greece has been a stepchild in previous discussions examining religious individ-
ualisation from a historical perspective. Yet Athens, in particular, offers various 
possibilities for an analysis of the problem of individual choices and their histor-
ical locations. The latter is important, as it is only through a comparison of the 
various historical circumstances that we can acquire a better insight into pro-
cesses of individualisation.
Julia Kindt (2015, 45) has persuasively claimed that Theophrastus’ ‘Supersti-
tious Man’ ‘illustrates the plurality of religious voices in the ancient Greek city’. 
This is true. Yet her observation also implies that there evidently existed a fair 
amount of freedom of expression within ancient Greek religion. If we follow 
the reasonable assumption that all free Athenians had this freedom, what then 
does ‘personal religion’ mean exactly? Is it really the right term? And what about 
the gender aspect? All of Kindt’s examples are of males, if I read her correctly. 
What neither she nor Jörg Rüpke comments upon are the limits of this personal 
freedom. Even if there is a spectrum of possibilities for personal agency, there 
must also be a limit. And this limit is established by the civic community when it 
accuses a person of asebeia, ‘impiety’. Although I agree with recent criticisms of 
the degree of importance attached to polis religion (Bremmer 2010; Rüpke 2011; 
Versnel 2011, 88–142; Kindt 2012), it remains a fact that the male members of the 
polis eventually determined what was allowed in religion and what not – even if 
messy margins arose from the process of establishing the limits of religious indi-
viduality. Of course, influential individuals were usually members of the higher 
classes and poorer and dependent persons probably had far fewer possibilities 
for developing their individuality, constrained as they were by poverty or slavery. 
Yet we should not deny them individuality either (Thomas 2010, 43). 
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Even when we accept that Athenians in classical times had a fair amount 
of religious leeway, there were also people who went too far and who provoked 
a negative reaction from their fellow citizens. These are the people in whom I 
am interested in this contribution, as they offer us a lens into personal religious 
motivations and convictions, a perspective that is almost non-existent in the case 
of most Athenians. As Arnaldo Momigliano (1987, 197) once observed, ‘we know 
little of how an individual behaved during his life in relation to the religious com-
munity to which he belonged’. Many Athenians may have made personal choices 
in matters of religion, but the outcome was not interesting or challenging enough 
to leave any traces in our evidence. This is different in those cases in which our 
sources report impiety trials. It is for this reason that these cases form the subject 
of my contribution to this publication.
Unfortunately, Athenian law is no easy matter to deal with and is, appro-
priately, the domain of true specialists. We do not have a detailed code civil or 
pénal to enlighten us as to what was permitted and what was unlawful in ancient 
Athens. Yet some qualities of that law are clear. The law stated the offence 
together with procedural consequences and the sentence. However, it fell to 
the members of the jury to decide whether the accusations brought before them 
really fitted the category of the offence, such as treason or impiety. This proce-
dure left a free playing field for both the accusers and defenders of the defendant 
to make their cases in front of a jury of 501 male Athenians over thirty years old, 
all good men and true. 
In my contribution, I will look at three well-known cases in which impiety 
played a role: the detail-rich trial of Andocides (§ 1), the famous trial of Socrates 
(§ 2), and the salacious trial of the courtesan Phryne (§ 3).1 In all these cases, we 
have some information about the trial but never all the evidence that was once 
available to the jurors. In the case of Andocides, I discuss his trial in detail to give 
an idea of what was at stake in a trial for impiety and what arguments the prose-
cution could produce. Having looked at the trial, we then focus on its background 
in connection with the theme of individualisation. For the trial of Socrates, we 
will concentrate on the grounds for the prosecution and condemnation, and for 
that of Phryne we will try to reconstruct what this famous courtesan actually did 
in order to be brought to justice. In the conclusion (§ 4) we will tie these cases 
closer to the subject of religion and individualisation.
1 For a very full discussion of all Athenian impiety trials, see Filonik 2013 and, from a more 
narrative perspective, Filonik 2016.
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1  The case against Andocides
Usually, when studying trials in classical Athens, we are confronted with a dearth 
of sources. Rarely do we get a view from both the defence and the prosecution: 
it is only in the cases of Demosthenes and Aeschines that we have two speeches 
from the same trial that can both be relied upon, viz. in the Embassy trial of 343 
BC and the Crown trial of 330 BC. The prehistory of a case usually has to be recon-
structed from the internal evidence of one speech, and often the outcome of the 
trial remains uncertain, unless it is particularly famous, as in the case of Socrates 
(see below, § 2). This makes the case we start with all the more interesting, as 
we do have quite a bit of information about the preceding events, which were 
nothing less than spectacular. Our main focus will be Lysias 6, a speech for the 
prosecution of Andocides, one of the great Athenian orators. It was probably in 
the autumn of 400 BC that our trial took place, but its roots go back to 415 BC 
(Furley 1996, not always persuasive). 
In the summer of that fateful year, the Athenians went off to conquer Sicily 
with their fleet. The failure of the expedition was the beginning of the end for 
Athenian hegemony, both politically and, it might be argued, culturally. Yet 
before the fleet had even set sail, the city was rocked by two great scandals: 
the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries and, only shortly before the date 
of departure, the mutilation of the herms (most recently, Murray 1990; Graf 
2000; Todd 2004; Hornblower 2008, 367–72; Osborne 2010, 341–67 [the herms]; 
Rubel 2000, 2014). Andocides was implicated in both scandals and had to 
leave the city, although he escaped execution by turning informer. When he 
finally managed to return after the political amnesty of 403 BC, he was indicted 
for having transgressed a decree by a certain Isotimides that barred people 
guilty of impiety from the Agora and the sanctuaries. Andocides was accused 
of having entered the Eleusinian sanctuary of Demeter and Kore, in violation of 
this decree. Moreover, some days before the trial, he was additionally accused 
of having put a suppliant-branch on the altar of the two goddesses, which was 
forbidden during the time of the performance of the Mysteries, from  September 
the 19th to the 22nd, which gives us the terminus post quem after which the 
trial must have soon taken place. We also have the speech in which Andocides 
defended himself. However, for our present purposes we will concentrate 
on the speech of the prosecution, although with half an eye on Andocides’ 
defence. 
The speech is not without problems. For the present, we can agree with the 
conclusion of Stephen Todd after a detailed discussion of all the various suspi-
cious aspects of the speech: ‘what we have is in origin and in essence a genuine 
speech delivered at the trial’, with probably a few post-trial revisions and 
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 additions.2 Moreover, the speech is not complete and seems to have been consid-
erably longer than what we have now (Todd 2007, 408). The speaker of the speech 
is not mentioned by name, but there are strong arguments that he was Meletos, 
one of the accusers of Socrates (Martin 2007, 149–51; Todd 2007, 408–11). As said, 
we also have the defence speech by Andocides himself and it is clear from his 
later political career that he won the case; had he lost he would almost certainly 
have been executed for his impiety.
So, let us now turn to the speech of the prosecution, which starts with an 
example of impiety. A man gave a horse to a temple, presumably that of Eleusis, 
but stole it back afterwards. Consequently, he was no longer able to eat and per-
ished from hunger (Lysias 6.1). The prosecutor mentions this event as a story 
told by the hierophant, the most important priest of the Eleusinian Mysteries. 
It is unclear from the speech whether it is the currently officiating priest or an 
earlier one but this detail is unimportant. We are, presumably at the beginning 
of the speech, already confronted with the grave consequences of a transgres-
sion against one of the most holy cults of Athens: the Eleusinian cult of Demeter 
and Kore. Evidently, sinning against these goddesses was a certain invitation to 
the most terrible of consequences (Bremmer 2019). It is a fairly natural transition 
from this anecdote to the speaker suggesting that if Andocides emerges as a free 
man from his trial he could be elected Basileus, the leading civic official at the 
Mysteries, who was responsible for ensuring that no impious acts were performed 
during the Mysteries (4). What impression would that make on those coming to be 
initiated or simply to have a good time at the fair of the Mysteries (5)?
In fact, it would be impossible both to stick to the ancestral customs and to 
retain Andocides, the prosecutor continues, and he mentions that only shortly 
after his return from exile Andocides had charged a certain Archippos with 
impiety, nota bene, against his own ancestral herm, presumably the one in front 
of his house (11). This was a rather audacious charge given that Andocides himself 
was implicated in the scandal of the mutilation of the herms in 415. The fact that 
Archippos could escape the charge by paying some kind of fine (12) seems to 
suggest a certain amount of guilt but also that there was no appetite for repeating 
the prosecution of 415 BC when a considerable number of people were executed 
and/or their goods confiscated. 
Subsequently, the prosecutor mentions various objections that could be 
raised against a condemnation (13–15). Yet if the Athenians ban people from cities 
in which they have wounded or mutilated others, and execute them should they 
2 Todd 2007, 407 (quotation). For my translations, I follow Todd, whose commentary has also 
been very helpful. 
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return to those cities, how can they let Andocides return to the sanctuaries of the 
gods whose statues he had mutilated? The objection (15) does not seem to be very 
strong since Andocides did not enter a sanctuary of Hermes, whose statue he was 
supposed to have mutilated; in fact, sanctuaries of Hermes did not even exist in 
Athens (Versnel 2011, 350f.) but strict logic cannot be expected here. And if other 
cities excluded people from their sanctuaries because of impiety committed in 
Athens, why should not the Athenians themselves be more careful in this respect 
(16)? The more so as Andocides is even more impious than the ‘atheist’ Diagoras, 
who committed words of impiety against rites and festivals not of his own city, 
whereas the former committed those acts against his own city (17) – an interest-
ing ‘local’ view of Greek religion. Andocides was even so impious as to become 
a ship-owner who expected to be safe at sea (19), an argument brilliantly used 
and turned to his own advantage by Andocides in his defence speech (Andocides 
1.137–39). The prosecutor concludes this part of his speech by noting that gods do 
not always punish instantaneously like humans but often let their children pay 
the price for the crimes of their ancestors (Gagné 2013), if they do not die prema-
turely themselves (20). In other words, according to the speaker the gods punish 
criminals during their lives or via their children but not via a post-mortem pun-
ishment, as happened to the great mythological sinners Tantalus and Sisyphus. 
Our speaker may be traditional in his beliefs but he is not terribly religious.
After these ‘religious’ arguments our speaker, somewhat abruptly, continues 
with a report of Andocides’ life since his release from prison for his participation 
in the scandal of the herms. This report, the truth of which we cannot verify, con-
sists of a series of crimes Andocides purportedly committed when travelling from 
one place to the next during his exile (21–29). His constant suffering is clearly 
meant to be seen as a slow punishment by the gods for his impiety (32).3 Ando-
cides even goes so far as to give advice in religious matters, such as sacrifices and 
processions (33) – evidently a behaviour that is supposed to make the audience’s 
blood curdle. 
The prosecutor proceeds to outline possible lines of defence to which And-
ocides may resort and which do not concern us here (35–49) before returning 
at the end to the crimes Andocides was supposed to have committed in 415 BC: 
‘This man put on a robe, imitating the sacred rites, and displayed them to those 
who were not initiates. He spoke out loud the words which must not be spoken. 
He mutilated those of the gods whom we worship, and to whom we sacrifice 
and pray, honouring them and purifying ourselves’ (51). The prosecutor pulls no 
punches and even conflates the two scandals, the profanation of the Mysteries 
3 Todd 2007, 461–62 compares Lysias, fr. 195 Thalheim. 
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and the mutilation of the herms, although Andocides was only implicated in the 
latter scandal to some extent and strongly denied any connection with the former. 
In addition, and he now returns to the actual charge, Andocides had transgressed 
the law of Athens by sacrificing on altars he was not allowed to and even by enter-
ing the Eleusinion and washing himself in its lustral basin – something he, due to 
the impurities of his previous life, should not have done. By purifying the city of 
Andocides, the prosecutor suggests, the city would expel a scapegoat, the ritual 
figure whose ritual expulsion purified the city yearly, even though we cannot be 
sure if that ritual was still practised around 400 BC (53) (Bremmer 2008, 175–96). 
The speech concludes with advice given by the son of a hierophant, that is, 
once again by somebody associated with the holy Mysteries of Eleusis. This man 
recommended to always put somebody guilty of impiety on trial so that every 
juror would individually have to decide what the verdict should be (54). And this 
is how the jurors should act with Andocides: ‘He will beg and beseech you, but 
do not have pity. It is not those who die justly, but those who do so unjustly, who 
deserve your pity’ (55). 
There are several problems with this speech, one of which is that the religious 
content has sometimes been overemphasised: we lack part of the speech and in 
the surviving part the prosecutor focuses in particular on religion at the begin-
ning and at the end. The missing parts may well have been filled with further 
accounts of supposed crimes committed by Andocides. Yet it is clear that when 
religion plays a role, the speaker is at pains to connect Andocides’ misdeeds to 
the Eleusinian Mysteries, whose most important priestly genos, the Eumolpids, 
he mentions three times (2, 10, 54). This is perhaps not surprising, as we know 
from Andocides’ own speech that the jury consisted exclusively of citizens who 
had been initiated into the Mysteries (Andocides 1.29). Moreover, there is a focus 
on purity. Andocides had polluted the holy water of Eleusis, which means that 
everybody else using that water would be polluted. However, by being accompa-
nied out of the city as a scapegoat he would make Athens pure again. It is not only 
in connection to the gods that Andocides is an impious figure but, by implication, 
he is also somebody who disturbs the civic cohesion (Martin 2007, 148).
The content of this speech makes much of impiety by focusing on religious 
matters. This should not give the impression that such a focus was normal. On 
the contrary. It is one of the surprising outcomes of a recent study that religion 
played a lesser role than we would have expected even in accusations of impiety 
(Martin 2007). In our case, the prosecutor stressed the role of the Eleusinian Mys-
teries as perhaps the most prestigious cult of the Athenians. Given that Ando-
cides was accused of having committed an impiety by entering the Eleusinian 
sanctuary, one must say that the speech is fairly focused. The speaker can hardly 
have been the main prosecutor, who was a certain Cephisius (Andocides 1.121), 
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but he will have been one of the supporting cast in the prosecution who focused 
on one of the aspects of the case. Another of the prosecutors, possibly even the 
driving force behind the accusations as Andocides claimed (Andocides 1.117–31), 
was Callias, so well known from Plato’s dialogues. Callias belonged to the second 
priestly genos of Eleusis, the Kerykes, and occupied the position of Dadouchos, 
the second most important office in the Eleusinian Mysteries. As Andocides 
himself may well have also been a member of the Kerykes, there seems to be an 
Eleusinian subtext to the trial that escapes us (Todd 2007, 402). In the end, we 
cannot judge how many acts of impiety were raised against Andocides, as only 
this speech survives, whereas the main speech, and perhaps others, must have 
concentrated on other aspects of the charges. One cannot escape the impression 
that religion was just one of the grounds for accusation. Other speakers most 
likely also returned to the events of 415 BC.
When we look back at the accusations, we see that they all try to paint Ando-
cides as negatively as possible. This vilification undoubtedly has to be connected 
with Andocides’ implication in the mutilation of the herms scandal of 415 BC. 
What is interesting to us is that despite the seriousness of the impiety at issue, it 
was possible for an Athenian to escape condemnation. The outcome of the trial 
is, therefore, a very interesting testimony to the leeway Athenians had in matters 
of religion. If levelled at the wrong moment, a charge of impiety could be fatal, 
while at another more felicitous time one might escape without serious damage 
(see below § 4). 
At the same time, the trial of Andocides took place against the background 
of the biggest religious scandals Athens had ever known, even though these 
were already fifteen years in the past: the profanation of the Mysteries and the 
mutilation of the herms, both of which are referred to by the prosecutor. In the 
case of the profanation, the actual performance of the Eleusinian Mysteries was 
parodied. In the case of the herms, the faces of the statues of the god were muti-
lated, their phalluses lopped off and the statues themselves sometimes knocked 
over (Hornblower 2008, 372–75). These targets were not just chosen arbitrarily. 
The Mysteries were the most solemn and prestigious festival of Athens, and 
Hermes was the god most popular on vase paintings and the only one who was 
the object of real human affection (Versnel 2011, 335–43). Fritz Graf (2000, 123), 
followed by Simon Hornblower (2008, 371f.), plays down the identity of Hermes 
and herm. However, the identity of god and statue was a recurrent feature 
all through antiquity (Bremmer 2013; Hölscher 2017, 86–102) and vase paint-
ings regularly show the statue of Hermes moving towards or otherwise com-
municating with the worshipper, the only god to do so regularly (Klöckner, in 
preparation). Consequently, both religious transgressions struck at the heart of 
 Athenian religion.
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In the current discussions, religious individualisation in antiquity is mainly 
studied in connection with changes in religion or transformations of traditional 
piety. In these Athenian cases, however, we can see groups of people rejecting 
traditional piety. The recurring atheistic statements in Euripides’ tragedies show 
that such views formed part of contemporary discourse (Lefkowitz 1987, 1989; 
Riedweg 1990a, b). Moreover, Euripides’ late tragedies problematise the posi-
tion of the gods: his Ion and Orestes show the protagonists Creusa and Orestes 
deserted by the gods, while in his Helen and Iphigeneia in Tauris gods no longer 
play a significant role. In Thucydides, the gods are simply absent and the reli-
gious factor is almost neglected in his work (Yunis 1988; Fusillo 1992 (with exten-
sive bibliographies); Hornblower 2010, 25–53; Whitmarsh 2015, 97–114), just as 
the name of a sacrilegious club like the Kakodaimonistai, ‘Worshippers of bad 
luck’, show to what extent many in the upper classes had become estranged from 
traditional religion (Murray 2000).
In modern times, voluntary associations proliferated from the middle of the 
seventeenth century onwards, thickening the space of the social and enabling the 
quick communication of new ideas (Hunt 2014, 85–86). We may well see a similar 
process at work in antiquity, as the blasphemous acts were perpetrated by members 
of political clubs, upper-class and often not that old – Andocides was about 25 in 
415 BC.4 It seems likely that the new ideas about the gods and new lifestyles, such 
as Orphism,5 were discussed in these clubs and thus more rapidly diffused than 
would otherwise have been the case. 
The affairs of 415 BC, then, point to a religious climate in which many of the 
upper classes may have started to debate about, or even doubt, the gods, but only 
a few actually went so far as to make fun of them. This approach was clearly the 
choice of a minority but their exploration of the religious possibilities evidently 
went too far for most of the population. Precisely this tension also lies at the root 
of the most famous Athenian trial for impiety, to which we now turn. 
2 The trial of Socrates
Around 180 AD, the pagan satirist Lucian published a blistering attack on the 
pagan philosopher Peregrinus, about whom he noted some interesting details 
concerning the latter’s Christian period. As he observed, in the Christian 
4 McGlew 1999; Hornblower 2008, 378 and 916–9. Note also the prominence of youths in the 
oligarchic revolution of 411: Thucydides 9.69.4; Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3.23. 
5 Cf. Euripides, Hipp. 986–87 where Hippolytus refers to a small group of age-mates.
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 congregation Peregrinus was only second after Jesus, ‘whom they still worship, 
the man who was crucified in Palestine because he introduced that new cult into 
the world’ (Peregrinus 11). Why would Lucian think that Jesus was killed because 
he had introduced a new cult? The answer is perhaps somewhat surprising. In 
399 BC, the Athenians had brought Socrates to trial on the following charge of 
impiety, graphê asebeias: ‘Socrates does wrong by not acknowledging the gods 
the city acknowledges, and introducing other, new powers (daimonia). He also 
does wrong by corrupting the young. The penalty should be death’.6 Evidently, 
many Athenians saw Socrates as somebody who had introduced new divinities 
(Parker 1996, 199–207; Rubel 2000, 342–63 = 2014, 74–98; Millett 2005; Ober 2011; 
Versnel 2011, 554–59; Bremmer 2017, 73). This had not escaped Justin Martyr, who 
noted that Socrates was condemned on the charge of ‘introducing new divinities 
(daimonia)’ and compared him to Jesus: Justin (I Apol. 5, cf. Pfättisch 1908) clearly 
knew the official Athenian charge. The Christians even called Peregrinus a ‘new 
Socrates’ (12), just as they occasionally compared Christian martyrs to Socrates. 
In fact, the Smyrnean martyr Pionius, who died under the persecution of the 
Emperor Decius, compared himself not only to Socrates but also to Aristides and 
Anaxarchus, other pagan ‘saints’ (Martyrium Pionii 12). By relating Jesus and their 
own martyrs to pagan examples of virtue, the early Christians removed them from 
the criminal sphere and claimed the moral high ground (Harnack 1906, 17–49, 
criticised by Geffcken 1908; Benz 1950/51; Döring 1979, 143–61; Dassmann 1993, 
39; Baumeister 2009, 22–8). The example shows the longevity of the tradition of 
the trial of Socrates and what one group of people in antiquity appropriated from 
that trial. We notice that the Christians focused on only one part of the accusa-
tion, but at least they stuck to the original charge.
The preservation of (part of) the original charge was not a given, as becomes 
clear when we get much closer to the actual event. Only some fifty-five years 
after Socrates’ execution, the orator Aeschines stated in an attack on his oppo-
nent Demosthenes: ‘After all, men of Athens, you did put to death Socrates the 
Sophist, because he was shown to have been the teacher of Critias, one of the 
Thirty (Tyrants) who subverted your democracy’ (Against Timarchos 173). Inter-
estingly, nothing is mentioned here about the religious charge of introducing new 
gods; Aeschines refers only to Critias, who might indeed count as an example of 
a corrupted youth, as he was a follower of Socrates in his younger days (van der 
Horst 2006; Danzig 2014). And indeed, according to the Attic rhetor Polycrates 
6 The original wording has been handed down by Favorinus, fr. 34 Barigazzi (apud Diogenes 
Laertius 2.40), tr. R. Parker; note also Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.1, Apology 10; Plato, Apology 
24b8–c1, Eutyphron 3b; Philodemus, On Piety, 1696–97 Obbink; Servius on Vergil, Aeneid 8.187.
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(fragment 8 Sauppe), who wrote a speech for the prosecution, Socrates had been 
the teacher of another notorious politician, Alcibiades. Since Xenophon notes 
that one of the speeches for the prosecution mentioned that Socrates had been 
the teacher of Critias, the most notorious of the Thirty Tyrants whose rule of 
terror in 404/403 had been responsible for the murder of many wealthy Atheni-
ans, it seems reasonable to suppose that Aeschines draws on this same speech 
(Isocrates 11.5; Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.12). When we consider what the col-
lective memory of Athens would have cared to remember about the trial, it seems, 
perhaps, less strange that they did not choose to focus on the issue of the new 
gods. The tyranny of the Thirty had been a traumatic experience for Athens, and 
its many murders and confiscations must have left a much deeper impression on 
the collective memory than did the charge of introducing new deities. 
Although, unfortunately, much less clearly expressed than by Aeschines, the 
rhetor Hyperides seems to refer to the same charges when he said of the Atheni-
ans, only forty years after the trial (around 360 BC when some of the witnesses to 
the trial would still have been alive), that their ancestors had punished Socrates 
epi logois, ‘for his words’, rather than for his deeds (Hyperides, fr. 59 Sauppe = 
fr. 65 Jensen). Evidently, in Hyperides’ recounting, it had not been for something 
Socrates had done that he was put to death but for what he had said. These, 
admittedly few, words also seem to point towards Socrates’ teaching rather than 
any undemocratic acts.
We can now see that the official charge did not play the dominant role we 
might expect from a modern perspective. In fact, although at an Athenian trial 
a person could be convicted of one crime only, the prosecution could, and often 
did, produce people who enlarged upon that one charge and even produced new 
arguments, unrelated to the charge, in order to influence the jury (Hansen 1995, 
12–13). Thus Xenophon mentions also the charge that, 
Socrates induces those who converse with him to scorn the laws by calling it madness to 
allow our magistrates to be selected by lot whereas no one would be willing to take a pilot, 
an architect or even a teacher of music on the same terms. But mistakes in such matters 
would be far less fatal than errors in what concerns the polis. In the young such arguments 
stir up contempt of the constitution and make them violent.  
 (Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.9, tr. Hansen)
Here we see a completely different argument altogether, viz. inducement to scorn 
the laws, in which the young are mentioned at the end. The vulnerable young 
are certainly important here but they are clearly not the exclusive object of this 
charge, which went much further and seemingly included all Athenians. 
Socrates, on the other hand, seems to have directed his own response to 
the charge of ‘atheism’. He first denied that he had taken any interest in natural 
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philosophy, probably in order not to be associated with philosophers such as 
Anaxagoras, who had denied the moon its divine status and therefore had also 
been charged with impiety (Parker 1996, 208f.; Whitmarsh 2015, 115–24; Haake 
2016). He also countered the charge of atheism by invoking his daimonion in order 
to prove that he believed in the gods. The latter argument can hardly have been 
very persuasive, given the personal character of his protective spirit (Lännstrom 
2012; Brandt 2017). Finally, he pointed to his own decent behaviour during the trial 
of the Athenian generals who had been summarily executed in 407 and his refusal 
to cooperate with the Thirty (Plato, Apology 32B-D; Xenophon,  Memorabilia 1.1.18). 
In one of the best recent discussions, Mogens Hansen (1995, 26) states that 
‘Socrates was sentenced for not sharing the ordinary Athenian’s views about the 
gods, and probably also for having criticised the democratic institutions’. I am not 
sure that this is the right way to formulate the problem, as we have very little knowl-
edge of what the ordinary Athenian thought about the gods. When we now look 
back at the charge against Socrates we can see that it contained three elements: (1) 
not acknowledging the gods, (2) introducing new ones, and (3) the corruption of 
youth. Let us briefly consider the modern discussions of these three points.
First, it seems that there was indeed resentment in Athens about the manner 
in which some philosophers, such as Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia, 
talked about the gods. Yet ‘in practice, no doubt, the Athenians very rarely moved 
against verbal impiety’ (Parker 1996, 209). Secondly, it is true, as we will see 
shortly (below § 3), that in the course of the fourth century people were charged 
with, and sometimes condemned to death for, introducing new gods. However, by 
400 BC we have a century behind us in which Athens had seen the introduction of 
many new cults and gods, from Bendis to Asclepius and from Adonis to Sabazius. 
Yet we do not have a single reliable example of anybody being executed for such 
an introduction (Parker 1996, 152–98 and 2011, 273–77). In fact, Socrates is the 
first we know of to have been charged in this way.
This leaves us with the third accusation, that Socrates corrupted the young. 
It is exactly this aspect of the charge that we saw mentioned in references to the 
trial over the following decades. From Plato’s Apology (33 A-B) we can see that 
Plato thought it necessary for his Socrates to deny that he had been any man’s 
teacher or that he had asked fees for his teachings, as the sophists were wont 
to do (Fredal 2008). Evidently, Socrates’ connection with the sophists was the 
background for the charge of corrupting the young, as Plato also realised. The 
connection was already a main topic of Aristophanes’ Clouds, of which a version 
from the early 410s has survived (Laks and Saetta Cottone 2013), but in the Birds 
of 414 BC Socrates is also closely associated with Laconising tendencies and his 
admiration for Sparta must have been well known (Dunbar 1995, 636–37; Laks 
and Saetta Cottone 2013). In short, Socrates was closely connected not only to 
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Athens’ archenemies but also to politicians such as Alcibiades and Critias who 
had inflicted so much misery on the city in recent decades.
In the end, we cannot be certain about the motives of the jurors but the evi-
dence we do have points towards a preponderance of political motives rather than 
religious ones,7 as indeed seems to have been the case in several other Athenian 
trials of that time.8 Yet the religious side should not be neglected altogether. Xen-
ophon, who was a contemporary of the trial, relates in his Apology (14.3) that a 
number of jurors felt phtonos, ‘envy’, towards Socrates in response to the special 
relationship with the divine that he claimed. In the end, we simply cannot be 
certain of the motives of the jurors, but we do note that the later Greek tradition, 
with the exception of Christian swriters, hardly paid any attention to the religious 
issue, a fact that has not been taken into account in recent discussions. 
3 The trial of Phryne
After the trial of Socrates, the next most famous Athenian impiety trial, certainly 
in terms of later interest, is surely that of the famous courtesan Phryne. In modern 
times, sculptors (Jean-Jacques Pradier, Phryne, 1844–45, cf. Lapaire 2010, 331–33), 
painters,9 poets (Ryan 1993), novelists,10 detectives,11 composers (Camille Saint-
Saëns, Phryné, 1893; Edmund Eysler, Phryne, 1906), and even a modern movie 
director,12 have all been inspired by her trial, although rather by the supposed 
climax than by the accusation of impiety levelled against her. Yet her case is a 
clear-cut trial for impiety and deserves to be analysed in closer detail.13 
7 This seems at least clear for one of the prosecutors, Anytus, see Sato 2005–2008; Lenfant 2015. 
8 Cf. Parker 1995, 202: ‘It may be that an accusation of impiety was almost never brought before 
an Athenian court without political anxiety or hatred being in the background’; Todd 2007, 411: 
‘the political subtext that is common in impiety trials at Athens’, cf. his commentary on Speeches 
5–7 of Lysias.
9 Jean-Léon Gérôme, Phryné devant l’aréopage, 1861, cf. Vouilloux 2002; more in general, 
 Wittenburg 2007, 210–4; Corpataux 2009; Kepetzis 2011, 301–5.
10 Nonce Casanova, Phryné: roman de la Grèce antique (Paris, ?1900, often reprinted). The name 
looks like a pseudonym, the more so as nothing seems to be known about the author (b. 1873).
11 The Phryne Fisher historical mysteries by Kerry Greenwood, cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Kerry_Greenwood (accessed 3-1-2017).
12 Mario Bonnard, Frine, cortigiana d’Oriente, 1953: http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frine,_ 
cortigiana_d%27Oriente (accessed 3-1-2017), cf. Cavallini 2008, 214–7; Schrödl 2013. 
13 For Phryne and her trial, see more recently Bartolini 1977, 116–9 (with previous bibliography); 
Versnel 1990, 118–19 (several mistakes in his Greek quotations), 127–9; Cooper 1995; Parker 1996, 
162–63, 214–17; Gherchanoc 2012; Eidinow 2016, 23–30.
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Phryne was born in Boeotian Thespiae and came to Athens as a child, probably 
around 370 BC, where she lived the rest of her career (all data: Raubitschek 1941). 
Around 347 or 338 BC, she was accused by a former lover, Euthias,14 of impiety. 
A summary of the charges against her have been preserved in a third-century AD 
anonymous rhetorical treatise, the so-called Anonymus Seguerianus, which con-
tains the abbreviated version of an earlier treatise, of which the date is unknown. 
By all accounts, the source is reasonably early and, it seems, reliable. It reports: 
‘Phryne accused of impiety: for she held a procession in the Lykeion, introduced 
a new god and assembled revel bands of men and women’. The report continues 
with what is probably the summing up of the prosecutor: ‘So I have demonstrated 
to you that Phryne is impious: she has led scandalous revels, is the introducer of 
a new god and assembled unlawful revel bands of men and women’.15 
Phryne was the most beautiful courtesan of her times and many passages 
from ancient authors testify to the spell of her beauty (Morales 2011). It is evident 
that this beauty saved her in the end, but our sources are divided regarding the 
manner in which she achieved this result. Our oldest source, Posidippus, a comic 
poet of the end of the fourth century – thus not that long after the trial – mentions 
that: ‘Though she is reputed to have done great harm to lives, she captured the 
court with regard to her life, and by taking the hand of the jurors one by one – a 
not unusual gesture in cases of supplication (Boegehold 1999, 19; Naiden 2006, 
102; Pedrina 2006) – with her tears she barely saved her life’ (fr. 13 Kassel- Austin). 
Yet around the same time, we hear of the most famous version, that is, that think-
ing his case lost Hyperides ripped open the dress of Phryne and showed her 
breasts to the jurors, who were struck by a superstitious fear that they might kill a 
priestess of Aphrodite (presumably because of her beauty) and let her off16; a later 
version even has Phryne herself ripping open her dress (Alciphron 4.4).
Now, the gesture of baring the breasts was not unknown in cases of supplica-
tion and all jurors must have been familiar with the passage of the Iliad (22.77–91) 
in which Hecuba bares a breast in order to persuade Hector not to confront 
14 Hyperides, fr. 172, 176 Jensen; Alciphron 4.3–5; Cooper 1995, 309–10.
15 Anonymus Seguerianus 215: ἀσεβείας κρινομένη ἡ Φρύνη· καὶ γὰρ ἐκώμασεν ἐν Λυκείῳ καὶ 
καινὸν εἰσήγαγε θεὸν καὶ θιάσους ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν συνήγαγεν· ‘ἐπέδειξα τοίνυν ὑμῖν ἀσεβῆ 
Φρύνην, κωμάσασαν ἀναιδῶς, καινοῦ θεοῦ εἰσηγήτριαν, θιάσους ἀνδρῶν ἐκθέσμους καὶ γυναικῶν 
συναγαγοῦσαν’. Parker 1996, 193 n. 148 notes that the terms συνήγαγεν and συναγαγοῦσαν are 
technical terms for the recruitment of temporary (Dem. 19.281; IG II2 1177.4) or permanent (IG II2 
1297.4) thiasoi, to which the case of Phryne has to be added.
16 Idomeneus of Lampsacus, FGrHist 338 F 14 = Brill New Jacoby 338 F 14A with Cooper ad loc.; 
Hermippus of Smyrna, FGrH 1026 F 46 with Bollansée ad loc.; Quintilian, Inst. 2.15.9; [Plutarch], 
X orat. 849D-E; Athenaeus 13.590D-F; Sextus Empiricus, Math. 2.4. 
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Achilles – a maternal gesture also attested of Clytemnaestra and Jocaste.17 Of a 
more sexual nature is the case of Helen, who avoided being murdered by Mene-
laos by showing her, undoubtedly beautiful, breasts.18 Similar cases of suppli-
cation, but also with erotic undertones, are the shedding of their dresses by the 
young girls Iphigeneia, Polyxena and Makaria at the very moment that they were 
to be sacrificed.19 In short, the supplicatory gesture of the baring of the breasts 
was certainly not unknown, although it is exploited here to great effect. The fact 
that our earliest source does not mention the baring has raised doubts about the 
reliability of the anecdote, but the testimony of a comic poet out of context can 
hardly be considered decisive.20 Given that Phryne was a courtesan, it might have 
been thought that her naked beauty was well known. However, it is precisely of 
Phryne that we are told that nobody ever saw her naked, except during her partic-
ipation in the Eleusinian Mysteries and the Posidonia of Aegina.21 The unveiling 
of her breasts therefore, if it actually happened, must have been a truly sensa-
tional moment.
Unfortunately, the speech in her defence by Hyperides has survived only in 
uninformative fragments (fr. 171–180 Jensen). This is all the more regrettable as 
the speech was highly admired in antiquity for its grace, subtilitas, and ability to 
invoke pity.22 It seems that all the accusations were related to the introduction of 
a new god: Isodaites. We are poorly informed about this god, and recent discus-
sions have not taken account of the fact that our main information derives from 
Hyperides’ own speech, in which he had the greatest interest in depicting this 
god as bad and as insignificant as possible. The lexicographers relate the follow-
ing: ‘Isodaites, mentioned by Hyperides in his oration for Phryne. Some foreign 
daimôn for whom lower-class women, especially those of little virtue, used to 
practise mysteries’.23 
17 Euripides, Phoen. 1567–9 (Jocaste), Electra 1206 and Orestes 526–9, 839–43 (Clytemnestra).
18 Lesches, Ilias parva, fr. 17; Euripides, Andromache 628–31; Aristophanes, Lysistrata 148–54, 
155–56.
19 Iphigeneia: Aeschylus, Agamemnon 239, cf. Harder 2002, 111–12. Polyxena: Euripides, Hecuba 
558–61. Makaria: Euripides, Heraclidae 561. In general: Cohen 1997.
20 For a persuasive defence of the authenticity of the event, see Raubitschek 1941, 906.
21 Quintilian, Inst. 2.15.9; Athenaeus 13.590F, cf. the painting by Henryk Siemiradzki, Phryne at 
the Poseidonia in Eleusis (sic), c. 1889. Parker 2011, 175 mistakenly charges Phryne with ‘exhibi-
tionism’, as he lets Aristippus dally with Phryne on Aegina, whereas the Cynic philosopher did it 
with the Egyptian courtesan Lais (Athenaeus 13.588E).
22 Dionysius Hal. De imit. 5.6; Quintilian, Inst. 10.1.77, 10.5.2, cf. 1.5.61 = Corvinus fr.22 Malcovati; 
[Longinus] Subl. 34.3f.
23 Hyperides, fr. 177 = Harpocration s.v. = Photius ι 224 Theodoridis = Suda ι 648 Adler: Ἰϲοδαίτηϲ· 
Ὑπ. ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ Φρ. ξενικός τις δαίμων, ᾧ τὰ δημώδη γύναια καὶ μὴ πάνυ σπουδαῖα ἐτέλει.
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It seems that little was known about this divinity, whose earthly career 
surely was finished after the trial. Later authors connect him with Dionysos or 
Pluto,24 but it is clear that they had no independent information.25 His name, 
‘equal divider’, seems to point to symposia, as the term occurs, albeit only once 
outside reports of Phryne’s trial, in a symposiastic context.26 The other aspects 
mentioned also seem to fit the context of the symposium, as it was normal to 
hold a procession after a symposium (Ghiron-Bistagne 1976, 207–97; Pütz 2003). 
The thiasoi, ‘revel bands’, mentioned also fit perfectly with the context of Phryne. 
Robert Parker (1996, 338–39) has argued that it was a typically third-century term 
for ‘societies of foreigners gathered round a native god’. Moreover, these societies 
did not contain citizens as members but mainly foreigners and slaves, who also 
typically honoured a foreign god. Parker does not mention Phryne in this context, 
but it seems that this was one of the first cases of such a thiasos, which, admit-
tedly, had gathered around a recently invented god rather than a native divinity 
and, moreover, was constituted of both men and women.
There is a final aspect to Phryne’s innovative rituals that also deserves to be 
mentioned. I have translated the Greek ἐτέλει in Hyperides’ description of Iso-
daites (note 75) as ‘practised mysteries’. This is, of course, not certain as it could 
also be translated as ‘practised rituals’. Yet Greek teletê is often used for mysteries 
or a mysteries-like ritual (Dunbabin 2008; Schuddeboom 2009; Pirenne-Delforge 
2016). Moreover, among the few fragments of Hyperides’ speech we find several 
references to terms deriving from the Eleusinian Mysteries (Hyperides, fr. 174, 175; 
Pollux 8.123–24, 141, cf. O’Connell 2013). I take it, therefore, that the cult of Iso-
daites contained mysteries-like features, which were contrasted with those of the 
Eleusinian Mysteries. In fact, we know that also in another contemporaneous trial 
for impiety, that against the actually executed priestess Nino, remarkably similar 
accusations were used: ‘assembling thiasoi’ (Dem. 39.2, 40.9) and mocking the 
(surely Eleusinian) mysteries (Scholion on Dem. 19.281) (all evidence: Parker 
1996, 163 n. 34; Eidinow 2016, 17–23). 
Looking back, we can see, however vaguely, the picture of an enterprising 
woman who founded a new cult, centred on a god connected to the symposium, 
with Dionysiac features to the ritual but probably also mysteric aspects. Phryne 
24 Plutarch, Mor. 389a (Dionysos); Hesychius ι 953 Latte: Ἰσοδαίτης· ὑπ’ ἐνίων ὁ Πλούτων· ὑπὸ 
δὲ ἄλλων ὁ Πλούτωνος υἱός. 
25 As rightly noted by Parker 1996, 163 n. 34. This is overlooked by Versnel 1990, 119, who wants 
Isodaites to be a double of Dionysos for his interpretation of Euripides’ Bacchae.
26 Lucian, Sat. 32: ὁ ἰσοδαίτης τούτου ἕνεκα ἡγεῖται ὑμῖν τῶν συμποσίων, ὡς τὸ ἴσον ἅπαντες 
ἔχοιεν, Versnel 1990, 119 n. 93 also refers to Euripides, Bacchae 421–3: ἴσαν δ’ ἔς τε τὸν ὄλβιον / 
τόν τε χείρονα δῶκ’ ἔχειν / οἴνου τέρψιν ἄλυπον.
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seems to have made a bricolage of various cults and rituals that attracted men 
and women, whereas normally Dionysiac groups at that time consisted of either 
men or women. We should not forget that Phryne, as a non-Athenian woman and 
a courtesan, had no access to the civic cults, with the exception of the Eleusinian 
Mysteries, and was excluded from the most prestigious Athenian women’s fes-
tival, the Thesmophoria (Bremmer 2014, 168–77). Demosthenes’ oration Against 
Neaira shows how dangerous it could be for a non-Athenian courtesan to try to 
behave as a citizen woman. It seems reasonable to suppose that Phryne tried to 
compensate for these social and religious handicaps by constructing her own 
cult, just as, through the centuries, women have either founded or joined new 
cults and religions to enable their self-realisation (Bremmer 2017, 33–41). 
However, by following this course, Phryne was treading on very dangerous 
grounds. The Athenians saw thiasoi of non-Athenians as revel-bands that were, 
potentially, centres of crime and social subversion. In the case of the Boeotian 
Phryne, the prosecutor used this feeling and connected it to the charge of intro-
ducing a new god. As Parker (1996, 163) notes, ‘the unlicensed god is exposed to 
suspicion, hostility, contempt, and the threat of actual repressive action’. Two 
other cases are known from the fourth century in which women were executed on 
the basis of comparable charges – presumably lacking advocates of the calibre of 
Hyperides to speak on their behalf (Trampedach 2001; Eidinow 2010). In the case 
of Phryne, her high visibility as a top courtesan coupled with her non-Athenian 
status must have made her vulnerable in any case. By infringing on the religious 
domain, she challenged fate. Her beauty, if not her breasts, did save her, but by 
all accounts it was a narrow escape. 
4  Conclusion
What can we conclude from our cases? The religious norm in Athens was eusebeia, 
commonly translated as ‘piety’ and connected to a root *seb-, ‘retreat in awe’. In 
the classical period, however, the element of reverence had come to the fore and 
was even extended to loving parents and patriotism. An important element of 
piety was keeping the ancestral customs. As Isocrates (7.39) observed: ‘piety con-
sists not in expensive expend itures but in changing nothing of what our ances-
tors have handed down’ (Dover 1974, 246–54; Bruit Zaidman 2001; Beekes 2010, 2, 
1315–16). Transgressions of the norm included wrongdoing during a festival, theft 
of sacred money, temple robbing, harm to sacred olives and, somewhat surpris-
ingly perhaps, impiety, as we would expect the other offences to be included 
under impiety rather than separated out. Yet its separate mention suggests that 
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impiety, asebeia, was a kind of rest category that evidently had no defined content 
and no fixed penalty (Parker 2005, 65, cf. Eidinow 2016, 48–62; Naiden 2016). 
Moreover, an important problem that remains is the character of the law 
against impiety: was it procedural or substantive? Although not focusing on 
impiety, Edwin Harris has argued that the Athenian law was substantive (Harris 
2009–2010), whereas others have taken a more procedural view (Todd 1993, 61 n. 
14, 64–7) or have even argued that the law on impiety was non-specific (Macdowell 
1978, 197–202; Parker 1996, 215). As far as I can see, there is no decisive evidence 
to decide the case, but the fact that only late sources speak of a formal law against 
the introduction of new gods (Josephus, Contra Apionem 2.267; Servius on Vergil, 
Aeneid 8.187), makes the latter position much more likely (Cohen 1991, 203–17). 
In what is still one of the best studies of Socrates’ trial, Moses Finley (1912–
1986) has pointed to another problem as well. As he notes, religion was ‘thor-
oughly enmeshed with the family and the state. Impiety was, therefore, a very 
loose notion’. Consequently, ‘the frequency of such charges and trials in Athens 
depended largely on the state of public opinion at any given moment’. Finley 
clearly drew here on his own experience during the McCarthy years during which 
he had to leave the USA in order to continue with his university career (Finley 
1968, 58–72 at 64, cf. Jones 2013). Indeed, Finley was one of the first to note the, 
what we call today, ‘embedded’ character of Greek religion (Parker 1986, 265, not 
refuted by Nongbri 2013). The Greeks had no word for our ‘religion’, which meant 
that impiety could take many different forms. This situation meant that in every 
impiety trial the Athenians had to decide whether the charge was persuasive or 
whether the charged offence constituted an acceptable exception to the norm. 
For example, the introduction of a new god could be perfectly acceptable at one 
moment in time, but not at another (so, rightly, Parker 2005, 66). Consequently, 
as Finley (1968, 71) observed regarding Socrates’ trial: ‘When impiety – and this 
is only an example – is a catch basin, no man is safe’. 
It is evident that being a woman or a foreigner in this community of male 
citizens could be a big disadvantage. Unlike in modern Western society, it was 
also perfectly acceptable for a prosecutor to state that he was an enemy of the 
charged person or wanted to take revenge (Mitchell and Rhodes 1996; Kucharski 
2012). The charge of impiety thus gave plenty of room for people to settle scores, 
as eusebeia was such a generous notion. These circumstances mean that, in the 
case of an impiety trial, the norm could always be said to have been challenged by 
somebody. Yet we also know that the Athenians did not condemn in every case. 
Indeed, they seem to have been fairly reluctant to hand out capital punishments 
for impiety; pollution, too, was clearly perceived as less of a threat than some 
prosecutors suggested (Parker 2005, 67–68). Even Socrates could probably have 
escaped the death penalty if he had shown more humility and less arrogance, 
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as Finley (1968) persuasively argues. In the end, the norm of eusebeia allowed 
for acceptable exceptions, but every case was decided anew and nobody could 
be certain of the outcome of his or her trial. It is all too frequently forgotten that 
even in the case of Socrates, as Plato notes in his Apology (36a), it would only 
have taken some 30 people changing their view to have robbed us of the dramatic 
outcome of one of the most famous trials in history. We would, of course, love to 
know who Socrates’ opponents on the jury were. Were they all conservatives? Or 
just opportunists? Or just normal Athenians who thought that Socrates had gone 
too far for once? We simply do not know. The bias of our sources prevents us from 
gaining a proper view of the jury’s reasoning. 
So what do these trials tell us about individualisation? It seems clear that in 
the last decades of the fifth century Athens saw a real case of de- traditionalisation, 
witness the contemporary agnostic, atheist and materialist discourses of philos-
ophers and dramatists (Bremmer 2007). We should also not forget that precisely 
in the last quarter of the fifth century literacy made big advances in Athens. This 
newish technology was eagerly taken up by the Orphics, and the oldest surviving 
European book, the Derveni papyrus, is a great example of this development. 
As noted by Mirjam E. Kotwick (2017, 63), the book also made it possible for the 
various philosophical, theological, and medical experts, such as the Hippocrat-
ics, to spread their expertise. 
Moreover, Socrates’ claim of a special connection with the divine singled him 
out to an extent that apparently (see above § 2) made other people envious. His 
claim surely presupposed a completely untraditional position regarding the gods 
and must have raised many eyebrows. In that respect, the Orphics were much 
more cautious, as they promised a special position only in the afterlife, even 
though their myths were pretty outrageous too (Waldner 2013, 225–7; Bremmer 
2016). Yet these discourses did not, so far as we can see, lead to a fundamental 
change in religious practice. Even Socrates was not charged with breaking tradi-
tional ritual. Evidently, the power of traditional religion set a clear limit to reli-
gious individualisation in Athens. However, the religious scandals of 415 BC can 
be seen as the outrageous consequence of these discourses. Yet, by all accounts, 
it was only a relatively small group of Athenians that dared to profane the Myster-
ies and to mutilate the herms.
It is virtually impossible for us to see how widely the de-traditionalising 
discourses were internalised by the Athenians. Our evidence is limited to the 
upper classes and we have no access to the personal confessions. A number of 
the scandalmongers of 415 BC were executed and the survivors clearly thought 
it wise to keep their mouths shut. Socrates did not leave any writings, and 
the debate about the historical Socrates is as fruitless as that about the his-
torical Jesus. What we can see, though, is that it was the aristocratic youths 
Religion and the limits of individualisation in ancient Athens   1027
who followed Socrates and the sophists. They made personal choices as the 
traditional order and ideas clearly no longer attracted them. In this respect, 
we should perhaps note that the emergence of Christianity was notable for its 
attraction of young people (Bremmer 2017, 23–24, 387, 393, 418). One need not be 
a convinced follower of the rational choice theory in order to see that the young 
have less to lose – the hippies of the 1960s and 1970s are another fine example 
of this phenomenon. Yet we can also observe that after Athens’ defeat we hear 
no more of these anti-traditional discourses. The social, political and intellec-
tual climate had radically changed, and the influence of the sophists had been 
discredited by their aristocratic followers. Evidently, individualisation is not a 
linear trend but can, even if perhaps temporarily, be stopped by unfavourable 
historical circumstances.
Phryne is a different case. The fourth century BC showcases a number of 
women who tried to improve their position by marrying husbands to whom they 
were not really entitled, the most famous being, perhaps, Neaira (Glazebrook 
2005; Bakewell 2008). If we are looking for female agency, there is plenty to find 
in the forensic speeches (Eidinow 2016, 312–25). Yet the case of Phryne is different 
as it is more ambitious. Here we have an outsider woman who tries to make the 
most of her position, perhaps even trying to leave the profession of courtesan 
behind her and to improve her social status by the invention of a new cult. Once 
again, her motivation is unclear and can no longer be recovered. Given the limi-
tations in religious life for non-free women – being a courtesan prevented Phryne 
from, for example, participating in the prestigious Thesmophoria – it is perhaps 
not wholly unsurprising that her ambition was to found a new, enduring cult. 
If we want to see an individualising woman, there could be no better example 
than Phryne. Unfortunately, our material rarely allows us to gain a good picture 
of similar women. Still, I hope to have shown that classical Greece should not be 
neglected in discussions of religious individualisation. 
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Avner Ben-Zaken
Traveling with the Picatrix:  
cultural liminalities of science and magic
In his bold De hominis dignitate (On the Dignity of Man), dated 1486, Giovanni 
Pico della Mirandola claimed that natural magic originated in Persia and India. 
Zoroaster’s magic, Pico continued, was the same divine art conveyed to Persian 
princes teaching ‘how to rule according to the dogma of the world republic’. 
Toward the end of his oration, Pico discussed the origins of natural magic: 
Pythagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, and Plato, he explained, had acquired 
magic’s secrets in far-off lands. For them, this Eastern philosophy was the most 
sublime of all arts. From the Persians it had been conveyed to the Greeks and the 
Arabs, who transferred it to Renaissance intellectuals (della Mirandola 1998, 29). 
In recent years scholars have taken up Pico’s invitation and started explor-
ing the chain of transmission from the Arab world to European philosophers 
and practitioners of natural magic during the Renaissance (Boudet, Caiozzo and 
Weill-Parot 2011; Saif 2015). Important works focusing on the Picatrix have shed 
light on the ways it contributed to the formation of a philosophical framework 
around ideas derived from magic.1
Here, however, I would like to probe a complementary perspective and to 
point out the connection between the multiple receptions of the Picatrix (Ghāyat 
1 In the mid-1970s, Vittoria Peronne Compagni forcefully delved into the religious and moral 
aspects of the Picatrix, showing its great effect on various fields of the intellectual life of the 
Renaissance (see Perrone Compagni 1975; idem 1977). Eugenio Garin stressed the importance of 
the text as a link between divinatory astrology and natural magic, stating its role in arguing that 
‘the celestial powers, in fact, come to be caught, and placated or used, by imprisoning them in 
fictitious material representations, talismans and amulets, capable of absorbing and concentrat-
ing astral forces’. Garin held that the Picatrix was for this process ‘as indispensable as the Corpus 
Hermeticum or the writings of Albumasar for understanding a conspicuous part of the produc-
tion of the Renaissance, including the figurative arts’ (Garin 1983, 47). Paola Zambelli further un-
derscored the importance of the Picatrix to the rise of natural magic, brilliantly showing that the 
text was read and digested even before the rediscovery of the Corpus Hermeticum (see Zambelli 
2007, 9). Anthony Grafton ingeniously showed that the unacknowledged citation of the Picatrix 
teaches us about methods of note taking and how knowledge was classified in the Renaissance 
(see Grafton 2004). More recently Bernd-Christian Otto has insightfully pointed out the crucial 
role cross-cultural and long term exploration of the history of several canonical works, such as 
the Picatrix, have had for the progress of our understanding of the origins and role of magic in 
Western civilisation (Otto 2016).
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al-ḥakīm [literally, ‘the purpose of the sage’])2 and the ways in which natural 
magic challenged the tenets of late medieval philosophy of nature. The implied 
presence of the work in the writings of three Renaissance philosophers – Marsilio 
Ficino, Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, and Tommaso Campanella – appears in con-
nection to their discussion of natural magic, which aimed at revising the prin-
ciples of natural philosophy by asserting such notions as action at a distance, 
natural motion by agency, the centrality of the sun, the linear motion of light 
rays, and the practical role of the individual, the magus, in making philosophy. 
Such radical physical notions could not appear without the reviving interest in 
ancient religions and without the rising demand to individualise not only the 
practices for knowing God but also the practices for knowing nature. 
I argue that such assertions indicate the central role the Picatrix played in 
reviving ancient religious practices for knowing nature and combining them with 
a contemporary philosophy of nature, pointing out that the origins of natural 
magic are rooted in ancient eastern religions. Thus, the Picatrix played a central 
role in, to use the words of Brian Copenhaver, the ‘rebirth of natural philosophy 
that encouraged natural magic by grounding it in eclectic Aristotelian thought’ 
(Copenhaver 2015) and also in providing the impetus towards the first phase of 
the scientific revolution, as Frances Yates long argued (Yates 1964). 
1  The text
Picatrix is a talismanic text from eleventh-century Iberia.3 Although background 
information about the text and its author are obscure, Maribel Fierro has attrib-
uted the work to a tenth-century Andalusian mathematician named Maslama b. 
Qāsim al-Qurṭubī (Fierro 1996, 105–7). Originally written in Arabic, it was first 
translated into Hebrew by an unknown translator. Alfonso X, as part of his cam-
paign to turn the Castilian vernacular into an imperial and intellectual language, 
2 Since Renaissance scholars read the Picatrix from complete or incomplete manuscript copies 
of the Latin translation, there was no single fixed text. Therefore, I am using the printed edition 
prepared by David Pingree (1986), who meticulously compared the extant manuscripts and ex-
cerpts that have survived in European archives. To give a complementary view, I have provided 
the relevant passages from the Arabic edition published by Hellmut Ritter in Leipzig in 1933. At 
some points the two versions diverge, indicating that the Latin text had a life of its own. 
3 Some scholars question whether the text was originally produced in Spain. Godefroid de Cal-
lataÿ argues that the text is rooted in the tradition of the Ikhwān al-safā’, the great occultist ency-
clopedia of the Iraqi Brethren of Purity and the Sabeism ḥarrānien, thus stressing that its origins 
are in the Middle East and not Spain (see Callataÿ 2011). 
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ordered its translation into Spanish in 1256 (Pingree 1981, 47; Avilés 2011, 95–123). 
Christian scholars later produced a Latin version, explaining their choice of 
title by spinning the following yarn: ‘The wise, noble, and honored philosopher 
 Picatrix (perhaps a distortion of Arabic name, perhaps Buqatris [Hypocrates]) 
compiled it from two hundred different books and many philosophers’.4 Practi-
tioners of natural magic copied, read, and circulated the text in Europe between 
approximately 1450 and 1600, incorporating parts of it into the tenets of scholas-
tic philosophy.5 By the late fifteenth century and early sixteenth century, several 
key authors who modelled a universe strung along fields of forces, and who evi-
dently had access either to fragments, or the whole manuscript, of the Picatrix, 
appropriated such selective approach to offer significant additions to explain 
exceptional natural phenomena that were ignored by the traditional philosophy 
of nature. 
The author, or Picatrix as the Latin translation named him, divided the work 
into four books, each containing about a dozen chapters. A glance at the table 
of contents reveals the scope of the work, which includes philosophical exposi-
tions that provided the necessary grounding, according to the author, for anyone 
interested in learning about natural magic. Among these doctrines one finds a 
theory of magic, the role of the anima mundi (the soul of the universe) in generat-
ing motion, the centrality of the sun in dispersing the anima mundi, and the role 
of the magician in exposing and controlling such physical-spiritual connections 
through experimentation and the quantification and manipulation of the forces 
of nature. However, the text does not merely elaborate on the ways bodies act at 
a distance through the medium of spiritual-physical entities (forces, radiation, 
heat). It also furnishes its readers with the practices needed to control such enti-
ties, including the manipulation of the influences of the heavenly bodies.
The author explains in his preface that he means to shed light on the nature 
of magic, a secret closely guarded by ancient philosophers. Here was a turning 
point, a moment when esoteric and scattered pieces of knowledge concerning 
natural magic are collected into a kind of ‘guide for the perplexed’, making natural 
magic accessible to the public. In addition to the somewhat vague reference to 
4 Citation from the prologue of the Latin translation: ‘Hoc autem opus perfectum fuit anna 
Domini MCCLVI, Alexandri MDLXVIII. Cesaris MCCXCV, et Arabum DCLV. Sapiens enim philoso-
phus, nobilis et honoratus Picatrix. hunc librum ex CC libris et pluribus philosophie compilavit, 
quem suo proprio nomine nominavit’ (Magrīṭī 1986,1).
5 Nicholas Weill-Parot has argued that scholastics defined the proper use of the Picatrix by stress-
ing that talismans reinforce the traditional similitudo, correspondence of matter and form, em-
phasising that the components of talismanic images pertain to the natural characteristics of the 
planets and by so doing rejecting the ceremonial constituents of the Picatrix (Weill-Parot 2011).
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‘two hundred books’, Picatrix mentions various specific sources of ancient reli-
gions, primarily Indian, Chaldean, and Nabatean texts, as well as Greek works 
and Egyptian accounts concerning Hermes, showing an impressive mastery of 
ancient Eastern religious cultures, themselves apparently acting at a distance on 
this Andalusian writer. Conscious of his position in an idiosyncratic historical 
moment, the author occassionaly stresses that he has been exposed to cultural 
currents that brought with them pieces of magical knowledge and practices pro-
duced with reference to various cultural vantage points, all of which required him 
to sort them out, standardise them, and collect them into a single book. 
The book’s principle is stated at the outset: philosophy was crucial for 
natural magic not as a metaphysical frame of reference but as the practical means 
of revealing ‘the causes of reality’, and thus as a guide to manipulating it. The 
author then defined philosophy of magic as having three substantial charac-
teristics: ‘it develops and does not decline, it is an active exploration and not a 
passive one, it is ready to be exposed and it does not distance itself [from the true 
seeker]’. The philosophy of magic also has three utilitarian factors: ‘it teaches, it 
educates, and it is not ready to be perceived by those who turn their back to it’. 
Thus, Picatrix prescribes the conditions for the study and the usage of natural 
magic: ‘whoever desires to explore, ought to acquire a passion for the sciences 
and thoroughly scrutinise their rules’, so as to utilise such knowledge, the secrets 
of which ‘have a great purity with which you will be able to help many’.6 Natural 
magic is difficult to understand since it deals with intangible spiritual-physical 
entities, utilising ‘connections hidden from our senses and sight’. After all, the 
word magic refers ‘to all things hidden from the senses’. The Picatrix states,
You should know that magic is by and large everything that enchants the intellect and that 
the souls are drawn to it. Thus, the wondering, the attraction, and the praising [in magical 
acts] are expressions of the actual difficulty the intellect has in grasping and understanding 
it. The causes (forces of nature) are hidden from the ignorant, and it is a divine force that 
is being expressed [in natural indications], so that the magus would perceive them. Thus, 
[natural magic] is the science of perception of the hidden causes [of nature].
6 For the Arabic text see Magrīṭī 1933, 5. 
 وللحكمة خصوصيات ثالث ذاتيات وهي تنمو وال تدثر، وتشرق وال تخمل، وتنجلي لينظر إليها وال تبعد. ولها قوى ثالث تدبيريات،
ب، وال ُتقبل على من عنها يرغب، واعلم أن هذه النتيجة التي نحن بسبيل كشفها لم يكن لها وجود لوال وجود  وهي أنها تزجر وتؤدِّ
الحكمة.
For the equivalent Latin text: ‘Quare scias quod hoc secretum quod in hoc nostro libro intendi-
mus discooperire acquiri non potest nisi prius acquiratur scire. Et qui scire intendit acquirere 
studere debet in scienciis et eas ordinatim perscrutari quia hoc secretum haberi non potest nisi 
per sapientem et studentem in seiencia ordinatim. In hoc autem secreto est magna puritas cum 
qua te multum adiuvare poteris’. Magrīṭī 1986, 4. 
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Beyond theoretical and linguistic analysis of the notion of magic, the Picatrix 
draws a connection between the practice of magic and its disciplinary bounda-
ries within magic: 
in practice, the subjects of this science are spirit in spirit and this is in the realm of imagi-
nation; spirit in substance, this is the realm of talisman; and substance in substance, this 
is the realm of alchemy. In short, most of the causes of magic are hidden from the intellect 
and it is difficult to perceive them.
However, by controlling that which the senses cannot detect, natural magic ‘vio-
lates’ the order of things. The original Arabic text stresses that ‘the word talisman 
is actually the inverse writing of the word musalit, to conquer and dominate a 
substance’, and, therefore, a talisman serves as a ‘violator’: ‘whoever makes an 
image attempts to dominate the destiny of an object by violence’.7 The role of the 
talisman is to violate and manipulate the order of nature, to expose the things 
hidden from the senses. 
The text goes on to integrate the Aristotelian philosophical tradition with the 
practice of magic, dividing magic into theoretical (ʽilmī) and practical (ʻamalī) 
knowledge.8 The theoretical relates to knowing the positions of the stars and the 
ways their ‘rays project toward the center-earth’, propagate through planetary 
spheres, and generate motion. Practical knowledge, on the other hand, relates 
to ‘the combination of natural qualities with the virtue infused by the fixed 
stars’, particularly elemental heat.9 Since the theoretical and the practical are 
intertwined and mutually conditioned, the art of magic places man in the center, 
bringing the theoretical down to earthly concerns, and lifting practices up to sub-
limities. 
The seemingly effortless combination of various fields and its essentially 
unique typology of knowledge gave the text its power of attraction. From Renais-
sance men such as the Florentine Neo-Platonist philosopher Marsilio Ficino, 
7 Magrīṭī 1933, book 1, chap. 2, 7.
 وحقيقة الطلسم انه معكوس اسمه وهو المسلط ألنه من جواهر القهر والتسليط
‘Et ymagines sapientes appellant telsam, quod interpretatur violator quia quicquid facit ymago per 
violenciam facit et pro vincendo facit illud pro quo est composita’. Magrīṭī 1986, book 1, chap. 2.5.
8 Magrīṭī 1933, book 1, chap. 2.8.
إن السحر مقيد في قسمين علمي وعملي
‘Et dico quod nigromancia dividitur in duas partes, scilicet in theoricam et Practicam’, see 
Magrīṭī 1986, book 1, chap. 2, 6.
9 Magrīṭī 1933, book 1, chap. 2.8–9.
والعملي هو الوقوف على المولدات الثالثة وما أثبت فيها من قوى الكواكب السَيارة
‘Practica vero est composicio trium naturarum cum virtute infusionis stellarum fixarum’, see 
Magrīṭī 1986, book 1, chap. 2.6.
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through natural magicians like Cornelius Agrippa, and up to early modern politi-
cal utopians such as Campanella, radical thinkers started looking for a bottom-up 
approach to the philosophy of nature. In mixing an Aristotelian philosophy of 
nature with natural magic that was rooted in individual religious practices from 
the ancient East, they provided a unified program for the exploration of nature, 
which included explanations concerning the natural phenomena of action at a 
distance. Such Renaissance men identified natural magic not only with ancient 
Greek philosophy but actually with ancient eastern religious cultures. 
The morphological readings of the works of Ficino, Agrippa, and Campanella 
against the backgound of the Picatrix expose direct citations and excavate latent 
remnants of the Andalusian grimoire, particularly with respect to four ideas 
central to the connection between natural magic and early modern science  – 
the necessary agency for natural motion; the role of the virtuoso in violating the 
order of nature, manipulating its laws, and exposing the existence of intangible 
physical entities, such as forces; the centrality of the sun; and, finally, the linear 
motion of rays and forces. 
2  Philosophising magic: Ficino’s animated 
cosmos
In writing one of the most influential works on magic, De vita libri tres (On the 
Three Books of Life), dated 1489, Marsilio Ficino, a senior colleague of Pico’s, 
relied on several sources. Scholars have pointed at a number of potential sources. 
His Latin translation of the Greek body of Hermetic lore and al-Kindī’s De radiis 
stellarum have been seen by some as evidence for the permeation of the theory of 
rays (Saif 2015). Others suggest that the whole section III in De vita was influenced 
by scholastic sources (Copenhaver 1984, 523f.). A reading of section III in De vita 
against the Picatrix reveals that Ficino not only used the Picatrix as a source 
but that it served as a crucial reference for his philosophical framing of astral 
magic. Ficino applied generic names to the borrowed material, typically labeling 
it ‘Arabian’, and sometimes simply reproduced passages from the Picatrix without 
attribution. 
Paula Zambelli has shown that Ficino had his reasons for this strategy. 
Manuscripts of the Picatrix circulated widely. Indeed, so wide was their circu-
lation amongst those with philosophical interests in Tuscany that the rector of 
the University of Pisa, Fillipo Valori, asked Ficino to borrow his copy of the text. 
A student of Ficino, Michele Acciari, replied on his sick teacher’s behalf, high-
lighting the reading and writing strategies of Ficino, who read the Picatrix closely 
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despite dismissing major parts of the text as superstitious. He nevertheless incor-
porated ‘whatever in it … was useful and worth reading, copying it into his own 
book, De vita libri tres. The rest – whatever he found vain, ineffectual, or con-
trary to the Christian religion – he omitted’. Acciari writes of the text that ‘Ficino 
himself warns you against reading it, because you will have to labour hard [to 
understand it] but you will find little of any practical use, especially since what-
ever is in any way useful or important in that work may be read point for point 
perhaps better and certainly more fully and clearly in his book De vita libri tres. 
If you read the latter thoughtfully and carefully you won’t miss a thing from the 
famous Picatrix’.10 Zambelli has forcefully concluded that Ficino was interested 
in highlighting his own works, De Vita and the translation of the Corpus hermeti-
cum, at the expense of the Picatrix, despite this source playing a more central role 
in his writings than he was willing to admit. 
Ficino’s selective reading of the Picatrix perhaps also resulted from reading 
partial versions of the text, which were circulated as incomplete manuscripts or 
as excerpts in a number of folios. David Pingree has pointed out that Ficino drew 
almost exclusively on books 3 and 4 of the Picatrix, raising the possibility that 
he read an incomplete manuscript that included only the last two books [3, 4]. 
Indeed, just such a manuscript is known to have been circulated in his immediate 
surroundings.11 
Book 3 of De vita libri tres starts by posing a philosophical problem: if intellect 
and matter belong to separate spheres, what then creates motion? Is there a phil-
osophical means of ‘taming’ the magical principle of action at a distance? Ficino 
addresses this central question by trying to define the agency of natural motion. 
If the universe were made up only of intellect and body, ‘then neither would the 
intellect be attracted to the body nor would the body be drawn to the intellect’. 
Agency is required. What permits an ‘attraction’ between bodies, Ficino implies, 
is the soul that acts between body and intellect, a carrier of secondary qualities. 
Agency, in the form of the soul, manifests itself as a spiritual- physical entity. 
Such a soul, Ficino concludes, has to be universal and ought to be  understood as 
10 But for all of that enthusiasm, the subject matter appears to have been viewed by others as 
off limits. When the nephew of ‘Giorgio the doctor’ (Paola Zambelli has identified the latter as 
Giorgio Anselmi da Parma the Elder) wished to publish his uncle’s treatise on magic, the print-
ers whom he approached steadfastly refused (Zambelli 2007, 9). See also Delcorno Branca 1976, 
464–71, esp. 470f.
11 The manuscript is Bodleian Library, Canonicianus classicus latinus 500; see Magrīṭī 1986, 
xxii. 
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‘equally connected with everything, even with those things that are at a distance 
from one other’.12 
With this declaration, Ficino framed previous magical or theological attacks 
on the hegemonic philosophy of nature, not merely in order to topple this philoso-
phy but, rather, to tame practitioners of magic by imposing on them a philosoph-
ical framework. This meant harking back to authoritative sources that preceded 
Aristotle. In contending that ‘the cosmos is animate just like any animate thing’, 
Ficino alerts his readers to the fact that he has adopted this from the traditional 
Neo-Platonist philosophy and from ‘Arabic astrologers’ who ‘thoroughly proved 
it’. They also proved, he explains, that ‘by applying our spirit to the spirit of the 
cosmos, made possible by physical science, we received celestial goods in our 
soul and our body’. Just as our bodies need a spirit to function, so the anima 
mundi is essential to the working of the cosmos, acting ‘by way of the rays of the 
stars upon nature and upon our spirit’.13
Ficino’s attributions of passages from the Picatrix to ‘an Arabic astrologer’ or 
‘Arabic writers’ serve to support current magical arguments about the animated 
cosmos and to justify the principle of action at a distance. Such assertions played 
an essential role in his effort to draw counters to a new natural philosophy that 
would not only break with the teleological explanations for motion but would 
also establish a new structure of the universe. It was the Picatrix that provided 
him with such a metaphysical framework. 
Only the last parts of the Picatrix delve into the theoretical tenets of magic, 
with the author outlining a philosophical framework for natural magic in the 
last chapter of book 3. He begins by discussing the confusing usage of ‘nature’: 
‘nature’ was variously used to refer to the ‘complexion of the elements’, innate 
heat, ‘forms and figures of the body’, and motion and spirit. Aristotelian natural 
philosophers, Picatrix stresses, used the word even more equivocally, meaning 
‘the body and all its properties’, the humors, ‘elements of heaven’, and ‘Godly 
virtues that cause generation and corruption’. The initial philosophical challenge 
taken up in the Picatrix is to sort out the word’s true meaning, setting it alongside 
the magician’s fascination with action at a distance. The text stresses that ‘The 
sages have defined “nature” as the beginning of motion and rest’ (my emphasis). 
12 ‘Praeterea cum sit (ut dixi) media rerum, omnia suo in se modo continent et utrinque ratione 
propinquo; ideoque conciliatur et omnibus, etiam aequaliter illis quae inter se distant, ab ea 
videlicet non distanibus’ (Ficino 1989, book 3, chap. 1, 244). 
13 ‘Quem sicut et quodvis animal multoque efficacius animatum esse, non solum Platonicae 
rationes, sed etiam astrologorum Arabum testimonia comprobant. Ubi etiam probant ex applica-
tion quadam spiritus nostril ad spiritum mundi per artem physicam affectumque facta, traiici ad 
animam corpusque nostrum bona coelestia’ (Ibid., book 3, chap. 2, 254).
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Such motion is generated through ‘the heavenly mediation between forms and 
bodies’, a universal agency.14
Book 4 opens by arguing that the seemingly scattered spiritual-physical 
agents, the forces of life (qūat al-ḥayāt) that rest in bodies, are actually representa-
tions of a single entity, the anima mundi (nafs al-kul). The anima mundi manifests 
itself as the force that generates motion, as ‘a kind of property apart from material 
things’, as spiritual phenomena (ashyāʽ al-rūḥaniyya), spiritual-physical entities 
that cause objects to ‘move naturally and not by accident’. This property ‘governs 
everything’ and exists simultaneously everywhere.15
If the anima mundi is the mediating agent that plays between bodies then it 
has to be located in the midst of the cosmic order. Book 4 of the Picatrix describes 
the five-tiered structure of the universe, assigning a place to the anima mundi:
1) First form [al-ṣūrah] (the order of things)
2) Intellect [al-ʻaql] (laws of causality)
3) Anima [al-nafs] (universal agent)
4) Nature [al- ṭabīʻah ] (motion and rest)
5) Elements [al-ʻanāṣir] (mixture of matter) 16
The particular location of the anima mundi determines its function in the cosmic 
order. Lodged between the highest and the lowest spheres, the soul of the world 
plays a mediating role in the universe; as the prime agent of natural change, 
transforming divine laws into tangible light, it relies on light to set nature into 
motion. ‘When the soul comes into agreement with the mind’, Picatrix explains, 
‘it creates light and wisdom and other virtues’. Perpetually in flux, nature shifts 
14 Magrīṭī 1933, book 3, chap. 12, 284f. 
لذلك حدها األوائل بأنها ابتداء حركة وسكون وحدها
‘Qua de causa primi sapientes sic diffiniverunt earn quod est terminus et
principium motus et quietudinis’. Magrīṭī 1986, book 3, chap. 12, 172.
15 Magrīṭī 1933, book 4, chap. 1, 291–92. 
 هذه الجملة هي العقل الفَعال المخرج لألنفس اإلنسانية في العلوم العقلية من القوة إلى الفعل وهذه الجملة هي مبادئ الكل بعد المبدأ
األول والمبدأ األول هو مبدع الكل
‘Et hoc genus est principium in omnibus post primum principium; et principium primum prin-
cipians omnia’. Magrīṭī 1986, book 4, chap. 1, 177. 
16 Magrīṭī 1933, book 4, chap. 1, 291f. 
 وهي العالم األعلى والصورة االولى وهو العنصر األول ثم العقل ثم النفس ثم الطبيعة وهي السماء ثم العنصر الجرمي وهو العنصر
الجسماني
‘Sapientes vero antiqui in hoc sunt concordati, quod Deus quinque res disposuit et ordinavit per 
gradus, quarum nobiliorem in summo gradu collocavit – videlicet materiam primam et formam 
primam, que est tam quam prima minera omnium; secundo sensus sive intellectus, tercio spir-
itus, quarto natura celorum, quinto elementa et elementata’. Magrīṭī 1986, book 4, chap. 1, 174.
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when ‘mind comes into agreement with the soul’.17 The anima mundi thus serves 
as the glue of the universe, fashioning universal harmony and balance. Towards 
the end of the first chapter of book 4, the author gives his conclusive definition 
of ‘nature’, naming as its characteristic trait the ‘perpetual motion’ (dāʼimat 
 al-ḥarakah) by which corporeal agents are perfected and completed, ‘living their 
potential through the forces of nature’.18
Furthermore, the Picatrix’s philosophy of nature suggests that man can 
control the various forms of anima mundi and, by doing so, can utilise natural 
forces to change his destiny and to change his world. Moreover, man can do the 
same with other parts of nature, shifting their animae toward the higher spheres 
of the ‘first form’ and intellect, or closer to the lowest spheres, nature and ele-
ments, changing their properties and setting them in motion.
Ficino adopted this new cosmic order to replace Aristotelian metaphysics, 
echoing Picatrix’s argument that ‘the relation of the anima mundi to the univer-
sal intellect is like the relation of our soul to the active intellect’. 19 He seems to 
have projected the intermediary role of a mere anima, which was thought to stand 
between the soul and body, onto the cosmic order, stressing the omnipresence 
of the anima mundi. The relationship between the universal body and the uni-
versal soul is equal to [that between] our spirit and our active sense. The soul of 
every being is the medium, Ficino argued, ‘by which the divine soul may both be 
present to the crude body and impart life on it’.20 Some of these souls or, as Ficino 
calls them, ‘spiritual bodies’, possess a physicality; this is clearly implied in his 
17 I present the pertinent Arabic and Latin texts. Although in some places a discrepancy be-
tween the two texts occurs, all of my translations are made from the Arabic, which is to be con-
sidered the original text.
Magrīṭī 1933, book 4, chap. 1, 286f. 
وجعل النفس فى افق العقل تستمد النور والحكمة والفضائل عنه بقوى منه مشاكلة لها تفيض ذلك عليها, وجعل الطبيعة في افق النفس...
‘Sensum autem et intellectum posuit in primo circulo descendente ab eodem, qui similiter ab 
eodem lumine descendit; sciencia etenim et nobilitas virtutis sibi convenientes ei vi ab illo em-
anantur’. Magrīṭī 1986, 174. 
18 Magrīṭī 1933, 294.
وبعض االوائل حدها بانها دائمة الحركة وهي مع ذلك كمال الجسم الفعال الحى بالقوة الطبيعة
‘Et una pars sapientum antiquorum sic determinavit: natura est durabilis motus cum quo est 
perfectio sive complementum corporis agentis et in potencia viva’. Magrīṭī 1986, 178.
19 Magrīṭī 1933, book 4, chap. 1, 292.
نسبة نفس الكل الى عقل الكل كنسبة انفسنا الى العقل الفعال
‘Et spiritus universi est sensus universi. Idcirco omnes substancie incorporee complete in corpo-
ribus celestibus moventibus redundant, et hoc propter quietudinem sensus’. Magrīṭī 1986, 177. 
20 ‘Que spiritus necessario requiritur tanquam medium, quo anima divina et adsit corpori cras-
siori et vitam eidem penitus largiatur’. Ficino 1989, book 3, chap. 3, 256f.
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statement that ‘besides this worldly body, generally apparent to our senses’, 
some spiritual forces ‘escape the capacity of our weak senses’.21
Ficino’s conclusions regarding the anima mundi appear, as in the Picatrix, 
toward the end of his book. He explains that the anima mundi is responsible for 
all natural actions at a distance; standing in for various undetectable physical 
entities, it causes all motion and rest. ‘The anima mundi’, he concludes, ‘gen-
erates and moves the forms of natural things by means of seminal forces it has 
received from the divine’. The magus, then, can play with such seminal reasons, 
shifting bodies closer to either the upper or the lower sphere, thus changing their 
properties and setting them in motion.22
But what are the means by which the virtuoso magus can manipulate the 
actions of the anima mundi? Picatrix argues that the heavenly bodies could be 
manipulated by talismans designed to suit the properties of each planet. Such 
talismans, made of materials that accord with the properties of the planet, are 
fashioned to mirror the planet’s qualities. They were used during the periods of 
the planets’ susceptibility to influence. 
I have pointed out one of the structural similarities between De vita libri 
tres and the Picatrix. In fact, Ficino broadly adopts the general scheme of the 
earlier work. In a chapter titled ‘On the Powers of the Rays from Which Images Are 
Thought to Obtain Their Force’, he outlines the ways by which one can control the 
heavenly bodies through the use of images to attract heavenly influences. Images 
can concentrate the power of the rays, since ‘by the rays’ intensity, matter – being 
dry and far from any moisture – is immediately kindled and, once kindled, is 
vaporised and dispersed in all directions, blowing out both flames and sulfur’. 
Not all the physical effects of the rays are detectable, since ‘this fire is very dark 
and, as it were, a sort of flame without light’.23 Although al-Kindī’s popular De 
radiis stellarum extensively deals with the role of the sun’s rays, it seems that 
the Picatrix was in fact more readily fitting for his argument, as it points out that 
as the human body requires a soul to trigger motion so too does a universal soul 
generate motion at the cosmic level. Both texts stress the mutually dependent 
connection between heat and light, on the one hand, and motion, on the other: 
21 ‘Quamobrem praeter corpus hoc mundi sensibus familiariter manifestum latet in eo spiritus 
corpus quoddam excedens caduci sensus capacitatem’. Ibid., book 3, chap. 26, 384.
22 ‘Itaque per rationes eiusmodi animam mundi facile se applicare materiis, quas formavit ab 
initio per easdem’. Ibid., 390.
23 ‘Sed ignem hunc putant valde caliginosum esse et quasi incendium quoddam luminis ex-
pers, sicut in coelo extat expers incendii lumen; ignis autem inter coelestem atque infernum 
lumen cum fervor coniungit’. Ibid., 321.
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bodies are endowed with rays and heat only due to their motion. But why were 
rays so important to Ficino and his contemporaries? 
In introducing astrological notions into the philosophy of nature, Florentine 
philosophers focused on the following question: Does the influence of the planets 
exist only in detectable and tangible forms (rays and heat), or does it manifest 
itself also in intangible ways (forces and radiation)? De vita libri tres played a 
central role in these discussions. It appeared just as a controversy regarding 
the truthfulness of astrology and other occult sciences reached its climax.24 At 
the two extremes were Ficino and Pico, the foremost philosophers of Florence, 
starkly disagreeing as to whether the cosmos was ensouled or unsouled. 
In his canonical work, Platonic Theology (Theologia platonica), first pub-
lished in 1482 and followed by a second edition in 1491, Ficino argued (book iv 
chap. i) that ‘just as universal nature exists everywhere in the universal body, 
so a universal soul exists everywhere in that universal nature’.25 Animated 
nature is connected to man through incorporeal light, he explains in De vita 
libri tres, stressing that the anima mundi, which is actually the omnipresent 
‘incorporeal light’, links the tangible part of the world to its soul, the world to 
the nature of man.
Disagreeing, Pico refused to hypothesise intangible properties with an occult 
character; preferring instead to stress the sensible and placing the rays of the sun 
at the center of his natural philosophy. In his attack on astrology, Disputationes 
adversus astrologiam divinatricem (Disputations against Divinatory Astrology), he 
reduces the effects of the heavenly bodies to physical properties, thereby detach-
ing man from predetermined cosmic phenomena. Light and heat become the 
central agents of nature and the angle of the solar ecliptic at different locations 
is held to be responsible for levels of heat and moisture, which in turn vary living 
creatures into different species and affect their coming into being and passing 
away.26 He believed that the planets and stars differ from the sun or moon inas-
much as they have very little influence on us, and perhaps none at all. The fetus, 
he writes, derives its main characteristics from its constituent human seeds and 
from the climate surrounding the mother, not from the moon and planets.27
24 For the cultural context of the controversy over the intangible effects of the planets, see ‘De-
fying Authority, Denying Predestination and Conquering Nature, Florence 1493’ in Ben-Zaken 
2011, 65–100.
25 ‘Sicuti se habet natura ad corpus, sic anima ad naturum. Ergo quemadmodum in universo 
corpore natura universalis est ubique, ita in universa natura ubique universalis est anima’. Fici-
no 2003, 286.
26 della Mirandola 1946, 1.203.
27 Ibid., 1.269.
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In this regard, Pico only selectively echoes book 2 chapter 3 of the Picatrix, 
which mentions sages who argued that ‘the effects of the heavens and their powers 
in this world are nothing other than the increase and decrease of heat’.28 The Pic-
atrix takes a different approach and additionally stresses that these sages ‘did not 
understand the wonderful occult properties of the planets’, since the increase 
and decrease of heat convey with them spiritual forces that generate motion. 
Furthermore, whereas Pico conceives of the manifested effects of the heavenly 
bodies (the sun and the moon) as heat and light, the Picatrix (followed by Ficino) 
argues that every moving body, even the most distant sphere, the eighth sphere, 
generates heat, rays, and other undetectable physical-spiritual entities. In this 
regard, the Picatrix explains that the motion of the heavens is the prime cause of 
accidental heat, which, in turn, gives life to nature. Whereas Pico argues that the 
heavenly bodies yield only a physical, measurable influence – rays and heat – 
Ficino relies on the Picatrix to argue that the tangible influence was only the tip 
of the iceberg, conceiving natural motion as the effect of intangible physical- 
spiritual entities, that will later, in the seventeenth century, be named forces. 
By appropriating, in addition to the Picatrix’s practical recipes and talis-
mans, the philosophical framework of the text, Ficino philosophically tames the 
arguments of natural magic, bringing the occult into the light. The occult, for 
him, does not mean spiritual entities detached from bodies; on the contrary, he 
believed that all of the acclaimed spiritual entities were actually physical, playing 
central roles in generating the motion in the universe. Such spiritual-physical 
entities underlined the necessary agency and causality in the laws of nature, 
which come into being in the form of forces of attraction, the radiation of rays, 
and heat. Thus, Ficino appropriated and reworked arguments from the Picatrix, 
presenting a middle ground in De vita libri tres. On the one hand, he narrows 
astrological influences to physical properties, while, on the other, he modifies the 
arguments of those who rejected astrology by expanding the range of heavenly 
influence to include intangible physical properties.
The concept of anima mundi played a key role in shedding light on what 
seemed to be occult knowledge and practices, and, thus, in transforming the 
occult into a subcategory of natural philosophy. However, the emphasis on anima 
mundi and its influence on the universe resulted in a view of man as a passive 
observer of the ways of the universe. Perhaps because Ficino consulted an incom-
plete manuscript of the Picatrix, referring to it at times as an ‘Arabic miscellany’, 
he left out a fundamental component of the complete work (especially books 1, 2, 
28 Magrīṭī 1933, book 2, chap. 3, 63. 
فعل الفلك انما هو بحرارة ازيد او انقص
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and 3 of the Picatrix), the practice of natural magic, as well as any discussion of 
the virtuoso magician who is able to transform his world. As Perrone Compagni 
has argued, Ficino’s selective usage aimed at creating in De vita a more purified 
version of the Picatrix that left out materials that might contradict religion.29 
The Picatrix’s other central theme was the practice of philosophy and magic – 
the practical aspect of philosophy, the making of philosophy without philoso-
phy, and the aspiration of making and changing the world by practice, which 
impacted subsequent generations of readers. The next significant station in the 
circulation of the Picatrix, Cornelius Agrippa’s De occulta philosophia libri tres, 
brought that issue to the fore. 
3  Legitimising practice: Agrippa’s virtuoso 
Whereas Ficino was located at the crossroads of Greek, Arabic, and Hebrew texts 
on natural magic and philosophy, Agrippa moved restlessly from one place to 
another, gathering sources and knocking over what seemed to him artificial cul-
tural and disciplinary fences. He could have encountered the Picatrix in several 
places: Spain, Italy, or even central Europe.30 Perhaps it was Johann Reuchlin’s 
borrowings from the Picatrix (The Book of Wonderful Word), presented as a lecture 
at the University of Dole in 1512, that brought the text to his attention; Vittoria 
Perrone Compagni has identified in Reuchlin’s essay a number of unattributed 
borrowings from the Picatrix (Perrone Compagni 1977, 317f. and 325). 
At any rate, Agrippa also had practical reasons to refer to the Picatrix. While 
Ficino used the text to promote his project to philosophise natural magic, Agrippa 
was out to legitimise the practice of natural magic. To that end, he attacked the 
hegemonic scholastic philosophy of nature for a teleological approach that 
treated practice as irrelevant to natural philosophy. Taking his convictions into 
the law court of Metz, he defended a woman from a village named Woippy who 
was accused of practicing magic, arguing that her work never exceeded the legit-
imate use of natural forces (Ziegeler 1973, 150–8). At the same time he worked on 
his alternative program of science, De occulta philosophia libri tres (Three Books 
of Occult Philosophy), written in the first decade of the century but only published 
in 1531–1533. He had good reasons to hesitate, since the work legitimised ritual 
29 For the reasons for the selective reading and usage of the Picatrix by Ficino, see Perrone 
Compagni 2011.
30 Darmstadt, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, 362 (630); Vienna, Österreichische National-
biblothek, 3317 (Philos. 156); Magrīṭī 1986, xvi–xvii.
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magic and emphasised the virtues and skills necessary for the would-be  magician. 
Cautious as to when and where he published, Agrippa also wrote dedications 
that aimed to reduce the danger of ecclesiastical condemnation. Furthermore, 
to soften the landing of his bold magnus opus, he preceded its publication with 
another book in which he openly promoted natural magic as the prime program 
for the sciences, transforming the magician into an experimental virtuoso. The 
Picatrix suited such an enterprise.
Whereas the previous generation of natural magicians tried to mix natural 
magic with scholasticism, Agrippa boldly treated the two bodies of knowledge 
as conspicuously contradictory. His De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et 
artium (On the Uncertainty and Vanity of the Sciences and the Arts), dated 1527, 
took aim at the hegemonic scholastic philosophy of nature. In the preface he calls 
the attention of the reader to the tyranny of scholasticism: ‘I find’, he writes, ‘a 
most detestable custom that has invaded all or most schools of learning to swear 
their students never to contradict Aristotle, Boetius, Thomas, Albertus or some 
such school deity: from whom if anybody would even slightly divert, he would 
be proclaimed heretic, a criminal against the holy sciences deserves only to be 
consumed in fire and flames’.31 Scholasticism, thus, ‘captivates the minds of stu-
dents and authors, depriving them of the liberty of searching after and following 
the truth’,32 turning ‘Arts and Sciences’ into a destructive force. For Agrippa, tra-
ditional study of the sciences entailed working within institutional divisions, spe-
cialisation which eventually yielded a narrowed view of science. Natural magic, 
by contrast, was a multicultural field, an interdisciplinary mixture of theory and 
practice. As such, enthusiasts such as Agrippa believed that every human being 
is able to discover and manipulate the hidden secrets of nature. 
De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium was written to break 
through the wall of scholasticism; it drove toward that end by cynically sur-
veying its derivative sciences. In chapters 41, 42, and 43, Agrippa appraises 
and differentiates magic, natural magic, and mathematical magic, presenting 
them as the products of intersecting cultural currents that he traces from antiq-
uity up to his own day. The noun magus, for instance, came from Persian and 
31 ‘Praeterea in multis ac ferme omnibus gymnasijs peruersus mos, ac damnabilis cosuetudo 
inoleuit, quod initiandos discipulos iureiurando adigunt Aristoteli aut Boethio, aut Thomae, aut 
Alberto, seu alio cuiuis suo scholastico Deosese nunquam repugnaturos: a quibus se quis latu 
unguem diuersum senserit, hunc haereticum scandalosum, piarum aurium offensiuum, igne 
flammisque absumedum proclamant’. Agrippa von Nettesheim 1575, Ad Lectorem.
32 ‘Denique quàm impia tyrannis, captiuare ad praefinitos autores studiosorum ingenia, et adi-
mere discipulis libertatem indagandae et sequendae veritatis’. Agrippa von Nettesheim 1575, Ad 
Lectorem.
1048   Avner Ben-Zaken
‘signifies a priest, wise man, or philosopher [who worked with] both natural 
magic and mathematical magic’.33 In chapter 42, Agrippa defined natural magic 
as the ‘highest power of natural science, the active part of natural philosophy, 
which by means of natural virtues, applied jointly and felicitously, elicits admi-
rable operations’. The Ethiopians and the Indians – the first to use ‘the virtue of 
herbs, and stones, and other natural things’ – set the standard. They also defined 
the role of the magic virtuoso, which was to consider ‘the strength and force of 
natural and celestial beings, and having worked diligently to discover their affec-
tions, [render] visible the hidden and concealed powers of nature’. Among these 
masters Agrippa names Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistus, but the only author-
ity whose biography he set down is ‘the author of the book to Alfonsus, written 
under the name of Picatrix, who into natural magic mixes much superstition, as 
indeed the rest have done’.34
The Picatrix, however, argues that the successful natural magician, the virtu-
oso, had to acquire not only a knowledge of the natural world but also the skills 
needed to extract such secrets publicly. ‘You should know’, the text stresses, ‘that 
the practice of magic [ʻamal, experimenta] discovers the secrets of sciences; by 
work and experiments doubts are unfolded’.35 If there is an agency in nature that 
causes motion and rest, the book indicates, then man carries within himself such 
agency and, through self-reflection, he discovers the ‘virtue that cares for and 
governs his body’, employing experiments to extend this insight into the realm 
of nature. 
Agrippa borrowed this line of argumentation and used it to set the founda-
tion for his greatest work, De occulta philosophia, affirming natural magic as a 
33 ‘Exigit etia hic locus ut de Magia dicamus: nam & ipsa cum Astrologia sic coniuncta, atq; 
cognate est, ut qui Magia sine Astrologia profiteatur, is nihilagat, sed tota aberret via. Suidas ma-
giam à Magusies & nomen, & originem traxisse putat. Comunis opinion est nomen esse Persicum 
cui adstipulantur Porphyrius, & Apolieus, & significare eorum lingua idem quod facerdotem sa-
piente sive Philosophum. Magia itaque omnem philosophiam physicam, & mathematicam com-
plexa etia vires religionum illis adiungit: hinc Goetiam, & Theurgiam in sequoq continet. Qua de 
cosa Magiam plerique bifariam dividunt in naturalem videlicet & caeremonialem’. Agrippa von 
Nettesheim 1575, chap. 41.
34 ‘Author libri ad Alphonsum, sub picatricis nomine editus, qui tamen una cum naturali magia 
plurimum superstitiones admiscet quod quidem fecerunt & alii’. Agrippa von Nettesheim 1575, 
chap. 42. 
35 Magrīṭī 1933, book 3, chap. 12, 282.
واعلم أيها الباحث أن العمل يخرج مكنون العلوم وبه تنحل الشكوك فانه عند حصول معرفة المطلوب تنحل الشكوك
‘Illum autem qui in hac sciencia se intromittere intendit scire oportet quod propter opera et ex-
perimenta que fiunt in hoc mundo scienciarum profunditates et secreta sciuntur, et ex operibus 
et experimentis solvuntur dubia’. Magrīṭī 1986, book 3, chap. 12, 170.
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science based on firsthand explorations of the secrets of nature. For him, the Pic-
atrix offered both lessons in natural magic and the historical and philosophical 
authority for the primacy of induction in the exploration of nature. 
Agrippa mentions the Picatrix several times in De occulta philosophia and in 
a few additional places he ascribes its content to ‘Arabs’. For instance, in book 1, 
chapter 12, titled ‘How Superior Bodies Control Inferior Things, and How the Stars 
and Signs Control the Bodies, the Actions, and the Dispositions of Men’, Agrippa 
writes that, ‘according to the doctrine of the Arabs, the Sun rules over the brain, 
the heart, and the rest of the feeling organs’.36 
However, it is when Agrippa offers his description of the virtues and skills 
possessed by those who practice natural magic that he draws most tellingly on 
the Picatrix. Early in his discourse, Agrippa explains that its purpose is to show 
‘how magicians collect virtues from the threefold world’. His decision to divide 
his treatise in three parallels the structure of the universe, made up as it was of 
elementary, celestial, and intellectual matter. The role of the natural magician, 
therefore, is to climb a ladder of philosophy by seeking ‘after the virtues of the 
elementary world, relying for assistance on natural philosophy in the various 
combinations of natural things, then the [virtues of the] celestial world via the 
rays, and their influences thereof, according to the rules of astrologers and doc-
trines of mathematicians’. By so doing the natural magician is practically ‘joining 
the celestial ventures to the elementary world’.37
Agrippa subsequently elaborates on the qualifications of the virtuoso. Magic 
necessarily relies on other disciplines. ‘Whoever wishes to study natural magic’, 
Agrippa suggests, must be knowledgeable about natural philosophy, ‘wherein are 
discovered the qualities of things, and in which are found the occult properties 
of every being’. He also has to be skillful in mathematics, ‘and in the aspects, 
and figures of the stars, upon which depend the sublime virtue and property 
of everything’. He has to be learned in theology, ‘wherein are manifested those 
immaterial substances’. Only after climbing these rungs on the ladder of philos-
ophy will he be ‘able to understand the rationality of magic’. Agrippa concludes 
that natural magic addresses not only agency in the world but also acts as a medi-
ator between different bodies of knowledge, since ‘there is no world that is the 
36 ‘Scias itaque iuxta Arabum traditionem Solem praeesse cerebro et cordi, <femori, medullis, 
oculo dextro et spiritui vitae>’. Agrippa von Nettesheim 1992, book 1, chap. 22, 129.
37 ‘Hinc elementalis mundi vires varris rerum naturalium mixtionibus a medicina et naturali 
philosophia venantur; deinde coelestis mundi radiis et influxibus iuxta astrologorum regulas et 
mathematicorum disciplinas coelestes virtutes illis connectunt’. Ibid., book 1, chap. 1, 85.
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product of magic alone, nor any labor that is exclusively magical, that does not 
comprehend these three faculties’.38
Agrippa may have drawn from the Picatrix the notion of the magus as mixing 
not only matter but also intellectual disciplines and cultural practices, a view 
of natural magic as interdisciplinary, while the magus is seen as an agent con-
necting the upper and lower worlds, the angelic and the celestial worlds to the 
elementary world. This magical virtuoso brings together distinct bodies of knowl-
edge (pertaining to each world), giving natural magic the crucial role of mediating 
and connecting the various detached disciplines of arts and sciences. The Picatrix 
stresses that the magus, in the practical process of making images and miracles, 
‘produces techniques and skills’ and is able to understand forms of things in 
nature by virtue of the exclusive human nature (which includes all other forms 
in nature): ‘the talismans are more powerful than any other optional thing since 
they were fashioned according to the universal nature. They (talismans) are like 
miracles since they use the general form and substance of nature, which in turn 
make miracles and other marvels’. If the talismans include the universal form of 
nature, then the craftsman, the magus, who created them encapsulates the struc-
ture of the universe, since ‘the image of man contains of the image of the spirit of 
the universe’.39 Agrippa counterpoises forms for acquiring knowledge: the medi-
eval scholastic vita contemplativa versus the occultist vita activa. Since man was 
created in the form of God, the magus, the individual practitioner, is able through 
an active exploration of nature to connect to the spirit of the universe.
One finds echoes of the Picatrix in other aspects of Agrippa’s work too. It 
appears to have informed his thinking on how the virtuoso connected differ-
ent worlds and crossed disciplinary boundaries. The magus not only alters the 
mixture of matter in this world, he also connects matter, bodies, spirits, and 
forms, to their celestial origins – to the single universal source of the anima 
mundi. He does this by making images and measuring matter. 
38 ‘Nullum enim opus ab ipsa magia perfectum extat nec est aliquod opus vere magicum, quod 
tres facultates non complectatur’. Ibid., book 1, chap. 2, 86–9.
39 Magrīṭī 1933, book 1, chap. 5, 85.
 ان الطلسمات انفذ من االختيارات النها مستعملة بطبيعة الكل وهي كالمعجز الستعمالها الخواص الطبيعية وذلك ان الخواص تفعل
 العجائب من االفعال
The Latin translation mistakenly marked this paragraph in chapter 6, whereas in the original 
Arabic text it is the end of chapter 5. 
‘Operatur industria et arte. et similiter ab aliis industria et arte retrahitur. Et invenit magiste-
ria subtilia et eorum subtilitates,et facit miracula et ymagines mirabiles. et scienciarum formas 
retinet….Et generalis forma hominis est archa forme spiritus in generali. et spiritus generalis 
est archa sensus generalis. et sensus generalis est archa luminis unde sensus procedit’. Magrīṭī 
1986, book 1, chap. 6, 26f.
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In De occulta philosophia, the making of images is the most evident trace of 
Agrippa’s reading of the Picatrix. He echoes his source at one point, writing, ‘The 
magicians affirm that both by the mixture and application of natural things and 
by images, seals, rings, glasses, and some other instruments, if [the events take 
place] opportunely under a specific constellation, a celestial illustration may be 
made, and some wonderful thing may be received by images’. Since the beams 
of the celestial bodies are animated, they ‘transport marvelous gifts, and a most 
violent power’, and the image can attract and manifest these ‘wonderful powers’. 
In order for the image to become more powerful it has to correspond to the natural 
properties of the objective heavenly body and also to have its form.40
Later on, Agrippa mentions his sources, saying, ‘There are besides in the 
zodiac thirty-six images, according to the number of the faces’ of which ancient 
mathematicians – and later ‘the Arabians’ – wrote.41 He further echoes the Pic-
atrix in a description of the planets. The image of Saturn, imprinted on a lode-
stone, shows ‘a man the face of a hart and the feet of a camel, seated on a dragon, 
holding in his right hand a scythe, in his left an arrow’.42
Moreover, the Picatrix links the practice of natural magic with the mathemat-
ical and quantifying practices that enabled the virtuoso to discover the hidden 
laws of nature, endowing him with the ability to channel a natural force to the use 
of man. Quantity is the foundation of this science, for magic is part of the quadriv-
ium. Quantity is divided into two parts, corresponding to geometric and algebraic 
laws of nature: ‘continuous quantity (line, surface, body, time, and place) and 
discrete quantity (numbers and words)’.43
40 ‘Coelestium enim corporum radii animati, vivi, sensuales, dotes mirificas potentiamque ve-
hementissimam secum ferentes, etiam repentino momento ac subito tactu mirabiles in imagin-
ibus imprimuntur viresetiam in materia minus apta; efficaciores tamen largiuntur imaginibus 
virtutes si non ex qualibet, sed certa materia fabricentur, cuius videlicet virtus naturalis cum 
specifica simul opera conveniat figuraque imagines similis sit figurae coelesti’. Agrippa von 
Nettesheim 1992, book 2, chap. 35, 251f. 
41 ‘Post quem scripserunt de illis etiam Arabes’. Ibid., book 2, chap. 37, 354.
42 ‘Faciebant enim ex operibus Saturni, ipso ascendente, in lapide qui magnes dicitur imagi-
nem hominis cervinum valtum et cameli pedes habentis, super cathedram vel draconem sed-
entis, in dextra falcem, in sinistra sagittam tenentis; quam quidem imaginem sperabant sibi ad 
vitae longitudinem profuturam’. Ibid., book 2, chap. 38, 358.
43 Magrīṭī 1933, book 2, chap. 7, 96.
 والكم ايضا كذلك الن الكم كما قيل في التعاليم ينقسم بالقسم االكبر الى قسمين وهما المتصل والمنفصل والقسم المتصل منهما ينقسم الى
خمسة اقسام وهي الخط والسطح والجسم والزمان والمكان. والقسم المنفصل منهما ينقسم الى القول والعدد
‘Et similiter quantitas est radix istius sciencie eo quod ipsa in quadrivio operatur. Secundum 
suam primam divisionem dividitur in duas partes, que quidem partes sunt ipsa quantitas con-
tinua et discreta. Quantitas vero continua dividitur in partes quinque. que sunt linea. superfi-
cies. corpus.
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In the same vein, Agrippa elaborated on the quantification of natural magic, 
saying that mathematical learning was a ‘necessity’ since all things ‘are gov-
erned by number, weight, measure, harmony, motion, and light’.44 By combining 
expertise in natural philosophy and mathematics – by using the laws of arith-
metic, music, geometry, optics, and astronomy, together with measuring tools – 
the magician virtuoso ‘may do many wonderful things’.45 He may, for instance, 
produce ‘images that speak and foretell things to come’. Above all, ‘numbers, that 
have more of form in them, are effective’ at finding their counterparts in the celes-
tial world, which leads to discovering ‘the effects of good and bad things’. Thus, 
Agrippa concluded, images and numbers both described the forms of nature.46
Agrippa’s and Ficino’s readings of the Picatrix converged around one par-
ticular image: the sun. Both were drawn in by the idea that talismans func-
tioned as did the sun, and that the sun is the center of influences, the source 
of all spiritual-physical entities. If one could create an image that encapsulated 
the sun’s qualities, it would, naturally and ineluctably, possess great practical 
powers. 
The Picatrix argues that heavenly bodies influence nature through unde-
tectable spiritual-physical entities that can be captured and used by means of 
images. It also argues that the sun, the source of those entities, governs the whole 
 universe by its rays. But which natural images, forms not made by man, could 
tempus et locus; et quantitas discreta dividitur in duas partes, videlicet numerum et verbum’. 
Magrīṭī 1986, book 2, chap. 7, 58.
44 ‘Mathematicae disciplinae ad magiam tam sunt necessariae atque cognatae ut qui hanc 
absque illis profiteatur, is tota aberret via frustraque laboret minimeque desideratum adsequa-
tur effectum. Quae cunque enim sunt et fiunt in istis inferioribus naturalibus virtutibus, omnia 
haec ‘numero, pondere, mensura’, harmonia, mootu et lumine fiunt atque reguntur et omnes 
res, quas videmus in istis inferioribus, habent radicem et fundamentum in illis’. Agrippa von 
Nettesheim 1992, book 2, chap. 1, 249. 
45 ‘Hinc magus, expertus philosophiae naturalis et matheseos, cognitisque mediis scientiis 
ex his utrisque existentibus, arithmetica, musica, geometria, optica, astronomia, et quae de 
ponderibus, mensuris, proportionibus, articulis et iuncturis scientiae sunt, cognitisque etiam 
mechanicis artibus ex illis resultantibus, quid mirum si supra caeteros homines arte et ingenio 
praecellens, mirabilia multa operetur, quae etiam prudentissimi quique et scientissimi valde ad-
mirentur?’ Ibid., book 2, chap. 1, 250.
46 ‘Loquuntur autem de numero rationali et formali, non de materiali, sensibili sive vocali 
nuero mercantorum . . . numerum naturalem et formalem et rationalem vocant, ex quo magna 
sacramenta emanant tam in naturalibus, quam divinis atque coelestibus. Per illum havetur via 
ad omnia scibilia indaganda et intelligenda; per illum havetur proximus accessus ad prophetiam 
naturalem: atque ipse abbas Ioachim in prophetiis suis alia via quam per numeros formales non 
processit’. Ibid., book 2, chap. 1, 253.
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perfectly capture such influences and win universal appreciation from all reli-
gions and cultures?
In book 3, chapter 5, the Picatrix offers a rather peculiar injunction for a pre-
sumably Muslim writer. The author give practical instruction to the magus on the 
process of preparing talismans: ‘Then we are making seven forms [talismans] 
on stones, each one in the form of the hour of the planet, [although the forms 
vary from planet to planet] they all convey the form of the cross, which is the 
mastery form of all the planets’. The cross holds a spiritual power since it ‘con-
nects to everything similar to its form and resists everything that is dissimilar to 
its form’, universally affecting all objects in nature. The Picatrix tackles a practi-
cal consideration – how to transform three-dimensional objects of nature, and 
their functional relations, into a two dimensional representation on talismans? 
In coping with this problem the text makes a radical implication – the form of 
the circle merely describes the location of objects in space whereas only linear 
forms, like the cross, can describe fractions of rays, their function, power, and 
influences. The text alleges physical and geometrical considerations: the sun rays 
are understood in terms of their length and breadth, formal qualities also found 
in the cross, ‘we drew the form of the cross since every planet carries its [cross] 
form, since every physical body has a surface, and the surface is made of length, 
breadth, and the form of breadth and length is actually the cross itself. And for 
this reason we hold the cross [as a universal form] since the spirits do not resist 
to it’. Taking this a step further, the Picatrix describes the cross as possessing ‘a 
universal mastery’ in manipulating the influences of the heavenly bodies, ‘we 
said that there is no person who is not subjected to the rule of the seven planets, 
and therefore, if the spirits connect to the image of the cross then it gives the man 
who carries it bravery and power’.47 Since light plays a role as an agent between 
47 Magrīṭī 1933, book 3, chap. 5, 184–185. 
...من كل حجر من هذه االحجار صورة ساعة الكوكب الذي ذلك الحجر من قسمته وتكون هذه السبع الصور حاملة للصليب
 وانما ذكرنا ان يكون صليبا الؔنا قد قلنا ان كل شىء يتصل بشكله وينافر غير شكله.... فالجل هذا ما شكلناه بشكل الصليب الن كل ذى
 جرم واقع تحت شكله الن ظاهر الجسم السطح وهو ما كان له طول وعرض وشكل الطول والعرض هو الصليب فاتخذنا لهذه العلًة
ليكون شكاًل ال تنافره الروحانية وهذا قال من سرأىر هذا العلم.
 ونقول انه ال يخلو من ان يكون كل الناس تحت حكم السبعة كواكب المذكورة فاذا اتصلت الروحانية بهذه الصورة واصابت محمولها
كانت له عزة وقوة.
‘Causa vero propter quam dicimus hanc figuram in forma crucis fiendam esse est quemadmodum 
diximus, scilicet quod omnia in suis viribus colligantur figuris ex sua qualitate existentibus, et 
fugiant a contrariis. Et nos querimus potencias spirituum planetarum ut sue figure coniungan-
tur, et non cognoscimus figuram spiritus nec ad ipsam attingere possumus experimento nisi per 
 figuram hominis, animalis vel alterius rei. Et ideo concluditur quod omnis virtus predictorum 
maxi me consistit in figuris. Idcirco, quia videmus omnes figuras et formas arborum et plantarum 
esse in suis figuris diversas necnon et figuras animalium et similiter minerarum, qua propter 
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objects in nature, drawing linear lines can describe the functional influential 
relations between objects and the form of a cross thus utterly encapsulates such 
relations.
 Ficino echoes the Picatrix, observing (3.18) that whereas some saw the circle 
as the fittest symbolic representation of the heavens, ‘the more ancient authori-
ties, as we have read in a certain “Arabic miscellany”, preferred above all other 
figures the cross’. He emphasises that ‘bodies apply their power as soon as it has 
diffused to a plane, and a primary plane is best marked out by a cross’. The cross, 
more than any other image, ‘possesses length and breadth and of all figures it 
possesses the highest degree of rectilinearity, and it has four right angles’. Since 
the effects of the celestials appeared most strongly ‘through the perpendicularity 
of rays and of right angles’, the stars are much more ‘potent when they occupy the 
sky’s four angles casting their rays upon each other to form a cross’. This was why 
‘the ancients said that the cross served as a receptacle for the strength of the stars; 
it therefore possessed the greatest power among images, receiving the forces and 
spirits of the planets’.48
 In De occulta philosophia Agrippa adopts a similar line. In one of the few 
places (2.23) in which he alludes to the Picatrix, the cross is presented as the uni-
versal figure of natural magic: ‘The Arabs confirmed that the figure of the cross 
has very great power, that it is the strongest of receptacles for celestial powers 
and intelligence’. He adds that the cross ‘is strengthened by the straightness of 
angles and rays; stars are most potent when they stand in the four corners of 
heaven and the projection of their rays forms a cross’.49
nullo modo cognoscere possumus proprie figuras ipsorum spirituum planetarum, ideo sapientes 
huius artis antique tamquam universalem figuram crucem elegerunt, et hoc propter quod omnia 
corpora apparent sua superficie et quia superficies figurarum habet longitudinem et latitudinem, 
et figura longitudinis et latitudinis proprie consistit in cruce. Idcirco hanc figuram tam quam 
universalem magis tram diximus in talibus operandi et tamquam receptricem virium spirituum 
planetarum eo quod aliqua figura non divertitur ab ea’. Magrīṭī 1986, book 3, chap. 5, 107.
48 ‘Postermi quidem imaginum auctores universam earum formam ad coelisimilitudinem ac-
cepere rotundam. Antiquiores autem, quemadmodum in quodam Arabum collegio legimus, 
figuram cruces conctis anteponebant, quia corpora per virtutem agunt ad superficiem iam dif-
fusam. Crucem ergo veteres figuram esse dicebant tum stellarum fortitudine factam, tum earun-
dem fortitudinis susceptaculum; ideoque habere summam in imaginibus potestatem, ac vires et 
spiritus suscipere planetarum’. Ficino 1989, book 3, chap. 18, 334.
49 ‘Figuram autem crucis Aegyptii atque Arabes summam potentiam habere confirmabant 
quodque sit omnium coelestium virium atque intelligentiarum firmissimum receptaculum, quia 
ipsa sit figura omnium rectissima, continens quatuor angulos rectos sitque prima superficiei 
 descriptio, habens longitudinem et latitudinem; dicebantque eam rectitudinem angulorum 
atque radiorum resultat; suntque stellae tunc maxime potentes, quando in figura coeli quantuor 
Traveling with the Picatrix: cultural liminalities of science and magic   1055
Since astronomers focused on the location of planets and on the structure of 
the universe, the mathematical language used to describe them ought to be geom-
etry, with the circle as its prime form. Despite this, Picatrix, Ficino, and Agrippa, 
as well as other thinkers working on natural magic, focused on the functioning of 
the heavenly bodies, the ways in which they linearly influence each others’ forces 
and rays. They thus claim that the proper mathematical language with to describe 
these bodies and forces ought to be a geometry of fractions of linear lines, with 
the cross as its prime form. 
Uniting the notions of the anima mundi, the centrality of the sun, and the 
role of the virtuoso through the form of the cross, which they made a universal 
and natural image, Picatrix, Ficino, and Agrippa offered a religious and politi-
cal symbol under which society could be organised. Thus, the readers of the Pic-
atrix went beyond philosophical discussions, laboring to legitimise the theory 
and practice of natural magic. Furthermore, they laid the foundations for a new 
discussion in which natural magic could serve as an ideological framework for 
bottom-up political and scientific utopias, centered around the symbols of the 
sun and the cross. Such societies had existed, they claimed, in the ancient East. 
4  Politicising magic: Campanella’s ‘Republic 
of supernal spirits’ 
Tommaso Campanella never explicitly mentions the Picatrix but his familiarity 
with it can be found in the book’s structure, places mentioned, and reference 
to particular ancient cultural practices. While Ficino lived at the center of the 
Renaissance circulation of texts, and Agrippa was a wandering ‘center of circu-
lation’, Campanella lived in a dungeon in Naples; how he came to read Picatrix 
remains a mystery. We have some indications that early in his life, before he was 
imprisoned, he practiced astrological magic, as is implied in Atheismus trium-
phatus (Atheism Conquered), which he wrote from 1606 to 1607. Moreover, since 
he alludes to the Picatrix in La città del Sole (The City of the Sun), which he wrote 
in 1601, it seems likely that Campanella encountered one of the circulating man-
uscripts of the text prior to his imprisonment in 1598, about a century after Ficino 
first mentioned it in print. 
obtinent cardines atque radiorum suorum in si invicem proiectione crucem constituunt’. Agrip-
pa von Nettesheim 1992, book 2, chap. 23, 319f. 
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Campanella was perhaps the last Renaissance intellectual who considered 
notions of natural magic in philosophical terms. He was surely aware of his 
historical position, reflected in his cautious attitude, and selectively mentions 
sources that fit with the religious and cultural circumstances of his time. An indi-
cation of why Campanella would not have been quick to unveil his debt to the 
Picatrix is found in the title of his work on astrology: Six Books of Astrological 
Matters, in Which Astrology, Purged of All the Superstitions of the Arabs and Jews, 
Is Treated Physiologically, in Accordance with the Holy Scriptures and the Doctrine 
of St. Thomas, Albert, and the Greatest Theologians; So That They May, without 
Suspicion of Evil, Be Read with Profit in the Church of God.50 To deflect a familiar 
Christian criticism of astrology, he proleptically attacked the very works on which 
he drew heavily. Campanella’s sources, he explained, would instead be Persian, 
Egyptian, and Babylonian. 
Although the Picatrix is not mentioned by name, its implied presence is 
detectable. In the first chapter of book 4, the Picatrix discusses the spirits of 
objects and their senses, stressing that ‘matter is divided into two parts, that is to 
say, the spiritual and the corporeal’,51 and that sensus mundi is substance equally 
distributed in all bodies, [something] distinct from matter’52; and finally that God 
‘planted it in those bodies’ but it is intangible, though physically manifest in the 
sun’s rays.53 In De sensu rerum et magia (On the Sense of Things and on Magic), 
which appeared in 1620, Campanella not only imitated the structure of the Pica-
trix but also reformulated its arguments, particularly those regarding the concept 
of sensus mundi – the intellect, soul, or spirit that resides in matter and is the 
prime cause of natural motion. Echoing the Picatrix, Campanella writes that the 
Arabs conceive of space as a godly entity sustaining all things. ‘Without contra-
dictions he lovingly receives all things, and nothing dies for him, but the body 
is dead in respect of it’. According to his Arab sources, natural bodies cannot 
be dead objects but are an extension of the being of God. ‘The attraction is the 
sense of space’, thus objects have senses that rely on the sensus mundi, namely 
the visible sun, to connect them to the anima mundi and to propagate and receive 
50 Campanella 1629. 
51 Magrīṭī 1933, book 4, chap. 1, 288. 
أن ألجوهر مع هذا ينقسيم قسمين روحاني وجسماني.
‘Sed materia dividitur in duas partes, videlicet in spiritualem et corporalem’. Magrīṭī 1986, book 
4, chap. 1, 175.
52 ‘est substancia equali pondere omnibus suis partibus, a materia remota’. Magrīṭī 1986, book 
4, chap. 1, 177.
53 ‘et plantavit earn in istis corporibus que sunt secundum lumen Solis, quod est ex eo qui per 
radios ipsa corpora attingit’. Magrīṭī 1986, book 4, chap. 1, 178. 
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spirits, forces, and other influences, which in turn transform matter and generate 
motion and rest.54 
But more than any other work, it is Campanella’s La città del sole (The City of 
the Sun), his scientific and political utopia, that bears the impress of the Picatrix. 
Here he mingles natural magic, talismanic art, experimental science, and heli-
ocentrism by way of cross-cultural exchanges. He sets the work on the mythical 
island of Taprobane in the Indian Ocean; there one can find ‘Adam’s footprint 
after his fall from grace’. The inhabitants, practitioners of natural magic, had 
‘come from India, flying from the sword of the magi’. The Solaris, as these people 
were called, followed Brahma and Pythagoras, and children were inculcated with 
a social ethic at a tender age, ensuring that the political order arose from the 
bottom up (Campanella 1995, 6f.).
This very idea occurs in the Picatrix. In a pendant to comments on the 
cross-cultural transmission of natural magic, the author mentions that from the 
ancient Chaldeans up to his own time and place people had described a utopian 
city of philosophers, a community of sun worshippers who employed talismans 
to guarantee political order. The Chaldean magi asserted that, ‘Hermes built, in 
the east of Egypt, a city twelve miles in length, in which he set a citadel that had 
four gates on its four sides. At the eastern gate he put the image of an eagle, at the 
western gate the image of a bull, at the southern gate the image of a lion, and at 
the northern gate he built the image of a dog’. The purpose of these images was 
to attract ‘certain spiritual essences’ that would act as gate keepers, ‘allowing no 
one to pass through the portals without their permission’. At the summit of the 
citadel, Hermes built a tower, which attained a height of thirty cubits, and on 
the summit of the tower he set a sphere, ‘the color of which changed with each 
of the seven days’. Around the city he placed diverse and changing images, by 
means of which the inhabitants were made ‘virtuous and freed from sin, wicked-
ness, and sloth’. The name of the city was Adocentyn (madīnat al-Ashmūnīn), and 
its people were ‘deeply learned in the ancient sciences, their profundities and 
secrets, and in particular in the science of astronomy’.55
54 ‘Ex quo Arabes quidam putarunt spatium esse Deum ipsum,quia omnes sustinet res, nullis 
contrariatur omnesque recipit benigne, nec unquam moriuntur illi, & perillud, sed hoc corpus & 
per modo respectu illius corporis mortuum est’. Campanella 1623, 25.
55 Magrīṭī 1933, book 4, chap. 3, 310. 
 وممن عن بهذا الشٲن جيل يسمون القبط وهم اعلم الناس قاطبة بهذا العلوم وهم الذين يقولون ان هرمس االول بنى بيت تماثيل يعرف
 بها مقادير النيل عند جبل القمر وعمل للشمس هناك هيكال وكان يختفى عن الناس فال يرونه وهو معهم, وهو الذى بنى المدينة الشرقية
 من مصر وكان طولها اثنى عشر ميال وجعل فيها حصنا له اربعة ابواب من جهاته االربع وصنع على الباب اشرقي صورة عقاب
 وعلى الباب الغربي صورة ثور وعلى الباب الشمالي صورة اسد وعلى الباب الجنوبي صورة كلب وأسكن فيها الروحانيات فكانت
 تنطق اذا قصدها القاصد وتسمع لها اصوات مفزعة فال يجسر احد على الدؔنو منها اال باذن الموؔكل بها وغرس فيها شجرة عظيمة
 تحمل كل صننف من الفاكهة وجعل في اعلى القصر منارا طوله ثالثون ذراعا وعلى رأسه قؔبة تتلؔون كل يوم بلون حتى تنقضى سبعة
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Adocentyn stood at the crossroads of a number of cultures, as does Cam-
panella’s utopian city. The parallels continue: Campanella describes the repub-
lican order of the City of the Sun as being constituted through the abstraction of 
the forces of nature into talismanic images. On the top of a civic dome, ‘nothing 
is seen over the altar but a large sphere, upon which the heavenly bodies are 
painted, and another globe upon which there is a representation of the earth’. 
The temple has ‘seven golden lamps always burning, and these bear the names 
of the seven planets.’56
The governing power of the sun and its centrality, and the cross as its geomet-
rical representation, led to the notion that the heavenly bodies are the natural 
republic, harmonically aligning the laws of nature with the laws of religion and 
society. The perfect earthly republic will, therefore, have to be organised along the 
same tenets. In the Picatrix such a political application of natural magic is clearly 
 ايام ثم تعود الى اللون االول وتكسو المدينة من ذلك اللون لوًنا جديًدا وجعل حول المانر ماًء كثيًرا ووؔلد فيه سمًكا وجعل حول المدينة
 طالسم ممن كل صنف تدفع عن اهلها المضاؔر وكانت تسمى مدينة الشمونين وهذا مذكور ايضاً في ‘اخبر مصر’ وهٶالء القوم اعنى
القبط ساكنون بمصر وهم العارفون باخبار البرابى ونقوشاتها وما اودع فيها من العلوم.
‘Sunt etenim magi qui in hac sciencia et opere se intromiserunt Caldei; hinamque in hac perfec-
tiores habentur sciencia. Ipsi vero asserunt quod Hermes primitus quandam domum ymaginum 
construxit ex quibus quantitatem Nili contra Montem Lune agnoscebat; hic autem domum fecit 
Solis. Et taliter ab hominibus se abscondebat quod nemo secum existens valebat eum videre. 
Iste vero fuit qui orientalem Egipti edificavit civitatem cuius longitude duodecim miliariorum 
consistebat, in qua quidem construxit castrum quod in quatuor eius partibus quatuor habebat 
portas. In porta vero orientis formam aquile posuit, in porta vero occidentis formam tauri, in me-
ridionali vero formam leonis, et in septentrionali canis formam construxit. In eas quidem spirit-
uales spiritus fecit intrare qui voces proiciendo loquebantur; nec aliquis ipsius portas valebat 
intrare nisi eorum mandato. Ibique quasdam arbores plantavit, in quarum medio magna con-
sistebat arbor que generacionem fructuum omnium apportabat. In summitate vero ipsius castri 
quondam turrim edificari fecit, que triginta cubitorum longitudinem attingebat, in cuius sum-
mitate pomum ordinavit rotundum, cuius color qualibet die usque ad septem dies mutabatur. In 
fine vero septem dierum priorem quem habuerat recipiebat colorem. IlIa autem civitas quotidie 
ipsius mali cooperiebatur colore, et sic civitas predicta qualibet die refulgebat colore. In turris 
quidem circuitu abundans erat aqua, in qua quidem plurima genera piscium permanebant. In 
circuitu vero civitatis ymagines divers as et quarumlibet manerierum ordinavit, quarum virtute 
virtuosi efficiebantur habitantes ibidem et a turpitudine malisque languoribus nitidi. Predicta 
vero civitas Adocentyn vocabatur. Hic autem in antiquorum scienciis, earum profunditatibus et 
secretis atque in astronomie sciencia erant edocti’. Magrīṭī 1986, book 4, chap. 3, 188f.
56 ‘Sopra l’altare non vi è altro ch’un mappa-mondo assai grande, dove tutto il cielo è dipinto, 
ed un altro dove è la terra. Poi sul cielo della cupola vi stanno tutte le stelle maggiori del cielo, 
notate coi nomi loro e virtù, c’hanno sopra le cose terrene, con tre versi per una; ci son I poli e I 
circoli signati non del tutto, perché manca il muro a basso, ma si vendono finiti corrispondenza 
alli globbi dell’altare. Vi sono sempre accese sette lampade nominate dalli sette pianeti’. Cam-
panella 1995, 3f. 
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in place. The text states, ‘The Nabatean sages have said that the power and works 
of the heavens and stars originate in the sun. . . . The fixed stars are the sun’s hand-
maidens; they serve, obey, and are humbled by him’.57 In Atheismus triumphatus, 
Campanella says of the sun: ‘It is endowed with a vivid and simple beauty; it is the 
nobler cause of lower things […] continually benefitting us by pouring out light, 
heat, and influences, generating, changing, producing all things; on account of 
all this the pagans could easily be led to think that it is a god’.58 He takes the idea 
a step further in La città del Sole, pointing out that the Solaris [just like the Naba-
teans] worship the Sun and in their morning prayer direct their prayers to the east, 
calling the Sun ‘our father in heaven’. Further, they ‘honour the Sun and the stars 
and conceive them as living bodies, icons of God and celestial temples; though, 
they do not worship the stars, but mostly the Sun. […] they worship God under 
the image of the Sun, which is the icon of God and his face and living image, from 
which comes light and heat to everything. And indeed, they built a temple designed 
like a lighthouse Sun, in which priests pray to God in the Sun and stars’.59 The 
City of the Sun functions as a republican polity that is ordered through talismanic 
symbols, magical worship, and education aimed at developing natural talents; 
57 Magrīṭī 1933, book 3, chap. 8, 229. 
 واما النبط فانها تزعم ان الفعل كله في العالم للشمس وحدها والكنهم لما علموا ان القمر معين لها على افعالها من غير حاجة منها اليه
 وال الى غيره وكذلك ايضا السبة المتحيرة فانها تتبع الشمس في الفعل اتباعا وتطيعها طوعا وتسجد لها وتسبح ليال ونهارا وهي الدهر
 داءمة في طاعتها ومستمرة في مرضاتها قوال وفعال واالفعال كلها للشمس وحدها عندهم وساءر السبعة مشاركة لها في بعض افعالها
وكذلك الكواكب الثابتة عبيد لها تسبحون ويسجدون لهم شركة في االفعال دون حاجة اليوم وجعلة صالتهم للشمس...
‘Neptinorum sapientes dixerunt quod potencie et opera celorum et stellarum sunt Solis simplic-
iter, et ideo quia vident et intelligunt quod Luna iuvat eum (hoc est, quantum in suis effectibus), 
non quod Sol indigeat ea nec aliis planetis; et similiter alii quinque planete sequuntur Solem in 
suis effectibus et obediunt et humiliantur eidem, et secundum disposiciones Solis in predictis 
effectibus procedunt. Et ideo omnes effectus sunt in Sole secundum eorum opinionem primitus 
radicati, ceteri vero sex planete iuvant eum in suis effectibus. Et similiter stelle fixe ancille sunt 
eidem, serviunt, obediunt et humiliantur ei, et in suis effectibus iuvant ipsum, non propter in-
digenciam quam habet ex eis. Et he gentes Soli hanc oracionem facere solebant’. Magrīṭī 1986, 
book 3, chap. 8, 138.
58 ‘Minore tandem reprebensione dignos deprehendi eos, qui adorant Sidera, Caelum & Solem: 
quonia m hac portiones Mundi se onstendunt, à corrupione distantes, & pulcheritudine vivida, 
simplicique donatae sunque nobiliores rerum interiorum causae, & in sublimi regione degunt, 
continuò beneficientes nobis, lucem essundendo, calorem , & influentias: generando, alterando 
Omnia que producendo: qua ob res magis movere possunt Gentes ad credendum quòd sint Dii’. 
Campanella 1631, 111.
59 ‘Onorano il sole e le stelle come cose viventi e statue di Dio e tempi celesti; ma non l’adorano, 
e più onorano il sole. Nulla creatura adorano di latria, altro che Dio, e però a lui serveno solo 
sotto l’insegna del sole, ch’è insegna e volto di Dio, da cui viene la luce e ‘lcalore ed ogni altra 
cosa. Però l’altrare è come un sole faro, e li sacerdoti pregano Dio nel sole e nelle stelle’. Cam-
panella 1995, 35f. 
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its structure mirrors that of the universe. This became an idée fixe for Campanella 
and in his other writings, such as Astrologia, he repeats that, ‘I certainly have the 
faith that the stars are a republic of supernal spirits’,60 echoing the Picatrix’s (2.10) 
description of the heavenly bodies as a celestial commonwealth centered around 
the sun. The talismanic form of the Sun, the Picatrix says, is a king,61 and just like 
a king it governs from the center its kingdom. The plants and the stars derive in the 
most efficient way their light, heat, motion and influences from the sun, making 
the celestial commonwealth a representation of perfect natural order. 
The City of the Sun, Campanella’s homage to the political practices of the 
East, is an attempt to revisit Adocentyn, a cultural alternative to scholastic 
Europe, a place where natural magic builds up rational, meritocratic, scientific, 
and state institutions.62 In a sense, Campanella follows the Picatrix’s  description 
of  Adocentyn, which Pico echoes in asserting that the Persian kings trained their 
60 ‘Firmissimè credo, quod & gentibus omnibus credibile videtur, teste Philone & Origene, sy-
dera esse Respub. Spirituum supernorum, cum in mundum corporcum ex mentali egrediantur. 
Nam activissima res est ignis lucidissima, sensitivissima, idcircò maximè conveniens spititibus 
potestate & sapientia decoratis’. Campanella 1638, III, XI, ix, i, 52.
61 Magrīṭī 1933, book 2, chap. 10, 108.
صورة الملك جالس على كرسي
‘Forma Solis secundum opinionem Picatricis est forma regis in cathedra sedentis et in eius capite 
coronam habentis, et formam corvi ante ipsum habentis et sub eius pedibus figuram Solis quam 
antediximus. Et hec est eius forma’. Magrīṭī 1986, book 2, chap. 10, 66.
62 It was not unheard of for Campanella to use Arabic sources. In his critique of Scholastic 
science, its culture and practices, and the geocentric ancient universe, he set his eyes on Eastern 
cultures, which he saw as the bearers of an alternative scheme of science and politics, even la-
tently guarding scriptural remnants of the ancient heliocentric cosmology. Noel Malcolm (2005) 
has argued that Campanella’s interest in the Near East and the Ottomans went beyond the use 
of foreign sources, stressing the East as the site of a philosophy, a practice, and a politics that 
emerged by natural magic. Luigi Amabile’s early reconstruction of the reasons for Campanel-
la’s imprisonment pointed out the connection between his political activity and his intellectual 
work in natural magic and in politics of apocalypse (see Amabile 1882, vol. 1, 226–28; vol. 3, doc. 
7, 15–17). The details of the conspiracy of which Campanella was accused are striking. In June 
1599, an Ottoman fleet commanded by Mūrat Reis was anchored near Reggio Calabria. Mūrat 
Reis was actually an Italian, originally Scipione Cicala, captured as a boy and recruited to the 
devshirme, the Ottoman institute for training captive boys as bureaucrats and soldiers. The now 
successful Mūrat Reis had stopped at Reggio Calabria merely to see his mother in Messina. But 
Campanella and his partners visited Mūrat Reis on his ship, urging him to invade Calabria so as 
to intensify the apocalyptic process, which, they hoped, would cause the pope to flee to a uto-
pian retreat called La città del sole. For Malcolm, the conspiracy shows that Campanella adopt-
ed from the Ottomans the political institutions that he later presented in his scientific-political 
 utopia. See Malcolm 2005, 41–67. On the conspiracy and its relation to Campanella’s thought, 
see Ernst 2010, 67–85. 
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sons in natural magic so that they could ‘know how to rule according to the 
dogma of the world republic’.
5  Conclusion
For Renaissance thinkers unfriendly to the establishment, natural magic offered 
an alternative program for the philosophy of nature. Moreover, these rebels 
presented natural magic as a scientific practice, a culture deeply grounded in 
non-European contexts. For Ficino and Pico, natural magic originated in the 
ancient Near East and was brought to Renaissance Europe through cross-cultural 
exchanges that involved Kabalistic texts and Arabic works on magic. For Agrippa, 
natural magic carried a new program for science, as well as new practices and 
new personas. For him, the magus – the new experimental naturalist – was a 
figure that first came to life in the ancient East. For Campanella, natural magic 
offered a bottom-up construction of natural philosophy that also entailed a new 
organisation of society, in which reason and firsthand experience order both 
nature and society. In imagining this alternative, they eventually returned their 
science to its historical point of origin, the East. Ficino, Agrippa, and, in a sense, 
Campanella, pushed the argument further, laying a foundation for a heliocentric 
worldview, initiating the search for the hidden forces of nature, and casting the 
virtuoso magician as the godfather of natural philosophy. 
The explicit and implicit presence of the Picatrix in the writing of these key 
figures indicates that the text played a central role in stirring discussions that 
aimed at turning natural magic into philosophy of nature, transforming the 
magus into an experimentalist, and converting the practice of natural magic into 
an institutional system of education. 
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Singular individuals, conflicting authorities: 
Annie Besant and Mohandas Gandhi
The pluralisation of authority in late 19th /early 20th century colonial India as 
it was asserted, appropriated, redistributed, reformulated or challenged from 
below generated conflicting sources of validation – divine, sovereign, patriarchal, 
knowledge-based. The complexity of this background complicates understand-
ings of the national provenance of religions, as well as of the social, political and 
ideological semiotics that surround the inclination to faith and position it within 
comparative frameworks. As I have said elsewhere, ‘What came to be described 
as legitimated European knowledges were hybrid formations that enfolded and 
systematised “other” knowledges, other hierarchies. [Indian] “local” knowledge 
transformed into European knowledge often travelled back into indigenist claims, 
and performed different functions in European and Indian locales’ (Sangari 1999, 
xxxiv). The internationalisation of anti-imperialist and anticolonial sentiments 
not only mediated indigenist claims but created new non-national circuits of soli-
darity and identity that could amplify the boundaries of a self. A tension between 
received, recrafted and experiential knowledge, between freely chosen affili-
ations and determining structures, between authorities and individualisation 
inhered in colonial and metropolitan circulations and interactions.
At this historical conjuncture, the discursive imbrication of divine, sover-
eign, and patriarchal power, the intertwined conceptions of the religious, politi-
cal, social, biological, and domestic in Britain and India make isolating religious 
individualisation problematic. As is now evident, what were named the national 
culture of England and civilizational heritage of India were jointly shaped through 
the institutional apparatus of colonialism and the circulation of colonial and met-
ropolitan actors and/or ideas in ways that cannot be captured in insular vocabu-
laries of autochthonous religions, unified regions or homogenous nations. Annie 
Besant’s discovery of an ancient ‘Hinduism’ and Mohandas Gandhi’s initial refor-
mulation of ‘his’ Hinduism and Indianness in Britain are in fact signs of a Britain 
transformed and permeated by empire. What is more, Hinduism, newly defined 
as a single religion, and Theosophy, a new religion that drew on Buddhism and 
Hinduism, were in the making across national boundaries.
Hinduism was a construction zone through the 19th century with several 
competing builders – missionary, colonial, orientalist, Indian reformist and 
antireformist individuals and organisations – none of these had a monopoly yet 
many recycled the same prefabricated bricks in pursuit of their goals.  Theosophy 
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too devised a pedagogic and occult version of Hinduism. In these religions in 
the making, individualisation could take place through and against an array of 
authorities – affirming some and critiquing others, and thus simultaneously sig-
nifying voices that were normative and resistant, conservative and dissenting, 
unoriginal and innovative. Individualisation appears to be constellative, con-
junctural, and a shifting process (see Fuchs 2015, 15).
Annie Besant could be characterised as a transnational actor who made India 
her base, adopted Theosophy and Hinduism, deviated from social and familial 
norms before and after her conversion as well as embraced the ‘other’ via an 
aggrandised ancient Hinduism. Mohandas Gandhi was a transnational actor 
whose early conception of Hinduism crystallised in his student years in London 
and expatriate decades in South Africa. Gandhi evolved into a nationalist and 
world-historical figure, and through his innovative practices later rejected Hindu-
ism as a boundary-marker. Both crossed cultural boundaries experientially and 
displayed a remarkable personal openness to syncretic spirituality that did not 
synchronise with their gendered religio-civilisational imaginaries of ancient India.
This essay does not systematically address their prolific writing, multiple 
public personae and changing political positions and nor does it map personal 
interactions and differences – only some aspects are pertinent here. Both spent 
formative years in London – a metropolitan zone of accumulation, display, dis-
semination and translation of ‘knowledge’ as well as a milieu that often threw up 
vexed combinations of imperialist hierarchies, heterodox dissent and anticolo-
nial or anti-imperialist sentiments. India inhabited the Anglo-European archive 
and the public sphere. Britain brimmed with imperial propaganda, discus-
sion, and representation of colonial rule in political and parliamentary debates 
while reformist debates on child marriage and the age of consent took place 
simultaneously in India and Britain. At the same time, a largely middle-class 
non- conforming fringe was engaged in comparative and critical evaluations of 
religions including Christianity as well as critiques of British colonisation and 
patriarchal marriage practices. Within this, there were several overlaps, affini-
ties or intersections between late Victorian heterodoxy and radicalism, often 
utopian and anticolonial, as well as ‘easily transferable sympathies’ between 
some Utopian Socialists, Fabians, Secularists, Theosophists and other occult-
ists, Vegetarians, Humanitarians, Irish nationalists, feminists, suffragettes and 
spiritualists (Anderson 1994, 566; Jayawardena 1995, 107–10, 113–4; Veer 2001, 
59–65; L. Gandhi 2006, 77–80, 121–25, 177; Miller 2009, 244, 249; Beaumont 2010, 
223–25; Miller 2013, 255–56; Malinar 2018). The Victorian entanglement of the 
social and spiritual, often infused with Orientalism and ‘eastern’ religions, could 
bifurcate into progressive and traditional positions on the ‘woman question’ or 
combine them in a ‘spiritualized feminism’ (Owen 2004, 26–27, 87–88). What is 
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more, liberal dissent at home by the British did not always preclude support of 
British imperialism (Viswanathan 1998, 185–87; L. Gandhi 2014, 7–9). With some 
exceptions, London’s liberal, socialist, Fabian and radical anticapitalist dissi-
dents mostly subscribed to racial hierarchy filtered through evolutionary theory 
(see Viswanathan 1998, 196; Schneer 2001, 164–71). Indeed, a racialised concept 
of cultural exceptionalism, which matched the racialisation it sought to resist, 
entered some Indian political demands for self-government. 
Besant outgrew Anglican Christianity, traversed a critical constellation of 
atheism, an individualist Secularism that rejected Christian doctrine, Socialist 
activism, feminist struggles for women’s individual rights to birth control, prop-
erty and suffrage, demands for trade union protection as well as Home Rule for 
the Irish. Most of her former political ties and several friendships dissolved after 
adopting Theosophy. Gandhi interacted with a similar radical fringe in London – 
Socialists, esoteric Christians, Theosophists, Vegetarians, Union of Ethical Soci-
eties, liberals, suffragettes, anti-imperialists, and had feminist, socialist, pacifist 
and Theosophist interlocutors in South Africa. He moved from an admiring to 
an uneasy then critical relation to Theosophists and their occult predilections 
as well as Besant who he first met in London just after her conversion. Besant 
disengaged from her earlier activism and re-entered serious political activity two 
decades after she came to India in 1893. Gandhi’s stake was already high when 
he wrote Hind Swaraj on a return voyage from Britain to South Africa. Although 
Gandhi was still a loyalist and Home Rule was the political horizon for him, 
Besant and other nationalists, he was developing a scalar and synchronic view 
of the intersecting materiality and contradictions of labour and capitalism in 
three countries, each in the grip of dislocating transitions and labour struggles. 
Through the experience of official discrimination, imprisonment, racist physical 
violence and proto-apartheid, and as witness to the brutal formation of a united 
white ruling class and a unified nation in South Africa after the Anglo-Boer war, 
his views on race had become self-contradictory, yet his campaigns maintained 
a studied distance from native Africans (Hunt 1993, 52; Habib 2011, 3–6; Lelyveld 
2012, 59–60; Desai and Vahed 2016, 42–44, 122–23).1 Initially, South Africa was a 
site of Indian cultural self-differentiation. 
This essay sketches an ensemble of colonial reformism, indigenism, civilisa-
tional moralism, rights claims as well as antimodern disclaimers filtered through 
anticolonial and nationalist projects that pushes against the individualisation 
1 Gandhi campaigned for licenses, rights to mobility and property for migrant Indian traders, 
and later against taxes on indentured workers; his prejudices too began to change. See Habib 
2011, 3–4; Natarajan 2013, 73–78, 83, 91, 102; Skaria 2016, 40–41, 49–51.
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of women in Besant’s Hindu Ideals (1904) and Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj (1909) as 
well as in some early speeches and writing from the 1910s and 1920s. These texts 
display startling connections and converging currents as they respond compara-
tively to colonial England and India. Besant contrasts a materialist, contractual, 
individualist ‘west’ with a unified Hinduism committed to a non-contractual 
regime, sees varna (the fourfold caste order) as stabilising social functions and 
Hindu women as repositories of dharma/duty and tradition. Gandhi seems to 
make a starker civilisational opposition between east and west. Yet, both seek 
to align notions of a premodern and an antimodern in their definition of rights 
and duties; both bundle prescriptive, religious and civilisational imaginaries 
into the concept of marriage; and both elaborate altruism as an agential model 
which spans the religious, social and political. Gandhi’s notable differences from 
Besant in these years are in the multiple inflections of dharma, rights and duty, 
an ascetic model of womanhood and marriage embedded in a nationalist project, 
and a multi- religious concept of the nation which inaugurates his later commit-
ment to a supradenominational religious axis.
Despite the selective diversity of Besant’s and Gandhi’s historical repertoires 
and intense personalisation of their religious choices, self-making practices, and 
transnational combinatoires in earlier and later decades, these texts and imag-
inaries are implicated in the same Indian reformist and transnational Oriental-
ist and Indological circuits that relied on textually predetermined and formulaic 
knowledge. Hindu or Indian women, a typified collective, are positioned in a 
prescriptive and repressive enclosure in which normative marriage becomes the 
site of deindividualisation. For Besant and Gandhi, marriage as a regulatory insti-
tution, and the women within it are seen as indispensable for the very survival 
of religion. In this curious inversion, that rebounds on the social and religious 
individualisation of women, it is not religion that protects marriage but women 
who protect religion. 
The gaps between Besant and Gandhi’s practice and prescription (to which 
I will return in conclusion) are significant. Even as both Britain and India are 
becoming ‘modern’, caste, rebirth, duty, dharma and Indian/Hindu womanhood 
are posited as antidotes to ‘western’ individualism. Paradoxically, Besant’s and 
Gandhi’s own individualisation as social and political actors seems to rest on its 
historical antagonist: a caste-based patriarchal order. The elevation of woman-
hood and the attraction for upper-caste regulatory marriage override the tenor 
of their personal disaffections. Besant separated from an oppressive husband 
who believed in ‘a husband’s authority and a wife’s submission’ (1908, 81), and 
though she did not reject the institution, she had demanded reform of marriage 
laws and protested the absence of financial, legal and social rights for married 
women (Owen 2004, 95; Blyth 2009, 122–23, 129). Gandhi carried the resentment 
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and guilt of a teenage marriage, had spent very few years in the same household 
as his wife, and, between 1906 and 1909, took a vow of celibacy, turning towards 
anticapitalism, civil disobedience, and inner spiritual self-reform (satyagraha). 
1 Framing the antimodern
European Enlightenment can be read as an abstract set of egalitarian values with 
emancipatory potentials that questioned old hierarchies and were appropriated 
and radicalised outside Europe as much as inside it to mobilise universal rights in 
colonial conditions. Alternately, it can be read as a comparative and contrastive 
project of European self-differentiation that incorporated the ‘discovered’ and 
conquered world into European knowledge systems, a project that was textual 
from its inception, drew on travelogues, novels and missionary accounts, and 
continued to play a shaping role in the late 19th and early 20th century (Conrad 
2012, 1009–15; Hulme and Jordanova 1990, 7–8, 12). The contrastive aspect was 
selectively incorporated as an ideology of capitalism, which was threatened by 
the political concretisation of egalitarian potentials, and normative hierarchies 
were devised to justify class, racial and colonial domination (Sangari 1999, xxxv). 
Whether the counterpoints to forms of Enlightenment universalism are attrib-
uted to the ascent of notions of racial/civilisational superiority and evolutionary 
theory (Veer 2001, 40; Conrad 2012, 1019–20), or seen as a global partitioning 
of its radical strands (Stoler 2016, 234–35), or understood as a part of its open 
‘dialectical history of proliferation and blockage’, Enlightenment ideals were not 
universalised in Europe and even less so in the colonies (Sangari 1999, xxxv). 
In 19th century Europe, romantic organicism and evolutionary theory were the 
currencies of denial. In the former, ‘the figure of woman serve[d] as a recurring 
cipher of the premodern within modernity itself’, while models of evolution usually 
relegated women and people of colour to an archaic or atemporal zone outside the 
path of historical development and placed them lower on the evolutionary chain 
(Felski 1995, 40, 55–56, 148). In significant social domains colonial rule took place, 
ideologically and strategically, under the insignia of anti-Enlightenment tenden-
cies, and was accompanied by assumptions that most Enlightenment ideals could 
not or must not be imitated, applied, or implemented in India.2 Further, colonisa-
tion shaped a reformist syntax in which forms of liberal universalism were uneasily 
2 John Stuart Mill enunciated the ‘principles of exclusion’ from liberty for ‘backward states of 
society’, and saw ‘despotism [as] a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians’ 
until their ‘improvement’ was achieved (On Liberty 1859, in Veer 2001, 17). 
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entangled with indigenist invocations of patriarchal practices and Hindu women 
as governed by religious belief; this became part of a compliant, shared, yet reac-
tive antimodern vocabulary by the end of the 19th century. 
The common emphasis on Besant’s vaunted cross-cultural hybridity and 
Gandhi’s so-called invocation of premodern solidarities or loyalties for nation-
alist mobilisation thus may obscure a wider problematic in which they were 
enmeshed, namely, the centrality and historical significance of the premod-
ern and antimodern in the gendered configurations of religion and modernity. 
Modernity, as I see it, is not about linear progress or sudden ruptures but is rather 
a question of specific regional and transnational configurations with ideological 
valences and political locations. A conjunctural and shifting temporal marker, 
the term modernity could encode self-transforming individualisation, subver-
sively egalitarian ideas of collectivity and self-determination as well as contras-
tive patriarchal/imperial discourses of domination. Inherently comparative, 
‘modernity’ was established in relation to that which is not, less or too modern, 
i.e., as absence and excess.
If, following Jameson, modernity is also understood as ‘a narrative category’ 
(2002, 94), then the premodern and antimodern could be seen as contrastive 
figures of self-differentiation which refer, inconsistently, to the extinct, the resid-
ual or the coeval. The very naming of a ‘premodern’ was and remains an ideo-
logical exercise. After over a century of colonisation it would be problematic to 
simply identify all extant religious and patriarchal practices in India as premod-
ern since some could be continuations from and before the 18th century while 
others entered different registers or were recast by state policies, laws, and labour 
markets in a colonial economy. Which features of social life were to be subsumed 
under the category of the premodern? What was to be selected as representa-
tive of a (desirable) premodern from a vast jumble of unchanged and changing 
patriarchal, religious, caste and other social practices in order to assemble an 
antimodern that could challenge western modernity? Since many definitions of a 
premodern were themselves made from an antimodern standpoint, the antimod-
ern became – both formally and substantively – a pre-eminently modern staging 
of the premodern. Against the mystifications of a triumphal capitalist story of 
progress that obscured the simultaneous emergence of new predatory forms of 
domination and exploitation, the antimodern unease with capitalism could come 
armed with another set of mystifications – an ascriptive, moralistic discourse of 
cultural differentiation.
Since the antimodern was contextual, multi-sited and striated by its double 
lineage in Enlightenment ideals and collaborative indigenisms, it became a discur-
sive space prone to pre-emptive resolutions and invaded by contradictions. Colo-
nialism could be resisted in the name of universalism and particularist  hierarchies 
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could be (re)instated in the interests of self-differentiation. In critiques of the 
effects of capitalist expansion, the exploitation of labour and legal discrimination, 
Enlightenment ideals could be invoked in the claim to rights as ‘British’ subjects, 
but the ground of eligibility for rights could be sought in civilisational and gen-
dered hierarchies which undermined universalism, foreclosed class struggle and 
feminist disturbance. A political modernity sought on the basis of an imagined 
ancient past and/or extant premodern ideas/practices of entitlement created 
sharp tensions between the theoretical universalism of rights and entitlement on 
civilisational grounds – which had gendered, casteist, and racial implications.
The discord between emancipatory Enlightenment universals and caste/
racial/civilisational differences was negotiated in several registers. In conserv-
ative colonial and indigenist patriarchal anti-western scripts, the antimodern 
could serve as an ideology of restraint for the colonised. At the same time, inter-
rogation and contention catalysed by the disparity between Enlightenment ideals 
and the vivid denial of rights, the violent formation of colonial states and eco-
nomic realities of imperialism could simultaneously reproduce and destabilise 
antimodern positions. Left and socialist critiques of capitalism and imperialism 
could also intersect with antimodern positions insofar as the term modernity was 
a synonym for the effects of the ongoing transitions to capitalism. Other affinities 
with socialism lay in the search for alternative lifestyles that could synchronise 
with a largely agrarian subcontinent and/or with communitarian alternatives to 
bourgeois or ‘western’ individualism.
The simultaneous production of a contrastive modernity and disaffection 
with the modern brought dissenters in the metropolis and colony into a pecu-
liar proximity, and co-constituted a transnational arena across India and Britain. 
What were the registers of the antimodern and the qualities of the synthesis and 
antithesis of east and west in Besant’s and Gandhi’s writing in the early 20th 
century? The antimodern, with its distinct lineages, and unreconciled  invocations 
of hegemonic and counterhegemonic authorities produced singular combina-
tions and suggests an entry into how its proponents could have intensely agential 
and individualised religious repertoires, and, in self-contradictory fashion, also 
deindividualise others.  
2 Annie Besant’s project
Like the colonial state, several nationalist projects in India sought to appropriate 
the moral authority of altruism, reform and regeneration in order to legitimate 
self-government. Further, the quasi-orientalist diagnosis of India – as repository 
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of usable ‘feudal’ modes and as subject of reform, religion and patriarchy as the 
most ancient and organising principles of Hindu society, religion as providing 
a compensatory area of ‘autonomy’, the true enlightenment of Indians lying in 
their own past traditions, and the special spirituality of women (read special 
powers for submitting to subjection) – structured such nationalist projects from 
the late 19th century. In this respect neither Besant nor Gandhi were original. The 
decline-and-rejuvenation narrative, an effect of textual transmission, was a settled 
authority supported by a spiritual east/materialist west binary that appeared in 
reformist tracts and print media; it paraded patriarchal features as marks of dis-
tinction from other religions/cultures, invoked an ancient golden age  – Hindu, 
Vedic or Indian – that turned a zone of colonial extraction into a site for the pro-
duction of symbolic value (Sangari 1999, xviii, xxix; Veer 2001, 49–50, 144).
Annie Besant purveys this old diagnosis through a personal ‘rediscovery’ of 
‘Hindu’ antiquity and adds a parallel narrative of the decline of British aristoc-
racy that played on contemporary fears of evolutionary regression. Some strands 
of Theosophy were formed at the crossroads of Indology, European Romanti-
cism and Orientalism – which had in common the production of self- confirming 
knowledge – and combined the aggrandisement of Hindu or Aryan antiquity 
with certain Euro-American occultisms. In this syncretic, circulating and rapidly 
transnationalised religion, the idea of a universal brotherhood became more 
attractive because it could include women. A religion without a god and human 
yet spectral Masters (the ‘Mahatmas’ – native spiritual adepts), it rejected ortho-
dox Christianity, looked to the east for spiritual guidance and had its own roster 
of ‘native’ interlocutors.3 Yet it saw itself as modern through the claim to science 
(Owen 2004, 34–35), and proposed a spiritually progressive evolutionism which 
made religion amenable to the laws of science. Through Theosophy, Besant chan-
nelled revitalising discourses and indigenist characterisations of Hinduism and 
upper-caste patriarchy into a more comparative and antimodern vocabulary – 
a vocabulary that aggrandised a regimen of dharma, community, altruism and 
duty as opposed to the modern emphasis on rights, the individual, self-interest 
and the law.
Hindu Ideals (1904), composed from notes of lectures delivered at the Central 
Hindu College, Benares, addressed young Hindu male students and belongs to a 
transitional period, before Besant joined the Indian National Congress, in which 
she was immersed in occultism and busy smoothing the  scandalous frauds and 
3 Besant saw the promotion of the study of Aryan and other eastern literatures, religions and 
sciences as tenets of Theosophy (Beaumont 2010, 226). At this time, the study of oriental faiths 
was also seen to break down ‘the exclusive pretensions of Christian dogma’ (J. M. Wheeler, 
‘Hindu “Song celestial”’, Our Corner, January 1886, in Miller 2013, 24).
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lawsuits left behind by Madame Blavatsky. In these lectures, she brahminised 
Theosophy and aligned it with a conservative antiwesternism and a notion of 
reluctant reform that was at once covertly assimilationist and blatantly reviv-
alist.4 And the appeal of her ensemble lay precisely in this combination. She 
critiqued the ‘west’, concretised the prospect of cultural superiority and offered 
colonial indigenism as ‘recognised’, ratified and approved by western science 
and scholarship, extending the type of legitimation earlier offered by Max Müller 
into a politically programmatic notion of Hinduism.5 Like Müller, she endowed 
ancient Hinduism with a unified metaphysic and a tutelary, inspirational role 
vis a vis the west. Hindu Ideals also rehearsed the enabling dichotomy in the 
colonial semantics of non-interference: ancient Hinduism had survived in its 
‘distinctive polity’, in the still-preserved injunctions of rishis, in its women and 
caste order, but it had also degenerated, needed succour and preservation by 
non-interventionist rulers (Besant 1904, 141, 143, 154–55).6 Further, Hindus were 
provided with the possibility of a synthesis of ‘east’ and ‘west’ through selec-
tive assimilation (ibid. 3–4) that could pose as a restoration of ancient Hindu 
glory – that is, a type of modernity that could be coded as a mere return to native 
‘wisdom’, and a type of synthesis by which they could be modern, that is, as 
regenerated Hindus, but could simultaneously denounce modernity. In short, 
they could have it both ways.
In a schema analogous to J. G. Herder’s romantic restorative ensemble 
in which each society was an irreducible, unique totality with a national soul 
and spirit, and the nationalist simply spoke for that spirit, Besant characterised 
‘Ideals’ as nationally distinct ‘essentials’ rooted in the nature of a people (ibid. 
5–10). However, in a peculiarly Theosophical twist, she gave a transnational itin-
erary to the soul and orchestrated the cycle of rebirth in relation to ‘individual’ 
national identities.
4 This section draws on Sangari 2004. Besant later represented the Theosophical Society as 
third in the great movements for the revival of religion in India after the Brahmo Samaj and 
the Arya Samaj with each marking ‘successive developments of the national self-consciousness’ 
(1925, 26, 32).
5 For Müller, who never visited the country, India supplied the ‘missing links’ in Europe’s ‘in-
tellectual ancestry’: ‘We all come from the East – all that we value most has come from the East, 
and in going to the East […] [a European] ought to feel that he is going to his “old home”, full of 
memories’ (1882, 6–7). 
6 Besant instructed the British that they ‘must learn to rule [India] according to its traditions’ 
(Theosophy and Imperialism 1902, in Anderson 1994, 568) which, ironically, synchronised with 
Britain’s paternalist phases of selective ‘non-interference’ in ‘native’ customs and religions in the 
presidencies under direct rule in 19th century India. On these phases, see Sangari 1999: xxvi, 105, 
188–89; Veer 2001, 21, 113.
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Nations embodied special characteristics, and the Jivas – the souls which are ready to 
develop these characteristics are guided by karma to take birth in those nations. These char-
acteristics will find their place in the Ideals of those nations.  (Besant 1904, 10)
Karma is a causal force for nations while reincarnation is a site for typification. 
The grouping of souls of one kind has significant implications for the caste order, 
marriage, and contraception (to which I will return).
Besant’s diagrammatic construction of west and east, in practice only Britain 
and India, instituted a discourse of rights versus duties that sought to displace 
historical comparativism by a differentialist discourse of civilisational moralism. 
The modern west nurtured ‘the lower mind […] dealing with concrete objects, the 
reasoning, questioning, scientific mind’; it had formulated the free, self- reliant, 
solitary individual bearing rights locked in a (Rousseauvian) social contract for 
the protection of these rights into a powerful ‘Ideal’ of liberty and individual 
strength (ibid. 11–15). This ideal, assisted by a Christian religion ‘given to help the 
western evolution’, in turn spawned a host of (imitable) virtues: social service to 
the needy, charitable institutions, the public spirit of citizenship and patriotism, 
personal and social qualities ranging from self-respect to justice as well as martial 
virtues such as will, valour and energy – all of which had enabled England to 
colonise the world (ibid. 15–17)! Though Besant may not have intended this, the 
profile that emerges is of a Christianity allied to British nationalism and commit-
ted to producing disciplined citizens for an imperial state. 
The Indian ‘Ideal’, ‘embodied in one word, Dharma, Duty’, flowed out of a 
religion that taught ‘Unity of Existence’ and a plan of society formulated by the 
rishis: it envisaged each person as embedded in an interdependent social order, 
born into obligations rather than freedom, upheld integration and ‘the orderly 
distribution of social functions’ through varnashram dharma – the different 
duties prescribed for each of the four castes (ibid. 18–20). While the western ideal 
stemmed from its history of industrialisation, the Indian ideal of the ‘Man Dutiful’ 
typically emerged from ancient religion and was the exact obverse of individual-
ism. However, rights (constellated with western individualism, aggression and 
separatism) are said to be no different from duties (constellated with dharma, 
peace, unity), because ‘each man obtains his rights when all around him dis-
charge their several duties’ (ibid. 20). The implication is paradoxical: the stand-
point of rights is morally inferior to that of duties but duties encompass rights 
anyway, and in this Indian antiquity is modern and supersedes the modern. 
In this non-contractual regime where duties double as rights, the absence of 
social contract not only characterises the relation of the individual to the state 
but covers all social relations and becomes, curiously, the foundation of obedi-
ent citizenship, state power, domestic and caste stability. Ethics proceed from 
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the  individual in the Christian west and from the transpersonal realm of ‘social 
Dharma’ in India, a dharma which is in accord with varna: thus ‘the dharma of the 
shudra was to serve’ (ibid. 20). The virtues that spring from the ‘Ideal of Dharma’ 
are based on ‘a sense of obligation’, which is to be discharged even if there is 
no reciprocity; wrong must be met with right even when the other party (king, 
husband, wife or son) is unworthy (ibid. 20–1, 23–24). In this non- retaliatory, 
non-western stance, lay the ‘safety’ of individual karma, the family and the state 
(ibid. 23–24). 
Dharma thus appears, paradoxically, to be a premodern version of social 
contract that creates non-contractual social relations and frees India from the 
dangers raised by modern iterations of social contracts in the west. This was, 
in fact, to become a cardinal tenet of antimodernity which carried not only 
guarantees for the state but also profound patriarchal assurances. Besant drew 
on  multiple legacies. She leaned on the deist, moderate tendencies within the 
Enlightenment which either sought to make it compatible with Christianity or 
were nervous about discarding religion as a guarantor of social stability as well 
as on conservative reactions to the Enlightenment (see Jacob 1981, 84, 263; Collier 
1990, 93). By the end of the 19th century, the discourse of duty had been assimi-
lated into a conservative bourgeois moralism impelled by unsuppressible fears of 
universal enfranchisement in Britain and in the colonies. Further, Besant’s exten-
sion of duties to cover rights – rights that could not be claimed but only given to 
the other through the performance of one’s duty (Besant 1904, 20) – and the char-
acterisation of domestic relations as a privileged non-contractual site promised 
to safeguard patriarchies and suggests two overlapping rationales. These may 
have trickled down from the classic patriarchalism of European political theory 
(such as Robert Filmer’s defense of patriarchal authority) which argued explic-
itly for a natural hierarchy of inequality. They may all have been gleaned from 
new theories of social contract which tacitly upheld patriarchal categories by 
placing the private-domestic domain outside the public-political and contractual 
realm. As Pateman shows, the social contract remained sexually ascriptive: social 
contract theorists saw men as civil equals but still represented the subjection of 
women as natural by defining women and the private domain in particularist 
ways (1988, 102, 104–07, 112–13). Besant’s address too, in assuring male privilege, 
pushed against the individualisation of women and feminist attempts, including 
her own, to renegotiate this social contract through suffrage, married women’s 
rights to property and better divorce laws. However, the address to Hindu men 
is double-edged since the description of all eastern social relations (and not 
those centred on women and the family alone) as bound by primordial obliga-
tions, threatens, ironically, to renew a Eurocentric and generalised feminisation 
of the east along the line of the internal fracture in the Enlightenment which 
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had  partitioned its egalitarian promise by excluding women.7 The spatial split 
between individual rights and social duties not only played into an imperial car-
tography of west and east but tended to undermine Besant’s own earlier empha-
sis on the fact that obligations were an integral strand in the modern European 
discourse of citizenship and rights carried moral imperatives as well as implied 
correlative duties for individuals and citizens.8
In her description of contemporary changes, Besant tried to circumvent such 
a spatial split by reconnecting eastern duties and western rights; however, she 
could only do this by invoking different principles – that of a synthetic restoration 
of antiquity in the east and that of intelligent modernisation in the west. Whereas 
selflessness derived from dharma tends to dissolve the individual into the social 
body, the selflessness derived from a Christian or humanitarian ethic transcends 
the individual. The west was now approximating the east since ‘modern scientific 
thought’ and the discoveries of evolution had dispensed with the idea of society 
as ‘an artificial contract’; it had learnt to recognise the essential organic unity of 
humanity and ‘a sense of community’ had given birth to ‘Altruism’ (Besant 1904, 
25). This altruism, a triumph over selfish individualism, had led to ‘co-operation 
instead of competition’, the growth of ‘public duty’ and ‘conscience’, provided the 
poor with protection, social security, free education and services that limited their 
oppression (ibid. 26). Altruism or the ‘Ideal of Duty’ now stood higher than rights 
in the west. Unfortunately, because of ‘the decay of spirituality’, India was moving 
in the opposite direction: the ‘Ideal of Duty’ which once comprised the essential 
‘Dharma’ of India had declined, the ‘field of duty’ had contracted to the familial 
(ibid. 27). Unlike the west, where they emerged from the individual who embodies 
rights, the wellspring of public duty and national unity in the east happened to be 
spirituality, it followed then that reviving spirituality would revive these as well.
While Besant’s version thus retains some 19th century functions of altruism 
and philanthropy – as legitimising ideologies of the dominant classes in England 
and the colonial state in India as well as euphemisms for imperial expansion in 
general,9 it carries some materialist concerns from her socialist past. Prior to the 
7 Though women were excluded in Enlightenment thought (Landes 1988, 204), the French Rev-
olution was a key point of reference for feminists who saw themselves as ‘retrieving the radical 
kernel within the Enlightenment project’ (Felski 1995, 166).  
8 Discussing these aspects of citizenship, Freeman notes that the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen in 1789 emphasised legal and inalienable, but not absolute, rights of in-
dividuals and closely associated these with duties of citizens/members of ‘a social body’ and 
obedience to the law (Freeman 1990, 172, 176, 178). 
9 Altruism and philanthropy structured the entry of British middle-class women into the public 
domain in England and its colonies and, conditionally, offered a position of imperial dominance 
while meliorative charity was implicated in managing class antagonisms in Victorian England 
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adoption of Theosophy, Besant had protested the exploitation of tenant farmers 
and labourers, organised trade unions and strikes, exposed the self-serving 
hypocrisy of Christian charity (1908, 304–05), and envisaged an evolutionary 
schema in which societies ascended from industrialisation to a non-competitive 
socialism (see Besterman 1934, 110–14, 116–18, 124–26). Now, however, altruism 
presents itself almost as an achieved socialism that also renders redundant Social-
ist agendas in Britain.10 While altruism fills the deficits of modernity in the west, it 
signifies the antimodern in India, acquires the power to chasten the modernity of 
the west and bring it nearer to the eastern ideal by joining rights with duties. Anti-
modernity becomes the vector of western self-reform qua ‘easternisation’ and such 
an easternised west becomes more fit to govern both its own class society and its 
colonies. She offers antimodernity to the west as an improved ideology of imperial 
expansion and as a renewed rationale for non-interference in Indian religions.
In a second and equally interesting move, antimodernity becomes the ideo-
logical correlate of India’s passage to modernity with altruism functioning once 
again as a friendly conduit. The west approximates the ancient east through the 
discoveries of science, that is, through its very modernity. Antimodernity is thus 
a natural product of the expansive historical logic of western society and science. 
However, the east becomes like the contemporary west through rediscovery and 
restoration of its ancient polity and morals, that is, through a necessary anti-
modernity. Ideologically, this writes antimodernity into the very terms in which 
modernity can legitimately be adopted – modernity to the colonised must always 
come in disguise and disguised as their own earlier self. The accommodation of 
change whether as innovation, assimilation or imposition can be justified only 
if modernity is simultaneously disavowed. The very path to modernity is sur-
reptitious and structured by a semantic of concealment while antimodernity 
becomes the name for screening or suppressing the several modern premises in 
which it was itself grounded. This also provided a method for recasting similari-
ties between west and east into a discourse of cultural difference. If the west has 
similar values then it was because it had belatedly but correctly begun to approx-
imate the east, if the east had the same values as the west, then they were its own 
to start with. Once synthesis was cast as a return, then any open assimilation of 
the modern because it was different (and therefore desirable) could (and still can) 
(see Sangari 1999: xliii, xlix, 104, 173–74). In her educational enterprises in India, Besant too was 
implicated in these agential avenues.
10 Beaumont notes that the confluences between socialism, occultism, especially Theosophy, 
utopianism and evolutionism could dematerialise socialist discourse and render it ‘half-mystic’. 
The utopian concept of a universal brotherhood allows Besant’s socialist beliefs to be ‘preserved’ 
and ‘mummified’ inside her Theosophical faith (2010, 223–28).
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be derided as foolish imitation and crude derivation while covert assimilation 
was given the opportunity to pose as true indigenism. Effectively Besant offered 
antimodernity to Indians as a dual site of veiled collaboration and proclaimed 
autonomy.
The Indian paradigm of altruism that Besant projects as ideologically supe-
rior to the western and Christian is extracted from a strictly caste-divided, severely 
brahminical and patriarchal Hinduism, heavily dependent on the four prescribed 
ashramas or stages of life, sacrificial rituals and ceremonial practices, and extrap-
olated from the Smritis, Shastras, Ramayana and Mahabharata (1904, 30–33, 
38–40, 47–49, 54–55, 58–60, 64–65, 70–72, 159–62). In fact, Besant participated 
in the scripturalisation and canonisation of the epics, and the colonial aggran-
disement of the Manusmriti, a text that now combined the weight of ancient 
prescription with colonial power (see Sangari 1999, 314–16). In Hindu Ideals the 
prescriptive corpus of the Smritis or Dharmashastras, obsessed with hierarchy 
and segregation and claiming to draw its authority from the Vedas, is made to 
stand in a mutually confirmatory relation with the Ramayana, rather than one 
that is discrepant; both speak in one voice and the epic appears to be merely the 
popular adjunct and prevailing face of prescription – an illustration of the ideals 
of marriage and kingship (Besant 1904, 93–95, 125). 
Besant had earlier opposed Judeo-Christian patriarchy as the underpinning 
of disempowering Victorian legal codes.11 She now valorises ancient Hinduism 
because it was patriarchal. Hindu Ideals presents the institution of Hindu mar-
riage as the sacred bedrock of the social fabric that was not to be disturbed too 
much by reformers (ibid. 84), the patriarchal household as an enlightened yet 
despotic monarchy, the perfect householder as a potentate, a prototype of self- 
governance and a male mentor par excellence. The householder’s own ‘obedience 
to rightful authority’ fits him to exercise authority over his domestic ‘kingdom’; 
he orders and controls all in his home and, since he is a ‘king’, none may order 
or control him. He enfolds all castes in his person: the many household duties 
vary with each caste and are most onerous among the upper castes, yet every 
householder ‘plays the part of each caste in his household’ – as priest, protec-
tor, provider and servant of the household, he is a brahmin, kshatriya, vaishya 
and shudra! He is also the ‘spiritual preceptor’ of his wife (ibid. 66, 68, 75, 88, 
92). The perfect wife – at once a friend and a reverential, obedient subject of her 
monarch husband – reigns over his household (ibid. 66, 93). The Hindu ‘Ideal of 
11 Besant attributed British women’s legal disadvantage to biblical law and its interpretations 
which treated women as social and sexual property of fathers and husbands, and denied women 
‘the inalienable right’ over their own persons without giving a wife equivalent property rights 
over the husband (Blyth 2009, 125, 130–33).
Singular individuals, conflicting authorities   1079
Marriage’ was based on the complementarity of sexes proclaimed in the Shastras, 
a non- antagonist non-competitive relation and not on separate rights of men and 
women as in the west (ibid. 85–86). In an earlier essay, ‘Womanhood’, Besant 
seeks to return Indian women to their own ‘ancestral custom’ (1900, 272, 278), 
asserting that anything which ‘separates one sex from the other in life or interest 
or brings them into competition or rivalry’ is fatal to the ‘progress of the race’ and 
upward evolution.12
 In contemporary India, Hindu women were a homogenous and exceptional 
‘type’, still naturally innocent, embodied the not-yet-extinct premodern, and had 
to be protected from the west.13 Since men had become ‘materialistic’, Hindu 
dharma had found its ‘refuge in the hearts of its women, a sure temple whence it 
may never be driven’ (ibid. 92–93). While women are guardians of ‘Hindu dharma 
and the Hindu home’ (ibid. 110), a dharma laden with patriarchal normativity, 
Hinduism is disconnected from nearly all patriarchal arrangements through famil-
iar exculpatory moves – its own intrinsic superiority, eternal modernity, degra-
dation and fall caused by later textual interpolation and Muslim conquest (ibid. 
86–91, 99–100). In Besant’s euphemistic interpretation, ancient Hinduism was not 
misogynist as Christianity was, while Hinduism’s superiority to Christianity lay in 
its refusal to make any distinction between ‘the sacred and secular’ (ibid. 59). 
Besant’s antimodern discourse has a transparent class location. Her unease 
with ‘democracy’ in the west and eulogy of caste rest on an explicit admiration 
for hierarchy described as ‘Aristocracy or the Rule of the Best’ (ibid. 113–14), and 
a thinly veiled loathing for class mobility in Britain. An ‘uncultivated’ butcher 
or salesman who manages by dint of wealth to enter the gentry is described as 
having a ‘Shudra body’, ‘Shudra manners’, a ‘Shudra Ego’ and unfit to be ‘a 
leader of society’ (ibid. 157–58). For her, varna unlike class was the foundation of 
a non-competitive fourfold order, each caste comprising a distinct and immutable 
‘class’ based on hereditary occupation (with shudras providing the ‘broad basis 
12 Here Besant is close to the socialist eugenicist, Karl Pearson who argued in ‘The Woman 
Question’ (1885) that scientific arguments about the good of the ‘race’ must always trump ab-
stract reflections on women’s individual rights: ‘We have first to settle […] what would be the 
effects of women’s emancipation on her function of race-reproduction, before we can talk about 
her “rights”, which are, after all, only a vague description of what may be the fittest position for 
her, the sphere of her maximum usefulness in the developed society of the future’ (in Miller 2009, 
249). The socialist investment in anti-individualism for a greater collective good could engender 
antifeminist arguments (see Miller ibid.).
13 In lectures given in 1897 and 1903, Besant said ‘Leave the Hindu woman untouched by Western 
thought […] We [the English] have women enough who are brilliantly intellectual and competent; 
let us leave unmarred the one type which is the incarnation of spiritual beauty. The world cannot 
afford to lose the pure, lofty, tender, and yet strong, type of Hindu womanhood’ (1942, 546–47).
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of the national pyramid’), and a useful restriction on social mobility (ibid. 135). 
Thus there was no merit in contemporary India ‘producing a bad copy of western 
forms and methods’ and sinking into the very ‘whirlpool from which the West 
is endeavouring to escape’ (ibid. 137). Even the west was beginning to realise 
the value of caste – a ‘social stability of form answering to the inner stability of 
spirit’ – and of birth as a ‘surer and more dignified foundation for social order’ 
than wealth (ibid. 157). Her claim resonated with conservative European interpre-
tations of the caste system (she cites Auguste Comte) as a sensible form of social 
organisation which had originated in racial division and the beneficent conquest 
of inferior natives by culturally superior Aryans – the ancestors of both contem-
porary Hindus and the British.14
 Varnashram dharma as the image of a hierarchical society that was divinely 
ordained but maintained by law had already come to provide a space where 
the nostalgias of anti-industrial, romantic and conservative organicisms could 
effortlessly rationalise, blend or ally with Indian upper-caste conceits and inter-
ests.15 Besant’s assimilation of caste to race coincided with the racialisation of 
caste in turn-of-century India, most infamously in H. H. Risley’s anthropometry 
which fused the social and the biological (Samarendra 2010, 51–58), and defined 
the caste system as ‘a community of race’ (L. Gandhi 2014, 68–69). For Besant, 
caste is a system that fixes the division of labour and generates duties, national 
essences, and characteristics. What is unusual in Hindu Ideals is the conserving 
function of reincarnation through which the soul climbs on the caste ladder and 
ensures the reproduction of ‘national Ideals’. The ‘four stages in the long pilgrim-
age of the soul [which] are maintained in the four castes, the youth, prime, matu-
rity and old age of the Jivatma’ still exist despite foreign conquests: India could 
only preserve her ‘racial characteristics’ because of the ‘strong barrier of caste’ 
(Besant 1904, 154–55).
In earlier lectures collected in Ancient Ideals in Modern Life, Besant nominates 
the fourfold caste order – non-conflictual, orderly and progressive – as the chief 
reason for India’s stability and explicitly binds it to ‘the path to Evolution along 
which a human soul develops’ (1901, 73–78). In successive births, ‘the soul passes 
from one to another [caste], according to the qualities it has developed [and] the 
actions it has performed’ (ibid. 79). The soul may rise or sink in this spiritual 
neo-Darwinism of individual and collective ascent and descent via reincarnation. 
Upward mobility increased responsibilities (especially of brahmins) since varna 
14 On the locations of Indian and British Orientalist Aryanisms, which come together in Besant, 
see Veer 2001, 76, 143–44.
15 On the, often Orientalist, European fascination with supposedly ‘non-exploitative and 
non-contradictory hierarchy’ obtaining in ‘Aryan’ India, see Kaiwar 2015, 110–12, 125.
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was not ‘a system of rights claimed by a caste, but a system of duties imposed on 
a caste; the higher the caste, the heavier the duties’ (ibid. 79). ‘Heredity’ supports 
status quo by playing a crucial role in ‘providing suitable physical bodies to suit 
each type of subtle bodies (Sukshma Sharira)’ (ibid. 81). Yet the caste order too 
has degenerated because it multiplied and subdivided, ‘less evolved souls came 
into Indian bodies […] and were no longer able to fulfil the dharma of the caste in 
which they were born’ (ibid. 84). 
The antimodern unfolds as an antidemocratic sign of cohesion, unity, racial-
ised evolution, and restoration of individual (husband) and collective (caste) 
authority. The upward social mobility, strong workers’ and women’s organisations 
make Britain an awkward candidate for a paternalist restorative project; India, 
despite the fall of men, is more opportune because of the vaunted continuity of 
womanhood and varna. Ironically, the Victorianisms Besant reproduces or trans-
mutes into an antimodern vocabulary and transposes to India were already sev-
erally mediated by the transactions of empire: as for instance, the anxiety about 
sources of spiritual and moral authority, the resolutions domestic ideologies 
offered for conflicts between paternalism and open competition, the  domestic 
world as replicating social order and yet capable of transforming it, the detach-
ment of morality from economic imperatives and women’s economic deprivation 
as a basis for their especial moral authority as well as the home as a sanctified 
source of altruistic emotions that could (even should) replace Christian solace.  
3 Mohandas Gandhi’s project 
As a set of pre-emptive resolutions, the antimodern aligns smoothly with empire 
in Besant. The contradictions are more evident in Gandhi. In South Africa, his 
main concerns were the status of Indians as equal citizens of empire and pro-
tection against racial discrimination (Habib 2011, 3). Faisal Devji notes that the 
Indian community in South Africa was ‘shaped entirely by capitalist relations, 
whether of commerce, service or labour, and had no dealings with premodern 
forms of possession or production’; therefore, unlike in India, rights could be 
claimed more directly without invoking the safeguards or privileges of caste and 
religion (2012, 50). Yet, as Gandhi found, the ‘rights’ promised to ‘Indian subjects’ 
by Queen Victoria’s proclamation in 1858 were not portable (Lelyveld 2012, 11), 
its liberal principles were not upheld. Visiting London as an increasingly disillu-
sioned petitioner in deputations on behalf of Indians in South Africa, he wrote: 
‘The only possible justification for holding together the different communities of 
the Empire under the same Sovereignty is the fact of elementary equality’ (Gandhi 
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1958–1982, 9, 516). As he travelled between India, London and South Africa, colo-
nialism seemed at once more dichotomous – a polarity of west and east – and 
more unified since capitalism was becoming ubiquitous. The colonies as sites of 
extraction stood in sharp contrast to the metropole as a venue of consumption.
Some strands in Hind Swaraj (a dialogue between a persuasive Editor and 
a Reader) noticeably approximate Besant. Gandhi consciously excludes Euro-
pean dissenters and the many Englishmen who desire Home rule for India from 
the ‘west’ (Gandhi 2015, 17), but makes a starker opposition between India and 
‘modern civilisation’ in England (ibid. 41–42), grants less to the west on the 
counts of science, morality and religion, and refuses to turn India into ‘Englis-
tan’ (ibid. 27). Yet, beneath the hyperbolic polarisation of sovereign and subject, 
both west and east are subjugated by a subsuming entity, a structuring force that 
determines the ‘condition’ of England, and through it, of India. He blames not 
the ‘English people’ but a destructive ‘modern civilisation’ not more than half a 
century old – ‘a civilisation only in name’ – ‘under [which] the nations of Europe 
are becoming degraded’ (ibid. 32, 34). He opposes a mode of conduct (named 
western civilisation) resting on force, colonial expropriation, and the desire of the 
British to ‘convert the whole world into a vast market for their goods’ (ibid. 40): 
the destruction of local industry and expansion of markets, pendant on speed 
and technological innovations, were impoverishing India. This flat indictment 
of colonial expansion, industrial capital, the exploitation of wage labour in colo-
nies and metropole, and the obsession with profit is not too distant from Marx’s 
more dialectical critique of the expansion of markets, the destruction of ‘national 
industries,’ and forcible introduction to all nations of ‘what it [the bourgeoisie] 
calls civilisation’, i.e. the ‘bourgeois mode of production’ which makes the ‘East’ 
dependent on the ‘West’ (Marx and Engels 1978, 476–77). Though Gandhi’s cri-
tique is blurred by an overblown antithesis of east and west, clearly Britain is 
controlled by a modern civilisation much larger and more powerful than itself 
and India is being restructured by the same modalities. Despite the asymmetry 
of power, east and west are aligned in that both are governed by the apparatus of 
capitalism and the drive for accumulation. The English are subject to capitalism 
and Indians are subject to a subjected nation.
At the same time, a tension between universal rights within empire and the 
civilisational grounds for claiming them is apparent in Hind Swaraj. Gandhi’s 
campaigns for rights in South Africa were allied to a notion of the special enti-
tlement of Indians as ‘British subjects’, but did not escape the racial and civilisa-
tional hierarchies instituted by colonisation, and he limited his  constituency by 
fighting white racism against Indians but not Africans (Gandhi 1958–1982, 1, 281; 
Gandhi 1958–1982, 6, 213; Skaria 2016, 40; Desai and Vahed 2016, 42–44). In Hind 
Swaraj, however, economic and cultural arguments eclipse the  loyalism he had 
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invoked earlier. Further, the semantic accretion within duties and rights allows 
these twinned concepts to move between role-bound entitlements and a univer-
salist language of rights – both terms straddle ongoing political transitions and 
acquire subversive connotations.
Many of the east-west antitheses in Hind Swaraj rest on morality versus 
immorality, faith versus irreligion, spiritual laws versus the laws of matter, a non- 
contractual dharma resting on a non-retaliatory ethic versus contractual norms.16 
In contrast to Besant’s views, dharma has a wider semantic range. As Parel (2015, 
xxi, lxi, xc, 90), Skaria (2016, 42) and Kumar (2015, 89) show, it can index duty, 
natural moral law, an injunction to the moral law, the pursuit of the welfare of 
the soul, religion as ethics, religion as sect (e.g. Hindu and Muslim), niti (ethics) 
and ethical integrity. Or dharma can be the opposite of adharma, i.e. irreligion 
(Gandhi 2015, 36). Parel’s argument that Gandhi ‘redefines the scope of dharma to 
include notions of citizenship, equality, liberty, fraternity and mutual assistance’ 
and ‘a civic humanism’ may seem stretched (Parel 2015, xxviii); however, dharma 
is not credal – that is, confined to a single set of religious beliefs – and extracting 
it from the solely spiritual, Gandhi repositions it in a secular terrain of civic virtue.
Gandhi seems to duplicate Besant’s assertion of the superiority of duty over 
the discourse of rights as well as the equivalence of duty and rights. However, he 
makes a distinction between duty, farajj, and religion, dharma (see Parel 2015, 
90). Duty (farajj in Gujarati, from Urdu farz, Persian origin) and rights (hako in 
Gujarati, from Urdu haq, Arabic origin) can be ‘premodern’ and ‘modern’ signi-
fiers, i.e. they can identify colonial subjecthood with premodern hierarchies as 
well as indicate the rights of proto-national citizenship. Farz denotes a set of con-
crete familial and social duties and responsibilities ordained by a person’s role 
as well as a religious duty. The Reader’s first concern in Hind Swaraj, shared by 
the Editor, is the demand for rights – hako – in India and South Africa (Gandhi 
2015, 13; see Skaria 2016, 290). Haq can be a compressed term for both entitlement 
and rights. Entitlements flowed from occupational, familial, social and labour 
relations. Extra-legal as a social and relational term, haq becomes a legal term 
where the horizon of legal rights is the sovereign colonial state. Further, because 
it also denotes that which is just, haq can occupy a non-hierarchical ground of 
customary reciprocity or work to mitigate social and political hierarchy through 
the expectation of reciprocity. The kinship or interdependence implied in the 
two-way flow between farz and haq in extant northern and western Indian idioms 
16 ‘The tendency of Indian civilisation is to elevate the moral being, that of Western civilisation 
to propagate immorality. The latter is godless, the former is based on a belief in God’ (Gandhi 
2015, 69). 
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(which were neither peculiarly Hindu nor ancient), is not clear in Gandhi’s English 
version of Hind Swaraj since rights and duties have a different linguistic tenor. 
Haq and farz flow from a place-bound terrain of specific entitlements for each 
person and require fulfilment of a role in order to gather its privileges. However, if 
rights flow from the place-less universalism attributed to a ‘liberal’ empire, every-
one can have the same rights. Farz and haq, as embedded in familial and social 
relations, can be owed to those below and above and be claimed vertically or 
laterally; liberal rights, and even haq as rights, are only vertical, addressed to and 
claimed from the state. Finally, haq also means truth – and this range from truth 
to rights allows for religious, secular and political usages.
In his struggle in South Africa, Gandhi assumed a direct passage from an enti-
tling performance of duty to legal rights for Indians. He believed that if they were 
loyal and did their ‘duty’ as British subjects ‘rights’ would ‘follow’ (Gandhi 1958–
1982, 7, 397 in Desai and Vahed 2016, 125).17 In Hind Swaraj, the foregrounding 
of passive resistance to British laws redirects the interdependence and sequence 
of duties and rights towards the state. Passive resistance is defined as ‘a method of 
securing rights by personal suffering […] the reverse of resistance by arms’ (Gandhi 
2015, 88), i.e. securing rights from the government by non-violent means also out-
lines the proper role of a just state. Obedience of unjust laws thus becomes contrary 
to dharma, which Parel annotates here as ethics (2015, 90–91). The subject/ citizen-
to-be is duty-bound to be disloyal and disobedient to the laws of an extractive, 
coercive or evil state (Gandhi  2015, 112, 116), and by performing this duty becomes 
morally superior to the state. Duty functions as a broad critique of tyranny and 
sovereignty which applies to contemporary Indian kings and princes as much 
as to British rule (Gandhi  2015, 74–75, 92–93). In emphasising the duty of rulers, 
Gandhi attempts to hold the colonial state to its own promises, liberal principles 
and  professed altruism - the self-imposed task of ruling/serving without reward.
[…] real rights are a result of the performance of duty; these rights they [the English] have 
not obtained. We, therefore have before us in England the farce of everybody wanting and 
insisting on his rights, nobody thinking of his duty. And, where everybody wants rights, 
who shall give them to whom?  (ibid. 79–80) 
If rights flowing from duties are read through haq and farz, their meaning exceeds 
mere equivalence. Farz and haq can only be sutured by a conditional reciprocity and 
17 In 1906, Gandhi justified his organisation of an Indian ambulance corps during the British 
suppression of the Zulu rebellion on the ground that if Indians ‘claimed rights of citizenship, 
they were bound to take their natural share in the responsibilities that such rights carried with 
them’ (Gandhi 1958–1982, 5, 326). At the same time, he argued that the British Empire could not 
hold its position by ‘unfair treatment of its loyal subjects’ (ibid 5,326).
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duty may be the means of acquiring rights. Further, if rights flow from performed 
civic and social duties, the power and centrality of the state is partially displaced. 
The state must do its duty to earn its right to sovereignty: an unjust state not doing 
its duty can have no rights over its subjects.18 Loyalty too becomes conditional.
 Gandhi, like Besant, castigated imitation of the west and its political insti-
tutions, saw varna as locus of social stability, a weapon against materialism and 
‘life-corroding competition’, and equated ‘moral fibre’ with continuity (Gandhi 2015, 
66–67). Although connections between white racism and the practice of untouch-
ability began to emerge in South Africa and he was to modify his views on caste 
in the 1930s (Lelyveld 2012, 25, 42, 60–61, 132), quasi-Besantian formulations recur 
over many years. For instance, in 1920 he represented caste and class as simply 
different modes of social organisation evolved in India and Europe; both had ‘pro-
duced certain evils’ but caste had helped more than class ‘to conserve certain social 
virtues’. The caste system was non-hierarchical and not based on ‘distinctions of 
wealth and possessions’: it was an ‘extension of the principle of the family’ and 
similarly ‘governed by blood and heredity’. Even if the ‘western doctrine’ of milieu is 
accepted, ‘milieu can be preserved and developed more through caste than through 
class […] It is the best possible adjustment of social stability and progress’ (Gandhi 
2015, 286–87). Like Hindu Ideals, Hind Swaraj combines transhistorical continuity 
with restoration: ‘India is still, somehow or other, sound at the foundation’ and 
modern civilisation has not yet reached all parts of the country (ibid. 64, 68, 70), 
while its fall is a result of the temptations of modern civilisation that accompany 
colonisation and are turning Indians away from god as well as from the antimateri-
alistic tenets of all their religions.19 Here, continuity can also be read to mean that 
colonial capitalism was not yet singly or fully determining and had not rationalised 
or homogenised those regions, which had little functional importance for it.
Gandhi’s argument for civilisational superiority, unlike Besant, includes a 
plurality of religions. He condemns the British policy of divide and rule, distances 
the anti-Muslim bias encoded in indigenist decline-and-restoration narratives 
by laying out a mixed older history of conflict and peace as well as rationales 
for  Hindu-Muslim amity (ibid.  50–55), rejects an organic or homogenous view 
of nationalism, repeatedly refers to India as multi-religious, refuses the idea that 
any one religion could comprise a nation, and reminds the British of their duty to 
18 Here too Gandhi departs from Besant. In her Indian ‘Ideal of Duty’, ‘duty must be done even 
to the undutiful’ (1904, 23). 
19 Consumerist industrialisation is said to lack dharma and morality; it is ‘Satanic’ according 
to the teaching of prophet Muhamed and Kaliyug according to Hinduism (Gandhi 2015, 34-–7).
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protect all faiths.20 Further, neither civilisation nor satyagraha (truth-force) follow 
the laws of evolution.  Civilisation understood as ‘good conduct which points out 
[…] the path of duty’ (ibid. 65) could be transhistorical while Gandhi’s concept 
of truth-force, being more than moral, belongs to ‘the ontological order of being’ 
(Kumar 2015, 63). 
On Besantian lines, this civilisation too is said to flow from the ‘due deliber-
ation’ of ‘our ancestors’ and ‘forefathers’ with their principled respect for rishis 
and fakirs:
They saw that kings and their swords were inferior to [the] sword of ethics, and they, therefore, 
held the sovereigns of the earth to be inferior to the Rishis and the Fakirs. A nation with a con-
stitution like this is fitter to teach others than to learn from others.  
 (Gandhi 2015, 67, my italics)
In Hindu Ideals, Besant’s rishis were composite characters: at once ‘divine’ and 
‘superhuman men’, objects of ritual-centred worship and ‘legislators’ who had 
built the ‘stately edifice’ of caste as well as India’s ‘social and religious polity’, still 
efficiently preserved by Hinduism; they enforced righteousness through ‘danda’ 
(punishment) but also ‘transcended humanity in evolution, by long service, by 
sacrifice, by tapas [concentrated spiritual exercise and austere self-denial]’ (Besant 
1904, 29, 70, 113, 119–20, 143, 145, 156). In Hind Swaraj, Gandhi’s location of the true 
Indian tradition as ascetic and renunciatory is partly affiliated to Besant’s founda-
tional rishi but diverges in significant ways. First, all religions are based on ethical 
principles (he objects to British rule because it is unChristian). Hinduism, Islam, 
Zoroastrianism have in common ‘that religion which underlies all religions’ (2015, 
41). Skaria annotates this as ‘the unrepresentable and inexpressible kernel that 
constitutes the condition of possibility for any religion as well as any conception 
of the ethical’ i.e. satyagraha (2016, 15). As a self-governing country India was to be 
ethico-religious in spirit but not in the literal sense of representing any particular 
religious denomination. Second, the Indian ascetic tradition which includes fakirs 
(a term used for Muslim mendicants), signals a non-sectarian view of ancient and 
medieval ascetics and, potentially, an inclusive dharma. Predicated on a personal 
struggle for self-mastery and linked to the project of self-rule and public service, 
ascetism fell into a self-sacrificing altruistic schema that functioned as a politically 
effective source of extra-political authority and legitimation. His invocation of the 
20 Gandhi argued that ‘one nationality’ and ‘one religion’ are not synonymous anywhere in the 
world; Hindus, Muslims, Parsis and Christians ‘who have made India their country’ are ‘fellow 
countrymen’ and will have to live in unity if only in their own interest (Gandhi 2015, 50–51). Gan-
dhi’s emphasis on Hindu-Muslim unity was forged in South Africa (see for instance, Hunt 1993, 
51; Lelyveld 2012, 14–15; Natarajan 2013, 164–65).
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‘sword of ethics’ diminishes the fear and power of merely political sovereignty (see 
L. Gandhi 2014, 20). Ascetism becomes a cross-religious resource from which to 
derive generalisable civic virtues and is intended as a weapon for the social reform 
of Indians and the British. Third, while as pre-determined by ancestral authority 
and calculation as Besant’s, Gandhi’s version of ancient civilisation was more pro-
grammatically based on anti- materialistic principles and austerity: it had set limits 
on wants and ‘indulgences’, disciplined passions, proscribed ‘luxuries and pleas-
ures’, restricted technology and urbanisation, reduced competition, kept courts, 
lawyers and doctors ‘within bounds’, eschewed technological innovation and 
maintained the moral force of people through manual labour (2015, 66–67). ‘Our 
ancestors’ can be read as limit, prophecy, injunction, and example. They seem to be 
precapitalist and presciently anticapitalist, and function as a reminder that indus-
trial capitalism is a chosen and thus reversible trajectory. The ancient limit must 
be recalled in order to restrain the hubris of a limitless modern. Varna and woman-
hood become performative, enacting – in perpetuity – the constraint of the limit.
Gandhi’s critique of capitalism is bolstered by an inflation of the spiritual regis-
ter but he diverges from Besant in construing civilisational virtues as unassimilable 
by a capitalist west. Rather the interlocking of anticapitalism and cultural differen-
tiation works to double the claim to an intractability which also redefines national-
ist struggle and British presence in India. While Gandhi still retained the Moderate’s 
faith in British Empire, the project of Indian self-rule had to differ from as well as 
usurp the moral authority of the colonial state. A relation of mutual benefit with the 
British could be made if ‘the root’ of this relationship was ‘sunk in religious soil’, 
for this they must search their own Christian scriptures. Indian civilisation being 
the superior one, the British must abandon modernity, live in the same manner 
as Indians, do nothing that was ‘contrary to our religions’ – Hinduism and Islam, 
and desist from commercial benefit and drain of wealth (ibid. 112–13). Reversing 
the direction of colonial universalising projects, he imagines a moralised, that is, 
Indianised and non-capitalist British Empire as more fit to govern India (ibid. 71).
In some sense then, Hindu Ideals and Hind Swaraj are imbricated in complex 
and continuous interchanges within the British Empire, and can be read as related 
and intersecting texts making distinct correlations between a reformed empire and 
antimodernity. In Hind Swaraj the antimodern is a sign of civilisational longevity, 
a mode of cultural self-differentiation, an anticapitalist argument for austerity 
and autonomy from the ‘west’, and a means for accruing nationalist authority. Yet 
it is an unstable sign since Gandhi’s own, equally compelling, confluences were 
with liberal, egalitarian and secular tendencies. His notable departures came in 
the growing and insistent refusal to restrict the centrality of religion to Hinduism 
by including all religions, the attempt to relocate cultural exceptionalism in good 
conduct and a multi-religious society rather than in a unique Hinduism.
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4  The womanhood project or disentangling  
the marriage knot
From the late 19th century marriage was a social and symbolic question in Britain 
and India. The comparative hierarchical ranking of sexual behaviour and mar-
riage practices in colonial anthropology turned monogamous and regulatory/
normative marriage into a marker of civilizational status (as is visible in Besant). 
Regulatory marriage was a recognised site of constraint and deindividualisation 
for women. In British and Indian conservative opinion, it was openly defended as 
a boundary marker which secured the ground for religion and nationalism, race 
regeneration and caste (jati) endogamy, racial superiority and national reproduc-
tion, the stable progress of evolution and empire. Marriage, then, was a matrix for 
the reproduction of multiple inequalities and not merely a compact between two 
individuals. At the same time, intense critiques of restrictive and oppressive mar-
riage practices were mounted from different positions by British socialists, British 
and Indian feminists, Indian higher and lower caste reformers, while British lib-
ertarian feminists argued for marriage resistance or free love. Even as the limita-
tions of regulatory marriage in Britain and India were under scrutiny, respectable 
(monogamous) marriage was still seen as a precondition for women claiming a 
place in the public sphere and/or full citizenship. Further, with proletarianisation 
and the bonded/indentured labour market, marriage and family structures were 
in a state of flux which coincided neither with higher caste patriarchal practices in 
India nor with Victorian ideals of companionate marriage. Women were entering 
the work force in Britain and India as they industrialised, families were separated 
through forced migration in the colonial labour economy, indenture was creating 
non-endogamous marriages and non-marital households, and patriarchal prac-
tices were being challenged and reformulated in contexts of caste mobility, class 
formation, or consolidation. 
Indian marriages simmered and then erupted as a political issue in South 
Africa. In 1906 Gandhi had protested against the requirement of separate permits 
for wives travelling with their husbands and posited Indian couples as a single 
unit (see Natarajan 2013, 133–34). In 1913 Hindu, Muslim, and Zoroastrian mar-
riages were invalidated in South African law which would from that point, rec-
ognise only monogamous weddings performed by judges, state officials, and 
Christian clerics. This meant that in the eyes of the law all non-Christian Indian 
wives were living out of wedlock and their children were illegitimate (Lelyveld 
2012, 107). Further, the state refused to classify any Hindu or Muslim marriage as 
monogamous since the rites were performed in India, a country which permitted 
polygamous marriages (Desai and Vahed 2016, 172–74). Gandhi said that Indian 
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wives were being ‘treated as concubines’ (Gandhi 1958–1982, 13, 61 in Natarajan 
2013, 133). Many Indian women from different regions, religions and castes jointly 
protested this derecognition of their legal status as wives and the campaign, 
which fused the claim to rights with cultural or religious self- differentiation, 
acquired a defensively nationalist tenor.
After Gandhi returned to India, in speeches and writing till the 1920s, wom-
anhood became an embodiment of an indigenist principle that was meant to chal-
lenge the very foundations upon which colonial authority, western materialism 
and degrading indentured labour were seen to be based. The indigenist valorisa-
tion of non-competitive, non-contractual social relations that legitimated conven-
tional patriarchal and caste-based divisions of domestic and reproductive labour 
thus remained more or less intact.21 At the same time, within Gandhi’s project, 
the notion of womanhood became a ground for desired social change including 
the abolition of indenture, the backbone of swadeshi (national self-reliance in 
manufacture and institutions) as an anticolonial gesture, an anticapitalist move 
towards economic self-sufficiency, and the space within which women’s public 
participation was to be determined. The description of womanhood was not a 
displaced site for the issues of the freedom struggle. The already significant and 
material question of patriarchal practices was for him also wrapped into spiritual 
self-purification, agential questions to be resolved in relation to the ‘west’, and 
was overdetermined by the pursuit of the common essence beneath all religions. 
Here I focus on the identification of women and sacralised marriage with 
social stability and the bedrock of religion through which marriage could become 
a site of deindividualisation. The non-violence Gandhi attributed to Indian women 
corresponded to the transhistorical essence of all religions (ahimsa, active love 
and compassion). Yet in the singular civilisational genealogy of womanhood and 
the epic lineage ascribed to the new companionate model of marriage, Gandhi is 
close to Besant’s project in Hindu Ideals. She had extracted complementarity, a 
quasi-bourgeois conjugality with its subordinate ‘companions’, from ‘antiquity’, 
that is, the Shastras and epics. Rama and Sita were ‘shining examples’ of the 
‘Hindu Ideal of Marriage’ while Savitri, Damayanti and Shakuntala were lesser 
examples of wifely fidelity (Besant 1904, 93–96). Gandhi’s model too was prem-
ised on antiquity, the same canon, similar notions of intact womanhood and 
fallen men, and the insistent separation in Hind Swaraj of ‘ancient civilisation’ 
from the ‘defects’ of contemporary marriage practices (Gandhi 2015, 69). This 
21 Gandhi’s idealisation of women as morally superior subjects, his positions on chastity, sexu-
ality and celibacy and marginal alteration of domestic roles have been thoroughly critiqued. See 
review in Hardiman 2013, 1715–981. 
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could tacitly make Indian women coeval with ancient ‘Hinduism’ since their 
power, strength and moral courage were said to derive from a unique ‘spiritual 
background’, to be ‘totally different’ from women of other countries and also 
capable of compensating for the contemporary lack of male altruism (Gandhi 
1950, 50; Gandhi 1958–1982, 87, 294). The ideal woman Gandhi wants to create 
depends on epic exemplars. She will be ‘pure, firm and self-controlled’ like Sita, 
Draupadi and Damyanti, and her ‘words will have the same authority as the Shas-
tras’ and be respected like those of her ‘prototypes of yore’ (Gandhi 1943, 19). She 
herself becomes the unwritten and embodied text of tradition. However, women 
are also seen as an inclusive entity and dharma as a cross-religious concept that 
holds a country together:
‘I know that in all communities, Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, and others, it is the women who 
preserve dharma. The day they forsake dharma, it will be destroyed. Our shastras say that 
a country in which the king and the women have abandoned dharma perishes.’ (Gandhi 
1988, 58)  
It was the regulatory, more than the explanatory or compensatory capacities of 
religious systems that had been at stake in the vociferous identification of women 
with Hinduism by 19th century reformers, and in some respects dharma for 
Gandhi too was a principle of restraint and restriction. Marriage in turn was the 
posited as the ‘fence’ that protects religion/dharma, analogous to its disciplinary 
powers, and like dharma, rested on ‘the law of restraint’ and restriction: women 
thus were ‘the apple of discord where the marriage bond’ was ‘loose’ (Gandhi 
1943, 155). Yet political self-determination and cultural self-differentiation being 
intertwined, Gandhi had to locate women at once as immutable and plastic, 
passive and active. He oscillated between seeing women as essential selves and 
selves that could be refashioned, as fixed repositories and instruments of desired 
change (Gandhi 1958–1982, 14, 86–87; ibid., 54, 184). 
Besant had placed sacramental marriage at the heart of a regulatory, patriar-
chal, sacrificial, national complex that could be maintained only if the conjugal 
relation was represented to women as spiritual rather than as carnal.22 Marriage 
was not only situated in a similar complex for Gandhi but locked into altruism, 
civic and political duty, and a polyvalent ascetism which could be repressive or a 
22 ‘Beware how you undermine in the hearts of Indian women the sacredness of marriage and 
the glory of the life of sacrifice. High have they held their Ideals through innumerable ages, and 
cherished love of husband as a spiritual force, and not simply as an earthly joy. Beware how you 
represent to them carnal pleasures as more alluring than the spiritual, and the life of ease and 
delight as more attractive than the life of self-obligation and sacrifice. If India is to be saved by 
her women, it will not be by women whose ideals are lowered’ (Besant 1904, 109–10). 
Singular individuals, conflicting authorities   1091
vector for individualisation. At one level, this was the corollary of a non- violent 
reformism in which the suppression and sublimation of sexuality seemed so 
central to conducting a public and political life of service, social work, passive 
resistance and dutiful disobedience that he virtually platonised marriage. Since 
he saw sexuality as a literal and metaphorical emblem of human vulnerability, 
self-control also became a measure of human aspiration, a part of the process 
of individual and national self-definition, analogous to swaraj (literally rule 
over one’s self) and applied equally to both sexes. Hind Swaraj classifies sexu-
ality as ‘an animal indulgence’, recommends chastity as a mental discipline for 
all men, forbids all but procreative sexuality for married couples, wants perfect 
chastity for a married man if he is a ‘passive resister’ but postpones a discussion 
of the consent or ‘rights’ of wives (Gandhi 2015, 95). The investment in a cura-
tive ascetism led Gandhi to typecast women’s nature as a type of asexual purity: 
she was not ‘prey to sexual desire to the same extent as man’ and more capable 
of self-restraint (2010, 105). Since ascetism for him was a largely non-reclusive, 
non-renunciatory practice of self-control and non-possession, it did not contra-
dict women’s domestic roles. The daily domestic sacrifices of women could be 
made congruent with the sage’s tapasya (ascetic self-denial) and coincided with 
the literal identification of household labour with piety in popular prescriptive 
literature (see Sangari 1999, 344–49).
For Gandhi, marriage also became a pre-eminently public institution; he 
resisted the domestic enclosure of conjugality, refused to corral marriage into a 
private sphere or import the shield of privacy that accompanied liberal individ-
ualism and bourgeois familial ideologies. The domestic was to be a transparent 
adjunct of the public. Domestic life and sexuality were to be integrated with and 
regulated by public duty, and women could regulate male sexuality if they sub-
limated their own (Gandhi 1943, 15–17). Abstinence could transform marriage 
into an altruistic institution. The bestowed and claimed virtue of English women 
had provided a moral right to rule. Gandhi’s extended ascription of virtue, moral 
power, sexual restraint and altruism to Indian women and marriage as part of 
the claim to self-rule went further. Under nationalist imperatives, altruism over-
lapped with ahimsa in inculcating ideals of public service and finding a principle 
of unity that would bond diverse groups. It also served as a platform from which 
to argue for the abbreviation of British rule.
Gandhi’s preoccupation with abstinence was not dissimilar from earlier Vic-
torian social purity campaigns and some contemporary middle-class feminists in 
England who also preferred abstinence over birth control as giving women more 
control over their sexuality, a degree of sexual autonomy within marriage, and 
protecting them from the transmission of venereal disease by profligate husbands. 
For theosophists, however, contraception interrupted the orderly  reproduction of 
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race, and by implication, caste. Madame Blavatsky insisted on self-restraint and 
celibacy since birth control interfered with the laws of reincarnation by reducing 
the number of bodies to which reincarnated souls must have access (Viswanathan 
1998, 196; Owen 2004, 98–99). After adopting Theosophy, Besant withdrew her 
writing advocating birth-control. She described sexual love as a source of intel-
lectual slavery and human degradation; argued that self-control and denial in 
marriage rather than contraception would assist upward movement on the evo-
lutionary ladder of rebirth; and recommended ‘restriction of the sexual relation 
for the perpetuation of the race’ (Besant 1908, 243; Besterman 1934, 91–94). Later, 
in the context of child marriage and adolescent sexuality, Gandhi too argued for 
a restrained procreative sexuality on similar ground: the ‘transgression of those 
limits imperils womankind, emasculates the race, induces disease’ (2010, 62). 
Non-procreative sexuality is also addressed as a symptom of western modernity. 
Gandhi’s notion of celibacy affirmed orthodox ideas of semen preservation while 
Besant felt that the ‘animal’ sexual passion and cravings of men and women had 
gone beyond ‘natural limits’ both inside and outside ‘the marital relation’ in ‘civ-
ilised countries’ (1908, 242). 
The selflessness attributed to Indian women combined with a political will 
to change could easily arc into the nurturing, selfless Victorian woman reforming 
both herself and the world – a figure who was at the deep centre of nationalist 
class consolidations in imperial Britain. However, Gandhi’s notions of full and 
partial celibacy offered an ideational and everyday form of intractability which 
moved towards the formation of a new sociality that cut through religious and 
patriarchal prescription. This resistant sociality, a form of individualisation 
through creative association, could redefine gender relation within the domestic 
and public-political arena and make a desexualised and unthreatening space for 
political participation. It sanctioned non-familial and non-biological kinship and 
could enlarge the circle of empathy and affection beyond the family. For him, 
unless marriage was sacralised and desexualised, it could be an impediment 
to practising universal love (ahimsa). Gandhi’s narrow view of kinship, centred 
on endogamous family-arranged marriage as the guardian of religion and social 
stability, thus lived alongside a free-wheeling enlargement of kinship through 
friendships enabled by his celibacy. His chosen lifestyle for non-biological fami-
lies/households in his South African communes and Indian ashrams (residences 
for spiritual aspirants) suggests that marriage and family may have been personal 
obstacles. Sunil Khilnani notes that Gandhi was interested in abstinence in order 
to enjoy the pleasures of disinterested companionship and friendship, ‘a bond 
devoid of instrumental aspects, purely voluntary, and between equals: com-
pelled neither by legal contract nor instinctual passion’ (2011, 66). Just as Gan-
dhi’s personal ascetism was self-devised and constituted from multiple sources, 
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 uncontrolled by gurus and institutions, this bond could be forged across differ-
ences of religion, caste, gender and nationality and transposed celibacy into 
secular forms of sociality. 
5 Towards a conclusion
The difficulty of isolating religious from social individualisation, and extracting 
it from social, political and ideological constellations is evident. Here it is only 
possible to speak of individualisation as the singling out of a person within and 
against a determining context in a specific conjuncture.
The contradiction between prescription and practice as well as the mismatch 
of gender ideology and social experience in Besant and Gandhi are only partially 
explained by the gap between powerful, circulating colonial ‘knowledges’ and 
their fraught personal navigation of patriarchal marriage in Victorian England and 
India. In Besant, a quasi-socialist angst over hyper-individualisation, conservative 
identification with a supposedly cohesive and authoritative religious system as well 
as anxiety about democracy coagulate into the antimodern and create some tempo-
ral confusion. The antimodern invoked to resist the modern calls up a premodern, 
caste-bound Hindu womanhood perceived as coeval, still extant, as well as located 
in a past golden age in which the religious and secular were indivisible. An iden-
titarian and pseudo-historical narrative of an anti-individualist ancient Hinduism 
gives authorial and textual authority to Besant as a self-nominated religious actor, 
serves to scaffold Theosophy’s occult practices, and multiplies the sources of her 
individual social and political authority. Since an opposition between the modern 
and antimodern could hardly be stabilised in Britain, she tries to secure it in the 
seductive longevity, continuity and non-competitive matrices of Hindu womanhood 
and varna. Besant stood at an authorising intersection in which the (rebounding) 
legitimacy she gained from her double location performed a suppressive and con-
servative function vis a vis dissident and more radical currents in both Britain and 
India yet allowed her to escape the recommendations she made for Hindu women.
Gandhi excoriates a capitalist west and resists it in part through a quasi- 
orientalist rendition of a textual and temporally distant ‘east’ of which woman-
hood and varna become the living remnants. The exaltation of womanhood and 
marriage participates in an indigenist and conservative anticolonialism. Situat-
ing a  culturally differential model of Indian womanhood as the archetypal not-
yet-extinct premodern could overturn the stereotype of a libidinous orient or the 
pejorative sexualisation of indentured labour in South Africa and the Caribbean. 
But asserting its exemplary virtue as emblematic of a sacralised universe fell into 
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another colonial and reformist stereotype that still coincided with conventional 
higher caste and new middle class patriarchal interests in India since it could be 
tied to the interrelated logics of seclusion, domestic labour and control of sexuality. 
At one level, varna and ancient/contemporary Indian women become the 
deindividualised and embedded place-bearers against which Besant and Gandhi 
shaped their relatively unfettered and detraditionalised lives and religious prac-
tices. In other words, their individualisation is contrastive and thus the analogue 
of a modernity that could be secured only by immobilising its opposite: it is 
modern in structure and antimodern in content. Both tendencies self-consciously 
resist western individualism yet cement their individuality in part by imagining 
an ancient, altruistic, sacrificial and repressive social order which, along with 
some of the alternatives they proposed, was already entangled in transnational 
characterisations of the modern, premodern, antimodern and western individ-
ualism. Further, the softened borders between the premodern and antimodern 
put the combined weight of ancient prototypes and contemporary regimens 
on the shoulders of women and subordinate castes. In this early 20th century 
phase, Besant and Gandhi become singular individuals in their personal, reli-
gious, social and political practice through positing varna and womanhood as 
amorphous collectivities. This prescriptive and discursive deindividualisation is 
performative and could lead in several directions. It was either ignored, appropri-
ated, contested, chastised, ridiculed or rejected by their contemporaries. Here too 
there was no direct path from ideology to social practice. Whereas the antimod-
ern for Besant and Gandhi could be compensatory, legitimating and enabling, for 
Gandhi it is repeatedly diverted or disrupted by strong anticapitalist and radical 
currents or his own creative innovations. He alternates between affirming, dest-
abilising, interrupting and reversing his antimodern positions, positions riddled 
with the volatile contradictions that he was to struggle with in later years.
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Vasudha Dalmia
Being Hindu in India: culture, religion,  
and the Gita Press (1950)
The Gita Press has retained its reputation as the premier Hindu religious publish-
ing concern of North India from its inception in 1926 up until the present day. Its 
Hindi monthly journal Kalyan – meaning ‘propitious’, ‘blessed’, ‘beneficiary’ – 
was conceived at the same time and continues to enjoy an extensive circulation, 
with 200,000 current subscribers.1 The Press routinely brings out a substantial 
annual number of the journal, focusing on a particular issue or religious text. 
In January 1950, barely three years after independence, the Press published its 
voluminous special issue on Hindu Samskriti, or Hindu culture. This publication 
constituted a major political and cultural intervention in contemporary discourse 
that was to help shape the newly formed republic. The volume has had seven 
print runs since then and is still in print today, testifying to the power it continues 
to exert over vast sections of the North Indian reading public.2 Given the publish-
ing history of the Press, which focuses on Hindu religious texts and moral tracts 
as drawing upon the authority of these texts, it is remarkable that the choice of 
focus in this annual issue was not on Hindu dharma, or Hindu religion, but on the 
more comprehensive ‘Hindu culture’. In this chapter, I shall focus on the notion 
of religion as encased in the broader category of ‘culture’ in this publication. I will 
also ask what equation Hindu culture is made to seek with the Indian nation as a 
whole, what social imaginary it works with,3 and what space is found for individ-
ualisation within this imaginary.4 
The Gita Press was founded by two men of the Marwari merchant community. 
These men were responsible for its general tenor and contents both during their 
lifetime and after, for their works continued to be reprinted and reissued. The 
elder of the two, Jaydayal Goyandka (1885–1965), acted as a mentor and sage for 
1 The English Kalyan-Kalpataru, started in 1934, has 100,000 subscribers. 
2 The details provided in this paragraph stem from Mukul (2015), a brilliant, wide-ranging, and 
comprehensive study that is full of insights. It also carries a six-page account of Hindu samskriti 
(276–82). My paper builds upon the insights of Mukul’s book but asks further questions.
3 ‘Social imaginary’, as Charles Taylor defines it, is the ‘way our contemporaries imagine the 
societies they inhabit and sustain’ (2004, 6).
4 I base the use of the term ‘individualisation’ on the reflections provided by Martin Fuchs (2016, 
105); in particular, I look for the ‘attempt by social actors to fight and overcome conditions that 
limit or constrict them with regard to their spiritual as also political wants and needs, their 
search for self realisation’. 
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the younger, Hanuman Prasad Poddar (1892–1971), who served as editor of Kalyan. 
Together with Goyandka, he shouldered the responsibility for writing key articles 
for the journal and for the Press’s other publications. Poddar was also the editor 
of Hindu Samskriti, along with Chimmanlal Goswami.5 There seems little doubt 
that Poddar and Goswami were instrumental in shaping the volume, although in 
their explanatory words at the end of the volume, they acknowledge the help of 
others in the editorial department of the Press. The bulk of the volume consists of 
concise articles by a range of Hindu thinkers, leaders, and scholars on the ancient 
merits and achievements of Hindu samskriti. It concludes with sections on the 
main gods of the Hindu pantheon, on the incarnations of these deities, on prom-
inent ancient sages, on ideal devotees, kings, and great men, including modern 
politicians. It also includes accounts of some ideal Hindu women. The scope of 
the volume, and its effort to be as comprehensible as possible, to include the new 
as well as the old, makes it clear that it was a modern enterprise, and one that can 
claim a place of prominence in the contemporary world.6 
1 The constitution of India as counter-pole
The timing of the publication of the volume was significant. The Constitution of 
India, adopted by the Constituent Assembly on November the 26th 1949, came 
into force in its entirety on January the 26th 1950. At this stage, the republic was 
defined as both ‘sovereign’ and ‘democratic’. The addition of the words ‘socialist’ 
and ‘secular’ to the Preamble was a later development, brought about through 
a constitutional amendment in 1976.7 However, this was the direction in which 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was already propelling the country. 
5 He was editor of the English Kalyan-Kalpataru and became editor of Kalyan after Poddar’s 
death, holding the post until his own demise in 1974. 
6 Monika Horstman’s important essay, ‘Towards a Universal Dharma: Kalyan and the Tracts of 
the Gita Press’, has made the point that the sanatana or eternal dharma propagated by the pub-
lications of the Press served the function of an ideological umbrella for modern Hinduism. The 
Press was critical of individual creeds and sects, even as it sought to subsume them within sa-
natana dharma. And finally, though it claimed to represent tradition, it was an entirely modern 
venture (1995, 298f.). 
7 As the Preamble reads now: ‘We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute 
India into a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic, and to secure to all its citizens: 
justice, social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; 
equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all, fraternity assuring the 
dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation; in our Constituent Assem-
bly this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this 
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But this was not the only direction in which the new nation was being pushed. 
We have to recall that, in the early years of independence, the nation was a project 
very much in the making and one that stood on unsteady feet. The violence of Par-
tition, which occured simultaneously with Independence, had torn apart the fabric 
of the North West and the East of the country. In addition to the countless instances 
of rape, maiming, and killings that happened on both sides of the border, there 
were now six million Hindu and Sikh refugees to resettle in India. This group pro-
vided a fertile ground for the propagation of grievances with Muslims in general. 
For them, as for the vast majority of Indians, the fact that Pakistan was an Islamic 
state seemed to demand that India too should heed its majority and become a 
 constitutionally-backed Hindu state. On the other hand, the large segments of the 
Muslim population that still remained in India had also to be adequately protected 
from Hindu and Sikh violence, which could take virulent forms. It was just two years 
since Nathuram Godse, a right-wing fanatic, had assassinated Mahatma Gandhi at a 
prayer meeting in Delhi on January 30th 1948. Shortly before this, the Mahatma had 
insisted that the new Republic pay Pakistan its due share of the common Treasury. 
This had caused much bitterness among right-wing Hindus, many of whom saw the 
Mahatma as a partisan of the Muslim cause. His last fast unto death, known today 
simply as the Delhi Fast, had been undertaken in the days immediately preceding 
his assassination in order to stop the indiscriminate killing of Muslims, not only in 
the old city of Delhi but across India as a whole. Godse’s act seemed the logical con-
clusion of the violence expressed against the Mahatma in Hindu quarters. 
The Rashtriya Svayam Sevak Sangh (the National Volunteers Corps), although 
not directly implicated in the act, was active in the propagation of its vision of a 
Hindu India: 
Realizing the Rashtriya Svayam Sevak Sangh’s (RSS) adherence to the ideology of commu-
nalism and violence and the hatred that it had been spreading against Gandhi and secular-
ism were the real forces behind the assassination – the RSS men had even celebrated it in 
many places – the government immediately banned the RSS and arrested most of its leaders 
and functionaries. Nehru, of course, had for some time been characterizing the RSS as a 
fascist organization. In December 1947 he stated: “We have a great deal of evidence to show 
that the RSS is an organization which is in the nature of private army and which is definitely 
proceeding on the strictest Nazi line, even following the technique of organization”.
 (Chandra et al. 1999, 79) 
The ban was lifted in July 1949, once the RSS accepted the conditions laid down 
by Vallabhbhai Patel, the Home Minister. The conditions were that 
 Constitution’. Sourced from https://www.india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.
pdf. Last accessed July the 25th, 2018.
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[t]he RSS would adopt a written and published constitution, restrict itself to cultural activi-
ties and not meddle with politics, renounce violence and secrecy, profess loyalty to India’s 
flag and Constitution and organize itself along democratic lines.
(Chandra et al. 1999, 79)
‘Culture’ would become a very loaded word, masquerading for a number of 
political and social agendas. The experience of Partition strengthened views 
which pulled society in two opposing directions. At one pole was the vision of 
a pro-Hindu India, exemplified by groups such as the R.S.S.. The other pole was 
expressly secular and pluralist, determined to overcome the trauma of partition 
not through the elevation of one particular group but, rather, through the removal 
of a state religious identity. 
The Committee formed to draft the Constitution was headed by Dr. Bhimrao 
Ramji Ambedkar, the icon of Dalit aspirations. It was Ambedkar’s  concept of the 
social order, as much as that of Jawaharlal Nehru, that guided the vision of India 
that was enshrined in the Constitution. As Nehru wrote in the troubled period 
immediately after Partition, ‘I believe in India being a secular state with complete 
freedom for all religions and cultures and for cooperation between them. I believe 
that India can only become great if she preserves that composite culture which she 
had developed through the ages’. And in this expressly secular and pluralist social 
order, ‘I am anxious therefore that the Muslims in India as well as all other reli-
gious groups should have the fullest freedom and opportunity to develop them-
selves. I am entirely hostile to Hindu or any other communalism in India’ (Nehru 
2003, 173, letter to the Nawab of Bhopal, July 9, 1948). As Sunil Khilnani points out, 
A specifically Indian compromise was needed, and he [Nehru] saw strengths in this. That 
compromise was outlined in the practical adaptation, after 1947, of the state into a distinc-
tive model shaped by Nehru’s understanding of the Indian past: a model committed to pro-
tecting cultural and religious difference rather than imposing a uniform “Indianness”.
(Khilnani 2004, 167)
It was a powerful and mellow vision: 
In his imagination, India appeared as a space of ceaseless cultural mixing, its history a 
celebration of the soiling effects of cultural miscegenation and accretion, “an ancient pal-
impsest on which layer upon layer of thought and reverie had been inscribed, and yet no 
succeeding layer had completely hidden or erased what had been written previously”.
(Khilnani 2004, 169) 
It stood to reason, then, that the western model of the nation, with one language 
and one religion uniting it, could not serve for India.8 
8 As pointed out by Khilnani (2004, 173).
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Further, the Constitution envisioned a democratic and egalitarian order with 
the provision of ‘reservations’ for the lowest castes, the ‘untouchables’, in gov-
ernment offices and educational institutions. This could not but be offensive to 
the vast majority of those who held the caste order to be sacred. It is against this 
background that, in January 1950, Hindu Samskriti was published in an effort to 
influence the political and cultural direction of the newly founded republic by 
insisting on the validity of caste hierarchy and the inherent Hinduness of India. 
That the title of the volume spoke of culture rather than religion, though it 
placed the Hindu religion, as interpreted by it, at its core, speaks for its effort 
to be as comprehensive as possible. Therewith was posited a pan-Hindu culture 
which dominated and occupied all of India, for ‘culture’ includes all aspects of 
the person’s life, aspects that would, on the face of it, fall outside the scope of reli-
gion in the narrower sense. This double move, to speak not of religion but of 
culture as determining the past, present, and future of Hindus, and thus of the 
Indian republic at large, while at the same time placing religion at the heart of 
this culture, is a well thought out strategy. It is followed consistently through-
out the massive volume: 904 pages in small print in octavo format. It did not 
foreground Aryans (and we shall see below why), but insisted rather on Hindu 
and  Hinduness.  It placed a series of Vedic hymns in the original Sanskrit, with 
translations into Hindi, at the beginning of the volume followed by short quota-
tions from the Upanishads, from the epics – Valmiki’s Ramayana and the Mahab-
harata – and concluded with a brief excerpt from the Bhagavata Purana. In thus 
including the canonical text of the Vaishnavas – one branch of the vast family 
of faiths now grouped together as ‘Hindu’ –  Hindu Samskriti, followed a pattern 
which was sustained throughout the volume. Religion and the social order pred-
icated on it form the core of culture. This will become apparent as we proceed. 
I shall focus on three articles I consider key to understanding the propositions 
advanced by the volume as a whole. 
The opening salvo is fired by Shankaracharya Brahmanand Saraswati of 
Jytorimath, Badrikashrama, in an article entitled simply ‘Hindu-Samskriti’ 
 (23–32). There are five present-day Shankaracharyas, each heading his own 
monastery in five different corners of India. All five trace their origin to the Adi, 
or Ur-Shankacharya, who is thought to have lived in the ninth century CE.9 The 
9 The Dakshiānmnāya Sri Sharada Peetham (main matha) at Sringeri Sharada Peetham in Shrin-
geri, Karnataka. The Uttarāmnāya matha  (Northern matha) at  Jyotir Math  in the city of  Jyotir-
math, also known as Joshimath, Uttarakhand. This is the seat of the Shankaracharya referred 
to above. The Pūrvāmnāya matha  (Eastern matha), or the Govardhana matha at Puri, Odisha.
The Paśchimāmnāya matha (Western matha), or the Dwaraka Pitha at Dwarka, Gujarat. Final-
ly, Sarvagna Peetham Kanchi Moolāmnāya Sri kanchi Kamakoti Peetham (Sarvjna Peetham), or 
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 successive Shankaracharyas enjoy enormous religious authority in modern India. 
Depending on his particular bent and personality, a Shankaracharya can become 
a public figure whose stance on specific issues is given weight and prominence 
by the media. 
The second article I shall consider is by M.S. Golwalkar (1906–1973). Gol-
walkar’s contribution appears immediately after those of the major religious 
leaders of Hindu India,10 despite the fact that he was the head of that ostensibly 
secular force, the R.S.S., founded in 1925, at more or less the same time as the Gita 
Press.11 Finally, I will discuss the article on – rather than by – Mahatma Gandhi, 
placed two thirds of the way into the volume. The location of this article has its 
own significance. The question that I will ask in this chapter is, what do these con-
tributions say about being Hindu and about individualisation in the new republic? 
2 Religion as Hindu culture
The substantial discursive part of the volume begins with a vehemently worded 
article by Shankaracharya Brahmanand Saraswati of Badrikashrama. He 
launches into his exposition by outlining a definition of the two terms in ques-
tion: ‘Hindu’ and ‘samskriti’. He takes up the term ‘Hindu’ first, which he sees 
as a denomination of ‘jati’. Jati can be translated as ‘caste’ and I will draw upon 
this usage elsewhere in the present chapter. However, here it stands rather for 
‘specific or generic characteristic or distinction’.12 There are two bases, the Shan-
karacharya says, for determining the jati of a people.  They are desh or country 
and dharmagrantha or religious texts. The country defines how some peoples 
are named, thus: Germans, French, Bengalis, and Panjabis. But there is also a 
the  Kamakoti at Kanchipuram, Tamil Nadu. Information sourced from https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Shankaracharya. Last accessed July 25, 2018. 
10 Eight articles by figures from prominent Hindu religious institutions follow. These are writ-
ten by the Shankaracharya of Dwarika, Karpatri Maharaj, an anonymous Mahatma, the Head 
of the Ramanuja Sampradya, an anonymous Mahatma of the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal, 
Madhavanand Maharaj (presumably the head of the Madhva Sampradaya), Aurobindo and the 
Mother – head of the Aurobindo Ashram in Puducherry. Aurobindo’s article is translated from 
the English and is not written originally for the volume.  
11 Anderson and Damle 1987 still remains the most detailed and reliable account of the organi-
sation, its history, and the mode of its functioning. See also Basu et al. 1993 for a critical account 
of the Hindu Right. 
12 Platts, John T: A Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English (369): http://dsal.uchicago.
edu/dictionaries/platts/. Last accessed on July 25, 2018. I refer to Platts throughout for the trans-
lations of Sanskrit terms I give. 
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further determination by reference to the religious texts of a people, thus Chris-
tians because of their belief in the Bible or Muslims because of their belief in the 
Quran. On closer inspection, country proves to be an inadequate base for defin-
ing a people. Bengalis, for instance, can be Hindus or Muslims. It is the religious 
texts, then, that define the ultimate affiliation of a people. Jati is thus determined 
by religious texts rather than country or manners and customs. 
Saraswati also notes the belief that there originally existed a single Aryan 
people who migrated to different countries and, in doing so, acquired different 
names. If they had all believed in the Vedas and other Shastras, then, regard-
less of the country in which they settled, they would have remained ‘Arya’ or 
‘Hindu’. However, some turned instead to the Bible and the Quran, proving that 
the primary definition of a people is not their having originally belonged together 
but, rather, the religious texts to which they now adhere. The Hindus (Arya is now 
simply dropped) are of one jati because they believe in the Vedas and other Shas-
tras; a Hindu bases his (the reference is always male) conduct, in both this- and 
other-worldly contexts, on actions propagated by the srutis, smritis, Puranas, and 
the epics. He believes in the varnashrama order (23). More on this order below. 
Being Hindu is, then, based on belief in a given social order drawn from spe-
cific religious texts. This first premise makes no political or nationalist claims for 
being Hindu, although these will follow.
The Shankaracharya then embarks on a lengthy and involved description of 
samskriti, deriving it from Sanskrit roots to mean ‘bhushan bhuta samyak kriti 
ya cheshta’, that is, ornamented actions and exertions in their entirety. Samskriti 
enfolds all fields pertaining to cultivated activity. Of all creation, it is human 
activity alone that qualifies for this definition, not that of other species, for this 
activity leads to happiness and peace. Samskriti is further based on its philosoph-
ical texts. The questions of who I am, where I come from, where I will go, who is 
the creator of this universe, and so on, are all issues that are resolved by philoso-
phy. In short, its religious and philosophical texts, which ultimately deal with the 
means of attaining mukti or release in this life, are the defining characteristics of 
a jati (25). The Shankaracharya is circling back here to his original proposition 
regarding the centrality of religious (philosophy is subsumed within this) texts as 
the defining feature of a people and their culture. The most dynamic form regard-
ing manners and conduct of this culture is the varnashrama order, the belief in 
the division of Hindu society into four varnas or castes13 and in the four ashramas 
or stages of life (24, 26). This culture is auspicious and beneficiary (kalyan) not 
13 These are Brahmans or priests and scholars, Kshatryiyas or warriors, Vaishyas or merchants 
and Shudras or servers.
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only to Hindus but to the entire universe. Following the varnashrama order makes 
for the most complete development, both personally and socially. 
The Shankaracharya then elaborates on the four ashramas in conventional 
terms: brahmacharya, or celibacy in student life; grihastha, or domesticity in 
married life; vanprastha, or part-retirement from family and social life; and, 
finally, samnyasa, or asceticism towards the end of life. He offers no new insights 
for the adjustments presumably needed to fit these ancient notions into modern 
lives. This is also the case with the four-fold varna division. In Hindu samskriti, a 
person’s jati, here meaning caste, and, consequently, his actions and professions, 
are decided according to birth, and thus accord with the nature with which he is 
originally endowed. If a person is made to follow a life pattern that differs from 
the one he has been endowed with, he will have to exert himself all the more, 
losing unnecessary energy in the process. But if all act in accordance with their 
place in the given social order, everything will be achieved peacefully and easily, 
leading naturally to societal progress in which there will be no conflict between 
old and new.  Varnasamkarta, or the corrupting mixture of varnas, leads to the 
destruction of society and nation. Here we see the notion of ‘nation’ creeping in 
unannounced, for without further discussion, Hindu society has become coeval 
with the Indian nation at large. In fact, though, this equivalence has been inher-
ent all along, given that it is the Hindu order alone which constitutes the nation 
(27). The notions of purity-impurity, touchability and untouchability, are a dis-
tinctive quality of Hindu samskriti (28). It was still politically possible to make 
such pronouncements in 1950; today they would need to be made more covertly. 
The Shankaracharya goes on to exalt the ethical qualities that make Hindu 
samskriti so outstanding: respect for women, respect for the elderly, and so 
on, there being no space for hatred of any kind in this culture. Ultimately, he 
emphasises again, it is the societal division into the varnas and the stages of life 
that determines what constitutes Hindu samskriti. By making the belief in reli-
gious texts the centre of the definition of Hindu, the Shankaracharya explicitly 
excludes Christians, Muslims, and others from any form of belonging within the 
social order, which is universalised even as it is extended and made peculiar to 
all of India. Further, by speaking of the four castes as alone determining this 
social order, Dalits, referred to as antyaja, that is, outside the four-caste order, are 
placed entirely outside the Hindu social order and with that the nation.
According to the Vedas and other Shastras, temples, and the icons installed 
in them, are defiled by the entry of the antyaja. Ghosts and spirits enter such 
temples instead of divinities and the worship of these entities strengthens evil 
tendencies. This results in the prospering of conflict, anger, and hatred, while 
sickness and natural calamities, such as excessive rain, droughts, earthquakes, 
etc., make for the destruction of the king and his subjects (31). 
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Addressing Hindus at large, the Shankaracharya proclaims: yours is the 
leading culture in the world. There is no worldly or otherworldly goal that you 
cannot attain. You have withstood the most atrocious attacks over the ages; now 
you need to stay firm on your path. He then takes on those in charge of the gov-
ernance of independent India, asking that they oversee the creation of an order 
in accordance with pure Indian culture, for it is Hindu culture alone which con-
stitutes Indian culture (29). If this does not happen in an independent India, 
what meaning and value would political independence have? There should be 
no interference in, or opposition to, the right of Hindus to follow their varnash-
ramadharma. It is not possible to remove this order and try to set up another that 
is classless and casteless. This is the very least that the Hindus can expect from 
their own government, that their svarupa, or own form, not be attacked as if ruled 
by a foreign government (30).  
The Shankaracharya ends by formulating seven demands of the government: 
that governance be moulded according to Hindu culture; that there be a law 
against the lowest castes entering Hindu temples, so that divine wrath not fall 
on all; that cow slaughter be banned; that the laws of purity and pollution not be 
eradicated so that the Hindu jati should not face decline; that marriage within the 
gotra14 and outside the varna, and divorce, etc., should not be enshrined in law; 
that a societal order without varna and jati not be ordained, thus undermining 
the Hindu order; and, finally, that the Hindu Code Bill and similar legal enact-
ments be entirely dropped.15 The Shankaracharya closes with a prayer to the lord 
to save the Hindu jati.  
The order that is propagated here is entirely Brahminical or as defined by 
Brahims, making no concessions to change and with a narrowly defined role for 
each citizen (always conceived of as male), one entirely derived from varnash-
rama. Man is straitjacketed by it; he has to follow the path laid out for him. He 
derives the meaning of his social existence entirely from his place in this order. He 
14 A Hindu clan tracing its lineage from a common ancestor, usually a saint or a sage. 
15 See Mukul (2015, 257–66) for an account of the resistance offered by Gita Press and Poddar 
and Goyandka to the Hindu Code Bill, on the table in the Legislative Assembly from 1944. Gita 
Press campaigned vociferously against it. When reintroduced in post-independence India, with 
Dr. Ambedkar as the Law Minister, the bill excited the same violent response. When had equality 
brought happiness? Inter-caste marriage, the restriction placed on polygamy, the relatively liber-
al laws of inheritance, adoption, would all play havoc with the system. A Hindu man could marry 
a low-caste girl, or a Christian, or a Muslim. Hindu women would theoretically be free to marry 
even Muslim men. The Indian National Congress’s landslide win in the first general elections left 
such arguments behind, and the Hindu Code Bill was finally passed in the form of four separate 
bills between 1954 and 1956, much watered down but none the less promising men and women 
much greater flexibility than before. 
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is not free to change it; he cannot, for instance, marry outside his caste without 
causing chaos in society. 
The article is followed by a five-stanza hymn to Hindu Bharat or Hindu India 
by someone who calls himself simply ‘Ram’ (33). The hymn brings out once more 
what has been ostensible all through the Shankaracharya’s expostulations – that 
Dalits,16 non-Hindus, most of all Muslims but also Christians, simply do not figure 
in the new republic. They are accorded no space, no rights. 
In her Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), published a year after Hindu Sam-
skriti, Hannah Arendt spoke of the German and Slavic pan-movements of the first 
part of the twentieth century. These movements accorded the individual a new 
meaning as a member of a cohesive whole and were to merge seamlessly with the 
agenda of totalitarian governments when the time came. What the Shankaracha-
rya, and the mass of articles in the volume that follow in his footsteps, depicts is 
not unlike the goals of these pan-movements. In propagating the universal and 
all-comprehensive reach of Hindi samskriti, a pan-Hinduness is being posited, 
which swamps the rights of all non-Hindus while, at the same time, claiming 
divine rights for Hindus as a whole. As Arendt pointed out:
The tribalism of the pan-movements with its concept of the “divine origin” of one people 
owed part of its great appeal to its contempt for liberal individualism, the ideal of mankind 
and the dignity of man. No human dignity is left if the individual owes his value only to 
the fact that he happens to be born a German or a Russian; but there is, in its stead, a new 
coherence, a sense of reliability among all members of the people which indeed was very 
apt to assuage the rightful apprehension of modern men as to what might happen to them if, 
isolated individuals in an atomized society, they were not protected by sheer numbers and 
enforced uniform coherence. (Arendt 1976, 235)
If it robs the caste-Hindu of a sense of individuality, of the freedom to disagree, to 
evolve his thoughts and pursuits, his sense of the self, outside of the order, it also 
lends him, as Arendt puts it, a sense of a new coherence, of mutual support from, 
and belonging among, others of his kind.  
16 There are two further articles on untouchability in the volume, one dealing with why Dalits 
are forbidden to enter temples (214–7) and the other discussing the logic underlying this and 
other such practices (218). Mukul has discussed Poddar’s acrimonious correspondence with Ma-
hatma Gandhi over the latter’s fast against the British award of a separate electorate for untouch-
ables. The ideas put forward by Poddar are identical with Shankaracharya’s (2015, 53–7). 
Being Hindu in India: culture, religion, and the Gita Press (1950)   1107
3 The political-theological grid of the Hindu Right
A different route that leads to the same sense of absolute merger and absolute 
affiliation is proposed by Madhavrav Sadashiv Golwalkar, the Sarsanghsamcha-
lak, or chief executive, of the R.S.S. from 1940 to 1973. Golwalkar’s contribution 
is also entitled ‘Hindu samskriti’.17 It is just four pages long but it puts forward 
its propositions boldly and clearly (57–61). Golwalkar is versed in the Sanskritic 
tradition; his language is also Sanskritic in the extreme. He is regarded as learned 
by his followers, hence his title ‘Guruji’. Here I retrace the moves he makes and 
the apparent simplicity with which he proceeds to set out his argument. There are 
many religious paths, he says, for mankind to attain ultimate happiness. They fall 
into two broad groups: those that try to attain happiness by devotion to Ishvara 
or the lord, understanding him as the essence, and those who believe that what is 
apparent is the essence of the universe, seeing nothing other than this and trying 
to obtain the means to satisfy natural needs and desires as easily as possible. 
Much modern thought has taken this latter direction. However, as time passes, 
these paths breed dissatisfaction. There are two reasons for this. First, it is impos-
sible to satisfy all sensory needs and it is in pursuit of the fulfilment of such needs 
that the most fearful wars are fought. Second, man is not without understand-
ing (nirbuddhi). In the course of time, he understands that happiness lies not in 
external things nor in fulfillment of these sensory needs but, rather, in pacifying 
sensual desires (vasana). 
It is out of this thinking and these expectations that religious paths are born. 
But these are paths founded on faith alone, whilst man is not able to forget the 
joys and sorrows of life. These religious paths seem unable to take care of the joys 
and sorrows of every-day life as it is lived. Man is thus faced with fearsome irres-
olution and this leads him to turn towards faith-less materialism. However, man 
also has buddhi (understanding, intellect, discernment). He searches for the ulti-
mate reality and alights upon a range of options. The sages of ancient India have 
pondered upon all these. These sages understood that happiness is based not 
in things but, rather, in the self (atmanishtha), and that man can attain eternal 
peace (chirantan shanti) without any kind of material plenitude. 
It is the jiva, the living Self, the vital principle or spirit, that is endowed with 
happiness (sukhamaya). All creation is, thus, endowed with happiness, is the 
manifest form (vyakta rupa) of endless truth. In addition to the jiva, the living 
17 As Mukul notes, Golwalkar and Poddar admired and appreciated each others’ work; Gol-
walkar had visited the latter in Gorakhpur (2015, 66, 155f.). On Golwalkar’s early life, his induc-
tion into the R.S.S., and his general orientation as its leader, see Anderson and Damle (1987, 41–5, 
112f.). On his significance in today’s India, see Bal 2017. 
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Self, and the jagat, the world, there is a third point, brahma, who forms the 
entire mandala of the universe, pervading all while yet being apart from all and 
entirely independent. Experiencing the presence of this brahma is the ultimate 
happiness. The paths that lead to the attainment of this experience are fourfold: 
karma, action; bhakti, devotion; yoga; and jnana, knowledge. The jiva is himself 
ultimately brahma, because it is the all-pervasive brahma who manifests in the 
form of jiva. The vaster the jiva feels, the more happiness he attains. The ‘I’ and 
‘mine’ impose limits on him. He has to abandon the slavery of these limits and 
become a renouncer. Golwalkar is here merely reproducing in accessible form 
what is familiar to most educated Hindus, in one form or another, as advaita: the 
monistic/non-dualistic philosophy propagated in various sophisticated schools 
of philosophical thought in the subcontinent at least since its first fully-fledged 
articulation by Shankara in the ninth century CE. But the next step Golwalkar 
takes is surely peculiar to his thinking. 
Once renunciation has led to the obliteration of the feeling of limitedness 
(samkuchit bhavana), what first offers itself for consideration is a vaster entity, 
that   is, one’s own society: the nation (rashtra). The feeling emerges that the 
brahman who exists in the jiva, who says ‘I’, is manifest in a vaster form in this 
rashtra. Rashtra or nation is thus raised to a transcendental form. There is no 
question here of positing a divine origin for the Hindu nation. Much more than 
this, the nation is part of the brahman. Golwalkar does not seem to be speaking 
of nations in general when he propounds this principle but, rather, of the Hindu 
nation alone.   
Let us pause for a moment to consider the significance of the term rashtra in 
Golwalkar’s thinking. In his 1939 treatise, We or Our Nationhood Defined, which 
he later disowned,18 Golwalkar lays out his understanding of rashtra19 in a way 
18 After the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in January 1948, following which Golwalkar was 
incarcerated for a time, the work became authorless as Golwalkar and the R.S.S. disowned it. It 
has recently been reprinted by Shamsul Islam (2006, second edition 2015). Islam discusses the 
publication history of the work – the last of its four editions came out in 1947 (63) – showing in 
his introduction that although the treatise became authorless and went out of print, Golwalkar 
continued to think along the lines laid out therein (13–99). Jaffrelot sees this work as the charter 
that the R.S.S. had previously lacked (Islam 2005, 68).
19 We or Our Nationhood Defined glosses the term rashtra as follows: ‘The word Rashtra, which 
expresses the whole of the idea contained in the English word “Nation” is as old as the Vedas 
and in the ancient works is described in a general way, as being so (Rashtra in truth) when it 
included “Swaraj” – independence, the power of the National Race over the whole land from sea 
to sea […]’ (Islam, 187f.). As Mukul has shown, the 1947 annual number of Kalyan opened with an 
extract from a speech by Golwalkar. Entitled ‘Sachcha Rashtravad’ or True Nationalism, the piece 
rails against the following blunder: ‘We accepted India has many nations and like the Americans 
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that, he maintains, follows the definitions of the ‘learned political thinkers of the 
world’20:
In fine, the idea contained in the word Nation is a compound of five distinct factors fused 
into one dissoluble whole [,] the famous five Unities: Geographical (country), Racial (Race), 
Religious (Religion), cultural (Culture) and linguistic (language).21
He then considers these five factors in some detail, first in general terms and then 
specifically in the Hindu case. In doing so, he fuses religion and culture into one, 
just as the Shankaracharya had done in the preceding article. As he proclaims: 
‘Culture is but a product of our all-comprehensive Religion, a part of its body and 
not distinguishable from it’ (Islam 2015, 158).22 Religion for him is not an individ-
ual question that needs to be kept out of ‘public and political life’. Rather, 
agreed to have a federation. This gave rise to a mutilated version of sub-nationalism in India’ that 
‘lacks true Bharatiyata (Indianness)’ (2015, 248). In June 1947, Kalyan carried another incendiary 
speech by Golwalkar (ibid., 253).
20 As Jaffrelot has shown, Golwalkar drew inspiration for his definition of what constitutes the 
nation from German thinkers, amongst others from ‘Bluntsley’, or Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, 
who defined nations as ‘organic beings’ with a ‘national spirit’ and ‘national will’. The nation 
was not composed of an arbitrary combination of men but of those rooted in a specific civiliza-
tion as articulated in the physique of the race and in their language and manners. Golwalkar’s 
understanding of race differed from the German; it was not obsessed with purity of race but 
rather with common cultural traits as inherent to the group, collectively inherited from their 
forefathers (2005, 70–4). 
21 Islam 2005, 154.  
22 Golwalkar differed in his conceptions of Hindu culture and religion from that other great 
ideologue of the Hindu Right, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966), who was president of 
the Hindu Mahasabha from 1937 to 1943. His best-known work, The Essentials of Hindutva was 
published in Nagpur in 1928. Excerpts here are from the web edition of the work: http://www.
savarkar.org/en/hindutva-hindu-nationalism/ essentials-hindutva. Last accessed on July 25, 
2018.  The overarching concept for Savarkar was culture rather than religion, which was sub-
sumed under ‘common fairs and festivals, rites and rituals, ceremonies and sacraments’. His 
definition of Hindu was threefold, whereby culture was defined, amidst its other attributes, by a 
common history, common literature, etc., rather than theologically: ‘A Hindu then is he who feels 
attachment to the land that extends from Sindhu to Sindhu as the land of his forefathers – as his 
Fatherland; who inherits the blood of the great race whose first and discernible source could be 
traced from the Himalayan altitudes of the Vedic Saptasindhus and which assimilating all that 
was incorporated and ennobling all that was assimilated has grown into and come to be known 
as the Hindu people; and who, as a consequence of the foregoing attributes, has inherited and 
claims as his own the Hindu Sanskriti, the Hindu civilization, as represented in a common his-
tory, common heroes, a common literature, common art, a common law and a common jurispru-
dence, common fairs and festivals, rites and rituals, ceremonies and sacraments’.  
1110   Vasudha Dalmia
Religion in its essence is that which by regulating society in all its functions, makes room for 
all individual idiosyncrasies, and provides suitable ways and means for all sorts of mental 
frames to adopt, and evolve, and which at the same time raises the whole society as such, 
from material, through the moral to the spiritual plane. (159)
Politics itself becomes a small factor ‘to be considered and followed solely as one 
of the commands of Religion and in accord with such commands’ (160). He denies 
the validity of sects, in short the plurality of Hindu belief systems, by proclaiming 
that they are ‘only parts of religion’ and not a multitude of religions (161). Finally, 
language, in the Hindu case Sanskrit, is ‘an expression of the Race spirit, a man-
ifestation of the National web of life’ (162). 
We can return now to Golwalkar’s article in our volume. After having pro-
claimed the identity of this ‘I’ with the nation, he proceeds to further develop 
his proposition.23 The person becomes vast (vishal) following the identification 
of the individual (vyakti), society (samaj), and the world-Self (vishwatma). Bring-
ing these three together, he experiences a vastness that is difficult to experience 
in this world. A philosophical-theological edifice is thus restructured to include 
as an integral part an entirely modern concept, samaj or society. This is further 
equated with rashtra or nation, as if it had existed as such since time immemorial 
and had integrally belonged there. Society and the nation thus acquire metaphys-
ical dimensions. 
This identification of man with nation, as Golwalkar goes on to explain it, 
makes for great happiness and peace in society. The people who constitute this 
society are of the same kind, have been created out of the same essential princi-
ple (sattattva), and therefore love one another. Society will be happy, progres-
sive, and best (shreshtha) in the same measure as the number of knowledgeable 
(jnani) people who exist in it (59). By this he presumably means those who have 
attained a higher state and merged with the nation. To dream of ‘Anarchism – 
withering away of the state’ (English in the original, 60) is possible only in Hindu 
culture. But while we wait for this situation to come about, Hindu culture seeks 
23 As Damle and Anderson put it, Golwalkar in his Bunch of Thoughts, ‘mentions four virtues that 
characterize the ideal man. The first is “invincible physical strength” […] referring to the calm re-
solve needed for commitment to disciplined activity. The second virtue, which Golwalkar called 
“character”, is a personal resolve to commit oneself to a noble cause. These two virtues must be 
guided by “intellectual acumen”, the third virtue. Lastly, “fortitude” is a virtue which permits the 
honorable person to persevere in a virtuous life. To summarize, the virtuous life is, above all, char-
acterized by industriousness combined with a zealous and painstaking adherence to dharma’ (1987, 
74; the authors have used an earlier edition of Golwalkar’s work, the page numbers they give do 
not tally with my edition). Golwalkar remains consistent in his thinking. The adherence to dharmic 
norms precludes any deviance from them, readying the individual for his merger with the nation.  
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to  regulate matters, to provide a corrective to disorder and misrule. Hindu culture 
and social order are here made coeval with the state without any further discus-
sion. Non-Hindus are obviously excluded from this order, since the same fellow 
feeling and love cannot exist outside the religion which fuses them together. 
Hindu culture has sought to provide an order to curtail the injustice perpe-
trated by those with wealth on those without wealth. This is the first and only 
mention of social inequality; it is immediately countered. For Hindu culture has 
seen that mutual dependency, mutual cooperation, fellow feeling, and affection 
are what keep society well ordered. Hindu culture has sought to follow this prin-
ciple in the constitution of its social order (60). 
Golwalkar concludes by reverting to his central thesis: ‘In everyday (vyava-
harik) life, all people should follow the resolve (dharana) that this society is the 
manifest form of the incorporeal Highest Self (amurta paramatma)’. This Highest 
Self is the lord of the world. 
The individual, becoming vast, in order to attain this happiness-filled (sukhamaya) Highest 
Self, has the duty to serve this manifest form of the Highest Self by becoming one with it, 
by renunciation, by selflessness, with his body, mind and speech, by offering it body, mind 
and wealth. Only by fulfilling this duty with his entire feeling (sarvabhava), can he attain 
success in this life, can attain happiness. (60) 
The wise who practice this Hindu culture will see that only this will lead to world 
peace and they will light the path for those who have forgotten their culture. Gol-
walkar closes by offering his short article at the feet of the Highest Self in the form 
of the Hindu nation (61).
This idea of the individual as part of a whole is repeated incessantly in Gol-
walkar’s writings, though elsewhere less explicitly clothed in a theological edifice 
than in the above formulation. Expressed in more general terms, which are of 
some significance for our considerations here, he says in the translated version of 
his writings compiled under the title Bunch of Thoughts: 
In the same manner, individuals, though imperfect, when merged into a corporate whole, 
can give rise to a perfect society. And therefore the superficial differences born out of the 
imperfections of the individuals are only indicative of the diverse manifestations of the one 
great and perfect and mighty reality – the society. This appreciation of the inherent spark 
of Truth, of Divinity in every individual, has penetrated into our various components and 
spheres of life – religious, social, political and economic – and patterned them for a har-
monious pattern of mutual goodwill and respect. This catholicity of spirit is an altogether 
unique contribution of our culture to world thought. (Golwalkar 1980, 51f.)
As Golwalkar puts it a little later in Bunch of Thoughts: ‘The ‘permanent’, there-
fore, is the national life. The ‘impermanent’ is the individual’ (61). This, then, is 
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a consistent pattern of thinking: national life is identified with the transcend-
ent Highest Self, or Ultimate Reality, and the individual is asked to merge with 
this national life in order to acquire perfection and permanence.24 Once again, 
Hannah Arendt provides a crucial insight into the kind of thinking that underlies 
pan-movements such as this:     
The pan-movements preached the divine origin of their own people as against the 
 Jewish-Christian faith in the divine origin of Man. According to them, man, belonging inev-
itably to some people, received his divine origin only indirectly through membership in a 
people. The individual, therefore, has his divine value only as long as he belongs to the people 
singled out for divine origin. He forfeits this whenever he decides to change his nationality, 
in which case he severs all bonds through which he was endowed with divine origin and 
falls, as it were, into metaphysical homelessness. The political advantage of this concept 
was twofold. It made nationality a permanent quality which no longer could be touched by 
history, no matter what happened to a given people – emigration, conquest, dispersion. Of 
even more immediate impact, however, was that in the absolute contrast between the divine 
origin of one’s own people and all other nondivine peoples, all differences between the indi-
vidual members of the people disappeared, whether social or economic or psychological. 
Divine origin changed the people into a uniform ‘chosen’ mass of arrogant robots.
(Arendt 1976, 233f.)
Golwalkar takes the hierarchical thinking of the Shankaracharya, and the bulk of the 
articles in the volume that echo him, to another level of abstraction, in which varna, 
the social status one is born into, is to be considered natural and innate to the person. 
The ground reality can be whatever it is; he leaves it untouched and uncritiqued. In 
Golwalkar’s thinking it becomes irrelevant. He does not address any notion of social 
inequality, any question of social injustice. The same is true of all sense of individu-
ality. Difference of personhood is considered superficial, a sign of imperfection. Indi-
viduality is regarded as something that needs to be submerged into a greater whole 
to achieve its potential, into samaj or Hindu rashtra. This is but one step towards a 
yet greater whole, paramatma or the Highest Self, making the rashtra or nation part 
and parcel of a transcendence that is absolute, unreachable by history.  
What of those who are not Hindus? In his 1939 book, the author who then 
identified himself as Golwalkar maintained roundly that, 
all those, who fall outside the five fold limits of the idea [nation], can have no place in the 
national life, unless they abandon their differences, adopt the religion, culture and lan-
guage of the Nation and completely merge themselves in the National Race.
(Islam 2015, 181) 
24 Jaffrelot also makes this point briefly: ‘This ideologically based cohesion coincides with a 
devaluation of individuality in the R.S.S.; the “new man” must sacrifice his personality to the 
cause’ (2005, 79).   
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As long as they maintain their difference, they are foreigners and live at the mercy 
of the national race. They ‘may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the 
Hindu Nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential 
treatment – not even citizen’s rights’ (Islam 2015, 183f.).
As in the view of the Shankaracharya, the social and cultural order proposed 
by Golwalkar as the base of the Hindu nation is Brahminical in its terminology 
as much as in its orientation. As Jaffrelot has pointed out, although the R.S.S. 
was conceived of as egalitarian, the view of its leaders continued to be based in 
the varna system, its pracharaks or preachers being drawn overwhelmingly from 
the Brahmin caste. The appeal to the low castes was surely in part due to the 
process of Sanskritisation, or the upward social mobility that belonging to this 
order entailed.25  
To return to the Gita Press volume, the universal impact of Hindu culture 
on other cultures is proclaimed by no less a personage than C. Rajagopalachari 
 (1878–1972), the then Governor-General of India (1948–1950), in his one page 
article. It is titled ‘Hindu samskrit hi vishvasamskriti hai’ or ‘Hindu culture alone is 
world culture’ (63).  As far as Rajagopalachari is concerned, there is no question of 
mutual interaction with other cultures; the action is entirely one-way. The univer-
salistic claims of Hindu culture are maintained also by two historically sketchy arti-
cles in the volume which deal with the influence of Hindu religion and culture on 
Islam and Sikhism, written, respectively, by a Muslim, Saj Rehmani ‘Firdausi Baba’, 
and a Sikh, Gyani Santsingh Pritam. These articles are intended as evidence that 
Rajagopalachari’s proposition is accepted by the followers of these two religions.
In the concluding section of this essay, I turn to the treatment in the volume 
of Mahatma Gandhi, who identified himself as a believing Hindu through his life 
and who was arguably the most significant Hindu of his time. Two thirds of the 
way in, the Gita Press volume contains a five-page article on ‘Mahatma Gandhi 
aur hindu samskriti’, ‘Mahatma Gandhi and Hindu culture’, by Pandit Lakshm-
inarayan Garde, a member of the editorial department of the Press and of the 
editorial board of our particular volume.26 This article is sandwiched between 
an article on death rites in Hindu culture and a set of three articles on the place 
of the cow, and on its protection, in Hindu culture. The Mahatma’s thinking is 
presented largely in accordance with the general editorial bent of the volume, 
though his marked deviations from it are impossible to entirely ignore and are 
25 Savarkar differed from those who believed in preserving the purity of the caste system. He 
believed in  cross-caste marital unions.  
26 Ibid. 598–604. As Mukul has noted, the Kalyan did not register the assassination of the Ma-
hatma in its February 1948 issue. In fact, Poddar was actively involved in defending the R.S.S., 
which, as noted above, had been banned for its alleged role in the killing (2015, 58f.).  
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partially noted. In the following, I present the main points of the article. I then go 
on to discuss how the Mahatma’s deeply personalised moral vision, his radical 
reformulation of views he held earlier, is essentially either not realised and regis-
tered or is passed over deliberately in this account. 
4 Gandhi’s vision as second counter-pole
Garde begins by proclaiming that Hindu samskriti itself was incarnated in the 
person of Mahatma Gandhi. The Mahatma was proud to be a Hindu. He pro-
claimed himself a sanatani or eternal Hindu.27 There was no trace of communal-
ism in his thinking, and Garde draws from this the conclusion that Gandhi was 
proof of the fact that the Hindu is, in general, not communal; he has love for all 
in his heart. The Mahatma’s universal love manifested itself in his dharma to free 
India. He showed by his work in South Africa that there was no feeling of enmity 
in his heart (598). Garde cites an excerpt from an interview with an English jour-
nalist at the beginning of 1937 as evidence that the Mahatma had full faith in his 
god that India would win its independence from the British, a belief that was 
fulfilled on August 15th 1947. This belief in God is the root base of Hindu culture, 
from which originates the second base, religion (599). Once again, we see that the 
wider term ‘culture’ envelopes the more particular ‘religion’. 
Garde follows these propositions with a second, partial quotation from the 
Mahatma. In this very early quotation, from Young India, September 29th 1920, 
Gandhi makes four declarations: that he believes in the Vedas, Upanishads, 
Puranas and all Hindu religious texts; that he believes in varnashrama dharma; 
that he believes in cow protection; and that he does not disbelieve in the worship 
of murtis or icons. Garde adds that the Mahatma did not believe in socialism or 
communism. His was a belief in religion, in ishvara, the lord, and in the tradi-
tionalism of Hindu samskriti. Having proclaimed this, Garde is forced to make 
important admissions on the grounds of the Mahatma’s later radical qualifica-
tions of his early statements, though he treads with great caution while doing so. 
27 ‘Sanatana Dharma’ or eternal, perpetual Dharma, to which most mainstream modern Hindus 
see themselves as belonging, is a nineteenth century creation. It projects itself as monolithic, 
pan-Hindu, and as enshrined in the oldest texts of the Hindus. As Zavos has pointed out in the 
context of the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas or Associations that sprang up from the late-nineteenth 
century in response to reform movements, practice and structure (image worship and caste hi-
erarchies) – as opposed to a theological core – were propounded as the defining features of this 
dharma (2000, 50–7). The Mahatma, in fact, does not fit into this mould, as we will see. The 
others represented in Hindu Samskriti do. 
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There were certain things in Gandhism, he explains, that, in the eyes of the san-
atani Hindus, were not in accordance with the Shastras, the institutes of religion. 
However, despite thus deviating, the Mahatma continued, from his own perspec-
tive, to base his views in Hindu samskriti. For example, although he believed in 
the varna order, he did not observe the present rules regarding commensality or 
inter-caste marriage. Nevertheless, he agreed in principle that marriages work 
best within one’s own culture. And although his effort to improve the lot of the 
lower castes and to promote Hindu-Muslim unity will always remain praisewor-
thy, if a person knowledgeable in the Shastras were to proclaim these beliefs to 
be outside the realm of these institutes, his saying so would not be out of place. 
Garde then quotes the Mahatma as saying that the store of Hindu samskriti is as 
overflowing as nowhere else in the world, something that the people do not yet 
know, as they have been kept far from it and have not yet recognised its virtues. 
As Garde proclaims, it is thanks to the British that they have forgotten their own 
cultural wealth (600). 
This is followed by general observations on the decentralised economic order 
that the Mahatma wanted to see established, the dismantling of large indus-
trial units, and his regard for honesty in public transactions, all of which were 
patently being disregarded in newly independent India. The socialism that was 
being followed was not in accord with Hindu samskriti (601). This was happen-
ing because Hindus were turning away from god, from the Mahatma’s belief in 
the Bhagavadgita. However, the Mahatma also used the Muslim terms for god – 
Rahim, Karim, and Allah – to persuade Muslims to acknowledge god, although 
it was unclear what effect this would have had on them (602). The rest of the 
article deals at length with the Mahatma’s own emphasis on the significance and 
value of chanting the name of Rama, and the crises from which this chanting had 
saved him (603). Garde closes with the observation that it was through this belief 
in the name of Rama that God procured independence for India. This independ-
ence should be used today in the cause of Rama. Only then would it be protected 
and prosper, leading to the spread of the rule of Rama throughout the world. The 
Hindu religion is then to rule the world as much as the nation. 
With the exception of his two equivocations concerning Dalits and Muslims, 
Garde presents the Mahatma’s thinking rather schematically in an effort to 
contain him. He does not falsify so much as omit or suppress that which does not 
fit into his generally conservative view of the Mahatma, although he does note 
where the Mahatma falls entirely out of line with the normal trends of conserva-
tive Hindu thought. It is important to see what aspects of the Mahatma’s thought 
he leaves out and ignores in order to make clear what he cannot afford to enter-
tain as worthy of note – the issues which would question the central ideas of the 
volume as a whole. 
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The Mahatma’s key ideas were evolved over time as part of his active life 
and they can often seem contradictory when taken out of chronological order. In 
order to understand his notion of Hinduism, I have mostly relied on the meticu-
lous work of J.T.F. Jordens (2012). Jordens’ interpretation, while taking cognisance 
of key studies of the Mahatma’s life and works, relies almost exclusively on the 
Mahatma’s own writings in laying out his views on the most salient aspects of 
his beliefs. Jordens pays particular attention to the changing of these views over 
time, for the Mahatma often revised his own earlier opinions. He was not apolo-
getic about this. Jordens cites his proclamation that,   
“I have never made a fetish of consistency”, and [he] advised the reader to reject his earlier 
statements for his later ones.
(Jordens 2012, 108, citations from The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, henceforth CW, 
vol. 59, 62). 
According to Jordens, the two most balanced statements of the Mahatma’s views 
of Hinduism were published in 1921, the first in Gujarati in Navajivan under the 
title ‘Who is a Sanatani Hindu?’, and the second later in the year in English in 
Young India, under the title ‘Hinduism’.  The Mahatma affirmed the fundamental 
tenets of Hinduism; a Hindu was one who believed in the existence of the atman, 
the Self, and the paramatman, the Highest Self; who believed that the atman did 
not go through birth and death but passed from existence to existence; and who 
believed that the atman could attain moksha or release from this cycle. He also 
dealt in these writings with the question of revelation. As he wrote in the English 
article, he had deliberately omitted the words ‘divine revelation’ with regard to 
the Vedas as he did not believe in the exclusive divinity of the Vedas. The Bible, 
the Koran, and the Zend Avesta were also divinely inspired. Secondly, not every 
word and every verse of these texts was divinely inspired. These had to pass the 
test of reason and morality before they could be accepted as true. And finally, 
he repudiated the authority, if they claimed it, of the ‘present Shankaracharyas 
and shastris to give a correct interpretation of Hindu scriptures’. People capable 
of doing so could emerge in the future but, in the meantime, ‘we, the common 
people, may cling to the essentials with a simple faith and live our lives in bhakti 
to God’ (ibid., 88–90; the Mahatma’s statements from CW 21, 246). This repudia-
tion of the claim of the Vedas to be the sole divine revelation, and of the author-
ity of the Shankaracharyas and other religious leaders to interpret them, con-
tradicts in its entirety all that is represented as Hindu Samskriti in article after 
article of the Gita Press’s publication. We should also to note that, in his later 
years, the Mahatma took care to distinguish between religion and culture, as 
Kumkum Sangari has shown. Regional and professional  commonalities, shared 
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customs and languages, common suffering in the context of colonial domina-
tion, and the struggle for independence, all of these undercut religious differ-
ence (Sangari 2002, 8f.). 
As for the belief in varna and ashrama, the Mahatma held to their basic 
validity all his life. But if he had originally claimed that they exercised bene-
ficial restraints for promoting self-control, he later modified his opinion radi-
cally with regard to intermarriage and interdining, as Garde had also pointed 
out. Lack of restraint in these matters, according to the Mahatma, had lead to 
the creation of innumerable jatis,which had created chaos. The original varna 
scheme had placed no restriction on intermarriage and interdining, which had 
now been brought into operation. It was necessary now to revert to the original 
order: 
The law of varna has nothing to do with these restrictions. People of different varnas may 
intermarry and interdine…But a Brahmin who marries a Shudra girl or vice-versa commits 
no offence against the law of varna.
(Jordens 2012, citations from The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, henceforth CW)
By 1931, he had declared that according to his definition of varna, ‘there is no 
varna in operation in present day Hinduism’. It had become extinct. By 1933 he 
was declaring both intermarriage and interdining to be a personal matter. 
His writings on the issue of untouchability are voluminous. As he stressed 
again and again, he was vehemently and expressly opposed to the doctrine and 
denied that it was sanctioned by scripture:  
If I discovered that those scriptures which are known as Vedas, Upanishads, Bhagavadgita, 
Smritis, etc. clearly showed that they claimed divine authority for untouchability […] then 
nothing on this earth would hold me to Hinduism. I should throw it overboard as I should 
throw overboard a rotten apple.    (Jordens, 112f., citation from CW 57, 7)
Untouchability was contrary to reason; it was a violation of truth and of non- 
violence. And it was in conflict with the fundamental precepts of Hinduism (ibid., 
112f., CW 26, 265). We have seen above that the Shankaracharya saw the practice 
of denying temple entry to Dalits as not only in consonance with varnashrama 
dharma but also in keeping with the natural order of the cosmos, prophesying 
dire natural disasters if it was transgressed. 
In the present context, three further issues warrant a closer, if necessarily brief, 
look. First, the Mahatma’s insistence in his last years that religion was a personal 
rather than a political matter, that it could never be a state concern: ‘Religion is a 
personal matter which should have no place in politics’ (Sangari 2002, 4; citation 
1118   Vasudha Dalmia
CW 76, 402, from the Mahatma’s paper, Harijan, 9 August 1942). As he specified in 
another context: 
I do not believe in State religion even though the whole community has one religion. 
State interference will probably always be unwelcome. Religion is purely a personal 
matter. There are in reality as many religions as minds. Each mind has a different con-
ception of God from that of another.
 (ibid., 6, citation from Harijan, 16 March 1947, CW not specified)
Secondly, we need to take note of the intensely personal nature of his moral 
vision. As Jordens points out, ‘in the final instance the supreme authority in 
matters religious is vested in the individual conscience. This primacy has been 
given the name of “the inner voice” by Gandhi’ (Jordens 2012, 152, citation CW 
26, 140). To safeguard against capricious use of it, the Mahatma at various times 
specified under what conditions it could be held to be valid:  
We should listen to everybody’s advice, but do only what our conscience tells us. And in 
order that our conscience may speak, we should observe the yama-niyamas [rules and regu-
lations for the spiritual aspirant similar to the Ten Commandments]. Everybody cannot hear 
the inner voice. We need divine ears to hear it.
(Jordens 2012, 153, citation CW 49, 311)
In speaking of the decision to embark on his 1932 Poona fast in his fight against 
the  communal award of separate electorates to Dalits in response to hearing the 
inner voice, he spoke once again of the preparation needed in order to hear it: 
Realist things are only relatively so. For me the Voice was more real than my own existence. 
It has never failed me, and for that matter, anyone else. And everyone who will can hear 
the Voice. It is within everyone. But like everything else, it requires previous and definite 
preparations. (Jordens 2012, 144) 
The point to be made here is the radical individuality of his moral vision. It stands 
in sharp contradiction to the primacy given to the authority of texts as propagated 
by the Shankaracharya and the other contributors to the volume. 
Finally, it will be worth considering the Mahatma’s ideas on pluralism, which 
he put forward in his later years, modifying his earlier views about the supremacy 
of Hinduism over other religious systems. Jordens once more: ‘in his writings after 
1930 no single statement can be found affirming or even suggesting the superi-
ority of Hinduism, which he had repeatedly referred to before that date’ (Jordens 
2012, 166). The change was deliberate and, according to Jordens, can be dated to 
a letter written to Narandas Gandhi on the 23rd of September 1930:
Equality of Religions. This is the new name we have given to the Ashram observance which 
we know as “Tolerance” […] I did not like the word but could not think of a better one. 
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Kakasaheb, too, did not like the word. He suggested “Respect for all religions”. I did not 
like that phrase either. Tolerance may imply a gratuitous assumption of inferiority of other 
faiths to one’s own and respect suggests a sense of patronising, whereas ahimsa teaches us 
to entertain the same respect for the religious faith of others as we accord to our own, thus 
admitting the imperfection of the latter. (ibid., 165; citation CW 44, 166)
It has been necessary to devote considerable space to the Mahatma’s views 
in order to set into sharper relief the views expressed in the two leading arti-
cles of our Gita Press volume, which the mass of other articles in, and contri-
butions to, the special issue on Hindu samskriti follow and confirm in their 
own ways. The Mahatma differed in all key aspects from them: in the matter 
of religion and culture being one, in acknowledging the absolute authority 
of the Vedic corpus or the authority of religious leaders as sole interpreters of 
it, in the belief in the inviolability of the varna order and in the legitimacy of 
untouchability. He regarded religion as a personal matter: there were as many 
religions as minds, it was certainly not a political concern, and there could be 
no legitimate state religion. And, finally, he differed from them in his belief in 
pluralism. These views and beliefs the Gita Press volume obliterated entirely 
in its effort to offer an authoritative and cohesive view of Hindu culture, com-
pounded as it was of a range of similar positions. The Shankaracharya and 
Golwalkar held identical views on the superiority of the all-pervasive culture 
of Hindus in India, rooted in their religion and philosophy, as laid down in 
their canonical texts in Sanskrit. Being Hindu meant adhering to these texts. 
Their mental make up as part of the varna order, their common culture and 
religion, bound all Hindus together; there could be no difference amongst 
them. They alone constituted the nation. There could be no space for individ-
ual Hindus to form themselves meaningfully outside this scheme of things. 
Neo- traditionalisation had won the day.
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Veronika Hoffmann
Individualised versus institutional religion: 
Is there a mediating position?
The significance of religious individualisation is broadly accepted by scholars 
focusing on Western Europe in the twentieth century. For the most part, however, 
analyses have focused on the dichotomy of individualised versus institutional-
ised religion. Individualised religion usually tends to ignore, rather than reject 
outright, the authority and truth claims raised by institutional religion, whereas 
institutional religion tends to be critical of the completely subjective nature of 
individualised religion. This paper asks if academic theology can play a mediating 
role between the two extremes. The present paper sketches a possible approach, 
limiting its perspective to contemporary Christianity in Germany and using this 
as a case study. It starts from the assumption that faith and doubt are intimately 
connected with the shaping and reshaping of personal identity. Religious beliefs 
and practices have to “resonate” with the individual, but claims of intersubjective 
rationality and the possibility for truth can still be maintained.
1  Religious individualisation in contemporary 
German Christianity ‒ again?
If there is any field of study in the sociology of religion in which individualisation 
is broadly undisputed and probably overanalysed, it is to be found in the con-
temporary Christianity of Western Europe. However, as shall be argued in this 
paper, in the case of Christianity in contemporary Germany, a model that con-
trasts individualised religion with institutional religion is too simple. There is a 
possible mediating position that is the result of special circumstances: the prac-
tice of academic Christian theology. Academic theology occupies a special place 
as a scholarly form of religious self-reflection that is at the same time situated 
in the university and based on a specific religious creed (Hoffmann et al. 2012; 
Wissenschaftsrat 2010). This special (and sometimes uneasy) place also means, 
as I argue, that academic theology is not solely an aspect of either individualised 
religion or institutional religion. It is for this reason that it may be able to play a 
mediating role in adequately conceptualising, and thereby alleviating a specific 
tension between, individualised and institutional religion in German Christian-
ity.
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The following is a case study that draws on the specific situation of the two 
mainstream churches in Germany. While a comparison with other settings, such 
as free churches in countries without the particularities of the German state-
church law or state churches in Northern Europe, is outside of the scope of this 
article, it hopes to serve as a preliminary work for such a comparison.1 What 
follows can be read on two different levels at least: 
1.  On a theological level, this chapter reflects on academic theology in the 
context of the  tensions between institutional and individual religion and on 
the role of truth claims, individual religious identity, and doubt.
2.  The chapter can also be read on a purely descriptive level. From this perspec-
tive, it serves as a case study of a religious phenomenon that belongs neither 
in the category of ‘institutional’ religion nor in that of ‘individual religion’. A 
stale dichotomy can be avoided and more complex relationships may come to 
light by showing a possible third category. 
First, we must clarify what ‘religious individualisation’ means in this context. It 
is not possible to discuss here in full the ongoing debate on this topic (Rüpke and 
Fuchs 2015; Fuchs 2015; with regard to Christianity in Germany: Gabriel 1996a; 
Rieger 2009; Wilke 2013). Instead, I will restrict myself to a brief sketch of how 
religious individualisation will be understood in this paper. 
Following Karl Gabriel, I take it that the main feature of religious individu-
alisation is the ‘attribution of religion to an individual and his or her biography’ 
(Gabriel 1996b, 12). This definition leads to the following conclusions: 
1. Individualised religion is not necessarily religion outside of institutional con-
texts. Research shows that, in Germany, individualised forms of religion are 
found within rather than outside of the churches (Bertelsmann 2008; Wilke 
2013). Individualised religion is not necessarily a form of religion that abol-
ishes the affiliation to any religious community; rather, it is a certain way that 
‘individuals interact with religious ideas and institutions’ (Rüpke and Fuchs 
2015, 324).
2. Individualised religion can be described as ‘deviant’ religion with respect to 
the doctrines of the institution, but this is not a necessity or requirement. 
Quantitative surveys tend to pinpoint religious individualisation in this 
area, probably because the data can easily be collected – for example, the 
percentage of members of Christian churches who believe in reincarnation 
1  The paper will also refrain from any attempt to predict future developments of the religious 
field in Germany. Some substantial changes in the course of the next decades are fairly likely. 
But, in my view, the situation is far too volatile to be in any way predictable.
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(Krüggeler 1993). Deviance from the official creed of the institution is an indi-
cation of individualised religion but not a necessary feature. 
3. The crucial point lies neither in a disaffiliation from religious institutions nor 
in individual deviance from official doctrine. The important point is rather 
the attribution of religion to the individual: understanding the individual 
(and the individual understanding him- or herself) as his or her own reli-
gious authority. The individual may well belong to one of the main churches 
and even be in complete agreement with that church’s teachings. But the 
ultimate reason for a certain religious form of life is not a social context that 
imposes it on the individual. Nor is it the sense of obedience to a religious 
authority nor even a compliance with what universal reason has recognised 
as ‘natural religion’ in the spirit of the Enlightenment. The reason lies in the 
individual and his or her biography – more specifically, the reason is the per-
ceived ‘fit’ between the individual’s self- understanding, his or her personal 
identity, his or her outlook on the world, and certain religious convictions 
and practices.
4. This does not necessarily lead to a ‘consciously chosen’ individual religion, 
as Peter Berger’s ‘heretical imperative’ suggests (Berger 1979). As Hans Joas, 
Charles Taylor, and others have noted, there are many factors at play when it 
comes to the formation and transformation of religious beliefs and practices, 
not the least of which are experiences that the individual will perceive as 
‘given’ rather than ‘made’ (Joas 2014; Taylor 2007, 833). Individual religion 
is not about choice per se, as a conscious act of selecting something from 
a menu of religions or compiling one’s own ‘religion à la carte’. The point 
is that whatever an individual’s religious beliefs and practices may be, they 
are his or her own in an emphatic sense of the word. They are not based on 
what religious authorities, the shared positions of a community, or academic 
consensus tell someone, but on who the person is: on their experiences, their 
values, and so forth. There is a need for ‘personal resonance’ (Taylor 2003, 
89), as Charles Taylor puts it. This includes the possibility that the individual 
may not choose at all in matters of religion because religion is just not that 
important to him or her. And although religious institutions may qualify indi-
vidual religious positions as ‘orthodox’ or ‘deviant’, these are not key ques-
tions or categories from the point of view of the individual. When it comes 
to mixing Christian and non-Christian elements of religion, for example, 
‘[t]hese alternative elements [to Christian religion, V.H.] are not perceived 
as contrary to the Christian self-understanding but as good and helpful. 
Authenticity, personal experience and consistency with one’s biography are 
the social place of this form of religion, not some religious creed’ (Wilke 2013, 
40; Gebhardt et al. 2005).
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The relevant criteria are not the reliability of a religious tradition, the question of 
universal truth and eternal salvation, or even an overwhelming religious experi-
ence. They are (1) the ‘authority of the individual’ in matters of religion, which 
refers to the freedom and the responsibility of the individual concerning his or 
her religion, and (2) the ‘fit’ of this religion with the individual, including his or 
her self-understanding and biography, in short, his or her personal identity. As 
Charles Taylor puts the key idea of our ‘age of authenticity’: ‘the injunction would 
seem to be: let everyone follow his/her own path of spiritual inspiration. Don’t 
be led off yours by the allegation that it doesn’t fit with some orthodoxy’ (Taylor 
2007, 489).
Taylor’s analysis of the age of authenticity is helpful in yet another way: 
critics of these forms of individual, ‘authentic’ religion (frequently, but not only, 
church leaders and theologians) claim that they are shallow, self-centred forms of 
‘wellness-religion’ (for examples, see Gebhardt et al. 2005). According to Taylor, 
however, although the criticism is justified in some cases, when framed as a 
sweeping condemnation it overlooks a necessary distinction between ‘manner’ 
and ‘content’ (or ‘matter’) with regard to religious individualisation (Taylor 2003, 
87f.).2 The manner is necessarily individualised today: ‘The kind of quest which 
I am invoking here […] is indeed defined by a kind of autonomous exploration, 
which is opposed to a simple surrender to authority; and people who engage in 
this kind of spiritual path are indeed put off by the moralism and code-fetishism 
which they find in the churches’ (Taylor 2007, 509; cf. Wilke 2013, 74). Gebhardt et 
al. (2005) very aptly speak of the ‘self-empowerment of the religious subject’. But 
this doesn’t mean that the content of individualised religion is by definition indi-
vidualised as well. It is quite possible that the individual’s quest leads him or her 
to forms of spirituality that are not completely self-centred but, rather, oriented 
toward a higher good and a higher order (Taylor 2003, 82f.). It is this confusion of 
manner and content that leads to an undue generalisation of individual religion 
as purely egoistic self-fulfilment.
This idea of a ‘religiously self-empowered’ individual in pursuit of a spiritual-
ity that ‘fits’ his or her personal identity poses major problems from the point of 
view of institutional religion. At least, the problem arises within the scope of this 
‘case study’: Christian mainline churches in contemporary Germany. According 
to Wilke, in some religious traditions, such individual ‘tailoring’ of religion using 
different religious ideas and traditions does not lead to tension between the indi-
vidual and the institution (2013, 76). But within Christianity, being a Christian 
is traditionally linked closely to church membership and questions of universal 
2  In his later work, A Secular Age, Taylor 2007 speaks of ‘framework’ instead of ‘manner.’ 
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truth and eternal salvation. Multiple religious belongings and the combination 
of ideas from different religious traditions are not acceptable, in theory at least 
(Zander 2015). 
So there seems to be a fundamental incompatibility between these forms of 
individual and institutional religion. The key problem lies not in differences at 
the level of belief content (as the standard example of Christians believing in rein-
carnation suggests) but between, on the one hand, the institutional view of the 
interconnected nature of religious truth claims, the authority of the church, and 
institutional belonging and, on the other, the individual view of radical religious 
self-empowerment. Because this tension is to be found within the institutions, 
religious self-empowerment and belonging to institutions that are theoretically 
incompatible in fact go together to a very significant extent.3
Now, how is this problem of compatibility addressed – by the individual or 
by the institution? To a large extent, it isn’t addressed at all, either by the insti-
tution or by the individual. With respect to the individual, I have already noted 
that ‘deviance’ as lack of compatibility with the institution is not a key category. 
Being at variance with official church teaching is neither a matter of concern nor 
a matter of liberation or protest (Gebhardt et al. 2005, 146f.). In my view, this is a 
key difference to earlier versions of ‘individualised religion’ in European Christi-
anity. The ‘religiously self-empowered individual’ is (1) not practicing some sort 
of folk religion. A folk religion typically is not an individual practice and its par-
ticipants believe themselves to be within the confines of the church community. 
The individual’s self-understanding is (2) not one of being a ‘heretic’. Disputes 
over orthodoxy were traditionally disputes over religious truth claims. The heretic 
would not claim some sort of individual religion but to be right with regard to 
everyone sharing the belief in question: if God is not triune then this is a matter 
of fact that is true for everyone. If the pope has no right to hand out indulgences, 
then no one can profit from an indulgence, and so forth. As we will see, the ques-
tion of truth claims and intersubjective justification is one of the main differences 
between ‘religiously empowered individuals’ and the self-understanding of the-
ology as an academic discipline.
The perspective of the institution is even more interesting. The problem here 
is most easily grasped with regard to the Catholic Church. The problem is well 
known (church leaders are, of course, familiar with surveys such as the ‘reli-
gion monitors’) but it seems that theoretical tools to address it are for the most 
part lacking. Universal truth claims, the authority of the church teaching, and 
3  For a rereading of the classical notion of sacramentality in view of this tension see Hoff-
mann 2015.
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the requirement for a comprehensive religious praxis of all (baptised) members: 
these are core principles of the church to which it continues to adhere, although 
they are seemingly incompatible with individualised religion. Officially, there 
is no ‘Catholicism à la carte’. On the other hand, the Catholic Church has, to a 
large extent, abandoned any practice of sanctioning or excluding dissenters (the 
Second Vatican Council explicitly refrained from formulating any anathemas). 
There are pastoral projects that try to take the tension between the institutional 
idea of what it means to be Catholic and the individual versions of ‘being a reli-
giously self-empowered Catholic’ into account. But on the conceptual level, the 
churches largely resort to an ‘as-if’ mode: they act as if adhering to the whole 
apostolic creed and the church teachings, attending mass every Sunday, and so 
forth can be expected of every member of the church, as if the reasons for non-
compliance can be attributed either to unwillingness or ignorance, and as if the 
remedy therefore is either exhortations or catechesis. 
2 Religious individualisation: gain or loss?
At first sight, instead of finding a mediating position in the academic realm, the 
either–or of the individualised-versus-institutional perspective seems to continue 
there. The contrasting positions of sociologist Ulrich Beck and theologian Ingolf 
U. Dalferth can serve as examples. 
2.1 Ulrich Beck: ‘A God of one’s own’ for the ‘sovereign self’
Ulrich Beck’s view on religious individualisation is clear from the title of his 
book: A God of One’s Own (Beck 2010). As for Wilke, Gebhardt and his co-authors 
and others, the ‘sovereign self’ is the new religious ‘authority principle’ (Beck 
2010, 29). Just how important the dichotomy of individual–institutional religion 
is for Beck becomes clear when he declares secularisation as ‘a great gain for 
religion’ (Beck 2010, 24, emphasis in original). ‘Secularization does not mean 
the demise of religion and faith, but instead the development and massive dis-
semination of a religiosity that is based increasingly on individualization’ (Beck 
2010, 29). The ‘decoupling of (institutional) religion and (subjective) faith’ is a 
key factor.4 
4  Beck 2010, 26. Beck believes that religious individualisation is part of a larger trend of reli-
gious revitalisation. That is highly debatable, for example, if one looks at the data provided by 
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What sets Beck’s analysis apart from other sociological studies is that his 
analysis is not purely descriptive. Beck makes a clear plea for everybody’s ‘own 
God’, especially because the individualising of God is necessary for a more peace-
ful future of religion. Whereas the ‘institutional God’ insists on exclusive truth 
claims, the ‘God of the individual’ tends to encourage peace and tolerance regard-
ing questions of so-called orthodoxy. According to Beck, if truth claims are ever to 
be reconciled with peace, this can only be achieved if we take religious truth to be 
radically subjective: one’s own God can be tolerant of the Gods of everybody else. 
Beck tries to distinguish his concept of a ‘God of one’s own’ from ‘postmod-
ern religiosity’. The latter comprises a ‘radical cultural and ethical relativism’ 
(Beck 2010, 134) that is celebrated as liberation from totalitarianism. ‘Religious 
postmodernism is based on the assumption that it is intellectually impossible 
to choose between “truths”. To that extent we can and must make our choices 
pragmatically – and we do so from the standpoint of “what does me good”’ (ibid., 
135). Beck’s objection to this is that ‘the cultural, subjective fluidity of religious 
convictions undermines the minimum of certainty that individuals require in 
order to form a personal identity as believers who have to assume responsibility 
in all aspects of society […] What keeps the conscious mind alert to the fact that 
the foundations of a personal religiosity can only be won and defended through 
public, political intercourse with others?’ (ibid., emphasis in original). Instead of 
a postmodern religiosity, Beck advocates a ‘religiosity in the second modernity’ 
that is not based on radical subjectivity but on the ‘impurity of cultures’: against 
‘the ideal of purity to be found among the clerical guardians of the truths of insti-
tutionalized national churches’ (ibid., 140), multiple belongings are possible. By 
way of example, he refers to what seems to have become the standard example of 
‘individualised religion’: the belief in reincarnation by self-professed Christians 
(ibid.).
Thus, Beck tries to advocate an individual religion that at the same time has 
a public dimension to it. Ultimately, however, it remains unclear how he can 
extract himself from the dichotomy of ‘either institutional or individualised’. 
How, exactly, can he prevent the ‘God of one’s own’ from being no more than a 
God who ‘does me good’? This paper argues that Beck’s model is missing a third 
perspective between the individual’s very own, private God and the religious 
institutions that claim to have a universal truth. That makes it almost impossible 
for him to effectively attribute some sort of rational, intersubjectively justifiable 
dimension to individualised religion.
the 2008 and 2013 Bertelsmann religion monitors. The point here is not Beck’s argument as a 
whole but the way he separates institutional religion and individual spirituality. 
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2.2  Ingolf U. Dalferth: ‘I determine what God is’ as ‘cafeteria 
religion’
Can academic theology provide this third perspective? It is important to note that 
while there is no sharp boundary between theologically trained and untrained 
individuals – probably every form of belief implies some sort of ‘theology’ –, 
the distinction between individual religion and academic theology in our case 
can be made clearly. This is in part due to the specifics of the German situation 
mentioned above: the academic discipline of theology is, on the one hand, con-
nected to a specific religious denomination but, on the other hand, committed to 
the rules of the academic discourse, namely an argumentative approach in the 
context of public discourse. Both features do not apply to the ‘religiously empow-
ered self’. 
At first glance, it seems that although theology is not structurally to be iden-
tified with the magisterium – and is very adamant about its academic freedom –, 
with respect to the critical view of individual religion, the mainstream of Chris-
tian theology sides with the institutional view. Ingolf U. Dalferth’s criticism of 
what he calls ‘cafeteria religion’ can serve as a case in point (Dalferth 2000). He 
argues that if ‘I determine what God is’, individualised religion is incapable – and 
unwilling – of rational justification: ‘No one asks whether what is determined 
this way is really God and whether God is really this way. These questions play no 
role because they are not thought to have any answer that would be more than a 
new (or old) mixture of opinions. In matters of religion and faith, public opinion 
now seems to recognize, at most, questions of taste’ (ibid., 8). Theology, in con-
trast, although as a self-reflection of religion speaking from the perspective of the 
participant rather than the observer, aims at rational self-reflection and thereby 
at the ability to account for its position in public discourses. Its critical distance – 
but not separation – from faith makes it possible for theology to explore the dif-
ference between the belief in God and the reality of God, although the reality of 
God is never accessible from the point of view of an observer. And the reality of 
God is the reference point, according to Dalferth: ‘The faithful do not subscribe 
to the principle “We determine what God is”, but rather to the principle “God 
determines what we are”. They thus determine God as they are determined by his 
reality. This, at any rate is the claim by which they are to be measured and it is the 
task of theology to do so critically. The truth of faith is decided by God’s reality’ 
(ibid., 18).
The Barthian heritage is of course clearly perceivable in this argument. More 
interestingly, Dalferth, as a Protestant, is in no danger of arguing too loudly with 
the authority of the church. He doesn’t claim that theology has definitive answers, 
either: 
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This does not mean, that we – as individuals or as a community – must consider our own 
understanding of God infallible or absolute. What Christians believe is not true because 
they believe it. They distinguish between God and the understanding of God, between 
truth and the practice of faith, because they seek to align themselves with God’s reality. 
In this way, the fundamental capacity for and obligation to self-criticism is built into the 
Christian faith itself. To this belongs that we refer to others in our own practice of faith, 
communicate with them, and thus create relative public spheres in which there is room 
for comparison, conflict, correction, deepening, or the combination of different concep-
tions of God.
 (Dalferth 2000, 19).
But truth claims and public accountability are the standards of Christian religion, 
not a ‘fit’ to personal wishes and spiritual needs. As Dalferth notes, ‘Precisely 
here lies the ineradicable contrast to the current culture of religious tinkering. 
Because they confess that they live out of the perception of God’s effective pres-
ence, Christians are obliged to resist the contemporary tendencies toward the 
privatization of faith, subjectivist mysticism, and the dissolution of religion into 
psycho-technical media of self-discovery’ (ibid., 22f.). 
Thus, the authority that is overthrown by the authority of the ‘self- empowered 
religious individual’ is not to be understood too narrowly as the authority of 
the ecclesial magisterium. It may as well be the authority of Scripture or, as in 
Dalferth’s case, the perceived authority of God himself (usually thought of as 
mediated through the Scriptures and, in some cases, through religious experi-
ence). The common denominator of those concepts is that the authority to ‘deter-
mine what God is’ lies not with the individual but with an ‘outside authority.’ This 
does not mean that the individual has to follow this authority blindly. As we have 
seen, Dalferth argues strongly in favour of critical reflection and public discourse. 
But it means that faith is discovered, taken on, accepted, or appropriated, not 
made or compiled. 
2.3  Academic theology: critic of religious individualisation 
by default?
Although positions vary, of course, and not every theologian would agree with 
Dalferth’s arguments in every respect, assessments of individual religion such 
as that offered by Dalferth are quite prevalent in Christian theology. There is a 
considerable amount of scepticism concerning common forms of individualised 
religion (Gebhardt et al. 2005, 139). Critical reviews of Beck’s God of One’s Own 
support this impression. Wilhelm Eppler, for example, argues that a ‘sovereign 
self’ that looks at religion in a purely utilitarian fashion disregards the truth 
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claims inherent in the Christian faith as revealed religion (Eppler 2009). And 
Gregor Maria Hoff remarks that any form of critical reflection on religion – the 
principal task of Christian theology – is made impossible if everybody believes 
only in his or her own God (Hoff 2008). Like Dalferth, Hoff highlights as the key 
problem the lack of any ‘outside’ dimension of individualised religion. The reli-
gious self’s own God is a completely internal one, a God that ‘looks confusingly 
similar to the self’ (Hoff 2008). 
Individualised religion seems to be inherently problematic not only from 
the perspective of religious institutions but – albeit for other reasons – from the 
perspective of Christian theology as well. But this paper argues that, on a closer 
look, theology can provide theoretical tools to help understand individualised 
religion in a more nuanced way and without a priori questioning the truth claims 
of the Christian religion. In this way, the dichotomy of individualised versus insti-
tutional religion can be transformed into a tension that can be handled instead of 
ignored. For the most part, these tools are already at hand but have not yet been 
applied systematically to the question of individualised religion and its relation 
to religious institutions.
3  Conceptualising individual religion and its 
tension with institutional religion from a 
theological point of view
There are at least two lines of argument in current theology that take the view 
of the individual into account in some way. Both provide helpful insights but 
they also have their shortcomings, so it will be necessary to explore a third line 
of approach as well. In each case, how the issue of religious doubt is treated will 
serve as a test case for the relationship between questions of truth, authority, 
and individual appropriateness. Although an open approach toward doubt is 
not in itself a sign of individualised religion, the ways in which religious doubt 
is understood nevertheless reveal something about how individual faith is 
conceptualised in relation to institutional authority and intersubjective truth 
claims.5
5  For a more detailed reflection on the emergence of new perspectives on doubt in Christian 
theology, see Hoffmann 2017.
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3.1 Rational justification of faith
The first approach has, in fact, already been introduced into our discussion 
by Dalferth’s arguments. Theology aims for a rational justification of faith and 
thereby moves away from any idea of unquestioned obedience to Scripture, 
church teaching, and the like. Without rational insight, there can be no public 
accountability, and rational insight cannot be prescribed. The individual himself 
or herself may and must take on the responsibility for what he or she believes. So, 
in a sense, critical self-reflection of religion itself shifts the emphasis toward the 
individual. However, at the same time, the reason to which rational argumenta-
tion refers is not individual, in the sense of relying on a personal fit or a biograph-
ical dimension, but is, rather, universal, as rationality is generally understood to 
be. The reflective process is not aimed at the meaningfulness for the individual 
but at intersubjective accountability. 
This move toward the individual but not, as it were, to the personal level is 
reflected in the role of doubt ‒ whether it concerns certain key beliefs or practices 
or the religious option as a whole. Traditionally, because faith is closely linked to 
truth and salvation, the more certain it is, the better. Doubt is an unwanted and 
potentially dangerous phenomenon. But if rational insight is one of the key fea-
tures of individual faith, doubt may play an important role in the process of clar-
ifying one’s position. Many theologians would argue that, at least from a rational 
point of view, faith never becomes unquestionably evident. It follows from this 
that doubt might even be an unavoidable presence, a constant factor in the ‘con-
flict of [religious and nonreligious] interpretations’.6 On the other hand, this form 
of doubt does not stem from ‘personal resonance’ but from rational justification, 
an intellectual exercise, it is true, but not necessarily a markedly individual act. 
In principle, and at least in the context of the same cultural and intellectual her-
itage, a good argument would be a good argument for everyone. 
3.2 Faith development
The biographical dimension of faith is more evident in the second line of 
approach: theories of faith development, such as James Fowler’s ‘stages of faith’ 
(Fowler 1989). Here, individual faith is closely connected with biographical pro-
cesses. It develops essentially in the context of the personal development from 
6  For a prominent example of a theology based on this idea (the term ‘conflict of interpretations’ 
is derived from Paul Ricœur, but adapted to the theological setting), see Werbick 2005.
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childhood to adolescence to adulthood. It is not necessary to look in depth at 
theories of faith development to see that a fundamental issue already arises in 
the concept of a ‘development’ (usually in one direction, with possible stagnation 
but no relapses) towards a ‘mature state’ of faith. Such a teleological understand-
ing of ‘faith development’ tends to restrict the individualisation of religion to 
individual ways of finally reaching a predefined goal.7 Of course, a development 
of identity can be assumed in children and adolescents and that their faith also 
develops in this context. But both become problematic when they assume that 
although some may climb further up the ladder than others, (1) there is a place 
for everybody to stop, and (2) there is no going back, no climbing down the ladder 
again.8 Hartmut Rosa has maintained that, for many today, personal identity is 
no longer something they ‘develop’, ‘find’, or ‘achieve’ at some point in their lives 
but, rather, an ongoing process (Rosa 2002). The same applies to the religious 
dimension of that identity. 
Thus, although faith development theories provide a helpful connection 
between biographically shaped individuality and religion, there are some heavy 
constraints to this connection. Our ‘test case’ ‒ doubt ‒ also points in this direc-
tion. In the context of faith development, doubt can easily be seen as an inte-
gral part of this development, marking the transition from one stage of faith to 
another. But its function tends to be limited to that of a catalyst for growth. The 
direction in which it will lead (ultimately, ‘higher up’) seems to be clear from the 
outset.
3.3  The processual character of religious identities and the 
role of faith and doubt 
These ‒ and possibly other ‒ approaches pave the way for a concept of faith that 
pays more attention to the dimension of the individual. But in and of themselves, 
they don’t lead far enough to overcome our individual‒institutional dichotomy. 
If theology wants to find a conceptual way to transform the dichotomy between 
individual and institutional religion into a tension, it needs to link faith and per-
sonal identity more closely. Two aspects are of particular relevance: 
7  It is important to note that this does not imply that the later stages are ‘better’: Fowler and 
Dell 2006, 40.
8  Fowler speaks of the possibility of a ‘recapitulation’ of earlier stages of faith, but that is not a 
real relapse but a new working-through of an earlier stage that overcomes earlier blocks or unre-
solved issues (Fowler 1989, 289ff.).
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1. What Taylor calls ‘personal resonance’ is mandatory. That a faith is said to be 
true or to lead to salvation (or both) is no longer a sufficient reason to engage 
in it, as long as it does not resonate with the individual. At the same time, 
Taylor’s distinction between the ‘manner’ and ‘matter’ of individualisation 
will help to counter the criticism of Dalferth and others that religious individ-
ualisation will lead to a completely ‘subjectivised’ religion. 
2. Personal identity is to be seen more as an ongoing process, not as a sequence 
of developments that reaches its final destination in a ‘maturity of adulthood’ 
and that applies equally to its religious dimension. A once-and-for-all- stability 
may not even be the ideal anymore. Instead, the aim is an always-to-be- 
rediscovered ‘fit’ of all the elements of an ever-changing personal identity in 
ever-changing contexts. Applied to religion, it is not the stability of a defin-
itive, doubtless faith that is looked for, but a personal faith that changes as 
the personal identity changes ‒ without this identity ‘growing’ to a ‘definite’ 
or ‘mature’ state. Gebhardt et al. speak of religious ‘wanderers’ (instead of 
‘pilgrims’, who are also on the way but are on their way to a clearly defined 
destination). Taylor takes up the image of being religiously ‘underway’ when 
he outlines ‘authentic spirituality’ as not aiming for a ‘position’ (of religious 
certainty, of attained truth, etc.) but as a spirituality of personal ‘quest’: ‘I have 
to discover my route to wholeness and spiritual depth. The focus is on the indi-
vidual, and on his/her experience. Spirituality must speak to this experience. 
The basic mode of spiritual life is thus the quest’ (Taylor 2007, 507f.).
In this setting, doubt, like faith, can be seen as a companion during the whole 
process of identity formation and re-formation, being affected by, causing, allevi-
ating, or speeding up the mechanisms involved. Doubt can also be understood as 
a signal that the ‘fit’ between the individual’s overall self-understanding and his 
or her religious beliefs and practices is lost. It therefore can be a catalyst but also 
a danger, a challenge, or a permanent feature of one’s religious identity. What 
is not the key factor here is what is frequently on the forefront of accounts of 
religious individualisation: a ‘deviance’ of the individual’s religious beliefs and 
practices from those of the institution ‒ perhaps even a deviance that makes a 
point of being deviant. The notion of doubt shows that the process component of 
religious individualisation connected to identity processes refers not only to an 
individual appropriation of or deviation from institutionalised religion but also 
to the process character of individual religion itself: the doubting individual can 
question religious positions or practices of communities as well as his or her own 
religious perspective.
 So much for doing justice to the individual side of our ‘dichotomy to be trans-
formed into a tension’. What about what has been subsumed under the heading 
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of ‘institutional’: the role of the churches themselves, as well as questions of truth 
and rationality that have an inherently intersubjective dimension and, conse-
quently, are in danger of marginalisation in the context of ‘one’s own God’? Critics 
aren’t wrong to claim that if ‘I determine what God is’ in a sense that excludes 
all rational justification or reference to already established religious reflection 
then it is highly questionable if the thus-determined God is anything more than 
a projection of my wishes, needs, and ideals. As noted earlier, Taylor’s distinc-
tion between the ‘manner’ and the ‘matter’ of what he calls ‘subjectivation’ can 
be used to maintain the tension here instead of resolving it in any one direction. 
Taylor contends that it is not only possible but necessary to orient one’s iden-
tity toward perspectives or values that don’t begin and end within the individ-
ual: ‘I can define my identity only against the background of things that matter. 
But to bracket out history, nature, society, the demands of solidarity, everything 
but what I find in myself, would be to eliminate all candidates for what matters’ 
(Taylor 2003, 40). A similar argument is made by Rosa; the ‘turning inward’ of the 
individual only works as long as it is not complete: ‘As long as a subject is able to 
ontologise any part of his or her identity (more discovering than choosing it, as it 
were), and defends this part against all opposition, a highly individualised iden-
tity can be developed, maintained and articulated’ (Rosa 2002, 290, emphasis in 
original). Identity problems don’t arise because the individual fails to find definite 
answers to all the questions he or she asks in the course of this development. The 
identity enters into a crisis when those questions can’t even be asked anymore 
because a radicalised self-reference no longer accepts any values as more than 
arbitrary choices ‒ a subjectivation of manner and content, as Taylor would call it. 
From a theological point of view, this form of connecting individual religion 
and personal identity allows for a subtler theological understanding of religious 
individualisation. There is no need to reject it a priori, implying that all individual-
isation equals some sort of self-sufficient, self-centred ‘wellness-religion’. Nor has 
theology to refrain from any critical assessment for the sake of ‘personal resonance’, 
for example, with regard to the possibly projective character of ‘one’s own God’. 
4 Conclusions and consequences
I have argued that theology can occupy something of a mediating position 
between individual and institutional religion. Usually, individual religion tends 
to ignore or outright reject the claims of truth and authority that institutional reli-
gion raises, whereas institutional religion tends to be critical of ‘completely sub-
jective’ individualised religion. The conceptual possibilities for the  integration of 
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individual perspectives into the basic orientation of the main Christian churches 
in Germany are still limited. Theology offers some initial approaches towards the 
connecting of individual and institutional perspectives that can be used as start-
ing points for a ‘mediation’ between the two. A basis for further development is 
the notion that faith and doubt are intimately connected with the shaping and 
reshaping of personal identity, but it does not follow that one has to completely 
abandon claims of intersubjective rationality and the possibility for truth. Reli-
gious beliefs and practices depend on a ‘personal resonance’ from the side of 
the individual, and the distinction between ‘manner’ and ‘matter’ of individu-
alisation makes an ‘outside grounding’ of this personal resonance conceivable. 
This by no means implies that the tension between individual and institu-
tional religion can easily be resolved. One could rather argue that it can in this 
way be described more clearly and therefore recognised as a tension. Theology 
has to play its part as a medium for critical self-reflection of religion in both direc-
tions. Individual religion must, for example, face questions about the projective 
character of a ‘God of one’s own’. Institutional religion has yet to fully realise 
that (1) ‘faith’ can no longer be conceived of as some objective ‘state’ defined by 
church authority that is to be attained and maintained by church members, and 
that (2) ‘personal resonance’ and a connectedness with personal identity must 
shape any contemporary theology of faith (and doubt). 
What might be the consequences for both sides of the ‘tension’? Here one 
can only speculate. On the side of individual religion, the possible effects of such 
a theological approach are particularly difficult to determine. They will depend 
on, among other factors, a certain willingness of the individual to reflect on 
and rationally question his or her religious beliefs and practices (otherwise, the 
concept of ‘doubt’ is also difficult to apply). 
Possible consequences may more easily be envisaged on the side of the insti-
tution. The connection of faith, doubt, and identity accounts for individualised 
religion within a theological framework that is compatible with the core beliefs 
of the institution. Therefore, it can offer an interpretive approach to the tension 
between institutional religion and individualised religion within the institution. 
The individual approaches to, appropriations of, and deviances from the insti-
tutional religion would no longer have to be handled in an ‘as-if mode’. Instead, 
they could be interpreted as integral parts of the processual character of lived 
individual religion. This might be characterised as some sort of ‘reinstitutional-
isation’ of individual religion ‒ if the term is used in line with the overall thrust 
of the present paper, that is, as referring more to discursive changes than to 
 empirical data. Perhaps a term such as ‘institutional integration of individualised 
religion’ would be more appropriate.
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Michael Nijhawan
Constructing a genuine religious character: 
the impact of the asylum court on the 
Ahmadiyya community in Germany
1 Introduction
In late November 2014, German investigative reporters for Der Spiegel, in collab-
oration with the televised magazine Report Mainz, published a feature about the 
Ahmadiyya community, alleging that mosque-based organisations in charge of 
membership registries demanded disproportionately high fees from their new-
comers in exchange for certificates needed in court hearings. Such certificates, 
aside from verifying membership in good standing, are also used to attest the 
holder’s involvement in religious practices. Ahmadi asylum seekers who initially 
rely on state support, it was claimed in the report, were exposed to an ‘extrac-
tion scheme’ that increased the vulnerability of refugees in an already volatile 
situation. Although community representatives vigorously rejected the claim that 
there was any such systematic abuse of asylum seekers, and indeed the reporters 
made little effort to dig deeper and understand the organisational structures of 
the group, the state agency for refugees and asylum claims (Bundesamt für Migra-
tion und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) launched an official investigation, questioning the 
legitimacy of the documents in asylum hearings. 
It appears that judges in the administrative courts were already sceptical 
about the credibility of the certificates. In one of my interviews with asylum 
adjudicators that accompanied my ethnographic work with Sikh and Ahmadiyya 
communities in Frankfurt and Toronto between 2003–2013 (Nijhawan 2016), a 
Note: This is a fully revised and abbreviated version of an earlier published chapter titled ‘The 
Radiating Effect of the Asylum Court on Religion’ which originally appeared in my book The 
Precarious Diasporas of Sikh and Ahmadiyya Generations, published by Palgrave Macmillan 
( Nijhawan 2016). The German Research Council (SFB 619) as well as the Canadian Council for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences provided generous support for this project in addition to minor 
grants from the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies, York University. I use pseudo-
nyms throughout this chapter to refer to all of my research participants. A draft of this paper was 
presented at the conference “Religious Individualization in Historical Perspective” that was held 
in Eisenach from June 27-30, 2017. I would like to express my gratitude to Ishita Banerjee, Jan 
Bremmer, Vasudha Dalmia, Saurabh Dube, Martin Fuchs, Anne Murphy, Kumkum Sangari and 
Jörg Rüpke for their constructive feedback at this occasion. I also thank Bernd-Christian Otto for 
his editorial queries and for guiding me through the final production stages.
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judge alerted me to this issue, mentioning that the courts explicitly require claim-
ants to document a ‘genuine religious character’ or religiöse Prägung. What lurks 
in the background is the status of Ahmadis as a precarious minority being sub-
jected to religious persecution, a category that has been recognised in the legal 
system as constituting a reasonable ground for admission. Meanwhile, it appears 
that the files have become more of a negotiating piece within a larger commu-
nicative context between lawmakers, individuals, and religious organisations. 
Ruminating about the various implications of the certificates, the possibility 
that demands are made in exchange for a good report, the gendered inequalities 
that come to the fore, and the role of lawyers who sometimes argue for and other 
times against the recognition of religious membership through the certificates, 
the judge described the situation as truly paradoxical: ‘It is simply not enough 
that a person is in some way persecuted; he must be persecuted on the basis of his 
Ahmadic religion (er muss ja wegen seiner ahmadischen Religion verfolgt worden 
sein) and the Ahmadic religion has to be of personal importance. He has to be, 
like they say it, a person with a religious personality. […] And this is why, besides 
verifying what had really happened, we always need to check how it is with his 
religiosity, is he at all devoted? To begin with, is he a member at all? That’s why 
we have the certificate; but then we have to ask, is he an active member, is he 
actively engaged? It is a huge problem; of course you cannot look right into his 
heart (sie können ihm ja nicht ins Herz rein gucken)’.
We can already gather from this opening statement that legal processes 
through which particular categorisations of religious character are validated 
during asylum adjudications are not only based on the credibility of individual 
claims. Rather, they also rely on the inquisitive methods of bureaucratic and judi-
cial fact-finding, which in turn are grounded on problematic assumptions about 
inner states of religiosity and normative religious practices, as well as specific 
cultural assumptions about what constitutes a credible narrative of persecution. 
Deliberations between different social actors on these issues have significant ram-
ifications that point beyond the immediate issue of granting someone asylum. 
The requirement of an authentic narrative for establishing religious char-
acter is neither innocent nor accidental to the system of refugee adjudication 
which, viewed from a comparative perspective, can take the form of ‘religious 
trials’ (Kagan 2010, Good 2013).1 Bearing in mind that there is a broader context 
for such interrogations of migrants’ religious sincerity and individuality, I want 
to examine the processes through which religious subjects and categories of 
1 See Kagan 2010, who suggests this terminology in his assessment of refugee boards in inter-
national contexts. 
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religious difference are governed in liberal democracies. To be more specific, I 
argue that assumptions about the inner sphere of personally held religious faith 
as encountered above, point directly to how judicial authority, and the law more 
generally speaking, informs concepts of individual religious choice, interpre-
tation, practice, and understandings of religious character as they circulate in 
the public realm. The implications of refugee adjudication are manifold in this 
respect and have long-term effects on the relationship between governments, 
courts, and society. 
The processes through which methods of inquiry, interpretive languages and 
normative schemes are negotiated and translated between the legal, political 
and social fields are never static. In fact, the practices constituting these fields 
undergo rapid changes themselves, with each influx of refugees posing new chal-
lenges to the system and creating political pressure on the judiciary  accompanying 
intense social contestations, processes we can witness all over Europe in recent 
years. Dagmar Soennecken (2009) argues that, certainly when one considers 
the post-Second World War history of German asylum law, the balance between 
political and judicial power has shifted over time, with the lower courts gradually 
taking on the role of silent lawmakers.2 It is particularly important to consider the 
role of the administrative courts, because the large bulk of refugee determinations 
occur here through the appeal process. Even though scholars have singled out the 
higher level and constitutional courts as having the most decisive impact on leg-
islative reform in the context of immigration (and religion), the role of the asylum 
courts is relevant due to the fact that in these courtrooms adjudicators, claim-
ants, and various experts and community members gather routinely to negotiate 
aspects of social and cultural citizenship. Moreover, the asylum courts provide us 
with more in-depth perspectives into how norm-setting procedures around legit-
imate claims to protection from religious persecution work on a day-to-day basis. 
It is sociologically imperative here to examine how political, judicial, and social 
fields are framed and become regulative of conduct and practice over time. 
Marc Galanter (1983, 120) argues that surrounding even the most authorita-
tive norms there is a great deal of indeterminacy and ambiguity as to how they 
impact different levels of social practice. Courts can convey ‘regulatory endow-
ments’ through the modes of rationality that the court rulings establish (think-
ing about specific ‘norms, procedures, structures, rationalizations’) and simul-
taneously by means of ‘explicit authorizations and immunities conferred by the 
2 Whereas most authors are concerned with the growth of judicial power with regard to the 
realm of political decision-making and legislative change, Soennecken is instead placing the 
emphasis on ‘judicialization from within’, which relates to how decision-makers adopt court-like 
procedures and rationalisations within e.g. bureaucratic structures.
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courts (and the law) on an immense variety of regulatory settings’ (ibid., 122). If 
regulatory endowments work in direct as well as indirect ways, it can surely be 
asked how normative ideas on religious belief and practice that are certified or 
invested with authorised truth claims in the courts impact on other areas of social 
action. When judges deliberate on religious practices in the court room, draw on 
legal guidelines from higher order rulings, hear witness experts, and use their 
own cultural reasoning to demarcate lines between people’s behaviour, they not 
only produce legal texts that legitimate status issues but they also communicate 
norms and expectations that are heard and responded to by the community. Not 
every individual will be affected by it, yet ‘religious individualisation’ as a process 
is certainly at stake in a context in which modern law, and more precisely those 
occupying positions of judicial authority, make decisions that impinge on the 
normative rendering of individual representations of religious behaviour. 
It would perhaps be exaggerated to claim that the law leads to the 
‘ neo-traditionalisation of religion’, a topic with which we have framed this 
section of the publication. Yet what should surface from my discussion below is 
an answer to the question of how terms such as ‘deviance’, ‘tradition’, and ‘reli-
gious character’ are rendered meaningful and become reified within particular 
constellations of modern judicial power. While difficult to show, these are vital 
issues when attempting to understand the specific effects that refugee determi-
nation processes have had on the Ahmadiyya community in Frankfurt. We can 
observe here how, over a period of three decades, the assessment of being a 
genuine refugee (of being genuinely injured in the way defined by asylum law) 
has become intricately linked to the question of how to be a genuine Ahmadi, that 
is, of being recognised in one’s religious character so that the former becomes 
intelligible to adjudicators, who have to decide whether or not a higher risk of 
being persecuted is incurred.
I have organised my discussion under four rubrics. I begin with a brief nor-
mative history of the asylum court and clarify the particular role Ahmadiyya 
cases have had on legal clarifications of religious persecution. I then consider 
the problem of credibility in asylum claims and elaborate on how judges ‘as final 
arbiters of credibility’ (Good 2009) approach the ambiguity of validation (Haber-
mas 1992). Credibility is probably the most commonly referenced topic in recent 
anthropological studies, which can be consulted for comparative insights. I am 
specifically interested in the role of intuitive knowledge (or ‘gut feeling’) and the 
use of ‘imagined identifications’ (Kelly 2012, 764) that characterise credibility 
assessments that are informed by attitudes of either scepticism or benevolence. A 
third section discusses the role of the judge as cultural arbiter. Here, we encounter 
a profound translation problem, for it is through specific rationalisations of reli-
gious and cultural difference that those seeking refuge are assessed. The tendency 
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is to make individual motivations transparent, yet claimants are also exposed as 
cultural others in this process, allegedly lacking certain traits that would make 
them fall in line with secular values. As the normative underwriting of judicial 
power is now widely debated in the literature with regard to the religion/secu-
larism binary, the fourth and major section of the chapter examines how, within 
refugee legislation in international and domestic realms, a particular interpreta-
tion of Ahmadi religious character is beginning to surface. Judges not only put 
credibility on trial and establish narratives as legal fact, they also continuously 
write the meanings of religion and religiosity into legal texts. I am interested here 
in how to understand this process from two specific angles. First, as Didier Fassin 
(2013, 48) recognises in contexts of trauma assessments in the courts, we have 
recently witnessed a ‘reconfiguration of the perimeter of persecution to include 
the intimate’, which is most obvious in the importance given to psychiatric doc-
uments certifying PTSD and the role played by expert witnesses, such as anthro-
pologists, speaking about atrocities in war-torn countries (see also Good 2009). 
I argue that a parallel resignification of religiosity occurs, which is recognised as 
a fluid zone stretching across a ‘core area’ of privately held belief and ‘peripheral 
regions’ of outwardly expressed behaviour. The courts are in need of certainty 
and clarity so that the legal process of granting Ahmadis asylum can make sense. 
Hence, in order to validate acts of religious persecution, it becomes imperative for 
the courts to establish a relationship between subjectively expressed belief and 
observed practice based on cultural assumptions of what counts as reasonable 
or normal expressions of religiosity. The consequences of such assumptions are 
particularly drastic when collectives such as the Ahmadiyya community bear the 
mark of either too little or too much religion in current immigration discourses. 
It is this contemporary constellation of religious individualisation and/or de- 
individualisation that this chapter interrogates. 
2  Ahmadi refugees and the role of the activist 
court in the light of art. 16 GG
In Germany, asylum law carries a specific historical legacy. Art.16 GG (Grundge-
setz, ‘constitutional law’) which values generosity over scepticism in the enact-
ment of asylum rights was once a pillar of German post-war democratisation, 
and one of the foundational constitutional principles upon which part of the 
moral legitimacy of the new federal republic was seen to rest. Tellingly, it was 
not the result of a law imposed by Allied Forces but the consequence of a will for 
atonement that the drafters of the constitution saw as reintroducing dignity into 
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the law (Soennecken 2009, 121).3 Soennecken observes that the growth of judicial 
power in the field of asylum did not flow directly from this constitutional prin-
ciple itself. In fact, it was first ignored when Germany dealt with millions of dis-
placed ethnic Germans – the so-called Vertriebenen-Deutsche – in the post-War 
period. In reality, it only became operative decades later, in the early 1980s, when 
the then prevalent ethnonational concept of German citizenship was challenged 
by postcolonial migrations and new refugee movements. It was during this period 
that new administrative procedures to fully implement Art.16 GG enabled lower 
courts to acquire the role of silent lawmakers (ibid., 114). The emerging signifi-
cance of asylum courts was directly related to (1) the lack of political vision with 
regard to de-facto immigration under a then-dominant guestworker paradigm 
and (2) the conspicuous ‘legislative silence’ (ibid., 104) on Germany’s asylum 
policy, which until the major constitutional amendment of Art.16 GG in 1996, 
left it to the judicial system to shape policy surrounding the refugee question. 
Post-1980 Ahmadi refugees arrived in precisely this period during which admin-
istrative courts acquired the role of activist courts. Ahmadis also feature in the 
two landmark cases ruled on by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht hence BVerfG) in the 1980s, at a time when the government began 
to dejudicialise the refugee assessment procedure through enhanced bureaucra-
tisation (ibid., 128).4 Arguably, the BVerfG ruling to recognise Ahmadis as a per-
secuted group in need of state protection played a major role. This legal recogni-
tion did not imply, however, that asylum status would be granted automatically. 
Rather, the higher courts specified procedures for establishing the critical thresh-
old of persecution. Much of the ‘fine print’ of the ruling was concerned with risk 
assessments of inner and outer forums of religious practice. The gradual growth 
of judicial power in the asylum courts was partly a consequence of the newly 
required fact-finding missions, a scenario for which the Ahmadiyya continued to 
provide an important point of reference as time went on.5
Ahmadis continue to be systematically marginalised in much of the Muslim 
world. The founder of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamat, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–
1908), entered the public sphere claiming prophetic qualities, a claim that is still 
largely rejected by dominant Sunni groups. Discrimination of Ahmadis must also 
be read within the specific historical context of state-formation in Pakistan, that 
is, in a context in which Ahmadis, some of whom were politically influential 
3 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Joppke 1999.
4 Reference here is to BVerfG 54, 341 (1980) and BVerfG 76, 143 (1987), the two rulings that clar-
ified the recognition of religious persecution under art. 16GG (see also Soennecken 2009, 130).
5 The administrative courts have been required to produce detailed evidence to evaluate group 
persecution status and to assess the risk for individuals to be subject to human rights violations. 
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leaders and members of the judiciary, became scapegoats in a political power 
struggle that shifted the country away from its secular constitution. Discrimina-
tion against the Ahmadiyya community, pejoratively labelled the ‘Qadiani sect’ 
after the place where the movement began, was historically motivated by conten-
tions between political factions and religious organisations that date back to the 
pre-Partition period and the then central political role of the Ahmadiyya move-
ment (van der Linden 2008). It was under Mirza Mahmud Ahmad and during the 
Kashmir crisis in the 1930s, argues Adil Khan (2015, 126), that the movement grad-
ually shifted its emphasis from the ‘otherworldliness of Ghulam Ahmad’s Sufi 
metaphysics’ to a broader ‘populist approach that offered this-worldly gains for 
average Indian Muslims’. Political scientists argue that the volatile institutions 
and political mobilisations of the post-Partition years created the peculiar con-
ditions for Ahmadis to assume the role of the nation’s enemy (Iqtidar 2012). In 
addition to Islamist parties, which had as their rationale the rejection of ‘contin-
uous prophecy’ in Ahmadiyya doctrine (Friedmann 1989), parties far removed 
from Islamism adopted the idea of Ahmadis as deviant others or delegitimised 
Muslims. In the period between 1974 and 1984, the ‘Ahmadiyya question’ gained 
political ascendancy, with the consequence, argues Sadia Saeed (2007, 146), that 
Ahmadis were disciplined into denouncing Islamic affiliation and in that sense 
served as the decisive figures in a process of redefining the relationship between 
state and religion. Boundaries ‘between the centre and the periphery, public and 
private, lawful and unlawful […] were debated, re-drawn, and re-inscribed in the 
nationalist narrative’ (ibid., 146). These processes of sanctioning Ahmadis were 
also supported by the socialist government under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto until it was 
overthrown by Zia al-Haq’s regime, which authored the 1984 anti-Ahmadiyya 
ordinance. Since then, it has become de facto illegal for Ahmadis to claim official 
status as belonging to a Muslim religious organisation and to practice ordinary 
religious lives in Pakistan. ‘Posing’ as Muslims, as the constitutional amend-
ment reads, is sanctioned with up to three years in prison. Due to the widespread 
violence and everyday forms of social discrimination, the community decided 
to move its headquarters to London.6 The exiling of the spiritual successor or 
khalifa furthered the transnationalisation of a religious movement that was ini-
tially limited to the proselytising activities of its missionaries. As I demonstrate 
elsewhere (Nijhawan 2016, 233–74), this transnationalisation resulted in a pro-
found organisational restructuring and institutionalisation of mosque-based 
6 As Adil Hussain Khan (2005, 165) points out, ‘Ahmadis often compare the story of [the khal-
ifa’s] escape from Pakistan [in 1984] to the hijra (emigration) of the Prophet Mohammad from 
Mecca to Medina’. 
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membership groups from the youth to the elderly, and further accelerated the 
movement of Ahmadi refugees to the UK, Germany, Canada, the United States 
and other countries. Although I could not acquire the exact figures, there is no 
doubt that the demographic of the community or Jamat in the Frankfurt region 
is disproportionally high in refugees admitted from Pakistan. This has forged a 
negative public image and social stigma that the community is still fighting to 
shake off. 
In the autumn of 2008, I conducted a number of in-depth interviews with 
legal adjudicators in the Rhein-Main metropolitan area, among them senior 
judges of an administrative court who had served there for several decades. The 
two judges I reference in this section were self-declared liberal  humanists and 
openly critical of revisionist political tendencies in the field of refugee rights. 
As a result, they called for an activist role for the judiciary. Judge A remembered 
vividly that when he joined the asylum chamber in 1983, five years after the state 
decentralised the asylum system by appointing decision makers and a state 
representative to defend the governments’ interest in the administrative courts, 
they were ‘suddenly faced’ with 500 to 600 cases of Sikh and Ahmadi asylum 
seekers per year. This volume would rise in subsequent years before subsiding 
to ‘less conspicuous’ numbers during the mid-1990s. In procedural terms, the 
administrative courts now consisted of specific chambers in which judges pre-
sided over asylum cases from a particular country.7 They heard appeal cases 
which, because of the frequent use of the ‘manifestly unfounded’ category used 
in first hearings, essentially meant they were adjudicating the large majority 
of actual refugee claims. When Judge A began his work on Ahmadi cases, it 
took him almost two years to complete the ‘necessary background research’, a 
fact, he admits, which gradually led to ‘an intense preoccupation with Ahmadis 
and Ahmadiyyat’ beyond his work in the courtroom. In our conversation, he 
mentioned the largely dismissive attitude within society and the judiciary and 
described how in his own chamber the judges felt like protectors of constitu-
tional rights in a political climate that rendered human rights vulnerable to 
opportunistic projects aimed at gaining electoral votes by calls to curb immigra-
tion. Seen from the perspective of the judiciary, their role was to be affirmative 
7 It was assumed that in the process of gradually acquiring the necessary (legal, contextual 
and cultural) ‘background knowledge’, the judges would be in a better position to function as 
a legal bulwark against fraudulent claims of persecution whilst identifying those who deserved 
admission.
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of the substance of asylum as historically manifest in specific institutionalised 
forms and practices.8
The judges’ role is, of course, not adequately addressed by mere reference to 
the court’s defiant stance in a context of rising anti-immigrant sentiments, a situ-
ation that we face once more today. Since I have just indicated that administrative 
courts have been exclusively focused on specific cases, the question of judicial 
power more generally must be looked at in relation to this  country-specific pre-
occupation. We have a courtroom here that over more than three decades has 
functioned as a meeting ground for community, government and judiciary; and 
so the issue, I think, points beyond case law and the intricacies of asylum leg-
islation. As the subsequent discussion demonstrates, discourses on individual 
and human rights and cultural and religious difference emerge in this scenario 
as socially ambiguous and politically consequential. Adjudicating Ahmadis who 
were subjected to religious persecution necessarily invokes assessments and 
cultural translations of the inherent religious character of the entire community 
claiming protection. This is where I want to shift the attention: we can see that 
over a longer period of time, the court’s centrifugal impact is felt in the arena of 
institutional religion and in public discourses on social integration and religious 
otherness. 
3  The threshold of credibility:  
semantic indeterminacy and judicial authority
There is little doubt among those working on asylum law that credibility assess-
ments have formed the core of the judicial process of refugee determination. 
The language of credibility has become pervasive in the court room and among 
the public at large, be it in response to representations of mass migration and 
boat refugees or to accounts of forged narratives of persecution that, as Fassin 
(2013, 50–2) demonstrates, have elicited a generalised sense of deep suspicion 
that intersects with an already present inherent culture of suspicion in the state 
bureaucracy.9 In asylum hearings in which trauma narratives are the essential 
focus, the judges’ problem of dealing with the ‘known unknowns’ has acquired 
8 Fassin (2013, 43) speaks of a ‘dual historiographical and semantic legacy’ in reference to the 
marginal space occupied by asylum law and ‘the ambivalence of hospitality, [as] always in dan-
ger of hostility’. 
9 See Suketu Mehta’s ‘The Asylum Seeker’ in the New Yorker, which suggests the ‘banality of 
deception’ in asylum claims as a common trope (cited in Fassin 2013, 51f.).
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some attention (Kelly 2012, 765) and anthropologists have looked at the broader 
implications of the certification and narrativisation of endured suffering (Fassin 
and d’Halluin 2007; McKinney 2007; Fassin and Rechtman 2009). In international 
contexts of adjudicating refugee claims, the reference to such credibility assess-
ments (also known as ‘refugee status determination’ or RSD) is particularly con-
tentious. Kagan (2010) shows that in scenarios of religious persecution, refugee 
boards and local courts engage in refugee status determination to make categor-
ical distinctions between legitimate refugees and so-called religious impostors. 
As he notes, ‘when asylum adjudicators set out to decide whether to accept such 
refugee claims, they can quickly find themselves administering a process akin 
to a religious trial’ (ibid., 1181).10 Even if such trials find a claimant’s account 
trustworthy with regard to the reported external facts, credibility still matters as 
remaining doubts over the ‘internal coherence’, a category often used in asylum 
hearings, can lead to dismissal. Once established as legal facts in court hearings, 
credibility assessments are unlikely to be questioned and are usually ‘not subject 
to rigorous appellative review’ (ibid., 1184). In Germany, the first hearings are 
administered by the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF). Consider-
ing the many factors that constrain the reliability of admission processes, those 
involved in asylum hearings are faced with a high degree of arbitrariness and with 
contradictory decisions insofar as favourable outcomes are not only contingent on 
the inquisitive strategies deployed by the adjudicators but also on the systematic 
flaws and errors in the bureaucracies themselves. As Bohmer and Shuman (2007, 
603) aptly put it, ‘contradiction is at the root of the production of ignorance’ in 
asylum hearings, which they consider to be built not on actual fact-finding pro-
cedures but on interrogation techniques that have the sole intention of deterring 
‘unworthy applicants’ (ibid., 604). Factoring in the broader institutional param-
eters that structure these assessments and the amount of discretion given to first 
decision makers, it seems inevitable that assessments of credibility and sincerity 
form epistemologically and morally vexed grounds of decision making.11
10 Kagan (ibid. 1185f.) refers to several court decisions in the United States where similar issues 
came to the fore.
11 Kagan points out: ‘In real life, credibility assessment involves many more factors, includ-
ing not just the answers but also the questions, the way the questions are asked, and the en-
vironment in which they are asked. Even vague and incoherent testimony may not definitively 
indicate fraud, because cultural barriers, language and interpretation problems, mental health 
issues, and the general limitations of human memory and communication can produce honest 
testimony that nevertheless appears superficially incredible’ (ibid., 1185).
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The judges I interviewed recognised credibility as a major problem.12 Judge 
B rationalised the judges’ dilemma by highlighting the uncertainties faced in 
making a judgment. Responding to my question about how he would defend the 
exceptionally generous handling of asylum cases in his own chamber, he pointed 
to the matter of credibility and how he and his colleagues, after detailed inter-
viewing and fact checking, would often ‘give the claimant the benefit of doubt’. 
Though he admitted a degree of naïveté in some such instances of credibility 
checks, he felt his generosity to be morally justified to prevent unjust deportations. 
The difficulty is in establishing the exact threshold at which ‘an asylum-relevant 
level’ of persecution is reached, which can vary greatly depending on how the 
judiciary defines the critical threshold. He further discussed what in the German 
legal jargon are referred to as exaggerated accounts (gesteigertes Hervorbringen) 
and noted how such assessments become contingent on the judges’ own predis-
positions. One judge might recognise cumulative acts of discrimination as fulfill-
ing the criteria of human rights violations, whereas another would consider the 
same circumstances as indirect persecution and thus an unsubstantiated claim. 
To counter legal ambiguity, both judges reemphasised their normative interpreta-
tion of Art. 16 GG and the moral obligation to uphold the right to asylum, which 
required adaptation to changing legal and political guidelines. For instance, 
interview techniques were adapted to fit the new rulings by upper level courts, 
especially the BVerfG 1994 decision to withdraw the status of group persecution 
for Ahmadis. As Judge B explained, they therefore avoided granting or withhold-
ing group persecution status and instead consistently assessed the risk potential 
in individual cases, even if that slowed down the process considerably.13 
Credibility assessments depend on interview and protocol technique as well as 
on the judges’ willingness and capacity to grant an appellant the opportunity to 
provide as much contextual detail as they can (through follow-up questions when 
deemed necessary) to bolster a claim. Much of this process depends on the willing-
ness of the judge to interpret the adequacy of descriptions and to identify discrep-
ancies in linguistic competency as cultural barriers and educational deficits rather 
than inconsistencies in internal credibility. Language matters profoundly in such 
circumstances of semantic indeterminacy. Linguistic anthropologists have long 
12 Judge K traces the history of credibility issues to the situation German courts faced when 
having to assess conscientious objectors to military service in the past.
13 Political pressure by the government to dissuade courts from implementing such statutes of 
group persecution was undeniably also a factor. Judge A points out that the state representative 
(Bundesbeauftragte) was routinely appealing the chamber’s decisions. This is notwithstanding 
the fact that according to the UN human rights conventions, Ahmadis clearly fulfill several crite-
ria that would justify group-based claims. 
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recognised this fact and looked at asylum hearings as spaces of meaning-making, 
which Jacquemet (2013, 203) appropriately terms ‘transidiomatic environments’ 
designed to deal with ‘deterritorialized speakers and their multiple languages’. 
There are a wide range of denotational and indexical practices through which 
speaking subjects are rendered credible and culturally intelligible in asylum courts. 
Jan Blommaert (2009) shows in a case study of Rwandan refugees how qualities 
such as multilingual competency that attests to a social biography of multiple 
migrations across fluid borders spaces is, in the courtroom, judged from a stand-
ard of normed nation-ness. An individual’s heterodox articulation of identity here 
becomes ‘indexical of certain political and historical positions, defined from within 
the synchronic universe of meanings, social categories, and attributive patterns in 
which his interlocutors operated’ (ibid., 416). We need to pay attention to these legal 
categorisations of subjects seeking refugee status as either ‘in or outside normalcy’ 
(ibid., 421), as they attest to the way in which cultural differences, language ideolo-
gies, and religious practices are evaluated, and in the context of which we find that 
judges sometimes express a profound sense of unease when having to make calls 
based on a high degree of intuition. 
How should we read this sense of unease when intuition or gut feeling has 
to be admitted? The semantic and pragmatic features of asylum adjudication do 
clash here with an evidence-based understanding of the law and ideal-type form 
of justice. Getting access to objective facts is notoriously difficult. The inherent 
instability of the process seems to also result from the tension between legal 
norms and what Judge B refers to as ideological persuasion.14 This emphasis on 
persuasion points beyond ideological differences in the judiciary and speaks 
directly to the structure of judgments in asylum courts. Werner Hamacher (2006, 
678) sees such dilemmas around how to grant human rights claims as a founda-
tional crisis in law. A crisis of judgment becomes manifest with each realisation 
that the specific remoteness of life-worlds that judges have to grapple with in their 
reasoning (and which implicitly they have to translate into codified rights when 
making credibility assessments) produces doubts about the kind of justice being 
served. It further undermines confidence in the authority exercised and emerges 
as a nagging doubt for the judge arguing from a value-rational position. They 
find themselves in a conundrum – perhaps not a moral conundrum per se (as 
they can preserve moral integrity by granting the claimant the benefit of doubt) 
14 Good (2009, 53) also pays attention to gut feelings in suggesting that ‘many credibility deci-
sions rested on “gut feelings”, the application of common sense, or recourse to personal expe-
rience’. 
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but a conundrum that throws into question the very premises (possibilities and 
impossibilities) of adjudicating (asylum) law under present political conditions. 
The conundrum the judges encounter is not entirely remedied by expanding 
the zone of indecision to maintain moral integrity. Hamacher (ibid., 686) carves 
out the idea of an simultaneous activation and inactivation in the process of 
granting rights (such as human rights) that, when (partially) suspended, could 
restore something of the humanity of those having to call upon such rights under 
particular circumstances – which for him of course becomes an aporia for modern 
law itself.15 Yet, in the asylum courts it is still required that those seeking protec-
tion under changing legal frameworks must prove that they have been affected by 
severe or cumulative effects of state-condoned violence as a consequence of the 
way in which their religious identity as Ahmadi is publicly conveyed. 
This is a key point. It is because of this crucial issue of enacted religious 
character that the courts have had to set new guidelines for courtroom inter-
viewing. In the five cases of Ahmadi appellants reviewed by a ruling of the UK 
Upper Tribunal in 2012, it was affirmed that in order to establish indisputable 
credibility, asylums seekers have to demonstrate the personal threats they faced 
beyond proof of identity as Ahmadis. So the burden to prove the seriousness 
of the violation of the right to expressing oneself as a religious persona always 
remains on the claimant and, implicitly, on the judges’ ‘inquisitorial methods’ 
(Soennecken 2009, 106) and wilful decisions.16 For example, when Judge A spoke 
about the role of ‘justification patterns’ in Ahmadi cases, he was quick to differ-
entiate between the recurrent patterns of an older generation (‘they say we won’t 
leave our home country unless we are under extreme threats’) and those of the 
younger generation (‘they say they are being prevented from educational success 
and produce documents that indeed demonstrate that they couldn’t take an exam 
or were denied admission’). Despite the fact that these accounts assume the form 
of narrative patterns (thus not individually specific texts), for the judge it does 
15 Hamacher suggests that ‘political, anthropological, and theological authorities who claim to 
be the advocates of human rights would serve the justice, freedom and dignity of man best by 
expanding the zones of their indecision and by bringing about the circumstances in which none 
of their rights need ever be appealed to – circumstances in which the right not to need and not to 
use rights could be exercised without any limits’ (ibid., 690). 
16 Soennecken (2009, 106) argues that historically, judges in administrative courts were rather 
deferential to the state bureaucracy. In the post-World War II period we witnessed a fundamental 
change to this attitude. Judges at this level used an ‘inquisitorial principle, which encouraged 
them to be more investigative than their North American counterparts. […] German administra-
tive law judges who adjudicate refugee claims are required by law to apply inquisitorial princi-
ples, in contradiction to assumptions about deference’. 
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not altogether undermine their credibility.17 Even under current legal guidelines, 
judges are being asked to put themselves in the shoes of an ideal-type social actor 
who is always also imagined as a particular kind of culturally shaped individual. 
Tobias Kelly argues that, ‘judges walk a line between accepting that you may not 
know many things about a claimant and assuming that they may be hiding some-
thing from you’ and that the problem here is not only the difficulty of reading 
motivation but also of imaginary identification that stipulates ‘an image of the 
“rational man”’ (Kelly 2013, 765). But I argue that it is not just the assumption of 
rationality that matters, it is also how a particular political and cultural context is 
read as capable of instigating forms of affect. While there are precautions in the 
legal tradition against taking imaginative leaps that might betray a class bias, it 
is still prudent to ask how cultural contexts are accounted for, especially if the 
situation is politically volatile and culturally complex. 
4  The judge as cultural arbiter
In a context in which judges deliberate on the credibility of asylum claims from a 
single group over a period that spans a generation, it is worthwhile considering 
what broader cultural implications such an engagement has. The Rhein-Main met-
ropolitan area as the local context for the social interactions between state, courts, 
and communities was not arbitrarily chosen for this study. The administrative 
court in question played a leading role in documenting the situation of Ahmadis 
and provided extensive reference material for other courts in the country as well 
as bureaucrats making decisions about safe third-country regulations. Moreover, 
we find here the largest concentration of Ahmadiyya institutions and mosques 
in Germany, including the national headquarters, missionary schools, media and 
press outlets, and a locally established network of institutional links between 
community representatives and municipalities that operate on multiple levels of 
social and educational engagement. Notably, the first mosque-disputes unfolded 
in this region too, with segments of the local population aggressively mobilizing 
against the founding of new Ahmadiyya mosques in cities such as Schlüchtern or 
17 Kagan (2010, 1183) notes, ‘the most challenging cases are those that rely extensively on afford-
ing asylum seekers the benefit of the doubt because of the lack of corroborating or contradictory 
evidence. In these cases, adjudicators assess credibility mainly by analyzing the applicant’s tes-
timony in reference only to itself, looking for consistency, detail, vagueness, and contradictions, 
among other factors. This process is sometimes referred to as internal credibility assessment’.
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Wiesbaden.18 The judges interviewed for this research are social actors within this 
broader social field and, importantly, are also active participants in civil society 
where they have supported social integration efforts and even initiated cultural 
exchange groups. Their discourse on the religious minority of Ahmadiyyat is 
accordingly shaped by these experiences and reflects local events that relate to 
the social integration of the community combined with all the associated debates 
over cultural assimilation that have taken place over the years in the public.
In the judges’ discourse there are many explicit references to social and cul-
tural features that carve out a distinct representation of Ahmadis as religious 
subjects. Judge A emphasised more than the others the degree of his background 
knowledge about the community, based on his efforts to gain a first-hand experi-
ence of the political situation in Pakistan. In order to acquire this experience, he 
travelled together with Ahmadi acquaintances to the country and did not shy away 
from participating in the Jamat’s community events and activities in his own city. 
Using the language of participant observation, he told me how his social engage-
ments and actions as a decision-maker were always ‘guided by an interpretive 
approach’ (von einem Verstehensansatz her geleitet). In longer narratives in which 
he described various situations in which he personally witnessed threats against 
Ahmadis, he gestured towards his development of an ‘intuitive feeling’ for their 
situation which served him in better evaluating the truth-claims made in the court 
room. In the judges’ accounts, which I can only briefly sketch here, an impor-
tant distinction was made, however, between being a witness to the religious per-
secution of Ahmadis and becoming a ‘cultural sympathiser’. Whereas personal 
engagement with the community was seen as supporting the role of the activist 
judge, opinions about existing cultural cleavages between liberal law and the reli-
gious normative order remained quite profound. Remarks on the cultural and reli-
gious otherness of Ahmadis went beyond the repertoire of integration problems 
that one often encounters in the public realm. They specifically concerned the 
‘fatalistic attitude’ displayed by Ahmadis, specifically the idea that Ahmadis have 
a desire and duty to missionize (sie haben ein Sendungsbewusstsein) and that they 
would passively accept their own victimisation. Concepts evoked in the judges’ 
comments, such as the ‘lack of critical self-inspection’, ‘fatalism’, ‘obedience to 
religious authority’, ‘proselytising consciousness’ or ‘living in the enclave society’ 
(in Parallelstrukturen leben) are all pervasive tropes in the wider public debate 
about the community and talking points for critics of Islam. The judges’ accounts – 
despite unambiguously rejecting any form of right-wing populism – often dovetail 
18 A detailed discussion of these contexts and the issue of mosque opposition can be found in 
Nijhawan (2016, 153–90)
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with this discourse, such as when Judge A separates the cultural and political con-
ditions that subject Ahmadis to violence (Pakistan persecuting a minority) and the 
cultural responses by Ahmadis (their ‘fatalistic outlook’ as an incomprehensible 
facet of religious difference). Incomprehension with regard to the ‘absolute faith’ 
of Ahmadis (aber die meinen es ernst) is an idea I came across frequently among 
adjudicators, even though not everyone would provide similar explicit rationales. 
But what is reiterated here is a civilisational discourse of the law (zivilisatorisches 
Rechtsverständnis) as the guiding normative principle, which outweighs whatever 
debates there might be in regard to credibility assessments, on the one hand, and 
Ahmadis’ displayed religious belief, on the other. 
Judge A’s interpretation of this norm aligned itself with Hannah Arendt’s ter-
minology of the banality of evil. The context for bringing up the banality of evil 
was explicit, as he defended the generous interpretation of narratives of persecu-
tion that judges in other courts deemed too banal and not credible. The rejection 
of such a ‘banality of deception’ in claimants’ narratives of persecution (see also 
Fassin 2013, 52) was further clarified in his acknowledgement of various social and 
economic motifs that bring people here (I am not stupid! I know that they come to 
be married here). And yet, the affirmation that there indeed was a ‘banality of evil’ 
(‘today they will call you bad names, the next day you are caught praying [i.e. posing 
as Muslim]’) remains a core issue for these judges. Perhaps because this generosity 
nourishes nagging doubts or because judges feel at risk of losing their neutrality in 
the eyes of others in the profession, they also made it very clear that the court room 
had a pedagogical function of reasserting secular constitutional norms in distinc-
tion from an alleged cultural incomprehensibility on the part of the other. There 
was a telling moment in our conversation when Judge A described how he lectured 
Ahmadi women on German democratic principles. All judges were rather explicit 
in their critique of the patriarchal structures that they saw as characteristic of this 
religious group. Hence, performative utterances such as lecturing claimants on the 
differences between verses in the Quran and principles in the constitution helped 
reassert judicial authority in a secular legal context. Ahmadi women, in particular, 
were seen as lacking autonomy and in need of intervention. The tacit assumption 
that the community would have the organisational and ideological characteristics 
of a sect or ethnic enclave never fully vanished from this discourse and was further 
infused by each new incident in the courtroom or public debate. Such examples 
illustrate the broader discursive effect of discourses on Islam in Germany. Iron-
ically, the very effort to identify a genuine religious character that the Ahmadis 
needed to establish credibility simultaneously cements  representations of reli-
gious difference and cultural assimilability. During court practice, the judges often 
had the impression that what unfolded before them in the form of collective pro-
cesses of religion-making must not undermine key principles of liberal autonomy 
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and freedom. Thus, legal adjudicators inadvertently enter a terrain of normative 
complexity that stipulates a relationship between languages of the law and of reli-
gion, which is anything but transparent. 
5  Genuine religious character in legal discourse
In order to fully grasp the impact of the court system on a normative view of religion 
and religious character, we need to finally consider the implications higher court 
rulings have had for asylum adjudication. We have observed on a small scale how, 
within the contexts of asylum adjudication, specific regulatory endowments such 
as the membership certificates and routine techniques of credibility assessments 
implicitly affirm the regularity in patterns of religious behaviour and ways of repre-
senting core beliefs associated with Ahmadiyyat. However, it is not too far-fetched to 
argue that asylum adjudication of the sort discussed in this chapter has even broader 
repercussions for the legal and public discourse about religion. There is nothing new, 
of course, about noting that law renders religion ‘in terms that are compatible with 
its own structural assumptions’ (Berger 2007, 281) and so the legal processes as spec-
ified in this chapter fit within a scholarly discourse on the governance of religion in 
late-modern times. This can be observed in different areas of legislation at the level 
of the international courts (Fokas 2015), when we consider, for example, how subsid-
iary principles concerning national jurisdictions become entangled with unfolding 
controversies on religious difference and pluralism.19 The asylum court does have an 
important place in this discussion. Through their continuous interactions with the 
community, and the meticulous procedures by which narratives of persecution and 
endured suffering become legal protocol, the courts are routinely engaged with these 
questions, which directly affect social citizenship and belonging.
To further illustrate this point, I want to turn to the 2012 ruling of the Euro-
pean High Court of Justice (EHCJ) which, in conjunction with Ahmadi asylum 
appeals before the German Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG) and the 
Upper Tribunal in the United Kingdom (UppTr), helped revisit prior legal crite-
ria for assessing Ahmadiyya religious practice in relation to the legal category 
of religious persecution. According to the new guidelines set by the EHCJ it 
cannot be expected anymore that Ahmadis would withhold their rights to call 
19 Effie Fokas (2015, 55) argues that the European Court for Human Rights ‘case law has  centrally 
contributed to shaping the terms of such controversies. The latter to the extent that the Court may 
be considered to be in the process of developing a “theory” on the proper place of religion in the 
public sphere’.
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themselves Muslim just to appease the majority in the countries of origin, to be 
discreet about their religion, and to seek the option of internal refuge in order 
to prevent themselves becoming the target of the violence of non-state actors 
(UppTr point 117, 50). The assumption of such internal refuge has been the cause 
for many rejections in asylum courts in the past. During the UK tribunal, the 
government representative had the audacity to claim that the  anti-Ahmadi leg-
islation would be upheld to keep public order and not to discriminate against 
the religious minority. Yet the judges’ response (which is referenced by the 
EHCJ was abundantly clear in rejecting such flawed argumentation, as ‘all the 
evidence shows that it is the violent aggression of sections of the majority pop-
ulation that needs to be curbed’ (UppTr, 49). With regard to state persecution, 
the court further clarified that the likelihood of unfair trials and prolonged 
imprisonment in Pakistan (in conjunction with the complex political dynamics 
concerning non-state actors hurting Ahmadis) form a context in which ‘these 
factors are capable of amounting to a state-approved or  state-condoned act of 
persecution within the meaning of the Qualification Directive and under the 
[Geneva] Refugee Convention’ (point 116, 50). 
The cautious tone in such statements nonetheless demonstrates that 
 decision-makers are granted a space of discretion to determine whether or not 
these factors are fully operative in each individual case. Hence, in reference to 
Pakistan’s penal code, the European High Court of Justice refrained from naming 
the ordinances as sufficient evidence for religious persecution, as it would be 
‘unhelpful to talk about laws per se being persecutory’. Instead, the focus of the 
detailed,  thesis-length legal text is really on the assessment of the specific condi-
tions of violence that could curb religious freedom. It deserves particular attention 
in this context that the EHCJ has declared invalid the distinction between a core 
area of religiosity and public display of a religious way of life, which in legal jargon 
is known as the difference between the forum internum and externum. Previously, 
the judges were asked to verify ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ if an individual’s right to 
religious freedom in the core area was actually violated, which in Germany would 
fall under Art. 4 GG. Despite different argumentation in the past, the German federal 
 administrative court readily accepted the new EHCJ directive to do away with this 
problematic distinction, which, to remind the reader, the judges also mentioned 
when referring to the intense probing of the forum internum as akin to taking the 
confession of a  claimant (den Antragssteller einer Gewissensprüfung unterziehen).20
20 See BVerwG 2.3.2, where the court affirms the extended definition of religion and the decision 
not to link the assessment of the level of incurred harm to the specific (private or public) aspect 
of religiosity. 
Constructing a genuine religious character  1157
Peter Danchin (2015) argues that the modern conception of the forum 
internum as category of inner belief has produced key dilemmas for the legal 
framing of religious freedom in terms of the individual’s right to religious 
self-expression. On the one hand, he identifies a dilemma in that the forum 
internum engenders ideas of autonomous choice (based on freedom from 
coercion) in contrast to other operative assumptions that convey the idea of 
a right to ‘maintain a certain category of inner belief such as “conscience” 
or “faith” understood as in some sense un-chosen’ (ibid., 243). We have seen 
above that this tension between choice and coercion played a significant role 
in the judges’ scepticism about Ahmadi claims, particularly when individuals 
appeared to the judges as ‘obedient’ and ‘fatalistic selves’ who precisely ‘could 
not’ or ‘were not allowed to’ make individual choices after paying spiritual 
allegiance to the khalifa. This relates to the second point Danchin mentions, 
namely that in recognising the manifestations or limitations of the freedom 
of religious self-expression (forum externum), judicial authorities take it on 
themselves to differentiate and determine the extent to which the forum inter-
num could be expanded into the public realm. In other words, as soon as reli-
gious self-expression is understood as relational and not solely anchored in 
the individual anymore, the question of how others’ rights and sensibilities are 
affected becomes a guiding principle for jurisprudence (ibid., 244). According 
to Danchin we can observe a ‘dramatic shift in spatialization’ (ibid., 246) in 
the European and North American case law on religious symbols in the public 
sphere (such as wearing the hijab, the crucifix cases, etc.) where interpreta-
tions of the right to wear a hijab or Sikh turban have been used to de-facto 
limit the individual choices of those being addressed. For Danchin the conse-
quence is that, ‘once religion is understood in terms of the three features (1) 
Enlightenment rationality posits (2) a conception of individual belief that is (3) 
autonomously chosen in the forum internum, then most of what was formerly 
internal and private is transformed into an external manifestation of religion 
now subject either to recognition or limitation by the state in the new, vastly 
expanded forum externum’ (ibid., 246).
If such changes of what constitute the fora internum and externum in the 
juridical field matter in deliberations about different forms of religious practice 
and how they are brought into accordance with secular values, it is significant to 
see that the EHCJ has suspended this dichotomy of private and public religion. 
However, Danchin demonstrates how other jurisdictions clung onto this distinc-
tion in order to effectively limit claims to religious freedom that seem to deviate 
from what states define as the boundaries of religious accommodation. 
It is yet speculative to suggest that the EHCJ decision would undermine 
such efforts or in other ways impinge on the religious freedom case law. For a 
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discussion of religious individualisation, it might appear to be a point of schol-
arly hair-splitting. Perhaps we can say that in both scenarios the key point is that 
political and legal institutions have retained the power to redefine the bounda-
ries by which religion is allowed to enter the public realm, as well as the extent 
to which collective rights matter when it comes to religious freedom. When seen 
from the perspective of the daily workings of asylum courtrooms we find that new 
directives further problematise questions of individual choice and representa-
tions of religion, for there is a certain tendency to read a traditional, if not dog-
matic, view of religious practice into legal reasoning.
To illustrate this, let me briefly summarise one of the asylum hearings that I 
observed in which deliberations around the sincerity of religious conduct came to 
the fore. This particular hearing occurred in 2012, shortly after the EHCJ ruling, and 
consisted of a two-hour investigation of the claimant’s religious conduct. Much of 
the judge’s interview comprised questions about the regularity of the claimant’s 
participation in the local community, what specific positions the person held, or 
what other activities he was engaged in. There was only passing mention of the 
membership certificate that the court had filed. The asylum seeker, who I shall 
call Mr Naveed here, did his best to account for his volunteer work and commu-
nity engagement, which from what I could tell was not satisfactory to the judge. 
Many questions ensued about his participation in the annual gathering of the 
Jalsa Salana, going into detailed questioning about activities there. For instance, 
she wanted to know what personal relationship Mr. Naveed had with the spiritual 
leader of Ahmadiyyat, which Mr Naveed affirmed, claiming that he sends weekly 
letters and even received personal responses. At this point, the lawyer presented 
various letters and other materials such as local newspapers in which we see Mr 
Naveed helping out with street cleaning activities after New Year’s Celebrations. 
But this was still not enough. The judge then continued with questions around 
prayers and practices of reading and the study of the Qur’an. She wanted to hear 
details about specific prayers and what relevance they held in weekly sermons. 
She went on to ask about his close relatives and their status in the Jamat. Mr 
Naveed was divorced, so the main line of question revolved around the religious 
education of his child, who happened to live with the mother. Confirming that 
the child is educated through the missionary system (waqf-e nau scheme) gave 
some additional support. In this manner, an hour and more was spent by the 
court in evaluating aspects of public religious conduct and details about the 
claimant’s knowledge of the Ahmadiyya faith. It was interesting to see how even 
minor, everyday aspects of providing social service and religious conduct were 
recorded in the court protocol. The judge continued to ask in more detail about 
Mr Naveed’s social and personal background in Pakistan: How would he describe 
his living situation and relationships with the community in the village where he 
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lived? When exactly was he confronted with enmity and aggression? What did 
these acts consist of? She also asked what function he held and how that made 
him visible as an Ahmadi. How many other Ahmadi families were in the village? 
What exactly did ‘the Mullahs’ hold against him? 
There is clearly a horizon of expectations that need to be met and failure to do 
so undermines the idea that privately held belief and publicly expressed behav-
iour are meaningfully related. Even if a claimant is capable of creating a relatively 
coherent self-image of religious service in diaspora contexts, the burden of proof 
still requires continuity between these more readily documented and verified 
practices and the social and political contexts of exercising religion in different 
regions of the country of origin, where it is of course notoriously difficult to come 
up with evidence. 
From the vantage point of such court hearings, the legal coding of religious 
sincerity and credibility can be seen to work in tandem with normative expecta-
tions of community service and participation in organised religious activity. As 
indicated above, adjudicators view the community almost solely as a patriarchal 
social hierarchy that puts strong conformity pressures on its members. Paradoxi-
cally, however, the courts’ interview techniques contravene the judicial discourse 
on individuality, for despite the scepticism levelled against the collective frame-
work of religion, it is that same framework with which an individual’s account 
needs to conform. Failing to meet expected standards of expressed belief and 
community engagement would logically lower admission chances. Any incon-
sistency that claimants show in the court protocol when, for example, aligning 
themselves with the organisational and doctrinal structures or providing an 
interpretation of Islamic tenets that fall out of a narrow interpretive grid of ques-
tioning used in the court interviews, would lead to what we already encountered 
as the problem of credibility. Significantly, the revision of asylum law has made 
establishing religious truth claims the major focus of such credibility. Is a person 
who seems unclear on certain tenets of the faith or expected religious routines 
still an Ahmadi? Will they need specific protection? These paradoxes are clearly 
enhanced as the courts are required to continuously assess the credibility of nar-
ratives of religious persecution on a case-by-case basis. 
The tendency of more intimate and intimidating credibility assessments in 
asylum courts that is spurred by this process runs parallel to what Didier Fassin 
(2013) discusses in relation to the case of trauma narratives in refugee hearings. 
In France, he observed a similar shift to more and more intimate questioning 
and increasing doubts levelled against the authority of medical and psychi-
atric experts. Despite all the rhetoric of individual rights and the uniqueness 
of each individual’s testimony, the fact-finding procedures in courts appear to 
be guided by a court culture of paternalism and suspicion, putting ever higher 
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demands on individuals to articulate intimate details of religious self-making 
that must fall in line with what amounts to an orthodox framework of religious 
norm-setting. In its 2012 country guidance on Pakistan, the Upper Tribunal 
already demanded several obligatory steps be taken by the decision-maker 
when faced with the task of determining the identity of an Ahmadi, includ-
ing the official documentation provided by the religious organisations of the 
Ahmadiyya community and an interview process through which genuinely held 
beliefs could be validated. Note how directive 122 demands judges ‘to include 
an enquiry whether the claimant was registered with an Ahmadi community in 
Pakistan and worshipped and engaged there on a regular basis’, whereas direc-
tive 123 specifies the need of ‘enquiry into the claimant’s intentions or wishes 
as to his or her faith, if returned to Pakistan’. Furthermore the document reads: 
‘The burden is on the claimant to demonstrate that any intention or wish to 
practice and manifest aspects of the faith openly that are not permitted by the 
Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) is genuinely held and of particular importance to 
the claimant to preserve his or her religious identity’ (Pakistan CG [2012] UKUT 
00389 (IAC), 51). 
It is important to remember here that leading religious specialists have 
appeared before these courts to outline the set of core beliefs and practices 
through which Ahmadiyyat can be set apart from other Muslim traditions. Key 
in such representations is, for example, the reference to tabligh as the personal 
engagement in meaningful debate and the propagation or proselytisation of 
Islamic ways of life. As I have discovered in my research over the last few years, 
the emphasis on tabligh has been framed as the major objective of the Jamat by 
the current khalifa. The religious leadership expects all auxiliaries to commit a 
certain amount of time to complement the work of trained missionaries and new 
educational programs have been developed to reach such goals. During the UK 
Upper Tribunal for example, witness evidence explicitly linked spiritual author-
ity, faith propagation, and individual duty, leading to the normative claim that 
ordinary Ahmadis would all be ‘keen and desirous to preach and those who 
cannot do it feel they are unable to discharge their duties as a Ahmadi. When 
living under a law that prevents that they feel sorry about that. Ahmadis are 
expected to respect the law of the country, but this does not mean they do not 
have the desire of doing tabligh. A display of high moral standard by Ahmadis 
which might attract others does not really discharge the entirety of the obligation 
of preaching required of all Ahmadis’. What is cited here by the court as an Ahma-
di’s desire and duty to preach amounts to a strong normative claim about how to 
interpret ‘genuine religious character’ in matters of refugee determination. And it 
is precisely because the court took notice here of a norm that establishes a rela-
tionship of continuity between internal and external forums (of internal desires 
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and spiritual claims and external constraints on fulfilling such desires) that adju-
dicators will feel motivated to continue the intense probing of credibility.
6  Conclusion
The sociological inquiry that I have presented in this chapter can contribute 
to a better understanding of the cultural specificities, conceptual tensions, 
and political implications of processes of religious individualisation as they 
unfold in late-modern contexts of state power and migration. I have argued 
that the emerging processes of self-other interdependencies in contexts of 
global migration require a thorough rethinking of the specific meanings of 
religious individualisation, for as we saw in the legal discourses discussed 
above, the ostensibly secular understanding of religious freedom seems to 
clash with the pervasive effort to establish narrow definitions of religion that 
are mapped upon entire groups. Religious individualisation is a contingent 
process of cultural articulation embedded within broader historical dimen-
sions that have produced various forms and imaginaries for social relations, 
degrees of religious agency, and challenges to traditionalism (Fuchs 2015). 
However, I think there are still many open questions to be answered. What do 
we mean by the relationship between individual agency and attributions of 
religious subjectivity or character in each context? In what specific ways are 
self-other relations embedded within practices of state power and the bureau-
cratisation of societies? Does a notion such as individualisation prioritise 
forms of agency and autonomy that appear intelligible to us, whereas other 
modalities of the “self” continue to elude Western audiences? Who defines the 
“us” and “them” in such debates and how do categorisations of such differ-
ence matter in  practical terms? 
Referencing the religious individualisation matrix, Bernd-Christian Otto 
(2017) lucidly remarks that not only have scholars associated religious individu-
alisation with analytically distinct processes of ‘individuation’ and ‘individualis-
ation’ (see also Rüpke 2015) but the intelligibility of each concept depends on very 
different levels of abstraction and cogency. We can study broader secularising 
trends or more intimate processes of inner experience and creativity, which each, 
when taken on their own, constitute significant analytical conundrums. Admit-
tedly, I have not said much in this chapter about how such inner experience is 
constituted and how the cultivation of religious selves is to be understood through 
the lens of the practitioner. Such questions guide my second inquiry on migrant 
precarity and religious subjectivity in this publication. In the context of the 
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debate on state power, traditionalisation, deviance, and religion that frames the 
contributions in this section of the publication, my aim was instead to demon-
strate how, within modern institutions associated with state sovereignty and 
liberal democracy, we can identify deeply ambivalent social processes that 
directly impact categorisations of religion and religious character. I have focused 
on asylum courts and the adjudication of refugees because this is a key site of 
social and political change. The current public debate on refugees is just one 
aspect of this process that has already caused major controversies in Europe 
around right-wing populism and its challenges to European values. I have shown 
this by  contextualising the role of the courts within such evolving forms of social 
and political change, along with the far-reaching changes to immigration policy 
and the unfolding debate on religion and violence that has affected the public 
image of Muslim minorities. My second point was then to complicate the debate 
on ‘deviance’ and ‘traditionalisation’ by demonstrating how state and the law 
assume a normative role when defining the parameters of such categories. 
Among other things, I have shown how in legal discourse individual acts 
and choices are measured against a standard of religiosity that has become the 
standard of determining risk-assessments of religious persecution. Let me reem-
phasise that my point was not to propose linear transactions between the legal 
and social fields, or to make a strong case for altered modes of everyday conduct 
and practice. Nonetheless, as several scholars working in the area of law and 
religion have thoroughly examined (e.g. Sullivan 2005; Mahmood 2006; Sullivan 
et al. 2011; König et al. 2012), the formative role of jurisprudence over religious 
minority rights and the governing of religion as a category of difference does have 
far-reaching consequences for social practice. ‘Courts, legislatures and other 
governmental agencies judge the activities of persons as religious or not, as pro-
tected or not, based on models of religion’, writes Winifred Sullivan, ‘that often 
make a poor fit with religion as it is lived’. The ‘poor fit’ of which Sullivan speaks 
matters in terms of how languages of the law and religion relate to each other. 
The asylum courts that I have studied routinely perform such rationalisations of 
religious character as evidenced in standardised repertoires of religious conduct 
and problematic assumptions about what kind of social commitment should be 
expected of Ahmadi Muslims. Judges and lawyers are now keenly aware that they 
act as interpreters of theological facts – as one lawyer phrased it sardonically in 
a conversation: ‘We are now also experts in theology’ – and their perception of 
secular law and guiding normative concepts has thus been lastingly affected.21
21 For a discussion of how experts in the legal sphere have assumed the role of theologians, see 
also Mahmood 2006.
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Avner Ben-Zaken, Jan Bremmer, Vasudha Dalmia, Richard 
Gordon, Michael Nijhawan, Kumkum Sangari 
Afterword: de- and neotraditionalisation
Our essays are sharply different in tenor, concepts, vocabulary, disciplines and 
modes of analysis. This hardly comes as a surprise. It is to be expected that such 
differences manifest themselves in this broad comparative effort. Each contribu-
tion examines historically and culturally divergent forms of Vergesellschaftung as 
the societal and symbolic context of the processes of de- or neo- traditionalisation 
analysed here. Only on such a broad basis is it possible to identify normative 
authorities and deviations from them in text and practice. We thus found a 
starting point in the relationship between specific historical constellations and 
encounters, and the opportunities they open up to reformulate what given his-
torical actors and groups regarded as tradition and as transgression or deviance. 
With the Athenians, in Jan Bremmer’s chapter we see a concentration of 
immigrant and native intellectuals who started to disseminate destabilising and 
subversive ideas. Yet the power of public order remained the factor that deter-
mined courses of action. A similar view concerning differences in power is shared 
by Richard Gordon in his chapter. For Gordon, the fundamental issue in relation 
to ‘deviant’ religious action in the Roman Empire was the differential distribu-
tion of religious knowledge-practices within a highly stratified social order, and 
the efforts of socio-political elites, both central (i.e. at Rome) and local, to claim 
that only their version of practices worked. For the ‘deviants’, such claims made 
no sense: why should the political elite prescribe to everyone else how to exploit 
the resources of the divine world? Avner Ben Zaken argues that it was the cross- 
cultural circulations of a grimoire, and its multiple receptions among key Renais-
sance thinkers, that transformed natural magic from belonging to the realm of 
esoteric practices into a coherent alternative philosophical program that chal-
lenged the tenets of late medieval philosophy of nature, making possible the rise 
of a new science.
Turning from Mediterranean antiquity and the European Renaissance to 
South Asian modernity, we encounter a period of continuity and rupture, in 
which several traditions were coined while others were contested. The past was 
now reread in anti-colonial as well as patriarchal and sectarian ways and these 
were, at times, intertwined. 
Kumkum Sangari’s contribution looks at nationalism and anti-modernity in 
the early twentieth-century writings of Annie Besant and M. K. Gandhi as they 
responded to the situations in India and England in a comparable way. The dis-
senting milieu in late nineteenth-century London acted as a trigger for both. The 
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circulations of ideas and people involved here show that the British and Indian 
contexts were entangled. Vasudha Dalmia’s chapter is situated in post-colonial 
mid-twentieth-century India. Her analysis shows how the making of a fundamen-
tally egalitarian and secular Constitution by the state encountered consolidated 
Hindu sectarian interests invested in ideas of Hindu supremacy and sharp social 
difference (for the textual constructions of authorities see also Feldhaus in III.2). 
Michael Nijhawan’s chapter offers a conceptual bridge, demonstrating how 
a religious minority (the Ahmadis) first entered the multi-religious arena in India 
under colonial rule and eventually, in the course of the emergence of the nation-
state after 1947, were minoritized and forced to re-describe themselves in a context in 
which they were identified with deviant and heterodox religion. The legal and social 
processes of resignifying such deviance and heterodoxy in the context of contem-
porary migration procedures in Europe display the ambivalence between religious 
individualisation and norm-setting, including neo-traditionalisation. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this is a framing of a debate that also plays a part in the discussion of 
the contrast and relationship between individual and institutionalised religion in the 
20th and 21st centuries German Christianities, as analysed by Veronika Hoffmann.
Bringing in the perspective of state and hegemonic formations relativises the 
concept of religious individualisation. There are different kinds of hegemony that 
are at stake in these papers and different kinds of legal systems within which 
to contextualise this discussion. In Athenian society of the 5th century BCE, the 
final authority lay with the collectivity of citizens, who could decide whether reli-
gious ideas were acceptable or not. In a few cases, execution was the final pun-
ishment for deviance. In the huge space of the Roman Empire, with its localised 
religious order in which priestly office in the public sphere was a mere adjunct 
to elite political careers, very diverse forms of religious specialism (divination, 
ecstasy, healing, initiation, magic …) were extremely attractive to those with suf-
ficient gifts in that they provided a means of achieving a modicum of social and 
religious capital ‘below’ the public system. Although such practices might be 
dismissed as ‘superstition’ or ‘magic’, and many small-time religious specialists 
offered ‘malign’ magic alongside their other skills, they were not generally felt to 
threaten the commonweal. 
In the Renaissance, proponents of natural magic instigated a coherent criti-
cism against the (intellectually and institutionally) hegemonic scholastic philos-
ophy of nature, which started losing its firm hold on intellectual high-ground. 
The medieval church and universities persecuted and marginalised natural 
magic, ascribing it to the heretic religious sources of Islam, Judaism or paganism. 
Renaissance thinkers, however, working at courts or within secretive societies, 
dared to pursue oral traditions, occult practices, and encrypted lost manuscripts, 
bringing them to the fore by printing, commenting on, and cultivating the philo-
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sophical tenets of natural magic, presenting it as a return to the lost and perfect 
wisdom of the ancients. The origins of such wisdom, so they argued, could be 
traced back through a mystical lineage to the origins of humanity, before religious 
disconcert, philosophical controversies, and a lack of concord between occultist 
views of natural phenomena, such as ‘forces’, and the accepted traditional views 
that denied their existence. In so doing they revolutionised the role of the philos-
opher of nature, turning his persona into that of a magician and transforming his 
function from one who contemplated nature to one who actively experimenting 
with it. This new image placed the natural philosopher at the center of the explo-
ration of nature.
There are overlaps and differences between the positioning of Hinduism and 
that of Islam in multi-religious societies in the colonial and post-colonial period. 
The struggle between sectarian and pluralist positions has been an important 
feature of social and political life in India from the early 20th century onwards. 
Besant and Gandhi were active in the struggle for rights in London and South 
Africa and both came to position rights within a discourse of dharma and duty in 
India. Besant’s own trajectory through Christianity, atheism and Hinduism was 
notably eclectic and became quite conservative. Gandhi moved ahead to pose a 
direct challenge to the hegemony of the British Empire and turned the discourse 
of duty against the rulers. However, his discourse on women and religion con-
tradicted the individualisation of his own religious practice. As Dalmia shows, 
after the violence of partition and Independence, the Indian constitution was 
being written even as the Hindu Right attempted to redefine India as a Hindu 
nation and to legislate accordingly. In this context, Gandhi resisted the merger 
of religion and culture and emphasised reason and morality over unquestioning 
fidelity to religious texts. And as Nijhawan shows, legal exclusion and violence 
in Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh pushed many Ahmadis to seek refuge in 
Western Europe and North America from the 1980s onwards. Religious transna-
tionalisation emerged as a process of institutional integration and adaptation to 
the norms of the liberal state. Yet in this context, religious minorities such as the 
Ahmadis have been confronted with another hegemonic formation in Europe, a 
formation that is both national and supranational and operates through the legal 
system. It is the judicial system that by its rules and procedural practices can 
enable and disable individual expressions in relation to various forms of member-
ship, including citizenship. This is exemplified in antiquity as well as  modernity.
The production of deviance and attempts to foreclose it is another striking 
element of our chapters. Questioning traditional beliefs about the gods and the 
natural order, the ‘modernising’ intellectuals in Athens adopted a point of view 
that we could call, to some extent at least, secularisation. This led to satire and 
iconoclastic behaviour in sections of the upper classes, ultimately causing the 
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state to set limits on acceptable levels of deviance. Although witchcraft was always 
available as an explanation of misfortune in the Roman Empire, there were many 
other competing explanatory forms and, at least among the Roman elite, such 
fears were considered superstitious and ridiculous. Divination, however, was a 
different matter, especially astrology, the new and ‘scientific’ form of divination 
that entered the Roman world in the second century BCE. With the establishment 
of a monarchical form of rule by Augustus (ruled 27 BCE-14 CE), emperors – who 
made considerable use of personal astrologers ‒ attempted to prevent others, 
especially within the elite, from making any political enquiries. As a result, the 
term magia principally came to denote the resort to astrology. 
Given the sheer numbers and diversity of minor religious specialists devel-
oping their own ‘superstitious’ practices, such attempts at repression hardly 
weighed in the balance until the post-Constantinian ‘Christian Empire’. Renais-
sance divination, which acted against the backdrop of institutional Aristotelian-
ism as manifested in the dogma of church, approached astrology not by taking 
for granted its tenets but, rather, by accommodating it to natural philosophical 
explanations. Ficino, for instance, presented the challenge of natural magic to 
the hegemonic philosophy of nature, not seeking to topple philosophy but, actu-
ally, to tame practitioners of astrology and magic by imposing on them a phil-
osophical procedure and consequently creating a metaphysical framework for 
natural magic. 
The personal religious choices of Besant and Gandhi were highly individual-
ised, yet they positioned women as the guardians of dharma in essentialist, pre-
scriptive and repressive ways. In contrast to the mingling of the religious and the 
secular in the writings of Besant and the early Gandhi, the Hindu Right posited 
a homogeneous Hindu social order with an overarching culture that saw secu-
larising trends as deviant. In the European context, where secularism is upheld 
as normative, we see the paradox of the law trying to fix the parameters of what 
counts as authentic religious belief and practice among the Ahmadis, and this has 
immediate repercussions for the individuals and communities concerned. We can 
see in these three essays how categories of belief and personal religious expres-
sion, including dharma, are defined in national and transnational contexts. This 
complicates the questions of individualisation as well as those of de-, re-, and 
neo-traditionalisation. For instance, transnational locations within a prolonged 
colonial temporality show examples of traditionalisation on old and new colonial 
sites in Sangari and Nijhawan’s chapters.
Several of the chapters here demonstrate the precarious social situations of 
women in the various societies which affect the possibilities of religious individu-
alisation. Dalmia and Sangari even show the divisions amongst women on these 
questions and Sangari indicates that the gap between social individuation and 
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religious individualisation of women was an area of deep social contradictions. 
In each case discussed in this section, we can see how heterogeneity is being 
produced and suppressed in mono-religious and multi-religious contexts. At spe-
cific historical junctions, the possibilities of individualisation, whether they are 
allowed or not, are mediated by the existing range of social, intellectual and reli-
gious currents, both locally and trans-regionally.

Section 4.2:  Pluralisation

 Open Access. © 2019 Angelika Malinar, published by De Gruyter.  This work is licensed 
under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110580853-057
Angelika Malinar
Religious plurality and individual authority 
in the Mahābhārata
1 Introduction
The emergence of religious alternatives to Vedic ritualism in the centuries around 
the beginning of the Common Era was an important feature of the larger polit-
ical and socio-economic transformations that unfolded in this period in India. 
They appeared around the same time as the establishment of the Maurya empire 
epitomised by King Aśoka (268–233 BCE) and consolidated during the reign of 
the Gupta dynasty (350–550 CE). This period was marked by an expansion of 
agricultural production, trans-regional trade, intercultural contacts and con-
frontations between North Indian rulers and outside invaders (Greeks, Scythi-
ans, etc.), the advent of script, and by new modes of representation (sculptures, 
inscriptions, etc.).1 The intellectual dimension of these processes was mirrored 
in an enormous production of texts reflecting these changes and offering new 
forms of knowledge. The pluralisation of religious doctrines and practices in this 
period was connected to processes of individualisation and new interpretations 
of religious agency. These resulted in enhancing the primary determination of 
personhood according to normative social roles (accorded in life-cycle rituals) 
by opening up new pathways for individuals to strive for their own well-being in 
this life and the afterlife (see Malinar 2015a). This development was manifested in 
new interpretations of the conditions of embodied, individuated existence, with 
the discourses revolving around teachings about the self, ego-consciousness, and 
various ideas of liberation from the limitations of corporeal existence. New inter-
pretations of karman as a mechanism of retribution that not only works in the 
sphere of ritual, but also (potentially) applies to all deeds accorded individuals 
an important role in the production of their own life-conditions. Auto-diegetic 
narration and life-story emerged as new literary forms,2 and the depiction of indi-
viduals entertaining their own ideas about the goals of life became a recurrent 
feature in a range of textual sources. Without necessarily taking recourse to the 
commonly accepted forms of authorisation (initiation by Brahmanical teachers, 
1 For a discussion of some features of what has been referred to as the period ‘between the em-
pires’, see the essays in Olivelle 2006.
2 For an overview of the development of life-history and autobiographical writing in India, see 
Malinar 2019.
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for instance), individuals engaged with the questions of what goal is the ‘best’ 
(śreyas), what is the ‘highest good’ (niḥśreyas) or the ‘unseen purpose’ (adṛṣṭār-
tha) for which one should strive, and what are the best methods for obtaining this 
good and stopping the causes of suffering.3 Some of them voiced their dissatisfac-
tion with well-established and commonly accepted religious goals and practices, 
and set forth new interpretations of their own; others promulgated alternative 
 religious-philosophical pathways. When these individuals convincingly argued, 
enacted, and embodied their tenets, they had the possibility of gaining social 
acceptance as living proofs of the validity of their ideas, and some of them became 
teachers and attracted followers. Some of these developments can be traced to 
dissent and a plurality of views already existing within the established, exclusive 
circles of Brahmanical learning. However, individuals from outside these circles, 
such as women, warriors, and merchants, also began to appear in the texts and 
were presented as formulating their own views on religious goals and practices. 
While the evidence for these developments does not suggest that the individual 
as such became the centre of social transactions and intellectual discourse – as is 
the case in modern individualism – it does point to the emergence of a diversified 
and proliferating religious field, which gave room to a plurality of religious-philo-
sophical pathways that individuals could adopt.4 At the same time, resistance 
against these developments, and thus against further religious pluralisation and 
individualisation, can also be detected. 
The compatibility of the established norms of social life with the new reli-
gious doctrines and their individualised forms of practice varied. The established 
norms were based on the ritual duties ordained in the Veda and administered 
by Brahmanical experts, predominantly for householders. In the period under 
discussion, the household was the primary site of religious practice. Vedic reli-
gion did not demand the establishment of permanent structures for public ritual 
performances, such as permanent ritual altars or temples. Such forms of public 
institutionalisation began to spread with the establishment of larger kingdoms 
3 The discourses about these issues and the spectrum of practices connected to them constitute 
what could be viewed as ‘religion’ in the period under discussion and this is what I refer to when 
using ‘religious’ or ‘religion’ in this paper. The general question of the applicability of the mod-
ern term ‘religion’ to classical India cannot be addressed in the context of this paper.
4 In standard theories of modernity, now much debated, the emphasis on the rights and the 
freedom of the individual and the rise of individualism are seen as features which distinguish 
modern societies from non-modern ones. With respect to the latter it is maintained that the in-
dividual is nothing more than a member and a representative of the social group to which he or 
she belongs. For an influential application of this view to India, see Dumont 1966. For a general 
critique of Dumont’s views, see Fuchs 1988. For a criticism of the idea that Indian culture lacks a 
notion of the ‘individual’, see Malinar 2015a.
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and with the popularisation and patronage of new religious ideas and practices. 
Ascetic religions, such as Buddhism and Jainism, as well as the monotheistic 
bhakti religions, were important factors in this process (with new religious sites, 
such as monasteries, reliquaries, icons and temples). Of key importance in this 
period was the establishment of the royal household centring on the king as a 
hereditary ruler of his kingdom and a powerful figure whose status and func-
tions were contested. Some of the new religious ideas and practices were directly 
connected to kings, who are depicted as either teachers or addressees. Further-
more, the king represented participation in the religious field through his intel-
lectual engagement with various religious-philosophical teachings (debates at 
his court, involvement in different registers of religious practice, patronage, etc.), 
through statements and rulings on religious groups and practices, through pro-
tection and patronage of various religious groups, and through the selection of 
his own religious preferences beyond his patronage of Vedic rituals and other 
religious groups. The inscriptions of King Aśoka (268–232 BCE), and the scholarly 
debates about his (private?) affiliation with Buddhism while supporting a range 
of religious groups, point towards this constellation of developments.5 Literary 
texts take up the issue as well, as can be seen in the Mahābhārata epic with its 
inclusion of various discourses about kingship and of a considerable spectrum 
of  religious-philosophical doctrines and practices. But members of other social 
groups, such as merchants and women from a variety of social strata, also emerge 
in this period as supporters and practitioners of the new religious teachings.6 
This is attested in the epic as well.
In this chapter, I shall discuss the ways in which religious plurality is 
depicted in the epic and ask which roles individuals assumed in the criticism 
and  re-interpretation of the ‘transmitted knowledge’7 of the Veda. The epic not 
only documents individual doubts and opinions but also more fundamental 
5 See, for instance, Bloch 1952, Lamotte 1953, Thapar 1961. 
6 On the spectrum of Buddhist donors, see Coningham 1995; for the role of women, see Willis 
1992; on archaeological and other data for the support of bhakti, see Härtel 1987.
7 This expression is used in the following instead of ‘tradition’, as it is not only closer to the San-
skrit equivalents (āgama, paramparā, sampradāya) but also highlights the processual character 
of the creation and administration of an authoritative body of knowledge-practice. The latter is 
characterised by a concern for stabilisation (‘canonisation’, forging community) and ensuring its 
continuing relevance (commentaries, production of new texts, selective re-arrangements of prac-
tices, attracting new patrons and audiences, etc.). ‘Transmitted knowledge’ also points to the sit-
uation that it is connected to particular ‘textual communities’ as well as to a selective acceptance 
of extant authoritative knowledge traditions and canonical texts by different religious communi-
ties. What appears as a fixed canon of Brahmanical authoritative texts is rather a ‘Kanonfundus’, 
a corpus of texts used selectively in Hindu religious communities; see Malinar 2011a.
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concerns about how to establish reliable knowledge. This connects the epic with 
the emerging field of philosophy as a new expert discourse. Some philosophi-
cal schools accepted originality as well as the exemplariness of an individual 
(whether human or divine) as the basis for a religious-philosophical truth claim, 
championing the idea that the testimony of ‘trustworthy persons’ should also be 
accepted as a means of knowledge (pramāṇa). The formulation of such claims in 
the epic, as well as in philosophical discourse, sometimes included a rejection of 
the Veda as the sole authority. As a consequence, representatives of the Vedic tra-
dition viewed the proliferating field of religious individualisation as a character-
istic feature of a ‘dark age’ of confusion and undesirable disorder (the so-called 
kaliyuga), which calls for counter-reaction. While one can detect resistance to and 
criticism of pluralisation almost from its very beginning, from about the 5th or 6th 
century there are explicit efforts to delimit the spectrum of choices and to reas-
sert the authority of the Veda over against doctrines and practices based on the 
authority of individual teachers. This reassertion culminated in  Veda-adherent 
 philosophers like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (6th-7th centuries) and Śaṅkara (7th-8th cen-
turies), who advocated a restriction of acceptable authorities and the outright 
rejection of teachers and teaching traditions not based on Vedic texts. While 
aspects of this later development have been studied in some detail,8 the dynamics 
of pluralisation and the processes of individualisation in the preceding period, 
to which these reassertions reacted, need to be studied in a more comprehensive 
manner. The Mahābhārata is an important document within this historical con-
stellation since it not only attests religious plurality but also the resistance to it. 
2  Negotiating religious plurality in 
the Mahābhārata
The Mahābhārata (MBh)9 includes not only seminal texts of bhakti-religion, 
Yoga, and Sāṃkhya philosophy, but also various discourses about the authority 
8 See Halbfass 1991, Eltschinger 2012. On the repercussions of the reassertion of  Vedic-Brahmanical 
normativity for the acceptance of ātmatuṣṭi, individual choice or preference as the reason for a re-
ligious practice, see Davis 2007; for the rejection of the idea of ‘following one’s desire’ (kāmacāra) 
as a desirable goal, see Malinar 2014.
9 In the following, I deal with the epic from a systematic perspective, referring to the text in 
its redacted, written form as found in the critical edition. The ways in which the juxtaposition 
of texts is the result of the textual history of the epic is an issue that cannot be addressed here. 
While there is no scholarly consensus about the exact date of the epic, its written form can 
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of transmitted knowledge as well as a broad spectrum of individual voices that 
each give their ideas and opinions about the ‘highest’ goal and the best practices 
for its pursuit.10 The wide range of texts is indicative of the fact that the validity 
of the Veda is no longer taken for granted and that the authority (pramāṇa) of 
‘transmitted knowledge’ has become a highly contested issue. This is one of the 
features of the epic that have led scholars to view it as a text that mirrors, as well 
as addresses, a situation of political and intellectual ‘crisis’.11 
At the centre of the religious-philosophical debates depicted in the epic are 
doubts about what actually constitutes the ‘highest good’ (śreyas, niḥśreyas), the 
working of the law of karman (the law of retribution), the after-world (paraloka)12 
and, perhaps most often, what constitutes dharma, a polyvalent term that frames 
in many instances the negotiation of social norms and religious-philosophical 
doctrines. The word dharma is used in the epic, on the one hand, as an abstract 
term with a variety of meanings, such as law, good practice, norm, rule, order, 
righteousness, socio-cosmic order, or religious-philosophical doctrine. On the 
other hand, it is used in various specified meanings, such as kuladharma (law of 
family), rājadharma (law of the king), or mokṣadharma (rules regarding libera-
tion). The epic deals not only with the clash of different normative orders but also 
with the situation in which the following of ordained dharma and ‘transmitted 
knowledge’ does not yield the expected results. Some protagonists experience 
quite certainly be dated to the period under discussion (2nd century BCE – 4th century CE). For 
an overview of religious positions documented in the epic, see, among others, Hopkins 1902, 
Strauss 1911, Sutton 2000.
10 A remark on the sheer quantity of texts we are talking about here may be appropriate. For in-
stance, the part of the twelfth Book dealing with mokṣadharma (‘right practice [for obtaining] lib-
eration’) consists of more than sixty texts (comprising 186 chapters) on  religious-philosophical 
issues (including one long exposition of bhakti to the god Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa). In addition, there 
are texts such as the Bhagavadgītā in Book 6, the Anugītā and other texts in Book 14, important 
discourses in Books 3 and 5, and the instructions in Book 13.
11 For an interpretation of the textual history of the epic as testifying to the intention of restoring 
the ideological supremacy of Brahmans after they lost influence due to Buddhism (patronised 
by King Aśoka) and other anti-brahmanical groups, see Holtzmann 1892–95 and Fitzgerald 2006. 
On the role of bhakti as a new doctrine that claims supremacy through mediating Vedic ritual-
ism with ascetic ideals in order to allow householders to seek liberation, see Biardeau 1981 and 
Malinar 2007a. At the same time, the epic documents the pluralisation of religious-philosophical 
views and practices by juxtaposing various teachers and teachings, and depicting conflicts of 
norms and practices without rigorously suggesting one as the ‘best’ or the ‘final word’. This is 
illustrated in the collection of philosophical-religious texts included in Book 12. On the scholarly 
debates about the role of these texts in the history of Indian philosophy, see Malinar 2017a.
12 The concern about what remains of a person after death, if there is an afterlife for the individ-
ual, is the major topic of a philosophical discourse at MBh 12.211–212; see Malinar 2017b.
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suffering on a scale that defies the idea that obeying the law results in plentiful 
rewards. Experiences of injustice cause doubts about, and even disgust (nirveda) 
with, what one was taught to accept. Individuals are depicted as coping with the 
tensions between their personal opinions and the social-religious values they 
have been taught to live by. But intellectual dissatisfaction is also an important 
reason for doubts and dissent. It is manifest in references to new expert groups, 
such as the “debaters of proofs” (hetuvādins), and in the depiction of household-
ers brooding over the validity of transmitted knowledge. Furthermore, some epic 
passages highlight the plethora of ideas and practices advertised by all kinds of 
people as ‘best’ as the referential framework of meaning for discussing doubt 
and confusion.13 The epic contains numerous texts in which the Veda and its 
adherents are criticised, although often for quite different reasons and with an 
equally broad variety of reactions, ranging from censure to endorsement. At the 
same time, new doctrines, such as bhakti, are not only propagated in the epic but 
also countered by calls for ‘proper’ (Brahmanical) authorisation. Furthermore, 
the epic narrative and the various didactic tales included in it are populated by a 
number of highly influential Brahmanical authorities who function as instructors 
and preceptors of the main protagonists.14
13 See, for instance, MBh 12.21, where the ‘great ascetic’ Devasthāna introduces his view on 
the matter as follows: ‘[…] Beings look to this and that Law (dharma) in this and that way at one 
time and another. […] Some recommend quiet calm, others vigorous exercise; some recommend 
neither the one nor the other, and others recommend both. Some men recommend sacrifice, and 
others recommend renunciation. Some recommend giving, and others recommend receiving. 
Some others renounce everything and sit still in silent meditation. Some recommend kingship, 
the protection of all creatures by slaying, shattering, and cleaving enemies and wrongdoers, and 
others live a solitary life’ (12.21.6–9; tr. Fitzgerald 2004, 212). Another depiction of religious plu-
rality is at MBh 14.48.12ff.: ‘Is there at all among the dharmas (doctrines about the right prac-
tice for achieving the highest goal) one known which one must follow best (anuṣṭheyatama)? It 
seems to us that the course (gati) of dharma is of different sorts, almost contradictory. Some say 
that there is something beyond the body, others say this does not exist; some say the non-eternal 
is the eternal, others say the eternal exists and exists not […] When the right practice (dharma) 
is being subject to such disagreement it spreads out in diverse ways. We come to no conclusion 
here – confused as we are. “This is the best (śreyas)! This is the best!” – thinking like this an 
ordinary man sets out (to obtain it). For the one, who is convinced of something being the right 
practice to pursue the (best) goal, worships it always’. For a discussion of this whole passage, 
see Malinar 2015a.
14 For an analysis of how Brahmanical norms are implemented in the household of some epic 
heroes, see Malinar 2015b.
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3  The household as a contested site 
of religious practice 
The discourses in the Mahābhārata show that religious pluralisation was viewed 
as potentially threatening to the Veda-ordained ritual duties anchored in individ-
ual households (gṛha) with extended families (kula, kuṭumba), in particular when 
goals and practices were advocated that would undermine the household as the 
centre  of ritual-social transactions. This is true, for example, in the case of ascetic 
practices (tapas) within the Vedic tradition that developed into the new life-styles 
of the forest ascetic (vānaprastha) and the complete renouncer (saṃnyāsin).15 
These forms of ascetic life are recommended as well as controversially debated 
in the epic. In addition, there was the new religious goal of ‘liberation’ (variously 
called mokṣa, kaivalya, nirvāṇa etc.) from corporeal existence (including that in 
the heavenly worlds propagated in the Veda) as championed, for instance, in the 
traditions of Buddhism, Jainism, and Yoga. These traditions call householders 
to ‘houselessness’, that is, to becoming itinerant ascetics, renouncers, lonely 
practitioners, monks, nuns, etc. However, ‘houselessness’ is not the only form 
of religious individualisation in this period, as is suggested by the juxtaposition 
of ‘householder’ and ‘renouncer’ as an influential scholarly representation of 
religious life in classical India.16 We also see householders expressing their own 
views and engaging in new religious ideas and practices without showing any 
intention of changing their status or leaving their family in order to follow a par-
ticular religious doctrine. The new religious doctrines offered not only ‘renuncia-
tion’ but also various other forms of engaging with the ‘highest’ goal of liberation, 
such as providing support for mendicants, or performing devotional reinterpre-
tations of daily activities.
It was not only Buddhism that offered householders new avenues for engag-
ing in religious-philosophical knowledge (monasticism, becoming a lay follower) 
but also the new monotheistic bhakti doctrines promulgated in the epic in texts 
15 For the history and institutionalisation of saṃnyāsa and the gradual acceptance of ‘libera-
tion’ as a ‘goal of men’ (puruṣārtha) in addition to the classical three goals of Vedic ritualism, see 
Olivelle 1993.
16 This juxtaposition has been discussed variously in connection with Louis Dumont’s claim 
that the renouncer represents ‘the individual-outside-the-world’ (Dumont 1981); see also above 
footnote 4. While this juxtaposition has served to address certain features of Indian society, the 
actual scope of agents and life-styles in classical sources needs to be dealt with, a factor which 
complicates matters considerably. 
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such as the Bhagavadgītā (BhG) and the Nārāyaṇīya.17 These emphasise the com-
patibility of a householder life-style devoted to god with the prospect of liber-
ation, and they redefine ‘renunciation’ (saṃnyāsa) as dedicating, ‘giving away’ 
one’s daily activities to god, and ‘liberation’ as a state in which the devotee shares 
or gains access to god’s transcendent state of being. Furthermore, Buddhism as 
well as bhakti doctrines advocate renunciation as an option for all (and not only 
for male initiates of the Veda) and they include in religious activities household-
ers, such as women and Śūdras, who were previously excluded from learning 
Vedic texts or practising Vedic rituals on their own. In this way, they considera-
bly widened the spectrum of potential followers.18 Vedic ritualism was thus not 
only challenged by the new ascetic religions but also by householders who were 
attracted by the new forms of practice (temple worship, giving alms to monks, 
nuns etc.) and who had their own ideas about god(s), the after-world, and the 
best religious practice. One important feature of this plurality is that doubt and 
confusion about which religious goal and practice are the best are depicted and 
discussed in the epic as well. This suggests a situation in which religious author-
ity has ceased to be based exclusively on patterns of kinship, well-established 
genealogies of social relationships, and restricted access to Vedic texts handed 
down exclusively by Brahmanical teachers. Instead of paying heed to the Veda 
transmitted from time immemorial, new teachers promulgated their own doc-
trines and practices without necessarily seeking Vedic authorisation. Further-
more, representatives of Vedic ritualism are accused of a lack of ‘true’ knowledge 
and of abusing rituals for dubious, egotistical purposes, with these representa-
tives or their clients said to be guilty of perverting the true meaning of sacrifice.19 
They are also criticised for asserting that there are no alternatives to the goals 
and practices of the Veda (nānyad asti: ‘there is nothing else’).20 This criticism is 
often connected with doubts about the basis of authority (pramāṇa / prāmāṇya) 
and thus points towards the changing modes of authorisation for religious texts 
and practices, which now seem to include individual experience and testimony.
17 For an analysis of the BhG and its relationship to the epic discourses, see Malinar 2007a; for 
the Nārāyaṇīya, see the essays in Schreiner 1997.  
18 See, for example, the authorisation of women and Śūdras for practising bhakti at BhG 9.32. 
This targeting of the lower classes is viewed by the critics of these developments as a flaw of the 
new teachers and as a dubious strategy to attract followers; see, for instance, epic and purāṇic 
depictions of the present age of decay (kaliyuga) in which Śūdras become teachers; see Eltsch-
inger 2012; for similar statements in philosophical texts, see Halbfass 1991.
19 Such criticism is not only voiced in texts like the BhG (for instance BhG 2.40–3, and 16.10–7) 
but also by representatives of Brahmanical norms themselves. See for instance MBh 5.43.31.
20 This is how the opinion of those engrossed in expounding the Veda is summarised at BhG 2.42.
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4  Doubting the reliability of transmitted 
knowledge
When epic protagonists are faced with divergent views and contradictory injunc-
tions, reasoning and critical inquiry are presented as means for resolving the 
 difficulties, although this is not always accepted unanimously. While critical 
examination is in some instances recommended as a method for establishing 
what can serve as a guideline and authority in matters concerning the ‘highest 
good’, it is elsewhere viewed as the cause of all intellectual problems and the 
weakening of age-old authorities. Not only new expert groups, such as the ‘debat-
ers of proofs/reasons’ (hetuvādins), are depicted as reasoning about the validity 
of transmitted knowledge21 but also individual protagonists. The latter are pre-
sented as voicing their doubts when faced with theoretical and practical dilem-
mas that result in a critique of the social role they ought to represent and of the 
use of ‘playing by the rules’. One important aspect of the depiction of these 
views is that the social basis for producing and obtaining religious knowledge 
is enhanced through the depiction of Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas as authorities in reli-
gious matters, a role that is no longer restricted only to Brahmans. Women are 
also depicted as using ritual instruments on their own,22 as practising forms of 
religion not envisaged for them,23 and as doubting the validity of established reli-
gious doctrines.  
An example of the latter is the dialogue between Queen Draupadī and her 
husband King Yudhiṣṭhira at Mahābhārata 3.28–37. The couple discuss the 
reasons for following prescribed dharma when this does not produce the  promised 
21 In quite a few places, the ‘debaters of proofs’ (hetuvādins), who attack the Veda and Brah-
manical norms with the ‘science of reasoning’ (tarkavidyā) are accused of excessive doubting 
and of propagating disregard for transmitted Vedic knowledge. In one of the more elaborate po-
lemics, they are compared with dogs and condemned as being unsuited for social relationships 
(MBh 13.37.11–6). Elsewhere, their appearance is interpreted as a sign that the last and worst of 
the four world-ages, the age of decay (kaliyuga), is in full swing (MBh 3.188.26). On the relation-
ship between such ‘heresy’ and ‘apocalyptic’ ideas in later Purāṇas and in Buddhist literature, 
see Eltschinger 2012.
22 See the two versions of the story about how Kuntī obtained a powerful mantra that allowed 
her to summon any god she desired at MBh 1.104 and 3.287–289; in relation to this incident a dis-
course unfolds at 1.111–3 that aims at prohibiting the independent agency of women; see Malinar 
2014.
23 At MBh 9.51, the Brahman sage Nārada objects to the unlicensed ascetic practices carried 
out by the daughter of the Brahman Kuṇi-Gārgya and forces her into marriage, since unmarried 
women are not allowed to become ascetics. On the epic depiction of Nārada as a representative 
of Brahmanical normativity, see Malinar 2015b.
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rewards but, rather, only disaster.24 Draupadī says (3.31.7): ‘The Law, when well 
protected, protects the king, who guards the Law, so I hear from the noble ones, 
but I find it does not protect you’. She calls on her husband, who has lost his 
kingdom despite always obeying dharma, to accept that such obedience does not 
work and to stand up and fight for his rights. She also suggests that the karman 
doctrine that implies ‘good will do good’ is in fact an idea disproven by the sad 
reality of the exile she and her husband are suffering. For the learned (paṇḍita) 
Draupadī, the ideas of ‘order’ and ‘justice’ implied in the terms dharma and 
karman have become dubious. She suspects that it is not lofty values that count 
but only actual power (bala): ‘Or, if the evil that has been done does not pursue its 
doer, then mere power is the cause of everything, and I bemoan powerless folk!’ 
(MBh 3.31.42. tr. van Buitenen 1975, 281). She also argues that the gods are mere 
schemers who are not interested in human welfare but rather treat human beings 
like puppets (3.31.35–7). Yudhiṣṭhira is alarmed by the critical impact of her rea-
soning, of her doubting that transmitted knowledge is the authority (pramāṇa) 
in salvific matters. He seeks to censure what he views as a transgression and 
accuses her of being a ‘non-believer’ (nāstika) since she doubts and argues too 
much.25 He warns his wife of the negative karmic consequences (being reborn as 
an animal) of her denying established authority. She is accused of ātmapramāṇa, 
of taking herself (ātman) as authority, instead of relying on ārṣapramāṇa, on the 
authority derived from the Vedic sages (ṛṣi). Says Yudhiṣṭhira: ‘Who is excessively 
doubting dharma will not find a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) in anything else. 
Arrogant is he who takes himself as the authority (ātmapramāṇa) as he despises 
what (or: who) is superior. […] Who neglects the authority that belongs to the 
sages (ārṣaṃ pramāṇam) is not guarding the laws, being deluded he violates all 
authoritative instructions and does not find any peace in all his lives. You must 
not doubt excessively the dharma that is followed by the learned as it is time-
less (old), being proclaimed by all-knowing, all-envisioning sages’ (MBh 3.32.15, 
20–1). Individual, self-reliant reasoning is checked here by insistence on belief, 
on the (tautological) statement that one must follow the ancient truths because 
one should better not doubt them. The excessiveness of the criticism is presented 
24 For an analysis of the whole dialogue focussing on the issue of gender, see Malinar 2007b. 
Another royal household debate at MBh 12.18 concerns a king who has chosen to live from alms 
(bhaikṣya) after taking up the life-style of a ‘skull-bearing’ ascetic (kāpālīm vṛttim). His wife rep-
rimands him for what she thinks is mere hypocrisy.
25 See the many occurrences of the prefix ‘ati-’, signifying an excessive or deviant performance 
of the activity denoted by the verb. Thus, Draupadī is said to ‘doubt too much’ (ati+śaṅk, 32.6, 
7, 9, 14, 15, 17, 21), to ‘argue too much’ (ati+vad, 32.6), to ‘transgress’ (ati+gam, 32.9.20) and to 
‘offend’ (ati+vṛt, 32.18) norms.
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as the main reason for Yudhiṣṭhira’s warnings as it results in Draupadī claiming 
a position she is not entitled to; at least not according to the very norms she 
objects  to. 
In Book 12 of the epic, Yudhiṣṭhira’s own questions about dharma are made 
the point of departure for a series of discourses. At several points he is depicted 
as doubting transmitted knowledge. At Mahābhārata 12.251–2, for instance, Yud-
hiṣṭhira asks his grandfather and teacher Bhīṣma about the criteria for defining 
dharma. Initially, Bhīṣma answers rather conventionally (following the account 
in Dharmaśāstra literature) by stating that dharma can be defined by reference to 
sadācāra, the ‘conduct of the good (norm-setting) people’ or ‘good ( norm-setting) 
conduct’, to authoritative dharma texts (smṛti), and to the Veda (veda). But Yud-
hiṣṭhira’s doubts are more fundamental when he turns to logical reasoning 
(anumāna). He detects contradictions, circular reasoning, and other undesirable 
characteristics of the three conventional methods of authorising dharma. First of 
all, Yudhiṣṭhira takes up the ‘conduct of good (norm-setting) people’ (sadācāra) 
and points out that it suffers from the flaw of ‘mutual dependency’ (anyonyas-
aṃśraya, circular reasoning): ‘Dharma is regarded as the practice of the good, if 
however good people define what is (good) practice – how can one prove what 
needs to be proved, since what is good remains undefined?’ (MBh 12.252.5). Thus, 
good practice cannot be used as a criterion for defining dharma because it is 
explained by reference to undefined ‘good people’.26 Next, the reliability of the 
authority of the Veda and (Veda-based) dharma manuals is questioned by pointing 
out that ‘the doctrines of the Veda diminish from world-age to world age’ (12.252.7) 
and that the Veda is ‘spread out in different directions’ (12.252.9). The diversifica-
tion of the Veda entails the possibility of contradictory injunctions and thus under-
mines the reliability of these texts in matters of dharma.27 Therefore, they cannot 
serve as a pramāṇa, an authority, a means of knowledge: ‘If they [the different 
texts] were all a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) then a means of knowledge would 
not be available at all. How then is scriptural authority established in case of con-
tradiction, when it is both a means of knowledge and not a means of knowledge?’ 
(12.252.10). Once the problem of defining the authority of transmitted knowledge 
has been recognised, certainty vanishes like a mirage as soon as it is explored by 
26  On this problem and the definitions of ācāra in medieval Dharmaśāstras, see Davis 2004. 
Yudhiṣṭhira further rejects the method of inferring dharma from its opposite (adharma) and vice 
versa.
27 Diversification refers, on one hand, to the transmission of the canon of the ‘four Vedas’ (ca-
turveda) in different schools, and, on the other, to the very pluralisation of the original single 
(eka) Veda into four; see Malinar 2011b.
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‘critically examining thinkers’ (anvīkṣyamāṇaḥ  kavibhiḥ; 12.252.13). This loss of old 
certainties is an important point of Yudhiṣṭhira’s speech. 
How is this reasoning dealt with here? Instead of demonstrating in which 
respects the Veda can be regarded as pramāṇa, or arguing that erudite Brahmans 
set the standard for what should be taken as the ‘practice of good people’, Bhīṣma 
gives an account of an encounter between the merchant Tulādhāra, belonging to 
the Vaiśya caste, and the Brahman Jājali (MBh 12.253–256). At the beginning of his 
account Bhīṣma relates that Brahman Jājali, a great ascetic dwelling in the forest, 
went to the ocean for further ascetic practice (tapas). When he began to think that 
there was nobody to equal him, he was told by the Piśācas (forest demons, goblins) 
surrounding him that he ought not entertain such thoughts. Such thoughts, they 
said, are not appropriate even for the famous merchant Tulādhāra in Varanasi. 
A displeased (vimanas) Jājali exclaims that he wants to see this man and sets out 
to pay him a visit. At this point Yudhiṣṭhira interrupts the account and asks what 
Jājali did in order obtain such high ascetic perfection (siddhi). Bhīṣma replies 
(12.253.13ff.) with a second report of what brought the Brahman to Varanasi.28 He 
relates that Jājali had been following the rules of forest asceticism all on his own 
and was engaged in ‘terrible’ (ghora) ascetic exercises (tapas). For years he would 
sit like a piece of wood, ‘eating wind’, and letting a pair of birds build a nest on 
his head. Since he did not move, the birds were not afraid to lay their eggs and 
raise their offspring on his head. When the birds finally left, Jājali was amazed 
by his own achievement: ‘He thought “I am a Siddha (a perfect man)” and self- 
conceit (māna) possessed him’ (12.253.38). He blurted out his conviction that he had 
mastered dharma (12.253.41). However, in response to this Jājali was immediately 
rebuked by ‘a voice in the air’ stating that in matters of dharma he was not the equal 
of the wise Tulādhāra – and even Tulādhāra was not permitted to talk like this. Full 
of anger, Jājali travelled to Varanasi and approached the merchant, who was going 
about his business. When Tulādhāra, ‘who made his living from merchandise’, saw 
the Brahman he welcomed him by displaying his knowledge about Jājali and about 
the circumstances that brought him to Varanasi. Mocking the Brahman slightly, he 
pointed out that the latter believed that mastering dharma consists of ‘taking care 
of sparrows’ and this misconception is the reason why Jājali was directed to him. 
The Brahman then asks how Tulādhāra, a merchant (vāṇija) dealing with 
all kinds of goods, has obtained the ‘highest insight’ (naiṣṭhikī  buddhi).29 
28 A discussion of the composition and textual history of the Tulādhāra story is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Both accounts highlight the problem of individual ascetics misjudging re-
ligious achievements (see also below).
29 This expression is used also in other instances in the epic for perfection in religious-philosophical 
knowledge; see for instance, MBh 12.211.15; 217.28; 260.8.
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In  introducing the merchant’s reply, Bhīṣma highlights the rather unusual 
situation that the Brahman is taught ‘subtleties of dharma’ (dharmasūkṣmāṇi) 
by a Vaiśya, who knew the true meaning of dharma (12.254.4). Without further 
ado, Tulādhāra starts his instruction by pointing out that to live one’s life 
without bearing malice towards anybody is the dharma that is eternal, 
ensures the welfare of all beings, and is friendly (maitra). In putting this into 
practice he has chosen ‘sameness’ (samatva), being impartial, as his religious 
observance (vrata), which he practises not in the context of Yoga mediation 
or other ascetic practices, but in his daily transactions with his customers. He 
describes his trade and points out that he holds his ‘scales’ (tulā) the same 
for all alike.30  Irrespective of whether they are friends or enemies, whether he 
weighs gold or grain: all are his friends whom he wishes well. Says Tulādhāra: 
‘He who is the friend of all, and is always delighted in the welfare of others 
in deeds, thoughts, and word, knows dharma, Jājali. I neither praise nor 
condemn the deeds of others as I am watching the colourfulness of the world 
like [I watch the clouds] in the sky. I neither coax nor impede,31 neither hate 
nor love. I am the same towards all beings, behold, Jājali, my observance! […] 
My scales are the same for all beings’ (12.254.9–12). Furthermore, the merchant 
points out that not posing a danger for others is the best conduct (ācāra) and 
therefore any maltreatment of animals (in trade, agriculture, or animal sac-
rifice) and human beings must be avoided. Otherwise, one takes what is not 
authoritative (apramāṇa) as an authority (pramāṇa; 12.255.14). Impartiality 
and non-violence set the highest standard of dharma which others (namely: 
Vedic Brahmans, ascetics, and mighty people) have ruined through violent 
partisanship (12.254.21). 
The scales are both instrument and yardstick for Tulādhāra’s understanding 
of dharma as a steadfast ‘observance’ of ‘impartiality’. His way of carrying out his 
profession is depicted as a religious practice that sets a standard for the ‘conduct 
of good people’ and also for Brahmans. The issue of what constitutes ‘conduct of 
good (norm-setting) people’, and thus ‘good (norm-setting) conduct’ (sadācāra), 
raised earlier by Yudhiṣṭhira’s identification of the lack of a definition of what or 
who is ‘good’ (sat), is here addressed by means of a didactic story. The Tulādhāra 
story has received some attention for its advocacy of non-violence (ahiṃsā) and 
30 The name Tulādhāra (meaning ‘scales-holder’) seems programmatic for this convergence of 
professional life and religious practice.
31 This can be very well understood as referring to his non-manipulative handling of the scales 
(see also the use of the ātmanepada form of the verbs in this stanza).  
1186   Angelika Malinar
its criticism of animal sacrifice.32 But the merchant’s ideas about sama(tva), 
being ‘the same’, ‘impartial’, ‘indifferent’, as the best practice is also an impor-
tant aspect of the text. It is presented as a form of conduct in which Tulādhāra’s 
personal engagement with religious-philosophical knowledge converges with the 
professional activities of his daily life. However, it is not depicted as resulting 
from an affiliation with a specific religious tradition or community. This reso-
nates with other epic passages in which samatva, ‘sameness’ or ‘impartiality’, 
is advocated as a desirable attitude that demonstrates a person’s freedom from 
egotistical interests (rooted in desire, anger etc.) and his concern for the welfare of 
others.33 But it is also presented as the result of meditative practices in the context 
of specific religious-philosophical teachings, such as Yoga, Sāṃkhya philosophy, 
and bhakti.34 
The depiction of the merchant Tulādhāra’s idea of ‘sameness’ resonates 
with the uncertainty Yudhiṣṭhira had voiced earlier with respect to the criteria 
which establish the validity of Vedic texts and define what is ‘good’  norm-setting 
conduct. His ideas of dharma are put into practice as an ‘observance’ (vrata) that 
is tested in the merchant’s daily business of ‘holding the scales’ for all kinds 
of people. The merchant’s views and his criticism of Brahmanical norms and 
practices are neither challenged nor explicitly endorsed, apart from their being 
reported by Bhīṣma to Yudhiṣṭhira. In contrast to this, Jājali’s solitary pursuit 
of asceticism results in a misunderstanding of dharma,35 which is connected in 
32 See Proudfoot 1979. The Tulādhāra instruction is not the only text in the epic advocating 
non-violence as the yardstick of what is a salvific, norm-setting practice irrespective of the reli-
gious path adopted; see, for instance, MBh 14.48ff. 
33 For instance, MBh 12.152.30; 12.154, 12.161.42.
34 The Bhagavadgītā, for instance, recommends Yoga as a method of becoming ‘the same’, 
which entails being able to view all things and beings as same, and to see the ‘same’ (absolute 
being, here: the self, ātman) in all beings; see, for instance, BhG 2.48, 4.22, 5.18–9, 6.8–9, 29, 32. 
In connection with its bhakti teachings, ‘sameness’ is described in the same text as an attitude of 
the highest god towards all beings. It is declared that the god Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa is not only ‘neu-
tral’ (udāsīna), that is personally disinterested in engaging in earthly matters, but also impartial 
(sama), since he himself treats all beings alike, without personal aversion or affection. Yet, this 
impartiality is scaled since he responds favourably to those who approach him with bhakti; see 
BhG 9.29–32; for a scaling of different forms of bhaktas, see BhG 7.16–28 and for an evaluation of 
different ascetic practices vis-à-vis bhakti, see BhG 12; samatva is also propagated as a character-
istic feature of a devotee, for instance at 18.54; see Malinar 2007a.
35 This is not the only instance in the epic in which a Brahman ascetic is criticised for his misun-
derstanding of dharma by ‘inferiors’, such as a wife or a member of a lower caste. At MBh 3.197, for 
instance, the Brahman Kauśika is first criticised by his wife for his ascetic life style and then by a 
hunter; see Brinkhaus 1994 for the composition of the text. In a similar vein, when Yudhiṣṭhira en-
tertains the idea of becoming a forest ascetic (12.9), he is criticised by his brothers (12.18ff.). 
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the text to the situation when a person takes himself as the authority for validat-
ing his or her own achievements. This points to a problematic aspect of religious 
individualisation, namely the danger of misjudging and misinterpreting religious 
ideas and practices when pursuing them on one’s own. The case of Jājali illus-
trates the danger of being carried away by achievements deemed extraordinary 
such that one comes to thinks that one’s achievements are incomparable. The 
case of Draupadī points to the problems that arise when confidence in transmit-
ted knowledge dwindles. Her experience of injustice results in a transgression 
of social roles and normative religious behaviour when she claims the right to 
think for herself, to take herself as the authority (ātmapramāṇa). In contrast to 
Jājali, Draupadī is censured by her husband as he keeps his dharmic faith. This 
highlights the gendered structure of the individualisation processes and the 
authorisation of individual agency as depicted in the epic.36 While both instances 
demonstrate that disapproval and censorship are never far away, it is also made 
clear that the querying of dharma, ‘higher’ insight, and norm-setting conduct 
is no longer the exclusive possession of Brahmanical authorities and that the 
discourse is not limited to negotiating the relationship between asceticism and 
householder-life. 
Not only in the passages discussed before, but also elsewhere in the epic, 
the word pramāṇa serves frequently to address the issue of authority, and in 
some instances, it seems to be already imbued with the new technical meanings 
in philosophical expert discourse, ‘means of knowledge’ and ‘valid cognition’. 
The newly emerging field of philosophy is an important arena for negotiating 
and delimiting religious pluralisation and individualisation in this period. The 
rise of philosophy is part of the cultural-historical context of the epic debates on 
authority.37 It plays an important role in the consolidation of old and new fields of 
knowledge in authoritative bodies of texts (śāstra, sūtra etc.), in the delimitation 
of ideological pluralisation, and of individual authority in matters pertaining to 
the ‘highest good’. In the following, some aspects of the philosophical discourse 
on valid knowledge shall be highlighted that connect the epic debates to another 
field of discourse which deals with ideological pluralisation and the broaden-
ing of the social basis of people engaged in religious-philosophical issues (royal 
households, merchants etc.). 
36 This issue cannot be discussed further within the scope of this chapter; see Malinar 2007b, 2014. 
37 For a discussion of the place of philosophy in the epic in the history of Indian philosophy, 
see Malinar 2017a.
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5  Trustworthy persons as ‘means of knowledge’ 
in philosophical discourse
Individual statements about the ‘highest good’ and debates about their 
authority are represented in the epic without rigorously expounding one 
 religious-philosophical pathway as ‘the best’. The epic juxtaposes various 
texts that claim to provide instruction about the ‘best’ and even places some 
of these at nodal points in the epic narrative, as if launching an ideological 
key-text. However, none of these positions is endorsed or activated across the 
epic as the religious-philosophical ‘master-discourse’.38 While the epic tes-
tifies to ideological pluralisation, philosophy is one of the driving forces of 
 religious-philosophical pluralisation and at the same time provides instru-
ments for regulating it. Philosophers cope at an epistemological level with the 
validity of competing religious-philosophical doctrines, inter alia, by making 
‘doubt’ (saṃśaya, śaṅkha) a prerequisite as well as a topic of philosophical 
expert discourse. Even more important is that critical inquiry and ensuring 
the validity of knowledge through accepted ‘means of knowledge’ become the 
characteristic features of philosophical discourse. In this connection, the word 
pramāṇa (in epic often used in the sense of ‘authority’, ‘yardstick’, etc.) obtains 
new technical meanings, namely ‘means of knowledge’ and ‘valid cognition’.39 
The production of philosophical tenets also entailed teachings not based on 
the Veda or even critical of it. Philosophers like Kapila, the founder of Sāṃkhya 
philosophy – which in its systematic exposition declares that the Vedic sote-
riology is ‘uncertain’ (anekānta) –, were accepted as authorities, a status that 
had to be validated. This meant not only justifying the criticism of the Veda 
but also providing criteria for the authority of the words of an innovative phi-
losopher or religious teacher who was not transmitting or reinterpreting the 
‘eternal’ Veda. The crisis of the authority of the eternal ‘words’ of the Veda 
and the claim that newly promulgated dharma is also reliable, or even more 
reliable, are addressed in philosophical discourse with the acceptance of the 
38 Various candidates for such an ideological ‘master-discourse’ have been suggested (for in-
stance, Sāṃkhya philosophy, bhakti, Brahmanical normativity) without reaching a scholarly 
consensus; for an overview of the debates on ‘philosophy’ in the epic, see Malinar 2017a; for 
various interpretations of the epic, see Brockington 1998.
39 The two meanings of pramāṇa point to what Matilal calls the ‘systematic ambiguity’ of the 
term that ‘means both, a means for (or a way of) knowledge and an authoritative source for 
making a knowledge-claim. It also means a ‘proof’, a way of proving that something exists or 
something is the case’ (Matilal 1986, 35f.). 
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verbal testimony (vacana, śabda) of knowledgeable individuals (‘trustworthy 
persons’, āpta) as a means of knowledge on a par with the Veda.40
The ensuing philosophical debate on the reliability of the ‘statements of trust-
worthy persons’ (āptavacana) testifies, on the one hand, to attempts to legitimise 
new teachers and doctrines, and, on the other, to a resistance to further plurali-
sation and individualisation of teaching traditions. The latter is mirrored in the 
arguments against the authority of individuals in matters of ‘unseen goals’ and 
‘highest good’ offered by Mīmāṃsā philosophers championing the sole authority 
of the Veda. The controversy is based on a general consensus among philosophers, 
who accepted ‘verbal testimony’ as a means of knowledge, that without words 
there would be no knowledge about things and entities that are invisible (adṛṣṭa), 
such as the after-world (paraloka) and the ‘immortal self’ (ātman). The other 
means of knowledge, perception (pratyakṣa) and logical inference (anumāna), 
cannot provide such knowledge. According to Nyāya philosopher Pakṣilasvāmin 
Vātsyāyana (ca. 5th century), a trustworthy person gives instruction (upadeśa) in 
invisible goals (adṛṣṭārtha) one should strive for, and also provides the reasons 
(hetu) for the recommended course of action. In his commentary on the Nyāyas-
ūtra he states: ‘“Trustworthy persons”41 are those whose characteristic feature is 
to perceive directly “this must be abandoned”, “this is the reason for abandoning 
it”, “this is something that needs to be obtained”, “this is the reason for obtaining 
it”’.42 
In philosophical discourse, āptavacana is treated as a source of philosophical- 
religious knowledge as well as an object of philosophical examination. Reasons 
must be adduced and the knowledge derived from verbal testimony is open 
40 The acceptance of verbal testimony or knowledge derived from words (śabda) as a pramāṇa 
side by side with perception (pratyakṣa) and logical inference (anumāna) is a characteristic fea-
ture of Indian philosophical discourse. Most philosophical schools accept ‘verbal testimony’ as 
a pramāṇa; exceptions are the materialists (who have no use for ‘invisible goals’), and early 
Vaiśeṣika; for an overview, see Saksena 1951, Oberhammer 1974, and Malinar 2013. While the 
‘words of the Buddha’ (buddhavanaca) are the basis of Buddhist practice, the question of in 
which respects the Buddha was regarded as a pramāṇa by contemporary Buddhist philosophers 
Dignāga (ca. 5th century) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 7th century) is intensely debated by scholars; see, 
for instance, Ruegg 1994 and 1995, Krasser 2001, and Silk 2002.
41 The plural form āptāḥ can also be understood as an honorific ‘the trustworthy person’.
42 āptāḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ idaṃ hātavyam idam asya hānihetur idam asyādhigan-
tavyam idam asyādhigamahetuḥ iti; Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 2.1.68. The Buddhist logician 
Dharmakīrti states: ‘Man cannot [safely] exist without resorting to the [reliable] authority of 
tradition [consisting of reliable statements], because from [reliable verbal knowledge, āgama, 
alone] he hears the great advantage and the [great] disadvantage of engaging in or abstaining 
from certain [acts] whose results are not [at present] perceivable’ (Pramāṇavarttikasvavṛtti, 108, 
2–5, tr. van Bijlert 1989, 119).
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to critical examination by means of the other pramāṇas (perception, logical 
 inference).43 How does one know that a person is ‘trustworthy’ and his instruc-
tion reliable? Philosophers who accept the authority of the statements of trust-
worthy persons (āptavacana) argue that the exceptional qualities of these 
individuals are the criteria for their authority in these matters. Nyāya philoso-
phers emphasise that the instructions by trustworthy individuals are based on 
immediate ‘insight’ and ‘direct perception’ – much the same as with the Vedic 
sages44 – and on the desire to communicate it truthfully.45 Another feature reg-
ularly mentioned in these discussions is that such a teacher has ‘compassion’ 
or ‘empathy’ (anukampa, karuṇā) for those who are not capable of knowing on 
their own how to obtain the ‘highest good’ and end their suffering.46 This char-
acteristic is closely connected to the claim that, in contrast to ordinary persons, 
trustworthy teachers are free from egotistical impulses (desire, hate, etc.) and 
have nothing to gain for themselves when they instruct others.47 Therefore, they 
are also not liable to lie and cause deception because such misdemeanour only 
occur if personal interests are pursued. In cases of the ‘trustworthy’, lying would 
not serve any purpose.48 
43 This is the position Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana when he states: ‘The self exists – this is 
known from the instruction by a trustworthy person’. He then continues with the logical infer-
ences (anumāna) that would support and substantiate the validity of the verbal testimony; cf. 
Nyāyya-sūtrabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1.  
44 In accordance with a widely accepted notion that certain persons are able to directly perceive 
the things that are beyond the senses, early Nyāya texts claim that the founder of the science of 
medicine (Āyurveda) had direct knowledge of all diseases and cures. Similarly, the seers of the 
Veda have directly perceived how the Vedic texts are connected to rituals and their results, see 
Chemparathy 1983. Yāska’s Nirukta 1.20 stresses the ability of the rsis to perceive dharma directly, 
while later generations lack it: ‘There were seers who directly perceived dharma(s). By [their] 
instruction they transmitted the [Vedic] mantras to the later ones, who did not directly perceive 
dharma(s)’ (tr. Ruegg 1994, 308).
45 Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, for instance, explains: ‘A teacher (upadeṣṭā) who has directly 
perceived dharma and is motivated by the desire to communicate the matter as he has seen it 
and is capable to do so, is “trustworthy” (āpta)’. Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7.
46 See Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 2.1.68, which resonates with Buddhist as well as early 
bhakti texts.
47 In a similar vein, but with an emphasis on the trustworthiness of the statement itself, the 
author of the Yuktidīpikā and philosopher of Sāṃkhya explains: ‘“Trustworthy” (āpta) is the 
utterance of someone who is free from passion etc.; it serves the purpose of another and is the 
cause [for a cognition] that cannot be obtained [with other means of knowledge]’ (āptā nāma 
rāgādiviyuktasyāgṛhyamāṇakāraṇā parārthā vyāhṛtiḥ, YD on Sāṃkhyakārikā 5, 87, 4). 
48 The alternative would be to keep one’s insights to oneself and just pursue an individually 
discovered truth privately. This option is a topic, for instance, in the case of the Buddha when 
he is depicted in the Pali Canon as being reluctant to teach after he has awakened to the ‘noble 
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Exponents of the Veda rejected these views and argued that only the words 
of the Veda are reliable since they are by definition ‘unalterable’ (akṣara) 
‘ truth-formulations’ (brahman) that were ‘seen’ and then voiced by ancient 
sages (ṛṣi). This position is elaborated in the philosophical school of Mīmāṃsā 
by means of the doctrine of the ‘authorlessness’ (apauruṣeyatva) of the Veda 
(so-called śruti). Philosophers such as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa refuse to accord individ-
ualised  truth-claims a status on a par with the Veda.49 At the most, they would 
accept them as smṛti, less authoritative texts composed by human authors. 
Mīmāṃsā philosophers argue that human beings are not reliable as they are 
subject to egotistical impulses and therefore prone to errors. This makes their 
words structurally unreliable. This argument also applies to ‘eternal’ persons, 
that is bhakti gods, such as Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa, or (later divinised) philosopher / 
teachers, such as Kapila or the Buddha, since they need a body (the site of ego-
tistical impulses) in order to instruct people about dharma. Mīmāṃsā philoso-
phers would also not accept the claim formulated in bhakti texts and endorsed by 
later Nyāya philosophers50 that the ‘highest’ god is the creator of the Veda. In this 
respect, the Bhagavadgītā and the Nārāyaṇīya, the early bhakti texts transmitted 
in the epic, differ from later theological-philosophical justifications of bhakti that 
seek to prove that their texts and practices are rooted in the Veda (vedamūlatva). 
These developments demonstrate that the religious pluralisation in the period 
under discussion does not simply continue. Instead, we see a reassertion of Brah-
manical normativity that, inter alia, aimed at restricting a further proliferation of 
religious individualisation in the context of bhakti and other religious traditions.
truths’, as well as in the figure of the pratyekabuddha (Pali: paccekabuddha), the Buddha who is 
a Buddha for himself only; see Kloppenburg 1983. See also MBh 12.9.3ff. on the attractiveness of 
solitary asceticism as the ‘blissful’ path one travels all alone. 
49 As is emphasised, for instance, by Taber 1992, 205: ‘Mīmāṃsā fundamentally rejects the abil-
ity of humans to know any transcendent matters’. This also applies to the idea that the Veda is 
created by (an) īśvara (creator god, god as cosmic sovereign) as propagated in some of the mono-
theistic bhakti traditions; see also Clooney 1987, who includes modern ideas of ‘authorlessness’ 
in his discussion of this position.
50 Later Nyāya texts, such as Udāyana’s Nyāyakusumāñjali (10–11th century), defend the au-
thority and validity of scripture and verbal testimony (including the Veda) by arguing that it 
was produced and promulgated by the eternal creator god (īśvara), thus rejecting the Mīmāṃsā 
doctrine of the ‘authorless’ eternity of Veda; see Chemparathy 1972.
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6 Trustworthy ‘eternal’ persons in the epic
As in philosophical discourse, the reliability and authority of the words of an 
individual is depicted in the epic as depending not only on the reasons provided 
for recommending a certain doctrine but also on the qualifications of speaker. 
Thus, epic texts emphasise the speaker’s disinterestedness and his freedom from 
‘desire and anger’. Compassion (anukampa) and the concern for ‘the welfare of 
all beings’ (sarvabhūtahita) serve as credentials. In addition to this, the personal 
relationship between the teacher (revealing his divinity in the course of the 
instruction) and the person approaching him plays a prominent role in the two 
longer epic instructions about bhakti. The ‘conversation’ (saṃvāda) between 
two individuals constitutes not only the narrative situation but also the form 
of instruction.51 The authorisation of the instruction is connected to a personal 
relationship based on acceptance and trust.52 This is highlighted, for instance, 
when audiences are asked to have śraddhā, confidence in the efficacy of a 
doctrine, because of the authority of the teacher.53 The trustworthiness of the 
teacher is mirrored by the trustfulness of the suitable disciple.54 Trust plays an 
important role in the process of establishing the authority of individual-based 
religious-philosophical knowledge, since it is intrinsically connected with the 
relational character of authorisation. The confidence in the goals and practices 
taught by the teacher must be stable in order to ensure one’s success. This means 
‘keeping the faith’ even in situations that seem to disprove it, or when one is 
censured by others. The emphasis on the actual teaching situation is thus an 
51 In this respect, these dialogues differ from the collective discussions in household contexts 
as the arena for voicing opinions and giving advice. See, for instance, the household discussion 
about Yudhiṣṭhira’s wish to give up kingship and become an ascetic at MBh 12.6–38; or the de-
liberations about war and peace in Book five. These household discussions also differ from the 
‘verbal contest’ (brahmodaya) between teachers attested in Vedic literature.  
52 See, for instance, BhG 4.3, when Kṛṣṇa makes Arjuna’s being his devotee and friend the foun-
dation as well as the motive for revealing his teaching; in the Nārāyaṇīya, the Brahman sage 
Nārada has to declare his credentials before he is instructed how to approach the god Nārāyaṇa 
(cf. MBh 12.322). 
53 See, for instance, BhG 3.31–2, where Kṛṣṇa asks Arjuna to have confidence in ‘my doctrine’ 
(me matam).
54 See, for instance, BhG 3.31, 4.39–40, 6.47, 7.21–2, 9.3, 23, 12.2, 20 etc.  Śraddhā is one of the key 
terms already in Vedic literature wherein it refers to the confidence in the efficacy of Vedic rituals 
and becomes manifest in the willingness to pay the priests a reward for their services. In some 
texts, śraddhā is also used when dealing with confidence in persons of authority; see Köhler 
1948, and Hacker 1963. In a number of epic texts, śraddhā is intertwined with bhakti and refers 
to the trust in the efficacy of the word of god and the devotion to him; see Hara 1964 and 1979 on 
the difference between bhakti and śraddhā. 
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important feature of the promulgation of bhakti doctrines in the Mahābhārata, 
which highlight individualised relationships between god and devotee as the 
foundation of religious practice. The various ways of relating to the embodied, 
visible presence of an otherwise transcendent god determines the religious life 
of a devotee in ways that could even result in ignoring or rejecting social norms. 
The spectacular character of the ‘vision’ (darśana) of the divinity granted to the 
devotee in both the Bhagavadgītā and the Nārāyaṇīya serves to substantiate the 
verbal testimony by reference to empirical evidence and provides a context for 
god’s iconic representation in places of worship. It unfolds against the back-
ground of god’s presence in the human body of the teacher. The authorisation 
of bhakti to Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavadgītā and to Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa in the 
Nārāyaṇīya draws on both these aspects: while its promulgation depends on a 
body of teachings and an embodied teacher, its authorisation draws on the cri-
teria of the larger discourse on this issue in combining specific characteristics 
of their personality with the ‘empirical evidence’ of a theophany. Yet in both 
texts there are also marked attempts to realign bhakti with Vedic rituals and 
Brahmanical normativity.55
The acceptance of temporarily embodied ‘eternal’ persons as authoritative 
instructors is contested not only in philosophical discourse but also in the epics. 
It highlights the need for the new teachings to address the tension between the 
embodied, temporally situated, promulgation of the knowledge and the claim 
that it has ahistorical validity. One way to counter the Brahmanical insistence on 
the ‘eternity’ of the Veda as the reason for its insurmountable authority was to 
make ‘eternity’ or some ‘transcendent’ state of existence a characteristic feature 
of the ‘trustworthy’ instructor. The ‘eternal’ Veda is countered with the ‘eternal’ 
person (a divine or liberated being). This results in an ambiguous positioning of 
the ‘historical’ teacher as both human and divine. This may explain why there is 
a considerable overlap in the depictions of human-styled teachers, such as the 
Buddha, and the new bhakti gods appearing in a body (tanu, avatāra).56 In this 
55 This can be seen in passages in the epic that aim at replacing, or at least reconnecting, the 
bhakti doctrines of the BhG with Brahmanical norms; this tendency is already apparent in BhG 
17; see Malinar 2007a. In the Nārāyaṇīya, the god Nārāyaṇa is depicted as endorsing Vedic rituals 
and protecting the Vedic gods; for a comparison between these two texts, see Malinar 1997.
56 This is clearly formulated in the BhG 9.11ff., for instance when Kṛṣṇa says he has taken a 
‘human body’ in order to promulgate his divinity, while also pointing out that this should not be 
a reason to disrespect his tenets. It is also pointed out at BhG 7.6 that the god appears in an ‘appa-
ritional’ or ‘artificial’ body that is not subject to karman. Although the BhG does not use the word 
avatāra, the idea of divine embodiments (the basis of what is known as the ‘avatāra-doctrine’) 
is present in the text, see Malinar 2007a. In a similar vein, Buddhism develops the ‘three-body’ 
(trikāya) doctrine of the Buddha; see Reynolds 1977. When later Nyāya philosophers like Udāya-
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way, the historically proclaimed new knowledge is turned into a manifestation of 
a trans-historical truth by according the teacher a transcendent, eternal state of 
being. A ‘highest’ god has to take a human body in order to reveal himself to his 
devotees; conversely, human teachers tend to be divinized, or are viewed as the 
embodiment of a transcendent state or divinity by their adherents. They show 
as well as represent the path to be followed. They are themselves the pramāṇa, 
the reliable authority and means of knowledge, as well as the guarantor of the 
efficacy of their instruction.57 In this way, the temporal quality of the statements 
of trustworthy persons entwines with a trans-historical truth-claim and the indi-
vidualised, embodied character of its authorisation. Religious-philosophical 
knowledge also obtains an experiential, personal dimension, since the teacher 
is regarded as the living proof of the fruitfulness of practising it. His activities as 
attested in the stories about his life serve as corroborative evidence for the words 
spoken. They highlight the exceptionality, as well as the exemplariness, of the 
‘trustworthy person’ and extend the issue of the relational structure of accept-
ance and persuasion to literary forms of representation (as can be seen in the 
emergence of the new genre of carita, ‘life-history’). 
7 Conclusion
It is not being as unique or different as everybody else (and thus sharing a com-
monly acknowledged equality as an individual) that constitutes individuality in 
the sources discussed here, as is the case with modern individualism, but, rather, 
exceptionality and exemplariness in the realisation of a religious-philosophical 
knowledge, as well as skilfulness and expertise in exposing it.58 The authority of 
an individual can be assessed by means of a catalogue of characteristic features. 
In this way, exceptionality is intertwined with exemplariness as the foundation 
of the authority of an individual in religious matters. The combination of exem-
plariness and exceptionality results in an ambiguous perception. While in some 
respects the teacher continued to be remembered as an individual with specific 
na accept the doctrine that an īśvara, a creator god or cosmic sovereign, creates the Veda, they 
also postulate that he has an artificial body (nirmāṇakāya) or instrument body (upakaraṇaśarīra) 
to carry out this task; see Chemparathy 1972, 148–57. 
57 See BhG 4.11 on the god Kṛṣṇa setting the pathway to follow and BhG 16.24 on his ‘authorita-
tive teaching’ (śāstra) as pramāṇa; the teaching (dharma) promulgated by the god Nārāyaṇa in 
the form of an authoritative text (śāstra) is made the pramāṇa at MBh 12.322.38–41and 12.328.22ff. 
58 See Rüpke 2013 on similar elements of individualisation in Roman antiquity in contrast to 
modern individualism and its emphasis on ‘being different’. 
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doctrines and a life-story, in other respects his very exceptionality resulted in 
interpretations that tended to de-individualise him. On the one hand, the empha-
sis on the exceptional can result in ascribing the teacher divine characteristics 
while, on the other, the authority of the teacher becomes part of a larger discourse 
on the authority of verbal testimony (śabda) in matters of the ‘highest good’ and 
‘invisible goals’. This becomes obvious in the emerging philosophical schools 
and their different interpretations of what constitutes the authority and validity 
of the statements of a person. It also marks the transition from the juxtaposition 
of individual ‘opinions’ (mati) in the Mahābhārata to the establishment of a phil-
osophical expert discourse for dealing with ‘elaborated doctrines’ (mata) as the 
framework for evaluating such ‘opinions’. Instead of recording the current confu-
sion about what is ‘best’ (śreyas) by juxtaposing different views, as is done in the 
epic, philosophers seek to create a referential framework that authorises as well 
as controls pluralisation and individualisation. 
All these processes are connected to contemporary socio-political contexts 
at different levels. The previous analysis points to the interest of supporters of 
new religious-philosophical ideas in endorsing individual authority and individ-
ualised religious practices. At the same time, plurality and individuals claiming 
authority were increasingly met with scepticism and even outright rejection by 
representatives of the Vedic-Brahmanical tradition, not only in the epic but also 
in the field of philosophy. This situation is also mirrored in a reconfiguration of 
the religious practices of householders in the socio-political realm and in intel-
lectual discourse, as well as in a broadening of the social spectrum of household-
ers engaged in the pursuit of new religious goals. Authority in matters of dharma 
is no longer exclusively in the hands of Brahmanical teachers, although they con-
tinue to play an important role in the epic and the (re)assertion of their authority 
has left its mark in many parts of the text. This connects the epic to efforts (appar-
ently shared by both new and old religious teachers) to establish a referential 
framework that authorises only exceptional, highly skilful individuals in specific 
religious contexts and under certain conditions. While individualised forms of 
religious practice and individual opinions about the ‘highest good’ are recorded 
and represented in the Mahābhārata, they are only explicitly recommended in 
cases of exceptional persons, who are at some point declared to be embodiments 
of a transcendent god (and even they do not remain uncontested in the epic). 
Otherwise, they are either censured – in particular in the case of women – or pre-
sented without further comments, as is the case with the Tulādhāra story. In these 
cases, the very inclusion of a particular instruction or  religious-philosophical 
position in the epic is a sign of approval and authorisation by composers and 
redactors of the epic, as well as by patrons of manuscript production and the 
various audiences who constituted the pluriform ideological  environment of the 
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epic.59 The various doubts, opinions, and instructions included in this text thus 
remain accessible as modes of thinking and acting, documenting religious plural-
ity as well as the controversies that surrounded it.60 
Another aspect of the re-configuration of the household is that compliance 
with Vedic ritualism does not rule out personal engagement with other forms of 
religion or even a selective approach to the spectrum of ordained ritual duties. 
The interpretation of the place of Vedic rituals, for instance, for householders 
who have become devotees of a ‘highest’ personal god can take quite different 
forms, as the epic attests. Thus, promulgations of ‘highest bhakti’ that advise 
against worshipping other gods stand side by side with a doctrine of bhakti that 
includes ritual care for Vedic gods. The latter option is particularly important for 
householders as it allows them to continue Vedic rituals (most importantly the 
saṃskāras, so-called ‘life-cycle’ rituals ensuring socio-ritual status), while also 
adopting bhakti, or Sāṃkhya philosophy, or even Buddhism as their personal 
religious pathway. Yet doubting too much, or engaging in one’s religious pursuit 
while openly rejecting social normativity, or misjudging one’s competence in 
assessing religious accomplishments, invited censure, in particular in the case 
of women. Another aspect of this re-configuration is that ascetic renunciation 
ceases to be the only form in which one could concentrate one’s life on a religious 
quest directed at ‘liberation’. The case of the merchant Tulādhāra demonstrates 
that religious authority can be based on the insight that one’s daily occupations 
are in fact the training ground for religious practice.  
Pluralisation and individualisation found support in decentralised forms 
of patronage and an intellectual discourse that accepted authoritative texts 
and verbal testimony by trustworthy persons as a valid means of knowledge 
(pramāṇa). But both the epic and philosophical discourse also point to the 
resistance against these developments and to efforts to delimit the dynamics of 
such individualisation and pluralisation by restricting individual authority and 
individualised religiosity. The pluralisation of religious-philosophical knowl-
edge thus resulted both in a proliferation of individualised forms of engagement 
with the religious field and in various attempts to restrict and delimit the latter 
by subjecting it to new criteria of acceptance. While this double-edged process 
is accompanied by what can be generalised as ‘de-traditionalisation’ at various 
59 This is also pointed out by Bakker and Bisschop (1999, 468) with respect to the inclusion of 
various versions of Sāṃkhya philosophy in the epic.
60 The recognition of these texts as a whole (but not necessarily in all of them) as authoritative is 
already sought in the epic itself with its claim to be the ‘fifth Veda’; see Malinar 2011b. Its ‘official’ 
endorsement happens when it is regarded by advocates of the sole authority of the Veda as smṛti, 
a text of (secondary) authority.
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levels (criticism, dissent, adoption of alternative texts and practices, turning to 
new teachers, etc.), it was by no means one-directional and nor did it neces-
sarily result in a replacement of the old by the new. It led, rather, to various 
re-configurations of the ‘transmitted knowledge’ of the Veda in view of chang-
ing socio-political frameworks and a pluralised, competitive field of available 
religious-philosophical teachings. This may point to the fact that processes of 
individualisation may not only be followed by processes of de-individualisation 
in a later period or as resulting in more and more individualisation, but also 
as continuously being intertwined with groups and institutions contesting and 
rejecting it. 
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Jörg Rüpke
Ritual objects and religious communication 
in lived ancient religion: multiplying religion
How can religion be described from the individual’s perspective and as prac-
ticed by the individual? This fundamental question lies behind any approach 
to ancient Mediteraenean religion that deals with individual agency in religious 
contexts, from an elite’s self-styled sacra publica (‘rituals on behalf of the com-
monwealth’) to groupings centring on a god, secta dei (‘sect of the God’, as Ter-
tullian says). Traditionally, ancient religion has been conceptualised as collective 
action within a coherent political framework (usually a city-state, a ‘polis’) and, 
thus, as involving a shared system of gods, ritual rules, and meanings (for criti-
cism of the concept of civic religion see Bendlin 2000; Rüpke 2012; Rüpke 2016a). 
To allow for the evident religious plurality in our sources, ‘elective cults’ have 
been identified in earlier scholarship (e.g. North 1992; Price 2012) by postulat-
ing a personal network, if not an organisation, lying behind practices that use 
the same name for the central divine addressee(s). The paradigm of ‘group reli-
gion’ (see the contributions in Rüpke 2007a) has been helpful to describe a wide 
variety of religious practices outside of, or only loosely coordinated with, ‘public 
religion’, but it does not do away with the central role of individuals in religious 
cooperation and the formation of groups (Rüpke 2007a, b; Rebillard and Rüpke 
2015; Lichterman et al. 2017). 
I will address this problem by proposing an analytical model of religion 
which describes religion as an individual resource that enlarges agency, strength-
ens identity, and furthers communicative success. My paper will draw on recent 
social, and social psychological, research as well as on discussions of the concept 
of religion within the discipline of the History of Religion. Stressing the place of 
the individual agent in the notion of ‘religion’ by referring to agency, collective 
and personal identity, and communication, this paper will open up new perspec-
tives on ‘objects’.
The original intellectual background to this paper is the work of the research 
group ‘Religious Individualisation in Historical Perspective’ at the Max Weber 
Center. The research group studied and challenged the widespread practice of 
dichotomically assigning individualisation and individual religious agency to 
Note: The ideas in this paper have been developed within the Kolleg-Forschergruppe ‘Religious In-
dividualisation in Historical Perspective’, based at the University of Erfurt and financed by the Ger-
man Science Foundation (DFG) under KFOR 1013. I am grateful to Paul Scade, who (again) improved 
not only the flow of the text but also the clarity of the argument. Remaining mistakes are mine.
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modernity, while characterising antiquity, as far as religion is concerned, in 
terms of the collective (concise summary Fuchs and Rüpke 2015; Fuchs 2015). 
The basis for this position, which we criticise, is a specific definition of religion. 
Religion is defined, often by reference to the French sociologist Émile Durkheim 
(1858–1917), as a collective enterprise, a definition that has frequently been crit-
icised for its inability to adequately take account of non-Western religious devel-
opments.
If religion is conceptualised from the methodological point of view of the 
individual and his or her social context, it is not ‘systems’ of belief or practices 
as elaborated by internal or external observers that will be the object of such a 
research strategy. Such systems could be appropriated by individual agents only 
partially and imperfectly (for the concept of appropriation, see Certeau 2007, 
1984, and Füssel 2006; the imperfect reproduction remains constitutive for de 
Certeau: Certeau 1987). Instead, it is lived (ancient) religion in its individual vari-
ations, its situations, and social constellations, that will be the subject of scrutiny 
(Rüpke 2012; Rüpke 2016a, 2016c). Only rarely do such interactions grow together 
into networks, organisations, or written texts which might develop an existence 
of their own and then resemble what we used to regard as ‘religions’. It is this 
‘lived ancient religion’ that a subsequent research group (named after its object 
of study) has, over the past few years, tried to grasp and turn into the basis for 
a larger narrative about ancient religion and the way it changed and developed 
(summarised in Rüpke 2016b). In the context of the present publication, I would 
like briefly to sketch the background theory before turning to examples of the 
diversification and multiplication of religious expressions and choices, and then 
narrowing the focus to the place of objects within such processes.
1 Religion
Let me start with the most general framework, religious action (the following is 
based on Rüpke 2015). Where is religion to be found in the context of the individ-
ual, if it is not to be looked for primarily in society, in collective phenomena? How 
should it be conceptualised if it is accepted that the individual is not isolated from 
society? 
Before I start to sketch my model, I offer a definition. In the context of my 
interest in religious change, I define religious action as risky communication with 
or about not unquestionably plausible agents. To enter in such a communication 
changing the situation, in which this communication takes place. Whether these 
agents are seen as gods, demons, or dead relatives is a matter of the relevant his-
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torical context. I do not say that this is religion but that for the understanding of 
religious change in antiquity (and comparable contexts) it is useful to understand 
religion in this manner.
In pursuing a phenomenological approach, I propose to examine three dif-
ferent areas:
1) Where does religion strengthen the individual’s agency, that is, his or her 
competence and creativity to deal with daily and extraordinary problems?
2) How does it contribute to the individual’s forming of his or her ‘collective 
identities’, that is, orientations or convictions that make the individual act or 
think as an imagined part of a group or a social formation of different form 
and intensity?
3) What is the role of religion in interpersonal communication; how is religion 
strategically invoked as, and solidified into, a medium of communication, 
which in turn provokes and shapes further communication?
I am interested in analysing religion from the point of view of the actor, the agent. 
I hope thus to also contribute to the understanding of the successful functioning 
of religion in larger, public contexts as well as in instances of ancient individu-
als’ appropriation and shaping of religion couched in the semantics of religious 
grouping, or even more atomised forms of religious plurality. It is this new lens 
through which we can look upon religion that I like to call ‘lived ancient religion’. 
2 Religious agency
Interpretative sociology and cultural anthropology have understood human 
behaviour as meaningful action, an understanding which is to be considered 
against the backdrop of socially produced meaning. The Pragmatist approaches 
taken by American sociologists since the early twentieth century have refined such 
analyses. Action is above all acting in order to solve problems. Time and again the 
individual faces situations that cannot simply be treated in preconceived ways, 
employing established aims and meanings. In the face of an imminent problem 
that needs to be solved, the individual develops or modifies aims and meanings 
within their course of action, or they modify pre-existing aims and meanings. 
After all, the acting person is always part of a social context that includes all of 
that context’s other agents and traditions of action. Within a concrete and con-
tingent space of possibilities the agent can be creative and develop new solutions 
(Joas 1996). Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische have briefly sketched this back-
ground and have refined a concept of ‘agency’ against such a pragmatist back-
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ground. Religion is not one of the topics they reflect upon but their employment 
of the notion of time within a theory of action is very useful for a concept of reli-
gion that is centred on the individual actor.
‘Agency’, in the understanding Emirbayer and Mische, is ‘the temporally 
constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments – the 
temporal-relational contexts of action – which, through the interplay of habit, 
imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures 
in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations’ 
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 970). The notion of agency is defined and developed 
on three temporal levels. a) Ever more elaborate and successful ‘schematizations’ 
are developed by the agent with regard to past action and with the aim of estab-
lishing routines. b) The agent develops ‘hypotheses’, which have an increasingly 
large time horizon, with regard to the future consequences of his or her acting; 
thus the agent is projecting such actions into the future. c) As far as the agent needs 
to evaluate the present situation in terms of practicality and needs to develop an 
appraisal of the situation within the social context, the agents develop ever more 
adequate ‘contextualizations’ based on their growing social experience (ibid., 
975, 983, 993). It is not the individual who ‘has’ agency but, rather, in dealing 
with the structural context in a given situation the individual acts agentically: 
‘the actors engage agentically with their structuring environments’. In this sense, 
structure and agency constitute each other (ibid., 1004). What does this imply for 
specifically religious action? I will briefly suggest a number of phenomena that 
come into sharper focus through pursuing the suggested line of inquiry.
For the development of schematisations out of past experience, one’s own 
and those of others, a historian of religion has to inquire how religious acting is 
learnt and made available for use in specific situations. What are the contexts of 
religious learning? How do observation, restricted or accompanied participation, 
and informal or even formal teaching interact with each other? How do individ-
uals learn to interpret experiences as religious? How can they develop new reli-
gious roles or take on a religious personal name?
Projecting into the future requires temporal structures that can be used to 
order future time. Who introduces new festivals or reforms festival dates? How 
can processes of change in institutions, for example the genesis of new priest-
hoods or the modification of existing priesthoods, can be considered from the 
perspective of agency?
The reinterpretation of social experience for the evaluation of the present pos-
sibilities of a situation that has arisen and can now be further developed offers a 
lot of space for religious action. Temporal rhythms might be changed by practices 
of sacralisation; the locus of action could be changed by employing local ritual 
action in order to deal with spatially distant problems; religious competences, for 
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instance those of religious specialists, might be transferred or derogated due to 
new arguments of religious legitimacy; political decisions might be influenced by 
invoking oracles (ibid., 1000–2).
To summarise, the enlargement of the environment defined as relevant for 
the situation through the introduction of ‘divine’ actors or instances is typical for 
religion. It is, most likely, this strategy that opens up new realms of imagination 
and creative individual intervention, thus enlarging agency (see the hypotheses 
ibid., 1006–7). At the same time, this very mechanism can seriously diminish 
agency for religious actors, since they might also attribute all further agency to 
such divine actors, leading them to wait for miracles or at least some form of 
explicit divine inspiration before taking any further action.
3 Religious identity
The concept of collective identity has been justly criticised insofar as it is used to 
postulate a permanent or even exclusive individual awareness of belonging or to 
imply that those who are ascribed permanent membership in some social group 
maintain a continuous self-description as a member (see Rebillard 2012, who opts 
for the concept of ‘salient identity’). I have, for a long time, refused to use the 
concept of identity at all and still prefer the plural ‘identities’. However, given the 
effects of even vague forms of belonging on individual behaviour, empirically val-
idated in Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1974, 69 for the definition of ‘group’; Turner 
1975; summary: Ellemers, Spears and Doosje 1999), it is difficult to get rid of the 
concept. In order to develop an empirically rich concept of religion (which covers 
a wide range of phenomena), it is useful to enlarge the perspective on action that 
is implied in the concept of ‘agency’ when viewed through the lens of the concept 
of ‘collective identity’. At the same time, it is necessary to employ a differentiated 
and dynamic concept of such identities. Recent research in social psychology has 
made a number of attempts to identify such a concept (e.g. Cameron 2004, 241, 
who distinguishes three factors of cognitive centrality for the individual agent, 
ingroup-affect, and ingroup-obligations). I will follow the proposal of three psy-
chologists from New York who argue for a sevenfold scheme that is sufficiently 
rich to fully, distinctively, and sufficiently grasp the facets of the phenomenon. 
Again, religion is of no importance for their modelling. All factors are conceptual-
ised on the level of the individual, not of the group.
The elements listed by Ashmore, Deaux and McLaughlin-Volpe are: self- 
categorisation; the evaluation of membership (whatever its form) by individuals 
and their perception of others’ judgments; the importance ascribed to this par-
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ticular group membership; the attachment to the group, that is the emotional 
involvement felt and the sense of interdependence (a feeling potentially produc-
ing a large overlap of personal and collective identity); ‘the degree to which a 
particular collective identity is embedded in the person’s everyday ongoing rela-
tionships’ (social embeddedness); the shaping of the individual’s behaviour by 
the particular collective identity; and, finally, the whole cognitive dimension of 
imaginations and narratives about the values, characteristics, and history of the 
relevant group as known and maintained by the person (Ashmore, Deaux and 
McLaughlin-Volpe 2004, 83). Given the widespread critique of the diverse con-
cepts of ‘religions’ as over-emphasising institutional features, it is important to 
stress that ‘group’ here does not imply any organised association but, rather, any 
situational grouping of actors (not only human) to which the individual ascribes 
him- or herself or from which observers distance themselves. Of course, this 
might lead to highly complex collective identities and multiple belongings (and 
distancing, ibid., 84).
How ‘religion’ (which will be more precisely defined below) is involved in a 
particular historical and cultural context and how this involvement might change 
over time or through processes of entanglement, is a matter of contingency, not 
of definition. Scholars of religion are concerned with familial identities relating 
to primary social groups as well as converned with secondary groups. They are 
concerned with the different roles of local, regional, and trans-regional identi-
ties, and the transfers and interferences between them (see Jones 2012 for ancient 
‘Greek’ identities). It is of the utmost importance that any essentialisation of these 
groups and associations be avoided. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, archaeologists 
focusing on material survivals have warned about making any direct interference 
from material objects to correspondingly hardened social relationships. Thus, a 
perspective that ‘community is something […] which is done’ (van Dommelen, 
Gerritsen and Knapp 2005), needs to be stressed.
One might conceptualise religious identities as particular frameworks of sit-
uations and hence integrate them within the action-theoretical model of agency. 
Likewise, acting might be described as a situational result of identities (see Emir-
bayer and Mische 1998, 992, who point to the frequently retrospective character of 
the concept of identity). However, by differentiating frameworks and identities, 
the dynamics and diachronic structure of the concept of ‘agency’ can be com-
bined with the synchronic analysis of the horizontal structure of social context. 
Importance is, thus, attributed to both poles, structure and agency. Finally, by 
replacing an essentialised concept of ‘religions’ (plural) with a complex model of 
collective and individual identity we are able to analyse processes involved in the 
formation of religious groups in terms of their differing trajectories and varying 
strength. This is particularly important for the study of religion in antiquity.
Ritual objects and religious communication in lived ancient religion   1207
4 Religious communication
By taking the concept of communication on board, the analytical approach 
acquires additional dimensions that further enrich its ability to provide a descrip-
tion of religion. First and foremost, communication is carried out by individuals, 
whether as communicator or part of an audience. Even in the context of mass 
communication, the reactions of those addressed could vary widely. Even if a 
message reached its addressee and was understood, it could still be interpreted 
and evaluated in very different manners by different individuals (see Chandler 
2011, s.v. ‘active audience theory’).
The classical semantic theory of communication starts from the relation-
ship between sender and receiver. The addressing person acts as the source. A 
signal is transmitted to the addressee and received as information, command, 
or the like. Elaboration of the model have concentrated on either the processes 
of encoding and decoding the message intended or on the social context, the 
setting of the communicative act, conceived of as small or large. Every commu-
nication based on primary media (language, body language, signs used face to 
face by sender and addressee), at the least, is full of interaction. Conversely, 
every interaction implies communication. In the extreme case of symbolic inter-
action, action is determined by the intention to transmit a message, even if 
highly encoded.
Relevance theory, as developed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, presup-
poses the encoding and decoding activities implied in the elementary use of lan-
guage and integrates the complexities of human communication in a model that 
is based on the assumption that ‘human cognition is relevance-oriented’ (Sperber 
and Wilson 1987, 700). One acts on the most relevant stimuli found in the environ-
ment. The same holds true for communication. In communication the communi-
cator’s informative intention to make his assumptions manifest or more manifest 
to an audience goes together with the need to make this informative intention 
mutually understood. This could be insured by stimuli which make this inten-
tion clear; this latter aspect is called ‘ostensive-inferential communication’ (700). 
As a result of communication, the mutual cognitive environment changes (699). 
Given the many stimuli for the potential audience, the ostensive stimuli must 
raise the expectation of optimal relevance of the ensuing communication. The 
gestures, music, and objects usually involved in religious action provide ample 
evidence. That is to say, the effort necessary to process the information (used in 
the broadest possible sense) must seem worthwhile for the audience. The com-
municator must produce the most relevant information she or he is willing and 
able to produce (Wilson and Sperber 2002, 257f.). Comprehension then means 
simultaneously constructing hypotheses about the explicit content, about the 
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intended contextual assumptions (the implied premises) and the intended con-
textual implications (the implicated conclusions, ibid., 262).
Religious communication has not yet been addressed within this framework 
in any substantial way, so I offer here a first approach to the topic. One strategy 
for gaining relevance in religious communication is to use specific intermediar-
ies. These are seen as ‘media’: persons especially sensitive to divine messages. 
The frequent presence of religious specialists (‘priests’, ‘seers’, aged or young 
individuals) raises the problem of religious ‘competence’, potentially a paradigm 
for agency and power, and its distribution and restriction. The imperial period, 
with its processes of the professionalisation of some religious specialists and the 
discussion of the legitimacy of claims of divine revelations, underwent important 
changes in this respect. 
The material presence of media acts as a further stimulus and enlarges the 
dyadic perspective of human-divine communication to secondary addressees, 
audiences, witnesses, connoisseurs, and tourists. The choice of media or ‘stimuli’ 
constitutes such circles. Thus, spoken prayer and written curse, familial sacri-
fice and public processions, constitute very different audiences.1 Certain forms 
of communication with the divine might be monopolised, as the late ancient 
‘expropriation of the diviners’ (Fögen 1993) demonstrates. In order to undermine 
the assumption that the divine is permanently attentive, scarcity might be con-
strued and removed – the ancient Greek practice of privileging certain persons or 
representatives of certain cities queuing for oracles (promanteía) illustrates both 
mechanisms (on which, see Latte 1968). Communication cannot be interpreted 
without regard to power and social inequalities. Thus it adds considerably to the 
actor-centred approach proposed here.
This leads back to the specifics of relevance theory. If the pragmatics of com-
munication with the divine lead to specific and extraordinary stimuli in order 
to gain the recognition of the gods, the introduction of religious communica-
tions into ordinary communication makes for an extraordinary stimulus as well. 
Extraordinary relevance is claimed by introducing gods in the context of inter- 
human, interpersonal communication and thus alters the latter’s rules. The many 
permanent forms of media of religious communication attest to their importance, 
while their survival attests to the success of this kind of communication. They 
help to utilise, easily repeat, or recurrently introduce religious elements in agen-
tial action or collective identity.
1 For the dimensions of the concept of ‘public’ in a history of religion perspective, see Gladigow 1995; 
Rüpke 1995, 605–28; Fine 2010; Mullaney, Vanhaelen and Ward 2010; Wolson and Yachnin 2010.
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5 Bringing objects into religious action
Within the triangle of communication formed by agents, media, and addressees, 
I have concentrated above all on the first and sometimes on the third corner, 
largely leaving aside the media of religious action or communication, and in par-
ticular those cases in which the latter take the form of objects that have a material 
presence beyond the situation.
I claim that the framework produced so far helps us to understand object- 
srelated practices and their change. A few examples, taken from a larger study of 
religious transformations in the ancient Mediterranean world (Rüpke 2016b), will 
help show how the individual perspective, informed by theoreticians of the mate-
rial turn, Bruno Latour’s actor-network-theory in particular (Latour 2005; see also 
Gosden 2005; Hodder 2012; Raja and Weiss 2015), helps us understand religious 
diversity and plurality.
Perhaps already at the end of the sixth century BC, simple clay heads (or racks 
bearing such heads?) were being used in the Campetti district of Veii (Steingräber 
1980, 224–6). The practice was only haltingly imitated but became very popular 
from the end of the fifth century BC. Ceramicists could cater to the new demand 
with a novel technology probably available in Italy from the end of the sixth 
century: the mass production of likenesses by the use of either a single or a dual 
matrix (Hofter 2010, 70; hand-fashioned heads and portraits: 72–3). Throughout 
central Italy, especially at the larger cult locations, people were offered a supply 
of heads or – surely cheaper – half-reliefs of heads that they could use for reli-
gious communication. The objects themselves prompted the uses to which they 
could be put, many of them being provided with rings at their base by which they 
could be stood securely on podia or benches, in chests or showcases, and even on 
the ground if such a position was appropriate. The half-reliefs, on the other hand, 
had provision for being hung (Steingräber 1980, 234; on visibility and invisibility: 
Bagnasco Gianni 2005). 
The quality of these objects often left something to be desired. The backs 
and edges remained unworked. After several hundred castings, the moulds were 
worn or had faults that were only superficially retouched. The products remained 
unpainted and almost always uninscribed: a lack of purchasing power was com-
bined with a deficient level of literacy. Many were fashioned as need dictated 
by the purchasers themselves, while others were individually finished, after the 
manner of a portrait. Notwithstanding such differences, the message conveyed 
to gods and humans by displaying the head was of a similar nature. For all the 
splendid architecture and decoration, for all that we know about the patrons of 
this place and their position as members of economic, military, political – and 
now, to top it all, religious – elites, the agents underlined that they, too, were 
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present. It cannot have escaped many of the actors that their heads would at some 
point be cleared away or taken down, and then thrown into pits or shafts. Despite 
this knowledge, in this way the actors appropriated these locations redolent of 
superhuman powers and human potentates, took possession of them in a way 
that was legitimated by the fact that their actions were religiously based – even if 
only for the time that their heads were present. 
Where religious activity allowed some individuals self-representation 
through architectural splendour, thus at the same time representing an attempt 
to guide religious practices in particular directions, it allowed others to appropri-
ate the very same spaces by modifying elite practices and, in so doing, to claim 
recognition of their own concerns and desires. Such appropriations needed legit-
imisation. It is precisely in Rome and Latium that frequent signs of coverings 
to the backs of the clay heads of simple actors provide clear evidence that the 
whole gesture is thus presented as one of specifically religious communication 
 (Söderlind 2005, 362; Comella 2004, 337; see also 333 on the representation of 
covered heads in Latin-region statues). Clay heads vied with built structures in 
this way until the end of the second century BC. Broad social strata and elites 
entered into an indirect trade-off in central Italy; the mass presence of objects 
originating from a multitude of hands had the effect not only of appropriating 
the religious infrastructure but also of strengthening it by contributing crucially 
to the sacralisation (Rüpke 2013) of structures and precincts. Here was a medium 
that served quite different purposes in many parts of Greece, while often under-
going similar processes of popularisation. In Greece, however, gods or gods in the 
presence of humans (thus perhaps implying tactics similar to the Italian ones) 
were the main theme of the clay reliefs (Steingräber 1980, 251; cf. Comella 2002).
But it was not only heads that were depicted. If the head could stand pars 
pro toto for the whole person, the same role might also be assigned to other body 
parts. While such parts as eyes, feet, arms, and legs were still so to speak of a 
public nature, the same could not be said of the external sexual organs, breasts 
and penises, and internal organs such as the lungs, intestines, or uterus. Anyone 
presenting the latter category of body parts within the public space of cult struc-
tures evidently understood such spaces primarily as settings for intimate com-
munication with those that were to be addressed there, as well as one form of 
individual appropriation. The precise content of such attempts at communi-
cation remained hidden to later observers. Was the intention to formulate and 
impress on the memory of the interlocutor quite specific concerns by means of 
quite specific objects? There is no doubt at all that the practice entered into a 
medical discourse in which specialist suppliers provided ever more specific rep-
resentations, perhaps as an element of a consultation or as a diagnostic offer that 
was by no means anatomically ‘objective’ (for extreme examples, see Recke and 
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Wamser-Krasznai 2008, 67–9; Charlier 2000). It was perhaps as a consequence of 
such a conversation and diagnosis that, in the third century BC, a woman from 
Etruria commissioned a female torso showing, between small, taut breasts and 
thick folds of fabric over the thighs, a large ovoid opening in the belly displaying 
the details of internal organs, including a loop of intestine at the lower extremity 
(Recke and Wamser-Krasznai 2008, Cat. no. 25). 
Plautus, the dramaturge and writer of comedies, and later Titinius, were able 
to address this theme with terminological precision at the turn of the 3rd century 
BC: their characters wished to ‘fulfil’ a votum, or ‘vow’, or were ‘condemned’ to it 
and so obliged to fulfil it (Rudens 60; Titinius, Comicorum Romanorum Fragmenta 
153). The language was not ancient and does not appear in inscriptions prior to 
the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. The juridical precision of the subject matter and 
the language it gave rise to suggest that the problem was conceived and resolved 
in situations in which the bounds of the dialectical space between individual 
humans and deities were exceeded, that is to say in which demands on the public 
purse were involved (Scheid 1981). This assumes a developed state system, which 
did not exist in 6th and 5th century in central Italy and was not achieved in Rome 
until the second half of the 4th century BC.  
For a long period, research into these religious practices did not inquire into 
the relations between objects and the space in which they were presented, or into 
the question of whether an object was acquired on the spot or had a long history of 
usage within the agent’s household, thus holding memories of festivals, periods 
of hunger, and, perhaps, showing traces of repeated repair. The only relevant 
questions for such an approach to research were already pre-defined by the well-
known answer, that is ‘votive’, votum, denoting a sequence of human problems 
and a promise to the deity in order to secure divine help, then an acknowledg-
ment of this help by means of a ‘votive’ object, a material dedication. On closer 
inspection, we do not find that this is the only or even oldest answer. Old inscrip-
tions contain, rather, the word donum, ‘gift’, if they use any such term at all.
Looking even closer, and with a view to chronology, the idea that somebody can 
be ‘condemned’ to honour his promise to a god by that god’s appropriate action in 
response to the human’s previous plea and promise is not ubiquitous. Rather, it is a 
result of a specific discourse of the third century BC. This discourse tried to address 
a specific and new problem by giving a more juridical precision to an act of religious 
communication within a wider social context. Probably, only very few situations of 
vovere in Rome itself existed up to the Second Punic War at the end of the third 
century BC: at the departure of a commander to the war (vota nuncupare), at the 
construction of temples, and upon the announcement of ‘great games’ (ludi magni). 
According to Livy’s account of Roman history, narratives of other, more individual, 
vota only appear from the end of the Second Punic War onwards. It is not until 200 
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BC that questions appear to have been asked as to how the body politic could be 
bound to a regular act of religious communication by means of vota, and how vota 
in general could be detached from concrete causes (and resources). The (‘great’) 
votive games were counted as periodically recurring events and were linked to a 
consul’s immediately preceding ‘five-year vow’ (Livy, Roman history 31.9.9–10). It 
was such reflections that were taken up by the comedies referred to above. 
The votum was not the epitome of Roman piety but, rather, a special means of 
committing to religious communication substantial resources that were subject 
to a social disposition. Questions arose as to how, for example, those hundred 
cattle promised by a Scipio in Spain (Livy 28.38.8), but to be slaughtered in Rome, 
were to be paid for.  In order to deal with such problems, by the end of the 3rd 
century BC an institution had been developed against a background of increasing 
statehood in Latium, and perhaps directly in Rome, that, while clearly covering 
the requisite ground, at the same time also offered a solution for particular prob-
lems involved in normal religious communication. Even though the votum created 
some new problems, and might give rise to ridicule, it quickly became popular. 
Already under the Republic, its use had become so formalised that, at Rimini, 
Pupius Salvius was able to assume that the abbreviation V S L M in his inscription 
was comprehensible: ‘He gladly fulfils the vow as merited by the god’ – votum 
solvit lubens merito (Inscriptiones Latinae liberae rei publicae 241).
I will now turn from religious practices in publicly accessible places to the 
domestic sphere and move from discussing the third and second centuries BC to 
the first and later centuries AD. Again, I propose a methodology, a perspective 
onto practices, that accepts differences as being the result of individual religious 
agency and individual (even if frequently copied or, better, appropriated) commu-
nicative efforts and experiences rather than viewing them as insignificant varia-
tions of a predefined set of rules and rituals called ‘domestic’ or ‘family religion’. 
Thus, again, from an analytical perspective ‘religion’ is multiplied.
There was no ‘religion privée’, no ‘domestic religion’ in Roman antiquity 
(against e.g. Laforge 2009). The type of communication that is treated here as 
religion was, in the first place, a network of practical strategies, experiences, and 
conceptions, also acts of institutionalisation and shared signs, which came into 
use, or already defined communication, in different social spaces. These various 
elements had to be learned and applied constantly to new spaces and situations, 
and so further developed; above all, however, they always came into confronta-
tion with the religious communication practised by others. This religious com-
petency, comprising knowledge, experience, and also courage and the will to 
experiment, moved, as the people possessing it moved, through different spaces. 
Such journeys or displacements, flights or abductions, were themselves presum-
ably only rarely motivated by religious concerns. But the spaces to which they 
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led were, to a varying extent and through the agency of various actors, already 
‘occupied’ by religious signs and actions.
For many in the great imperial-age cities and metropolises, the street as a 
‘house’ comprising different rooms constituted the primary living-space. However, 
the few home-occupiers who were able actively to configure the architectural fea-
tures and furniture of their homes created an ‘infrastructure’ that could also be 
used by others in a multitude of ways. Lighting played a major role here, not only 
in terms of which spaces should be lit and used but also which spatial elements, 
whether mural decoration or furniture, should thus be moved into the light. Lamps 
themselves were instruments of religious communication of the first order. Sculpted 
objects arranged around the wick of either bronze or clay lamps produced a corre-
sponding shadow (Bielfeldt 2014, 202). But the lamp also illuminated itself; figures 
of gods decorating its aperture might be made to appear brightly illuminated (221). 
These, in common with other options such as circus scenes or erotic motifs, became 
real ‘eye-catchers’ that stimulated the gaze, and lamps serving as brilliant ‘eyes’ 
created the feeling in the observer that he or she was being seen by them. 
The same considerations apply to another vital religious instrument: the 
altar. The decorative, often also richly-decorated, slender Italic altar, and perhaps 
its portable and collapsible equivalent in bronze, also had its place in the garden 
(Dräger 1994). It was used as an unmistakable sign of communication with a 
presence that was not otherwise immediately obvious to the eye, whether that 
be ‘gods’ or ‘the dead’. Its use was unthinkable without a flame or a libation and 
the shape of its upper surface invited just this mode of activation. Even in this 
respect, however, the object was not merely an instrument to be used but, with its 
decoration depicting ritual procedures and other instruments and materials used 
in those procedures, it was itself an act of religious communication and ritual that 
was continually in progress. It could be still further activated with a minimum of 
effort, by the placing of a lamp and a minimum of speech or song. More might of 
course be done: baked items of various forms, aspect, taste, and smell were also 
widely used, as were flowers.
Strategies practised in houses (or in the street) might also be used in institu-
tional spaces designed for religious communication, such as temples and temple 
grounds. If graffiti were welcome in the home, as an emphatic reaction on the 
part of invited guests, this minimalised but durable form of linguistic commu-
nication may also have played a role within the precincts of temples. This was 
demonstrably the case at Dura-Europos in the east of the Roman Empire. There, 
in the temples and assembly buildings of Jews as well as worshippers of Christ 
and Mithras, users of graffiti endeavoured to perpetuate themselves by placing 
their requests to be remembered or blessed as close as possible to the foci of reli-
gious communication: close to the cult image, on mural paintings, or in corridors 
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(Stern 2014, esp. 146; in houses: Scheibelreiter-Gail 2012, 161 with instances from 
the 1st century BC to the 4th century AD). In this way these individuals appro-
priated the great two- or three-dimensional signifiers of religious communica-
tion belonging to others. Of course, altars both great and small, and increasing 
numbers of lamps as offerings, continued to play a large role in the Imperial Age, 
to the detriment of depositions (exemplary: Scapaticci 2010, esp. 107).
Architecture itself was a more visible and more effective means of multiply-
ing religion. Collaborating with the architect, those who commissioned temples 
could express and communicate their desires as to external size and shape, as 
well as internal design in terms of spatial effect and decoration, and the speci-
fications of the image of the god, its size and positioning in the inner room (see 
e.g. Davies 2012). This is especially evident in the choice of unusual forms such 
as the round temple.
A few years after 146 BC (the confirmed date of the first marble temple in Rome), 
after a successfully foiled pirate attack, a merchant called Marcus Octavius Heren-
nus, who had previously been employed as a flute-player, built a round temple on 
the Tiber and dedicated it to Hercules Victor. In so doing, and as confirmed by Mas-
urius Sabinus in the early first century AD, he linked his specific interpretation of 
his own experience with Hercules’ general association with successful commerce 
(Macrobius, Saturnalia 3.6.11). It is possible that he was supported by the promi-
nent architect Hermodorus, who was active in this period. The structure – if it is 
the round temple still visible on the Forum Boarium and this temple is not to be 
identified with the one built by Lucius Mummius, the victor over Corinth, and also 
dedicated to Hercules Victor (discussion in Coarelli 1992, 92–103; 185–204) – was 
unusual in many ways (details: Arnhold and Rüpke 2016). It had neither a podium 
nor a clearly-defined frontal aspect. The twenty columns stood so close together 
that they entirely obstructed the view of the core structure, the cella, and from a 
distance also obscured the entrance with its two flanking windows. It was only 
from a close distance, with the door and windows open, that the statue placed at 
the centre would have been well-lit and visible. The foundation was built of the 
widely used Grotta-Oscura tufa but the structure above emphasised innovation 
and high aesthetics. The interior walls were built of the new but local travertine 
and the almost ten and a half metre high slender columns were fashioned out of 
Pentelic marble from Attica. This was surely a demonstration of superior wealth 
and of the appreciation of Greek culture, similarly visible at multiple locations 
around Rome, as well as in cultural contexts, in its institutions, and its theatre.
It was probably a few decades later that Quintus Lutatius Catulus continued 
the experiment with round temples by building a temple of ‘Fortuna of the present 
day’ (Fortuna huiusce diei) on the Field of Mars, today to be admired as Temple B on 
the Largo Argentina. The importance that the consul of 102 BC assigned to religious 
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communication is shown not only by this temple, built in the following year, but 
also by the fact that, while himself probably lacking a priestly office, he succeeded 
in having his son co-opted by the pontiffs in the following decade: a son who then 
in his turn became celebrated by completing in lavish fashion the restoration begun 
by Sulla of the Capitoline Temple of Jupiter (Rüpke and Glock 2008, no. 2308). 
Quite unlike Herennus, Catulus set his round structure on a two and a half 
metre high podium, and surrounded it with eighteen more substantial pillars, 
also on Attic bases and with Corinthian capitals, to an overall height approaching 
eleven metres. The builder gave this structure, one of the series of temples on this 
square on the Field of Mars, a clear orientation and frontal aspect – it must not 
be forgotten that the visibility of a temple depended primarily on the degree of 
development of its surroundings; Rome’s narrow streets frequently allowed only 
short lines of sight (Betts 2011, 129). A broad stairway leads onto the podium, and 
the entrance lies in the alignment of access behind a widened intercolumnium. 
Catulus had the cult image placed in such a way that it faced the visitor on a colos-
sal scale and in living colour at the opposite side of the internal space; the visible 
body parts were of white marble (perhaps with a painted surface), while the rest 
may have consisted of bronze body armour. With the entrance open, at a height of 
some eight metres this space-filling deity was visible from a great distance. 
Catulus also refers back to the tradition of ‘Fortuna’, the force of fate, linking 
her with a radically personal twist on fortune as a visible, even insistent pres-
ence: she is the power who helped him at a particular moment. His purpose is 
entirely polemical. Catulus is here celebrating as his own victory the defeat of 
the Cimbri at Vercellae (June, 101 BC), won by him together with Gaius Marius, 
the already celebrated commander, an assertion to which the construction of the 
temple gives monumental relevance. We must not forget that he is doing this in a 
context in which the presentation of votive objects is a widespread form of popular 
ritual practice. The marble structure gleams in contrast to the clay objects left on 
benches and in pits (on this level at the Largo Argentina, see Andreani, Moro and 
Nuccio 2005). But this itself makes it clear that the temple is not just a building but 
a representation and perpetuation of a specific religious communication aimed 
at higher authorities. Of course, Quintus Lutatius also broadcasts his version of 
events by word of mouth and by the written word, but in the heightened compet-
itive atmosphere of the Late Republic mere tales or assertions were not enough. 
This is perhaps the underlying reason that narrative friezes on temples played no 
great role in the pursuit of individual distinction (thus Rous 2011). Pluralisation 
of religion was above all made visible in new architecture. And new architecture 
offered space for individual religious experiences and communications that left 
visible traces for others on a much wider scale, as we saw in the sequence of 
examples at the very beginning of this chapter.
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6  Perspectives on religious objects and  
object-related rituals
How do these examples fit into the understanding of religion and, above all, 
religious communication sketched out above? I propose four perspectives from 
which they can be approached.
1) Relevance. Objects, as I have already briefly implied, might help to enlarge 
relevance. They draw attention. This is, of course, not a new idea but the 
standard interpretation of dedications. It holds true in a vertical dimension, 
increasing the attention to the gods, as, for instance, when an Aelius Aris-
tides presents a silver tripod. Similarly, in a horizontal dimension, aware-
ness of something relevant is raised among other visitors of a place, even 
mere bystanders. In both cases, objects increase the agency of the agent, the 
probability of agency being ascribed to her or him by other human observers, 
but they also invite the ascription of agency to themselves. Thus, agent and 
object mutually gain further identities.
2) Sacralisation. I propose to use the concept of sacralisation not just as a 
synonym for ‘religious’ but as a part of the strategies used to make a situ-
ation ‘special’ (see Taves 2009; Knott 2010; Taves 2010, 2015), to mark out 
action and communication as ‘religious’. In this sense, the notion stands on 
the same level as ‘ritualisation’. ‘Sacral’ is frequently used in topographi-
cal terms, as defining limits in space – a sanctuary for instance. However, 
within a specific situation often the individual actor cannot effectively estab-
lish exclusive boundaries, but can just focus attention for a certain period. 
Here the manipulation of objects comes in. Incense allows the definition of a 
space by a special smell for a certain time. A cake is prepared or bought from 
expert producers, it is handled during a performance, and presented as a 
token of benevolent communication. The killing and subsequent preparation 
of animals makes for an even more complex performance, if we think of pigs 
or even larger animals, and also allows for the involvement of a larger com-
munity. For smaller groups, a cock or dove is much more quickly prepared. If 
roasting and boiling takes too much time, interest in the events might begin 
to wane but the Roman concept of dies intercisi, which could be used for ordi-
nary business inter caesa et porrecta, points towards a way of dealing with 
this problem in the case of large scale rituals.
3) Sacredness. The concept of permanently being sacred, beyond the period of a 
performance, transcends religious action proper. It has a temporal trajectory 
in both directions, preserving memories afterwards and raising the status of 
a place by pointing forward to such memories before a religious action. The 
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place is upgraded by memories even if these are false ones: I remember a 
ritual I participated in in a different place when I see indicators of others’ 
former rituals in this place. The place is attributed agency and a specific, reli-
gious, identity. Such an attribution asks for a strategic placement of indica-
tors to delimit ritual space. The agents are often temple personnel, not the 
individual actors. They appropriate individual religious communication by 
placing dedications, thereby making them more or less visible, and they 
create the affordances of a place.
4) Experience. The influence exerted by earlier acts of religious communication 
already points towards my final perspective: the experiential dimension. 
The approach I have taken focusing on y agency seems to stress the strategic 
aspect of religious action. But strategy does not equal deceit. Nearly always, 
there exist ‘secular’ alternatives to acting religiously – if we except the situa-
tion analysed in the famous ancient Gedankenexperiment of somebody utter-
ing vows while drowning. Acting religiously is also risky. Others might resort 
to force, might question the initiator’s religious competence, or might ques-
tion the claim that the god invoked is listening, or even doubt its very exist-
ence. To minimise such reactions, the choice to act religiously will usually 
be based on experience. Such experience could be previous individual expe-
rience, but it could also be the experiences known to or communicated by 
others, that is by way of their contributions to the sacredness of the place or 
on institutional patterns of plausibility.
The choice of the object employed is clearly far less risky and much more based 
on individual decision, on one’s investing of memories or money in the selection 
of an object that was previously employed in everyday use, on special occasions, 
or bought or created for the very act. This is a part of the life of the object or the 
‘biographies of things’ that are intertwined with the users’ own life experience. 
Such obejcts create very different ‘resonances’, also with regard to later observ-
ers, thus contributing to the sacredness of a spatial context. 
7 Conclusion
Agency, collective identity, and communication define the perspectives I have 
used to focus on the individual in its sociality and environment in the first part 
of this paper. Each of the three terms refers to individuals reaching out as they,
 – act upon their total environment as temporal beings, in their appraisal of 
past, present, and future (‘agency’);
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 – position their structured selves in a socially structured environment (‘identity’);
 – and address their social environment in an interactive manner, in a direct 
form, via intermediaries or lasting media (‘communication’).
Religious action, on this interpretation, is understood as a form of communica-
tion that enlarges a relevant situation by ascribing agency to not unquestionably 
plausible agents. Within this framework I have analysed the role of objects, devel-
oping four different perspectives: relevance, sacralisation, sacredness, and the 
experiential dimension.
The high social and material investment involved in the construction of ini-
tially less plausible contemporaries (or ‘counterintuitive agents’ in the termi-
nology of evolutionary theories of religion) and in the project of producing rel-
evant communication with them seems to produce, time and again, a surplus of 
self-stabilisation, power, or the capacity to solve problems. And it is immediately 
rendered precarious and contested due to the shifting of positions, of prestige, 
and even of the power produced by success. Sacralisations, that is, engaging in 
the risky type of communication described as religious above, within the other-
wise unquestioned plausible and evident environment, are elements of such stra-
tegic action. My metaphor of ‘investment’ alludes to the material extravagance, to 
the enormous expenditure of religious communication for its media of such com-
munication. This includes cult images and sanctuaries, complex rituals, textual 
and communicative strategies, and, not least, personnel. 
I have not claimed that objects are necessary for religious communication. If 
Maik Patzelt is right, the basic religious act is that of praying: expressive, emo-
tional speech, or, even better, song and dance (Patzelt 2018). Objects are some-
thing added to this. And this degree of freedom is probably what accounts for 
the enormous variety in this cultural field and the resulting multiplication of 
religion. 
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Institutionalisation of tradition and 
individualised lived Christian religion 
in Late Antiquity
Eusebius of Caesarea’s letter CPG 3502 is one of the earliest narratives about the 
Council of Nicaea (325) that describes procedures and documents used at meet-
ings between bishops and the emperor Constantine. This chapter looks at pro-
cesses of religious individualisation in the reception of the letter from the fourth 
to the seventh century and asks which mechanisms of religious pluralisation 
shaped the transmission of this seminal text for the history of Christianity. It thus 
questions the context of its twentieth century publication. Analysing also Cyril’s 
letter CPG 5320, the chapter scrutinises the reliability of the narrative implied by 
the texts that have usually been regarded as sources for the councils of Nicaea and 
Ephesus (431). It does this by pointing to the processes of religious individualis-
ation that shaped lived Christian faiths and pieties in Late Antiquity. The scope 
of enforcement of conciliar decisions and the vulnerability of the representativity 
of the participants will be discussed, situating their actions in the context of the 
plurality of lived Christian faiths. The chapter also discusses the dynamics of the 
de-institutionalisation of Roman religious rites in Late Antiquity by examining 
them in the context of fragmented Christian orthodoxies in which bishops and 
other religious authorities were vulnerable to accusations, and social upheaval 
or unrest.
In the vast and ever growing literature about political, religious, and social 
developments in the fourth-century Roman Empire, anyone reading about the 
statement of faith of Nicaea, Constantine’s involvement in theological matters, 
Eusebius of Caesarea’s Arian inclinations, or related issues is fortunate when the 
account gives information about relevant fourth-century texts. One of these will 
probably be Eusebius’ so called Epistula ad Caesarienses, CPG 3502. Depending 
on the target readership of the publication, this information may be followed by a 
cryptic reference to a recognised modern edition of the work. Most probably, the 
extremely abbreviated form will lead to ‘Urkunden zur Geschichte des Arianischen 
Streits 318–328, ed. Hans-Georg Opitz, Athanasius Werke 3.1, Berlin/Leipzig: 1934, 
Note: I am grateful for the input of Geoffrey Greatrex, Markus Vinzent, Jörg Rüpke and the patient 
readers at Eisenach. This chapter has benefited from the generous support of St Edmund’s Col-
lege. Finally, I thank the University of São Paulo for granting leaves to pursue research abroad out 
of term and to take part in the conference at which this paper was discussed.
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42–7’. This edition is a landmark of conciliar and patristic studies which reflects 
their harmonising positivistic historical approach to texts. It implicitly created 
volumes of acta for the synods and councils involving Athanasius and Arius, not 
least for Nicaea (Brennecke et al. 2007, v-vii; Meier 2011, 125; Brennecke 2011, 15–7; 
Blaudeau 2012, 139–44, 153; Testa 2014; Stockhausen 2015, 136–42).
From the apparatus of this compilation or the notes in a commentary or a 
study, the curious reader may learn that the letter was not transmitted as a stand-
alone piece or as part of a collection of Eusebius’ letters (which neither he nor 
any other contemporary or later editor ever assembled). Rather, it was quoted 
in the works of Athanasius, Gelasius, Socrates, and Theodoret. What the cryptic 
list of fourth and fifth-century works1 does not indicate is that even when sig-
nificant variants are attested, all the authors were engaging with the text that 
appears in Athanasius’ collection, appended to De decretis Nicenae synodi (Opitz 
1935a; Opitz 1935b; Hauschild 1970, 108; Hansen 1995, l). In this work, Athana-
sius defended his faith and piety by analysing conciliar practice and output, as 
attested in Scriptures and the memory of the fathers of Nicaea, including, with 
caveats, Eusebius. The reliability of this foundation was secured by the presenta-
tion of written evidence, namely a dossier containing at least a letter. According 
to the title it bears in Athanasius’ dossier, Eusebius had allegedly sent it ahead 
of his arrival from Nicaea to the people of his diocese. The letter is self-referential 
and programmatic in character, and some of the rather detailed comments on dis-
ciplinary and theological matters addressed at the council are destabilising. Little 
doubt has been voiced concerning the authenticity of the chronology implied by 
the rubric in De decretis, which makes the letter ‘the most ancient source con-
cerning Nicaea’ (Cameron and Hall 1999, 265; Ramelli 2011, 47) and informs the 
biography of Eusebius’ literary persona.
1 Late-antique religious pluralisation 
The generally accepted picture of the early Church Councils is based not on con-
temporary documents but, rather, on various narrative sources that have been 
compiled years, and sometimes many years, after the events they describe. The 
usual justification for accepting these later sources as evidence is the surrender 
to their intra- and intertextual claims and narrative guarantees of trustworthi-
ness and accuracy. A long tradition of scholarship on contemporary, or near 
1 ‘Ath. de decr. nic. (BKO R) Sokr. 1.8.35 (MA FHC G Σ) Theod. h. e. 1.12.1 (An s ζ) Gel. 2.35.1 (abc) 
Th.’ (Opitz 1934, 42 ad loc.).
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contemporary, evidence, including studies about Rabbinic culture, Manicheism, 
Neo-Platonism (and other philosophical lifestyles), magic, Sassanian religion, 
and North African and Arabic peoples, has not eroded the belief that within a few 
decades before or after Constantine, if not before, lived Christian religion was an 
individual position-taking in relation to an institutionalised Christian Church. It 
is also widely assumed that it can be described with patient Quellenforschung of 
texts in Greek, Roman, Syriac, Coptic, etc. and the material evidence. The right 
questions urge rephrasing (Donner 2006).
The textually more prominent late-antique Christianities were self-asserting 
cultures. Like other late-antique mystical, philosophical, rhetorical, and legal 
schools, they resorted to textual representations of their past and values, as well 
as to the performance and narrative problematisation of practices and rituals 
(Berg 2001, 88–91; Gordon 2015). Within a constellation of discourses of faith, 
such as statements at synods, or in writings, such as Eusebius’ letter, Christian 
oral and written works were arguments in processes of individualisation for per-
suasion through identification with religious paradigms and the relative author-
ity of synods (Heil 2010, 87–9, 99f.; DelCogliano 2011a, 672; Radde-Gallwitz 2017; 
Graumann 2017b, 52). Meanings varied according to the awareness and acknowl-
edgement of biographical narratives and the sayings and writings associated to 
the authors named for their teaching and in expressions such as ‘the faith of the 
fathers of Nicaea’. Preaching and writing on the logical, (meta-)physical, and 
ethical notions at stake in the religious polemics was therefore variously under-
stood and interpreted, creating multiple reactions. Especially in communica-
tions addressed to larger audiences stemming from a variety of educational and 
socio-economic backgrounds, concepts and values tended to be homogenised by 
association to a core (ritualised) vocabulary.
For most late-antique religions, scant evidence exists for the substantial 
intrareligious diversity or for the common flaring up of violence that occurred 
when individual or collective expectations about the people or institutions medi-
ating or providing their religious concepts and rites were not met (Hezser 2005; 
Sizgorich 2009, 21–4, 121–34; Ando 2010; Mayer and Neil 2013; Drake 2013; van 
Loon 2014, 110f.; Dunn 2015b, 266–8; Kahlos 2015; Dijkstra 2015, 25–30). They 
are better attested in some Christianities because in these topoi of social and 
religious individualisation which engaged with Roman imperial values were fre-
quently used. The conscious decision between irreconcilable theological views 
or against unacceptable misconduct fell between two or more discourses, each 
of which labelled itself as orthodoxy and orthopraxis and condemned the alter-
natives as unchristian (pace Otto 2017). Arguments on Christian matters were 
narratively referred to Roman jurisdiction, insinuating the possibility of imperial 
involvement in the form of recommendations, promulgation of laws, organisation 
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of synods, and invitations to debates. ‘Discourses of exclusion’ were widespread 
individual self-assertions of Christian religious identity, whereby self-awareness 
of belonging to the ‘one faith’ was expressed by pointing out moral and concep-
tual dissimilarities to followers of other discourses. Shaping the identity of others 
excluded these others from the social institution created by the narrative.
It is often assumed that early Christian synods and especially the Church 
Councils of Late Antiquity reached unanimous decisions which were actively 
promoted by the participants upon their orderly return. This seems to be cor-
roborated by taking at face-value ancient documents, such as Eusebius of Cae-
sarea’s historiographical-theological accounts of the aftermath of the Council 
of Nicaea, especially De vita Constantini 3.21–2 (Bleckmann and Schneider 2007, 
96–101; Johnson 2014, 150f.). Actually, these narratives are part and parcel of the 
repertory of fragments of discourses created by subsequent authors. This chapter 
shows their version of the events becoming history, institutionalised by incorpo-
ration through quotation and allusion in works and collections written as evi-
dence of the tradition and authority of the fathers, on which many historians still 
draw uncritically.
The chapter analyses the development of a religious landscape and literary 
environment which gave shape to a type of epistolography from bishops to their 
dioceses. It also shaped the social and political meaning intrinsic to these letters, 
which made them important documents about synodical proceedings and the iden-
tity of religious agents. Analysing Athanasius’ reception in De decretis of a letter of 
Eusebius of Caesarea about the meetings at the Council of Nicaea and its statement 
of faith sheds light on the inclusion of Cyril’s letter CPG 5320 in collections of doc-
uments about the Council of Ephesus in 431. It shows that the model of a bishop’s 
responsibility for his diocese and accountability to Roman administration, formu-
lated by Eusebius in discourses assigned to the character of Constantine in the 
letter and in De vita Constantini, is mirrored in the character of his ego-persona and 
its self-effacing insertion in a collective past there outlined. The existence of the 
letter posits the fulfilment of this role, lending documentary meaning to the text. 
Eusebius’ process of religious individualisation promotes and defends his faith and 
piety, that is, his teaching and the uprightness of his character as bishop, teacher 
and citizen. Athanasius’ polemical engagement with it, shaping his ego-discourse 
and affecting the meaning of Eusebius’, shows nevertheless the relevance of 
Eusebius’ writings as well as the religious and narrative polemics associated with 
Eusebius’ persona and œuvre. This step in the reception of Eusebius’ discourse 
is only stabilised in a subsequent moment, represented in this chapter by Cyril’s 
letter CPG 5320. Presupposing the patterns of religious individualisation typified 
in the literary personae of Eusebius and Athanasius, Cyril’s discourse lends them 
an authority which at that point was not yet simply a given. The rhetorical engage-
Institutionalisation of tradition and individualised lived Christian religion   1227
ment with the sacred history of these literary personae and with imperial identity 
ultimately illuminates the fourth- to sixth-century  de-institutionalisation of reli-
gious practices and the pluralisation of Christian identities.
2 A scholar’s letter
Written in the first plural person, Eusebius’ letter blurs the boundaries of 
the views which are ascribed to the synodical bishops, Constantine, and the 
 Eusebius-persona who argues for the acceptability of the emperor’s statement of 
faith (Strutwolf 1999, 53–60; Lieu 2016, 176). The familiarity of Eusebius and the 
intended recipients with Constantine’s Epistula ad Nicomediensis 1–2 (Opitz 1934, 
58) should be taken for granted. For the readers of the writings of Eusebius and 
Athanasius, the existence of a theological discourse in an official public letter 
from Constantine was much more present and relevant than any hypothetical role 
Constantine was said to have had in the meetings and theological discussions in 
Nicaea. The presence of the emperor at the Council of Nicaea established a sym-
bolic link consolidated by narratives and legislation (Noethlichs 2006, 117f.). The 
literary context which can be associated to Constantine’s letters explains the gist 
of Eusebius’ narrative, which uses the character of the emperor to voice a few full-
length theological arguments. The extended account of tensions in the sessions 
and the details of a synodical controversy seem in line with Constantine’s asser-
tions but remain distinctively Eusebius’ own.
The letter falls in line with Eusebius’ literary creation of Constantine’s reli-
gious individualisation. Thus, for instance, he credits him with the initiative of 
assembling an oikoumenikḗ súnodos, which decades later Philostorgius (Histo-
ria ecclesiastica 1.7.7) could still attribute to Athanasius (Chadwick 1972). The 
elements for the theological argument in CPG 3502 are placed in the mouth of 
Constantine and a number of bishops in a historiographic narrative along the 
lines of De vita Constantini and the Historia ecclesiastica. In all of these, Euse-
bius’ emperor is imbued with a theological expertise which needs improvement 
by the hands of a master, in which role Eusebius paints himself into the narra-
tive. Like De vita Constantini, the ‘main point’ of the letter CPG 3502 is the prom-
inence assigned to the emperor in the procedures (Higgins 1966, 242). The scene 
is dialogical, with intervening reference to discussion and debate. This became a 
leitmotiv of the expectations of emperors about what bishops should do. Sacrae 
of convocation and reprimand mentioned it, as seen in Theodosius II’s missives 
to the factions assembled in Ephesus in 431. Practices changed little but the dis-
course of Christians echoed the changes (cf. Graumann 2017a, 271–4). Eusebius 
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also created a type for the relation between emperor and bishop in which indi-
vidual agency and culpability remains with the legislating emperor, while the 
bishop, although showing greater initiative and theological acumen, subsumes 
himself into the collective voice of a tradition which is Eusebius’ own discursive 
creation. Demonstrating a collegial behaviour and showcasing the theological 
correctness, the letter grants Eusebius the qualities which he painstakingly tries 
to deny his opponents, such as Marcellus (Vinzent and McCarthy Spoerl 2017, 17). 
His literary and public activities tended towards a coherent authorial persona 
whose actions and thoughts would be representative of those common to them 
who, in the eyes of his intended audience, were the faithful and pious (Grafton 
and Williams 2006; Johnson 2014, 146–52).
In Eusebius’ theological works before and after Nicaea, passages such as 
Demonstratio evangelica 5.1.13 (Heikel 1913, 212, 12–6) and De ecclesiastica theo-
logia 2.14.4 (Klostermann and Hansen 1971, 115) contradict some of Constantine’s 
arguments in CPG 3502. Familiarity with Eusebius’ claims makes it possible to see 
that in the letter the character ‘Eusebius’ harmonises them by proposing a theo-
logically imprecise variant (Strutwolf 1999, 58). Eusebius’ statements apparently 
improve on Constantine’s (‘subordinationist and unorthodox’, Higgins 1966, 
242), strengthening them against gnosticising interpretations, but in practice 
they were equally likely to be misunderstood as sabellianism (Feige 1992, 289; 
Rizzi 2013).
Twenty-five or thirty years later, Eusebius’ version of controversies at the 
sessions in CPG 3052 was appropriated by Athanasius. His dossier in De decretis 
conveys a polyphonic landscape of theology, religious leadership and Christian 
authorship in which his own actions and character are a point of reference. It 
resembles the first stage of the Collectio Corbeiensis (Dunn 2015a, 188), Sabinus 
of Heraklea’s Synagoge (Hauschild 1970, 107–8), and the anti-Donatist group of 
seemingly authentic Constantinian documents in Historia ecclesiastica 10.5–7 
(Carotenuto 2002, 68–73). Athanasius’ editorial craftiness is well known from 
his handling of the citations of Asterius and George of Laodicea (DelCogliano 
2015; Cassin 2015; Kannengiesser 2006; Johnson 2006) and of uncorroborated 
texts (Gwynn 2007, 74). The organisation of the supporting documentation in De 
decretis has, however, raised few suspicions. The information about the recip-
ients of the letter in the heading of CPG 3502 is accepted at face-value, except 
for the description of Eusebius of Caesarea as areianófrōn, which is identified as 
Athanasius’ authorial intervention. The adjective is part of Athanasius’ casting 
of Eusebius as like-minded with Arius (Winkelmann, Pietri and Rondeau 2013, 
89). It is also part of the narrative creation of ‘Arianism’, connecting proponents 
of alternatives to concepts associated with the fathers of Nicaea to the character 
and theses excluded from the institution which was, at that time, also being dis-
Institutionalisation of tradition and individualised lived Christian religion   1229
cursively defined in the reference to a ‘catholic’ ‘church’ as recipient of imperial 
letters, such as De decretis 38. The association of katholikḗ to ekklēsía was quickly 
gaining visibility in Constantine’s official discourses, particularly in his letters, 
universalising it. In Christian polemics, it was simultaneously associated to a 
qualitative connotation which cast dissident communities as alien to what was 
officially sanctioned as the only authentic religion and, therefore, the receiver of 
imperial largesse (Vinzent 1999, 237–40; Winkelmann, Pietri and Rondeau 2013, 
373). Athanasius discursively created ‘Arianism’ as the contrast to the communion 
with Nicene fathers, imbued with the faith he ascribed them, thereby amalgam-
ating for polemical purposes their plurality of religious practices and interpreta-
tions (Gwynn 2010, 233).
Making his model explicit to the reader of De decretis, Athanasius assimilated 
to his theological argument the rhetorical mise en scène of the ‘original’, that is, he 
attributes his interpretation of homooúsios to that of the emperor and his implicit 
authorial-persona to the role of an instructing interlocutor with emperors previ-
ously played by Eusebius. So much for the discourse projected towards the future. 
Athanasius created a narrative of an ‘official’ imperially sanctioned understand-
ing of Nicaea where there had never been one before by crafting references and 
traditions (Boyarin 2000, 27). Eusebius had used a similar rhetoric in his debates, 
for example that against Marcellus, and CPG 3502 casts ‘good’ piety and faith in a 
nutshell. Athanasius created the authority of Eusebius’ distinctive account of the 
Nicene controversial language, while reminding the reader of the limitations in 
Eusebius’ attitude. In the narrative, the letter polemicises against hoi perì Euse-
bíou, a category which Athanasius associates explicitly to Eusebius of Nicomedia 
and Eusebius of Caesarea, as well as ambiguously to both or neither, in a number 
of works, including De decretis and Epistula ad Afros, almost all written after the 
deaths of both Eusebius (Stockhausen 2002, 194; Morales 2006, 288–90; Gemein-
hardt 2011, 210–4; Bergjan 2017, 134). Furthermore, a well-informed reader 
might know of conflicts between the theology put forward in CPG 3502 and that 
defended elsewhere by Eusebius. Such contrasts encourage an interpretation of 
the letter as having a preemptive character, as if Eusebius tried to remain a step 
ahead of information and rumours about the discrepancy between the synodical 
decisions and his earlier teaching, or about incidents during the Council in which 
his orthodoxy had been questioned or situations in which he had committed or 
suffered anything that might weaken the authority of his discourse.
The heading turns the letter from proof of good citizenship into evidence that 
Eusebius had sown contention on theological minutiae among the population of 
the Roman Empire, since he had referred to and given detailed examples of the 
sort of religious disputation on words used by all factions to decry their critics. The 
letter would show Eusebius also working against the imperial wish to promote a 
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view of Christianity and of the imperially-designed synod of Nicaea as a harmo-
nious gathering of like-minded individuals all in agreement with one another. 
It described the synod as a process and not as the confirmation of the bishops’ 
agreement on the versions conveyed by synodical letters and in references to 
the events. Furthermore, Eusebius would have exposed the emperor’s religious 
shortcomings to the recipients which Athanasius in De decretis described as the 
Caesarean paroikía. Read with the values of fourth-century Christian epistolog-
raphy in mind, CPG 3502 communicated the intrinsic insufficiency of the Nicene 
statement of faith and its need of interpretation thereby inducing its pluralisation 
(Strutwolf 1999, 53).
2.1 Eusebius’ historiographic and panegyrical epistolography
The narrative coherence of a literary persona and the ideas being put forward 
by it should not be confused with the sincerity of the author (Ayres 2007; Drake 
2014, 43f.; Frenkel 2017). Eusebius’ portrayal of, and relation to, Constantine is 
clearly more ambiguous than a literal reading of his panegyrics might suggest. 
However, nothing indicates that he fomented public dissent (Johnson 2014, 151). 
By the time of the Council of Nicaea he had already established a significant 
authorial presence in the theological and exegetical landscape with which the 
letter is in dialogue and in which its direct or indirect readership placed it. Euse-
bius had inherited a multi-faceted role from Origen via Pamphilus and the school 
which he seems to have kept active also in Caesarea reflected this (Zamagni 2011, 
158–73). The literary ‘I’ that Eusebius set out defended the interests of this milieu, 
stamped with imperial endorsement of its editorial output by the imperial letter 
exhibited in De vita Constantini 4.36, but also by the characterisation of Eusebius’ 
persona and his rhetoric as expert advisor and interlocutor, as seen in CPG 3502. 
It should furthermore be plausible that this literary ‘I’ was the ‘same’ of Eusebius’ 
persona in the Commentary to Isaiah, and De ecclesiastica theologia, for example 
(McCarthy Spoerl 2006, 41; DelCogliano 2011b, 41–5; Inowlocki 2011, 199; Penland 
2013; Johnson 2014, 42–6, 144f.). His narratives of pastoral concern show that he 
tended the reputation of his authorial voice for the sake of the ongoing recogni-
tion of the validity of his teaching. They illustrate how in the empire projected by 
his historiography, erudition was a vital asset.
The narrative statement of Eusebius’ zeal for the correctness of faith and piety 
according to Nicene and imperial decisions updated his authorial persona. Retro-
spectively plausible, the story neither indicates that he altered his view or that he 
endeavoured to actually spread the concepts and instructions mentioned in his 
historiography of conciliar organisation and authority. Eusebius did not dispute 
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the authority of the Council of Nicaea. Accordingly, he recognised the validity of 
the statement of faith on which the members had agreed as a suitable formula-
tion for the issues discussed there. Nevertheless, he took for granted that bishops 
were entitled to articulate in other creeds the orthodoxy they claimed to share, 
and to try to convince their peers that they expressed the same faith (Campen-
hausen 1976, 128, cf. Kinzig 2017, 306, 317). When Eusebius affirmed the historio-
graphical relevance of Nicaea for the characterisation of the empire and its rela-
tion to Christianity, the event did not yet have the religious referential character 
which Athanasius attributed to the faith of the fathers of Nicaea in later writings. 
Complemented by other authoritative sources, it became a yardstick that had to 
be verbalised as suited the time and the problem at stake (Stockhausen 2002, 2).
The performance of a letter conveyed the voice of the writer and letters 
addressed to just a few recipients were tailored to them specifically by the choice 
and arrangement of the arguments. Thus, detailed lines of reasoning should 
have been envisaged for small expert audiences. The letter-writer assigned them 
characteristics which may have overlapped or even corresponded to their actual 
identity. As shown in Higgins’ recreation/paraphrase, Eusebius characterised 
himself less as a bishop who had the responsibility and entitlement to instruct 
on faith and piety (Bowes 2007; Elm 2015, 93, 99–105) than as a master/teacher 
and Roman citizen who engaged in disputations with non-Christians. Casting 
Eusebius’ authorial voice as that of an irreproachable citizen, CPG 3502 seems to 
address expert readers who could be beyond the confines of Christian positions. 
The account of the Council of Nicaea in Eusebius’ letter is centred on the agency 
and synodical authority of an unbaptised emperor. As in De vita Constantini, the 
narrative focus has a biographical and panegyrical character (hypothetically) 
addressed to the emperor and aiming for a broad readership (Barnes 2007). 
Accordingly, Eusebius did not expect the recipients to know the wording of the 
statement of faith, which is a paradox if the rubric is assumed to be true (Cam-
penhausen 1976, 129f.). The letter is a defense of Eusebius’ persona in terms rel-
evant to Roman legal and administrative procedures, not to his spiritual author-
ity as bishop. Suggesting that Constantine was persuaded by his exposition of 
the Nicene statement of faith, Eusebius’ letter claims that complaints, petitions 
and civic measures moved by or under the instigation of his opponents, even 
if they were the majority of the bishops or a synodical consensus, would be 
going against the imperial will and wish. In both De vita Constantini and the 
letter, synodical decision-making is subordinated to the pronouncements of a 
non-Christian, sidelining the relevance of the consensus among the majority 
of bishops who were disputing at that time the soundness of Eusebius’ teach-
ing. In De vita Constantini, Historia ecclesiastica and CPG 3502, Eusebius was 
knowingly adding a narrative to a tabula rasa of content and styles, not because 
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no socially recognised patterns or works portraying the relation of bishops to 
emperors or synodical proceedings existed but because proceedings varied and 
were often contentious and none of the available narratives had gained status. 
They present exemplary life patterns for inhabitants and officers of an empire 
ruled by a Christian emperor. As panegyrics, De vita Constantini and CPG 3502 
are naturally silent on Constantine’s failures, especially on matters of faith, 
and compatible with his administration and legislation, which both favoured 
other groups and circumscribed Christian practices. They were part of a reli-
gious landscape characterised by dynamic pluralisation, not least by the super-
imposition of family traditions, education in lifestyle-informing schools, and 
regional religious institutions, as well as the changes that took place in each 
(Belayche 2013, 243; Humfress 2014, 22–9; Gordon in this publication). Refer-
ence to, and especially any digression on, the causes and characters who were 
involved in ongoing religious disputations and growing estrangements would 
denigrate actions of the laudandus.
The narrative of CPG 3502 provides an example of a letter that contributes to 
the acceptability of the bishop’s literary persona (on which depended also the 
reputations of those on whom he relied explicitly as authorities). Once accepted, 
this persona supersedes any images that may have arisen from rumours about 
him having been or become Nicene, which is therefore also of marginal relevance 
for the individualising effect the letter had. Eusebius’ letter shows that state-
ments of faith were dynamic discourses that offered public testimony of religious 
concepts and exposed the author to their refutation and condemnation but also 
to reception and interpretation. In these processes, the words which could be 
used to express the standard of orthodoxy shifted as quickly as in other scholarly 
engagements with religious notions (Abramowski 1982; Feige 1992, 290f.; Drecoll 
2011, 470).
 From a certain moment onwards, Eusebius’ letter and his interpretation of 
the Nicene faith were deemed orthodox. His Christian historiography and his 
conciliar account were the winning narrative models, reinforced in the works 
of his continuators, late-antique chroniclers, Byzantine librarians, and, finally, 
the reception of his words at face-value in medieval history, modern history, and 
church history. The success of Eusebius’ strategy is largely due to a (reasonably) 
independent ratification from an authorial voice which, despite a number of 
obstacles, gained great authority, namely that of Athanasius (Graumann 2002, 
415–8; Graumann 2003a).
Athanasius shaped the context of the letter with his narrative, affirming, 
with caveats, Eusebius’ orthodoxy. Attempts to identify the influence of Atha-
nasius on the apprehension of CPG 3502 effectively lead to circular arguments 
since all of its reception is apparently dependant of its transmission in Atha-
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nasius’ works. The text of CPG 3502 now found in Socrates Scholasticus has 
several different readings to those available in the extant sources for Athanasius’ 
works, although Socrates drew on De synodis at the time he was revising the 
first two books of his Historia ecclesiastica and included Eusebius’ letter (Haus-
child 1970, 108; Hansen 1995, l). The reader knows of no ‘Eusebius’ but the ‘I’ 
of the narratives which reach him in rumours, texts and discourses attributed 
to, speaking about, or alluding to Eusebius (pace Lieu 2016, 175). This authorial 
 self-fashioning had to stand up to the scrutiny of the audience, which might be 
familiar with any subset of the true or invented information about his character, 
whether real or literary and of his own making or not. The endeavour to memori-
alise the past occurred in the elaboration of the ego-discourse and the moulding 
of dossiers and florilegia. 
Eusebius’ letters were only transmitted within other works by himself or 
other authors. If, on the one hand, they yield a biased picture of his epistolo-
graphic self-fashioning, on the other, the mediated transmission was decisive 
for the credibility of Eusebius’ account. Thus, the letters on creeds present a 
theological expert as he instructs the recipient with the narrative of engagement 
with quoted statements of faith and further arguments. Also the transmission 
of fragments of a letter to Euphration of Balanea (Apamea/Syria Secunda) was 
mediated by Athanasius as an explanation of Arian concepts (De synodis 17.3). 
His often vague references to Eusebius’ letters do not imply that readers would 
be able to identify the text from which he drew an excerpt or allusion, nor that 
he expected or feared that they would have access to his or others’ recensions 
of them. Even De decretis circulated without several or all items of the dossier 
(Heil 1999, 20f.).
Eusebius’ and Athanasius’ self-effacing self-fashioning and the weak links 
to the ‘historical truth’ of the texts do not belittle their importance. Rather they 
show the success of the texts in ‘becoming true’ beyond the scope of their  contents 
and the control of the authors. The targeted audience was aware of the apologetic 
aim of the writings and engaged critically with them, to improve, appropriate, or 
refute them. Eusebius’ De vita Constantini, Historia ecclesiastica, and letter were 
the entextualisation of his literary persona, and key elements in the textualisation 
of Constantine’s participation in Nicaea. They also provided a type for  synodical 
proceedings. Athanasius’ dossier and especially the Epistula ad Afros operated 
the recontextualisation of the letter and, by the changing characterisation of 
‘Eusebius’, effected the textualisation of his literary persona (Oesterreicher 2013, 
142f.; Humfress 2014, 17; Morales 2017, 70). Later, Eusebius’ letter was recognised 
as an accurate source for the events at Nicaea and for Eusebius’ participation in 
the council, complementing the information in the Historia ecclesiastica and De 
vita Constantini (Quiroga Puertas 2015, 113f.).
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3  Individualisation of narratives of religious 
institutionalisation
The received view of a homogeneous church, as attested in the literature and in 
figures of speech, did not correspond to the multiple forms of religiosity that can 
be deduced from the same texts and appear in the textual and archaeological 
evidence (Belayche 2013, 243). The late-antique religious landscape went through 
a fragmentation of authority due to the existence of conflicting discourses about 
the same religious referential, namely, the individual identity as Christian. 
Despite the proliferation of texts claiming normative value in their internal narra-
tive, lived Christian religion remained a multiplicity of experiences, varying from 
the level of the individual to that of group and society (Rüpke in this publication; 
Gordon in this publication).
The jurisdiction and spiritual authority of bishops in all areas of the Roman 
Empire was not uniformly accepted. The normative and institutionalising dis-
courses of regional power over, for example, the control of the see of Alexandria 
over Egypt and neighbouring provinces co-existed with tokens of individualis-
ation in religious practices and notions. The development of Origenism, monastic 
and ascetic practices, and messianic narratives were further tokens of individu-
alisation that contributed to the fragmentation in the landscape of monotheis-
tic religions in Late Antiquity. In the later fifth century, narratives exposed the 
ongoing vulnerability of the bishops of Alexandria when they were unable to 
handle challenges or gain credibility for their narratives. The powerful bishops of 
the fourth and early fifth century were also threatened but the limitations of their 
control are hardly evident in the sources (Martin 1997, 173; Gemeinhardt 2011, 
335–43; Gwynn 2013, 50; Wipszycka 2015, 135, 314–35). A living memory remained 
of the endorsement of the synodical depositions of controversial figures such as 
John Chrysostom, Athanasius, and Eusebius, and of imperial support for disputed 
views, including Arian, Eusebian, and Sabellian concepts. The cultural contacts 
between Christian and local cultures, such as the pre-Islamic tribes, also show 
the resilience of beliefs in the face of preaching and legislation (Shepardson 2008, 
25–46; Millar 2009, 104). Stereotypes were reinforced by normative discourses 
and fuelled accounts of tensions which flared up during episcopal elections, con-
troversies, and when bishops were vulnerable and displayed weakness (Crawford 
2013, 253–7; Kristensen 2016). These social processes informed features of oral 
discourse reflected in narrative patterns, such as acclamations and the histori-
ography of social unrest (Rammelt 2013; Piepenbrink 2014). More than processes 
of religious individualisation, they reflect late-antique mechanisms of reaction 
to representative bodies and nominated leadership. In this context, the authority 
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of elected post-holders or bodies and of endorsed leaders, such as bishops and 
emperors, existed only as long as it met public expectations. Their grip on power 
was intrinsically vulnerable (Humphries 2015; Kaldellis 2015, 147–50).
Local reaction to news about the depositions of bishops and about new 
appointments suggest that information concerning synodical events could 
spread quickly through oral and written narratives. These could range from 
assumptions, rumours, and calumnies to announcements supported by mate-
rial evidence. The information would not reach everyone in all dioceses equally. 
The title Eusebius’ letter CPG 3502 bears in Athanasius’ dossier places it in this 
context. A pastoral letter should dispel rumours and calumny and restore the 
respect, confidence, and familiarity of the people. It should help to create a more 
homogeneous and receptive audience for the bishop, handling the expectations 
his engagement had created, possibly by his own instigation. Several narratives 
describe the risks bishops who left their dioceses might run when they returned 
there (Flower 2013, 156–62; Hillner 2015, 249–55). They might face an adverse 
reception, either because during their absence significant parts of the clergy or 
the people had risen up against them, or because they came back spreading an 
unwelcome discourse. The diverse social, religious, and educational background 
made the people in a diocese a locus for widespread individualisation. As with 
most classical narrative topoi, this story combines and modifies factual details 
of several moments and places that are part of the shared narrative culture. In 
this case, the story implies that it was incumbent on a bishop to coalesce his 
public somewhat so that those who thought of themselves as Christians, and had 
therefore their notion of ‘we’ (Christians) vs. others, did not disagree with him on 
the matter at hand. This dynamic of the performance of a letter sent to a diocese 
makes it plausible that Eusebius and Cyril wrote to their dioceses but gives no 
guarantee that the literary versions transmitted in the compilations were once de 
facto letters.
3.1 A letter to a diocese
The narrative setting derived from the rubric of Eusebius’ letter shows him 
looking after interests that were his responsibility. It does this by asserting that 
he had engaged on behalf of the faith on which everyone in his school, in the 
diocese of Caesarea, and in the kósmos agreed until then. This he had laid out 
in his personal statement of faith. The narrative presents him showing to all in 
Church and Empire the compatibility of his and the Nicene faith. In the Chris-
tian oikouménē and the Roman kósmos, a bishop was responsible for his diocese 
insofar as it expected him to look after its interests and he bore responsibility for 
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what happened in it. At a synod, or in front of civic and imperial authorities, a 
bishop was a representative of the collective will of the people of his diocese, who 
ought to defend the interests of his see, therefore of the metropolis and thus of 
the city as well.
Most synods would issue synodical letters addressed to all dioceses but 
the chain of dissemination and enforcement of synodal communications was 
 multi-channelled. Like governors, bishops entrusted with writings might not dis-
close them in their territories and communication of actions was contingent on 
local interests (Corcoran 2000, 245–53; Weckwerth 2010, 22; Allen and Neil 2013, 
18–33). Subscribers to synodical decisions ought to abide by the decisions. In CPG 
3502, Eusebius has Constantine and his ego-character echo the expectations that 
bishops should teach and foster the faith and piety. The rubric endows Eusebius’ 
letter with a narrative of preparing the ground for his return, which suggests his 
commitment to putting into practice what the Historia ecclesiastica describes 
Constantine exhorting the bishops to do. To stop the promotion of topics con-
demned by synodical or imperial promulgations could also be expected, accord-
ing to the common topos of episcopal diatribe of denouncing failures to do so. 
Bishops could be accused of neglecting their office if condemned practices, 
beliefs, and the teachers of such were identified in their dioceses (Crawford 2013, 
237–40; Schor 2015a, 162–9).
Eusebius’ letter claims it suffices to follow his pre-conciliar teachings. It lays 
out the compatibility of his private statement of faith and of the statement agreed 
on by every member of the Council. It exempts from any accusation his former 
doings and everyone who acknowledges them, even if they ignore the faith of the 
fathers of Nicaea. Casting the recipients as Eusebius’ paroikía, the rubric presents 
Eusebius as proposing the creed and its explanation in the guise of bishop of 
Caesarea, that is, in the name of his diocese and, thus, of each Christian in it. It is 
an attemporal and universal representation of the faith and piety of the members 
of the church of Caesarea. There was, then, no need to alter or to actively promote 
the theological import of the Nicene faith. The writing guarantees that the Chris-
tians in Caesarea agree on either Eusebius’ statement of faith or on that of Nicaea. 
Failure to do either befell then not the collective dimension of the diocese, but 
individual lived religion. It was not enough to accuse a bishop of the transgres-
sions of members of his diocese if it could not be shown that he was somehow 
responsible for it. Eusebius’ letter prevents any such accusation: he had an ortho-
dox diocese and he was an orthodox bishop; any deviation thus had to originate 
either from outside forces or from faults of individual Christians.
This representation of a bishops’ accountability for the homogeneity of the 
Christian faith in his diocese was relevant for Athanasius in view of imperial 
concern with the violence he and other Christian groups were deploying in Egypt. 
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The internal narrative in Athanasius’ use of Eusebius’ letter acknowledges the 
accusations that Eusebius was not Nicene ahead of the Council but blurs them, 
too, by endowing him and the theological content of the letter with positive quali-
fiers. It suggests that Eusebius could dispel the accusations by preparing a writing 
on the statement of faith of his diocese, which is also the theme of the work of 
Athanasius in which it is cited. Athanasius’ rubric connects CPG 3502 to the task 
which, according to the historiographic narratives of Eusebius and Athanasius, 
Constantine gave the synodical bishops. In short, numerous processes of reli-
gious individualisation discussed as possible scenarios for the composition and 
primary reception of Eusebius’ letter qua literature, qua private letter or qua letter 
to his paroikía probably occurred at his time but were not recontextualised and 
transmitted. Moreover, the processes that actually happened cannot be recon-
structed accurately for any text, even when supported by plenty of details about its 
later reception, because it does not yield enough data. The text conveys only one 
key piece of information: Eusebius deliberately projected an  ego-discourse into 
history that situates himself viz. the rulers of a wider religious landscape, which 
he depicted across his oeuvre. In his narrative creation, he obscured his agency 
by projecting himself into the reception of the past – a past created by his dis-
course which modifies the past conceived by the reader. Eusebius’  ego-discourse 
was relevant for Athanasius as a precedent for advancing antiquity over majority, 
so that a hardly attested Synod of Rome would rank higher than the historical 
Synod of Antioch (Abramowski 1982, 263; Vinzent 1999, 388).
4 Eusebius’ many letters
Although in Athanasius’ (extant) writings CPG 3502 is only quoted in full in the 
florilegium in De decretis, he referred to or quoted from it in a number of other 
works as well. Some came from his later years when he was no longer antagonis-
ing Eusebius downright, in part through a selective appropriation of his literary 
output. If in the dossier the heading denounces the theological problems of the 
letter and casts the author as non-catholic, in the main text Athanasius offers 
little criticism of the letter itself (Ayres 2004, 352–5). That is, once it is ‘improved’. 
Athanasius’ arguments not only resemble their theological content, which is 
standard fourth-century fare, but also develop, respectively, the character of and 
relation to past and present authorities with similar rhetorical strategies. Reli-
ance on Eusebius’ authorship and epistolary voice goes so far as to leave implicit 
in De decretis 3 an argument stated in full in CPG 3502 about the dual function of 
the term ‘from God’, which serves to distinguish the Son from the creatures and to 
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demonstrate that the Son is from the Father (Ayres 2004, 353). However, when the 
metatext is not so obvious, as in De decretis 19 and De Synodis 4, the reasoning is 
restated. The similarity coexists with the disparity between the webs of reference 
for the terms the two authors are defining to use as ciphers. This is to say that con-
cepts such as homooúsios inherit different meanings from the narratives and the 
authorial voice associated with them. Athanasius’ confrontation with Eusebius’ 
reputation and with the theological content of the letter are clearly derived from 
a scholarly engagement with the text that makes it likely that he worked on his 
own copy of the dossier, much like Sabinus assembled his Synagoge and Maximi-
nus wrote scholia on Parisinus Graecus 8907 (Hauschild 1970, 124; McLynn 1996; 
Testa 2013).
Athanasius’ recourse to Eusebius’ writings on the faith of the fathers of 
Nicaea, in particular to his creedal formulations varied. It did not follow any clear 
pattern or development, as can be seen focusing on his major apologetic writ-
ings. He attached CPG 3502 to De decretis and described it as Eusebius’ letter to 
his pa roikía. In De synodis, which is considered a reworked and more polished 
improved version of De decretis, Athanasius referred to two different creedal 
statements by Eusebius. For one, he mentioned the creed found in CPG 3502 
without identifying the source and, when referring to the letter, he did not specify 
to whom Eusebius wrote it. Athanasius furthermore referred to the statement of 
faith in Eusebius’ letter to Euphration of Balanea. Finally, in the Epistula ad Afros, 
Athanasius mentioned CPG 3502, describing it as Eusebius’ letter to ‘the same’ 
which, in the context, might refer to a number of possible addressees but hardly 
to his paroikía. A reader of Epistula ad Afros who lacked access to texts such as 
those appended to De decretis was more likely to see in it a reference to Eusebius’ 
school or more probably his sympathisers, the Eusebians, whom Athanasius was 
combatting (cf. Ad Afros 7.1). Athanasius furthermore included Eusebius on the 
list of fathers in Epistula ad Afros, while he had previously left Eusebius out of 
the analogous list in De decretis 25ff. and tarnished his name in the rubric of De 
decretis 33, only praising his parádoxon in the course of the theological argument 
of De decretis 3 (Stockhausen 2002, 50).
Eusebius projected in the ego-discourse, as well as in Constantine’s sayings, 
an image of an ‘intellectual’ Christianity for which texts, exegesis, and instruc-
tion seem central. His contemporaries sometimes reacted negatively to this 
representation. Athanasius’ irony about Eusebius’ links to lógioi in Epistula ad 
Afros 6.4 is a case in point. Eusebius’ partial depiction of the religious landscape 
remained controversial. For Socrates (Historia ecclesiastica 1.1.3), Eusebius’ 
sermo humilis was not convincing and cast a shadow over the accuracy of his 
views (Wallraff 1997, 235–57; van Nuffelen 2004, 173–87; Bouffartigue, Martin and 
Canivet 2006, 40f.; Quiroga Puertas 2015, 111; Young-Evans 2016, 19).
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Fourth- and fifth-century writers, especially Gelasius (Verdoner 2011, 
6–7 on De decretis 4.4 and 5), still cast Eusebius in with the ‘Arians’, who are 
presented as insidious and contentious, propagating accounts that weaken 
the solidity and certainty of (imperial) institutions and of statements about 
faith. This echoed a negative characterisation of Eusebius’ contribution to the 
Council of Nicaea and of his theological inconsistency, reflected in Athanasius’ 
rubric. Nevertheless, they also qualify Christianity, Empire, their relation, and 
their members according to lines which were to be found in Constantine’s offi-
cial letters and had been used by Eusebius. This resonates in Athanasius’ sug-
gestion that Eusebius’ works were known and were becoming the sources for 
later authors.
This overview of the reception and spread of these works in Late Antiquity and 
Byzantium, offers a very different picture of the impact of Athanasius’ writings 
on the reception of Eusebius’ letter and reputation than the incautious modern 
reader would gain from the apparatus of Opitz 1934, ad loc. There, the anterior-
ity and the presence of the ‘whole’ text give De decretis a status it never had. De 
synodis succeeded in superseding De decretis and both works were less copied 
and cited than Epistula ad Afros. This can be seen in the following summary of 
the secondary transmission of Athanasius’ works, limited to a list of the authors, 
regardless of their religious or geographic status (cf. Brennecke, Heil and Stock-
hausen 2006, lxxvii-lxxxiii; Heil 1999, 8–21):
1. De decretis: catena in Epistulam ad Hebraeos (Cod. Parisinus gr. 238); Severus 
of Antioch;
2. De synodis: Socrates Scholasticus; Severus of Antioch; Euthymius Zygabe-
nus; Doctrina patrum; 
3. Epistula ad Afros: Theodoret; Severus of Antioch; Timothy Aelurus; Leontius 
of Byzanz; Eulogios and a Syriac translation.
This list shows the limited engagement with De decretis, which would have con-
tributed to the reduced availability of this texts and its dossier. At the same time, 
the quotation in Theodoret’s Historia ecclesiastica (with the mention of it being 
a letter ‘to the same’) and the Syriac translation indicate a preference among 
fifth- to eighth-century authors for the Epistula ad Afros, which contrasts with the 
invisibility of the text for almost a hundred years, one of the points used to argue 
against its authenticity (Stockhausen 2002, 27–32). Thus, the information about 
Eusebius’ letter and its narrative was received primarily under the bias of Epistula 
ad Afros. Furthermore, positive characterisation of Eusebius is more frequent in 
the b-type (‘Antiochene’ in Opitz 1934; Opitz 1935c, 98–104) transmission of Atha-
nasius, which predominates in the extant manuscripts (Tetz et al. 1996, 18; Heil 
1999, 3–8).
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5 A bishop’s letter 
Eusebius’ appropriation of authority by claims of filiation to a number of char-
acters would have evoked the characteristics of ego-discourses in biographic 
and historiographic works familiar to his public. Despite ancient and modern 
attempts to identify the genealogies of authority to which Eusebius referred in De 
decretis 33.13, such as the glossator of Socrates’ Historia ecclesiastica 1.8.51, it is 
their very ambiguity that allows Eusebius’ ego-discourse to appropriate informa-
tion about experiences of religious individualisation known to his reader. Indeed, 
it is possible he conflated this information with the reader’s awareness of Euse-
bius’ narratives of people and events in De vita Constantini, Historia ecclesiastica 
and treatises. This argument of filiation moves into focus in the later works in 
which were received texts by Eusebius linked to his involvement in the events 
of, and controversies surrounding, the Council of Nicaea. Athanasius’ writings 
which point to CPG 3502 and other letters by Eusebius are a seminal case in point. 
Patristic filiation is not only expressed in the text (for example in De decretis 25.1) 
but also underscored by the quotation of a passage of CPG 3502 as Eusebius 
‘steadfast’ addressing ‘his own’, which later many translators have paraphrased 
as his paroikía from the vantage point of our access to the late-ancient texts.
The reception of the literary personae of Eusebius and Athanasius further 
shaped the processes of Christian individualisation and institutionalisation. 
Eusebius’ topoi of moral and theological accountability viz. expectations associ-
ated with the Roman emperor resonate in the redaction and edition of synodical 
proceedings and supporting documents. However, the perception and expecta-
tions concerning the letters a bishop might send to his diocese while away at a 
synod or ahead of his return were decisively shaped by Cyril’s letters and trea-
tises. The modern, largely unquestioning, acceptance of the trustworthiness of 
the information in the heading of CPG 3502 given by Athanasius in De decretis 33 
was preconditioned by the inclusion of pastoral letters by Cyril in edited works 
about later events, especially in the acta of Ephesus 431. A case in point is the 
influence the Epistulae ad clerum populumque Alexandrinum, CPG 5320 and 5321, 
(ed. Schwartz 1914ff. I I/1, 116f.) have on the characterisation of the main reli-
gious and political agents and the interpretation of texts and events mentioned 
elsewhere in the collections of conciliar documents. The discovery of a cameo of 
daily life in the synodical collections may surprise the modern reader. The text in 
the modern editions of Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum is, however, part of the 
editor’s narrative creation of Cyril’s good character, governance, and episcopacy. 
The agency of the ego-character fades into its narrative of past or unnamed actors 
who give no clue about Cyril’s contested situation. The difference between the 
depth of the theological exposition of the letters of Eusebius and Cyril parallel the 
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diverging views on erudition and education which Eusebius assigns to Constan-
tine, and for which Socrates Scholasticus faulted Eusebius’ Historia ecclesiastica.
Few aspects of late-antique synodical and imperial literature have received 
so much attention in the current source-critical scholarship than the flaring up 
of the Nestorian controversy and the June 431 Cyrillian session. They paraphrase 
and harmonise the texts to create further convincingly plausible accounts, which 
remain hypothetical (Fraisse-Coué 1995; Graumann 2002, 357–98; Barnes 2011, 
121–7; Frenkel 2015; Amirav 2015; Bevan 2016). Unlike the abundance of theolog-
ical arguments in Eusebius’ CPG 3502, Cyril’s letters seem to dwell on mundane 
matters interspersed with common-sense exhortations expressed as Christian 
admonishments adorned with Scriptural quotations. Cyril’s letter to the ‘people’ 
of Alexandria supports the trustworthiness of the synodical historiography con-
veyed by the compilation and the uprightness of the characters within. Albeit 
filled with plausible minutiae from travel literature, the letter rehashes formu-
lae which could serve as a reminder of who the bishop was, that he was alive, 
and that, in his view, he was still in control of the see. It would counter tentative 
usurpers and be written proof to disqualify the authenticity or authority of reports 
and documents announcing his deposition, even if they were true. For those who 
recognised the authority of Cyril’s narrative persona, the writing would void any 
later rumours or disqualify measures and actions such as Theodosius II’s later 
acceptance of the conciliar decision to depose Cyril.
The historical and narrative context in which developed the relevance of 
literary engagement with oral or written discourses of earlier authors and the 
sanctioning of narrative patterns which led to the initial redaction of acta of 
Ephesus is convoluted. It was influenced by the later Cyrilian sessions, the impe-
rial endorsement of the decisions of the sessions of the so-called Oriental bishops 
whose contacts with the Roman administration were far less murky than Cyril’s, 
his own deposition and imprisonment, and the little understood events in Chal-
cedon and Constantinople where, with the direct involvement of Theodosius II, 
the synod was finally dissolved. The Cyrillian synodical documentation does not 
acknowledge any insufficiency in the ecumenicity of its conciliar proceedings, 
nor the validity of the proceedings and decisions of other groups of bishops. The 
reader of acta, however, would be aware of the physical and intellectual ridicule 
of Nestorius, the Orientals, and other recognisable narrative personae associ-
ated to deviating practices or beliefs. Invective concerning moral and theologi-
cal shortcomings was a common tool to dissuade the internal and real audiences 
from incurring or persevering in disciplinary or theological heresy. ‘Mere rhet-
oric’ contributed to stabilise and give cohesion to ancient empires, especially 
the  late-antique Roman empire (Diefenbach 2012, 64–9; Wienand 2012, 163–75; 
Pfeilschifter 2013, 330f.; Humfress 2013, 84–92; Mattheis 2014; Börm 2015, 18f.). 
1242   Luise Marion Frenkel
Perhaps, for Roman taxation and legislation, enforcement of imperial measures 
was more relevant than the social effect of the rhetorical didactic trope found in 
their narratives, which informed the Roman imperial identity of the ruler styl-
ised as a pater familias. However, in general formal announcements and physical 
violence alone did not alter the faith and piety of Roman audiences, as reflected 
in discoureses about Christianity. Cyril’s narrative oriented the Alexandrians 
towards a Christian way of life purged of what was incompatible with it, includ-
ing even rulings of synods on orthopraxis and jurisdiction.
The rhetoric of the letter CPG 5320 (cf. CPG 5321), including the images of 
storm, care, and concern, contributes to the narrative context of the minutes and 
synodical letters the strength and unassailability of its leading character. This 
contrasts with Cyril’s vulnerability in the narrative found in imperial legal doc-
umentation, which recognised the condemnation of those presiding over the 
synods (Cyril, Memnon and Nestorius) but not of their followers or of the sub-
scribers. This was a legal and imperial narrative circulating independently of 
Cyrillian literature and a piece of material evidence that could be used as a prec-
edent for future accusations. The reader, commentator or scrutiniser of the acta 
and of collections of Cyril’s letters who reads-over-the-shoulder of the people of 
Alexandria sees Cyril’s concern for his diocese. He also interprets anew images 
of storm and navigation, which were topoi for the Roman state and its relation to 
Christianity too.
The soft and most gentle winds of Cyril’s crossing of the great and wide sea 
echo his participation in the synodical sessions. Cyril is a passenger and no ref-
erence is made to crew or captain, just as the minutes of the session craft the 
impression that the proceedings unfolded autonomously, without leadership or 
any organisation standing in the wings. Nothing hints at the shortcomings, suf-
fering, and illness which wreaked havoc on the preparations, nor at the violence 
employed by Memnon’s imperial soldiers, just as the Cyrilian documentation is 
silent about the existence of meetings by a group of bishops who likewise con-
sidered themselves to be the Council of Ephesus. The letter documented Cyril’s 
serene punctuality, which was a counterpoint to the prolonged delay of the Ori-
ental bishops. Belittling this, the letter addressed the criticism waged against the 
Cyrilian sessions for having happened without waiting for the arrival of all, since 
all should participate in the synodical session. The representation of a relatively 
harmonious unfolding of the Council of Ephesus given by CPG 5320 and other 
conciliar documents contributed to the characterisation of synodical collections 
as more authoritative than imperial compilations, such as the legal codes.
Cyril’s works conferred authority on Athanasius’ literary persona, affirming 
the reliability of the content of Athanasius’ works (for example, the representa-
tion of Eusebius as an orthodox and good bishop). Eusebius, seen through 
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 Athanasius’ discourses, which were, in turn, endorsed by Cyril’s narrative 
persona, is the reference for Cyril’s orthodoxy and for synodical historiography. 
Alongside the conciliar sermons of Theodotus of Ancyra and Acacius of Melitene, 
the letter contributed to equate Cyril with Athanasius and, especially, with Euse-
bius, that earlier great New and Old Testament commentator, major letter writer, 
keen interlocutor with the administration, and meddler at court. Praising Cyril’s 
interpretation and appropriation of the past, the narratives endorse the authority 
of his discourse, which exhorts the reader to adopt his model of individualised 
lived religion (Graumann 2009, 39). Since Cyril seems to make use of the Fathers 
correctly, his doing what Eusebius did in writing a letter to his diocese when trav-
elling because of a synod as a token of pastoral concern would have the same 
effect as a textual guarantee of orthopraxis and creedal orthodoxy, according to 
Athanasius, whom Cyril lays out as an authority.
The validity of this process of religious individualisation depended of the 
social endorsement of circular arguments which gave historiographical accu-
racy to narratives, by accepting that texts which owed their existence to them, 
as citations and allusions, and around which the works had been composed, 
corroborated them. Similar processes of religious individualisation involving 
inter alia imperial and Christian narratives increased the pluralisation of Chris-
tian identities in the Roman Empire. The rhetoric of self-assertion by exclusion 
of others fostered the rejection of non-orthodox rule. However, the late-antique 
rulers whose faith was not considered orthodox by parts of the population 
conflicted with the prevailing concepts of rulership, still influenced by Roman 
republican and imperial narratives which informed the ongoing, albeit modified, 
imperial cult. Athanasius’ contemporaries, for example, had living memory of 
pre-Nicene, Arian, and Nicene emperors. Historiography and hagiography mon-
umentalised examples of Christian self-assertion viz. Roman emperors. The con-
scious decision in support of religious heterodoxy or heteropraxis, unrealisable 
in the first centuries, started to become an option in the period leading up to 
Justinian’s reign in the East as well as in Western kingdoms and dioceses, when 
normative and legislative definitions of heresy gained visibility in discourses, 
praxis, and legislation (Meeder 2015, 104f.; Dunn 2015b, 282–5; McKitterick 
2016, 255–8). The processes of institutionalisation in Latin,  Byzantine, Syriac, 
Jewish, and Arabic traditions countered this with the endorsement of the truth-
value of certain narratives that were warranted by reciprocal corroboration and 
their reception in late-antique antiquarianism. Gradual validation of reading 
these ancient texts at face-value made real the concepts of a  well-defined insti-
tutionalised Christianity, the events and characterisation of individuals, their 
agency and individualisation, and the antiquity and tradition of the theological 
ideas presented in the text.
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It seems obvious to the incautious curious contemporary reader with whom 
the chapter began that a Christian leader should act and speak of his initiative 
self-deprecatingly and let his conciliar activity be subsumed in a collective voice. 
Athanasius’ use of Eusebius’ letter is typical of fourth-century intranarrative pro-
cesses of individualisation. The admonishments and concepts of semiotics and 
communication in meta-literary and programmatic works were strategies to cope 
with living memory and existing textual evidence of former views, without having 
to acknowledge and reject them openly (Stroumsa 2016). The status of Eusebius’ 
rhetoric was shaped by the selective reception of Athanasius in Cyril, Socrates, 
Ephrem, Theodoret, Maximus, Rufinus, Jerome, Gregory etc., who engaged with 
Athanasius’ narratives much as he had with those of Eusebius. The tendency to 
present Christian polemics and synodical ‘solutions’ in the terms and conditions 
of imperial identity, focusing on unity and the avoidance of stasis had, in Euse-
bius’ CPG 3502, a relevant vade mecum to represent dialoguing with an emperor 
and improving his opinions.
6 Concluding remarks
The chapter has focused on oral and written discourses of fourth- and  fifth-century 
bishops addressed to a synod or to their dioceses in which they defended their 
participation, their stance towards its collective decision, and legitimacy. Alleg-
edly arguing for the interests of the people and properties of a bishop’s see, the 
discourses present agonistic and cohering processes of Christian individualis-
ation, respectively by the exclusion of deviant beliefs and behaviours and by the 
conscious assimilation of the faith. They reveal the diversity of apprehensions 
of the numinous even when promoting a de-individualising engagement within 
Christian faith. Thus, what seem to be homogenising decision-making and com-
munication processes actually attest the spread of patterns of self-practice super-
imposed on Roman and regional individualised customs, countering the idea 
that pre-modern religions are collective phenomena. The discourses reveal the 
diverse cultural and metaphysical concepts that shaped Christian appropriations 
of religious agency, insofar as the relevance of the arguments depended on edu-
cation, profession, and engagement in religious life. The texts and discourses 
which seem to be proof of an enforcement of homogeneity were apologetic writ-
ings which advocated at their inception for a range of moral, ethical, cultural, 
political, and metaphysical behaviours or beliefs, and participation in rituals 
and adoption of observances with which individual practices and social spaces 
should not be incompatible.
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Narratives related to synodical decisions were a prominent agent of change in 
the fourth- to seventh-century legal pluralism of the Roman Empire and bishops 
were vulnerable to them. The material or textual evidence of effective enforcement 
of synodical decisions is rather scarce. At first sight, the supporting texts of conciliar 
documentation, such as letters and homilies, seem to be witnesses of processes of 
institutionalisation. Their making, however, reflects individual narrative institution-
alisations of the past in the form of an appropriation of available narratives which 
modifies the past and makes it available for individual engagement with the reli-
gious beliefs and practices. Editorial interventions consolidated written evidence for 
the defence and construction of authority or for its disavowal. The narrative ‘institu-
tionalisation’ seen in legal, historiographical, and religious accounts and compila-
tions proposed textual landmarks which contributed discourses with inbuilt claims 
of authority as ‘historical documents’. They construed traditions about the authors 
as ‘fathers’ and consolidated religious, behavioural, and theological arguments 
and historiographic content anchored in the authority of the literary persona or the 
repository of the collection. Showing Eusebius’ pastoral concern, the rubric in Atha-
nasius and Socrates effectively makes him into the first of the pateres ekklêsiastikoi 
(church fathers) according to the criteria which he had laid out in Contra Marcellum, 
in what amounts to the first occurrence of the expression, spontaneously used in 
the argumentation about the relevance of earlier authors (Graumann 2003b, 883–7).
Eusebius’ letter was preserved and gained its historiographical status by a 
process of religious individualisation through Athanasius’ selective appropria-
tion of earlier narratives, sometimes inserting them as written proof in his text, 
but not necessarily verbatim and possibly adding new passages to the literary 
memory. The transmission of Eusebius’ letter does not reveal its relation to his 
works and whether the public of the other accounts had access to it. Athana-
sius’ use of it in his treatise on the Nicene faith and, especially, in the Epistula ad 
Afros, gave it a prominence among those aware of either work. It was, then, prone 
to circulate, possibly as a stand-alone piece, and be received as an authoritative 
text, as a writing to be agonistically analysed and eventually refuted. Sabinus, 
Gelasius, Scorates and Cyril exemplify the wide range of engagement with it, with 
impact on the transmitted text.
Athanasius’ evaluation of Eusebius’ letter imparted on it a finality it never 
could have had as mere physical written evidence of an individual discourse, 
not supported by further guarantees of its use and effectiveness. The reception 
of Athanasius and the consolidation of his authority in most Christianities lent 
trustworthiness to Eusebius’ letter and credibility to its account. It set a prece-
dent for letters on participation at synods to be addressed to dioceses, offering 
a token of pastoral concern, acknowledgment, and communication of collective 
and imperially endorsed faith and piety.
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The self-effacing discourse can easily seem a notion of individualisation 
focused on the self, so that the authorship of theological arguments and texts 
would now be characterised as creativity, in conflict with classical notions of 
authorship which still prevailed in Late Antiquity. The fact that it was plausible 
that they sent the letters to their dioceses indicates the theological and discipli-
nary individualisation of the lived Christian religion in the dioceses by which the 
local population or significant groups could react against their bishops if they 
seemed to fail to protect their interests or were accused of apostasy. The recep-
tion of the texts imputed a marked degree of agency to the authorial voice in the 
letters of Eusebius and Cyril (Ando 2006, 127). Historicising the authorial perso-
nae creates a focus on the individual which usually exaggerates the past reality. 
Actual agency is rather to be seen in the authoring of a persuasive narrative of 
the past which succeeds in establishing traditions and the reputation of the 
 characters.
Eusebius of Caesarea’s Epistula ad Caesarienses and Cyril’s Epistula ad clerum 
populumque Alexandrinum are representative of the two main material narrative 
processes of religious individualisation, namely, quotation and compilation. An 
author or an editor created a narrative by the material appropriation of the nar-
rative culture (Urban 1996). The arguments aimed to avoid rejection grounded on 
accusations of siding with condemned beliefs, or prevent impediments to return 
to or stay in their sees because of collective actions motivated by local cultural 
and religious interests. The self-effacing effort of a bishop to assert authority in 
his diocese or to persuade fellow bishops included merging in an imprecise col-
lective notion of church, of company of the fathers, of assembled bishops, and 
was concomitant to an effort for distinctiveness from religious authorities who in 
his view expounded a deviant faith. Socrates Scholasticus’ criticism of Eusebius 
shows that this effort was central to his rhetorical presentation of the data and 
arguments. Once ‘improved’ through the lens of Athanasius, Rufinus, Sozomen, 
Theodoret, and others, Eusebius’ narrative became history.
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Asaph Ben-Tov
Early modern erudition and religious 
individualisation: the case of Johann 
Zechendorff (1580–1662)
1 Introduction: an invitation to a funeral
On 1 January 1630,1 a baker by the name of Zacharias Zechendorff from the small 
Saxon town of Schneeberg in the Ore Mountains (Erzgebirge) wrote to his brother. 
After wishing him and his wife good health and peace for the coming year and 
commending them to God’s care, he turned to the matter at hand:
I cannot withhold from my heavy heart that God Almighty, whose council is secret and 
who alone is wise, has summoned our dear mother from this world on 31 December at the 
sixth hour, following her infirmity and numerous illnesses since Christmas Eve, and has 
released and redeemed her from this vessel of fear. Together with friends and relations, I 
have decided to bring her blessed corpse to burial, as is the custom (üblichen brauch nach) 
on Sunday 3 January and wish my dear brother and sister-in-law to attend this final show of 
respect and Christian duty. I also wish to convey my brotherly request that you both come to 
our late mother’s house tomorrow or the following day, if possible, at the eleventh hour to 
pay your last respects. I would much rather be of service to my dear brother and my sister-in-
law under happier circumstances than this tearful occasion and faithfully commend them, 
together with ourselves, to the divine protection of the Almighty.
The recipient, Johann Zechendorff (1580–1662), was headmaster of the Latin 
school in nearby Zwickau, where the letter is now preserved in his Nachlass at the 
Zwickau Ratsschulbibliothek.2
1 Old Style.
2 Ratsschulbibliothek Zwickau (RSBZ) MS 172.6 fol. 38r-v. Meine willige Dienste neben Wun-
schung von Gott dem Allmächtigen eines glückligen, friedt vndt freudenreichen neuen Jahres 
frisches gesundten heiles sambt aller ersprießlichkeit an leib vndt seele bevorn EhrenvehsterAcht-
barer vndt wohlgelehrter herr bruder, so wohl auch Erbare vndt Ehrentugendsamer frau Schwäger-
in, Derenselben kann ich aus betrübtem hertzen nicht vorhalten, wie Gott der Allmächtige nach 
seinen geheimen vndt allein weisen rath unsere liebe mutter nach ihrer großen vndt vielfältigen 
leibes schwachhait am heiligen Abendt iungst als 31 Decembris zu abendt umb 6 hora auß dieser 
welt abgefordert vndt aus den angst karren ausgespannet vndt erlöset. Wann i[c]h dann neben 
den andern freunden vndt Muhmen gänzlichen entschlossen bin, solches ihren seeligen leichnam 
künfftigen Sontag als den 3 Januarij üblichen brauch nach zur erdten bestatten zu laßen, vndt 
aber den L[ieben] bruder sampt der fraw Schwägering ganz gerne bey solcher lezten ehrerzeigung 
vndt christlichen dienste ganz gerne sehen wißen vndt haben wollte, als glanget an dieselben mein 
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Death notices and invitations to funerals are not an obvious place for histori-
ans to search for manifestations of religious individualisation. Read almost four 
hundred years later, the baker’s letter to his brother offers us one of those archi-
val moments when persons, long dead and forgotten, are ‘given a voice’. Yet the 
relevance of this voice to the present publication may seem far from obvious. The 
baker of Schneeberg was inviting his brother to their mother’s funeral. Whether or 
not the latter attended (we do not know), there is no reason to assume that the cer-
emony and the expressions of grief and solace surrounding Anna Zechendorff’s 
death would have been performed and expressed in any fashion other than in 
conformity with seventeenth-century Lutheran practice. Through the accident of 
preservation among his brother’s papers, Zacharias Zechendorff’s voice has been 
preserved – in itself no mean achievement, as seventeenth-century bakers rarely 
leave a paper trail other than in parish registers and occasional legal records and 
wills. Unlike the doomed Meursault of Albert Camus’ L’Étranger, the baker’s reac-
tion to his mother’s death was embedded in a belonging to his society and its 
ritual and emotional norms. In terms of religious sentiment, his intention and 
wording, though personal, are unoriginal – nor was he aiming at originality or 
individualisation in any meaningful sense.
For the present inquiry, it is the recipient of the letter who is of interest. 
Johann Zechendorff, Zacharias’ elder brother, was headmaster of the Latin school 
in Zwickau from 1617 until his death at the age of eighty-one in 1662. While his 
younger brother has subsided into posthumous oblivion, Johann Zechendorff has 
fared slightly better. In his fiftieth year, when he received the letter, the Zwickau 
schoolmaster was a respected, albeit minor, member of the Republic of Letters. 
He was, at the time, the author of several short works but above all was an enthu-
siastic student of oriental languages. A brief account of his scholarly pursuits will 
suffice, in order to shed light on this case of scholarship and religious individu-
alisation.3
brüderlich vndt schwägerlich bitten, wo es muglichen, sich morgen, oder folgendtes Tages umb 11 
hora in der mutter seeligen behausung einzustellen, vndt Jhr inn diesen den letzten ehren dienst er-
zeigen vndt beweisen, [fol. 38v] worfür ich dann den L[ieben] Bruder vndt frau Schwägering, iedoch 
lieber in frölichern, als solchen betrübten zustandt dienstwillig vndt sie neben uns allen Göttlicher 
protection vndt Allmacht ganz treulichen befehle. Datum Schneberg Den 1 Jan: A 1630. / Der L[iebe] 
Bruder / Williger / Zacharias Zechendorff / Bürger vndt Becker / Daselbst.
3 The following short account of Zechendorff’s life is a much abridged version of that offered in 
Ben-Tov 2017a.
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2  Johann Zechendorff: a seventeenth-century 
schoolmaster and Arabist
Johann Zechendorff was born in 1580 in the Saxon town of Lößnitz in the 
Erzgebirge. His father, Michael Zechendorff, was a school teacher (in Lößnitz and 
later in nearby Schneeberg) and his mother Anna, née Hannauer, was the daugh-
ter of the mayor of Schwarzenberg. After the death of Zechendorff’s father she 
remarried (Melzer 1716, 581). At first tutored by his father, Zechendorff commenced 
his studies at a series of Latin schools at the age of nineteen, visiting Aschersle-
ben, Braunschweig, Eisleben, and the Latin school in Zerbst, before being recalled 
back home by his father. It seems that it was at the Latin school in Schneeberg that 
Zechendorff made his first significant acquaintance with oriental languages stud-
ying Hebrew, Aramaic, and Syriac. An acquaintance with Arabic, which was to 
prove his great passion, came only when he was in his early forties. After studying 
in Leipzig (1604–1608) he was appointed in 1610 as co-rector of the Latin school in 
Schneeberg, becoming its headmaster in 1614. In 1617 he was invited to head the 
municipal Latin school in Zwickau, where he remained headmaster for the rest 
of his long life, although in his final years he does not seem to have attended in 
person. At his death in 1662 he was survived by his second wife, Marien-Salome, 
née Götsen, but by none of his children. After some dealings, Zechendorff was suc-
ceeded as headmaster by his former pupil Christian Daum (1613–1687), a promi-
nent scholar and pedagogue in his own right (Mahnke 2001; Ross 2015).
When Zechendorff assumed his post in Zwickau in 1617 he does not seem 
to have known any Arabic. His first works, extant in manuscript, deal with the 
instruction of Latin and bear the unlikely titles Methodus Cabbalistica, and Cab-
balah Nova-Antiqua. Despite appearances, these dry manuals have nothing to do 
with Jewish mysticism but with a stringently systematic instruction of Latin, in 
the firm belief that such an approach would enable its swift and easy acquisi-
tion (schnell und leichtlich as Zechendorff puts it in his German writings). Though 
instruction in oriental languages was occasionally offered at German Latin 
schools4 – mostly Hebrew, with occasional instruction in Aramaic (Chaldean), 
and Syriac – Zechendorff’s belated but enthusiastic discovery of Arabic and its 
instruction in Zwickau are exceptional. It is to his study of Arabic, and of the 
Koran in particular, that Zechendorff owed his reputation in the seventeenth- 
century Republic of Letters. In 1638 he published his Specimen Suratarum, the 
Arabic text of two short Suras (61 and 78) with an interlinear Latin translation and 
brief commentary, followed several years later by two further short Suras (101 and 
4 See Ben-Tov 2017b for the Gymnasium Illustre in Hamburg.
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103) accompanied by a commentary based on the thirteenth-century Tafsir by 
Nāṣīr al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar al-Bayḍāwī.5 These slim publications may seem 
unimposing to modern Arabists. However, they were a pioneering undertaking in 
an age when the Arabic text of the entire Koran was available in Europe only in 
manuscript (and these, for most scholars, not easily obtainable) and European 
students of Arabic like Zechendorff in Zwickau had very little in the way of refer-
ence books, with the important exception of Thomas Erpenius’ Arabic grammar 
of 1613. Not surprisingly, Zwickau presses were not in possession of Arabic types. 
Instead of producing the Arabic text of Koranic specimens in Hebrew translitera-
tion – a common practice among orientalists at the time – Zechendorff had one of 
his pupils prepare wooden types for him. 
There is much to say about these two slim and pioneering scholarly publica-
tions (see Ben-Tov 2017a and 2017c); in the present context it will suffice to note 
that Zechendorff claimed in his correspondence to have translated the Koran in 
its entirety and that he had not been able to find a patron willing to pay for its 
publication. Clearly, Zechendorff’s patrons had more urgent concerns on their 
mind during the Thirty Years War, which ravaged Saxony, and Zwickau in par-
ticular, whilst the town’s schoolmaster was busy studying the ‘Turkish bible’. 
Zechendorff occasionally mentions this complete Latin translation of the Koran 
to fellow scholars but it remained unpublished and, to the best of my knowledge, 
does not seem to have had an impact on contemporaries – if any indeed had read 
it. This led me, initially, to treat his claim with seasoned scepticism. A full Latin 
translation of the Koran, made directly from the Arabic original, whatever its phil-
ological merits, would have been a remarkable achievement at the time and was 
unlikely to disappear without a trace. The Zwickau schoolmaster, I thought, was 
neither the first nor the last scholar to exaggerate his scholarly achievements. I 
was wrong. Zechendorff’s claim has recently been vindicated with Roberto Tot-
toli’s discovery of the bilingual (Arabic/Latin) Koran manuscript held today at 
the Egyptian National Library and Archives in Cairo (Tottoli 2015).6 Zechendorff’s 
translations of the four short Suras and his several other published works repre-
sent only a modest portion of his scholarly output. If we wish to understand his 
scholarship in situ and gauge its significance for an understanding of the possibil-
ities of religious individualisation opened up by early modern erudition, we must 
turn to his manuscript Nachlass held at the Zwickau Ratsschulbibliothek. With 
this in mind, we return now to the letter he received from his brother in January 
1630 informing him of their mother’s departure.
5 Ben-Tov 2017a, 2017c; on the broader context see Malcolm 2012.
6 I am grateful to Roberto Tottoli for kindly allowing me access to a copy of this manuscript.
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3 Scholarship and religious individualisation
The relevance of this letter to the question of religious individualisation becomes 
apparent when one views the manuscript itself rather than a ‘clean’ transcript 
of its content. Like so many other letters addressed to him, Johann Zechendorff 
adorned the original with marginalia. The letter with its sad tidings reached Zech-
endorff about four years after he had acquired his own copy of the Koran. As 
mentioned above, this was no trivial acquisition. Until the printing of the Arabic 
text of the Koran by the Hamburg pastor Abraham Hinckelmann in 1694 and the 
epochal bilingual commentated edition by the Roman priest Ludovico Marracci 
four years later, European scholars wishing to study the Koran in the original had 
to procure a manuscript. There were various routes allowing for such acquisition, 
ranging from spoils from wars with the Ottoman Empire to trade in the Levant. 
We do not know how Zechendorff acquired his own copy. We do know, from com-
ments he makes in passing in his works, that he had purchased it at great cost 
– an enormous investment for a badly paid schoolmaster. Regrettably, this copy 
is no longer to be found in Zwickau. We may assume either that Zechendorff sold 
it in his later years or that it was later sold by the school library, which had inher-
ited his papers. Koran manuscripts in seventeenth-century Europe were valuable 
and, since the early modern study of the Koran in Zwickau did not outlive Zech-
endorff, there must have seemed little point in allowing an expensive codex to 
gather dust. On receiving the letter from his brother, his first Koranic publication 
was still eight years in the future (1638) but Zechendorff was already immersed in 
its study. At the bottom of the letter’s first page, he noted in Arabic:
[…] He hath guided this woman on the road of the righteous and she believed in Allah ‘Isa 
and sought refuge in him.
And further down:
He, in His mercy, helped her from this world into the Hereafter. And therefore, O all ye 
Turks, and O People of the Scripture, do not commit excess in your religion and do not say 
of Allah except the truth.
These Arabic notes are in fact a medley of paraphrased Koranic verses. What 
catches the eye at first glance is Zechendorff’s assertion that the deceased woman 
believed in Allah and sought refuge in him, amended in an afterthought to ‘Isa 
(the Arabic for Jesus). Of particular interest is also the closing exhortations to 
‘all ye Turks’ to say nothing but the truth about God. This is a thinly disguised 
paraphrase of the Koranic verse 4:171: ‘People of the Book, do not transgress the 
bounds of your religion. Speak nothing but the truth about God. The Messiah, 
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Jesus son of Mary, was no more than God’s apostle and His Word which He cast to 
Mary: a spirit from Him’.7 Sura 4, from which he was paraphrasing, is entitled The 
Women and opens, appropriately, with a call on believers to treat orphans justly. 
Zechendorff, it will be remembered, had just become an orphan himself – albeit 
a middle-aged one. Sura 4:171 is one of the central anti-Christian verses in the 
Koran, calling on the people of the Scripture (ahl al-kitāb), here meaning Chris-
tians, to not commit falsehoods about God, and thus not to claim that the pious 
prophet Jesus of Nazareth was the son of God, and to desist from referring to the 
Godhead as three-fold – unthinkable blasphemies from a Koranic point of view. 
Scribbled on the invitation to his mother’s funeral, Zechendorff turns the tables 
on the original verse by calling the ‘Turks’ (a common Early Modern metonym for 
Muslims) to claim nothing but the truth about God – for a pious Lutheran a call to 
recognise Incarnation and the Trinity. If this was a dialogue with Muslims, it was 
one confined to the schoolmaster’s own mind, a note penned on the notice of his 
mother’s death. Above all, this and countless other notes in Arabic, made for per-
sonal edification, reveal that Zechendorff’s study of the Koran, his visiting-card 
to the Republic of Letters, also had a personal and devotional aspect to it.
To stress the obvious: I am not suggesting that Zechendorff was in any way a 
crypto-Muslim nor that his enthusiastic and pioneering study of the Koran was 
an outlet for heterodox convictions or practices – e.g. an implicit endorsement of 
the antitrinitarian teachings of his Socinian contemporaries (cf. Mulsow 2010). 
The evidence we have suggests that he was a conformant seventeenth-century 
Lutheran, that he never intended to be anything else, nor was he mistaken for 
anything else by his contemporaries. And yet, when one examines his manu-
scripts, it becomes clear that his preoccupation with the Koran was (also) of a 
devotional nature – Lutheran but unconventional and profoundly individual.
There is more to this than a clever scribble by a self-taught Arabist. A com-
prehensive study of Zechendorff’s Arabic marginalia and palimpsests, mostly in 
the letters preserved among his papers, may shed further light on his scholarship 
and its uses. It can here be noted that in some cases, as with the letter informing 
him of his mother’s death, the Arabic notes are directly related to the content of 
the letter, while in other cases (probably most) he seems simply to be making 
use of free space on the letter page and unused versos. A case in point for the 
latter are his extensive Arabic quotes from the Arabic New Testament, preserved 
over numerous verso-pages of letters he received – beginning with Matthew 12:6, 
7 All quotes from the Koran are taken from the English translation of N. J. Dawood 20062.
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Jesus’ critique of the Pharisees and their ‘hypocrisies’ (Ms 172.6 fol. 110).8 In the 
same palimpsested letter convolute, we find Zechendorff paraphrasing Sura 33:1: 
‘Prophet, have fear of God and do not yield to the unbelievers and the hypocrites’. 
Ending with an Arabic paraphrase that lends the verse a Christian twist by reaf-
firming the Incarnation, this pious paraphrase is headed by the Latin title Alco-
ranus Christianus (Ms 172.6 fol. 70r). Elsewhere, in the margins of an invitation 
to a wedding, we find a passionate address calling on the Jews (ahl al-yahūd) in 
 pseudo-Koranic Arabic to embrace Jesus Christ as their saviour. Such outpour-
ings of Christian piety scribbled on letters and ephemeral notes can, quite liter-
ally, be expanded a hundred-fold.
4 The Koran and Lutheran personal edification
Both in his miscellaneous notes, as well in works published and unpublished 
alike, the Zwickau schoolmaster is unequivocal in his commitment to his native 
Lutheranism and there is no reason to question the sincerity of his rejection of the 
Koran’s antitrinitarian teaching. Yet his papers also reveal the profound affinity 
he felt to the Koran – if not to portions of its teaching then to its forceful expres-
sions of monotheistic piety. Time and again we find Zechendorff marvelling at 
the language of the Koran and its expressive religious prowess.9 It is clear that he 
found Arabic, which he taught himself in his early forties, a congenial medium 
for expressing religious sentiment. Paraphrasing Koranic verses as expressions 
of Lutheran piety was something of a preoccupation of his and his papers also 
reveal his fondness for quoting the New Testament in Arabic. Most of all, we find 
him formulating his own prayers and rambling meditations in Arabic, ranging 
from a few sentences jotted down in the margins of invitations to weddings (and 
bearing no apparent relevance to the invitations) to religious ‘essays’ spanning 
the versos of several letters.
Zechendorff’s discovery of Arabic and the bulk of his work as an orientalist 
coincided with the miseries of the Thirty Years War to which the inhabitants of 
Zwickau were repeatedly subjected – fighting accompanied by hunger and out-
breaks of the plague (Herzog 1845). A virulent bubonic outbreak in 1626 claimed 
8 The Arabic version of the New Testament was published in 1616 by the great Dutch Arabist 
Thomas Erpenius, Novum D.N. Iesu Christi Testamentum Arabice (Leiden, 1616).
9 From Zechendorff’s comments elsewhere it is clear that he was also well aware of the poetical 
nature of the Koran. For the European discovery of the Koran as a work of religious poetry, see 
Loop 2009.
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the lives of 375 victims and occasioned an order from the Saxon Elector Johann 
Georg I for weekly penitential sermons and Catechism exams for adults as well as 
schoolchildren (Herzog 1845, 409).
Zechendorff’s elaborate response to one bubonic outbreak, possibly that of 
1626, is preserved in his Nachlass. Convinced, like many contemporaries, that 
the plague was an expression of divine wrath, the pious schoolmaster turned 
his attention to the Seven Penitential Psalms, which he read with his pupils in 
numerous languages. At the time, Zechendorff was offering Arabic lessons and 
was eager to introduce his pupils to the style and vocabulary of the Koran.10 
This outpouring of piety at a time of dire affliction coupled with the eagerness 
of a learned Arabist to offer his pupils instruction in this language – a rarity at 
Europe’s great centres of learning in the early seventeenth century, let alone at a 
Latin school! – gave birth to a striking work which was never published, and in 
all likelihood was never meant for publication: An Arabic paraphrase of the seven 
penitential psalms, i.e. in the style of and taken from the system of the Quran, which 
contains CXIII chapters,11 or rather from the Arab Cicero and in the Ismaelitic and 
regal Solomonic language: in pure and unadulterated speech set down rhythmically, 
with an interlinear Latin translation for the benefit of German students of Arabic, 
to allow them an easier access to the Quran.12 Zechendorff’s German introduction 
to the work makes it clear that it is meant as a work of scholarship. He quotes 
some of the great scholars of his day, most notably the Leiden Arabist Thomas 
Erpenius, states his disagreement with others, and positions his work within the 
broader context of European scholarship since Robert of Ketton’s twelfth-century 
translation of the Koran. Zechendorff was a fully-fledged member of the Repub-
lic of Letters and not unreasonably proud of his achievements. Yet at the same 
time, his ‘Koranic paraphrase’ of the Penitential Psalms, is clearly a devotional 
work, which fits in perfectly with his devotional Arabic practices scribbled at the 
margins of countless letters and notes.
As with almost all contemporary Europeans writing on the Koran, Zechen-
dorff opens the introduction to the paraphrased Penitential Psalms with some 
10 Possibly in private lessons (collegia privata).
11 This is a rare slip. As Zechendorff knew, the Quran has 114 chapters. In an undated letter to 
the Jena Orientalist Johann Ernst Gerhard the Elder (1621–1668), Zechendorff even offered an 
analysis of the short concluding Sura. Forschungsbibliothek Gotha (FBG) Chart. B. 451, fol. 132r.
12 Septem Psalmorum poenitentialium Para-Phrasis Arabica id est stylo, & ex Alcorani Systemate 
quod cxiii capita continet sive ex Cicerone Arabico & Ismaelitica atque Lingua Salomonis regia: 
puris, merisque Loquutionibus appronatis Rhythmice [marg. add. Cum versione interlineari Latina] 
In Usum Arabicantium Germanorum: ut ad Alcorani Lectionem Aditus facilior patescat. Diligenti 
Lectione ac Meditatione a Iohanne Zechendorff LLarum Orientalium Cultore Conscripta.
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hostile comments. He notes that there is more eloquence (Reden v[nd] Wortt) and 
substance (Res oder Realia) in the Psalter than in the ‘monotone droning’ of the 
‘book of the deluded Muhammad’ (a book, it will be remembered, which he was 
studying intensively in those years). This stands in contrast to his subsequent 
assurance that the paraphrase, using Quranic verses as mosaic stones, ‘[…] is 
magnificently beautiful and ornate, set and recited in the regal Arabic tongue, 
as it [Arabic] is attributed to King Solomon, as its inventor, through the wisdom 
with which he was endowed by God. So, for the sake of this language, it is not to 
be contemned’.13
At the bottom of each page, Zechendorff quotes the ‘paraphrased’ psalm 
verse in Luther’s German rather than in the original, stressing, to my understand-
ing, the devotional nature of the work – he was certainly capable of quoting the 
psalter in the original Hebrew had he wished to. This is accompanied by several 
couplets of rhyming Arabic verses (made up by Zechendorff but attempting to 
emulate Koranic verses, sometimes using common Koranic phrases) which more 
or less approximate the tenor of each verse of the Penitential Psalms. To this is 
added an interlinear Latin translation.14 The resulting unpublished work was a 
mixture of devotional literature (however unusual) and an unconventional text-
book to help pupils better understand the difficult language of the Koran – in 
itself an uncommon pedagogical goal in seventeenth-century Saxony!15 The work, 
not surprisingly, was never printed nor am I acquainted with any  contemporary 
or later references to it. Despite the didactic background, the  carefully written 
and nicely bound octavo volume has the air of a work of private devotion to it. 
 Zechendorff’s contemporaries, whether Protestant or Catholic, would have cer-
tainly understood the appeal of the Penitential Psalms – what is remarkable is 
that the Zwickau headmaster saw in the Koran, or in its phraseology, a kindred 
spirit which, to his mind, well expressed the sentiment, if not the content, of these 
Psalms. Nor is this elaborate work an isolated case. Thus, in writing to console 
the Marburg pastor Georg Teucher, whose wife Maria (a relative of  Zechendorff’s) 
had died in childbirth in 1654, Zechendorff concludes with a ‘Koranic para-
phrase’ of Ps. 40.17: ‘But I am poor and needy; yet the Lord thinketh upon me: 
thou art my help and my deliverer; make no tarrying, O my God’. He quotes in 
Arabic (in Hebrew  transliteration) and in Latin translation what purport to be 
13 Ibid. fol. 220v. Aber will es herlich schön, v. zierlich nach Arabischer königlicher Sprach / wie 
sie denn dem könig Salomoni, als dem Erfinder, nach seiner vom Gott verliehenen Weißheitt, zug-
eschrieben wirdt / gesetzet, v. geredetdt, so ist es der Sprachen halben, an ihr selbsten nicht zuver-
werffen.
14 For a consideration of an example of this, see Ben-Tov 2017a, 58–60.
15 Septem Psalmorum poenitentialium Para-Phrasis Arabica, 223v.
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 corresponding snippets from Suras 59:33 and 25, which, arranged together, read 
‘My misery lies heavily upon me, but my Lord prepares a feast in my honour. In 
him I have a guide. He suffices me as helper’.16 Further Arabic quotes from the 
Psalter are scattered among Zechendorff’s myriad notes (e.g. Ms 172.6 fol. 98r) and 
in the margins of his unpublished bilingual Koran there are numerous references 
to Psalm verses.
A further expression of Zechendorff’s unusual approach to the Koran is 
offered by his first publication on the topic: a festive Latin oration he delivered 
at a graduation ceremony at the Latin school on 13 August 1627, with the title 
Fabulae Muhammedicae sive nugae Alcorani (Mohammedan Fables, or the Trifles 
of the Koran). The work offers a summary of and commentary on a number of 
episodes in the Koran that relate stories also known from the Old Testament. Both 
the account of the Koranic episodes and the schoolmaster’s comment on them are 
delivered in Latin hexameter.17
The ostensible purpose of this work was to expose the mendacities of the 
Koran by presenting its version of several Old Testament events, in Latin verse, 
and pointing out the discrepancies. It is, however, hard to overlook the fact 
that most of the ‘lies’ Zechendorff excoriates are fairly trivial – e.g. censuring 
the unbiblical appearance of a raven in the Koranic account of Cain and Abel 
(5:27–31). Such instances arguably do more to stress what the Biblical and Koranic 
accounts have in common. It is also noteworthy that Zechendorff avoids here the 
numerous passages in the Koran which offer a religious point of view genuinely 
and significantly different from the understanding of religion he shared with his 
Zwickau audience. In the introduction, he likens the Koran to a work of orien-
tal tapestry, striking in its colourful splendour and the variegated material from 
which it is woven.18 Put less colourfully, the Koran for Zechendorff was a medley 
16 Miseria mea gravis mihi! Sed parat escsm honorem Dominus meus, mihi in eo director, sufficit 
ipse mihi auxiliator. באסי שדידן לי אלא אעתר אלרזק אלכרים רבי לי בה האדיאן כַפי הַו לי נציראן. Zechen-
dorff ends his condolences with a similar exercise on Ps. 4.17: ‘I will both lay me down in peace, 
and sleep: for thou, Lord, only makest me dwell in safety’, excerpting verses from Suras 7, 18 
and 12.
17 A charming reminder of the immediate context, i.e. a graduation ceremony attended by local 
notables but also by talkative teenagers, is offered by Zechendorff’s final remark before em-
barking on the first ‘fable’. Ibid. B2v. Has ego dum refero strepera dictante Minerva/ Omnes nunc 
faveant, sint tranquillissima tecta:/ Garrula lingua suam non intermisceat odam.
18 Ibid. A2v. Quod sunt perstromata Babylonica, sive ut vocant tapetes Turcici, varietate quipped 
colorum a Phrygionibus variegate & aucupicti: Jllud etiam est ALCORANUS ARABICUS, sive Liber 
ille, ex quo Turcae verbum Dei, & suam Religionem se haurire sibi persuasum haben; per quem pie 
& honeste hic vivere gestiunt, & quo in tandem creduli se beari confidunt.
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of truth and falsehoods.19 True to form, the work is prefaced by an impassioned 
address to Muslims in Arabic and Latin, much akin to Zechendorff’s marginal 
note to the letter of 1630 informing him of his mother’s death:
O Turks and Arabs! If only you would separate that which is false from the book which you 
study, which are the fabulous parts, I have shown to you, and have written it down for you 
in Latin. [If you do so] you shall live in uprightness and shall be united with us in faith.20
The sentiment may have been sincere but at the same time I am not aware of any 
evidence to suggest that Zechendorff ever engaged in any missionary effort what-
soever or had any real interest in so doing. Apart from the obvious fact that con-
verting Muslims would have been an unlikely undertaking in  seventeenth-century 
Zwickau, if this piece of metric rhetoric were composed with an eye to proselyt-
ing, even beyond war- and plague-ridden Saxony, he would not have composed 
it in Latin hexameters. What captivated Zechendorff here were the parallels and 
affinities between the Koran and the Bible. This line of thought also informed his 
bilingual edition of and commentary on Suras 61 and 78 (1638). In the commen-
tary to these short Koranic chapters, he offers an assessment of the truth value 
of each verse, depending on its conformity to teachings in the Christian Bible. In 
itself a standard way for seventeenth-century Christian scholars to study Islam 
(and indeed any foreign religion), what is striking is the considerable number of 
‘Christian truths’ Zechendorff claims to have found in these two Suras. 
Several years later Zechendorff would discover the importance of Muslim 
commentaries to the understanding of the Koran and would publish a further 
Koranic specimen, availing himself of the thirteenth-century commentary by 
Bayḍāwī, which he had recently obtained. This in itself is a significant develop-
ment in his scholarship but his sustained fascination with the Koran, which is 
attested repeatedly in his manuscripts, was based rather on a sense of affinity 
than on a desire to study Islam in its own terms. 
We turn finally to Zechendorff’s most ambitious work, his unpublished trans-
lation of the entire Koran, recently discovered by Roberto Tottoli (Tottoli 2015; 
Glei 2016). An in-depth analysis of Zechendorff’s approach to the task of translat-
ing the Koran is the subject of an ongoing research project in Bochum (Glei 2016). 
19 Ibid. Sic modo vera & sana invenimus posita: modo falsa & mendacijs referta, nulloque sensus 
acumine aut argumentorum pondere, quod hominem Christianum vel leviter movere possit instruc-
ta: modo fabulosa atque absona veris sunt immista; modo de his, modo de illis confuse agens 
nomina tractat. [...] Jllis omnibus hactenus in authentico, & autographo quodam Manuscripto Ar-
abico cognitis a me eius gratia primum, ut linguam Arabicam aliquot modo (quum meo cortice 
natandum, viva Praeceptoris voce, destitute) familiarem mihi redderem.
20 Ibid. A4v. 
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The volume comprises the Arabic text, carefully copied out by Zechendorff, along 
with his interlinear Latin translation. The manuscript volume also contains a 
fair number of marginalia in the schoolmaster’s distinctive handwriting. Many 
are of a philological nature, while others bear witness to a more personal, even 
devotional, reading. I would like to conclude with a brief consideration of a few 
instances. 
The volume opens with several passages from other works of scholarship, 
which Zechendorff copied in his own hand by way of a preface to his ambitious 
work. Among these, interestingly, is a lengthy quote from Martin Luther’s Table 
Talk, in which the Reformer discusses his translation of the Old Testament from 
Hebrew to German, stressing that ‘I am no Hebrew according to grammar and 
rules’ and that knowledge of languages was not in itself sufficient for the art of 
translation, which Luther sees as a particular divine gift and grace.21 What this 
is meant to indicate to readers about Zechendorff’s Koran translation is open to 
speculation. 
Not surprisingly, most of Zechendorff’s marginalia to his Latin Koran trans-
lation are themselves in Latin. The few exceptions deserve special attention. One 
such we find in the margins alongside the opening verses of the fourth Sura (The 
Women): 
You people! Have fear of your Lord, who created you from a single soul. From that soul 
He created its spouse and through them He bestrewed the earth with countless men and 
women. Fear God, in whose name you plead with one another, and honour the mothers who 
bore you. God is ever watching you.22 
Zechendorff added a German paraphrase in the margin: Ihr sollt Gott anbeten mitt 
forcht. Er hatt den ersten Mann erschaffen v[nd] von ihm das erste Weib, daher 
21 Luther, Tischreden: Ich binn kein Ebreer nach der Grammatica v. Regeln, denn ich las Mich 
 nirgent anbinden, sondern Ich gehe frey hindurch, Wenn einer gleich die Gabe der Sprachen hatt, 
v. verstehet sie, doch kann Er darumb nicht eine in die ander so bald bringen vnd wohl verdolmet-
schen. Dolmetschen ist ein solderliche Gnad vnd Gabe Gottes. Die 70. Griechische  Dolmetscher/ 
so die Ebreische Bibel in die Griechische Sprach bracht haben sin im Ebreischen vnverfahren 
und vngeübt gewest/ ihr Dolmetschen ist sehr leppisch vnd vngereimpt / denn sie haben die 
 Buchstaben / Wort vnd art zu reden verachtet / also/ das auch S. Hieronymi Versio vnd Verdolmet-
schen ihnen fürzuziehen ist. Wiewohl wer Hieronymum für ein Ebreer schilt / der thut ihm gewalt 
vnd vnrecht. Denn nach der Babylonischen Gefengnis ist diese Sprach so corrumpiert vnd verderbt/ 
das man sie nicht at widerumb können zu recht bringen/ Wenn Moses vnd die Propheten jetzt wider 
 aufferstünden / so würden sie ihre wort / wie sie jetzund verdrehet sind / selbs nicht verstehehn.
22 Zechendorff translates this as: Eja homines, timete Dominum vestrum, qui vos creavit ex anima 
sola & creavit ex illa conjugem suam & & diffudit ex illis duob[us] viros multos & mulieres ergo co-
lite Dominum quem petietis/interrogabitis [] eo & matrices nam DEUS est vobis explorator.
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ihr alle herkommet, derwegen sollet ihr nicht hartt, noch vndanckbar sein gegen 
Ewern weibern, v[nd] weill gott v[nd] die engell den Waisen günstig sein, so sollet 
ihr Euch dieselben befohlen sein lassen. Esst von den ewrigen, v[nd] nicht von dem, 
das ihnen zu gehöret, thut – here Zechendorff breaks off in mid sentence.
A tiny note scribbled in German over the title of Sura 70 is easily overlooked 
but instructive. Sura 70 (Al-Maʽārij, The ladder/ascending stairways) describes 
the Day of Judgment, with the evil doers’ punishment and the reward of the just 
recounted after calling on believers to be patient (‘Therefore conduct yourself 
with becoming patience. They think the Day of Judgment is far off: but We see it 
near at hand’ 70:5–7). Over the Sura’s title, Zechendorff jotted a note in miniscule 
German: Wie lang muß einer haben ehe er gen himmel steigt (How long must one 
wait, before one may ascend to heaven). This was probably added by an infirm, 
world-weary Zechendorff in his old age. Zechendorff, it is worth remembering, 
lived to be eighty-one – a feat of uncommon longevity in the seventeenth century. 
At his funeral in February 1662, his eulogiser, the Zwickau superintendent Got-
tfried Siegmund Peißker, admitted that Zechendorff no longer attended the Latin 
school in his final years but stayed at home praying all day, a sign of spiritual 
vitality in Peißker’s eyes. Was Zechendorff pouring over his unpublished magnum 
opus as an act of the individualised piety of an unusual Lutheran Arabist? The 
countless pious ruminations scribbled in pseudo-Koranic Arabic on the versos 
of letters he had accumulated over the years suggest that at least some of the old 
schoolmaster’s prayers, uttered while impatiently awaiting his ascent to Heaven, 
were spoken in Arabic.
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Islamic mystical responses to hegemonic 
orthodoxy: the subcontinental perspective
1 Setting the scene 
From the early thirteenth century down to the 1830s, Persian was the official 
language in major parts of the Indian subcontinent despite the fact that most 
common people could not read or write this classical language. Paradoxically, 
and despite its elite dimensions, as a linguistic and cultural phenomenon Persian 
posed a challenge to the hegemonic orthodoxy that revolved around Arabic, the 
language of religion (Islam). Indeed, the Sultans of Delhi, who were mostly of 
Turkic or Afghan origin (note that the Afghan language enjoys a striking simi-
larity to Persian), realised the potential of Persian for use as a quasi-secular and 
flexible language. Later on, Akbar, the greatest Mughal Emperor (Mughals were 
originally Turks), also tried to check the ascendancy of ambitious Turks and the 
Arabic-knowing ulama (Muslim clergy) by patronising Persian. In this context, 
it is useful to remember that the Sufis who migrated to medieval India were pri-
marily Turks and Persians. The Sufis were well versed in both Persian and Arabic 
but they mainly wrote in Persian and composed their Sufi music (Sama) in the 
same language, in order to make themselves intelligible to the ruling elite (both 
Muslims and non-Muslims), who knew Persian due to its role as the official lan-
guage. This convergence of imperial and Islamic mystical endeavours marked the 
triumph of Persianate tradition, which represented heterogeneity, as opposed to 
the process of Arabisation, which is often associated with homogenising propen-
sities (compare the Arabisation of North Africa with subcontinental Persianate 
traditions). 
This paper aims to contextualise and analyse some leading Persian texts 
(such as Akhbar ul Akhyar, which appeared in the sixteenth century, and Safinat 
ul Awliya and Majma-ul-Bahrain, both from the seventeenth century) in order to 
explore elements of the implicit, and at times explicit, challenges posed to the 
hegemonic orthodoxy, which was often identified with the Arabisation process. 
We are not using the term Arabisation here exclusively in the linguistic sense. 
Rather, the term is used to represent a religious-cultural process with homoge-
nising propensities that are contrasted with the Mughal cosmopolitanism asso-
ciated with Persianate tradition. In the eighteenth century, with the decline of 
Mughal political power, we notice the resurgence of the hegemonic orthodoxy 
which launched its assault against the Persianate tradition and against aspects of 
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the mystical traditions allegedly associated with it. Paradoxically, the assault was 
not exclusively exogenous, because some of the very products of the Persianate 
tradition, such as Shah Waliullah of Delhi, became critical of the tradition and 
gravitated towards reform based on ‘Arabisation’. Such individuals believed that 
the Persianate tradition and aspects of the related mystical traditions contributed 
to the decline of Mughal political power and the degeneration of Muslim society 
throughout the subcontinent.
In the subcontinent, Friday prayers, centring around the mosques, are char-
acterised by the overwhelming visibility of males. In other words, hegemonic 
orthodoxy is also represented by a form of masculinity. The gatherings in Sufi 
shrines, by contrast, are characterised by the presence of women and children, 
(both Muslims and non-Muslims) the marginalised elements in society. Indeed, 
mystical traditions often represent feminine dimensions in predominantly mas-
culine cultures. Unlike the scripture- or mosque-based hegemonic orthodoxy, 
mystical traditions placed emphasis on the local symbols of Islam, such as the 
Sufi shrine, veneration of Sufi saints, pilgrimage to the local shrine (as if com-
peting with the universal annual pilgrimage to Mecca), etc. In the Persian texts 
mentioned above (also known under the broad categories of tazkira, or Sufi hag-
iography, and malfuzat, or table talks involving a Sufi saint), we notice the rep-
resentation of the mothers or daughters of illustrious Sufi saints as pious ladies. 
We also notice women acting as Sufis themselves (pirani). Many of these pious 
women are shown as possessing the power to perform miracles (keramat) or to 
shower blessings (Baraka) on their disciples. As a counterpart of the ulama (Male 
Muslim clergy), they were even entrusted with the sacred job of disseminating 
knowledge relating to ethics (Akhlaq literature) and right conduct or behaviour 
(Adab) among the masses. This newfound role for women in the practice of 
Muslim piety was unique and is an example of the individualisation of religious 
experience.
However, we should not exaggerate the role of this individualisation process 
as this experience was very much restricted to a small number of special women 
who occupied lofty positions in the mystical hierarchy and, hence, could easily 
be distinguished from ordinary women or the masses. The legitimising process 
involving these special women or spiritual elites is interesting. For example, their 
genealogy is often traced from the Sayyids, or the Prophet’s family. Or at least 
they were depicted as the mothers, sisters, or daughters of illustrious male Sufis. 
In Weberian terms, these elite women enjoyed both hereditary and acquired cha-
risma, which easily differentiated them from the masses of devotees. In the for-
mation of this counter-hierarchical setup, which posed a challenge to the mascu-
line hegemonic orthodoxy, we therefore notice a de-individualisation of religious 
experience.
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2  Abdul Haq Muhaddis Dehlawi: a theologian Sufi 
or a Sufi theologian?
Shaikh Abdul Haq Muhaddis Dehlawi (1551–1663) was one of the most illustri-
ous scholar-sufis (alim-sufi) of Mughal India. He compiled Akhbar ul Akhiyar (in 
Persian), which is recognised as a leading source on South Asian Sufism.1 His 
name gives us a first insight into his life. We can see that he was based in Delhi 
(Dehlawi) and that he was well versed in hadis, for which he earned the title 
Muhaddis (someone learned in hadis). In spite of being based in Delhi, he was 
also an extensive traveller and travelled as far as Hijaz (Saudi Arabia) to study 
the hadis and Islamic law. In addition to being thoroughly exposed to Islamic 
scholarship, he was also initiated into various Sufi orders and it is for this reason 
that he is appropriately termed a scholar- (alim)-Sufi. This remarkable and char-
ismatic scholar-Sufi needs to be studied in the context of his various entangle-
ments, which were both religious and mundane in nature. We have discussed 
the fact that Abdul Haq was celebrated both as an alim (Muslim theologian) and 
a muhaddis (someone well-versed in hadis). These qualities enhanced his status 
among other Muslim scholars, some of whom were supporters of scriptural funda-
mentalism. Even during the Islamic revivalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, after his death, the reformists were unable to denounce him, despite 
his strong connections with the Sufis. Seen from this perspective, he enjoyed 
a unique position in South Asian Islam. In spite of his profound knowledge of 
Islamic theology, he was also interested in mystical experiences, which kept the 
door of religious individualisation open for him. Due to his reputation as an alim 
and muhaddis, he was not ostracised by the custodians of hegemonic orthodoxy 
for his inclination towards Islamic mysticism. His de-individualising qualities (a 
muhaddis-alim cannot easily be distanced from the sharia or the canon law of 
Islam) shielded him from potential danger. To confirm our hypothesis, we may 
cite the examples of the Mughal Prince Dara Shukoh and his close associate Sufi 
Shahid (Martyr) Sarmad, whose religious views had individualising potential. 
These men were executed by the Mughal State under Emperor Aurangzeb, who 
used their religious views as a pretext for their elimination. During their tragic 
deaths, we notice a convergence of hegemonic orthodoxy and hegemonic polity. 
1 A copy of the Persian text is available at the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Abdul Haq was well 
versed in Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). Arthur Buehler, in his seminal work on Shaikh Ahmad 
Sirhindi, has used the term ‘Jurisprudential Sufism’, which is also applicable in the case of Abdul 
Haq, see Buehler 2011.
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Through the event of execution of Sufi Sarmad, Indian Sufis got their ideal martyr 
and he is regarded as the Mansur Hallaj of India.2
The linguistic dimension of Abdul Haq’s religious individualisation also 
demands our attention. Like other theologians, Abdul Haq was well versed in the 
Arabic required for reading the written scripture. He could, then, have written 
about Sufis and Sufism in what is recognised by Muslims as the language of reli-
gion. The importance of the original language can be seen in the widespread resist-
ance to attempts to translate the Quran from Arabic into any other language. The 
eighteenth century reformist Shah Waliullah of Delhi showed his guts and gump-
tion when he became the first Indian to translate the entire Quran into Persian. 
Since Persian was the official language in the subcontinent, even Hindu nobles 
cum administrators had to learn it. The translation of the Holy Book into Persian 
thus gave educated non-Muslim Indians access to the Quran, which created a 
favourable environment for interfaith dialogue. This pioneering translation of the 
Holy Book had the potential to emancipate religious discourse related to Islam 
from the monopoly of the ulama and to incorporate multi-religious South Asian 
elements into the process of discourse. In this context, the eminent theologian 
Shah Waliullah emerged as an active agent of religious individualisation in eight-
eenth century South Asia. What about those scholar-Sufis (alim-Sufis) or Sufis 
involved in compiling the malfuzat (table talk involving Sufi saints), maktubat 
(letters exchanged between Sufi saints), and tazkiras (biographies of Sufi saints) 
in the Persian language from pre-Mughal times onwards? Since Sufism in the sub-
continent had both Muslim and non-Muslim followers, and the educated among 
the latter read Persian, the situation was amenable to interfaith dialogue. This 
was a process that was not particularly attractive to the ulama, who were keen 
to establish the superiority of Islam in comparison to other religions. A section 
of the ulama in pre-Mughal India went so far as to express their views in favour 
of the forced conversion of non-Muslims. However, wise and farsighted Turko- 
2 Mansur Hallaj was martyred for uttering the individualising words Anal Huq, meaning ‘I am 
the Truth’ or ‘I am God’. Due to a mystical experience, he refused to differentiate himself from 
God. In short, only God prevailed in his successful mystical experience. For boldly uttering this 
truth, representatives of the hegemonic orthodoxy in West Asia cut him into pieces several cen-
turies before Sufi Sarmad. From then on, all the persecuted Sufis argue that they are afraid of 
divulging the mystical Truth because their fate could be like that of Mansur Hallaj, who is recog-
nised by the Sufis as one of the earliest martyrs in the history of Sufism. His plight is compared 
with the tragic battle of Karbala, during which the Prophet’s grandson Husain attained martyr-
dom. Husain’s death marks the beginning of a tradition of individuals regarded as the martyrs of 
love (for God). This category represents the highest form of religious individualisation in Sufism. 
Still, we must not overlook the political agenda behind the execution of the Mughal Prince Dara 
and his associate Sufi Sarmad.
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Afghan rulers such as Iltutmish dismissed proposals of this kind and aspired 
instead to counter the arrogant ulama with the Sufis, who represented a more 
liberal, human, spiritual, and to a great extent pragmatic, outlook in the context 
of challenges faced by the early Muslim empire builders in South Asia.3 While 
the Mughal and pre-Mughal Muslim rulers in South Asia played a significant role 
in promoting Persian as the official language or language of administration, at 
the socio-cultural level this classical language was virtually institutionalised 
by the various Sufi orders who used it to produce and circulate their religious 
manuscripts, as mentioned earlier. Largely because of this conscious selection 
of the ‘other’ (a language other than Arabic), Persian was able to flourish as an 
important vehicle for the spread of mystical knowledge in the subcontinent. This 
Persianisation also facilitated the democratisation of mystical knowledge, in the 
sense that Hindu nobility or administrators who knew Persian could now access 
Islamic texts. However, it is important to remember that this process of Persian-
isation, which elevated Sufi knowledge or mystical knowledge to the status of 
shared knowledge by incorporating the non-Muslims who knew Persian, fell short 
of truly domesticating mystical knowledge because Persian was not the language 
of the masses in India.4 Even the sama (sufi music) was composed in Persian.5 
3 Nurul Hasan 2005, 67 and Rizvi 1986, 135f. Non-Muslims far outnumbered the Muslims in 
Medieval South Asia. The farsighted Muslim empire builders more or less followed a policy of 
non-interference as far as the belief pattern of non-Muslims was concerned, an approach that 
enhanced the legitimacy of those rulers. While a section of the ulama showed interest in con-
version, the Sufis in general exhibited a liberal, human, and spiritual outlook, which sustained 
India’s eclectic traditions. In order to gain greater acceptance among a heterogeneous popu-
lation, the rulers in South Asia often patronised institutions, such as Sufism, which reflected 
multi-religiosity or multi-culturalism.
4 I have borrowed the term ‘domestication’ (of knowledge) from Rahul Parson’s article on Banar-
asidas, which he wrote for the Erfurt Research Group (2013–2015). Arthur Buehler (2011), in his 
monumental work on Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, has shown that there were only 3% of the entire 
population ruled by Emperor Akbar were ashraf (aristocratic Muslims who claimed foreign ori-
gin). So we can argue that the Persianisation of Sufi texts not only implied their democratisation 
but also their de-ashrafization, or the emancipation of mystical knowledge from the monopoly of 
the Arabic-speaking ashraf. It created a situation in which non-Muslims who knew Persian could 
also access knowledge related to Islamic mysticism.
5 As demonstrated by the famous medieval court poet Amir Khusru (d. 1325), who was the murid 
(disciple) of the illustrious Chishti Sufi saint Nizamuddin Awliya. Chishti is the name of the pop-
ular Sufi order that popularised Sufi music. The heterogeneity of Sufism is confirmed by the 
fact that the Naqshbandi and the Suhrawardi orders discouraged music. Interestingly, but not 
surprisingly, the bauls (philosophical folk singers of nineteenth and twentieth century Bengal) 
trace a spiritual connection with the music-loving Chishti Sufis. Hegemonic orthodoxy within 
Islam is opposed to poetry, philosophy, and music, and Sufi and folk poets have been the target 
of orthodox criticism. Recently, a statue of charismatic baul singer Lalan Shah was destroyed by 
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In other words, the individualisation of religion in South Asia should be studied 
in the context of the convergence between the Islamic mystical tradition and the 
Persianate tradition.6 This is why the Islamic revivalist/reformist movements in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century South Asia launched their assaults against 
the Persianate tradition, for this tradition had, according to them, contributed to 
the degeneration of Islam, culminating in the political decline of Muslim states.7
Regarding the multiple entanglements of Abdul Haq, we need to remember 
that the entry point of his religious individualisation was actually his father who 
was intensely mystical. In spite of this, his father Shaikh Saifuddin prescribed 
for his son the sharia-tariqa trajectory, in line with the established tradition.8 
To satisfy the spiritual urges of Abdul Haq, his father had him initiated into the 
Qadiriya Sufi order (silsilah), and Shaikh Musa, who was living permanently in 
the court of Emperor Akbar, became his murshid (spiritual guide).9 Some of the 
Qadiriya Sufis are extremely intriguing figures, with a number of them going so 
far as to even study the Vedas and Upanishads.10 It should be noted that Emperor 
Akbar’s policy of sulh-i-qul or peace with all was actually introduced by the 
Qadiriyas in the pre-Akbaride period. In this context, it is worth recalling that 
Prince Dara Shukoh was also initiated into the Qadiriya order and that he ven-
tured to translate the Upanishads into Persian. We have also mentioned Abdul 
Haq’s murshid, who had strong connections with the Akbaride court, a bastion of 
religious experimentation in sixteenth century India. It appears that these multi-
ple entanglements with the forces of religious pluralism played a significant role 
in making Abdul Haq’s magnum opus Akhbar ul Akhiyar (which is an account 
of Sufi saints) a  non-sectarian work. This particular feature also enhanced the 
authenticity of his work. Here, Abdul Haq, in spite of being an alim (theologian), 
stands apart not only from the sectarian ulama but also from sectarian Natha 
the custodians of religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh. All these examples challenge Samu-
el Huntington’s thesis of a ‘Clash of Civilisations’ and indicate that there is, rather, a clash within 
civilisation. This clash within represents the clash between liberal, spiritual, and mystical Islam, 
on the one side, and hegemonic orthodoxy or scriptural fundamentalism, on the other. The for-
mer sustains the forces of religious individualisation.
6 For a detailed discussion of the Persianate tradition in India, see Robinson 2001, chapter one.
7 Ibid.
8 Hanif 2000, 41–50. Sharia means the canon law of Islam and tariqa is the mystical path of the 
Sufis. The most illustrious Sufis of South Asia first mastered the sharia and then traversed the 
Sufi path or tariqa. For the sake of convenience, I have called this the sharia-tariqa trajectory. 
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Panth and Siddha literature. Jain Hindi literature is also instructional and sec-
tarian.11 Treading amongst these various orthodox traditions, Abdul Haq’s stance 
was neutrality, not only in religious matters but in the case of imperial politics as 
well.12 In fact, he was too submerged in mystical experiences to be a sectarian.13 
It is in the context of his intense inner mystical urge that we notice the dynamics 
of the individualisation of religion. In spite of his thorough exposure to sharia 
and scriptural Islam, he felt that it was important to transcend this frontier. 
Another important point that demands our attention is the evolution of the term 
murshid or spiritual preceptor. In the early phase of empire building in which 
Turkic sultans such as Iltutmish were involved, the term murshid faced many 
challenges, even within the Muslim community. During the thirteenth century, 
the ulama became particularly jealous about the increasing popularity of char-
ismatic murshids such as Khwaja Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki. The ulama wanted 
to drive him out of Delhi but were unsuccessful due to the intervention of Sultan 
Iltutmish, who venerated the Sufi saint.14 Nevertheless, during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, when the heyday of the Mughals coincided with the life-
time of Abdal Haq, a murshid’s position in society was reasonably consolidated. 
The murshid was, by that time, recognised as an alternative source of authority, 
a divergent voice in the wider society, if not a direct challenge to the ulama. We 
use the term ‘wider society’ because a murshid’s position was not confined to a 
particular community. In the South Asian context a charismatic murshid might 
be venerated by Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs alike. Therefore, the social base of 
the murshid could be broader than that of the ulama. Whereas the ulama rep-
resented a rigid, formal, and external form of religion by putting emphasis on 
the universal symbols of Islam such as Mecca, the place of pilgrimage, the Holy 
Book or the Quran, the hadis (sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad), 
and the Prophet, the murshid emerged as the ‘imaginaire’15 Muslim who indulged 
in creativity and improvisation, reflecting his appropriating nature which culmi-
nated in the recognition of local symbols of Islam, such as the Sufi shrine or the 
11 Rahul Parson discusses this in his article, mentioned in n. 4 above, by citing Ramachandra 
Shukla. In this context, one must also remember the disenchantment of Abdal Haq’s father with 
the greedy and mundane ulama. See Hanif 2000, 41–9.
12 Hanif 2000, 41–9.
13 In the context of bhakti or Jain experiences, Rahul Parson calls this anubhaba (inner self 
experience).
14 Rizvi 1986, 3–8, 11f.
15 I have borrowed the term ‘imaginaire Muslim’ from the international workshop held in Raleigh, 
USA in 2002. The title of that workshop, organised by the Triangle South Asia Consortium, was ‘The 
Work of the Imaginaire in South Asian Islam’. The term ‘imaginare’ implies someone who is creative 
and improvisational and hence capable of transcending the narrow confines of scriptures.
1276   Amit Dey
murshid himself. The nature of Islam in South Asia has to be understood in the 
context of the subtle tension between the universal and local symbols of Islam. 
The appropriating and accommodating nature of the Sufis often borders on Indi-
anness. For example, Muinuddin Chishti, the doyen of the Chishti order in India 
used to advise his followers: ‘Develop river-like generosity, earth-like hospital-
ity, and sun-like wisdom’.16 While uttering these words he was aware that river, 
earth, and sun are venerated by the people of India. In spite of being a pious 
Muslim, he had no difficulty in using idioms and symbols that were intelligible 
to the Indian people. In this way, in the early Sultanate era, he represented a shift 
from extra-territoriality to Indianness. Extra-territoriality characterised ashraf 
behaviour (that of aristocratic Muslims who claim foreign origin). Seen from this 
angle we can conclude that some Sufis were associated with the de-ashrafisation 
process. Individualisation of religion involved all these intriguing developments, 
which do not merely indicate the blossoming of the inner self but a creative and 
meaningful identification with local symbols and alternative ritual patterns (such 
as veneration of the murshid, pilgrimage to the sufi shrine, taking part in sama or 
Sufi musical ritual on the anniversary of a Sufi saint’s death, known as urs in Sufi 
terminology, or considering the composing of maktubat, malfuzat, and tazkira as 
acts of piety)17 without formally renouncing the Islamic identity. The ulama led a 
group or a local community. The preaching of the ulama was instructional in the 
sense that he expected his followers to observe the basic tenets of Islam against 
the threat that those who did not would be punished by God on the Day of Judge-
ment. Therefore, the God of the ulama was often God the punisher.18 But the Sufis 
project a different image of God. God to them is benign, loving, and forgiving. 
The Sufi is also known as wali (plural: awliya), or the friend of God, or even the 
lover of God.19 Instead of terrorising the Muslim masses through pamphleteer-
ing, the Sufis advise the common man to select carefully the kamil murshid, or 
16 Cited in De 2004, 1–15. 
17 In mainstream Islam memorisation of the entire Quran (the person who achieves this is re-
spected in the community as hafiz), writing tafsir (commentary on the Quran), or copying the 
Quran in beautiful handwriting are regarded as pious acts. So the Sufis managed to develop a 
parallel sense of piety through the compilation of Sufi texts in a language other than Arabic. 
18 Thanks to the utilisation of printing technology in India since the nineteenth century, we find 
hundreds of pamphlets or booklets in the vernacular languages, with a deliberate admixture of 
Arabic and Persian words, which were used to terrorise the Muslim masses and deter them from 
any deviation from the basic tenets of Islam. The ulama considered the pirs (murshids or spiritual 
guides) as a potential threat in terms of their capacity to influence the masses. The ulama often 
denounced the pirs as bhanda faqir (Bengali) or pseudo pirs. The instructional pamphlets circu-
lated by the ulama were known as nasihatnama. See Dey 2006, chapters 2, 3 and 4.
19 Aquil 2017, chapters 1 and 2.
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perfect guide, in order to experience the mystical Truth.20 Thanks to the system-
atic and sustained efforts of the Sufis, the –pir-muridi (spiritual preceptor and 
disciple) relationship had been institutionalised within the Sufi movement. Thus, 
unlike the ulama who interacts with the local community or group, Sufis could 
enjoy a special interaction with a special disciple. The specially chosen spiritual 
successor of a murshid is called the khalifa or deputy. In short, all khalifas are 
murids (disciples) but all murids are not khalifas. All this points towards the cre-
ation by the Sufis of a counter hierarchy. We know that collective (community) 
is very important in Islamic identity. But the success of the Sufis lies in the fact 
that they could create a spiritual space for the individual within the broad frame-
work of Islam. Of course, that space is perennially threatened by the custodians 
of hegemonic orthodoxy.
3  Religious individualisation, Sufism and the 
discourse on women 
Many Muslim writers speak with contempt about the incapacity of women in reli-
gious matters and of their lack of intelligence and morals.21 An early writer says, 
‘The majority of women are lacking in religion and virtue and that which prevails 
in them is ignorance and evil desires’.22
However, Sufis were well aware of the positive aspects of womanhood. Some 
of the Quranic tales serve as beautiful illustrations of the role of women in reli-
gious life. The most famous example is that of Potiphat’s wife, as told in Sura 12: 
this woman, completely lost in her love of Joseph, is a fine symbol of the enrap-
turing power of love, expressed by the mystic in the contemplation of divine 
beauty as revealed in the human form. It can even be said that Sufism was more 
favourable to the development of feminine activities than were other branches 
of Islam.23 The sympathy of the Prophet for women, and his four daughters in 
20 Dey 2006, chapter 4.
21 In the discussion of this intriguing sub-theme, we shall rely heavily on the Persian Manu-
script of Abdul Haq Dehlavi entitled Akhbarul Akhiyar. Dehlavi devoted one entire chapter in this 
manuscript to female Sufis, a rare gesture in the history of South Asian Sufism.
22 Abu Talib, Qutal-Qulub II, 238. Cited in Smith 1928, 133.
23 The persecution and, at times, the elimination of the Sufis during the last hundred years 
in West Asia, North Africa, Afghanistan, parts of Bangladesh, and Malaysia has often meant 
less freedom for women in the public space. The evolution of feminine attire in these regions, 
particularly during the last fifty or sixty years, is indicative of the attempt to restrict the visibil-
ity of women in public space. In the early 1970s it was hard to find women in the capital city 
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particular, excluded the feeling of dejection so often found in medieval Chris-
tian monasticism. The veneration of Fatima in Shia circles is indicative of the 
important role assigned to the feminine element in Islamic religious life.24 Before 
Sufism arose, women were recognised as saints, including Amina, the mother of 
the Prophet, and Fatima, his daughter, who enjoy the veneration of all Muslims 
because of their relationship to Muhammad.25 So it is not surprising that Shaikh 
Abdul-Haq Muhaddis Dihlawi (1551–1642) devotes a separate chapter to women 
saints in his famous Persian work, the Akhbaru’l-Akhyar.26 Being an expert on 
hadis (the recorded sayings and deeds of the Prophet), Abdul Haq knew the 
importance of the leading women in the family of the Prophet.  The question is 
why most other writers were silent about the role of women in religion? This was 
because discussions about Muslim women in the public space were simply not 
common. Getting entry into the manuscript implied entry into the public space in 
one form because the manuscript could move from hand to hand. Veneration of 
the women in the Prophet’s family is not only common in hadis, in sirat (biogra-
phies of the Prophet) literature too we find these women treated with respect. So, 
in the genre of Sufi literature, Abdul Haq’s treatment of the topic was pioneering 
and bold. He did not want to end his responsibility just by mentioning them. If 
we carefully read his chapter on women Sufis,27 it is impossible to miss the degree 
of enthusiasm on the part of the pioneer author. Silently but clearly, Abdul Haq 
aspires to convey the serious message to the readers that women could acquire 
mystic-spiritual knowledge and that under such circumstances they should be 
elevated in the spiritual hierarchy just as their male counterparts were. This 
argument climaxes when citing an example he is allegorically posing a question 
before the audience/readers: ‘Is not the lioness dreadful?’28 Given such a context, 
it is reasonable to propose that the production and circulation of Sufi texts (in 
of Dhaka covering their heads but this practice is now quite common in many parts of West 
Bengal. In March 2017, I interviewed two highly qualified Bangladeshi ladies domiciled in the 
Western world. Both covered their heads and strongly opposed Sufism as a deviation. One of 
them would not allow her close relatives to sing before strangers under normal circumstances. 
One of the reasons underlying their dislike for the Sufis is the latter’s fondness for sama or Sufi 
music, currently known as qawwali. However, we should remember that the Suhrawardiya and 
the Naqshbandiya Sufi orders do not encourage music. The Chishtiya order encourages sama.
24 Schimmel 1975, 426.
25 Smith 1928, 137.
26 Dehlavi 1605 (?), 280–3. 
27 Edward Said, in his Culture And Imperialism, would call it ‘reading between lines’. See Said 1993.
28 For the exact words, please see the next footnote. The Sufis used to respond to queries indi-
rectly and in an allegorical manner. This apparently camouflaged the process of religious indi-
vidualisation, making them immune to the assault of the custodians of hegemonic orthodoxy.
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Persian) in medieval India institutionalised the allegorical responses of the Sufi 
masters (murshids). The pattern not only betrayed their sense of humour but was 
crucial to the enhancement of their charisma among their followers, much to the 
consternation of the ulama.29
In fact, women continued to play an important role in the Sufi movement in 
India, both as Sufis and as mothers of leading Sufis. Shaikh Nizamu’d-Din Auliya 
used to say:
When the lion emerges from a jungle, none raises a question about its sex. The descendants 
of Adam should adopt piety and obedience to God whether they be men or women.30 
It is instructive to consider the role of mothers in Sufi biographies. Many religious 
leaders admitted that they received their first religious instruction, and even their 
preliminary training in the mystical path, from their mothers. The Prophet said: 
‘Paradise lies at the feet of the mother’.
Whether it be Baba Fariduddin, Ganj-i Shakar’s mother, or Shaikh Nizamu’d-
Din Auliya’s mother, there is no doubt that many elderly women contributed to 
the spiritual formation of some of the great Sufi saints through their familial ties.
Bibi Sara is one of the earliest women saints mentioned in the Akhbaru’ l-
Akhyar. She was the mother of Shaikh Nizamu’d-Din Abu’l Mu’id, an important 
contemporary of Khwaja Qutbu’d-Din Bakhtiyar Kaki. The Akhbaru’l-Akhiyar (in 
Persian) provides an interesting story involving Bibi Sara.  People used to visit 
Shaikh Nizamu’d- Din Abu’l Mu’id to get rid of their problems, both spiritual and 
material. On one occasion, there was a drought (imsake baran) in Delhi. Every-
body began to pray for rain (baran) and the Shaikh was requested to do like-
wise. The Shaikh then took a thread (rishla) from a garment (daman) worn by his 
mother. He held it in his hand and began to pray: ‘Oh God the chastity (hurmat) of 
my mother is well-known. She has never unveiled her face before strangers, and 
I am praying on behalf of this pious lady, please send rain for us’. ‘Az Shaikh in 
haraf guftan, az Khuda baran ferestadan’ – After hearing the Shaikh’s appeal God 
sent rain for them.31
Shaikh Abdul Haq Dihlawi clearly mentions the name of Bibi Zulaykha, the 
venerated mother of Shaikh Nizamu’d-Din Auliya: ‘Bibi Zulaykha walida-e Shaikh 
29 In the South Asian context, the ulama represents rigid, formal religion, and are not necessari-
ly known for their sense of humour. On the contrary, the Sufis are known for their smiling image, 
their sense of humour, which is often associated with their spiritual wisdom.
30 Abdu’l Haqq, Akhbar, 280: ‘Sher az bisha birun ayed kase pursid ke an sher nar ast va mada 
farzandane Adam ra ta ’at wa taqwae baid khua  mard bashad wa khua zan.’
31 Dehlavi 1605 (?), 280.
1280   Amit Dey
Nizamu’d-Din Auliya ast’.32 Nizamu’d-Din Auliya had deep respect for his mother. 
He used to say: ‘Walida mara ba Khuda Ta’ala asna’i bud’,33 – ‘My mother was the 
way towards the Kingdom of God’. When the Shaikh’s mother was faced with any 
problem, she could discover the solution in her dreams. According to Sufi belief, 
such a power was exclusively reserved for Sufi saints. In this context, it is not dif-
ficult to form an impression of her place (maqam) in the history of Sufism. Shaikh 
Nizamu’d-Din had to pass his early days in poverty. When the house was bereft 
of food (ghalla) his mother consoled him by saying that: ‘Imroz ma mehman-e 
Khudayem’34 – ‘Today we are the guests of God’.
One day, in a similar situation, the Shaikh’s mother uttered these words and 
suddenly the Shaikh observed that a man appeared in front of their house with 
foodstuffs (ghalla) worth one tanka (silver coin). This experience brought about 
enough spiritual satisfaction to the Shaikh. Later on, whenever he was in a time 
of need (har hajati), the Shaikh would visit his mother’s grave (khake walidai-e 
khud) and offer prayers.35
We have already referred to the ziyarat (religious visita tion) of Shaikh Nizamu’d-
Din Auliya to his mother’s tomb. In this connection, the Akhbaru’l-Akhyar pro-
vides interesting information, the importance of which cannot be ignored if we 
are to come to a better understanding of the nature of relationship between the 
state and Sufism. Sultan Qutbu’d-Din Mubarak Shah (1316–1320) was jealous of 
Shaikh Nizamuddin’s popularity and expected that, along with all the Shaikhs 
and Ulama, Shaikh Nizamu’d-Din should also visit the mosque in the fort of Sipri 
(qilae  Sipri) for the Friday (juma) prayer. But the Shaikh replied: ‘Masjid nazdik 
darem wa in ahaqq ast’.36 ‘There is a mosque nearby, and it is more worthy’. Now 
according to the Sultan’s order, the entire religious community of Delhi assem-
bled at the palace on the first day of the lunar month (darghurra har mahi) to offer 
congratulations (tahni-at) to him. The Shaikh further antagonised the Sultan by 
sending a loyal servant (iqbal-e khadim) as his deputy. The vainglorious Sultan 
(gharur-e badshahi) made it clear to the Shaikh that if he failed to pay homage to 
the Sultan in person, he would be forced to do so. Ignoring the threat, the Shaikh 
quietly prayed at his mother’s tomb and returned home. Divine dispensation 
(qaza’i Ilahi) led to the assassination of the Sultan by his favourite and protégé 
Khusraw Khan before the first day of the next month (ghurra mahe ayanda) and 




36 Dehlavi 1605 (?), 282.
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the Shaikh was saved from humiliation.37 Thus the mother of Shaikh Nizamu’d-
Din not only contributed significantly to the later brilliance of her son but, even 
after her death, continued to remain a constant source of peace, solace, and 
inspiration to the greatest fourteenth century Sufi (d. 1325) in India.
So we notice that not only the murshids (spiritual guides) but also their 
pious mothers were presented as an alternative source of religious authority, 
perhaps as a plot to take the wind from the sails of the mullahs (ulama).38 This 
representation also served another purpose. By projecting stories in which the 
pious mothers played a pivotal role, such those mentioned above, people were 
advised to respect their parents and their mothers in particular. In this way, the 
Sufis virtually institutionalised akhlaq (ethical) literature in medieval South Asia. 
This genre emerged as a parallel literature, if not the direct counterpart of the 
scriptures.
Another great woman Sufi was Bibi Fatima Sam of Delhi. Baba Farid (d. 1265) 
often referred to her piety and sanctity. Her spiritual qualities were equal to those 
of the greatest male Sufis of her time. It was for this reason that Baba Farid used 
to say: ‘Fatima Sam marde ast’.39 She regarded Baba Farid and his brother, Shaikh 
Najibu’d-Din Mutwakkil, as her own brothers.40 Some important information about 
Bibi Fatima can be found in the malfuzat (conversations or discourses)41 of Shaikh 
Nizamu’d-Din Auliya (1238 – 1325). The Shaikh heard her saying: ‘Az berai anke 
para’e nan wa kuza ’e ab bakase dehand neyamathaye dine wa duniya wai nisar’e yu 
kunand ke sad hazar roza wa namaz na’ tuwan yaft’.42 This implied that feeding the 
hungry, giving water to the thirsty, and distributing money amongst the poor on 
festive occasions, were more meritorious than hundreds and thousands of namazes 
37 Ibid. 282f.
38 Envisaging parents as substitutes for gurus is not uncommon in South Asia.  In the 1970s, 
hundreds of thousands of people travelled to Western Bengal due to the Liberation war in Bang-
ladesh, coupled with political turmoil and the related economic crisis. Under such circumstanc-
es, many people or families sought the intercession of gurus or so called religious guides. Some 
of those who refused to follow this practice stated ‘we do not need gurus, parents are our greatest 
gurus’.  
39  Ibid. 280: ‘Fatima Sam is a man.’ 
40 In the conservative society of South Asia, it is very uncommon for a Muslim lady to treat men 
who are not her blood relatives as her own brothers. Fatima Sam’s decision to do so reflects her 
independent spirit or man-like nature.
41 The discourses delivered by a leading Sufi to a select gathering of Sufi disciples and visitors 
gave rise to a distinctive genre of Persian literature. This was known as malfuzat, which also 
contained didactic poetry, anecdotes, and pithy sayings. For more information on malfuzat, see 
Rizvi 1986, 3–8 and 11f.
42 Abdul Haq, Akhbar, 280.
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(prayers) and many days spent in fasting (roza). Here, an independent spirit found 
expression through the criticism of rigid, formal, or external religion. Emphasis 
was explicitly placed on the humane aspect of religion. After her death, Shaikh 
Nizamu’d-Din Auliya used to go to his mother’s tomb (rauza) to offer prayers and 
he always received spiritual satisfaction in doing so: ‘Sultan-ul-Mashaikh (Shaikh 
Nizamu’d-Din) dar rauzae  Fatima Sam bisiyar mushghul bude’.43 Again this is 
very significant. The great saint, instead of always visiting the mosque filled with 
devout Muslims, at times would seek spiritual satisfaction in the solitude of the 
graveyard. Indeed, the act of visiting the majar (grave) has been institutionalised 
by the Sufis. The Wahhabis44 are vehemently opposed to such practices.
The Chishti attitude to manual labour and prayer comes through clearly in a 
story related by the Shaikh.
One day the Shaikh visited the tomb of Bibi Sam, which was near a pond (hauz). A man 
appeared with a basket filled with khiyar (a vegetable resembling a cucumber) and dropped 
them near the tank, where he performed wazu (ablution) and then calmly said his prayers 
(du rakat-namaz). After that, he washed the khiyars one by one (yagan yagan khiyare shust) 
and then recited three blessings for the Prophet Muhammad. Being deeply impressed with 
the man’s piety, the Shaikh offered him a silver tanka (coin) but this was refused. The 
Shaikh asked the man, who was a lowly paid labourer, how he could afford to refuse the 
offer. The man replied that his father was also a vegetable seller who died leaving him very 
young. After that, his mother was able to teach him the most elementary rules for formal 
prayers. When she was dying, she advised him: “Tu niz khiyare wa sabze ba-faroshi” – “You 
should also continue as a vegetable seller.” In short, his dying mother instructed him not to 
depend on anything or anyone else for his living.45
After the man stopped talking, it appeared to the Shaikh as if he was listening 
to the words of a saint (awaze abdal ast). So manual labour was not looked 
down upon by the Chishtis. On the contrary, they were prepared to appreciate 
the qualities of a common man or woman if he or she was aware of the value of 
self-reliance and followed some basic rules for formal prayers. This was one of 
the reasons for the popularity of the Chishti silsilah (order) among the common 
people. Unlike  the vainglorious and greedy ulama,46 the Chishti Sufis aspired 
43 Ibid. 280. Sultanul-Mashaikh means ‘king of the saints’. Mashaikh is the plural form of Shaikh 
(saint). The conscious borrowing of the political term sultan (king) seems significant for it poses 
a challenge to temporal authority.
44 For the sake of convenience, I have used this term, meaning, rigid, orthodox, and often mili-
tant Muslims, or self-appointed Muslim reformers.
45 Hamid Qalandar, Khayrul Majalis 227–78. Also see Abdul-Haq, Akhbar, 281.
46 Eighteenth century Punjabi Sufi poet Bullhe Shah’s compositions are replete with such im-
ages of the ulama.
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to move closer to the everyday life of the common people and by emphasising 
the dignity of the common man, they reflected their de-ashrafising approach to 
society, very much in tune with the hadis.47
It is evident from the malfuzat (conversations or dis courses) of Shaikh 
Nizamu’d-Din Auliya that the nazms (verses) of Bibi Fatima Sam were of exquisite 
beauty, delicate but full of spiritual thought. Shaikh Nizamu’d-Din had memo-
rised a famous misra (hemistich) composed by her: ‘Ham ishq talab kuni wa ham 
jan khuahi, har du talbi wale mir nashawad’48 – ‘A person, who is a seeker of 
“Divine Love” (ishqe ilahi), but at the same time concerned with the safety and 
security of his personal life, cannot become a true lover’. Religious individual-
isation acquires a new dimension here with the differentiation between Divine 
Love (ishqe ilahi) and human love (ishqe majazi). 
Bibi Fatima’s tomb was in the old Indraprastha. After many years, it became a 
deserted place (kharabah). The memory of Bibi Fatima also fell into obscurity and 
she became known to the local people only as Bibi Saima or Bibi Sham.49 From 
the perspective of religious individualisation, this geographical isolation of her 
grave is symbolic.
Shaikh Abdul Haq Muhaddis Dihlawi mentions the name of Bibi Auliya, 
a female Sufi who lived at the time of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq. Shaikh 
Abdul-Haq says ‘Bibi Auliya az salihat waqte khud bud’50 – ‘Bibi Auliya was one 
of the most pious ladies of her time’. She led a withdrawn life (khalwat) medi-
tating in her hujra (chamber) for untold hours. She was also known for constant 
fasting. However, her reclusive life did not make her indifferent to the sorrows 
and sufferings of the common people. In the month of Muharram she actively 
engaged herself in charitable works which included the establishment of a 
langar (an alms house) for the distribution of free food among the poor. It is said 
that Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq had deep faith in her.51 Shaikh Abdul-Haq 
wrote, ‘Qabre wu birun qulae Alai ast’52 – ‘Her grave is situated outside the fort of 
Sultan Alau’d-Din Khalji (Ala’i)’. Her sons and grandsons apparently also became 
saints. When Shaikh Abdul Haq Muhaddis Dihlawi (1551 – 1642) was writing his 
 Akhbarul-Akhyar, the descendants of Bibi Auliya were still alive and they were 
47 The Chishti Sufis, in particular, wanted to get rid of the infamous ashraf (high born Muslims 
of foreign origin)-ajlaf (converted Indian Muslims) divide in Indian society. I have called this the 
de-ashrafisation process.






popularly called himams (high-minded).53 Among them, Shaikh Ahmad probably 
became the most famous. He was also well informed about many Sufi saints.54
4  Mughal prince Dara Shukoh and 
individualisation of religion
Eclectic traditions both pre-existed and outlived the scholar cum mystic Prince 
Dara Shukoh. In this context, it will be useful to discuss the Sufi doctrine of 
Wahdat – ul – wajud or pantheism, which can be regarded as the entry point 
for the individualisation of religion in the Islamic mystical context. The Sufis 
use the term ‘Hama Ust’, meaning everything is ‘He’, which implies that God is 
reflected in everything. Using this doctrine some Sufis went so far as to claim 
that God is also reflected in a heathen or a Hindu and, given this, a Hindu cannot 
be denounced as a kafir or infidel.55 Mulla Daud, the author of Chandayan, who 
was linked to the famous fourteenth century Sufi Nasiruddin Chiragh-i-Delhi, 
praised Muhammad as the beloved of everyone. At the same time, he referred to 
the Vedas and Puranas as revealed books, like the Quran.56 Mirza Mazhar Jan-i-
Janan, a Sufi poet of the Naqshbandi order, came to the same conclusion as Dara, 
viz. that the Vedas were revealed books and Hindus could not thus be identified 
with the Kafirs of Arabia. He even argued that there was little difference between 
idol worship and tasawwar-i-shaikh (common among those who venerate a Sufi 
saint) or concentration on the mental image of the preceptor.57
Dara was a sound scholar, poet, and calligrapher with an artistic bent. 
However, unlike his great forefather Akbar, he was not adept in the art of state-
craft. It is said that Emperor Shah Jahan advised his eldest son Dara to acquire 
the knowledge available in the Greek, Roman and Persian worlds alongside 
the knowledge prevalent in India. After completing this process, Dara should, 
according to his father, launch his career like a second Alexander (Sikander 
Sani). However, it was not Dara’s desire to be another conqueror; he wanted 
instead to be a thinker.58 It appears from his famous work Majma-ul-Bahrain 
53 Ibid.
54 Abdul-Haq, Akhbar, 283.
55 Hughes 1999, see Wahdat-ul-Wajud. Also, Chandra 1996. While the ulama is interested in 
proselytising, the Sufis are interested in the spread of love for each and every human being.
56 Chandra 1996, 139.
57 Ibid, cited on page 151.
58 De 1983, 294.
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that he believed in Ijtihad, or the right of the learned to interpret scriptures 
according to changing circumstances. In other words, he put emphasis on Aql, 
or reason, like his predecessor Akbar and his cultural successor Raja Rammo-
hun Roy. The clash here is not, in fact, between different civilizations or lan-
guages but, rather, it is within Islam itself, between Ilm (here the term Ilm or 
knowledge has been used in a narrow sense, meaning scriptural knowledge) 
and Aql (Reason). The door of Ijtihad being partly closed, Aql (Reason) appears 
to have taken a back seat within Islam. But, till the tenth century, when the 
Mutazila (rationalist school) was still around, the term Ilm was used in the 
broad sense as it allowed Aql (Reason) to be its integral part. Through differ-
ent phases, spanning several centuries, Islam experienced the reassertion of 
orthodoxy, which reduced the term ilm virtually to the status of literal funda-
mentalism or scripturalism. The eminent historian Muzaffar Alam has implied 
in his scholarly work that with the advent of western political dominance from 
the late eighteenth century, the nervousness of the ulama increased and they 
renounced and denounced the spirit of experimentation which had originally 
made Islam a world religion. In this way, the door of ijtihad (the right of the 
learned to interpret scriptures) was partly closed during the colonial milieu, 
culminating in the decline of Aql (Reason) in Islamic societies.59 A majority of 
Muslim theologians still believe that if experimentation is allowed to continue 
then Islam could be overwhelmed by the ‘other’. This situation poses a serious 
threat to India’s eclectic traditions, which are intrinsically interweaved with the 
dynamics of religious individualisation. 
Dara was only twenty-five when he produced his very first work in Persian, 
entitled Safinat-ul-Awliya (The Notebook of The Saints). He mentions in the intro-
duction to this work that he used to venerate the Sufis and the religious divines. 
He had studied their lives closely but was disappointed to find that the details 
of their lives were scattered in the pages of so many different manuscripts, so 
he decided to produce this work in order to provide, within a very small canvas, 
the details regarding the dates of birth and death, the places of burial, and other 
important particulars of the saints of Islam.60 Without being sectarian, Dara wrote 
in this book about various Sufi orders. However, the most significant part of this 
work is the author’s focus on women, as he deals with the wives and daughters of 
the Prophet and with a number of female mystics.
59  Alam 2004, 20–51.
60 Majma-ul-Bahrain by Dara Shukoh, edited in the original Persian with English Translation, 
Notes and Variants by M. Mahfuz-ul-Haq. The Asiatic Society. Kolkata, first published 1929, re-
printed in 1982, 5.
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Bikrama Jit Hasrat, in his scholarly work Dara Shukoh: Life and Works (1979, 
reprinted 1982), has shown that Dara was not only respectful to female mystics 
but was also in favour of his talented sister Jahanara acquiring spiritual knowl-
edge (see also, Dey 1996, 1–20). In Majma-ul-Bahrain, there is clear evidence 
to prove that Dara acquired knowledge about Tauhid (monotheism) and Irfan 
(divine knowledge). The latter is a Quranic word and the selection of such a word 
by Dara is significant but not surprising. Dara did not renounce Islam officially. 
However, his rivals tried to denounce him as an infidel, which served their narrow 
political interest.
Dara’s Sanskrit learning enabled him to explore and appreciate Upanishadic 
monotheism, which was, according to him, no different than Quranic monothe-
ism. From 1065 A.H. (?) onwards, he was more deeply interested in the study of 
Hinduism. In 1066 A. H. he had the Jug Bashist translated into Persian. Shortly 
after, he himself translated the Upanishads into Persian prose. He also most likely 
had one of his courtiers translate the Bhagvat Gita (Majma, 28). 
In his Hasanat-ul-Arifin, which he completed in 1064 A. H., Dara included the 
name of Baba Lal – the only Hindu whose aphorisms he quoted. Dara also includes 
the name of this saint, whom he calls Baba Lal Bairagi, in the Majma-ul-Bahrain 
(Majma, 24), alongside those Muslim saints and divines who were the best rep-
resentatives of Islamic mysticism. The inclusion of the name of a Hindu in such 
an exclusive list of Muslim divines shows unmistakably the high esteem in which 
this devotee was held by Dara. Indeed, Dara invited the saint to meet and had 
conversations with him. It appears that Dara’s private secretary, Chandar Bhan, 
was present on the occasion of these interviews and, perhaps, acted as an inter-
preter (Majma, 24). It is useful to note that Dara’s eclectic mind was so broad that 
he did not confine his efforts to exploring the commonalities between Hinduism 
and Islam only. He also thought about including other religions in his project, 
such as Christianity. This inclination was manifested in the year 1640–1641, when 
he carefully studied the Bible (see De 1983, 294).
We can wind up the discussion by considering a few examples from the 
Majma. This book begins with an interesting verse: ‘Faith and Infidelity, both 
are galloping on the way towards Him […]’. ‘Apparently Abul Fazl had this verse 
inscribed on a building which Akbar had built for the common use of the Hindus 
and the Muslims’ (Majma, 37). This was a clear manifestation of the fact that Dara 
derived inspiration from the eclectic spirit, which was sustained and enhanced 
by the policy put into action by his great grandfather. In the pages of Majma (38), 
Dara portrayed himself as a faqir endowed with esoteric knowledge (llm-I-Batin) 
with which he aspired to know the tenets of religion of the Indian monotheists. 
Dara was elated to find that the difference between Indian monotheism and 
Islamic monotheism was only verbal. 
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5  Significance of the endeavour and concluding 
remarks
In religious individualisation, the power to select or reject a topic or to differenti-
ate between topics according to their relative importance is crucial. All the topics 
in a religious text or religious tradition may be known to the practitioners of the 
religion. But in a particular socio-economic or political context, one or a few of 
them might assume a special significance. The charismatic theologian Sufi Abdul 
Haq successfully exercised that capacity to identify issues according to their rel-
evance. 
Symbols, idioms, terms, allegories, and particular short sentences can  be 
extremely significant in Sufism. These assume a special meaning when we 
aspire to study religious individualisation. We can develop a method of negoti-
ating Persian mystical texts. Like joining the dots, we may endeavour to link the 
symbols, idioms, terms, allegories, and particular short sentences dealing with a 
specific issue. For example, we can apply this method to Abdul Haq’s narration 
of the life and philosophy of Bibi Auliya, a female Sufi. We instantly realise that 
this approach enriches our understanding of the dynamics of religious individu-
alisation as they relate to a great woman Sufi, becoming more comprehensive and 
meaningful. On this particular occasion, we have linked ‘Bibi Auliya az salihat 
waqte khud bud’ – ‘Bibi Auliya was one of the most pious ladies of her time’. She 
led a life spent in withdrawal (khalwat), meditating in her hujra (chamber) for 
untold hours. She was also known for constant fasting. In the month of Muhar-
ram, she actively engaged herself in charitable works, which included the estab-
lishment of a langar (an alms house) for the distribution of free food among the 
poor. It is said that Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq had deep faith on her Shaikh 
Abdul-Haq wrote ‘Qabre wu birun qulae Alai ast.’ – ‘Her (Bibi Auliya) grave is sit-
uated outside the fort of Sultan Alau’d-Din Khalji (Ala’i)’.61
Regarding the comparison between the homogenising Arabisation of North 
Africa and the heterogeneous Persianate tradition of South Asia, I would like to 
mention a meeting that occurred while I was attending a programme on religious 
61 The italicized terms or words confirm her exclusive and elevated position in the hierarchy of 
Sufis. The woman Sufi preferred to carry out her charitable works during the month of Muhar-
ram, which is significant. Because Husain, the beloved grandson of the Prophet attained mar-
tyrdom in that month. He is regarded by the Sufis as the first martyr of love (for God). Second-
ly, the langar or free kitchen played a significant role in the institutionalisation of Sufi rituals. 
Muharram is celebrated by the Shia Muslims with gaiety and fervour. However, the majority of 
Sufis are Sunnis. Still, they prefer to use Shia symbolism to express their marginalisation by the 
hegemonic orthodoxy.
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pluralism in Santa Barbara, USA in the year 2010. There I met a lady professor 
from Cairo who told me that she had never visited the museums or pyramids in 
Egypt because the items from the age of jahiliya (ignorance of the pre-Islamic 
Arab world) are preserved there. This professor not only acted as a representative 
of the hegemonic orthodoxy with her statement but also, interestingly, applied 
the term jahiliya outside its original context, the geo-cultural frontiers of the Arab 
peninsula. By contrast, a self-educated Muslim lady of India, Rokeya Sakhawat 
Hossain, who died in the 1930s and was never directly exposed to western aca-
demic institutions, had no problem in celebrating the Indian civilisation of the 
pre-Islamic era. Does this mean that early modern personalities such as Abdul 
Haq and Dara Shukoh, or early twentieth century personalities such as Rokeya 
Sakhawat Hossain, are likely to have been more cosmopolitan, liberal, and 
modern than their twenty first century counterparts?
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Afterword: pluralisation
This group of chapters addresses the ways in which authorities are established 
and operate in relation to processes of pluralisation in case-studies drawn 
from very different cultures, geographical zones and periods. It is, above all, 
textual sources that are used to reconstruct discourses and practices related to 
pluralisation. These stretch from classical epic in Angelika Malinar’s chapter 
to reports about church councils in Luise Marion Frenkel’s, and from bio-
graphical and philosophical texts in the context of subcontinental Sufism 
as analysed by Amit Dey to language textbooks and marginal notes in Asaph 
Ben-Tov’s chapter on an early modern European teacher of language. Material 
objects, sometimes bearing inscriptions, sometimes not, have to be added to 
these sources, as shown by Jörg Rüpke. When oral forms of communication 
and the diffusion of knowledge are important for religious identities, the very 
materiality of letters and texts and the problem of accessibility to generic forms 
are significant (Frenkel, see also Henderson in III.2). Against this background, 
the dissemination of visual practices and the aesthetics of religious communi-
cation through material objects and sites mediate processes of both pluralisa-
tion and homogenisation.
A comparison of the chapters leads to a distinction between different dimen-
sions of pluralisation. The selected cases and approaches suggest starting such 
differentiation from a basic distinction. What we observe first is the broadening 
of the range of ways in which participants engage with religion. The mere mul-
tiplication of practices used in communicating with the divine, as well as the 
media used in such activities, need not imply the criticism of existing forms, need 
not imply crises or even conversion, but opens up the possibility of individual 
selection on the basis of inclinations or preferences (see also Murphy in I.2). An 
inhabitant of the ancient Mediterranean might just feel an aesthetic attraction 
to a new form of votive, a learned man from the early modern period might just 
be fascinated by an unfamiliar semantics of theistic belief, or an ancient Indian 
householder might study monotheistic devotional texts while continuing with his 
polytheistic practices. The observation of such a multiplication might, however, 
also lead to a more conscious, or even critical, appraisal of what we refer to as 
the pluralisation of religious practices and beliefs. In particular, polemical inno-
vations, articulating differences between old and new or right or wrong, also 
mobilise contemporary observers and responses. Spatial proximity among intel-
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lectuals of the same city or attentive administrators or weak authorities might 
make a crucial difference in this respect in so far as it could quickly sharpen such 
differences and accelerate the formation of groups.
Pluralisation is intimately related to social and economic differences, as 
many chapters in this publication demonstrate, such as those on differences 
in degrees and forms of deviance in fourth century BCE Athens or late ancient 
asceticism (see also Bremmer in IV.1 and Ramelli in III.1). Highly visible temple 
architecture and quickly buried clay deposits were options available to and con-
genial for people of very different social and economic positions. In processes 
of developing or authorising mechanisms of pluralisation, gender, ethnic dis-
tinctions and social distinctions turn out to be sensitive issues. While, on the 
one hand, the pluralisation of religious options gave new opportunities for the 
excluded to engage with religion, they were, at the same time, met with resist-
ance. Their roles in religion were contested. The debate about such persons 
offered also an arena, in which contestations of new practices and concepts 
found a favourite place. While ascetic religion in ancient India opened up path-
ways for male householders, it is much debated whether this also happened for 
women. The multiplication of the latter’s religious practices was more accept-
able when they continued their traditional social roles. A number of female Sufi 
saints are known but they were never given authorial or foundational roles, 
other than in the case of certain religious practices that were addressed to their 
graves. In several cases, male saints acted or were seen as spokespersons for 
the female saints. Here, bhakti traditions seem more accommodating to female 
initiative, as is attested by the inclusion of women in spiritual lineages in the 
late medieval period. The characteristic opening up of bhakti to social groups 
otherwise excluded was precarious and marked by phases of canonisation and 
prolonged closure. The same hold trues for early and late antique Christian and 
medieval Indian nunneries, as well as European nunneries respectively group-
ing of female religiosi (see also Mulder-Bakker and Ramelli, III.1). All of this is 
attesting to the diverse historical constellations that either allowed to consoli-
date female agency or restricted it.
The detailed analyses offered by our chapters make the important point that 
innovation and change must not be looked for only in specific social groups or 
positions. Very different positions could emerge even within social or profes-
sional, ethnic or denominational, groups which shared interests. Pluralisa-
tion – to use this as the overarching term – can be seen as a phenomenon within 
established groups and frameworks as much as between more clearly articulated 
groups. It can be internal as well as external.
The gradation of ways in which bhakti can be practiced is extremely diverse 
already in the earliest texts, allowing for intellectual quests or the seeking of 
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relief from economic suffering. Female sufis could be found in family roles as 
mothers of sufi saints, thus acting within established lines of tradition, or they 
could be isolated spiritual personalities themselves (Dey). Late ancient bishops 
could take very pronounced theological positions, but that did not hinder them 
to display a large variety of attitudes towards the (again highly diverse) ways, 
how the population in these bishops’ jurisdictional districts lived Christianity on 
a day to day basis (Frenkel). Such discrepancy can be observed elsewhere. Even 
the intensive appropriation of Quranic terminology and imagery made the early 
modern learned Zechendorff never expect his pupils to change their religious 
allegiances from Christianity to Islam (Ben-Tov). When parameters of orthodoxy 
exist, the gap between internal variation and heresy is narrow. The fuzziness of 
shared practices and discourses of Sufism was subject to very different classi-
fications around the fringes of Islam by different actors or observers. It clearly 
emerges from the chapters in this section that “religions” are lived by their fol-
lowers in ways that question their norms as closed systems. Religions are lived by 
individuals and are, accordingly, fragmented (Rüpke). 
This also means that authority in religious matters is much more fragmented 
and contested than is usually assumed. Our chapters suggest that assertions 
of religious authority are intimately related to processes of pluralisation. Not 
being able to rely on social or political authority, these claims are competitive. 
Authority is not simply given but is, rather, based on acceptance, with complex 
discourses dedicated to establishing its criteria. To start with, rhetorical devices 
are employed to characterise the status, the reliability and the trustworthiness 
of the self in ego-narratives (Frenkel, see also Henderson, III.2, and Bashir, II.2). 
Agency in religious pluralisation is, therefore, found in the creation of narra-
tives about the past and its actors, or the description of the characteristics and 
characters of the present with which new religious practices and concepts, or 
new combinations of these, can be described as being ancient and traditional, or 
common, respectively. With different modes of communication, or even of intel-
lection, agents of pluralisation try to establish criteria of plausibility for which 
the tools of enforcement available to political authorities are not sufficient. Phi-
losophy tries to establish impersonal criteria, epic narrative contextualises the 
“opinions” of individual “I’s” by a faceless or withdrawn narrator. The reader-
ships and audiences, however, know of alternative authorities to those claimed 
by the texts with which they are confronted (cf. again Henderson and Gordon, 
IV.1). Different teachers, other saints, and nearby monasteries offer alternatives 
(Frenkel, see also Ramelli, III.1). Uttering doubts about doctrinal matters also 
questions authority (see Casteigt and M. Vinzent in II.1). Doubt might be funda-
mentally endorsed, as, for example, in Indian philosophy, thus engaging with 
claims that are built only on trust. As such, it could be employed as a medium of 
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control, in particular in relation to the truth claims about invisible powers and 
authority built on such truth claims. Other cultures have an ongoing discourse 
about doubt. This discourse could be fed by the narration of stories about periods 
and contexts that rigorously excluded doubt, for instance about ancient Athens 
(see Bremmer, IV.1) or medieval Islam.
Evidently, there are limits to pluralising agency. Again, the contexts limit 
the social spaces for religious initiative and authority. Setting out on the path 
of pluralisation through a process of exceptional deviance is a high risk, pos-
sibly life-threatening strategy for the agent. The process is ultimately success-
ful when the initiator’s deviance establishes an exemplary behaviour as a new 
norm, extrapolating from former systems of value. The very character of religious 
authority, that is the claim of tapping an extra-social or trans-local divine source 
in miracle working or improving ritual and thus proving that you are a “friend of 
god”, is relevant here – with quite different consequences for the various social 
groups. The renouncing of sexuality is frequently implied, in particular for males. 
The formulation of authority as an existing group consensus, usually proved by 
referring back to texts that are claimed to prove the existence of such consensus, 
is in most scenarios a low-risk form of pluralising agency. Again, the question of 
whether new groups are thus created or internal splits obliterated, thus hiding 
internal pluralisation, has been answered differently by each of us.
Religious practices are spatial practices. This fact has remained implicit 
in our chapters for the most part. Extrapolating from this observation, one can 
assume that processes of multiplication or pluralisation created new religious 
spaces in proportion with the frequency of variation. This might start from the 
small place given to a sacred character by a votive dedication and then intensi-
fied by a second such offering. Religious diversity or homogeneity inside houses 
was visible only to the few inhabitants and occasional visitors. The rise of ascetic 
homelessness resulted in the increased visibility of many practices. The new 
religious engagement of individuals in the ancient Mediterranean or in India 
produced religious bodies in plain sight of many people. Other initiatives led to 
their visual concealment, with the establishment of various physical sites, such 
as monasteries, caves, Sufi lodges and tombs, and commemorative spaces, just 
within walking distance of the traditional households. Sufi saints offered reli-
gious services to be applied to new fields; yogic practices rendered the body into 
an easily reachable but at the same time highly complex micro-topography in 
need of permanent care. 
New religious spaces were not only created by practices but also by texts. 
These texts themselves changed, when they were brought into new spaces and 
pronounced or read there.  Texts themselves were sites in which quotations of 
other texts could be found. Pluralisation meant that the topography of religious 
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sites became much more complex and polyvalent, a phenomenon that did not 
apply only in urban contexts. Mosques, as highly controlled spaces, could be sup-
plemented and even contested by shrines. Moving from one space to the other 
could involve significant shifts in religious identity or authority. These could be 
related to social or gender roles: the child who accompanied the mother to the 
shrine became the boy who accompanied his father to the mosque.
Language is another crucial site for the negotiation of religious pluralisation. 
The linking of bodies of religious knowledge to specific, and above all erudite, lan-
guages could be used to restrict access. Multilingualism and the ability to address 
audiences from diverse linguistic backgrounds facilitated pluralisation and the 
empowerment of individuals, but might also be used restrictively to mark reli-
gious authority. Being able to understand, copy, and comment upon authoritative 
texts is a competence that enables barely visible micro-pluralisation or produced 
consequential changes. Switching language to a more accessible idiom likewise 
leads to pluralisation, as in the case of Persian in the 16th and 17th centuries. 
Zechendorff used the teaching of another language, Arabic in his case, to trans-
port religious ideas. Specific terms could be used to create borders and negotiate 
pluralisation – or to hide advanced internal pluralisation. In classical India, the 
acceptance of individuals as sources of religious knowledge modified the under-
standing of the role of language, which had been seen as a closed system of col-
lective knowledge. “Trustworthy persons” emerged as a new category of verbal 
reliability and evidence for religious truth claims (Malinar). 
By way of conclusion, we would like to emphasise that pluralisation and 
individualisation are intertwined and intrinsically connected to determining the 
function of religious authorities. Accordingly, processes of individualisation are 
as precarious, temporary and reversible as are the complex processes of plural-
isation. Access to, and dissemination of, media of religious communication are 
as crucial for individuals in manifesting the multiplication of religious signs and 
practices as they are in stabilising them. Coping with and regulating pluralisation 
affects the place of religion in society in many respects. It calls for ascribing reli-
gious authority to individuals in new ways, opening space and defining its limits. 
Legal and political frameworks, as have been addressed in our chapters (see also 
IV.1), are existent, accepted and invoked – or newly developed. The concepts of 
individual religious agency entertained by the political, legal and economic (for 
instance in the role of patrons) actors are part of the negotiation of pluralisation 
and the recognition or rejection of individual religious authority.

Section 4.3: Walking the edges
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1 Introduction 
But the mind of man is also subject to an unaccountable elevation and presumption, arising 
from prosperous success, from luxuriant health, from strong spirits, or from a bold and con-
fident disposition. In such a state of mind, the imagination swells with great but confused 
conceptions, to which no sublunary beauties or enjoyments can correspond. Everything 
mortal and perishable vanishes as unworthy of attention. And a full range is given to the 
fancy in the invisible regions or world of spirits, where the soul is at liberty to indulge itself 
in every imagination, which may best suit its present taste and disposition. Hence arise 
raptures, transports, and surprising flights of fancy; and confidence and presumption still 
encreasing, these raptures, being altogether unaccountable, and seeming quite beyond the 
reach of our ordinary faculties, are attributed to the immediate inspiration of that Divine 
Being, who is the object of devotion. In a little time, the inspired person comes to regard 
himself as a distinguished favourite of the Divinity; and when this frenzy once takes place, 
which is the summit of enthusiasm, every whimsy is consecrated: Human reason, and even 
morality are rejected as fallacious guides: And the fanatic madman delivers himself over, 
blindly, and without reserve, to the supposed ellipses of the spirit, and to inspiration from 
above. Hope, pride, presumption, a warm imagination, together with ignorance, are, there-
fore, the true sources of ENTHUSIASM.  (Hume 1987 [1741])
When Hume wrote these few lines, he was in good company in assessing the 
perils of certain Christian groups who had influenced Western Christendom since 
the Reformation. In the ground-breaking multi-volume Tous les cérémonies du 
monde (1723–1743), Bernard Picart and Jean-Frédéric Bernard, Huguenot exiles in 
Amsterdam, described with a certain amount of criticism a recent religious phe-
nomenon which had spread to Paris at the beginning of the 18th century. A group 
of followers of a Parisian Jansenist and ascetic, François De Paris, became known 
by the name convulsionnaires de Saint Medard. After De Paris’ death, his gravesite 
in Saint Médard became a place of pilgrimage where followers had visions and 
were miraculously healed (Hunt, Jacob and Mijnhardt 2010, 270–95). Mainly com-
posed of women, this movement was characterised by embodied religious prac-
tices, some of which were rooted in biblical traditions. They spoke in tongues, 
danced, prayed, and sang. 
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Some decades earlier, persecuted French Huguenots from the Cavennes, a 
region in the south of France, began roaming around the country while preach-
ing the imminent coming of the Kingdom of God. Besides sermonising, they per-
formed miraculous healings, sang, and spoke in tongues. When, through the 
network of Calvinist support, they moved to England, they attempted to resume 
this religious enthusiasm in an urban setting (Laborie 2015). 
From the 1650s to the 1660s, many Jews, some of whom were of Christian 
descent, became caught up in the frenzy of a messianic movement led by a 
‘messiah’ figure who heard voices and then fell into a trance-like sleep, in which 
they acted against established religious norms (Scholem 1973; Idel 2000; Goldish 
2004). In roughly this same period, some of the most radical groups of the English 
dissent appeared: they spoke only when possessed by the ‘Spirit’ that enabled 
them both to be reached by God and to speak His word. 
While many examples of practices such as these florished in the context of 
the Protestant Reformation, it is important to consider other, earlier and parallel, 
historical cases that culminated in highly individualised religious experiences rep-
resented by imposing personalities, who were imbued with prophetic agency.1 A 
number of earlier examples can be found in the lives of Gioacchino da Fiore (1130–
1202 ca.), Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1498), and Tommaso Campanella (1568–
1639). Their millenarianism was combined with utopian imagination and vision-
ary experiences that exerted a meaningful influence across many areas of thought 
for many centuries to come.2 The joachimite tradition embedded among the Friars 
Minor is just a case in point. Indeed, this tradition travelled different cultures, as 
European countries built their overseas empires, influencing religious movements 
imbued with prophetic and apocalyptic imagination (Travassos Valdes 2011).
These religious phenomena are usually linked to Christian millenarian-
ism, Jewish messianism, apocalypticism, and the broad cultural phenomenon 
of ‘prophecy’, which is rooted in biblical traditions. These terms conceptualise 
complex religious experiences that often overlap and that do not appear exclu-
sively in biblical religions, but also in other non-Christian environments, and 
throughout the wider religious context of antiquity (Aune 1983).
1 This article is part of my research period at the Max Weber Centre in Erfurt in 2014–2015 within 
the context of the Research Group in “Religious Individualisation in Historical Perspective” (FOR 
1013). For the use of this notion, see Rüpke 2013; Fuchs and Rüpke 2015; Otto 2017. 
2 These are only paradigmatic examples. The bibliography on these themes is extensive since 
some of these personalities exerted enormous influence in many areas, as in the case of Joachim of 
Fiore. In other cases, they became national heroes and, accordingly, played a growing role as myth-
ical figures of anti-clerical national narratives. For references, see Weinstein 2011; Popkin 2013.
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In this chapter, I focus my analysis on cross-cultural religious phenomena 
that were defined by the negative notion of ‘religious enthusiasm’. Although the 
term itself was used specifically to describe the practices of a number of Chris-
tian groups, and appeared more frequently in certain cultural contexts, such as 
those found in England and the German territories, religious enthusiasm was, in 
fact, a key feature of the early modern period and crossed all possible religious 
divides.3 In the English parlance of the early modern period, ‘enthusiasm’ was a 
term that described religious behaviour that was considered inappropriate and 
dangerous to the wellbeing of society.4 Criticism of the alleged ‘gift of prophecy’ 
appeared in the immediate aftermath of the Protestant Reformation and was pri-
marily directed at Anabaptism. Later, the term ‘enthusiasm’ was applied to dif-
ferent realms, from medicine to philosophy, becoming a label through which to 
disapprove of and dismiss certain traditions as well as enemies (Heyd 1995). 
A great deal of research has been conducted on this topic, with many scholars 
attributing the rise of the Enlightenment and criticism of religion to the repres-
sion of enthusiasm (Laborie 2015). However, religious enthusiasm persisted, both 
through space and time, and it is therefore problematic to assert its demise, even 
in the age of Enlightenment (Lovejoy 1985). Visionaries and prophets never dis-
appeared; indeed, their practices and worldviews, as much as their cultural strat-
egies, were replicated into the twentieth century.5
Religious enthusiasm encompasses a set of ‘religious experiences’6 often 
linked to visionary episodes, which may be rooted in biblical tradition, or, to be 
precise, to the textual tradition that described ancient prophetic practices, both 
in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. Visionary experiences can also be 
found in texts commonly referred to by scholars as ‘apocalyptic literature’, a genre 
that spread throughout the ancient Jewish world and became exemplified in the 
Revelation of John, the apocalyptic text that closed the canon of Christian biblical 
scriptures.7 Religious enthusiasm among Christians was both ‘restorative’, in the 
sense that it aimed to reinstall a form of primitive Christianity as the truest form 
of religion, and ‘redemptive’, meaning that it aimed to establish heaven on earth. 
3 For a first systematic historical genealogy, see Knox 1950, although we find an attempt at a 
genealogy in Johannes Hornbeek (1653), who associates ‘enthusiasm’ with the ‘libertines’ (Heyd 
1995, 21). For the Ibero-Hispanic world, see Silvério-Lima and Torres-Megiani 2016.
4 Hume 1987; Gibbon 1994; Foster 1997. For a historical assessment of the phenomenon in the 
19th and 20th century, see Taves 1999.
5 Religious enthusiasm is still very much alive, especially in the form of charismatic Pentecostal-
ism: Alexander 2009; Anderson, Bergunder, Droogers and Van der Laan 2010.
6 For this notion, see Martin, McCutcheon and Smith 2012.
7 The literature on this textual and religious tradition is vast. I list the most relevant references: 
Collins 1998; Himmelfarb 2010; a controversial text is Cohn 1970. 
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In analysing biblical prophecy, Max Weber labelled these religious currents 
as traditions of ‘charismatic authority’, a notion which was destined for great 
success and was systematically applied to many other cultural and political con-
texts. Charismatic authority indicated, in Weber’s definition, a quality of the indi-
vidual that set this individual aside, that endowed him/her with special ‘gifts’ 
stemming from extra-ordinary powers (Weber 1978).8
Visionary experiences vary according to their function. If apocalyptic visions 
were typically linked to eschatological fantasies and imbued with images of vio-
lence, death, and war, then prophetic visions tended to be more nuanced, as 
they also conveyed hopes of justice and redemption, and overlapped with other 
sensory experiences that scholars tend to describe as ‘mystical’. Jews and Chris-
tians held similar attitudes, although with different connotations, towards these 
visionary experiences and their imagination of the end of time. For Jews, prophetic 
notions foretold the coming of the messianic age whereas for Christians it meant 
the parusia, the second coming of Christ on earth and the Kingdom of God.9 Pro-
phetic behaviour and social criticism were often linked therefore enhancing polit-
ical millenarianism, which could cross many cultures (Subrahmanyam 2001).
There were at least two forms of religious experiences that overlapped in 
many written records. One is better describe as mystical journey, which is often 
depicted in autobiographical narratives as well as texts written by disciples. In 
general, these texts are rife with portrayals of emotion and descriptions of the 
path that leads to a profound encounter with God. This personal encounter some-
times prompts a person’s particular ability to be empowered and to perform reli-
gious deeds.10 
The other religious experience we find in these narratives is linked to a form 
of ‘spirit possession’, which, if properly performed, affects both the body and the 
mind and supports a highly individualised religious experience. The body inhab-
ited by the supernal force is always empowered: the experience might lead to 
the formation of a small group of disciples or to the organization of a movement. 
It could also incur a condemnation for insanity or witchcraft, and therefore in 
8 ‘A certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary 
men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded 
as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated 
as a leader […] How the quality in question would be ultimately judged from an ethical, aesthet-
ic, or other such point of view is naturally indifferent for the purpose of definition’ (Weber 1947 
[original 1922]). 
9 There is a large body of literature on millenarianism and chiliasm: see Goldish, Kottman, 
Force, and Laursen 2001.
10 See especially James 1902; Otto 1926; De Certeau 1987 and 2013. 
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some jurisdictions, the death penalty. Medical scrutiny of religious behaviour is 
not a new practice, especially for Catholics and Protestants, and became particu-
larly meaningful in the first half of the 18th century. This was when it specifically 
targeted the religious phenomenon of enthusiasm, either as a form of supersti-
tion or illness of the mind and/or body (Laborie 2015; but especially addressed in 
Burton 1621; Heyd 1995). The Catholic Church’s medical examinations followed 
specific instructions, devised to identify true holiness, to establish sainthood, 
and ultimately exercise a form of discipline over uncontrolled personal religious 
experiences.11 Likewise, powerful and controversial mystical experiences were 
examined to detect inappropriate behaviour or to eliminate practices that were 
deemed dangerous. The most emblematic case is of course that of the arch-mystic 
Teresa of Avila, whose emotional experience of her encounter with God inspired 
numerous depictions in representational works of art. She herself kept a diary of 
her visions, at the suggestion of her confessor, who was able to both address and 
discipline Teresa’s inner responses.12 
Being possessed by any sort of extra-ordinary power entails the use of the 
body to convey a religious message. My goal in this chapter is to pinpoint how the 
body was empowered in order to convey a message, to pursue a political goal, to 
strengthen group identity, or to break the legal constrictions of society. Moreo-
ver, my interest is in investigating how the empowerment of the body through an 
altered state of mind worked across gender and class divides. 
What is fascinating in analysing these religious experiences through the 
prism of different faiths is that, from a certain perspective, they employ a common 
pattern of religious individualisation. This form of individualisation involves 
both a strong volition and a gradual process that leads to a separation of the self, 
the formation of a temporary divided or enstranged ego, since episodes of spirit 
possession do provoke altered states of consciousness. On the one hand, spirit 
possession, prophetic behaviour, and visionary experiences have in common 
a similar structural pattern vis-à-vis the functioning of the mind. Protestants, 
Catholics, and Jews referred to culturally prescribed models that defined accept-
able psychological behaviour, the proper way to induce visions, and the appro-
priate mode for reaching unity with the divine power. The transformation of these 
highly personal and individualised experiences into religious movements varied 
greatly and often depended on social settings, strategies of  communication, and 
the intersection of the societal and psychological needs of the group.  Therefore, 
11 There is an extensive bibliography: I refer here specifically to Malena 2015; Luzzatto 2007.
12 For her biographical work, see Weber 2009. Female mysticism was kept under control by the 
presence of the confessor and the established relationship between the spiritual director and the 
person (who is usually part of a Church order).
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as some scholars suggest, visionary and/or mystical experiences should be 
understood not just as a psychological experience but as an embedded part of a 
complex religious system (Harmless 2008).
In this chapter, I focus on marginal traditions and the question of how they 
might be viewed through a contemporary lens. In particular, I discuss George Fox 
and the rising movement of Quakerism, and Sabbetai Zevi’s messianic Jewish 
movement. Besides their chronological proximity, there are a number of features 
that make these two movements suitable for parallel analysis. To begin with, in 
both cases we find a compelling religious leader, a highly distinct character with 
the power to become part of shared memory of a specific group. Second, the fol-
lowers of both movements faced similar social difficulties in finding that they 
were often subject to persecution. Third, in both cases we can identify an interac-
tion between collective enthusiasm and personal ecstatic or mystical experiences. 
My analysis will therefore focus on: the use of the body to induce an altered state 
of the mind, as, for example, through ascetic practices (§ 2); the significance of 
place in informing mystical experiences and inducing spiritual possession (§ 3); 
and the relationship between the individual and the social setting (§ 4). 
2 George Fox, the ‘twice born’ 
In his influential work on ‘religious experiences’, William James described a 
psychological type, the ‘twice born’, as consisting of those who were likely to 
undergo feelings of despair, melancholia, and distress in search of a plentiful 
experience of God (James 1902, lectures VI and VII). James made ample use of 
Quakers’ ‘autobiographical’ accounts, amongst which was the Journal of George 
Fox. George Fox (1624–1691), a weaver, dissenter, and founder of the Society of 
Friends, which became later known as Quakerism, lived during the period of 
great religious conflict that struck English society in the mid-17th century (Hill 
1972; Dandelion 2008). Fox recorded much of his religious journey in his Journal, 
the first edition of which was published shortly after his death and was heavily 
edited in order to make it resonant with the Quaker establishment.
The Journal is a written testimony that follows the structure of a conversion 
narrative (the Confessions of Saint Augustine are one of the most influential exam-
ples of this type of narrative). A narrative of the self is, of course, a very specific 
literary genre and should be analysed, among other ways, as an ego-document.13 
13 For the study of ego-documents see: Center for the Study of Egodocuments and History 
(http://www.egodocument.net/egodocument/who-we-are.html, last accessed 15th August 2018).
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Many Christian narratives about mystical practices also document the experience 
of religious conversion, that is, an account of a psychic transformation which 
symbolizes a radical transformation of personal life, a radical ‘conversion’, in the 
parlance of William James (James 1902, lectures VIII and IX). Although not all 
conversion narratives are mystical in content, some do provide information about 
a number of practices that describe the state of the soul striving for an encounter 
with God. These can be described as ‘biographies of the soul’. 
Fox was a preacher, a person who exploited the oral dimension and its perform-
ative effects to preach the word of God. The oral dimension is a remarkable feature 
of Christianity since its inception. Many of the leaders who were dubbed enthusiasts 
were preachers and their activity extended to various places, some of which were 
public spaces. Although preaching was regulated by the rules of classical rhetoric, 
it often gave an opportunity for extraordinary examples of religious individualis-
ation, because preaching was linked to fame and success (Facchini 2017). 
Christian preaching conveys two distinct elements of religious practice: the 
mimetic, which refers to the historical Jesus and the early Christian community, 
and the psychological, connected to the very act of preaching, with ecstatic 
results occurring through the performative effect of the uttered word. Fox’s 
Journal describes both the development of the group and the interior story of his 
religious selfhood. God is omnipresent in Fox’s account. He indeed describes an 
encounter with him at the young age of eleven, which can be interpreted as an 
early rite of passage: 
When I came to eleven years of age I knew pureness and righteousness; for while a child I 
was taught how to walk to be kept pure; the Lord taught me to be faithful in all things, and to 
act faithfully two ways, viz. inwardly to God, and outwardly to man.  (Jones/Fox 1904)14 
But then, according to his account, he spent several years attempting to escape 
the worldly temptations of Satan, fighting bouts of despair and depression. 
‘Temptations and despair’ are two recurring words that have led to a wealth of 
publications about the intrinsic bond between religion, enthusiasm, and melan-
cholia.15 The Journal is permeated by a recurring trope of darkness and light, a 
dualism devised to describe mood swings, from melancholy and depression to 
enthusiasm and optimism. Overall, Fox seems to opt for an optimistic outlook, 
a trust in humankind. One phrase captures some of this religious ideology 
14 James observed how personal crisis affected young boys at this age, which was often con-
ceived of as a moment of change. For this ritual stage, see Durkheim 2013 and Van Gennep 1981. 
It may also be analysed in the context of the biological changes that occur with the onset of 
puberty. 
15 This theme has been thoroughly explored: Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl 1964; Schiera 1999.
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 particularly well: ‘I saw also that there was an ocean of darkness and death; but 
also an infinite ocean of light and love which flew over the ocean of darkness. In 
that also I saw the infinite love of God’ (Jones/Fox 1904, 87).  
In Fox’s narrative, the Christ-like life examples are templates for his own per-
sonal transformation: ‘priests’ and ‘temples’ are not means for communicating the 
power of God. God does not dwell in ‘dreadful places’ (churches) or with priests 
and theologians; God lies within the heart of every man and woman, dwelling 
with the people (according to his own reading of Paul and Stephen). His ‘open-
ings’ – that is, a type of revelation – come from reading the Bible and questioning 
traditional knowledge. But nothing seems to provide the answers he is searching 
for, nothing seems able to heal the pain of the soul (Jones/Fox 1904, 90f.). 
After roaming, exploring, asking the preachers and the priests, and finally 
acknowledging that ‘there was none among them that could speak to my condi-
tion’, he heard the voice of God. 
When all my hopes in them and in all men were gone, so that I had nothing outwardly to 
help me, nor could I tell what to do, then, oh, then, I heard a voice which said ‘There is one, 
even Christ Jesus, that can speak to thy condition’; and when I heard it my heart did leap 
for joy.
Fox’s search seems to alternate moments of solitude with moments of socialisa-
tion, made up of encounters with people who are to become his followers and 
supporters. Following in the footsteps of Gospel narratives, open spaces indi-
cate the ritual setting for meditation and individual prayer. He often spends time 
with people inside, while seeking loneliness outside. The voice he hears comes 
directly, in his imagining, from Jesus. One might be tempted to speak of a sort of 
Christ-mimesis, which is a common occurrence among Christians, although in 
many cases this is rooted in Jesus’s suffering and death, as seen in many Catholic 
spiritual exercises, from Loyola to Catherine von Emmerick (De Certeau 2010; also 
Luzzatto 2007).
In one passage that, according to Jones, is emblematic of Fox’s religious 
psyche, this model is clearly described: 
I was very much altered in countenance and person, as if my body had been new moulded 
or changed. My sorrows and troubles started to wear off, and tears of joy dropped from me, 
so that I could have wept night and days with tears of joy to the Lord, in humility and bro-
kenness of heart. I saw into that which was without end, things which cannot be uttered, 
and of the greatness and infinitude of the love of God, which cannot be expressed by words. 
For I had been brought through the very ocean of darkness and death, and through and over 
the power of Satan, by the eternal glorious power of Christ; even through that darkness was 
I brought, which covered over all the world, and which chained down all and shut up all in 
death. The same eternal power of God, which brought through these things, was that which 
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afterwards shook the nations, priests, professors and people. Then could I say had I been in 
spiritual Babylon, Sodom, Egypt, and the grave; but by the eternal power of God I was come 
out of it, into the power of Christ.  (Jones/Fox 1904, 87f.) 
The Journal went through substantial editing, both at the end of the 17th century 
and later, when a philological edition was published (Villani 2003; Smith/Fox 
1998). There is no space here to reflect upon the significance of the writing phase 
that, as we mentioned above, plays an important role in defining truth claims and 
establishing an authoritative tradition. Fox founded a religious group in which 
contact with the power of Christ was continuously sought and experienced, both 
by men and women. His followers became missionaries, and enthusiasm was an 
outstanding feature of their practice, shaking and trembling an integral part of 
their ritual gatherings. Quakers were certainly ‘fanatical’: they embarked on dan-
gerous missions, as with those who went to Italy with the purpose of converting 
the Pope, or those who were imprisoned in Malta (Villani 1996). But beyond this, 
they challenged theological authorities and political powers, refusing to pledge 
oaths and to serve in the army. As the movement flourished in the second half of 
the 17th century, it reached America and became established there, where it lost 
some of its original features. As suggested by Max Weber, the routinisation of 
charisma was finally institutionalised. 
3  When the body speaks: prophecy and 
messianism of Jews 
The religious zeal of the Iberian Jews was influential in the rise of the phenome-
non increasingly known as spirit possession, as well as in fuelling the messianic 
frenzy that erupted with Sabbetai Zevi, the ‘mystical messiah’, around 1665–66. 
Mysticism, messianic enthusiasm related to the Sabbatean movement, and 
altered states of the mind are ideal points of departure for analysing forms of 
individualisation.
While Gershom Scholem attempted to reconstruct the history of Sabbetai 
through a phenomenological approach, recent literature has emphasised instead 
the general historical contexts in which Christian millenarianism and apocalyp-
ticism overlapped with Jewish messianism (Yerushalmi 1971; Goldish 2004). It is 
notable that one of the most important supporters of Sabbetai, Abraham Miguel 
Cardoso, was a former New Christian and made ample use of Christological exe-
gesis to justify Sabbetai’s conversion to Islam (Halperin 2007; Ruderman 2010, 
163–6; Maciejko 2011).  
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Messianism can be interpreted against a backdrop of messianic doctrines, 
ideas, and practices with a comparative approach that connects the Jewish and 
Christian realms. In the phenomenology elaborated by Scholem, Christian mes-
sianism is especially antinomian and critical of authority, whereas Jewish mes-
sianism points toward the restorative dimension (a restoration of ancient political 
power). This is because rabbinic agency aims to control apocalyptical leanings 
and, in Scholem’s interpretation, all potential anarchic cultural tendencies 
associated with ‘apocalypticism’ (Scholem 1973). Sabbetai Zevi was described 
by Scholem as a ‘mystical messiah’, and he implied that mysticism explained 
both his action and his disruptive antinomian attitude (Scholem 1971). But there 
is more: When Scholem conducted his extensive research, the subject of Jewish 
mysticism was not yet fully established in the academy. Mysticism and kabba-
listic lore had been under attack since before the early 19th century and many 
scholars denied that Judaism had a deep and widespread mystical tradition. 
Moreover, Scholem and others inferred that the kabbalah disseminated through 
the 16th and 17th centuries was responsible for two major historical processes: 
one related to a new conception of the self, through the idea of a personal conver-
sion, a  self-redemption, an inner form of salvation (Liebes 1993). The second is 
linked to pathways of secularisation that I shall not discuss here, as they are quite 
outdated according to recent reassessments of ‘secularising’ theories. Suffice it to 
say that Scholem’s aim was to identify an internal religious secularising pathway 
in order to prove that Judaism had both the power required to modernise and its 
own methods for undertaking the process.16
Since the inception of the sciences of religion, ascetic practices have attracted 
scholarly attention, although they are usually associated with Christian tradi-
tions and oriental religions (Harpham 1993; Wimbush and Valantis 1998; Flood 
2004). For a better understanding of messianic agency, a perspective that can be 
offered is one that comparatively analyses different forms of mysticism induced 
by ascetic practices. Ascetic practices among Jews are already detectable in 
ancient rabbinic sources, although many historians claim that ascetic practices 
were always regulated (Diamond 2004). These practices usually affect the body 
deeply, thus inducing a modification of the mind’s setting, and hence a modifica-
tion of the relationship between the self and the Godhead. Kabbalists and ascet-
ics made ample use of visions as a way of empowering themselves with author-
ity but, in order to do so, they had to subjugate their bodies. But not all mystics 
16 It is not possible to elaborate here on this interpretation of Jewish messianism, which is, in 
other words, a theory of modernity and secularisation. Historiography on Kabbalah and Jewish 
mysticism seems to accept it without critical inquiry. See Maciejko 2011 and 2017; Engel 2017.
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were destined to inspire religious movements or enthusiasm as did Sabbetai Zevi. 
For a long period, visionary experiences were only shared among disciples and 
guarded within small esoteric groups of adult males.
The case of Yosef Karo, whose mystical practice reveals certain interesting 
features related to textuality in both the oral and written dimensions, sheds light 
on some of the religious attitudes that were to reappear in the 17th century, when 
the messianic movement emerged. Yosef Karo was born in Spain and was an exile 
from 1492. He moved to the Ottoman Empire and eventually settled in Safed, the 
holy city of the kabbalists. He became one of the most important legal authorities 
through the compilation of the Shulkan arukh, a legal codex he authored. He also 
experienced ecstatic moods, which were induced through bodily practices that 
had an impact on the brain. I now draw from a description written by ‘eye wit-
nesses’: 
Know that the saint Karo and I agreed to stay up all night in order to banish sleep from our 
eyes on Shavuot. We succeeded thank God so that you will hear we ceased not from study 
for even a moment […] all this we did in dread and awe, with quite unbelievable melody and 
tunefulness […] No sooner we had studied two tractates of the Mishnah than our creator 
smote us so that we heard a voice speaking out of the mouth of the saint, may his light 
shine. It was a loud voice with letters clearly enunciated. All the companions heard the 
voice but were unable to understand what was said. It was an exceedingly pleasant voice, 
becoming increasingly strong. We all fell upon our faces and none of us had any spirit 
left because of our great dread and awe. The voice began to address us, saying: ‘friends, 
choicest of choice, peace with you, beloved companions […] Behold I am the Mishnah, the 
mother who chastises her children and I have come to converse with you.
(Artzy and Idel 2015, 94; for translation Jacobs 1978)
This is an extraordinary excerpt. According to Moshe Idel and Shahar Artzy, this 
is an ‘experience of trance’, the outcome of deep study sessions and sleep dep-
rivation. It is performed within the frame of a liturgical moment, the festival of 
Shavuot, a celebration that is part of the yearly calendar and is a commemoration 
of the Torah being received by Moses on Mount Sinai, in which the tradition is to 
remain awake and study throughout the night. It is a public experience shared 
by a small group of devotees, which indicates the esoteric element of collective 
mystical practices. The experience is a positive manifestation of ‘a voice’ (the 
maggid), which is allegedly linked to the extra-ordinary realm. It is based on 
auditory perceptions, embodying the whole of the oral Torah. The written word of 
the ‘oral Torah’ is heard. The body of the ‘saint’ is the means through which the 
voice manifests itself. This voice is, as the Mishnah/Torah (the Law), a feminine 
character: it is melodic, pleasant, strong, the mother, the friend, who comes and 
speaks out. Furthermore, if we follow the description of Shlomo ha-Levi Alkabetz 
(the author of this account), the experience affects the body of the saint (Karo) 
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and the bodies of those who witnessed the event. Although the saint has the 
auditory hierophany, the group is struck by the same experience: their bodies are 
immediately drained of strength. We may assume that the ecstatic experience is 
contagious (as also happens in other religious groups). 
Maggidic experiences became widespread and were sought after; they varied 
to an extent, although they were usually reached through bodily practices, which 
combined sleep deprivation and mind concentration, and through games of 
memory’ (letters, prayers, cognitive concentration, textual exercises). Often, this 
experience was conducted in solitude. It would then be ‘remembered’ and written 
down. Sometimes, it was described by disciples/witnesses and from that moment 
it became socialised. 
Let us turn briefly to the testimony of another rather well-known mystic 
from late 16th century circles. This interesting account describes the ecstatic 
experience of Hayyim Vital, one of the most prominent representatives of Luri-
anic Kabbalah (Scholem 1941). The dynamic here is between the teacher (who 
left no written sources) and the disciple. Vital was allegedly instructed to fast for 
 forty-eight hours and perform a practice of ‘unification’ (yichud – a combination 
of Hebrew letters and prayer). Then, before the High Holy Holidays, he was sent 
to ‘the cave of Rabbi Abaye and Rava’, where he stretched over the tomb of one 
of them, performed yichud (of mouth and nose), and fell asleep. He awoke and 
nothing had happened, so he performed a second yichud. He became confused 
and ceased. A voice in his consciousness spoke to him, inviting him to try once 
more, which he did. He concentrated and succeeded. 
Afterwards, a great and exceeding fright and trembling seized me in all my limbs and my 
hands were trembling, knocking against one another, and also my lips were trembling in 
an exaggerated way and were moving rapidly with forcefulness exceedingly fast […] And 
the sound exploded in my mouth and tongue and said more than 20 times ‘the wisdom, the 
wisdom’. Then it went on to say, the wisdom and knowledge, many many times […]. All this 
was with great wondrous speed, many times in the waking state. And I have fallen on my 
face, spread out on the grave of Abaye.  
 (Artzy and Idel 2015, 95f.; Kallus 2003, 408–13)
In this case, as we will see also in instances of spirit possession (dybbuks), there is 
an interesting added element concerning the significance of ‘place’, as the expe-
rience occurs on the grave of a rabbi in a holy city, Safed. Rituals performed at 
grave sites share a similarity with cults associated with Muslim holy men. In this 
case, the gravesite is linked to the ancient sages who were held in high esteem 
and were considered to be the founders of the kabbalistic tradition, such as rabbi 
Shimon bar Yohai (Chajes 2003). 
If we now turn to participants in the ‘messianic frenzy’ of the 17th century 
movement, we are able to trace new attitudes. We will refer to internal narratives 
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generated by members of the Sabbatean movement and will not take into con-
sideration those composed by critics of the movement.17 I will describe the expe-
riences of Nathan of Gaza (in 1665) and some of the followers of the movement 
before Sabbetai converted to Islam.
When the holiday of Shavuot arrived, Rabbi Nathan called the scholars of Gaza to study 
Torah with him the entire night. And it occurred that in the middle of the night a great 
sleep fell on Rabbi Nathan; and he stood on his feet and walked back and forth in the room 
and recited the entire tractate Ketubot by heart. He then asked one of the scholars to sing 
a certain hymn […] meanwhile he leaped and danced in the room, shedding one piece of 
clothing after another until his underclothes alone remained. He then took a great leap and 
fell flat on the ground. When the rabbis saw this they wished to help him and to stand him 
up, but they found he was like a dead man […] Presently a voice was heard, a voice emitted 
from his mouth, but his lips did not move. And he said: ‘Take care concerning my beloved 
son, my messiah Sabbatai Zevi’; and it said further: ‘Take care concerning my beloved son, 
Nathan the prophet.’ […] Afterwards he rested a great rest and began to move himself. His 
colleagues helped him to stand up on his feet and asked him how it had happened and what 
he had spoken. He replied that he did not know anything. The sages told him everything 
that had happened, at which he was very amazed.  (Artzy and Idel 2015, 97f.) 
This case suggests both a trance and spirit possession. Although there are some 
contradictions between the narrator – who knows the content of the voice that 
spoke through Nathan – and the lack of understanding of the witnesses, what is 
interesting here is the process that leads to the consecration of the messiah and 
his prophet. Language, study, and chanting are linked as means to produce an 
emotional reaction, suggesting a bodily possession that is manifested through 
alteration of the body, dancing, and disrobing, leading to a loss of conscience. No 
memory of the experience is left, as is known to happen in cases of spirit posses-
sion (Halperin 2007 with a different translation; Artzy and Idel 2015). The report 
also mentions a strong scent coming from Nathan as he became increasingly 
possessed by the extra-ordinary force.18 In this account, we read that Nathan 
undressed himself, although within the safe, closed context of followers. Chris-
tian enthusiasm often ended with ‘disrobing’ in public spaces, which contributed 
to the perception of their madness and social dangerousness (Heyd 1995). 
17 Criticism of these experiences was voiced but remained quite marginal due to the success of 
the movement. After the conversion of Sabbetai critics became more vocal and persecutions of 
alleged Sabbatians were widespread, see Carlebach 1990.
18 ‘Then did the rabbis come to realize that the aroma they smelled had emanated from the 
same spark of spiritual holiness that had entered into Master Nathan and spoken these words’ 
(Halperin 2007, 36).
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As the movement gained traction among Jews of the Ottoman Empire and 
elsewhere, prophetic symbolical acts spread and antinomian activities increased. 
The Memorial describes many instances of prophesying through trance (tar-
demah – becoming weak, almost falling asleep, as with Nathan). 
This was the manner of prophesying in those days: people would go into a ‘trance’ and fall 
to the ground as though dead, their spirit entirely gone. After about half an hour they would 
begin to breathe and, without moving their lips, would speak scriptural verses praising God, 
offering comfort. All would say, Sabbetai Zevi is the messiah of the God of Jacob. Upon recov-
ering, they had no awareness of what they had done or said. (Halperin 2007, 36)
This form of prophecy also affected women who, we can assume, had limited 
access to the study of ritual laws. Nevertheless, they were very active, both 
through the organisation of confraternities or the cultivation of their own char-
ismatic behaviour, as is suggested by some cases among former Christians of the 
Ottoman Empire (Chajes 2003). Trance and spirit possession became widely prac-
ticed during this period of enthusiasm and were accordingly recorded across the 
diaspora (Scholem 1973 and Villani 2015). 
4 Spirit possession 
The religious movement that gave rise to Sabbatean messianism was characterised 
by the phenomenon known as spirit possession, which, superficially, resembles 
practices pervasive among Christian enthusiasts (Knox 1950). This experience 
was pursued, indicating a strong volition, and empowered the body with new 
forms of religious agency. Externally, the messianic movement resembled other 
religious movements that sought pneumatic experiences and social changes.
Spirit possession in Judaism is also known through the notion of the dybbuk, a 
concept that was fictionalised in the early 20th century through theatre and film, 
yet based closely on kabbalistic lore dating back centuries. Although described 
as possession by a malevolent spirit, the dybbuk bears some resemblance to the 
maggid experience. However, it portrays, if analysed through the perspective of 
religious individualisation, a different set of cultural problems.  A dybbuk is the 
evil spirit of a person who has allegedly come to a violent or dramatic death. A 
dybbuk is more likely to be associated with religious deviance (Rüpke 2016) and 
requires religious training and expertise in order to be removed. In other words, it 
demands a ritual expert specialised in expelling evil spirits. 
In the Christian world, exorcism was defined by precise laws and was con-
sidered a dangerous practice, and it still occurs within the Catholic Church. 
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The question of control over spirit possession opens a complicated chapter 
related to the repression of witchcraft in Europe, which dramatically increased 
after the Protestant Reformation. It will suffice to observe that those who 
underwent charismatic experiences could potentially be charged with the 
crime of witchcraft.19
From my perspective, alleged demonic possession is a type of individualis-
ation in which volition is minimised: often, cases of evil possession are the result 
of traumatic experiences (rape, abuse, social discrimination) and it is through the 
spirit possession that a person strives to socialise his or her traumatic experience. 
If, from a cognitive and neurocognitive perspective, demonic possession is similar 
to ecstatic experience, from a social and cultural perspective it narrates a different 
story. Spirit possession is one of the most widespread religious and psychological 
experiences and is found across diverse cultures.20 I address it here because cases 
of dybbuk possession are described in hagiographic sources devoted to the deeds 
of the kabbalist who could, in turn, perform exorcisms. Somehow, kabbalah and 
spirit possession emerged simultaneously and thus appear to be linked.  
Among Jews, exorcism was not regulated as it was for Christians, and the 
spirit might be evil but not necessarily demonic. Exorcism was performed as a 
way of communicating with the spirit in order to identify his/her history. The 
spirit often spoke, but the rituals were so invasive that the person they inhabited 
could easily die. The dybbuk’s story often described traumatic family situations, 
sexual abuses, conflict among relatives, misery, and unhappiness. Being dispos-
sessed of his/her own self was a way of revealing the socially unspeakable. It 
was a means to give voice to a self that was denied expression, even at the risk 
of being destroyed. In a similar way to ‘prophetism’, which was less common 
in Jewish spheres than among Christians, possession reveals a gender issue. 
Spirit possession and ecstatic experiences were common among women. Jewish 
women were often recipients of dybbuks and were more frequently possessed by 
evil spirits than men. Among Christian women, by contrast, these experiences 
had more chances to be socialised positively. Nevertheless, they were always con-
sidered extremely dangerous and kept under strict surveillance. Indeed, in many 
instances women who had such experiences were ultimately persecuted in an 
atrocious manner. 
19 The literature on this topic is extensive. For general references: De Certeau 1970; Douglas 
2004; Coudert 2011. On anthropological views of exorcism and spirit possession more generally, 
see Csordas 1994, who examines contemporary exorcism. 
20 The bibliography is vast, especially when it includes shamanism. One relevant example of 
this research is provided by Lewis 2003; Crapanzano and  Garrison 1977; Ginzburg 2017.
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5 Preliminary conclusions
A summary analysis of prophetic/visionary experiences among Jews and 
Christians, in which signs of prophecy were sought or stimulated, indicates a 
 bi-directional movement. On the one hand, one may identify the way in which 
body practices were employed in order to attain a religious experience that sub-
sequently produced a radical modification, both of the self and of the religious 
group. On the other hand, religious beliefs and practices were needed in order to 
activate a bodily mutation that could be validated socially. Furthermore, spirit 
possession could be ritualised and pursued by male members of esoteric groups. 
Conversely, these experiences could happen with a lower level of volition and 
with a greater amount of self-induced violence, as can be seen in the convulsion-
ary followers of Jansen. 
Religious enthusiasm unquestionably combines two distinct elements that 
are significant vis-à-vis religious individualisation. The first involves the deeply 
personal experience of being possessed by spirits, the ‘Holy Spirit’, God, Christ, 
the divine, and partially coincides with a religious practice which conveys mysti-
cal experience of encounter and identification with the divine. The other signifi-
cant element is the social dimension of the experience, as it was not confined to 
individual experience per se but was, rather, translated into action, meaning that 
it was performed within a social context and, ultimately, translated into a text.21 
The process of writing is pertinent because it translates the sensory experience 
into language, through its literary, semantic, and symbolic devices. The texts do, 
according to some scholars, undeniably betray the actual experience by pattern-
ing them on authoritative models. One could suggest, that they indeed reproduce 
religious experiences patterned on authoritative models.
If religious enthusiasm was a cross-cultural phenomenon, the specific path 
leading to an encounter with God could vary. Enthusiasts employed similar 
practices – primarily possession, speaking in tongue, trances – which enabled 
men and women to transform into ‘prophets’. The body was the main means 
through which to communicate this experience, which could be sought through 
a great number of ascetic and semi-ascetic practices. In many cases – especially 
among Christians – war and social strife had a strong impact on the type and 
quality of asceticism and ecstatic behaviour. Religious persecution had a strong 
impact on Huguenots, such as the ‘French prophets’, as well as on Quakers, 
although these groups differed in supporting or condemning violence and war. 
Jewish enthusiasm was to some extent the outcome of exile and oppression, 
21 The mystical experience is ephemeral, transitory, but when it is recorded, it survives. 
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and surely created conflict among Jews themselves. Despite behavioural simi-
larities – trance, possession, speaking in tongue – the convulsionnaires emerged 
within the context of Cistercian traditions in the Catholic Church.  In their 
case, we find an enormous amount of violence present in ascetic practices that 
involved self-infliction of pain to an extent that seriously concerned the political 
authorities (Strayer 2008). 
The search for a profound personal encounter with God through ascetic and 
mystical practices involves a double paradox. This quest often requires a ritual 
setting or the support of followers and disciples. In certain cases, it generates 
a community; very rarely does it remain an isolated individual experience. Fur-
thermore, as Idel and Artzy suggest, Jewish mysticism involves an experience in 
which the self is always divided (Artzy and Idel 2015, 111f.). In itself, the mystical 
experience is unique and represents a radical form of religious individualisation, 
yet it may only be possible through a dissociative experience, which affects both 
the body and the soul. Furthermore, one may suggest that to be of any signifi-
cance, even the most radical personal religious experience of an encounter with 
God must be recorded and thus socialised. In other words, it must be offered for 
the consumption of a group of followers, at least in the case of ‘enthusiasm’, 
which is undeniably always collective. 
Religious enthusiasm offers a wide range of types of individualisation: one 
easily identifiable type is ‘competitive individuality’ (Rüpke 2013), although this 
exists in the context of a religious market that was not endowed with ‘individual 
rights’. Against this backdrop, mystical and ecstatic experiences used the body/
mind relationship as a repository of charisma,22 that is, as a receptacle or source 
of ‘extraordinary power’. This proved to be successful in reinforcing processes 
of individualisation, eventually contributing to the growth  of religious enthusi-
asm that crossed into both Jewish and Christian faiths. These distinct yet similar 
phenomena highlight a certain amount of visionary agency.  They subsequently 
fuelled both de-traditionalisation processes, with the invention of new religious 
forms (many of the Christian groups that emerged from the Reformation), and, 
as in the case of Catholics and Jews, a substantial attempt to innovate within 
a superimposed system. Criticism of ‘enthusiasm’ must therefore be understood 
as a strategy to oppose truth claims on religious legitimacy, rather than a rising 
rationalised mode for interpreting religion. 
22 On the notion of charisma, I refer here to Taves 2013.
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Out of bounds, still in control: exclusion, 
religious individuation and individualisation 
during the later Middle Ages
Medievalists during the last decades have been well aware of phenomena asso-
ciated with the process of individualisation, and they have also been aware of 
different aspects of exclusion, religious exclusion being one of them. Various 
researchers have taken both issues into account and pointed out how they affected 
religious discourses and agents in a mutually reinforcing way. However, a wide 
range of terms is used to describe these phenomena within the historiographical 
tradition, while one and the same term may be used to denote a number of differ-
ent concepts, depending, for example, on the distinct field of study to which it is 
applied. In order to reduce this complexity, the present paper will focus only on a 
limited time period (namely the later middle ages from the 12th century onward), 
on the western church (without paying attention to heresy, which has its own 
history of exclusion) and, with regard to the case studies, mainly on sources from 
regions within what is now Germany. In order to further clarify the conceptual 
and terminological difficulties, it is necessary to approach different concepts of 
individualisation or of the individual as such, and their relations to exclusion, 
by systemising different accounts. In effect, this means bringing together at least 
four different approaches, three of them situated within historical research and 
one within sociological research. I will argue that it is crucial to distinguish forms 
of voluntary exclusion from forms of non-voluntary exclusion. However, it will 
also be necessary to take into account the fact that, as far as the impact on indi-
vidualisation and individuation is concerned, some of these threads may come 
together in medieval religious discourses and practices when we examine the 
source material.
1  How to talk about religious individualisation 
and individuation with regard to the 
Middle Ages?
Historical research over the last few years has dealt with the individual, with the 
person and the self as well as with private and personal spheres in contrast to 
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public and representative spheres on a broad scale.1 One of the main topics of 
research in this context is religion, in particular monastic life and devotional 
practices. The variety of terms used by scholars is a consequence of a methodo-
logical difficulty. Modern theoretical concepts and their related terminology differ 
from medieval concepts and their terminology (Iogna-Prat 2005b, especially 
8f., Goetz 2016, 470 ff.). At the same time, we need to take into account the fact 
that words similar to those used in modern research (e.g. individuum, persona, 
subiectus) may denote quite different, or at least variant, concepts in medieval 
sources (Iogna-Prat 2005b, 26–9). This may appear trivial, but it is crucial to 
decide whether to focus on medieval terminology or to use modern terminology 
to explore medieval concepts, structures, and practices (‘heuristic anachronism’, 
Moos 2006, 253). This is especially important when dealing with exclusion, for 
some phenomena we now group under this keyword were expressed within the 
semantic field of inclusion in medieval Latin (Röckelein 2014, 129). Therefore, 
regarding the topic of this chapter, the relation between exclusion and processes 
of individualisation or at least individuation,2 and its place in the section of this 
publication concerned with ‘Walking the edges’, the latter option – to use modern 
terminology – seems preferable. At the same time, we have to keep in mind that 
what can be interpreted as exclusion in a modern sense is likely to bear different 
connotations in medieval source material. It is, thus, necessary to clarify some 
historiographical principles from which my examination will begin.
Jacob Burckhardt’s dictum that the individual was invented only during the 
Renaissance, whereas people in former times associated themselves exclusively 
with broad categories, such as corporations and kin, sometimes seems to still echo 
through the discourse about individuality and concepts of the individual, even 
though by now many studies have indicated the opposite, or at least called for a 
differentiated approach.3 For example, Jan A. Aertsen makes a plea for methodo-
1 For example, the contributions to a recent conference on one of these topics, the person in 
the Middle Ages, dealt with a great number of issues (Die Person im Mittelalter: Formen, Zeichen, 
Prozesse, Frühjahrstagung des Konstanzer Arbeitskreises für mittelalterliche Geschichte e.V. Re-
ichenau, 14th to 17th March 2017), such as death and dying, and law and ecclesiology. For an 
outline of research positions up to the middle of the 1990s, see Aertsen 1996. On the basis of 
previous research, Derschka distinguishes different ‘domains of individuality’: religion, monas-
ticism, philosophy, law, literature, art, emotions, social relationships, material culture, money, 
and theories of personality (Derschka 2014, 29–192). 
2 Musschenga defines ‘[…] individualisation as an objective process of social change, individua-
tion as development of personal identity […]’ (Musschenga 2001, 5). 
3 For a survey and evaluation of research since Burckhardt’s times, see Iogna-Prat 2005b, 8–23. 
The latest monograph dedicated to the subject of the individual in the Middle Ages deals in-
stead with the High Middle Ages (Derschka 2014). Concerning Burkhardt’s dictum and its 
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logical and terminological precision. He warns against diffusing concepts of the 
individual and of personality and against diffusing modern concepts with medi-
eval understandings of individuum and persona. At the same time, he points out 
that modern notions of individuality and personality are to a great extent based 
on medieval theological reflection.4 It is hardly surprising then that research 
has frequently taken into consideration works of theology, similar philosoph-
ical approaches, and the personal statements of intellectuals (most frequently 
those from the 12th century onwards).5 As Franz-Josef Arlinghaus states, in this 
field of study sources with an emphasis on introspection and  self-reflection that 
contain hints for distancing oneself from the others serve as markers for measur-
ing gradual stages of individuality (Arlinghaus 2015, 13).
Moreover, modern concepts of the individual, the self, individuation, and 
individualisation serve as tools to evaluate and to explore medieval societies and 
political thinking.6 Otto Gerhard Oexle for example, referring to Simmels concept 
of social circles, assumes that medieval group culture (e.g. guilds and fraterni-
ties) could serve as a ‘benchmark for individuality within a society’ (Oexle 2001, 
20 with reference to Simmel 1968, 27, 30).
Those groups based on coniuratio could be interpreted as ‘indicators and a 
factor of a medieval culture of the individual’, inasmuch as groups were grounded 
on the actions of single persons (Oexle 2001, 34). Concerning political thinking 
and the political mentality, individuality and concepts of personality have been 
identified in, for example, the time of Henry IV (1050–1106), the excommunicated 
and deposed king being in conflict with a vast number of princes, lords, bishops, 
and subjects. According to Tilman Struve, descriptions of individuals became 
increasingly common motives within historiography during Henry’s regency, and 
individual and personal features became ever more important in these descrip-
tions. Struve assumes that chroniclers then pictured ‘the individual yearning for 
freedom, bursting the bounds of traditional ties’ (Struve 2006, 13). From a differ-
ent perspective, Sverre Bagge traces tendencies ‘towards an emphasis on “the 
inner man”’ within historiography. In his eyes, Henry’s biography,  composed 
 consequences, see ibid., 9–28. While Derschka concentrates – like others in recent times – on 
the 12th century, Hans-Werner Goetz has emphasised that the phenomena under examination 
can be found in early medieval times as well, see Goetz 2016, 267ff.
4 Aertsen 1996, IX-XV. See also Iogna-Prat 2005a, 247–70 with regard to ecclesiology and Signori 
2005, 119ff. with emphasis on Christianity.
5 For example, most contributions in Aertsen and Speer 1996: Individuum und Individualität im 
Mittelalter explore concepts of the individuum and individuation in theological and philosophi-
cal treatises, although two sections are dedicated to historiography and art.
6 For a thorough consideration of the use of the various terms connected to individualisation in 
the research history of the field of medieval studies, see Schmitt 2001, 241–9.
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by an anonymous author familiar with the king, can be seen as a pioneer work 
leading towards the 12th century when subject-related descriptions became 
popular (Bagge 2002, 308 and 363). Philippe Buc, however, has designated the 
late 11th century as a period of political individualisation: because a ‘transper-
sonal concept of the state’ was established, Henry’s contemporaries were able to 
accuse him of putting his ‘private interests’ above the interests of the Empire (Buc 
2010 61–94). We can see that research here focuses on social structures and norms 
and on how individuals reacted to them in either a deviant or a productive way, as 
well as on modes of describing historical actors in narrative sources. 
During the last years, Niklas Luhmann’s approaches in particular have been 
a subject of discussion in medieval studies. Luhmann’s concept of medieval soci-
eties as stratified societies is highly controversial among medievalists. Neverthe-
less, his views on exclusion and inclusion have stimulated debates about medieval 
social history. According to Luhmann, inclusion in stratified societies is achieved 
by identification, by being part of a certain estate (‘Stand’) or group that is defined 
by exclusion and inclusion. Individuality could therefore be achieved by allocat-
ing a social status (Luhmann 1995, 243f. Cf. Bohn 2006a, 145f.; Bohn 2006b, 35f.). 
By contrast, in societies shaped by social differentiation the individual is char-
acterised via exclusion, i.e., every single person is forced to establish a reliable 
role management with regard to several functional systems (science, politics, 
economics etc.), and being an individual (or a system of its own) is only possible 
beyond those functional systems (Luhmann 1989, 158f. Cf. Bohn and Hahn 2002, 
9, 13; Bohn 2006a, 148ff.; Bohn 2006b, 31ff.). While some studies that start from 
this approach will be discussed below in the context of the relationship between 
individualisation/individuation and exclusion, it is worth noting that Peter von 
Moos has pointed out the need to invert Luhmann’s approach when dealing 
with the status of individuals within medieval canon law (Moos 2005, 271–88). 
In addition, the authors of a recently published volume (Arlinghaus 2015b) use 
Luhmann’s concept to fathom modes for discussing the self, self-reflection, and 
introspection in premodern times by distinguishing self- and  hetero-referential 
practices of self-construction. Therefore, modes of autobiographical attempts to 
inscribe the self into society are used to explore premodern ‘individuality’ (for a 
description of this methodological approach, see Arlinghaus 2015a). This volume 
serves as an example of the continuing interest in premodern sources that contain 
statements about the author’s ‘self’ and which are sometimes subsumed under 
the term ‘ego-documents’ (on this matter see, for example, Schmolinsky 2012). 
This concern has its roots in the 1970s and has interested historians focusing on 
literature, spirituality, and mentality (cf. Schmitt 2001, 249ff.).
In medieval studies, the correlation between individuals and social struc-
tures or groups seems to be the main starting-point for consideration while the 
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 individual’s internal relation to God is sometimes taken into account as a third 
factor. A particular approach might, therefore, investigate contexts in which this 
correlation and its norms are in transition or contested (cf. Fuchs 2015, 336). At the 
same time, it might aim to reconstruct levels of (de-)traditionalisation, (de-)stand-
ardisation and (de-)privatisation, since privatisation often serves as a marker for 
individuality, whereas traditionalisation and standardisation seem incompatible 
with individuality (cf. Struve 2006, 13; Rüpke 2013, 7; Fuchs 2015, 334). For that 
matter, exclusion and inclusion (and hetero-reference and self-reference respec-
tively) can serve as modes of description on the level of social processes as well 
as on the level of the analysis of historical texts. With regard to the sources, per-
sonal statements of excluded individuals could help to show whether exclusion 
fostered individuation or individualisation, even though we need to bear in mind 
that these statements may not reveal an actual ‘inner self’ but more likely help 
to uncover ‘the narratives that would create and shape an institution called indi-
viduality’ (Arlinghaus 2015, 17). When dealing with social processes that might 
be called individualisation, it is necessary to consider norms of exclusion, too, as 
they can reveal how much ‘individuality’ an excluded individual should have at 
his or her disposal. But let us first explore the way in which current research deals 
with religious exclusion in the context of individuation and individualisation. 
2  Correlations between exclusion, 
individualisation and individuation 
in religious contexts
Bernd-Christian Otto refers to individualisation with regard to ‘standing-out indi-
viduals’, i.e. individuals who stand out of something (Otto 2017, 40), an idea that 
might lead one to conclude that exclusion is at the very core of individualisation. 
But this would be a rather reckless leap, especially when taking into account 
that – and here again I draw on Otto’s considerations – ‘discourses of exclusion’ 
may serve the function of ‘othering’ and thereby lead to the very opposite of 
individualisation (Otto 2017, 44f.). Moreover, the self can define itself by means 
of inclusion, by reference to the values and beliefs of the religious community, 
thereby shaping its own unique identity (Melville 2002, XV). It is, thus, neces-
sary to distinguish carefully between inclusion and exclusion and to take a close 
look at the correlation between exclusion and inclusion. It should also be noted 
that the term ‘exclusion’ can be applied to various phenomena of medieval reli-
gious life. Some of these, such as the dichotomy of orthodoxy/heresy are clearly 
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connected to ‘othering’ but others are connected instead to the configuration of 
the individual’s soul and the development of its inner relation towards God. This 
assumption requires some explanation. I shall start with forms of self-imposed 
exclusion and withdrawal because ‘self-exclusion’ – in contrast to involuntary 
exclusion (cf. Bohn and Hahn 2002, 10f.) – is considered to be one of the main 
aspects of religious life in religious practice as well as concerning monastic and 
ascetic life in the Middle Ages.
2.1  Self-imposed exclusion, seclusion, and withdrawal from 
common spaces and society
Three aspects of self-imposed exclusion require attention: ‘private piety’, monas-
ticism in combination with similar phenomena, and saintliness, aspects that, in 
the given order, delineate a curve from a minimal to a maximal degree of exclu-
sion that a human being is able to perform. 
‘Personal piety’ or ‘private piety’ has been a popular topic of research and is 
still studied by those working on medieval religious practice. It bears a notion of 
individuation insofar as individual practices are concerned, and it bears a notion 
of exclusion insofar the individual is regarded as standing outside of, or at least 
being detached from, a community. There is some disagreement about what 
‘personal’ or ‘private’ piety actually means. At this point, it is not necessary to 
develop a precise definition. For the present line of argument, it will be sufficient 
to explore the notions of several concepts.
From a theological perspective, Bernhard Lang has highlighted apotropaic 
elements of personal devotional practices, which he defines as manners of acting 
and speaking that individuals performed in order to express their enduring emo-
tional relationships with a Deity who grants protection and security. In addition, 
Lang writes of a ‘simple piety without reflection’, in contrast to a reflexive religios-
ity based upon certain meditative methods, which he calls ‘(Virtuosen-)Spiritual-
ität’. In this sense, personal piety for Lang is the basic form of lay religiosity (Lang 
2009). Lang seems to be speaking of religious practices performed in a state of 
temporary (self-)exclusion from established and standardised forms of religiosity. 
Although details of his notion of personal/private piety are not discussed in 
historical research, one comes across implicit references to exclusion in other 
studies as well. Eva Irblich, for example, argues in her study of prayer books which 
belonged or were attributed to the Holy Roman Emperors Frederic III (1415–1493), 
Maximilian I (1459–1519), and Charles V (1500–1558), that one can distinguish 
between ‘individual features’, on the one hand, and features attached to these 
emperors’ roles as rulers, on the other. Speaking of exclusion, Irblich’s second 
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assumption seems to be more important: in contrast to Lang, she does not speak 
of apotropaic practices when defining personal devotion but deals with a variety 
of practices that can be attributed to an individual who withdraws from the com-
munity of believers to contemplate. The small size of the books, their limited 
range of texts, unconventional compilations of texts and iconographies, as well 
as traces of usage and personal entries, all imply, as Irblich suggests, that the 
books were used in the context of practices of personal piety (Irblich 1988, 11–45).
Irblich’s approach is more common in medieval studies than that of Lang. On the 
level of objects, private or personal piety is addressed by researchers when a book 
was kept in a private collection, when images were of small size and were not on 
display in a public space but in domestic surroundings, and when books and images 
show traces of use. What makes it legitimate to categorise practices and objects of 
personal or private devotion as personal and private – something belonging to the 
sphere of individualisation and individuation – is a moment of temporal exclusion 
or withdrawal from common rooms and practices. Gabriela Signori demonstrates 
that these practices were not common for lay people alone, as is shown by the evi-
dence from monasteries (Signori 2005, especially 134). Exclusion here is addressed 
in a very broad and non-specific sense in this context and the topic thus requires 
further specification, especially with regard to social structures and norms.
From a modern perspective, the key figure of voluntary religious exclu-
sion throughout the Middle Ages is the monk or nun, at least members of those 
monastic formations and orders that requested enclosure on a large scale. Yet 
the underlying concepts of exclusion can only be perceived when set against its 
opposite: inclusion. Concerning monastic life and enclosure, Hedwig  Röckelein – 
 discussing the interpretations of Niklas Luhmann, Cornelia Bohn, and Alois 
Hahn – stresses the ambivalent, or rather interdependent, conception of lifestyle 
by speaking of exclusion and inclusion at the same time (Röckelein 2014). Monas-
tic rules did actually operate with the term inclusio, implying that a community of 
like-minded people was enclosed behind monastery walls where they lived a life 
different from that outside the walls with respect to religious practice, economy, 
and daily routine. When someone quit this form of life or was forced to leave the 
monastery, he or she would have been classified as excluded (excommunicatus) 
(Röckelein 2014, 129). When modern concepts are applied, one will recognise 
aspects of exclusion in the inclusio of monastic life. Thus Röckelein describes 
cloistered ascetics as ‘esoteric antisocial elements’ withdrawing from their 
ancestral social ties (family and friends).7 While this may count as one aspect of 
7 Röckelein 2014, 129. For Luhmann’s concept of inclusion and exclusion in stratified societies, 
see Luhmann 1995, 243f. and above. See also Hahn and Bohn 2002, 13–7.
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 individualisation as described above, it remains obscure how individuation and 
individualisation are connected to this kind of exclusion. Yet traces can be found 
on various different levels.
First of all, with regard to the rest of society, the monk or the nun was 
someone special, and – I again refer to Röckelein – it was the element of volun-
tary exclusion that attracted social attention and generated social prestige. To 
accomplish this exclusion, monks and nuns were bound to a rule that regulated 
their whole life, subjecting them to the authority of their abbot or abbess and 
to the control of their brothers and sisters (Röckelein 2014, 130f.). These norms, 
especially the fact that the community itself was the most important feature of 
monastic life to which everyone had to submit, contradict the idea of monasteries 
as places inspiring individuation and bringing forward some process of individ-
ualisation, as Gert Melville argues. In any case, ‘one of the greatest achievements 
of medieval monasticism, besides developing perfect forms of community, was 
producing structures of individuality that can be identified as breakthrough in 
cultural history leading towards inner self-determination’. This was possible 
because monasteries provided monks and nuns with the opportunity to focus 
on their inner relationship with God by minimising outward distractions and 
sensual temptations (Melville 2002, XIIf.). Living in a cloister prevents individ-
uals from committing sins which would separate them from God (ibid. XXf., see 
also XXVI.). Besides, monastic life required self-reflection on different levels: the 
very decision to join a monastery required, in the ideal case, self-assessment and 
the testing of one’s own spiritual strength during the novitiate. Taking the vow 
meant committing oneself to the community of one’s own volition (ibid. XXXIIf.; 
cf. Melville 1996, 167ff.); in the middle of the 12th century, Premonstratensians 
even expected their members to follow the rules with their hearts and of their 
own volition (Melville 1996, 156). 
Treatises dealing with the religious edification of monks, nuns, and regular 
canons called for self-exploration and self-inquiry, especially from the 12th century 
onward, during which Peter Abelard (1079–1142) composed his Scito te ipsum 
(‘Know  Thyself’) (Melville 2002, XXXVIf. and XXXVIIff.; see Peter  Abelard’s 
Ethics) and the canon regular Hugh of Saint Victor (c. 1096–1141) claimed in his 
 ‘Didascalion, or, On the Study of Reading’ to acquire wisdom by reading, as 
wisdom would facilitate self-recognition (Hugh of Saint Victor, Didascalicon, lib. 1, 
c. 1, 110. See Stammberger 2002, 116; Mensching 1994, 599–603.). Of course, self- 
reference, or rather practices of contemplation that ensured reflection about one’s 
own inner relation to God, was a common subject of devotional texts produced 
for and in monasteries in the following centuries as well. Kaspar Elm, when dealing 
with  Dominican women’s convents during the 13th and 14th century, even as -
sumes that ‘religious individualism’ became more important than the  community 
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(Elm 1992, 42f.). This may be true for some particular cases but, in general, exclu-
sion and the relation to the outside-world, communal life, and contemplation 
remained equally important topics of the monastic discourse.8
To live as a recluse (in Latin and German the term inclusa/Inkluse again indi-
cates the tension between modern and medieval terminology) can be seen as an 
even more radical form of voluntary exclusion. Recluses were likely to be walled 
up inside a cell next to the church after the liturgy for the dead was celebrated for 
them. During the rest of their lifetime, as far as normative sources are concerned, 
only a window looking inside the church allowed them to take part in the liturgy 
and to serve as spiritual guides for their visitors. The recluse’s solitude left even 
more room for contemplation than that granted to monks and nuns, resulting in 
an even more exceptional position between society and God (cf. Herbert McAvoy 
2010; Kruse 2012).
To mediate between this world and the other was the main function of saints, 
and the narratives of hagiography have also been the subjects of research dealing 
with the correlation between exclusion, inclusion, and individuality. Andreas 
Hammer, among others, has stressed that the future saint needed to exclude 
himself from the human community in this world in order to prepare himself for 
heavenly inclusion, i.e. inclusion in the community of saints. While the former 
action provided the future saint with exclusion individuality, the latter deprived 
him or her of individuality in any form whatever. Transcendental experiences in 
this world, such as visionary experiences, were taken as signs of the forthcoming 
heavenly de-individualisation.9 In this case, individuality and the total loss of 
individuality, exclusion, and inclusion, did not contradict each other but were, 
instead, interdependent. They thus complemented one another with regard to the 
hagiographical narrative (Hammer 2015, 228).
With regard to monks, nuns, recluses, and saints, voluntary exclusion served 
transitional purposes. Withdrawing from the secular community was supposed 
to enable the individual to get closer to heavenly inclusion and because of this 
excluded individuals could mediate between this world and the other. To a lesser 
degree, the logic of inclusion via exclusion is valid for private devotion as well. In 
all cases, exclusion leads in a certain direction, towards God. In terms of ecclesi-
astical concepts, this means travelling away from the Christian community in this 
world towards the heavenly community by moving towards the edges of Christian 
8 Regarding the situation of Dominican women’s convents, see, for example, Hirbodian 2016.
9 Hammer 2015, 226f. Münkler (2006, 36ff.) discusses the saints’ exclusion-individuality as well. 
The ‘overcoming’ of personality and the self is also addressed in other articles, dealing with very 
different contexts, cf. Haas in this publication.
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society. Individuality and self-reference are to be found in between.10 Would this 
also be the case if the individual turned around and took a step in the opposite 
direction, an action that, according to ecclesiastical norms, would cause involun-
tary exclusion? 
2.2 Exclusion as sanction for deviant behaviour
Before examining traces of individualisation within forms of non-voluntary 
exclusion and the potential of forms of non-voluntary exclusion for individua-
tion, it is important to remember that one of the most important, if not the most 
important, purposes of exclusion was to keep delinquents away from the commu-
nity in order to prevent ‘contagion’.11 This applies both to excommunication as an 
ecclesiastical sentence as well as to related punishments for deviant behaviour 
in monastic communities (Jaser 2013, 323f., 340–8; for monastic life see Melville 
1996, 163; Lusset 2011, 156). To explore the meaning of non-voluntary exclusion 
for individualisation and individuation,12 it is necessary to shift the focus to some 
extent away from the community and towards the delinquent himself, who might 
not have been too happy about his ‘opportunity’ to take part in those processes, 
and to his or her relation with the community.
10 This three-pole structure is important for other phenomena discussed in this publication as 
well. Cf. for example Cristiana Facchini 1299: ‘Unquestionably, religious enthusiasm combined 
two distinct elements that are significant vis-à-vis religious individualization. The first one refers 
to the deeply personal experience of being possessed by spirits, the ‘Holy Spirit’, God, Christ, the 
divine, and which partially coincides with a religious practice related to ‘mysticism’. The other 
one refers to the significance of the social dimension of the experience, as it was not confined to 
an individual experience per se, but was translated into action, meaning that it was performed 
within a social context and ultimately translated into a text’. Cf. Cornelia Haas’ 1365 descrip-
tion of the ‘United Lodge of Theosophists’ (U.L.T.) ‘method and individual approach to Helena 
Blavatsky’s theosophy, which emphasises without exception the pursuit of the individual and 
its perfection – meant as an act of unification with the Divine or higher self, as well as with the 
community of likeminded persons, in an individual, vital way in service for humanity’.
11 Cf. Hahn 2006, 67ff., 71ff. for theoretical reflections about exclusion on account of sin and 
contagious diseases.
12 Britta Müller-Schauenburg’s (1351) study of Benedict XIII in this publication deals with a spe-
cial case of involuntary exclusion.
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2.2.1 Norms of exclusion and traces of individualisation and individuation
When dealing with religious and ecclesiastical norms of exclusion, it is important 
to keep in mind that even though two of the main characteristics of the church 
were its role as a social body and as a normative and even political institution, its 
main goal was, nevertheless, to lead the single believer to salvation (Moos 2005, 
272–4). Consequently, Bohn and Hahn even find ‘modern’ elements within eccle-
siastical concepts of exclusion that served to sanction deviant behaviour and 
thinking: ‘In a society that designs itself according to afterlife, religion developed 
[…] its own patterns of exclusion. Everyone was determined by the risk of dam-
nation: the upper class as well as the common folk. […] the most important form 
of exclusion in this world that corresponded to afterlife was excommunication; 
it could strike a nobleman and even an emperor. The worst exclusion of all leads 
to eternal hell: Religion within the stratified society anticipated modern settings 
of inclusion and exclusion, because religion constituted an early form of a dif-
ferentiated functional system that included everyone in the first place and sec-
ondly promoted individuation. The individual, not a collective, is to be redeemed 
and damned’ (Hahn and Bohn 2002, 15; likewise Bohn 2006b, 147f.; Bohn 2006a, 
37f.). Bohn and Hahn seem to echo Moos’ statement that Luhmann’s model needs 
to be turned upside down with regard to canon law (Moos 2005, 271–88). They 
furthermore clearly refer to a macroscopic level, thus it shall be discussed if indi-
viduation and individualisation can also be found when going into detail. Let us 
first consider norms of exclusion as a sanction with the aim to correct deviant 
individuals. 
Monastic rules and consuetudines (‘customaries’) included various forms of 
exclusion to correct errant monks and nuns as well as lay brothers and sisters. 
The abbot (or the abbess) could separate the deviant from the dormitory, exclude 
him or her from communal meals and work or even mass (excommunication). 
In severe cases one could be imprisoned or – in the worst case – even expelled 
forever.13 Some communities and Orders that had developed a central organ-
isation managed to gain even the penal jurisdiction over monks usually held 
by the bishops (see for example Füser 2000, 43ff.), including excommunication 
as legal punishment. When exclusion is seen as a medicine to cure the deviant 
who drifted away from the norms of monastic life, its benefit for the soul of the 
13 Röckelein 2014, 129, 134–8. Füser 2000, 65–9, 76–80, 87–90, 100, 124–8, 139ff., 152–7, 186–90, 
205ff., 214, 220, 224ff., 232ff., 245f., 248ff., 296ff., 304–9, 311, 316f. Monastic rules and synodal 
statutes refer to the imprisonment of delinquent monks from late Antiquity onwards; from the 
10th century onwards, some consuetudines of canons regular deal with the subject as well, see 
Lusset 2011, 154ff.
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individual is obvious, as the rules were thought to enable the individual to unite 
with God. But exclusion may also have contributed to the individual’s individua-
tion on another level. Megan Cassidy-Welch, speaking of Cistercian monasteries, 
assumed that even incarceration served as something more than ‘punishment’. 
It was also intended to remind the sinner of the merits deriving from ‘ascetic 
practice and the cenobitic life’ (Cassidy-Welch 2001, 25). She adds that, in a way, 
‘incarceration was not necessarily solitary: the prisoner was able to commune 
with God and rediscover the means to eternal liberty’ (Cassidy-Welch 2001, 41). 
Thomas Füser comes to a similar conclusion when comparing normative sources 
of Benedictine, Cistercian, and Cluniac origin up to the 14th century: ‘in every day 
monastic life, punishments mark central points for defining one’s own spiritual 
progress’ (Füser 2000, 328).
Norms of excommunication for deviant behaviour are known in Christian 
communities from the New Testament onwards. They applied not only to monks 
and nuns but also to clerics and the laity. The censure experienced a change-
ful development throughout the centuries up to the 12th century that cannot be 
described here (see Vodola 1986, 1–27). The basic idea was that a severe sin sep-
arated the sinner from God, a view that was expressed by separating the sinner 
from the sacraments or even the Christian community and, in doing so, forcing 
the sinner to amend and to return to the bosom of the church. During the 12th 
and 13th centuries, some fundamental specifications with regard to the role of 
the individual were collected or established and discussed in canon law. They can 
be found in the private collection of Gratian (Decretum Gratiani, ca. 1140) and in 
official canonical collections such as the Liber Extra (1234) and the Liber Sextus 
(1298). We learn from those sources that one could be sentenced with excommu-
nication, for instance, for disobedience to prelates, for violating ecclesiastical 
rights and possessions, for injuring clerics, for infringements of norms concern-
ing marriage and sexuality, for maintaining contact with an infidel or for practic-
ing magic (Decretum sive Concordia discordantium canonum, C. 11 q. 1 c. 12, C. 12 
q. 2 c. 4, C. 17 q. 4 c. 23, C. 24 q. 3 c. 19, C. 2 q. 6 c. 32, C. 26 q. 5 c. 9). Minor sins and 
offences resulted in a minor excommunication (exclusion from the sacraments); 
major sins and offences entailed a major excommunication (exclusion from the 
sacraments and the community of believers in a broad sense, as common and 
economic life, legal rights, and feudal ties were affected to varying degrees) (see 
for example Liber Extra, 2.25.2; 5.27.10, cf. Vodola 1986, 44–96). Even though some 
scholars tend to understand excommunication as a mere disciplinary punishment 
(cf. Vogel 1975, 446), we have to bear in mind that in contemporary legislation it 
was meant to provide inner spiritual healing as long as the excommunicated indi-
vidual faced the sentence with respect (see for example Dekrete der ökumenischen 
Konzilien 2. First council of Lyon 1245, const. 19, 291).
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Some developments in canon law shed light on strong tendencies towards 
standardisation yet, at the same time, point to new perspectives for the indi-
vidual. Excommunication for certain offences required an ecclesiastical judge’s 
sentence, whereas other offences automatically and immediately led to excom-
munication. Canonists and popes deliberated on the latter form of exclusion par-
ticularly in the 12th century. In some respects, this differentiation helped increase 
papal control; in certain cases, e.g. when the excommunicate had beaten a cleric, 
only the pope could grant absolution (Vodola 1986, 28–31; Dekrete der ökume-
nischen Konzilien 2. Second council of the Lateran, can. 15, 200 = Decretum sive 
Concordia discordantium canonum, C. 17 q. 4 c. 29). With regard to heresy, excom-
munication ipso facto could be used to uncover cases of erratic religious behav-
iour that perhaps otherwise would not have been detected. If people from the 
delinquent’s personal environment knew about the excommunication ipso facto, 
they were obliged to avoid contact with the delinquent. The delinquent’s priest, 
for example, was not allowed to administer the sacraments to him. Thus compe-
tent ecclesiastical judges were able to read the signs and take the case to the court 
(Vodola 1986, 34). But, nevertheless, this so called excommunicatio latae senten-
tiae first and foremost concerned the excommunicated individuals themselves, 
who were thrown back on themselves and their consciences.14 Besides, in less 
serious cases, such as when someone had made contact with an excommunicate, 
this form of penalty granted a certain amount of privacy: the person concerned 
could make his confession to a simple priest and attain absolution without 
undergoing a process and appearing in court (Liber Extra, 5.39.29). The concept 
of general excommunication, i.e. on certain days ecclesiastical judges sentenced 
everyone in general who committed a certain crime or would commit it in future 
(cf. Huizing 1955, 315–8; Jaser 2013, 359–73), prima facie seems to provide striking 
evidence for a process of de-individualisation. But Dominique Iogna-Prat draws 
attention to the fact that since 1246 at the latest the practice of excommunicat-
ing collectives had been abandoned. The ecclesiastical judges were pledged to 
judge and punish only individuals with this sentence, thereby acknowledging 
their personal responsibility (Iogna-Prat 2005b, 20; Liber Sextus, 5.11.5). Peter D. 
Clarke traced similar discussions and norms concerning the interdict, a censure 
that prohibited groups, such as the citizens of a certain town, from participating 
in the rites and services of the church (Clarke 2007, 21–7).
Speaking of personal responsibility and culpability, the ecclesiastical process 
dealing with excommunication allowed reflection upon the question of whether 
14 As von Kober puts it, excommunicatio latae sententiae prevails ‘nur vor Gott und dem Gewis-
sen’, Kober 1857, 51.
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or not the penalty was imposed justly. Apart from the fact that the culprit was 
able to appeal against a sentence (cf. Hergenröther 1875; Köbler 2014, 296ff.) 
and to give his or her opinion in this regard, the mere idea that a sentence could 
be unjust inspired popes and scholars to reflect upon the relation between the 
church, the status of the sinner, and God. We learn from the Decretum Gratiani 
that God’s judgement will not be affected by an unjust sentence, because Gods 
judgement relied upon the individual’s conscience exclusively (Decretum sive 
Concordia discordantium canonum, C 11 q. 3 c. 54). Though, in general, the excom-
municate was obligated to respect even an unjust sentence until it was lifted, 
he or she was allowed to disregard it when it forced him to act wrongfully or to 
disobey Gods commandment (Decretum sive Concordia discordantium canonum, 
C. 11 q. 3 d. p. c. 90, c. 95, d. p. c. 101. Cf. Helmholz 1982, 211). In consequence, 
this left room for personal considerations about religious principles, at least on 
a level still compatible with the orthodoxy. The same applied to an excommu-
nicate’s fellows. While they were in fact obliged to avoid contact with someone 
struck with a sentence of major excommunication, they were allowed to decide 
if they avoided someone condemned unjustly, as long as they were led by their 
conscience (Gillmann 1924, 7).
Excommunication was intended to bring the excluded individual to volun-
tarily reintegrate himself or herself into the church. As such, it was a sanction 
that could and should be removed after a time. During the phase of excommuni-
cation, the intention was that something should happen to the individual’s inner 
attitude towards God and towards the Christian community. Whether what hap-
pened was sufficient or not needed to be judged, and it was judged within the 
process of absolution. Ecclesiastical judges needed outward signs to evaluate the 
inner state of a culprit, to condemn him or to lift the sentence. Concerning abso-
lution, it was confession,15 a pledge to improve and to make amends, sometimes 
in terms of public penance, that served this function. Concerning practice, we are 
well informed about the excommunicates’ pledges and public acts of obedience 
and penance (cf. Neumann 2008; Mansfield 1995), i.e., those actions directed 
towards the Christian community. Unfortunately, the act of confession, which 
was more explicitly directed towards the sinful individual, remains obscure. We 
nevertheless have to take into account that in some, or even many, cases some 
kind of confession might have taken place, even though we do not know what 
the individual and his confessor talked about. The impact of confession on 
15 Confession was required at least when a confessor absolved an excommunicate in the face of 
death, see Swanson 2011, 9ff. In some cases, confession was also required when an excommuni-
cate was to be absolved regularly, see Mersch 2017, chapter IV 2.3.
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 individualisation and individuation is highly ambiguous. As has been pointed 
out by Nicole Reinhardt in the context of early modern confession, confession 
was embedded within a highly normative framework and committed the individ-
ual to this normative framework. Nevertheless, confession drove individuals to 
self-examination, to think about their intentions and conscience (Reinhardt 2015, 
424; see also Münkler 2009, 25–8, Münkler focuses on confession’s contribution 
to processes of normalisation). This ambiguity can be observed in medieval times 
as well,16 although the normative frameworks and modes of self-examination 
were subject to fundamental historical changes until the 16th and 17th centuries. 
However, Alois Hahn, referring to the changes confession underwent since the 
12th century and quoting publications from across the range of the aforemen-
tioned fields within medieval studies, has claimed that in this case ‘subjectivity 
results from processes of social control’ (Hahn 1997, 409).
Assuming that Hahn’s viewpoint is valid, a similar ambiguity can be observed 
when exploring phenomena of exclusion. Exclusion usually did not correspond 
to an exclusion from society but, rather, played a crucial role as a means of reg-
ulation within society (Bohn 2013, 79). This observation is important for under-
standing the impact of phenomena of exclusion on modes of individuation and 
processes of individualisation that were, in turn, connected to the institution of 
confession. When thinking about individualisation and individuation, a point of 
particular interest is the privacy of auricular confession postulated at least since 
1215. But it should be noted, too, that confession is based upon an even more 
complex aspect of Christian thinking, namely the concept of sin. In theology and 
canon law, the question of individual intention became increasingly important. 
Again, it is the 12th century that is most commonly seen as the period of upheaval 
(Schmitt 2001, 251). Hahn and Bohn, for example, refer to Abelard, who in his 
Scito te ipsum shifted the focus from exploring external action in order to detect 
sin towards intentional action, i.e., acts of the will consisting in consent to sin. 
For Abelard, atoning for one’s sin therefore presupposed internal contrition, ‘con-
trition of the heart’ (contritione cordis).17 Although it had been common to explore 
one’s own internal state with regard to sin at least since Augustine (d. 430), the 
16 Arlinghaus 2015, 10ff. with reference to relevant previous studies. For correlations between 
sin, conscience, norms, and deviance in 12th and 13th century monasticism, see Melville 1996, 
172–82, Melville 2005, 186f. For the impact of ecclesiastical theories of intention on statements of 
defendants before ecclesiastical courts in the 14th century, see Mersch 2018.
17 Hahn and Bohn 2002, 11f. with reference to Peter Abelard’s Ethics, c. 3, 4–37, and c. 19, 88f.: 
Cum hoc autem gemitu et contritione cordis, quam ueram penitentiam dicimus, peccatum non per-
manet […] – ‘Moreover, with this sigh and contrition of the heart which we call true repentance sin 
does not remain […]’. See also Kramer and Bynum 2002, 65–71 with reference to further sources.
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particular emphasis on introspection from the 12th century onwards may be 
explained by reference to the ‘birth of purgatory’ during that time, leading to a 
broader acknowledgement of the individual’s responsibility for him- or herself 
(Kehnel 2002, 36 with reference to Le Goff 1981). In canon law, scholars debated 
about whether collectives were able to sin in the form of consenting to anoth-
er’s sin or if this was possible only for individuals (Clarke 2007, 27f.). This would 
imply that various phenomena grouped around concepts of sin may be enlight-
ening subjects for the issue discussed in this paper, since sin entails sanction. 
Furthermore, absolution required inner contrition and this was true not only with 
regard to ‘private’ and regular confession but also with regard to an absolution 
from excommunication.
When comparing forms of voluntary exclusion, such as those sketched above, 
with the norms of involuntary exclusion, a number of essential differences can be 
observed. As already stated above, while monastic and saintly withdrawal from the 
world was supposed to bring an individual closer to God and enable him to serve 
as a link between this world and the other, the exclusion of sinners was believed to 
express their distance from God. With regard to the legislative setting, the sinner 
was of no positive use for the community of believers. Nevertheless, we can observe 
several similarities as well. Both types of exclusion have sometimes been under-
stood in the scholarship as liminal conditions (concerning monasticism, see Röck-
elein 2014; concerning excommunication see Jaser 2013, 322–8). In either case, 
this condition was thought to be temporal, as inclusion was its final aim;18 monks, 
nuns, and saints would aim to unite with God while excommunicates should reinte-
grate themselves into Christian society. Furthermore, in both cases, although a strict 
set of norms shaped the relevant condition, it offered and demanded individual 
 self-reflection and reflection on one’s inner relation to God. In the case of excom-
munication, concepts of guilt and conscience shaped this reflection. In the next 
chapter, we will see that these ideas had an influence on historical agents as well.
2.2.2 Being excluded and talking about excluded individuals
When examining individual cases of excommunication, with regard to the source 
material, we are far better informed about the prelates who excluded deviant 
subjects than about how penalised individuals reacted to their exclusion. Where 
we do have information we can mainly trace legal procedures that point towards 
18 Cf. Hahn 2006, 71: ‘Soziologisch sind diese partiellen Formen der Exklusion deshalb relevant, 
weil sie Inklusion und Exklusion in spannungsvoller Weise miteinander verknüpfen müssen’.
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conflicts we today would assign to the field of politics, as in many cases command 
structures or ecclesiastical properties were concerned. But from time to time we 
find examples that hint at individuation and individualisation in responses to 
ecclesiastical censures or in sources that talk about excommunicated individuals. 
In what follows, a number of examples will be discussed in order to show to what 
extent excommunication could initiate or enforce processes of individuation and 
to what extent talking about the excommunicate’s inner state could serve as a 
means of standardisation.
With regard to appeals against excommunication, from the 12th century 
onwards we often read about procedural errors, ill-informed judges, and miscon-
duct. This is true, for instance, in the case of English bishops appealing against a 
sentence imposed by Thomas Becket (d. 1170), archbishop of Canterbury, during 
the Becket-controversy in 1166 (Materials for the history of Thomas Becket 5, 
no. 204, 403–8. Cf. Helmholz 1994, 242ff.); in the case of laymen who had been 
excommunicated in the context of quarrels with clerics during the Middle Ages19; 
in the case of appeals during the conflict between the Colonna-cardinals and 
Pope Boniface VIII in 1297 concerning his administration and election (Becker 
1988, 54–9); and in the case of monks and abbots appealing against charges of 
apostasy in the 15th century (Svec Goetschi 2015, 231–59). 
What do we learn in these instances about an excommunicated individual’s 
internal state, about his or her personal relation to God? In many cases, we find 
that the excommunicated person presented his or herself as a good Christian 
who did his very best to fulfil his role in Christian society as a bishop, monk, 
nun, king, or layman holding a special office. And in some cases, those appeals 
served propagandistic purposes. Some of the most popular examples – at least 
with regard to German medieval studies – are those related to King Louis IV ‘the 
Bavarian’ (d. 1347). After a double election and the subsequent disputes about 
the papal ratification of Louis’ kingship, Pope John XXII excommunicated Louis 
in March 1324 and imposed an interdict on the Empire. Three texts illustrating the 
development of Louis’ argument from December 1323 onwards suggest that he 
planned to appeal before and after the sentence was imposed.20 He insisted on 
his election and kingship being legitimate, portrayed himself as a sincere catho-
lic believer and ruler, pointed out legal errors in the process of his excommuni-
cation, and tried to demonstrate that John XXII was an unjust and illegitimate 
19 Cf., for example, the appeal filed by the city of Soest in 1280 against a sentence of excommu-
nication imposed on the citizens by Siegfried of Westerburg, Archbishop of Cologne, Westfälis-
ches Urkundenbuch 7, no. 1726, 795ff.
20 Among the numerous studies dealing with those connections, Becker’s book about appeals 
should be mentioned in particular, Becker 1988, 72–99. 
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judge. Concerning this last aspect, Louis at first criticised John’s treatment of the 
Friars minor (December 1323, Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Constitutiones 5, 
no. 824, 641–7, the passage concerning the Friars minor: 646), before setting aside 
this argument in the second text (January 1324, Monumenta Germaniae Historica. 
Constitutiones 5, no. 836, 655–9), and going on to accuse John of being a heretic 
with a thirst for spilling Christian blood in the last text (May 1324) composed 
after his excommunication. The argumentation includes references to the under-
standing of evangelical poverty held by the Friars minor (Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica. Constitutiones 5, no. 909f., 723–54; see for example Wittneben 2003, 
229ff.), a highly controversial subject within the Order and the church at that time 
which led to papal processes, doctrinal decisions, and various appeals.21 Louis 
promulgated this appeal throughout the Empire (see for example Kaufhold 1994, 
66–9), from which we can see that it was composed not just as legal remedy in the 
ecclesiastical court but also to serve a propagandistic purpose.
When people were excommunicated during a dispute over religious ideas and 
doctrine, the dispute might be shifted to the question of whether the individual 
should obey his prelate or – if the prelate was wrong – follow his conscience and 
disobey. This can be observed, for instance, with regard to the  above-mentioned 
dispute between the Friars minor and the Pope. However, those conflicts are 
more general, the texts may only briefly touch on the topic of conscience, the 
authors mostly appeal not against censures but against papal bulls dealing with 
doctrine, and they stress their main subject – for example evangelical poverty – 
rather than excommunication or the appellants’ internal state (cf. for example 
Wittneben 2003, 282ff., 290–352 on the Friars’ minor appeals from Avignon and 
Pisa [1328], on the topic of conscience especially 309; Wittneben 2004; Becker 
1988, 72–83). Appeals allow us, then, to look at how excommunicates evaluated 
ecclesiastical hierarchies as well as their position and the judge’s position within 
these hierarchies and how they dealt with ecclesiastical norms. Here one might 
speak of ‘inclusion individuality’ in the state of exclusion, since the appellants 
related themselves to the norms and ideals of the Christian community. The per-
sonal relationship the excluded maintained with God seems to be less important 
than the individual’s place within Christian society, the judges’ misconduct, and 
in some cases the intentions the (future) excommunicate describes when explain-
ing that behaviour led to excommunication.
21 Cf. Miethke 1969, 76f., 86, 105 note 390, 403–6, 409f., 416, 424, 429, 501, 505, 517 with infor-
mation about the appeals of Louis IV, those of the Friars minor, and the correlations between 
those texts.
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With regard to this last aspect, the strategies excommunicates used to 
legitimise their behaviour sometimes seem to slightly foreshadow ‘modern’ 
 role-distance. When, at the end of the 15th century, the Pope excommunicated 
Johann of Morschheim, a palatine bailiff, Johann excused his behaviour with 
reference to the specific context. The actions which led to his excommunication 
were embedded in a conflict between his superior, Philip, Elector Palatine of the 
Rhine, and the abbot of Weissenburg abbey, who were fighting over possessions. 
Johann 1498 tried to gain support for the annulling of the sentence by declaring in 
a plea that he had not attacked the abbey of his own will but due to his duties as 
a bailiff.22 Overall, appeals may shed light on how the excommunicates perceived 
themselves as legal persons or at least acted like one. But this seems to lead us 
too far away from the aspects dealt with in medieval studies when speaking of 
individuation, the individual, or the self.
When an individual ruler or city consul ignored a major excommunication, or 
when it was likely that he would ignore it, ecclesiastical judges could impose an 
interdict on the excommunicates’ lands. Here again, sources inform us about the 
reactions of the aggrieved parties, and here again I want to draw on the example 
of Louis IV. As I have argued elsewhere with reference to the Dominican mystic 
Margaretha Ebner and the Benedictine monk Hugh of Geurtheim during the reign 
of Louis IV, the interdict could press people to criticise norms and judgements 
(Mersch 2013). As Louis was never granted absolution, the interdict was – or 
should have been – in force throughout more than two decades in large parts of 
the Empire. Hugh’s convent, taking the king’s side, ignored the censures. Hugh 
himself changed his mind in 1338 and went to the papal court in Avignon to ask 
for absolution. He also pleaded to be allowed to break his vows by not return-
ing to the monastery in Gengenbach so long as the interdict lasted, a request 
his Benedictine superiors supported and which the curia finally granted. As 
Martin Kaufhold puts it, Hugh was able find his own way out of the above men-
tioned predicament (Kaufhold 1994, 248f.; Vatikanische Akten no. 1988, 719f.); 
his conscience seems to have made him act against the opinion prevailing in his 
convent. Margaretha Ebner’s case proves that such individual decisions could be 
based upon reflection of one’s own internal attitude. When she composed her 
‘Revelations’ in the period after 1344 in order to describe her life shaped by the 
mystical vocation, Margaretha used the excommunication of Louis IV and the fol-
lowing interdict to ponder two questions: Is it possible to act on the basis of one’s 
22 A summary of Johann’s plea by Konrad Peutinger († 1547) can be found in Deutsche Reich-
stagsakten. Mittlere Reihe 6, no. 146, 597f.: He said he was ein amptman der Pfaltz gewesen, und 
deshalben seins ampts, was er wider den stift gehandlet, hette tun müssen, nicht us sein sunderli-
chen willen noch vornehmen.
1340   Katharina Ulrike Mersch
own free decision when the decision contradicts the commands of a prelate? 
And if it is possible, why is it possible? The answer she received when asking the 
infant Jesus himself was quite straightforward: yes, it is possible because true 
love for god outweighs the duty to obey. It would, therefore, be possible to receive 
communion even during the interdict, as long as the individual sought to do so 
out of love for God. At the end of her ‘Revelations’ she reinforces her argument. 
‘Human judgement is’, as the infant Jesus told her, ‘often deceived’ (Margaretha 
Ebner. Offenbarungen 28, 35f., 148), and the interdict is in fact merely a penalty to 
support the judgement of a human being, even though this human being might 
be the pope.23 The two examples illustrate that in situations affected by censures 
of exclusion it is possible to detect individual decisions that may be based on 
internal reflection.
With regard to absolution, we often learn that the former excommunicate felt 
contrition. When the citizens of Magdeburg, for example, were on their way to 
be reconciled some five or six years later after Archbishop Burchard III was mur-
dered in the city in 1325, the city’s representatives went to the curia and shed 
tears to express their contrition (Urkundenbuch der Stadt Magdeburg 1, no. 339, 
205–9). In addition, some excommunicated consuls wrote about their deep regret 
in separate letters addressed to the pope (Päbstliche Urkunden und Regesten, no. 
512, 283f.; Urkundenbuch der Stadt Magdeburg 1, no. 336, 203f., cf. Mersch 2018). 
We do not know whether the future reconciled delinquents really felt this way or 
if they only tried to comply with ecclesiastical norms. Nevertheless, it is obvious 
that the delinquents’ internal states were a subject of discourse. 
This was the case not only in court rooms but also in historiography. As indi-
cated above, in the 11th and 12th centuries the excommunicated King Henry IV 
was depicted in a way that laid emphasis on the inner condition of the individual 
(Bagge 2002, 308 and 363). Concerning Henry’s famous penance and reconcilia-
tion at Canossa, where he sought out Pope Gregory VII in 1076/1077, chroniclers 
wondered if his penance was honest or if he only pretended contrition. Philippe 
Buc has gathered together the sources dealing with this episode and points out 
23 This addresses a tension that is actually effective up to date, cf. Veronika Hoffmann’s remarks 
in this publication on contemporary German Christianity: ‘The key problem lies not in differenc-
es at the level of belief content […] but between the institutional view of an interconnectedness 
of religious truth claims, the authority of the church, and institutional belonging and the indi-
vidual view of radical religious self-empowerment. Because this tension is to be found within 
the institutions, religious self-empowerment and belonging to institutions that are theoretically 
incompatible in fact go together to a large extent’ (1121). For the correlation between deviance, 
processes of impiety, and personal choices, especially concerning the deviant’s followers, cf. Jan 
Bremmer’s contribution to this publication.
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that some authors pondered the question of whether the penance reflected an 
inward view or not. The contemporary Benedictine monk Hugh of Flavigny pro-
vided his readers with a harsh description of Henry’s attitude on the grounds 
that Henry had obtained absolution only on account of his outward appearance. 
Hugh stressed that someone ‘who only pretends to look for God does not deserve 
to find him’ (Buc 2001, 243; Hugh of Flavigny. Chronicon, lib. 2, 444f.). Bonizo of 
Sutri, an adherent of Gregory VII, reminded his readers that penance needs to 
be done with a humble mind and body (mente ut corpore), implying that Henry 
performed the penance only with his body and not in his mind (Buc 2001, 243; 
Bonizo of Sutri. Liber ad amicum, lib. 8, 610). Similar examples can be found in 
sources from the 12th and 13th centuries and in sources dealing with less popular 
people, too (cf. Mersch 2017, chapter IV 1.3a and 2.4). Concerning the 14th century, 
the example of Louis IV shows that even someone who died without reconcilia-
tion could be depicted in a positive way with regard to his internal state. Louis 
was never reconciled and he died in 1347 as an excommunicate (Czerny 2005, 
81f.) who, according to canon law, was dissociated from the church and therefore 
separated from God, not only in this world but in the other as well. Many sources 
describe how Louis died from a stroke during a hunt (cf. Czerny 2005, 34–48; 
Glaser 2002, 1–37). Pope Clement VI then condemned the dead emperor, calling 
him a ‘persecutor and enemy of God and the Roman church’,24 and some contem-
porary chroniclers did the same by reflecting on signs of Louis’ internal state. For 
example, Henry of Rebdorf, a canon from Eichstätt, pointed out that Louis had 
died without any signs of penance or contrition (Henry of Rebdorf. Chronik, 68f.). 
In contrast, we read in the ‘Life of Emperor Louis IV’, presumably written in 1347, 
that the ‘good catholic’ Louis died while ‘lifting his hands and eyes to the sky, 
recommending himself humbly to God and the Virgin Mary’ (Chronica Ludovici 
imperatoris quarti, 137). According to a contemporary Bavarian continuation of 
the ‘Saxonian World Chronicle’, Louis’ companions witnessed that, in his last 
breath, he said a short prayer addressed to the Virgin Mary.25 The Dominican friar 
Henry of Herford reported that Louis had spoken words of penance, his hands 
and eyes directed towards the sky: ‘Almighty and merciful Lord, have mercy on 
me, the poor sinner, because although I have truly sinned a lot, anyway, I have 
never ever renounced you, God of mercy, or belief or vow, as you know’. Having 
24 In a letter addressed to Bishop Ulrich of Constance, November 13th 1347, and again in a letter 
addressed to King Charles IV, December 7th 1347: dampnate memorie Ludovici de Bavaria, dei et 
ecclesiae Romane persecutoris et hostis, Vatikanische Akten, 848f. Cf. Czerny 2005, 72f.
25 Sächsische Weltchronik. Zweite bayerische Fortsetzung, 339. Michael de Leone tells a similar 
story, Michael de Leone. De chronicis temporum hominum modernorum, 472f.
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said this, he then died (Henry of Herford. Liber de rebus memorabilioribus, ad a. 
1347, 270f.). 
For the approach pursued in this paper, the chroniclers’ interest in Louis’ 
internal or mental state is important with regard to the concepts of sin and 
penance. Susan Kramer and Caroline Walker Bynum, referring to the 12th century, 
point out that ‘man cannot see what is hidden […]. This privileging of the inner 
self is […] the root of the disclaimer frequently cited in twelfth-century treatments 
of penance that the church judges exterior things while God alone judges what 
is hidden or secret. The church does not know the soul of even an open excom-
municate or heretic who is seized suddenly in death, for example […]. Neverthe-
less, despite this admitted inability to see into the soul, the church does retain an 
interest in knowing the interior homo’ (Kramer and Bynum 2002, 71). Apparently, 
excommunicates’ contemporaries in general retained an interest in knowing the 
inner man. When taking into account the fact that at least some of the chroniclers 
may have had a didactic purpose, using the story to tell their readers how to die 
a ‘good death’, and thereby explaining how even an excommunicated individ-
ual could achieve heavenly inclusion,26 discursive elements of individualisation 
seem to have been used here to spur religious standardisation.
Taken together, the statements of excommunicated individuals and individ-
uals from the excommunicate’s environment, as well as reports about excluded 
individuals within historiography, bear resemblance to the norms of exclusion 
sketched above. The strict set of norms shaped how these people talked about 
themselves and about excommunicated individuals. In turn, the way in which 
they talked helped to reinforce processes of standardisation. Nonetheless, the 
individual’s inner state was at stake and sources related to excommunication can 
thus shed light on how people thought about this internal state and found means 
to talk about it.
3 Conclusion
Both self-exclusion and involuntary exclusion demarcate states of being that 
relate the individual to society in a very specific way and, at the same time, to 
God in an equally particular way. Whereas self-exclusion should lead towards 
God and therefore pave the way to heavenly inclusion, involuntary exclusion 
should, above all, illustrate the individual’s distance from God. But on another 
26 For the correlation between the particular judgement, the individual, and inclusion in gen-
eral see Hamm 2016, 290ff. 
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level it should also persuade the sinner to reintegrate into the church or, in other 
words, to again achieve inclusion in the church, a this-worldly inclusion even-
tually paving the way to heavenly inclusion. Consequently, in both cases strict 
norms were developed that should guide the individual on his or her way. And 
exclusion could be made visible in terms of temporal or permanent spatial sep-
aration: one could contemplate in a ‘private’ room, live in enclosure, be walled 
away inside a separate room, or even be banned from the mass and, therefore, 
from (certain parts of) the church building. In both cases – voluntary and invol-
untary exclusion – guidance was available in terms of discourses about the inter-
nal state. This could be found in treatises dealing with the religious edification 
of monks and nuns or, for example, in historiographical texts dealing with the 
internal state of sinners. In both cases, standardisation and individualisation are 
not mutually exclusive but mutually dependent. Although exclusion as a means 
of religious standardisation via ‘punishment’ may seem to be in conflict with the 
notion of individualisation because it appears as a measure of compulsion, it 
could still provide starting points for the individuation of an individual. Canon 
law expected that those threatened by excommunication and those being excom-
municated exercised introspection and self-reflection to prepare to reintegrate 
into the Christian community. Furthermore, it had the potential to contribute to 
a process of individualisation because the implementation of ecclesiastical pen-
alties provoked protests and discussions about whether these penalties had to be 
accepted and why, which is to say that individuals had to choose whether to obey 
a judgement or to deal with it in a rather stubborn way. On the level of discourse, 
then, excluded individuals could serve as figures onto whom debates could be 
projected, allowing the discussion of ideal forms and modalities of self-reflection 
and the internal relationship with God.
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The lonely antipope – or why we have 
difficulties classifying Pedro de Luna 
[Benedict XIII] as a religious individual
1 Object of the study
This paper presents a case study of a late medieval, although pre-modern, person 
within the context of the Latin (Western) Great Schism. The geographical focus is 
on south-west Europe, or, to be more precise, the South of France and the North of 
the Iberian Peninsula. The example leads us to reflect on a special problem with 
the concept of individualisation, a specific problem of perception, description, 
and terminology, which results in the invisibility of a special kind of individu-
alisation. The chapter will conclude by proposing a term that can mark out this 
specific invisibility in a visible manner, so that the problem is, at least, included 
in the research matrix. 
Two points should be mentioned in advance. First, the case might be some-
what surprising. The person to be analysed was a pope: Pedro Martinez de Luna, 
known also as Benedict XIII. A pope (or ‘the pope’) could figure well as the oppo-
site of what is usually assumed to be interesting within the process of individual-
isation. It is important to recognise that the object of this case study is the natural 
person (this pope), not the office (the pope). 
A second point concerns the meaning of the term ‘religious’. Throughout this 
paper, the meaning will be mainly judicial. Pedro de Luna was a canonist, a spe-
cialist in Canon Law, and, probably for this reason, his ecclesiology, his under-
standing of heresy and ‘orthodoxy’ and also his own statements and actions 
according to or differing from his contemporaries, were mainly judicial. So the 
term ‘religious’ has a meaning not so much in a theological sense but in the sense 
of ‘divine law’. Therefore, law is not only the limit of religious freedom or the 
shelter of a wide range of religious options: i.e. it functions not only as the frame 
but as the religious field itself. But, in turn, the term ‘divine law’ (ius divinum) 
will not be used here in precisely the same sense it carries in the discourse of 
canonists. Within that context, the phrase is used as a terminus technicus and 
forms the antonym to ‘ecclesiastical law’ (ius mere ecclesiasticum).1 In the present 
1 Ecclesiastical law is made by human beings and it is the outcome of the work of humans who 
tried to listen to God but were forced to use human language to express the concrete norm, or 
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chapter, however, no opposition to ecclesiastical law is intended. Here, the term 
just makes clear that, as seen from the Christian Canonistic perspective, religious 
law is really part of the relation with God as a transcendent being. Most canoni-
cal/legal norms refer largely or wholly to questions about the social aspect of the 
mystical body of Christ and are used to regulate the life of the Church in a social 
way. They are ‘religious’ in a strict sense but they are not ‘unquestionably plausi-
ble’ as, in theory, divine law is in the sense of the terminus technicus. 
2 The life of Pedro de Luna/Benedict [XIII]
Pedro Martínez de Luna (1342–1423) is known today primarily as the pope of the 
obedience of Avignon from 1394–1417/23.2 His papacy was the longest of the Great 
Western Schism. Despite this, he did not become as well-known as he might have 
done because he was considered by the later tradition to be an antipope. As such, 
he was given significant weight neither in secular historiographical research con-
texts, where popes of the Schism were written with brackets around the ordinal 
numeral (‘Benedict [XIII] / Pedro de Luna’) or not (‘Benedict XIII / Pedro de Luna’) 
and freed from the question of the legitimacy of their succession, nor in theolog-
ical contexts, which tried to draw a valid line from Peter the Apostle through the 
‘real’ popes of ‘Rome’ to the present, where his inclusion would have meant his 
becoming part of the long tradition of popes, who are, thanks to the office, always 
an object of fame and curiosity.3 Nor did Benedict become an object of research 
as simply an interesting person, at least not outside his native Spain (Puig i Puig 
1920; Moxó y Montoliu 1986; Parrilla, Muñiz, and Caride 1987; Sesma Muñoz 1994; 
even had to regulate something which is untouched by questions or topics of divine law. Divine 
law, on the contrary, has to be made by God. For example, the substance of the Ten Command-
ments will be seen as divine law. Even there, seen from the Christian Canonistic perspective, one 
must distinguish between the order God gives and the expression of the order through the medi-
um of human language. Several norms, judicial or moral, are nevertheless seen as being divine 
law, as, for example, the indissolubility of sacramental matrimony (Aymans 1996).
2 The date 1417 is usually seen as the end of the schism, as it marks the deposition of Benedict 
XIII by the Council of Constance. However, since he did not accept this deposition, and because 
there remained loyal churchmen with him who elected a successor, there is another strong tradi-
tion of dating the end of the schism later. According to this reading of events, the end of Benedict 
XIII’s papacy is the date of his death: Moxó y Montoliú 2006; Alanyà i Roig 2014.
3 The historiography of papal history was initially understood as a task to be pursued like a 
chronicle, starting with the Liber pontificalis. After the Protestant Reformation this changed, as 
historiography became an important political and theological issue. For a splendid introduction 
to the conditions under which this historiography developed, see Fuhrmann 1989.
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Centro de Estudios Bilbilitanos Institución ‘Fernando el Católico’ 1996; Pereira 
Pagán 1999; Suárez Fernández 2002, etc.). Research on the time of the Schism 
and the Council of Constance had little to say about him, with some exceptions 
in the works of writers from Germany (e.g. Ehrle 1892, 1900a, 1900b; Seidlmayer 
1933; Girgensohn 1989; Langen-Monheim 2008; Jaspert 2014; Schwedtler 2018, 
Müller-Schauenburg 2018) and France (Pillement 1955; Millet 2009). 
De Luna was born as the son of a noble family (Schwedtler 2018, Müller- 
Schauenburg 2018), at a small castle in the city of Illueca in Aragon (Pereira 
Pagán 1999, 31–40). In Aragon some relics of his body are kept today in a small 
shrine (Parrilla, Muñiz and Caride 1987, 157f.). He was familiar with the Iberian 
political and cultural situation and well connected to the noblemen throughout 
the whole region, and familiar too with the ‘multi’-religious situation, in which 
Jews, Muslims and Christians lived in close proximity. After a military education, 
he studied Canon Law at the University of Montpellier, where most students from 
Aragon went at that time. He became a professor at the same university, where he 
taught the Decretum Gratiani (Verger 2004). 
By the time De Luna was born, the papacy had already been in Avignon 
for thirty years. In earlier phases of historiography, this shift of the papacy to 
Avignon was ill-famed as a ‘Babylonian captivity’ of the Church and both the King 
of France and the pope were blamed for creating a wrongful dependency of the 
papacy upon the French crown. Today’s historiography tells a very different story. 
French historians, followed by the international community, were the first to 
emphasise the cultural impact of the Avignon papacy on Europe as a whole and 
also on the Latin Church (Hamesse 2006; Favier 2006 et al.). The period of Pedro 
de Luna’s childhood was already seeing signs of the decline of the papal palace 
as a cultural centre of the Latin world. However, the papal court’s effects were still 
present, the intellectual situation vibrant. Within these years, the ecclesiology 
of the late medieval Latin Church took its most important developmental steps 
and the influence of mystical, as well as philosophical, traditions came to the 
attention of the popes – here we need only mention the struggles with such noted 
‘heretics’ as Eckhart, Marsilius of Padua, William of Ockham, and the Cathars. 
Pedro de Luna was created cardinal in 1375 by Gregory XI in an atmosphere 
that was filled with expectancy at the imminent return of the papacy to Rome. The 
following year, he accompanied the pope back to the city with which the papacy 
is most identified but it appears that this ‘come-back’ was by no means easy. In 
contrast to attitudes at Avignon, the pope was not welcomed by the populace and 
violence from clergy of his party made things even more difficult. In 1377 the pope 
had to flee to Anagni, near Rome, for some months, staying there from May to 
 November. Less than twenty months later Gregory XI died on the 28th of March, 
1378. The election of a new pope took place in Rome that April, albeit under very 
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difficult circumstances due to threats from the public. Eventually, a second election 
took place but the pope who had been elected in the first process, Urban VI, refused 
to give up his position. Thus the Great Schism began (Seidlmayer 1940). 
Pedro de Luna was among the group of cardinals who returned to Avignon 
with Clemens VII, the winning candidate of the second election. During the 
following years, de Luna made his career as a cardinal. His main mission was 
the winning of territory for the obedience of Clemens VII. He had some signifi-
cant successes both in France and, especially, in the Iberian Peninsula. The first 
reason for his success was his familiarity with the Iberian nobility and church, 
and the second was his clear thinking and argumentative abilities.
When Clemens VII died in 1394, Pedro de Luna was elected as his succes-
sor. Everybody’s wish was to end the schism and he seemed to be the one with 
the wish and the ability to do so. But there was a change of atmosphere in the 
relationship with the French crown. Charles VI of France no longer supported 
Benedict XIII, dissent arose, and there was a military attack on the papal palace 
in Avignon, during or after which the pope and his curia were imprisoned in the 
palace. After seven months of imprisonment Benedict XIII eventually managed 
to flee. Once he was free again, the atmosphere changed somewhat in his 
favour. He took up a kind of ‘mobile papacy’ based on a series of temporary 
locations, moving with his curia mainly along the coast between the Pyrenees 
and Liguria. 
The Council of Pisa in 1409, organised by cardinals of both obediences, was 
initially viewed sceptically by de Luna/Benedict XIII for canonistic reasons. Nev-
ertheless, he sent a delegation and was ready to participate in the proceedings. 
But the delegation was treated very badly and even threatened by the Council 
(Brandmüller 1990). This experience, and the broader outcome of the council – 
a third pope and Benedict XIII’s deposition and excommunication by the car-
dinals – changed Benedict’s disposition and his willingness to strive for union. 
The personal danger for him grew and so, in 1411, he finally moved to Peñiscola, 
a small castle at the coast between Barcelona and Valencia. This castle became 
the new (and last ‘Avignonesian’) papal palace. The radius of his papal activi-
ties became, seen from a European perspective, more and more local. The king 
of Aragon and the clergy remained loyal and the obedience, despite becoming 
smaller, continued to function well, at the beginning at least. A deep break came 
with the Council of Constance and its temporal dependency in Perpignan in 1415 
(which has been neglected in research and historiography for a long time), when 
the emperor-to-be Sigismund of Hungary came to see Benedict XIII to ‘negotiate’ 
with him (Jaspert 2014, 119–41; Catafau, Jaspert and Wetzstein 2018). In fact, the 
only option Benedict XIII was given was to abdicate unconditionally. After the 
unsatisfactory result of the Council of Pisa, and being a canonist, this option was 
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not one Benedict could take seriously. When the King of Aragon and Sigismund 
both tried to press a decision on him, Benedict left the place with his curia and 
returned to Peñiscola. 
The result was a consensus and contract between the two kings, effectively 
dictated by the more powerful ruler. A part of the regional clergy became part of 
the contract party, another part tried to stay loyal to Benedict XIII. In Constance, 
Benedict was deposed (again) by the Council in 1417. But he lived on until 1423, 
governing in Peñiscola, and passed his papacy on to a successor who managed, 
in 1429, what had eluded Benedict: the ending of the schism in a legal way, 
without the risk of more chaos, and to give up papacy while being, from his own 
point of view, responsible for the perpetuation of the apostolic succession (Suárez 
Fernández 2002, 307). Up until his death, Benedict XIII had a small, functioning 
curia and was, in fact, a pope, albeit one separated from almost the whole of the 
‘rest’ of the church. He spent the period living in a small palace, surrounded by 
the sea, and indulging his fondness for books. His library is known of and dis-
cussed by specialists of this late medieval period and of the history of books in 
general (Jullien de Pommerol and Monfrin 1991; Egger 1995; Planas Badenas 2014; 
Löffler 2018 et al). Not so well known is his public disputation about religion with 
jewish scholars, which dates to just before the Council of Constance, although it 
has been topic of some research (Pacios Lopez 1957; from Jewish side for example: 
Talmange 1985; Rauschenbach 2002; Cohen 2013). The outcome and meaning of 
this disputation is very problematic from today’s perspective (Jörg 2011). None-
theless nobody doubts that he was the only medieval pope who initiated and per-
sonally took part in a public disputation with Jews, had an inventive concept of 
the union of Jews and Christians, and was very much interested in and familiar 
with Jews as well as Muslims.  
3  A person of integrity, non-violence and  
law – condemned, excluded, secluded
We can observe four aspects of Benedict’s personality which mark him out as 
a possible object of research on religious individualisation in his period. The 
first is a part of his character: he remained a person of integrity while being con-
demned by ‘the church’. Many of his contemporaries, whether of his obedience 
or not, gave reports or testimonials describing, and even enthusing about, this 
quality of his character and his behaviour in general (with many quotations: 
Immenkötter 1976). This pope always went his own way within the church and 
this characteristic independence of mind became more pronounced, rather than 
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less, when he became a person with responsibilities for important decisions 
within the  institution. To give one example: during the election of 1376, de Lunas 
behaviour contrasted markedly with that of the other cardinals (Seidlmayer 1933). 
He remained calm and reasonable during the violent election of Urban VI and 
also remained calm regarding the outcome of the election. Initially, he refused 
to flee with the others from Rome to Anagni, waiting instead to study the situa-
tion, acquire and accurate the picture, and draw his own conclusions. Eventually 
he went to Anagni, alone, with the aim of convincing all his colleagues of his 
opinion. Meeting them, afraid as they were and ready to execute panic-fuelled 
and inconsiderate proceedings, he again showed himself to be a listening and 
reasoning person. He was ready to be convinced by them concerning their fear. 
He did not just deliver his own opinion or shout loudly enough to be the winner 
of the discourse; rather, he reacted to what he was seeing and tried to find a legal 
way to keep the church together. He was not a notorious loner, however. His 
strong will to think with his own mind was noticeable in the eyes of contempo-
rary eyewitnesses. 
In Medina del Campo, the King of Aragon organised an interview of the 
participants of the elections in order to come to his own opinion regarding the 
elections and who should be recognised as the legal pope. De Luna alone testi-
fied, stating that he had not been afraid during the first election (which would 
have been a legal foundation for the second) but that he had subsequently been 
convinced by the fear of the other cardinals, and only then he has been prepared 
to countenance a second election (Seidlmayer 1933, 211f.).
Later in life, too, Benedict XIII was never willing to be pressed. He always 
insisted on forming his own opinion and acting in accordance with his own 
beliefs. Even while suffering the loss of territory, he remained faithful to his 
favourite way of finding a solution: through argument. Attractive, intelligent, 
never boring, and upright, he was a magnet to interesting contemporaries and 
they took pleasure in his presence. When politics took another turn, he was left 
by most of them. Hardest of all was his abandonment by the King of Aragon, 
whom he had helped so much. Despite these setbacks, he did not threaten 
anybody ( Müller-Schauenburg 2018) and just continued on his own way. When 
the mission from the Council of Constance came to announce to him his deposi-
tion, he remained calm and reasonable (Brandmüller 1997, 266–8). In contrast to 
so many other popes of medieval (and other) times, not a single rumour of nepo-
tism, the breaking of moral rules or vows was ever told, or none at least that was 
found to be true: The accusation that he called demons (see also Boudet 2009), 
aired by the Council of Pisa, was unfounded and was not repeated at the Council 
of Constance. That he remained such a person, even while being condemned by, 
so to speak, the ‘rest of the Christian world’, was not the outcome of his lack of 
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power but of a high ethical standard. He did not change his behaviour when he 
lost power and  influence but remained as he had been from the beginning, as is 
evident, for example, in the context of the election of 1376.
The crucial question regarding the interpretation of Benedict XIII’s behaviour 
within the matrix of religious individualisation is that of his own understanding 
and motivation for this behaviour. We do not have sources such as diaries that 
contain reflections on these decisions. Because of this, if we wish to look further, 
we must of necessity turn our eyes towards his library, to the books he owned and 
read, and to the people with whom he talked. As has already been mentioned, the 
papal court of Avignon had become a centre of culture at that time and, contrary to 
what is sometimes assumed, the growing humanism of the period had something 
like a centre or cluster not only in Italy but also in Avignon. Being an intelligent 
and interested person, Benedict XIII made contact with humanists (Ornato 1969).
Nicolas de Clamanges, the famous French humanist, was for a long time part 
of Benedict’s court and also acted as his librarian. Remarkably, not in the ‘libraria 
magna’ but in the personal small working papal library, dating to his years in the 
papal palace in Avignon, we can find a collection of manuscripts containing works by 
Petrarch (Jullien de Pommerol and Monfrin 1991, 132). For a while at least, Benedict 
must have had a special interest in this author. It is very likely that he was attracted 
by Petrarch’s melancholic view of loneliness, especially the inner loneliness of the 
person who tries to follow the way of the mind.  This sense must have been particu-
larly prominent for him as he suffered through the decline in French support. 
This atmosphere of melancholic and tragic loneliness may have been very 
important for Benedict XIII, as a pattern for understanding his own situation and, 
perhaps, also important for the few people who remained loyal to him as part of 
his small papal curia until his death. Literature gave nourishment and positive 
value to this type of existence. One has to follow one’s way, no matter whether or 
not the crowd accepts it or is even willing or able to understand it, and consola-
tion can be received from the beauty of the truth – these assumptions must have 
been decisive for Benedict XIII. He also possessed an exemplar of the ‘Dialogus’ 
of William of Ockham. Ockham’s teaching of the church of the ‘faithful remnant’ 
in the right way to God must also have been important to Benedict XIII. The man-
uscript had already been part of his library when he was still a cardinal (Ehrle 
1890, 555). It was brought to Peñiscola to become part of the papal library at his 
new palace (Jullien de Pommerol and Monfrin 1991, 489). Third, and in addition 
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to Ockham’s theological perspective, the tradition of consolationes was founda-
tional for Benedict XIII’s positive attitude towards being left alone with the truth.4 
What is really most peculiar regarding Benedict’s behaviour is his non-violent 
reaction to the threats he had to suffer. This was very closely related to his reading 
of the Stoics and, especially, to the perspective of the ‘consolatio-literature’. Ben-
edict XIII took his time to think about each situation and he always took his 
next step with a sober mind. When his life was in danger, he simply changed his 
location immediately and calmly, but he never started a precipitous and violent 
defence. He suffered what was done to him, not moving one inch away from what 
he assumed to be the right way and the truth for the church.5 Benedict may have 
been not a saint, and nor did he only bring peace. It is questionable, for example, 
whether his meticulous sticking to the law or his idea of bringing the Jews closer 
to the Christian community did not have an enormously disruptive effect, as it 
has been said also regarding the disputation of Jews and Christians above men-
tioned (Dahan 1990, 359). But his reaction when being injured himself was always 
calm and sometimes ironic. These ironic dicta, in particular, have been taken by 
some historians as proofs that he was detached from any serious connection with 
reality anymore, yet in fact, they are not. Benedict never mixed arguments with 
jokes. Where negotiation was concerned, he stuck to arguments and to nothing 
else. But he had room for both. When he called the rock of Peñiscola his ‘Arche 
Noe’ (Seidlmayer 1933, 206), excommunicating the rest of the world – a compari-
4 There is a Consolatio which was for a long time attributed to Benedict XIII. However, today we 
can be certain that he was not the author (the real author was Iohannis de Tambaco,), although the 
reason for this (wrong) medieval adscription of the text to him through two medieval manuscripts, 
is an open question. The simple fact of the reference to the similarity with the described situation 
Boethius/Johannes/Pedro does not explain the adscription: an image of his one with arms, and 
one from his nephew, a close relative, just seven years after his death – if the adscription had been 
an image of his ridiculous error, this had been impossible. The questions, given by Stegmüller 
concerning the process and motivation, are still open (see Stegmüller 1963). At least it must had 
been imaginable by people very familiar with him, maybe himself, that this could have been his 
perspective and the text be composed by him. One manuscript puts this text in context with Cicero. 
Also interesting is that it is containing strong reference to Seneca (rules of the Imitatio Christi). 
5 This attitude could be described as related to the perception of ‘Leidensmystik’ (pointed out 
in the context of Dietmar Mieth’s work on Meister Eckhart) which was new at his times, with the 
parallel characteristics of being not ascetic, being unsought and unwanted, having its origin 
only outside of the individual, not abnegating the empirical situation by the average of theolog-
ical reflection, and – we can only assume, be the lack of the diary telling s.th. like this – felt as a 
duty in obedience to God (see Mieth 2004, 136–49). There are some typological parallels with the 
case of Riccarda Suitner, who speaks about radical pacifism and the diversity of American sects, 
which can be considered ‘in an apparently paradoxical way [...] simultaneously an expression of 
individualisation and conformity’, see her contribution to this publication. 
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son which has often been said to describe an old man who is not to be taken seri-
ously any more – he was in fact only expressing, as a canonist, the consequence 
of the separation of all the others from him, in as far as he might be the true pope. 
The image conveys his feeling that God was with him in his increasing seclusion 
in that place, giving him shelter while a big battle was happening all around him. 
Really, like Ockham, Benedict XIII was able to imagine a true church held and 
built by just a few souls, perhaps only one soul, going on in the right way without 
any kind of ‘power’ in a secular sense of the term. And although at the end of his 
life more or less nobody in Europe was ready to affirm his position, he carried on 
in what he assumed to be his way until the end. 
Benedict XIII never restricted the judicial singularity of the papal office. But he 
restricted himself within the limits of canonistic options (which are less extensive 
than the theological options which came after the schism), and he never thought 
himself to be omnipotent or as having any similar status. While a pluralistic option 
was not part of his concept of the papacy, his adherence to the ‘way of arguments’ 
(known as via discussionis or via conventionis) as a way of leading the church 
means that, at least at the level of theory, he was familiar with, and even assumed, 
a plurality of possible positions. His manner of staying faithful to his convictions 
regarding religious law and his own ecclesiological standpoint, even while losing 
not only his real political power but also his friends and supporters, is more than 
surprising and is best explained by looking at the books in which he was interested.
4  Four reasons for invisibility within the matrix 
of ‘types of individualisation’
So, we have a person who separated from the church because of his own, careful 
thoughtfulness. Why is it so difficult to describe this person within the frame-
work of religious individualisation? There are four main reasons, which dis-
close a paradox, namely that there are some individuals in history with little or 
no chance of becoming a ‘religious individual’, although they perform perfectly 
some essential elements of a standard individualising career. We will look at each 
of the four in turn.
The first reason is that the counter-part of deviation in this case is difficult to 
grasp. It is neither institutional nor normative. Benedict XIII was elected as the 
pope and he never ceased to define his life, office, and mission in these terms. 
Seen from his perspective, there was only a de facto, but not a de jure crack in his 
relationship with the Roman Catholic Church. His reference community did not 
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change at all.6 In addition, Benedict was a canonist through and through and it 
was partly his fidelity to legal procedure that made him so lonely. He did not act 
against laws. He did not and could not refuse to obey a religious authority, since 
he himself was, in his own eyes, the highest authority. So in terms of a devia-
tion, one can only describe the separation between numbers or groups of people. 
Perhaps with the perspective of history, one can identify a process of privatiza-
tion  – but without any relevance to anybody, at least. There has not been any 
long-term effect, no new theology or something like that.7 It is impossible to iden-
tify a ‘deviation’ of this individual, neither from an institution nor from norms. 
The ‘otherness’ of this person is in-visible.
The second reason is similar to the first: There is a lack of  self-characterisation 
as a deviating subject. Benedict XIII wanted to be traditional, regardless of the 
fact that few remained faithful to him who shared his understanding of tradition. 
The zero-point of the measure for deviation was himself. From his point of view, 
all the others were deviating. They were heretics. This individual in defence had 
a perfect fall-back position. He tried, with all his power, to be an institutional 
person. Office and persona came in tension and relation in a very striking way. 
Benedict XIII stepped, so to say, out of his original persona to defend an office 
with which he himself was completely identified. 
The third reason, again closely related, is: there is a lack of perception by 
others as a deviating subject in an emphatic manner, positive or negative, and a 
lack of institutionalisation and historical reception of him in terms of individual-
isation. No group followed in his path and no process of institutionalisation took 
him as a point of reference.  In short, there was no stabilisation for long, no stand-
ardisation, no regime following him, and therefore there was never anybody who 
included Benedict XIII’s story, at least in general terms, into his or her own story 
of individualisation, institutionalisation, or de-institutionalisation. With the disso-
lution of his former institutional environment when the schism ended in 1429, and 
the lack even of an ‘honouring’ resistance against his position, the complete neglect 
and overwriting or replacement of this institutional form was complete. We do not 
6 One might describe the ‘heretics’, i.e. anybody not accepting him as pope, as the counter-part 
of the deviation from which he distanced himself. 
7 During Benedict XIII’s time as pope there was an emergence of spaces of choice or freedom, 
both for the believer and for theologians of the time within his obedience. This was an effect of 
his ecclesiology. He did not mind if theologians were doing or thinking things that seemed to be 
quite new regarding their teaching in philosophy, Christology, the status of the Mother of God, 
and other such topics which had been objects of struggle for a long time and became so again 
afterwards. To him, only the administrative ‘orthodoxy’ was relevant. His indifference to theolog-
ical questions, or – emphatically – his ‘stoic’ relation towards dogmatic struggles can be seen as 
an effect or a result of the ‘legalistic’ individualisation of Pedro de Luna.
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have any appropriation (‘Aneignung’, see Matthias Engmann on Kierkegaard in this 
 publication), any recipient. This case makes it obvious that there is not only a par-
adoxical characteristic of religious individualisation that as soon as it affects reli-
gious groups or prompts their formation, dynamics of normativisation and stand-
ardisation may ultimately congeal into a collective phenomenon (see the general 
introduction by Fuchs et al. in this publication). On the contrary: if formation of new 
groups or discourses and standardisation does not happen in any way, then there 
will be no visible phenomenon at all, at least not one of relevance. The notion of ‘rel-
evance’ could also be seen as a crucial point. In the case of Pedro de Luna, we have 
to mention the emerging Spanish and Catalan research interest in him now, which 
is developing now partly for political reasons. So there is not simply ‘nothing at all’. 
How relevant is a group of recipients who are, again, deviating from the mainstream 
of research? Additionally, a kind of ‘third order relevance’ can be identified regard-
ing the question the case raises for the concept of religious individualisation and for 
the historiography of the time of the Schism as it is usually told. 
To summarise: There is a general problem with describing individualisation 
as deviation as far as the leading figure of a traditional religious institution is con-
cerned. And there is a special, second problem, visible particularly in this case, 
of how to grasp an unsuccessful ‘individual’ who was not even admired by those 
who followed his path a little later on, i.e. the popes after the final union of with 
the remaining papal curia from Peñiscola, taking up for example his support of 
the university of Salamanca, or the canonists of the school of Salamanca – who, 
quite the reverse, deliberately avoided referring to him. This problem may be a 
specific or typical problem within the late middle ages, during which period the 
interstices between what emerged as ‘modernity’ and what remained ‘medieval’ 
were more complex than historiography was for a long time willing to concede.
This reveals the necessity of applying an inverted frame of the concept of 
individualisation, in order to register – and not to miss in research, as well as in 
historiography written by an institution itself – such possibilities as the case of a 
person who in fact is unwillingly deviating from a religious institution of which 
he simultaneously believes himself to be the solitary leader, granted that status 
by the will of God. What the case of the lonely antipope asks is for us to name his 
type of individualisation, so that it may be part of the research matrix. I propose 
to call this type of individualisation ‘missed individualisation’. 
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5 ‘Missed individualisation’
‘Missed individualisation’ does not mean – just to underline directly the most 
likely misunderstanding – that Pedro de Luna failed to become an individual. The 
failure and ‘missing’ are elements of the history of its reception. Missed individu-
alisation is a lack of perception, under very special conditions, by the contempo-
rary as by the later-born. A social precondition of this type of individualisation is 
the identification of the person with an office (what we would perhaps call within 
a modern framework an ‘impersonal’ position), and the type of office itself. In the 
case of Benedict XIII, his contemporaries were not interested in him as a model of 
a religious plurality, which seemed to be desirable. Nevertheless, a leading figure 
in medieval times was, seen from the legal point of view, strong, much more 
endowed with internal law (in German: ‘Eigenrecht’). There was not in every case 
such a big contrast between the legal frame and the ‘individual’, as we would 
assume from the modern point of view. Research on religious individualisation, 
having its origins in specific modern ideas that are now to be extended into new 
spaces and periods, could be in danger of missing such cases if it does not draw 
them out with special effort. This notion, this kind of process and dynamics of 
individualisation, must be considered with special attention. These cases will 
probably never become the most convincing examples within the frame: they are 
truly ‘missed’. But it seems to be important, at least, to identify them as well. 
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Cornelia Haas 
Varieties of spiritual individualisation 
in the theosophical movement: the United 
Lodge of theosophists India as climax 
of individualisation-processes within 
the theosophical movement
Helena Blavatsky’s ‘Theosophical Movement’, founded in 1875 in New York, 
shows itself in its beginnings as an example of detraditionalisation from conven-
tional forms of religion. This is associated with an opening for individual and 
experimental approaches to new and foreign forms of religions and spiritualities. 
The later increase in institutionalisation within the movement provided less space 
for this sort of individuality and led to divisions and splits within the movement. 
This chapter aims to identify and extract the specific dynamics of processes 
of individualisation, as well as de-individualisation, within the theosophical 
movement in the form of a step model. The latter in the United Lodge of Theoso-
phists’ (U.L.T.) ‘method’ and individual approach to Helena Blavatsky’s theoso-
phy, which has as its sole focus the pursuit of the individual and its perfection. 
This pursuit is understood as an act of unification with the Divine or higher self, 
as well as with the community of likeminded persons, in a way that is both indi-
vidual and vital, as well as providing a service for humanity. Certain features of 
this process are methods for an ultimate elimination of disturbances that obstruct 
the study and spread of the true teachings of Blavatsky, seen as a manifestation of 
divine wisdom. However, an essential component of this process is the realisation 
of one’s own, individual path. 
1 Introduction
The Theosophical Society (TS), established in 1875 in New York, introduced a per-
spective on the world that its founder, Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, later defined 
in the subtitle of her Opus magnum opus, ‘Secret Doctrine’ (1888), as a ‘Synthesis 
of Science, Religion, and Philosophy’. The society had as its first and most impor-
tant objective the forming of ‘a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of Human-
ity, without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or colour’. Their second explicit 
aim, with which I will be concerned in this chapter, was to gain deep insights 
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both the sciences and the wisdom contained in world religions (‘to encourage 
the study of comparative religion, philosophy and science’), for the purpose of 
individual spiritual perfection and self-divination (‘to investigate unexplained 
laws of Nature and the powers latent in man’).1 This second aim offered mani-
fold possibilities for spiritual individualisation.2 This de-traditionalisation from 
conventional forms of religion and spirituality, parallel to an opening up to indi-
vidual and experimental approaches to new and foreign forms of religions and 
spiritualities, climaxes in the United Lodge of Theosophists’ (ULT) programmatic 
individual approach to Helena Blavatsky’s theosophy. 
This chapter aims to identify and extract the specific dynamics and the 
development of processes of individualisation (and de-individualisation) within 
the theosophical movement.3 It can be regarded as a step model, beginning with 
the foundation of the TS in its specific historical and geographical environment 
and culminating in the concrete implementation of the ULT ‘method’ as a pos-
sible peak of spiritual individualisation within the Theosophical Movement. 
These processes and varieties of spiritual individualisation within the history of 
the Theosophical movement can be defined generally as dynamic, partly reac-
tive, and sometimes backwards, even in the sense of de-individualisation. The 
ULT (India) represents one of the movement’s programmatic climaxes and can 
be seen as a special example and ‘methodology’ for reactive spiritual individual-
isation. In the following, I will outline the particular gradual process of spiritual 
individualisation, which starts with the formation of the Theosophical Society 
in 1875 in New York as the breeding ground of previous global spiritual and sci-
entific currents.4
1 This is the most prominent version of the ‘three objectives’. For the history of revisions and 
modifications see. http://theosophy.wiki/w-en/index.php?title=Objects_of_the_Theosophical_
Society (last accessed 5th August 2018).
2 I prefer to use the term ‘spirituality’ because of its more ‘inclusive’ connotation, which more 
suitably represents the Theosophical Society’ self-image. 
3 In doing so, it is important to distinguish between generally visible tendencies within the 
movement and their consequences, and highly individuated individuals at the top, such as He-
lena Blavatsky, Annie Besant, or Bahman Pestonji Wadia. The latter have been the subject of a 
number of studies and are not central for this discussion. See, for example, on Helena Blavatsky: 
Cranston 1993; Goodrick-Clarke 2004; Keller and Sharandak 2013; for Annie Besant: Taylor 1992; 
for prominent Indian theosophists: Moritz 2017. 
4 Part III, Theosophy, Culture, and Society, in Hammer and Rothstein 2013, provides an overview 
with different topics. For detailed information on the spiritual precursors, see Godwin 1994.
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2  The beginning: the theosophical society (New 
York, 1875) as a platform for individual religious 
options and a provider of ‘ancient wisdom’
First, it will be useful to embed the genesis of Blavatsky’s Theosophical movement 
into the context of socio-religious, occultist, philosophical, and scientific traditions 
and events spanning global history.5 Of particular interest for the topic at hand are 
those traditions and events that were well-known to Blavatsky and explicitly men-
tioned in theosophical sources, such as in the presentation of ‘classical’ Theosophy 
as a quest for divine wisdom (Goodrick-Clarke 2013). Scientific discussions on evo-
lutionary theories, new archaeological discoveries, psychology and occultism, as 
well as social challenges were important issues. Finally, a main source for Blavat-
sky’s incorporative theories on the rise of the human race and the link between the 
cosmos and its spiritual development were Indian religions. This background pro-
vided arguments against the rising ‘purely materialistic’ Darwinism and provided, 
in her opinion, a ‘natural’, magical worldview (Bevir 1994, 748; Haas, forthcoming). 
The importance of spiritualism and its establishment in the Anglo-American 
urban intellectual middle and upper classes in particular, increased in the late 
19th century. The growing interest in spiritualism, and in consequence its commer-
cialisation, generated accusations of fraud against dubious mediums and their 
activities. This in turn led to a loss of reputation, but also to investigations about 
‘different possible realities’, first and foremost by the academic field of psychol-
ogy in the United States.6 Finally, a literature-based,  culturally-interactive avant-
garde spirituality, triggered by various religious, utopian- and reform- movements,7 
post-war-experiences,8 ‘new’ sciences including psychology (Taylor  1999) and 
5 This kind of examination was – and is – extensively done in the relevant secondary literature, 
e.g. Bevir 1994; Godwin 1994; Lubelsky 2012; Hammer and Rothstein 2013; von Stuckrad 2014. 
6 Such as the Society for Psychical Research.
7 The western and central regions of New York state at the time of the Second Great Awakening, 
was termed ‘the burnt district’ by Charles Grandison Finney in 1876, who defined this area as 
‘over-evangelized’ and without any unconverted population left over to be ‘burned’. See Cross 
1950; Wellman 2000; Pritchard 1984; Altschuler and Saltzgaber 1983. This region became fer-
tile ground for many of the new religious and reform movements who later permeated almost 
all parts of society, e.g. Transcendentalism in literature, Utopian groups (e.g. Shaker-movement), 
as well as Protesting-movements as the Women’s rights movement, the American labor move-
ment, Abolition movement, Prohibition or Temperance movement). Surveys are Sutherland 1989; 
Schlerth 1991 Claybaugh 2007. For the Women’s rights movement: Braude 2001. 
8 The popularity of spiritualism gains in importance especially after periods of war (American 
Civil War 1861–1865 and WW I 1914–1918), when people had suffered the loss of relatives and 
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parapsychology, as well as a growing interest in- and knowledge of eastern spirit-
ualities became the fertile soil of the movement (detailed information in Carroll 
1997).9 Spiritualism and the quest for scientific proof of the existence of spirits 
and supernatural phenomena thus turned into a matter of interest for the intelli-
gentsia, especially in North America. Knowledge of non-Christian and, in particu-
lar, Asian religions and wisdom systems was common and widespread in these 
circles (Christy 1932; Bergunder 2006). This is equally true for the idea of universal 
religion (Transcendentalism and Unitarianism are to be emphasised here) as a 
result of one of the central themes of 19th century scholarship: the search for 
origins.
When considering North America in particular, a close connection between 
spiritualism and Protestant forms of religion and their ideals should be taken 
into account, manifested, for example, in a commitment to reform in the areas of 
women’s rights and the abolition. This factor will later be particularly interesting 
with regard to Olcott and his Buddhist activities in Sri Lanka (Prothero 1995 and 
2006). The rising importance of modern science should likewise be seen in direct 
relation to these phenomena in the light of industrialisation and the pioneering dis-
coveries of the (natural) sciences during the 19th century, the latter became increas-
ingly influential. A transformation process from ‘faith’ to ‘plausibility’ had to be 
warranted by ‘knowledge’. Therefore, as well as to demonstrate scientific claim, 
many religious communities labelled themselves as ‘scholarly’ (Stuckrad 2014).10
As a matter of fact, a fertile tension arises from these seemingly conflicting 
issues of science, spiritualism, and world-religion. This tension can be considered 
the basis for the genesis of the Theosophical Society’s program. According to the 
protocol11 of the first meeting, the society was originally formed ‘for the study and 
elucidation of occultism’ in 1875 in New York by Helena Blavatsky, Henry Steel 
Olcott, and William Quan Judge, who had all been involved in spiritualist circles 
before. Thus, they were quite aware of the scientific examination of  spiritualism 
loved-ones and were willing to try new ways to get in touch with them. A prominent post- WW-
I-example is Arthur Conan Doyle, creator of ‘Sherlock Holmes’. Conan Doyle wrote numer-
ous books on the subject, among them The History of Spiritualism (1926). For background and 
reasons for the spiritualist ‘hypes’ see e.g. Oppenheim 1988; Hick 19906, 129–76; Carrol 1997; 
 Albanese 2007.
9 Italicised sentences show the plot of each section in this chapter.
10 Blavatsky often commented very harshly on the academics of her time and their ‘dogmatics’. 
See Haas 2012 and forthcoming.
11 Notes of meeting proposing the formation of the Theosophical Society, New York City, 
 September 8, 1875:  http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a8/St-1ata.jpg (last ac-
cessed 6th June 2017).
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by scholars; the zeitgeist influenced them to work from similar motives and – at 
least in theory – for the same purpose.
In terms of religious individualisation, for this initial stage of the TS it can 
be stated that the aim was solely the scientific study of the occult, which was later 
combined with the desire to acquire knowledge of universal laws and their dissemi-
nation. According to Olcott, the ideal of Universal Brotherhood as the ‘first objec-
tive’ was developed later, around 1878, and was not part of the original concept 
but merely a necessity with regard to the intended association with Asians.12
However, acquisition of knowledge of world religions and their ancient wisdom 
was seen as necessary for each member’s individual ‘pool of knowledge’ and as a 
basis for finding their own path. Therefore, it is fixed as ‘the second objective of the 
TS’: ‘II. The study of ancient and modern religions, philosophies and sciences, and 
the demonstration of the importance of such study’. Knowledge as an objective of 
individual searching should, the society believed, originate from pure, ancient tra-
ditions in their original form, which are to be preserved. Established, traditional, 
forms of religion were perceived and criticised as corrupt or obsolete. 
The third objective, ‘III. The investigation of the unexplained laws of Nature 
and the psychical powers latent in man’, was thoroughly modern for its time and 
is connected, inter alia, with the emergence of psychology as an academic disci-
pline. It should also be noted that the idea that Asian religions in particular were 
important carriers of religious experiences emerged in close connection with the 
inception of psychology. Some psychologists have considered William James’ The 
Varieties of Religious Experience (1901/02) to be an early example of a combina-
tion of scientific acceptance and study of the existence of the unseen, which mod-
ified the common, merely materialistic idea of the sciences.13
12 ‘The idea of Universal Brotherhood was not there’ and did not occur until in 1878, the Soci-
ety’s ‘sphere of influence extended so as to bring us into relations with Asiatics and their reli-
gions and social systems’, thus making ‘the Brotherhood plank […] a necessity, and, in fact, the 
corner-stone of our edifice’. The by-laws adopted in 1875 simply state, ‘The objects of the society 
are to collect and diffuse a knowledge of the laws which govern the universe’. Olcott, cited by 
Anonymous 1951, 45 (last accessed 9th August 2018).
13 James was a member of the TS branch in Boston (no longer existent) at that time. This infor-
mation can be found with reference to Blavatsky-biographer Sylvia Cranston in Taylor 2009, 50, 
n. 58: ‘James had been a member of the Theosophical Society in Boston since 1888, read their 
literature, and commented regularly upon it, particularly in The Varieties of Religious Experi-
ence (1902a). […] Acknowledgments to Sylvia Cranston for providing me with documentation for 
James’s membership in the earlier Theosophical Society’. The significance of the paranormal for 
late 19th century psychology and William James in particular is portrayed in an interview with 
Eugene Taylor by Thibaud Trochu (2008). For further reading, see Taylor 1983 and Blum 2006, as 
well as the critical review by Taylor 2007.
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One additional, and equally important, factor regarding the supposed tendency 
towards religious individualisation in the initial phase of the movement is the fact 
that Blavatsky had already been familiar with (Tibetan) Buddhism for a long time. 
She even called her apartment in New York ‘Lamasery’. Olcott was also interested 
in Buddhism during this period in New York and had at least a basic knowledge of 
both ancient texts and discussions about Buddhism’s ‘modern’ forms.14
Buddhism contains immense potential for individualisation in its basic 
assumptions and in the sometimes explicitly anti-dogmatic nature of its teach-
ings, such as the direct invitation of its founder to act solely according to one’s 
own experience and to accept as ground-breaking that which has been recognised 
by each individual as right. Nothing but serious reflection on one’s own experi-
ence can, in combination with the acceptance of the ‘four noble Truths’ and other 
universal laws, lead to escape from the cycle of rebirths. This is certainly one of the 
key reasons behind the wide range of possibilities offered by the TS for an individ-
ual approach to religion, religious experience, and spiritual liberation, which is 
free from any convention about ‘What is to be believed’. The Theosophical Move-
ment in its initial stage therefore creates a fundamental platform of possibilities 
for religious individualisation by offering and at the same time requiring the study 
of world religions and their wisdom, as manifested in their ‘second objective’. This 
should prompt the individual to search for his or her own truth by using the knowl-
edge gained. Moreover, the existence of both a spiritual world and the paranormal 
is a natural assumption, while commercial spiritualism is officially rejected.
Any kind of traditional religious confession or belief therefore becomes irrele-
vant and is subsidiary to the idea of Universal Brotherhood. At the same time, the 
fundamental necessity of studying the human psyche is emphasised as an abso-
lute requirement in the face of massive upheavals in matters of faith through new, 
spiritual-religious currents and their confrontation with the realities of their time.
Finally, the focus on individual religious needs is to be taken into account 
within Universal Brotherhood.
3 Activities and interactions in India 
In order to discover whether religious individualisation may have been triggered 
by the TS’s various interactions with indigenous religions and existing religious 
movements in India from 1879 on, in what follows I examine them in their own 
broader historical and intellectual contexts. Here, observable phenomena are 
14 For discussion on the specific ‘Buddhisms’ of Blavatsky and Olcott, see Haas 2015.
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characterised by great diversity and can only be recorded based on individual, 
particularly significant, phenomena as shown below:
1) The (very short) ‘fusion’ with Dayananda Saraswati’s Hindu reformist move-
ment Arya Samaj (Anonymous 1951, 59; Campbell 1980, 77) failed after a short 
time. The reasons for this failure were twofold. On the one hand, regarding 
content, the relationship was blocked by Saraswati’s basic assumptions that 
all non-Vedic teachings are heresy, that there is one sole ruler to be wor-
shipped, and that the Veda is the exclusive source of true knowledge. On a 
more psychological level, Sarasvati’s claim to supremacy soon collided with 
the TS’s founders’ popularity and their need for recognition. The first issue, 
in particular, conflicts with (and is absolutely contrary to) the concept of an 
individual approach to religion, which was based in part on the TS’s found-
ers’ tendency towards Buddhism. Finally, the fusion resulted in the Theoso-
phists’ ‘conversion’ to, and emphasis on, the superiority of (Theravada) Bud-
dhism,15 the fundamental claim of which is that the individual finds his or 
her way to (self-) salvation without god or institutions.
2) The interaction with the Parsees in Mumbai eventually resulted in ‘Parsee 
Theosophy’.16 This special form of Zoroastrian religion includes e.g. the rees-
tablishment of occult elements, such as the reintroduction of Avestan as the 
ritual language, the introduction of reformed rituals with a new emphasis 
on the occult content, as well as the combination of traditional theological 
concepts with scientific terminology. This created a new form of metaphoric 
Avestan hermeneutics and was advocated for by the Theosophists. It addi-
tionally agrees with the traditional notion of faith in a personal god, as well 
as with the intermediary role of a priest. Indeed, Parsee Theosophy can also 
be interpreted as a counter-movement to the simultaneously increasingly 
fashionable Western textual criticism and the corresponding interpretation 
of tradition. As such, it is, however, a phenomenon of the elites and the edu-
cated classes who are aware of the related debates.
Even though Parsee Theosophy is a side effect affecting the (minority) 
religion of the Parsees more than the Theosophical Movement itself, Parsee 
Theosophy is a still ongoing result of and reaction to preceding religious 
individualisation within the community and is therefore based on partly 
15 For details, see Haas 2015.
16 A brief description of the rarely used term Parsee Theosophy as a separate category can be 
seen in the online encyclopedia Overview Of World Religions of the Division of Religion and Phi-
losophy at the University of Cumbria: http://www.philtar.ac.uk/encyclopedia/zorast/partheo.
html (last accessed 8th June 2017). The origin of the term parsi/parsee is usually traced back to 
‘those from Persia’, and does not signify any religious affiliation. See Stausberg 2002, 373. 
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re- traditionalising and ‘esoterising’ the Zoroastrian religion within the 
Indian Diaspora. It can thus be summarised as a process, triggered by the 
Theosophists, of religious individualisation based on re-traditionalisation by 
‘regaining lost spirituality’.
3) As to the Theravada Buddhism of Sri Lanka, the intermediary work and pop-
ularity of Henry Steel Olcott from the 1880s onwards was both responsible for 
its revival and the cause of a major boost, through his setting up of infrastruc-
ture and his support for religious networking among the various Buddhist 
traditions of Asia. The explicit preference for Theravada Buddhism by Olcott 
and Blavatsky, seen as ‘representatives of the West’, raised new confidence 
among the Sri Lankan Buddhists (Campbell 1980, 84; Bechert 1995, 336f.; 
Queen 199617).
With regard to religious individualisation there must be a clear distinction 
between a) the potential of extension of individual paths in the West (‘Western 
Buddhism’) inspired and enhanced by Theosophical Buddhism, and, on the 
other hand, b) the creation of stimuli within the existing Sinhala Buddhism. 
Olcott’s perception and reforms of Buddhism play an essential role for 
Western recipients: his ‘Protestant Buddhism’, as it was defined by Obeyese-
kere (1970) and Prothero (1995), represents a new variety of Buddhism, using 
methods derived from, among others, Christian missionaries.18 It idealises 
and simultaneously hybridises Buddhism with the ideas of the Theosophists 
and therefore turns it into a religion more easily ‘digestible’ by interested 
Westerners than contemporary Buddhism as it was actually practiced. In this 
way, Prothero states, Olcott turned out to be the ‘first Western Buddhist mis-
sionary’. 
4) Compared to what I have outlined so far, the role of Annie Besant appears 
much more diverse and less specific in terms of spiritual or religious indi-
vidualisation. The reason for that is a permanent tension between spiritual-
ity and politics that defines her person and activities. In many respects, this 
can be recognised as the result of her political commitment. It specifically 
manifests in, for example, her significant affinity for Brahmanism in her later 
Theosophical life, as well as in a clearly evident, increasing hierarchy in the 
movement during her presidency, along with the creation of (public) cults 
17 Queen 1996, 21ff. identifies Olcott, Dharmapala, and, finally, Ambedkar as pioneers of the 
so-called ‘Engaged Buddhism’.
18 A discussion of this term is given in detail in Prothero 1995. According to him (1995, 281), the 
basic, simplified typology is as follows: ‘Obeyesekere intended the term to convey two meanings: 
first, that this new form of Buddhism began as a protest against Christian missions; and, second, 
that it mirrored Protestant Christianity in structure and content’. 
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(Krishnamurti, etc.) in the TS Adyar. The latter tendency, in particular, even-
tually led to the resignation of her co-worker BP Wadia (and many others), 
who then joined the (U.S.) United Lodge of Theosophists and later estab-
lished this group in India.
Religious individualisation, based on the interaction of theosophy and indige-
nous religions, is largely characterised by the mutual influence of Besant and 
parts of the Brahmin elite. However, this too – as in the case of Buddhism and 
Olcott in Sri Lanka – was preceded by a variety of activities from pre-existing 
Hindu reform movements and was often even inspired by colonial presence and 
Christian missionary activities. Thus, the TS in India had already gained some 
influence among Indian elites even at the beginning of Besant’s active time. 
Individuals such as Bhagavan Das, with whom Besant founded the ‘Central 
Hindu College’ (CHC), now ‘Benares Hindu University’, at Benares, should be 
mentioned here. For the education of young Hindus, she authored an introduc-
tion to Hinduism titled ‘Sanatana Dharma’ (1903) – analogous to Olcott’s ‘Bud-
dhist Catechism’ –, and the ‘Universal Textbook of Religion and Morals’ (1910), 
both inspired by Theosophical ideas, as well as those of Hindu reformers. These 
became required reading for students of the CHC (for biographical details on 
Besant, see Taylor 1992).
The essential character of this period in the movement’s history can be char-
acterised as a strategic and systematic distribution and institutionalisation of 
authoritative Hindu-Theosophical knowledge. This happened in reciprocity with 
the expansion of the Theosophical platform to Indians and the offer of Theosoph-
ical hybridised Indian, as well as Western, knowledge to India. Besant’s politi-
cal commitment thus temporarily shaped the interpretation of ‘right action’ from 
one’s own religious experience and conviction in dealing with the colonial power, 
a concept that would later compete with those of Gandhi. 
The period of Annie Besant’s influence as president is characterised by her 
(late) significant affinity for elitist Brahmanism as well as by an increasing, con-
trolled hierarchical structure (also in the sense of ‘esoteric’ hierarchies) within 
the movement and the creation of public cults such as Krishnamurti. It marked 
a period of religious de-individualisation within the original society and resulted 
in a great number of schisms and the emergence of opposing groups within the 
movement.19 
19 Starting with the separation of TS Adyar and TS America under WQ Judge in 1895.
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4  Controversies, splits and their consequences 
within the movement 
Changes in the quality and quantity of religious individualisation within the The-
osophical movement should be contextualised and analysed in the context of the 
movement’s history and inner dynamics: after internal loyalty losses caused by 
the ‘Coulomb affair’,20 Blavatsky founded the ‘Blavatsky Lodge’ and the so-called 
‘Esoteric Section’ (ES) in London in 1887/88. They represent the ideal of a commu-
nity of individuals, ‘true adepts’ (‘chelas’) who seriously study Theosophy21 while 
rejecting worldly necessities in the form of membership fees, fixed premises, and 
official membership. Campbell (1980) considers this a consequence of a long 
standing and fundamental programmatic conflict, and of the ‘tension between 
mysticism and established organization’. In this context, he defines ‘mysticism’ 
as ‘a type of individualized religious response to the perceived hardening and 
formalization of religion’.22 
Notably, the ES models the history, methods, and structures of organisation, 
as well as the ideals of leadership, for what would later be known as ULT. Moreo-
ver, the new organisational forms of these groups are matters of particular inter-
est since they show characteristics of an elitist-spiritual, secret, literally ‘esoteric’ 
counterpart to the exoteric side of the movement represented by Besant, Olcott, and 
Adyar-hierarchies. 
In case of the ULT, this concept of the ES is equally the basic requirement 
for individual spiritual progress. However, the elitist idea, officially formulated 
by Blavatsky, was omitted and, therefore, no secrecy was required. For the ULT, 
this resulted in a seemingly paradoxical approach: the adopted form, which 
was designed by Blavatsky to protect the esoteric parts of Theosophy, was now 
propagated as a ‘method’ for stimulating individual spiritual progress, and was 
thus converted into an exoteric mode.23 However, reality is always shaped by 
individuals.
20 For detailed description and backgrounds of the Coulomb affair, see e.g. Anonymous 1951, 
82ff.; Cranston 1993, 265–84; Campbell 1980, 87–95.
21 For Blavatsky’s idea of the ‘perfect chela’, see Anonymous 1951, 136ff. 
22 Campbell 1980, 97. 
23 This is discussed within the movement and ULT itself, as the question of an anonymous au-
thor shows: ‘Is ULT, one wonders, trying unsuccessfully to function as an exoteric group within 
an esoteric form?’ The article ULT’s Nature and Method – How Esoteric is the Work Of the Unit-
ed Lodge of Theosophists? originates from the ULT-allied Theosophy Magazine, Los Angeles, 
 January 1961, 127–30, ‘Question and Comment’, online http://www.wisdomworld.org/additional/
Question- AndComment/Number5-January1961.html (last accessed 19th February 2018).
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5 United Lodge of Theosophists
Finally, I will try to sketch the ‘method’ of the United Lodge of Theosophists as 
(one) climax of spiritual individualisation within the Theosophical movement. In 
historical perspective, the ULT was a splinter group of the TS in America, under 
W.Q. Judge’s presidency after its separation from the TS Adyar. Its founder, Robert 
Crosbie, was a former member of the TS in Boston. Born into a largely Protestant 
environment, he was, like most other founders, exposed to spiritualism from a 
young age. The aforementioned affinity in the TS with the rising desire for sci-
entific study of the paranormal as well as Oriental Studies that was prominent in 
America co-occurred in the life sciences as well as in (academic) psychology, with 
the same basic interest, but from different starting points.24 
These different backgrounds should be kept in mind when looking more 
closely at the ‘method’ of the ULT, which in terms of religious individualisation 
can be reduced to its essential features25 and summarised as:
1) The programmatic rejection of structures of organisation, as described in 
the previous section on the Esoteric Section and Blavatsky Lodge. The 
only requirement for associates is the agreement to the so-called ‘Declara-
tion’. As stated on their website, ‘A brief philosophic declaration is its sole 
guiding document’.26 The prevalence of forms and (hierarchical) structures is 
24 Thus, the prominent TS member William James, who entered the Lodge of the TS in Boston 
in the same year as Robert Crosbie, shows in his works profound knowledge of the Theosophical 
doctrine when he identifies the Indian Vedānta philosophy as one of their fundamental con-
cepts. Taylor 2009, 36 with reference to an article by William James on the meaning of ‘person 
and personality’ in Johnson’s Universal Cyclopedia, New York, 1893.
25 A detailed description by the ULT itself with appropriate statements can be found in the Pam-
phlet The United Lodge of THEOSOPHISTS. Its Mission and Its Future. Online: http://www.phx-
ult-lodge.org/amission.htm (last accessed 19th February 2018).
26 The text reads as follows: ‘Declaration: The policy of this Lodge is independent devotion to 
the cause of Theosophy, without professing attachment to any Theosophical organization. It is 
loyal to the great Founders of the Theosophical movement, but does not concern itself with dis-
sensions or differences of individual opinion. The work it has on hand and the end it keeps in 
view are too absorbing and too lofty to leave it the time or inclination to take part in side issues. 
That work and that end is the dissemination of the fundamental principles of the Philosophy of 
Theosophy, and the exemplification in practice of those principles, through a truer realization of 
the SELF; a profounder conviction of Universal Brotherhood. It holds that the unassailable basis 
for union among Theosophists, wherever and however situated, is “similarity of aim, purpose 
and teaching,” and therefore has neither Constitution, By-Laws nor Officers, the sole bond be-
tween its Associates being that basis. And it aims to disseminate this idea among Theosophists 
in the furtherance of Unity. It regards as Theosophists all who are engaged in the true service of 
Humanity, without distinction of race, creed, sex, condition or organization, and It welcomes to 
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regarded as a main cause for turning away from the essential: the pure study 
of Theosophy and self-awareness of the individual as part of the Universal 
Brotherhood, also regarded as potential unity with the Divine. 
2) Access to divine wisdom with the higher self via rejection of any personalisa-
tion of teachings and connected personal cults, which are seen as obstacles for 
overcoming the ‘illusion of self’. Emphasised keywords are therefore ‘imper-
sonality’, ‘anonymity’, and, as a consequence, ‘esotericity’. Here, ‘imperson-
ality’ and its meaning ‘anonymity’ function as protection for each individual 
as a part of a whole: only by eliminating the obstacle of the ‘illusion of self’ 
can the individual achieve personal access to divine wisdom. It is the only 
way to become a specific, individual part of the theosophical organism, the 
‘Universal Brotherhood’, according to one’s own karma and through consist-
ent development of one’s higher self. This should, however, not be confused 
with a selfish quest for knowledge and progress which is not conscious of the 
perpetual connection between the individual and the whole. 
3) The absolute necessity of independent study and individual comprehension 
of the original sources and the movement’s history, and, in consequence, the 
availability of original materials. In addition, the need for the study of the 
philosophy and history of the Theosophical movement for everyone’s own 
independent comprehension of the original teachings, as well the familiarity 
with the writings of Blavatsky, Crosbie, Judge, Wadia and other ULT-writers.
4) Independent, practical application of the ‘third objective’ of the Theosophi-
cal Movement, ‘to investigate unexplained laws of nature and psychic and 
spiritual powers latent in man’.
5) The ideal of the inspired, ‘magnetic’ individual as a permanent potential 
nucleus/centre to spread (theosophical) wisdom invisible to others. Such an 
individual requires spiritual integrity as a potential founder and the centre of 
a study group, whose members he can influence positively by invisible forces 
to make them better people and to spread his influence, again ‘invisible’, to 
other circles. 
its association all those who are in accord with its declared purposes and who desire to fit 
themselves, by study and otherwise, to be the better able to help and teach others. “The true 
Theosophist belongs to no cult or sect, yet belongs to each and all.”’ Further, there is a form 
to sign by associates: ‘Being in sympathy with the purposes of this Lodge, as set forth in its 
“Declaration”, I hereby record my desire to be enrolled as an Associate, it being understood that 
such association calls for no obligation on my part, other than that which I, myself, determine’. 
http://www.ult.org/ (last accessed 19th February 2018).
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These criteria emphasise without exception the pursuit of the individual and its 
perfection, meant as a process of unification with the Divine or the higher self, as 
well as with the community of like-minded persons, but each in their own vital 
way. Here, all of the features above are methods for the ultimate elimination of 
irritation that prevents associates from studying and spreading the true teachings 
of Blavatsky, regarded as a manifestation of divine wisdom. An essential point, 
however, is the realisation of one’s own, individual path and its necessity. Gen-
erally speaking, increasing institutionalisation within the Theosophical Move-
ment is regarded as diminishing the space for individual approaches, leading to 
splinter groups claiming individual approaches as their main original objective. 
However, as in most ‘religious/spiritual programs’, there is a natural and funda-
mental tension between ideals and realities. 
6 Conclusion
The obvious potential offered by the original TS is in decline – in its motherland as 
well as in other countries such as India – due to the increasing hierarchy and dogma 
within the movement. This trend resulted in, among other things, the separation 
of the United Lodge of Theosophists (ULT) in Los Angeles in 1909. The concepts 
and backgrounds of this splinter group can, again, be seen as the result of several 
processes in the TS, such as the founding of the Esoteric Section (ES) by Blavatsky 
herself in 1888. The ES was supposed to take shape as an elitist secret society and 
was directed by Blavatsky at ‘true adepts’. These are distinguished from mere blind 
followers for the purpose of individual study of ‘real’ Theosophy. The ‘esoteric form’ 
of the ES presents itself in many ways as a model for the organisational structure 
of the ULT. The latter consciously understands established organisational forms as 
obstacles to an individual search for truth. Particularly remarkable as characteris-
tics are the principles of a) emphasis on the inner self, b) impersonality and ano-
nymity, c) ‘esotericity’, as well as d) the idea of ‘each member a centre’. They show 
a permanent call for the individual’s representation and his or her responsibility for 
the ‘soul of the whole body’, which is supported by very few regulations and gen-
erally rejects administrative control. The ULT’s programmatic individual approach 
to Helena Blavatsky’s theosophy is based solely on one’s own experience and self-
study and explicitly rejects any form of organisation, institutionalisation, hierar-
chies, or dogma. With its strict emphasis on the writings of Blavatsky and her ‘true 
disciples’, William Quan Judge, Robert Crosbie, and B.P. Wadia, the ULT – an organ-
isation of American origin and refined in India, among other countries – carries a 
certain echo of the ‘sola scriptura’ feature of Protestant religions. 
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The ULT India was founded in 1929 by the Indian Parsee B.P. Wadia. This year 
marks at the same time with the resignation of Krishnamurtis the beginning of 
the “Post-Gilded Age” of TS Adyar. ULT India could possibly have acted here as a 
trigger, preserver, or even destroyer of religious individualisation in the context of 
the Theosophical Society Adyar in India. 
The history of splits and schisms within the Theosophical Movement and, 
ultimately, the foundation of the ULT provides some general insights into the 
dynamics of individualisation processes, both (a) within the movement, structur-
ally as in self-understanding, as well as (b) specifically in India in reciprocity with 
indigenous religions, colonial perceptions, and political involvement.
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Individualisation in conformity:  
Keshab Chandra Sen and canons of the self
The Brahmo Samaj, one of the earliest and most important Indian social and reli-
gious reform movements, shared with liberal Christian thinkers and like-minded 
philosophers a remarkable emphasis on the self. The ‘Brahmo Self’ was intellectu-
ally related to a complex tradition that was shaped by Puritan practices of scrupu-
lous self-examination and faculty psychology, a philosophical paradigm concerned 
with the nature of man and the relationship between vices and virtues, faculties 
and will. Both traditions contained the notion of a self that could, and needed to, be 
balanced, checked, and thereby improved or developed. For the first twenty years 
after it was founded, the Brahmo Samaj presented itself as representing a particu-
lar strain of philosophy, namely the Advaita Vedanta. In this context, the relation 
between man and divine was a pivotal point of discussion. Moving back and forth 
between these discourses on the self, the emergent self-constructions reflected 
certain social constellations and problems within this religious community. 
Keshab Chandra Sen (1838–1884), a leading figure of the prominent nine-
teenth century Bengali reform movement Brahmo Samaj (roughly translatable as 
Society of God) from the late 1850s until his early death in the 1880s, produced 
an enormous number of lectures and designed several religious rites that centred 
on the individual as the very basis for the realisation of religious knowledge. He 
tirelessly emphasised the necessity of a ‘living religion’, presupposing that ‘God 
is not dead, and the channels of inspiration are not shut up’ (Sen 1904/1879, 437). 
Aiming for God-realisation by turning ‘inwards’ (antare), his writings were no 
less characterised by the urge for religious and social reform, linked to discourses 
of the ‘development’ of the Indian people. Sharing the notions of many of his 
contemporaries, Indian intellectuals and Westerners alike, he cherished neither 
the religious traditions that dominated popular religious culture in Calcutta nor 
the Brahmanical ‘high-culture’, with its reliance on ritual accuracy, outward 
duties, and dietary confinements. While generally welcoming Western culture as 
superior to Indian culture in its contemporary condition, he believed that this 
superiority was confined to the present and did not extend into the future. He 
was convinced that providence held a special place for India and Indians in the 
history of mankind.
The Brahmos, as they came to call themselves from the 1840s onwards as part 
of their development of an identity that set them apart as a confined religious 
community (Hatcher 2001), belonged to a middle class that was tied  particularly 
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closely to the British colonisers. Many of the great Bengali families had laid 
their financial foundations in the eighteenth century by working for the British 
East India Company as translators (dubashees) or traders and moneylenders 
(banyans). In the early nineteenth century, members of the middle class were suc-
cessful in building up trading companies and indigenous banking houses, and 
were able to establish themselves as jamidars, the (mainly absentee) landlords of 
rural Bengal. But their financial success did not last. Financial crises in the 1830s 
and 1840s undermined their wealth and almost all of them were pushed out of 
trade and banking. Their elite position thus became more precarious, with their 
sources of income narrowing to what could be earned serving the British adminis-
tration in the then capital of the British Empire in India. This class of people, now 
more dependent on a thorough education than ever, had long since turned edu-
cation into one of the fundamental characteristics of their identity. They called 
themselves bhadralok, a term that literally reflected the English ‘gentleman’, and 
was understood to designate a ‘civilised’ or ‘good mannered’ person. According 
to their own perception, it was their education that distinguished them from the 
uneducated masses, the ‘small people’ (chottolok), on the one hand, and from old 
Indian aristocracy, on the other (Bhattacarya 2005; Sarkar 2011). Yatna, relentless 
efforts and industry, which had already played a major role in precolonial edu-
cational literature, remained one of the most important lessons to the educated 
youth of Calcutta. Yatna came with a promise: children that were lazy and disre-
garded their parents would have a dark future life, whereas those that applied 
yatna to their behavior in regards to education would be able to achieve anything 
they aimed for (Hatcher 1996). This attitude was not confined to their own class; it 
was applied especially to the lower classes, in a manner that carried strong pater-
nalistic overtones (Bhattacarya 2005). This middle-class, which encompassed 
individuals of differing social status, thus valued education highly as a means to 
uplift the individual from a state of ignorance and end the deplorable state of the 
Indian people, as well as, often, its only source of employment and income. It was 
within this general framework that the encounter with Western, as well as Indian, 
traditions and philosophies took place. 
In an earlier article on individualisation in the Brahmo Samaj (Höke 2015), I 
concentrated upon the particular way in which notions of Avatarism, the theory 
of ‘Great Men’ as developed by Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson, and 
the Gaudiya Vaishnava practice of raganuga bhakti sadhana, were fused into a 
set of unique practices, called sadhu samagama, or ‘Pilgrimages to the Saints’. 
I attempted to observe closely how Indian, European, and American traditions 
were linked within a religious framework that was generally informed by and 
open to both streams of thought. Its leading principle, ‘intuition’, allowed free 
borrowing from anything cherished in religious traditions. My discussion there 
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was based on the premise that linguistics, in conjunction with social processes 
of translation, played a central role and the argument I develop in the present 
chapter progresses along a similar line. 
Although the discursive construction of the self by no means exhausts the 
processes of what we call ‘individualisation’, it was an important part of the way 
these processes were reflected and consciously set into motion in late eighteenth 
and nineteenth century Europe, America, and India. In this paper, I will concen-
trate on two decisive elements in the construction of the self in the writings of 
Keshab Chandra Sen. First, I will show that his expectation that one observe, crit-
ically examine, and develop the self, often has to be framed within the context of 
the faculty psychology of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy and overlapping 
with practices of  self-examination that had a long history in Protestant piety. 
Second, I will discuss his treatment of the self, which emerges from his reflection 
on the discourses of Indian Vedantic traditions. Keshab’s notion of the self falls 
somewhere between a position that identifies the atman (the individual self) with 
the brahman, and a position that involves the passionate veneration of a personal 
Godhead as cultivated in bhakti-traditions, which latter presupposes a relation 
and therefore a discrimination between the worshipper and the worshipped. These 
elements, self-examination and self-cultivation on the one hand, and the relation-
ship between the divine and the self on the other, were pivotal features of the 
notion of the self in Brahmo discourse. Whereas practices of self- examination and 
self-cultivation were, as we will see, part of a framework that was more globally 
acknowledged and that could be put into use for different ends, the wide-ranging 
and open discussion of the relationship between man and the divine contained 
elements that were for several reasons confined to India. There was not only a 
long and encompassing tradition of discussing these matters, which had to be 
addressed by the Brahmos as a part of the traditions they had grown up with, but 
also a certain reluctance on the part of Christians to question the personality of 
the godhead to the extent that was possible in India.1
A related element, concerning the exaltation of the individual self as the deci-
sive authority in religious matters, is much too encompassing to be dealt with 
here. It should be sufficient to note that no religious knowledge that depends on 
outside authority, whether ascribed to persons or to books, could ever supplement 
the immediate, direct encounter with the divine for most of the authors discussed 
here. However, the cultivation of the self as part of, and yet as  something above, 
1 Among the New England intellectuals, it was Ralph Waldo Emerson who, at least partly inspired 
by his readings of Indian philosophy, went furthest in his idea of an impersonal godhead. In doing 
so, he provoked a huge wave of protest that encompassed even the most liberal Christian thinkers, 
expressing and emphasising the absolute need for a personal god. Grodzins 2002, 115–27. 
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society and in a dual relationship with the divine was not only a prerequisite for 
immediate knowledge of the divine but also the way to gain such knowledge, as 
it led to encounters with the divine. Self-reliance was a term that was prevalent 
beyond the circles of New England’s intellectuals; it also informed many of the 
practices of the Brahmo Samaj, especially in the New Dispensation Church.2
Regarding processes of individualisation, this analysis also emphasises 
that even though religious actors may insist on the necessity of religious imme-
diacy and individuality, they never do so in a vacuum. On the contrary, they 
rely on canons of knowledge, only some of which were handed down to them 
in the form of written texts. Others were transmitted orally or as religious prac-
tices, with which the historical actors engaged, were inspired by, and sometimes 
refuted. This article does not aim to analyse processes of ‘individualisation’ in the 
Brahmo Samaj generally, but rather seeks to show how discussions of the ‘self’ 
relied on different canons of knowledge, some of which were shaped by Christian 
approaches, others by Hindu discourses.
1  The self as subject of examination 
and improvement
That the English term ‘self’ was a word prominently used in Keshab’s English 
publications is undoubtedly linked to the importance attached to the term in the 
English and Northern American traditions he interacted with. Protestant tradi-
tions in England, and even more so in America, had a long history of concentrat-
ing on the self as a subject of reform. Americans had, from the late seventeenth 
century and through the entire nineteenth century, been speaking freely about ‘the 
importance of constructing the self properly’ (Howe 1997, 3). The time between the 
American Revolution and the Civil War has been singled out as a period during 
which discussions of selfhood and identity exploded and brought about shifts 
in language. Whereas some terms, such as ‘self-government’, ‘self-culture’, and 
‘self-reliance’ emerged for the first time, older terms, such as ‘self-denial’ and 
‘self-improvement’ became vested with new meanings (Masur 1991, 191). David 
2 The New Dispensation Church (nava vidhan) emerged as the result of several schisms in the 
Brahmo Samaj. The ‘Brahmo Samaj of India’ (Bharatbarshiya Brahmo Samaj), founded in 1866 as 
a distinct branch of the movement and headed by Keshab Chandra Sen, further split up in 1878, 
after a time of severe criticism of Keshab, and the manner in which he developed his thought and 
style of leadership. Two years later, early in 1880, Keshab applied the name ‘New Dispensation’ 
to his own movement, and declared it to be a further step in the course of religious progress.
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Howe, in his monograph on Making the American Self, regards the conscious 
performance of acts of self-construction specifically as the exercise of a practice, 
albeit one that was mainly achieved verbally (Howe 1997, 4). The ‘self-made men’, 
as heroic ideal of the nineteenth century, was by no means confined to successful 
entrepreneurs. Rather, suggests Howe, the self-made man was,
one who had attained eminence by his own efforts in any walk of his life, not necessar-
ily in business, and not just in monetary terms.  The process of becoming self-made was 
understood as the development of human potential broadly conceived. Finally, what dis-
tinguished the self-made man was that his identity was a voluntarily chosen, conscious 
construction, not something that had to be achieved by an individual in isolation. 
 (Howe 1997, 136)
One element that contributed to the discourse of the self in England and America 
was the ‘polite culture’, inherited from Scottish enlightenment. Linked to the goal 
of a free society, the ‘essence of polite culture was the balanced cultivation of the 
self […]. The cultivated gentleman or lady, the responsible citizen, the objective 
observer of society: this was the ideal self’ (Howe 1997, 55). ‘Balance of charac-
ter’ was the highest aim in the cultivation of the self, embedded in the paradigm 
of ‘faculty psychology’, likewise inherited from Common Sense philosophy. ‘The 
psychology of the age’, writes Howe,
taught that human nature could be analyzed in terms of certain components, such as the 
“understanding” (powers of awareness, including both sensation and reflection) and the 
“will” (powers of action or motivation). Among the powers of will could be distinguished a 
variety of human motives, typically arranged in a hierarchically defined sequence of “fac-
ulties”. The moral and rational powers (because they partook of the divine nature) had 
precedence over emotional and instinctive impulses (animal powers).  Last of all came the 
mechanical reflexes (vegetative powers), over which there was no conscious control. Those 
powers that were under some degree of conscious control could be cultivated or restrained 
by the exercise of will.  (Howe 1997, 5f.)
Exercising control over the faculties and strengthening the moral and rational 
powers was of utmost importance, as the higher faculties in the sequence of 
rightful precedence were considered to be much weaker than the animal powers. 
 Conscience was not only supreme but also the weakest of motives. Within this 
framework, self-interest was not necessarily repudiated. Instead, self-interest 
could also be considered a rational faculty, as long as it was kept in its place, 
guided by prudence, in the sense of self-preservation, and balanced with con-
science, the moral sense (Howe 1997, 12f.).
This whole strain of thought developed within the framework of Christian 
thinking and values. First, Scottish Common Sense was related to reformatory aims 
within the Church of Scotland (Howe 1997, 50–2). In America, where the  paradigm 
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was widespread and dominated the political discourse, it not only became part of 
the thought of liberal Christian groups but was also taken over by Evangelicals. The 
act of critically observing the self, and developing and improving it accordingly, was 
often as much a question of having the freedom to do so3 as it was a moral obligation. 
As a practice that relied on observing the individual, the individual bore a great deal 
of personal responsibility. The individualism it brought forth did not stand in polar 
opposition to a strong sense of community. Projects of self-discipline could, rather, 
to cite Howe, ‘be undertaken collectively as well as individually’ (Howe 1997, 5). 
The habit of keeping self-observational pocketbooks or diaries, a practice 
particularly cultivated by the Puritans in England and New England, overlapped 
with faculty psychology and was probably no less influential in shaping the 
notion of the self as an object of scrupulous examination. In Puritan theology, 
self-examination was closely linked to predestination. By self-examination, 
‘each person ought to seek to discern the twin signs of election in his or her life: 
the inward testimony of the Spirit and the outward evidence of sanctification’.4 
Only by questioning their heart and by questioning their life could Puritans 
know whether or not they belonged to the elected few who were saved by God. 
But diaries were not only used to reflect on and investigate one’s own self. These 
writings, when shared, could serve as spiritual stimuli with an effect similar to 
that of listening to sermons or regular readings of biblical texts (Bremer 1995, 21). 
Self- examination also became a crucial part of the wider genre of conversion nar-
ratives that gained importance in the Christian ‘Awakenings’ of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century in America and England. Apart from Puritan and Non- 
Conformists sources, this mainly Evangelical genre also relied on the practices 
of self- examination of German Pietists, such as Philipp Jacob Spener (1635–1705) 
and August Herrmann Francke (1663–1727). Although the Pietism movement was 
slightly earlier than that of the Awakenings taking place on the British Isles and 
in northern America, both phenomena were closely interrelated (Welch 1972, 15). 
Although the Unitarians and Transcendentalists did not generally cultivate 
the practices of writing conversion narratives or of keeping self-observational 
diaries, the latter practice was not entirely unknown.5 However, focusing on 
3 The freedom of developing oneself was not naturally a given for people of lower status, women 
or black people in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. 
4 The link between self-examination and predestination was already established by William 
Perkins (1558–1602) in the sixteenth century. Hindmarsh 2005, 36.
5 Caroline Healey Dall, for instance, first started to write her diary under the influence of this im-
pulse. Dall was part of the inner circle of the transcendentalists and was married to the Unitarian 
missionary Charles Dall, who spent the best part of his life as a missionary in India and became 
the only Christian ever to be initiated into the Brahmo Samaj. See Drees 2005.
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the self still became a decisive part of their teachings and writings. The region 
in which these movements mainly developed – Boston, New England – was a 
stronghold of Puritanism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. This 
widespread notion of a self that needed to be questioned and examined critically 
but that could also be developed and improved found a prominent place in the 
discourses of liberal Christians, being informed by Puritan practices as well as the 
paradigm of faculty psychology. The Unitarian Monitor, a fortnightly publication 
of American Unitarians, cites a book by William Sullivan intended for schools: 
A self examiner may be supposed to ask himself such questions as these: Have I duly con-
sidered my bodily frame, and its wonderful constitution, and uses; – have I endeavoured 
to preserve it in a fit condition to render to myself, to my connexions, to society, and to 
its Creator, the duties for which he ordained, and gave it; […] what account have I to give, 
of the week that is gone; have I learned any thing; am I wiser or better, or more worthy of 
my own respect, and that of others, then I was on the last sabbath; have I let the hours 
run by unmarked, by any useful act of mine; […] have I done to others, as I would that 
they should do to me; have I escaped vain and criminal anger; have I said of any one, 
unlawfully, that which I should not dare to say to him; have I been gentle, charitable, 
civil, cheerful, kind hearted; have I rendered that which is due; have I made promises, 
which I cannot perform, or any which I should not make; whom have I offended; […] if 
my peace of mind is disturbed, if a blush tinges my cheek, if a sigh burst from my heart, 
if a tear dims my vision; must this have come over me, or could I have prevented it; […]. 
 (Sullivan, cited after Unitarian Monitor 1831, 102)
This quote contains several hints towards the ideals involved in the cultivation of 
the self, such as the instrumental use of the body to fulfill one’s duties towards 
oneself, one’s kin, society, and God, or the absolute control over, or even subdual 
of, any kind of emotion. However, what I want to draw attention to here are the 
practices of formulating concrete questions that lead to a scrupulous investiga-
tion of one’s everyday behavior and of rendering an account of the past week, 
which seems to imply a regular execution of this practice.
William Elleray Channing’s (1780–1842) lectures and writings may serve as 
another example here. In an introductory remark to a public lecture series held 
in 1838, published in 1839 as an essay entitled ‘self-culture’, Channing defines 
the venture of cultivating the self as ‘the care which every man owes to himself, 
to the unfolding and perfecting of his nature’. ‘Self-culture’, he emphasises, ‘is 
something possible. It is not a dream’ (Channing 1839, 9). Self-searching, ‘the 
faculty of turning the mind unto itself; of recalling its past, and watching its 
present operations’, is only a preliminary step towards the power of forming the 
self by seeing ‘in ourselves germs and promises of a growth to which no bounds 
can be set, to dart beyond what we have actually gained to the idea of Perfection 
as the end of our being’ (Channing 1839, 10). Distinguishing several dimensions 
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of self-culture,6 Channing places it in the context of the relation of the individ-
ual to society and the world, on the one hand, and the relationship with God, 
on the other, the two being intimately connected (Channing 1839, 13–5). Focus-
sing on the social dimension of self-culture, Channing singles out aspects of the 
self that ‘must be discharged’ and repressed  (Channing 1839, 12f.). He shows a 
more sceptical approach to self-interest than the Scottish Enlightenment philoso-
phers mentioned above, although their approach to the issue was popular among 
Americans in general. Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881), the great Scottish philosopher 
and essayist, went even further in calling for the ‘Annihilation of the self’, so that 
‘Life, properly speaking, can be said to begin’ (Carlyle 1838, 192–7). The emphasis 
on selfishness and self-seeking as parts of human selves that are to be overcome 
sometimes leads to the apparent ambivalence of a discourse centring on the self 
that seeks to annihilate itself.
2 The self as atman? 
The notion of atman in Indian philosophy and religion, usually translated as 
‘self’ in English writings, has been the subject of much discussion for hundreds 
of years. While atman is already mentioned in a more limited sense in the earlier 
genre of the Brahmanas, the concept of atman is first developed within the Upan-
ishadic tradition, ca. 700–200 BCE (Malinar 2009, 45–9).  Here it is an immortal 
part of the human being that is already liberated and only dwells inside the body 
to leave it after death, either to be re-embodied or to be released and never to 
appear again. Later schools of Vedanta (literally: the end of the Vedas) dissented 
greatly, particularly on the question of the relations between the divine, the mate-
rial world, and the individual ‘self’. 
On a spectrum between dvaitic (dualistic) and advaitic (non-dualistic, some-
times termed ‘monistic’) positions, two interpretative poles were available. At the 
dvaitic end of the spectrum is the idea that there is a personal God from whom 
human atman will remain a separate entity altogether. At the other end, the extreme 
advaitic position, all differentiation is just mistaken perception that is to be elimi-
nated by knowledge (jnana) and the realisation that the atman is nothing apart from 
the tranquil, transcendental consciousness (brahman). This debate encompassed 
many different positions articulating complex models of the relationship between 
the divine, man, and the material world. I will confine myself here to those of par-
ticular importance in the Bengali context: the already mentioned position of Advaita 
6 The moral, religious, intellectual, social, and practical dimensions. See Channing 1839, 15–21.
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Vedanta, most popularly formulated by Shankara in the 8th/9th century CE, and 
that of Acintya Bhedabheda (roughly translatable as ‘inconceivable non- difference 
in difference’), as it was developed by Jiva Gosvami, a 16th century follower of the 
great Bengali (that is: Gaudiya) bhakti saint Caitanya (see Gupta 2007). Shankara’s 
position of Advaita left a lasting impression on succesive generations of those who 
discussed Vedanta philosophy, and although there are some interesting twists and 
turns in the relationship between the Gaudiya Vaishnavas and Advaita schools,7 the 
former came to regard the latter as their ‘archrivals’ (Holdrege 2015, 40). But these 
claims of absolute opposition between Gaudiya Vaishnavas and Advaitins should 
perhaps not be taken too seriously. Although the Advaitins served as the rhetorical 
‘Other’ for Gaudiya Vaishnavas, there are mediating figures, such as Sridhara Svami 
(14th century), who was acknowledged as the greatest commentator on one of the 
most important texts of the Gaudiya Vaishnava tradition, the Bhagavata Purana, 
despite being a samnyasin (renouncer) of a Shankarite order (Gupta 2007, 40). 
For Advaitins, brahman, the absolute Being, without form and characteristics, 
is the highest principle. Personal forms of the Divine are but inferior approaches 
to brahman, useful only for those who are incapable of approaching the formless. 
In contrast to this, the Acintya Bhedabheda has it that Krishna, in the form of the 
cowherd (gopala) in the heavenly realm of Vraj, is the true form or nature (svay-
amrupa) of the divine, and its only independent, complete form. By developing 
what Barbara Holdrege calls an ‘encompassing hierarchical taxonomy’, the great 
Vaishnava theologian Jiva Gosvami subsumes all other forms of the divine, includ-
ing brahman, as subordinate, dependent aspects of Krishna (Holdrege 2015, 50f.). 
The way of the Advaitins is not, then, declared to be completely wrong but, rather, 
an incomplete and partial truth. 
The approach to dealing with earlier, rival traditions is similar in both cases: 
Advaitins as well as Gaudiyas posit hierarchical models of the divine which incor-
porate, domesticate, and subordinate, rather than succeed, the earlier traditions 
(Holdrege 2015, 44). Apart from differences regarding the true form of the divine, 
it is also the choice of different ways (path) and ultimate goals that distinguishes 
Advaitins from Gaudiyas: Shankarites single out knowledge (jnana) as the only 
means of understanding the true nature of the atman as undifferentiated from 
7 Caitanya himself had taken a vow as a samnyasin (an Advaitin renouncer and wandering as-
cetic) early in his youth, although he was probably initiated into a form of Advaitin sect that 
was inflected by bhakti (see Holdrege 2015, 41). Furthermore, the name of one of his well-known 
followers was Advaita Acharya, literally the teacher of Advaita. This phenomenon was an issue 
discussed by his followers, who found an explanation that did away with any engagement with 
the tradition of Advaita by reading into it an expression of the non-difference (advaita) between 
Advaita Acharya and Caitanya. See Manring 2005, 36 and 57.
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brahman. This insight alone can free the jiva, the individual being, from the cycle 
of rebirths (samsara) and lead to salvation (moksha), the final absorption into 
brahman. To achieve this end, it is necessary to lead the life of a renouncer (sam-
nyasin) (Bartley 2011). Gaudiyas single out bhakti, a term of manifold meanings 
that primarily denotes utter love (prema) and longing (viraha) in Bengal, as the 
appropriate means for approaching the divine. They do not aim for moksha but 
for a direct, loving relationship with Krishna. The relation of the divine to the 
atman, as well as the relation of the divine to the material world, is that of an 
inconceivable non-difference in difference (acintya bhedabheda), insofar as, 
in the end, all that exists is an emanation of one kind or another from Krishna. 
However, as the immutable and unchangeable Supreme Being, Krishna Gopala is 
neither touched nor affected by the processes of change to which humans and the 
material world are subjected. The material world is brought forth by the uncon-
scious yet unavoidable activity of Krishna’s powers, the shaktis. In contrast to 
Advaitins, who hold that the material world is a distracting illusion (maya), for 
Gaudiyas the world must be real, as it is an emanation from Krishna (Santideva 
2000, 215–56). While some Vaishnavas, especially in rural Bengal, also led a life 
of renunciation, the mainstream practice is that of a grihastha form of participa-
tion, that of a householder who does not neglect his social duties but remains 
part of his family and extended kinship group. Another term that also needs to be 
considered here is ahamkara (the sense of I-ness), which brings forth the notion 
of the ‘I’. Within Advaita, this ‘I’ (aham) is not related to the atman itself but is, 
rather, part of the extended self; it ‘designates the individuated self represented 
in […] jiva-consciousness’ (Ram-Prasad 2013, 226–9). Given the complexities of 
the notion of atman, it seems that we lose something both on the side of atman as 
well as that of the term self when we translate the one into the other. 
3 The self in Brahmo discourse 
Advaita Vedanta and faculty psychology seem to be key issues for understanding 
the conception of the self within the Brahmo Samaj. Despite his emphasis on the 
universal elements of religion when writing and acting on the international stage, 
the founding figure of the Samaj, Rammohan Roy, had introduced the Advaita 
Vedanta into the movement right from the beginning in the late 1820s.8 He was 
8 See Killingley 1993. Rammohan dealt likewise with Muslim, Hindu, and Christian sources, and 
expressed his religious worldview from within these traditions. It is not easy to see precisely 
how these are related to each other in his work, as he himself does not link them explicitly. 
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the first to translate at least a part of the Upanishadic writings into Bengali. 
Debendranath Tagore and the group of like-minded people around him, who 
began to renew the Samaj in 1842, initially subscribed to Advaita philosophy as 
well. Brian Hatcher has translated and analysed an early publication of the Tatt-
vabodhini Sabha, a society founded by Debendranath before joining the Brahma 
Samaj, many of whose members later turned towards the Samaj with their leader. 
The small tract, called Sabhyadiger Vaktrikta, was published in 1841. According 
to Hatcher, the contributions show what he calls a ‘Bourgeois Vedanta’, by which 
he means a version of the Vedanta that allows its authors to develop a different 
understanding and legitimation of their newly acquired social status. While they 
emphasise the immediate worship of the supreme self and rely on the Upanishads 
and other scriptural sources to authorise their arguments, they rarely refer to any 
of the subjects that are commonly associated with Advaita Vedanta. The ‘meta-
physics of atman and brahman; the relationship between ignorance (avidya) and 
illusion (maya); and the characteristics of an ultimate reality that is beyond name 
and form’ (Hatcher 2008, 74) were of minor importance compared to the ques-
tion of how to pursue a life in this world and the need for a balanced character. 
The first discourse, delivered by Shyamacharan Mukhopadhyaya, formulates this 
position clearly and gives an example of this strain of argument: 
[…], when lust, anger, &c. grow strong, careful effort to control the senses will be fruitless. 
If the senses are controlled but greed is not restrained, then no thief will be able to stop 
stealing. A person who fails to control his lust and anger will suffer all sorts of misfortunes. 
However, if he acts with all his senses properly regulated, he gains blessings in this life and 
the next. What’s more, if it weren’t for our senses, there would be no way to live our lives 
in this world. […] the senses are at the very root of worldly life. To prevent the predomi-
nance of lust, anger, and the other vices, the countervailing virtues of shame, patience, 
&c. were created. Therefore, respected members, dedicate your lives to the right cultivation 
of patience, sincerity, virtue, truth, &c. and to the defeat of lust, anger, greed, delusion, 
pride, &c.  (Hatcher 2008, 143)
Killingley discerns the three religious traditions with which Rammohan interacts as distinct 
modes in which he addressed different audiences. Muslim, Hindu, and Christian audiences 
were addressed separately by using the respective religious terminology and scriptural sourc-
es. Although he does not single out any of these traditions as more important for shaping his 
overall religious thought, Killingley emphasises that Rammohan presents himself solely as an 
exponent of Vedanta in his Bengali writings (see also Killingley 1982). Bruce C. Robertson re-
gards  Rammohan as a representative of Advaita and regards his universal religious thought as 
being governed by this self-understanding. According to Robertson, the terminology Rammohan 
used in his English writings was misleading. It not only led to a mistaken view of his philosophy 
among Unitarians but also among successive generations of Brahmos (see Robertson 1995).
1392   Vera Höke
The useful purpose of the senses and self-interest, when subdued to nobler motifs 
and countervailed by virtues in a balanced character, seems to echo some of the 
ideas formulated by faculty psychology. Although Hatcher does not, himself, 
use this term, he points out similarities with Scottish Enlightenment authors, 
such as Thomas Reid and Adam Ferguson. As the Scottish Enlightenment had 
become part of the curriculum of English-language schools, it seems very likely 
that the members of the Tattvabodhini Patrika were familiar with the  key-writings 
(Hatcher 2007, 78). Rather than ascribing the similarities to the influence of these 
authors, Hatcher explains the attraction of these arguments by referring to the 
context of the successful bhadralok. 
Whereas the conception of the divine as ‘the Supreme Self, whose essential 
nature is consciousness’9 remains rather closely related to classical formulations 
of Advaita Vedanta, the relation between self and God envisioned by Shankara 
later became a stumbling block for this philosophy in the Samaj. According to 
Debendranath Tagore’s autobiography, the discovery of the metaphysics of atman 
and brahman was his pivotal reason for turning his back on Advaita Vedanta. He 
found it to be opposed to the relationship of man to god as that of a worshipper 
to the worshipped, which Debendranath declared to be the essence of Brahmo-
ism. Even more so, the idea that worshipping the Supreme Being according to 
Vedanta would lead to liberation by annihilation of the individual conscious-
ness (prithak samjnana) and absorption into that Supreme Being (nirbbanmukti) 
was to him a terrible sign of extinction.10 The duality of man and divine, incom-
patible with Advaita philosophy, was declared the basis of Brahmoism, despite 
its explicit insistence on the worship of an abstract, a-personal godhead. As a 
consequence, the Brahmo Samaj turned towards a more intuitive approach to 
the divine.
The scrupulous examination of the self, comparable to the practices of the 
Unitarians, became more important in the Samaj some twenty years later. If we 
are to follow Keshab’s cousin and long-term companion Protap Chandra Majum-
dar, the practice of publically giving an account of one’s own behaviour and 
misbehaviour and inviting others to comment on it critically, was already intro-
duced in 1860, only three years after Keshab Sen had joined the Samaj. Describ-
ing the meetings of the Sangat Sabha, a small society within the Brahmo Samaj 
in which the participants were mainly the then young supporters of Keshab, he 
writes: 
9 Discourse Five, written by Chandrasekar Deb. See Hatcher 2007, 150.
10 Tagore 2012, 80–4, see also the English translation: Tagore 1914, 160–5.
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They met frequently, and with fiery zeal for self-reformation, laid bare their whole hearts, 
freely and frankly discussed their own faults, courted mutual aid and criticism, and under 
Keshub’s guidance made most genuine progress in spiritual and moral life.  
 (Mozoomdar 1887, 130)
Though Keshab increasingly turned towards Gaudiya Vaishnavism in his later 
years, practices of critical self-examination remained a part of his program. In the 
late 1870s, for example, the missionaries of the New Dispensation were expected 
to keep a spiritual diary. They were furthermore asked to write daily reports that 
had to be handed over to Keshab himself.11 Besides, self-investigating questions 
that bear a striking similarity to the catalogue reprinted in the Unitarian Monitor 
(cited above) were also to be found in the New Dispensation’s journal:
Have you yet found out the work of your life, and discovered the means of carrying it out? 
Have you found your place in the New Dispensation, the place every one is pleased to give 
you with blessings and good wishes? What undoubted successes have you achieved in your 
religious career? What passions have you completely conquered? How many souls have you 
been the means of saving? What testimony can you give of having seen God, of having for-
given your enemy, of having abjured the love and care for worldly wealth, and turned your 
home into a sanctuary? Do all those who know you best pass a favourable opinion of your 
character?  (Sen 1916/1882, 121f.) 
Furthermore, Keshab’s strong predilection for the topic of sin (pap) likewise 
shows at least a partial relation to the need for scrupulous self-examination, 
and the promise that the self can be developed and improved. Original sin, 
he once remarked, was nothing but the liability of human beings to give in to 
carnal propensities (Sen 1904/1877, 368). The ‘remedy’ for this ‘disease’, i.e. the 
general liability to sin, was to be sought in the cultivation of the spiritual as 
well as the worldly life. He demanded that we ‘must so train and discipline our-
selves, day after day, that we may rise above things of this world and enter into 
the spirit-world’.12 
11 Damen 1983, 170. Self-Examination as an important practice was by no means confined to 
Keshab alone.  A number of lectures by the Brahmo Shivnath Shastri, who later became one of 
the leaders of a rival branch of the society, was collected and published in 1951 under the head-
ing atma-pariksha (‘Self-Examination’), a term that seems to be of relatively recent origin. The 
first of these lectures carries the title ‘Self-Scrutiny – Through Other’s Eyes and One’s Own’ in the 
English translation by Rajanti Kanta Das. Shastri, 1953.
12 Sen 1904/1877, 373. The term ‘spirit world’ introduced here hints at Keshab’s idea of a separate 
realm that lies beyond ‘worldliness’, in which human beings were able to have immediate inter-
course with ‘Great Men’ (sadhus). This scheme seems to be related to the ever-present heavenly 
realm of Vrindavan, accessible to the devotees by means of raganuga-bhakti sadhana. Howev-
er, it is not possible to discuss this matter in detail here. For the Gaudiya Vaishnava notion of 
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The concrete realisation of the discipline of the self is linked to a cultivation 
of the worldly life by means of ‘ascetism’ (vairagya) and spiritual life by means 
of ‘practice’ (sadhana). Vairagya was a widespread notion in the Indian tradi-
tions with which Keshab interacted. The term is mentioned in the Bhagavad 
Gita, one of most important sources of Krishna-bhakti (Bhagavad Gita 2.47–48, 
see Zaehner 1973, 51), and was also used by Shankara, the foremost thinker of 
Advaita Vedanta (Raveh 2012, 33f.). Whilst it is most commonly translated as 
detachment or non-attachment (Damen 1983, 158), Keshab chose to translate it 
as ‘ascetism’ in his English writings. To prevent misunderstandings, and proba-
bly to distinguish it from samnyasa, the ascetic ideal of the Advaitins, he eagerly 
distances himself from what he calls ‘wrong ascetism’. The renunciation of the 
world, family, and children (i.e. taking samnyasa) he called the ‘absurd and 
mean’ aspects of ascetism, nothing but ‘an error and a sin’, and not more than 
‘pious selfishness’ (Sen 1916/s.d.). The Brahmo Samaj always cultivated the form 
of grihastha-religion, that of householders remaining within the social structures 
of the family. Although Keshab in certain contexts advised some Brahmos to 
distance themselves much more strictly from family and friends than it appears 
here (Sen s.d./1876, 5f.), renouncing the world was in general not an alternative 
to being selfish, greedy, ‘worldly’. There was no way of doing away with social 
duties and ties, even though they could turn out to hinder spiritual development. 
The emphasis on the need for ‘the death of carnal nature’ (Sen 1870/1868, 90) was 
not a merely theoretical issue but, rather, a practical one, although there is clearly 
a connection to the notion of examining and developing the self as advanced by 
the Unitarians, amongst others. 
The community of close followers that Keshab had gathered around him was 
shaken time and again by problems and the misbehaviour of some of its members. 
He had placed on their shoulders the expectation of being a ‘model brotherhood’ 
that would serve as the germ of a social reformation, not only in India but for all 
mankind. However, the actual community fell short of the ideal (Damen 1983, 
157–67). These conflicts can partly be traced back to financial shortfalls, suggest-
ing that the emphasis on ascetism was also a way to turn a time of hardship into 
a virtue. After all, the need to set up strict rules ‘for the subjugation of the carnal 
nature, for the regulation of worldly duties and desires’, and to practice vairagya, 
‘which is only another name for simplicity and austere self-discipline’, became 
 heavenly Vrindavan, see Haberman 1998; for the related set of practices called ‘Pilgrimage to the 
Saints’, see Höke 2015.
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more pressing in the face of what was perceived as ‘the weakness and instability 
which have repeatedly characterised the lives of a great many Brahmos’.13 
While Keshab shared the prevailing estimation of conscience as the highest 
but weakest faculty,14 he shares Carlyle’s call for a complete annihilation of the 
self, which he develops in much more detail. In this regard, it is Jesus Christ that 
sets the example to be followed.15 Turning towards the sayings of Jesus that ‘I 
and my father are one’ (John 10:30) and ‘I am in my father and my father is in me’ 
(John 14:11), he explains that Jesus was devoid of any ‘individuality’. 
These words clearly mean […] nothing more than the highest self-denial. […] Self must be 
extinguished and eradicated completely. Christ said so, and Christ did so. He destroyed self. 
And as self ebbed away, Heaven came pouring into the soul. For, as you all know, nature 
abhors a vacuum, and hence as soon as the soul is emptied of self [sic] Divinity fills the void. 
So was it with Christ.  (Sen 1883, 287f.)
 A similarly radical stance is taken by Keshab in his writing on ‘Objective and 
Subjective Yoga’, a long article that explains his theory of Yoga to his American 
audience, first published in the New York Independent in 1883, shortly before his 
death. He explains that for ‘Vedantic Yoga’ (i.e. Yoga that looks for God in nature) 
‘material is the great obstruction’, whereas in Keshab’s own theory of ‘Subjective 
Yoga’ (i.e. introspective Yoga), the self is the problem that needs to be eradicated 
in order to achieve the union with the Divine: 
This self-abnegation is not merely self-denial or asceticism in the ordinary sense of the term. 
It is not merely the renunciation of carnal pleasures and temporal enjoyments. It is not 
even the highest form of poverty. It is not mere sackcloth and ashes. It is something more. 
The sacrifice it enjoins is far more radical and deep. It is the sacrifice not of self-interest or 
selfishness or self-indulgence, but of self itself. The yogi hates self as an abomination and 
an evil in itself. […] He will have no other salvation than the absorption of I, Mine and Me in 
the godhead. (Sen 1883, 17f.)
It seems that he does not point to the dissolving of the atman in the brahman 
but, rather, to the sense of I-ness (ahamkara) and the ‘I’ (aham). That it would be 
misleading to translate the ‘self itself’ as atman in this context is shown by his 
introductory remarks on the meaning of Yoga: 
13 S.a., ‘Retrospect of the Year’, Theistic Annual 1877, 2. While no author is given, this critical 
estimation was probably written by Pratap Chandra Majumdar, who edited the journal.
14 ‘Our conscience has the right to rule over us, but not the might’. See Sen, 1870/1868, 78.
15 On the peculiar practice of the Sadhu samagamas and their place between the Great Men- 
Theory developed by Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson and Gaudiya Vaishnava prac-
tices, see Höke 2015. On Keshab’s overall conception of Christianity and the meaning of Jesus for 
religious history and practice, see Höke 2018.
1396   Vera Höke
What does yoga literally mean? Union. […] The created soul, in its worldly and sinful condi-
tion, lives separated and estranged from the Supreme Soul. A reconciliation is needed; nay, 
more than a reconciliation. A harmonious union is sought and realized. This union with 
Deity is the real secret of Hindu yoga. It is spiritual unification; it is a consciousness of two 
in one: duality in unity.  (Sen 1883, 1f.) 
The unity thus remains a duality; the atman remains separate from the divine. 
The absorption of ‘I, Mine and Me in the godhead’ does not suspend the relation-
ship of worshipper and the worshipped. It should be noted here that there is a 
movement between and on the edge of Western and Indian philosophical streams 
of thought. The balance of character as aimed for according to the widespread 
paradigm of faculty psychology is being connected to vairagya. In trying to make 
‘ascetism’ a workable translation, it had to be distanced from samnyasa. The 
complete annihilation of the self as a preparatory step leading to the union with 
the divine is, for Sen, exemplified by no one else than Jesus Christ. This union, 
however, is one in which the duality of man and divine remains. Interweaving 
elements of the Indian and Western frames of reference, the usage of Western and 
Indian terminology to structure not only the religious argument but also actual 
practices in the community of Brahmos leads to a new understanding of both 
the Western and the Indian sources. Sadhana, religious practice as a ‘method of 
realization’ (Haberman 1988, 7), is another of those indigenous terms that are 
combined with Western ideas16 but that also leads far beyond the confines of the 
imagination of Western authors.
The necessity of developing a cultivated, well-mannered, self in society was the 
foundation upon which the shared intellectual discourses of the United Kingdom, 
North America, and India were based. In the nineteenth century, the notion of the 
‘self’ was a key concept that was explicitly reflected upon and debated. The indi-
vidual did not only bear a substantial amount of personal responsibility, interwo-
ven with recurring elements of divine grace, but also had potentials that could 
and should be realised by self-cultivation. ‘Self-interest’ was deemed a necessary 
driving impulse, albeit only when tamed and subdued by the nobler faculties. In 
Calcutta, this strain of thought was integrated into a reading of Advaita Vedanta 
by members of the Tattvabodhini Sabha, many of whom would later become 
Brahmos. In the 1830s, when the Bengali bhadralok were still mostly successful 
entrepreneurs, this served to legitimise their new-found social status, as well as 
their entrepreneurial activities. In the 1870s, when the fate of many of those who 
16 The Indian concept of sadhana was central for the practical side of religion within both the 
New Dispensation and the Brahmo Samaj of India from the 1870s onwards. Introducing sadhana 
as a novel feature in one of their newspapers, the Brahmos, tellingly, translated it as ‘self-culture’ 
in 1876. See Indian Mirror, Sunday Edition, 24.09.1876, 1.
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considered themselves as bhadralok had changed, with their lives becoming more 
precarious, self-interest was downgraded in the view of the Brahmo Samaj of 
India and the Church of the New Dispensation. Although the discourse remained 
centred on the self and the constant examination of one’s own behaviour was con-
ducted more scrupulously than ever, self-interest was something to be overcome 
and annihilated. While not allowing for a complete withdrawal from worldly 
duties, Keshab Chandra Sen cultivated an attitude of indifference towards worldly 
successes as well as disappointments. It was not coincidental that the emphasis 
on self-examination emerged at a time of trouble within his small community, it 
rather emerged as a solution to specific organisational problems and unrest. In 
contrast to how the self was discussed in the United Kingdom and America, in Cal-
cutta these discussions became entangled with rival ideas, of being in or retreat-
ing from the world, that were peculiar to India. Practices of  self-construction were 
related to Indian philosophical discourses; the discourse of the self thus became 
entangled with a more ontological perspective that focused on the relation 
between humans and the divine. The Brahmo Samaj shared an abstract, imper-
sonal notion of the divine with Advaita Vedanta. Unlike the latter, however, the 
Brahmos considered the relationship between man and divine as that between 
worshipper and worshipped. This approach overlapped with the bhakti-attitude 
of the Gaudiya Vaishnavas, a tradition which gained importance in the 1870s and 
particularly in the area of spiritual self-cultivation. However, despite calling for 
an immediate encounter with the divine, this encounter was informed by different 
canons of tradition, on the edge of which the Brahmos developed their own ideas. 
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Afterword: walking the edges
Our section looks at different religious constellations in a variety of historical 
and cultural contexts and the way in which individual actors within them seek 
their path to the Divine, God, or Wisdom (Facchini, Mersch, Haas, Höke), or seek 
to restore religious legality to their marginalised position as a deposed pope 
and justification of remaining in the office in terms of religious law (Mueller- 
Schauenburg). Contributions in this section embrace different historical periods 
and contexts, including the Latin Christian Middle Ages, Christians and Jews 
of the early modern period from Northern Europe to the Ottoman Empire, and 
the modern period that connects continental Europe, Great Britain, India 
and the United States. This selection implies that we are dealing with very dif-
ferent notions of “religion” and equally different concepts of the individual self 
or non-individual self. 
Despite the huge differences in historical and cultural contexts, our chapters 
share common features: they all deal with case studies that move on the sideways 
of the mainstream. They deal with religious minorities, excluded or expelled 
people, but also with exceptional cases and splinter groups. In different ways 
all of these walk the edges, either of one or between several religions, cultures or 
geographical regions. 
Two chapters address medieval Latin Christianity. Katharina Mersch deals 
with two different forms of exclusion: one leading the Christian soul away from 
society and God (excommunicates), and one from society towards God (monks, 
nuns and others). This process pushes individuals or groups to the edges of 
Christian society. This also holds true for Britta Müller-Schauenburg’s case study, 
which deals with Benedict XIII, an antipope during the Western schism (1378–
1417). While sticking to the authority of his office, he was abandoned by the main 
body of the church. 
Cristiana Facchini analyses religious enthusiasm in the seventeenth century, 
a phenomenon that affected Protestant, Catholic and Jew alike. If Jews were on 
the edge of both Christian and Muslims societies, their diaspora interacted with a 
common tradition of sacred texts that supported the idea of prophetism or pneu-
matic experiences. In the case of Christian groups, pneumatic experiences were 
always deemed dangerous, as they were often performed by people who would 
be persecuted or marginalised, as in the case of Quakers and ‘revulsionnaires’. 
Prophetism, and therefore ‘spirit possession’ had always been conceived as a 
challenge to established religious communities and norms. 
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The chapters by Cornelia Haas and Vera Höke address cases in which histor-
ical actors walked on the edges between several religions, aiming for a harmo-
nious whole based on an eclectic synthesis of their parts. Keshab Chandra Sen 
(1838–1884), a leader of the Bengali religious movement called Brahmo Samaj, 
aimed for an eclectic universal religion. His approach was not only informed by 
Western Unitarianism and Transcendentalism but also by Indian philosophical 
and religious sources. The Theosophical Movement, founded in 1875 in New York, 
represents in itself a cosmopolitan fringe-phenomenon, based mainly on litera-
ture, avant garde spirituality and spiritualism.
Furthermore, all religious groups described here – laity, clerical, and religious 
minorities – developed a dialectal relationship between the search for a special 
(and individualised) contact with the Divine and the interaction with the social 
realm. Secondly, strong tendencies to question a given authority are evident. The 
value of tradition is a common topic of discussion, often via – or resulting in – 
restorative ideas. Tradition is necessarily taken up in a selective way and always 
remains ambivalent. Thirdly, the phenomena observed can be described by a 
threefold terminology of a) exclusion, b) inclusion, and c) seclusion (solitude). 
a) By exclusion we mean, on the one hand, all those practices that aim to ban 
‘deviant’ individuals from the “true” community of believers, the “body of 
Christ”, and the collective memory (Mersch, Müller-Schauenburg). On the 
other hand, social exclusion enhanced many forms of religious individual-
isation that might eventually support the rise of new religious communities 
(Facchini). In the case study of the Theosophical Movement, exclusion might 
be supportive of the endorsement of a new authoritative set of rules, as can be 
seen by Helena Blavatsky’s forming of the esoteric section, which addresses 
only ‘true adepts’ (Haas). 
b) By inclusion we mean paths that lead to the construction of a new type of 
community in which the believers are integrated through the means of a 
new relationship with the Divine within a different social setting (Facchini, 
Mersch). Alternatively, inclusion might also refer to the inclusion of new 
sources within the canon of traditions referred to by a community, merging 
them with other sources to form a unified whole in which the boundaries 
between “old” and “new”, “own” and “others’”, are no longer easily discern-
able (Facchini, Haas, Höke). 
c) By seclusion we denote the willing separation of one or a few individuals 
either from the main religious body or from worldly affairs.  Alternatively, 
it can indicate the way a group of believers leave another group in order to 
profess a higher truth. Seclusion implies always a choice about space and 
the selection of ascetic, sometimes bodily, practices (Facchini, Höke, Mersch, 
Mueller-Schauenburg). For example, contemplation was set apart from 
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common places. This withdrawal is not necessarily physical. In the case of 
religious enthusiasm, Jews sought ‘mystical experiences’ in specific, identi-
fied places, such as the graves of holy men. In Fox’s narrative, God does not 
dwell in ‘dreadful places’ (churches) but lies within the heart of every man 
and woman (Facchini). In the case of Benedict XIII, the abandoned person 
shows a remarkable attitude of detachment from the struggle of power 
(Müller-Schauenburg).
Seclusion may also be regarded as a way to contextualise traditional 
models of seclusion, insisting on the importance of remaining in the world, 
and amongst worldly affairs, instead of renouncing it. Thus, the Brahmo 
Samaj aimed for a “householder” religion (grihastha), calling radical forms 
of ascetism (samnyasa) sinful (Höke).
These terms are related to the relationship of the individual towards God, as well 
as the relationship of the individual towards society or the social realm. This 
already shows that the distinction that we advance here is artificial and only 
useful for clarifying our perspective, as all the aspects mentioned are actually 
closely interrelated. 
The ideas of the self that are articulated within our case studies are often 
rather broken or fragmented (Facchini, Hoeke). They might even lead to an out-
right rejection of a personal, visible self, which can be expressed by anonymity 
or a call for “impersonality” (Haas, Mersch, Mueller-Schauenburg). Some of the 
practices described in these chapters also imply an elitist attitude to the search for 
the Divine or religious tradition. Walking the edges is not a model for the masses.
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